 My name is Sam Tangredi, and I have the, here at the War College, I have a very grandiose title of being Lido's Chair of Future Warfare Studies and Professor of National, Naval, and Maritime Strategy. We are on the research side, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, that bridge, the walking bridge, is not too far for you to walk over and visit us. And particularly when you all take the Halsey Group Elective or Maritime Advanced Warfare Program. I have the great pleasure of being the moderator of an outstanding panel, and our topic is the future security environment, looking at it broadly and strategically. And my main job, however, today, right now is self-restraint. I have many, I've been working AI as a main research project. I have many things that I agree with Peter Singer and things I don't agree with Peter Singer. And the one thing that you should take away from the War College is that every issue has two sides. And you're gonna have to think, think, or more than two sides, you're gonna have to think about and study about and turn your mind around to see the opposite point of view. Recently, my research has been going in the direction, no longer AI is direction of de-globalization, de-digitalization, network optional warfare, because I think we're gonna see that after you've been hacked into your online backing account has been hacked into for the sixth time, you're gonna walk over to the Navy Federal Credit Union branch next to the exchange to do your banking. So let me introduce the panel. They have full introductions in the program, but we're gonna have two speakers that are coming virtually and of course, two speakers are here. Our first speaker is gonna be Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Orders, Australian Regular Army, although now he is working at the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense Development Concepts and Doctrine Center, and they have a small group that looks at the future security environment and they put together a very useful publication, not novelized like David Singer's work, but looks kinda like this, it's called Global Strategic Trends and it's an outstanding publication, this is sixth edition, they periodically update it and it's an interesting thing for us in the US to look at because you get a different view of this future security environment than our own from an ally. So Ryan's a military engineer, he's deployed to Timor-Leste, Thailand, Malaysia and also worked with a provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan and if I recall rightly, our president also commanded a provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan so there is commons, allies working together. Our next speaker is gonna be Mr. Jeffrey Becker. He's from Joint Staff J7 and he is the lead writer on what is called the Joint Operating Environment, looks kinda looks like this and it is the view of the future that is worked into the national military strategy, it's kinda Chairman's view of the future, they do it a variety of ways, Jeff has been working on that since its conception back when it was a task of JIFCOM. Next we are going to have Ms. Catherine Sendak. She has very unique background because recently she was the director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy but prior to that, she worked as a professional staffer in Congress for the House Armed Services Committee and then once for the Senate Armed Services Committee so that is a unique view that she's gonna present and then finally we're gonna have Mr. John Barter. John is from the United Kingdom but he is now Vice President of what I consider the most prestigious think tank closest to Ukraine which is Globus, it's in Bratislava, Slovakia, they run the Bratislava Forum which is where Prime Ministers Eastern Europe, all of Europe come to so he has a unique perspective. However, they are experts in their field, however, they are also human. Ryan Orders is a cyclist and in his next leave he plans on cycling part of the Tour de France circuit so that's a good luck for them. Jeff Becker is an avid hiker and recently in his last leave he climbed the third highest mountain there in the United Kingdom which is Helvellen, Helvellen, Helvellen and then he's gonna take on the first highest, I'm sure, soon. Katie Becker is an avid tennis fan and was able this year to see all four of the Grand Slam events, the Wimbledon, US Open, Australia Open, and French Open and I'm betting that she's a very good tennis player when she steps on the court. And finally, just a bit about John Barter, he's two cycles, he once cycled from Monte Carlo all the way back to the UK. I didn't ask him and say, is that because you lost all your money at Monte Carlo and had a pedal back? But after 40 years he's getting back into kayaking and since he told me, he says, modern kayaks don't have any soul. So he decided to build his own, take the boat building course and build his own. So these are the people we're gonna hear from and they are experts in their field and the first one I'm gonna turn over to is Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Orders. Right. Good day, Senator. And look, thanks very much for inviting me to talk with you all today. And straight off, I actually did my cycling tour just before I came here and let's just say I have a better appreciation for professional cyclists than I did before doing it. My efforts were left a lot to be desired. But anyway, today I wanted to discuss a couple of perspectives about the future security environment that I think are important, but also I hope to provide a point of view that differs in some way to what you may have heard before which aligns with Sam's sort of open points there. And I did this deliberately because when we look at the future, one of the biggest risks is that we get to a point where we view the future with a high level of confidence and certainty because this will leave us open to surprise. So when it comes to the future, there's two things I am confident about. The first is that we can't predict what's going to happen but the second is that whatever the future does look like, the world will be different to the one we know and understand today. So with that in mind, when looking at the future security environment, my team focuses on what drives change and therefore how can we prepare for and shape the future in consideration of that? Great Power Competition is one of those drivers and I'll talk briefly to that now and an aspect of that in how middle powers can influence this. So usually when we say Great Power Competition, the first thing that comes to mind is that of the competition between the United States and China. About a year ago when I talked on this, I started by using the phrase that whilst China lacks friends, the US has enemies to spare. And look, this was my short way of describing what I saw as the major challenge that both countries faced. We're potentially moving to a future where deterrence for conflict is centered on stable and strong alliances but achieving this is actually really difficult to do. And as we've seen recently in Europe, alliances can strengthen and change in the future but it's usually in response to an event not as an action to deter. The US China competition is no doubt front and center for us but we need to be cautious of limiting our thinking to these two nations. Most of the world doesn't want to and indeed it doesn't actually have to choose between the United States and China and if you are most of the world, then you make up a third choice. Now the reason this third choice has become more prominent is that many countries have and will continue to move into a developed status or the middle income bracket. And this gives them greater influence on the global stage whilst also enabling them to be more assertive in defending their own national interests. The result for powers like the United States or China is that their ability to dominate world issues may diminish in the face of multiple influential middle powers and this is actually likely to be a good thing for global security. Over the past few decades, the US has been the global hegemon and this is starting to change with other powers competing more regularly with it. A multi-polar world is potentially more stable than a bipolar world that's focused on a competing US and Chinese interest. I think an important aspect then for great power competition is considering what countries may make that third choice and what that might mean for us whilst recognizing that if our goal is stability and to avoid conflict, then it's okay. Indeed, it's even advantageous for us to have countries that don't align with either the US or Chinese views. And at this point, I would like to highlight India as one of the key countries to watch in the future. So India is a country that has an historical non-aligned position and it tries to maintain ties to multiple different countries concurrently. India is also a growing economic and technology power. And will soon be the world's most populous nation and this will see it have the largest growth for energy demand of any country over the next 20 years. Where it sits geographically, a quarter of the world's population is on its borders. It remains the largest democracy but it also has domestic proto-Hindu policies that are often at odds with Islamic populations. And this is occurring at a time when Islam will grow to be on par with Christianity as the two most followed religions over the next few decades. So consequently, India's actions will be critical a critical part of great power competition in the future but which way it goes is really uncertain. The importance of India though leads to broader considerations particularly in relation to the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific is of high global importance and attention today and it will continue to be. Half of the world live there but currently attention is focused primarily within the Pacific. And we would like, not we would like, we foresee that this will start to shift towards the Indian Ocean more so. And it's necessary to recognize that the Indian and Pacific oceans are different and maintaining a single strategy or approach for both areas may not necessarily be ideal. If there is a large shift to the Indian Ocean, the relative importance of the East Coast of Africa will increase and this may provide a range of opportunities for those coastal African countries to capitalize on or conversely be taken advantage of. There is a risk though that great power competition in the Indian Ocean could further destabilize Africa by creating a new divide on the continent. Now, I want to change tack for my next point by talking about a global driver of change that is occurring that I think is significant but doesn't get the airtime it currently deserves. And this driver of change is in regards to human population. For almost all human existence our population has been growing and indeed for the last couple of centuries it's been expanding rapidly. Our modern lives, our economies, our governments everything we understand today is built on a premise of continued human population growth. We've already seen the first countries to reach peaks in population that's been led by Japan but it's also evident in Russia, Europe and soon to be China and South Korea amongst others. This peak in population is going to be experienced on the global scale over the next few decades and each country on earth will be faced with this challenge. Demographic changes like reaching a peak in population is one that is experienced gradually and so becomes a risk to inaction as it creeps up on countries. When we combine population peaks with other trends such as increased life expectancy it means our populations will age and dependency will shift from large youthful groups to large elderly groups. Our country's experience or adapt to this demographic transition could be a significant aspect of great power competition that ultimately influences global power dynamics. Whilst this is a relatively new phenomenon different countries will deal with it in their own ways and they'll be based on their cultural norms their governance mechanisms and their economic options. Some of the changes we're likely to see though as a result could be an acceleration of automation technology to increase work productivity. We're likely to see improvements in the quality of life into old age that actually alters our perspective of what it means to be elderly and this will be driven by investments in healthcare. There's potential for increased global competition for humans as a resource of labour and their skills and knowledge and governments or non-government organisations will increasingly be involved in social welfare programs. It's difficult to infer what may happen to global power dynamics because of these demographic changes. On the one hand, it's likely that wealthy nations will be able to adapt more readily than others primarily through technology advances and this could be to their advantage. Conversely, many poorer nations, particularly in Africa will continue to see population growth out to the end of this century and this pool of labour may provide them an advantage in the longer term future. I recently read a future study from around the year 2000 and that talked about the world in 2025 and it said some things that I've seen repeated in just about every futures paper since and that's that populations are growing, we are urbanising, we are aging. A growing population has been a historical fact and so ingrained in us that we may not have considered the alternative that our population won't grow indefinitely and indeed on current predictions from the United States a United Nations question our world's population could peak by around 2060. Look, that concludes the points I want to raise today. I appreciate when we come to questions you may have a broader area you want to discuss I'm happy to contribute to that where I can. Within my organisation in the UK we look at the global future which is an all-encompassing beast but my personal areas of focus are on the future of society and the future of the Indo-Pacific region so if you do have questions related to that I'm happy to take them. Thank you for your time and I'll pass back to you Sam. Much. Now we turn over to Jeff. Thank you and although this panel is titled Future Security Environment the context for these discussions in my mind is really about the military implications of the future security environment after all we're here together at a military war college so in my remarks really are gonna be overwhelmingly concerned with the meaning of strategic change in the future security environment for the structure and for the function of the Navy and for the joint forces as a whole. To this end I'd like to talk a little bit about the changing character of war how we see it changing in the joint staff of the importance of deep futures thinking despite the inherent difficulties in doing so and about the need for military officers to maintain a relentless focus on the conduct of warfare with a full set of potential military tools and to think about that in the context of potential future operating environments and moreover I'd like to connect up this idea with the idea of disruptive military change and disruptive change more generally because it's really in the doing and in the operating that that disruption occurs not necessarily in any specific technologies or in the strokes of a grand strategist in Washington DC or elsewhere as we talk through the change in the future security environment I'd like you to think about the meaning of the changes we're talking about for both your service, for your place in it and based on your understanding of the future security environment what will your service need to do and be? What's it for and how does it fit inside this larger joint team? So to get into this headspace I'd like to first pose a question to you over the next couple of days we're gonna hear about a multitude of we already have about a multitude of dynamic and very challenging changes to the security environment disruption, transformation, discontinuity all those words feature pretty strongly in our discussions however if the future really is about disruption if it's about discontinuity if it's about complexity why is it important for us as military professionals to think about long-term military change at all? The future be it two years in the future be it two decades can really be a long time and although a great deal can change what I'd like to do is first anchor our thinking and a few things I think we can really assume as we look forward into the future and the first of those is that the future security environment is going to see war war as an application of organized political violence is gonna remain an enduring feature of the human condition and although war endures the methods employed in it the character of war is always evolving and it's always changing second understanding how warfare changes doesn't come naturally and it doesn't come easily and attempts to predict it with any accuracy or difficult and for that reason warfare often resembles as the great British strategist Colin Gray once put it a race between belligerents to correct the mistaken beliefs which with a entered conflict third despite an overwhelming failure to predict doesn't excuse us as military professionals from considering the demands of future warfare closely examining changes in the future security environment expands our understanding of the scope of future problems of possible problems and helps us really develop an appreciation for the implications of change for how we'll need to build and fight the joint force in the future so although we can't effectively predict the future we can prepare for what comes next better and Admiral Nimitz for example noted that the Navy has seen all elements of the war with Japan during the war plan orange wargaming efforts in the 40 plus years prior all except the kamikaze which was new and that vast and sustained effort over many years paid dividends preparing the Navy well for what would come and I posed to you that we're gonna need to be doing those same sorts of things today so to look into the deep future effectively thinkers really have to strike a delicate balance between two competing dynamics that I call credibility on one hand and inspiration on the other and what I mean by this is that any view of the future security environment has to be anchored and grounded in a good understanding of what's actually possible we need to understand critical trends it'll be decisive and measure the pace and of those changes that are gonna push us forward that credibility however has to be coupled with enough courage and with enough open-mindedness to step outside of some of our certitudes and some of our assumptions and imagine a very challenging and even counterintuitive conditions that might alter our world in fundamental ways this is what the inspiration side of the equation is really about tomorrow's not gonna be like today only more so but it will be different and surprising and sometimes transformative ways and good military futuring really strikes a convincing balance between credibility and inspiration but what convinces me might not convince you as well and in my experience everybody's dial for those two ideas is set very differently some gravitate to the more tangible more credible side of the equation others are able to see patterns and convergences that aren't readily apparent however it's in that dialogue between those two forces that we really get a better understanding of the future and what we as the joint force is gonna need to consider as we move out so as we move into this a little more concretely what I'd like to talk about is a little bit of the idea of the sources of disruptive change given this let's try and take a credible yet inspired look into the future of military change and I really see three major factors in the changing in the character of warfare that'll make us rethink how we use military power in the future security environment and the first of these is a little counterintuitive but it's that warfare is gonna see more separation separation between advanced military powers and second and third tier military forces but that separation is not only between different militaries but also within them as high end military forces become increasingly incompatible with larger mass industrial scale formations so again that separation and stratification of military power within and across militaries and the second is that accelerating and compounding technological breakthroughs have the potential to enable rapid military transformation to those militaries that sees them and can integrate them and effectively within their formations that military change is gonna be spiky and accelerate rapidly in different sort of technology domains and isn't occurring uniformly across them third is that warfare and this is the most interesting one for me is that warfare is really gonna see more variation as militaries develop increasingly divergent military capabilities, doctrine and concepts and I draw your attention to for example the Chinese strategic support force which is a military service that man trains and equips and fights information space, cyber and information warfare into a single service that supports the other services which is an innovation, maybe right, maybe wrong but it induces some variety in the way that the Chinese are attempting to build their military forces and that's gonna be important in a second and I'll hopefully convince you why that's important so those changes in the character of war don't necessarily determine who wins and the current war in Ukraine really illustrates this but they do however tell us some important things about the character of those wars how those wars are gonna unfold for example there's a higher risk of strategic and military surprise as well as an increased risk of miscalculation as militaries don't have a good understanding of how the wide range of advancing technologies and operational approaches will behave when they actually clash something that perhaps we're seeing on the battlefields of Eastern Europe as we speak second is that deterrence both at the nuclear and conventional levels will be harder to sustain particularly when you think about that multi-domain sort of aspect of warfare and when you're bringing new domains into both nuclear deterrence and that sort of thing and that's some of the impetus you're seeing behind ideas such as integrated deterrence that are currently working but third you're gonna also see declining interoperability between increasingly divergent military forces again both within militaries but also within them this is especially troublesome for the US as we typically work with a wide range of partners around the world during operations so something that separation we're gonna have to sort of think hard about that so given those changes in the character of war you know what do they mean for the US military and I think there are three major themes that we can discern that you'll encounter and we'll need to think through and the first of those is that the joint force will be contested globally we're gonna face long range battle networks enabled by advanced sensors that are reaching out farther than ever before AI enabled battle management mobile power projection forces covered by long range missile fires from an adversary's homeland and also ways to attack the US homeland to slow or halt the global movement of the joint force the second of those big themes is adversaries will apply military force in ways to fracture and disintegrate the joint force and defeat its elements in detail adversaries that really recognize the importance of network command and control for joint operations and there's hardly a single joint concept or joint idea that doesn't feature the notion of integration and networking as the fundamental element of the solution and adversaries have really noticed this and as such, the joint force is really gonna have to find ways to operate and fight despite those intensifying efforts to disrupt our unity of effort during operations and the third of these is that the joint force risk being outflanked in an expanded competitive space as adversaries avoid engaging the joint force directly and route around it and to disrupt opposing societies by opening new avenues of pressure or influence to achieve their aims so together these changes really suggest a future in which there are significant challenges to complicate the ability of the joint forces that's currently conceived to address threats to the US and its interests and unaddressed the joint force out to 2040 risk this elevated risk of surprise and danger of an outright battlefield defeat so I've presented you with a whole series of problems there's a lot of detail underneath each of those problems but there are also some that if you go with me at that level there may be a way forward to how we think about structuring the joint force at the highest levels and so what ways of operating are really gonna work in that environment? A few of those attributes of a future joint force that the Navy will need to be a part of is to be successful in this environment for example the US will need forces and capabilities that are able to exert early resistance to adversary actions both globally, regionally and locally by being capable of splitting apart to avoid threats and coming together to mass combat power where needed. The joint force is gonna be able to develop efficient lethality the ability to strike and destroy for the lowest cost at scale at the longest potential ranges and this may mean a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to defeat and disrupt long range sensor networks and the reconnaissance strike capabilities along which adversary long range strike relies and the joint force in the nation must be able to operate with long-term endurance both to deter and to fight if the ongoing interstate conflict in the Ukraine has really taught us anything it's that reinforced loud and clear that great power conflict is vastly lethal to human beings to equipment and people will be killed and material destroyed and expanded in great numbers. The joint force needs the raw industrial capacity behind it as well as the mass logistics support and repair and reconstitution capabilities required to stay in the fight but also convince the adversary that we can stay in the fight and this is the same whether or not we're building the most exquisite, largest, most expensive aircraft carriers and submarines or robotic swarms that need to be replaced over and over again we need the mass industrial capacity to keep those mass forces in the field. So with that, I think those are the types of general attributes that I would sort of expect for a future joint force to be able to operate in that conception of the future security environment and I'd expect that kind of joint force to be able to lower the risk of surprise to complicate enemy planning efforts and their confidence that early strikes and attempted fate accompli would be successful and to be able to both avoid and to take a punch and to throw those punches and to be able to continue the fight and we need to think hard about that about the ability of the United States as a whole to engage in long-term conflict and to convince the adversary that we can as well. So that's the end of my prepared remarks and I'll turn it back over. Thank you Jeff and now we go over to Katie. Thank you so much. Good morning. Thank you all so much for having me here. This is my first time to the Naval War College. It seems like a pretty good place to come to school every day. So I hope you all enjoy your year very much. As was mentioned before, I'm gonna take a hard turn from joint staff and I'm here to talk to you about congressional viewpoints on the future security environment. I had the pleasure of working on the Hill for about 13 years. Many of those as a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee and that's where I got my chops on European regional policy, which then I took to the Pentagon. So I'm not gonna talk a ton about Ukraine. I'm gonna talk a little bit about it but welcome questions on that situation moving forward as well. So from the early days of my career on the Hill, starting in the Senate, I realized very quickly that national security is one big giant puzzle and every piece of the puzzle plays a very, very important part of moving us in the direction to create security and stability, not only for ourselves but for our partners and allies. And very quickly I learned that in order for me to be better and better at my job, I needed to learn how all of those pieces fit together. So I've taken it upon myself over the course of the last 20 years or so to sample and see how all of these different aspects fit together. So I've had some Hill time. I've had some Pentagon time. I'm currently at a nonprofit business executives for national security which allows the private sector to offer insights and recommendations to members of the national security community free of charge to give best business practices which has been a very interesting concept. I've also done some nonprofit work as well. And that all being said, I started my very first job in the Senate in 2004 and my goodness, have we seen some changes in the future security environment and current security environment. And I've spent a lot of time thinking about how all of this fits together. So I'm gonna take you from a congressional perspective. Congress, thank goodness this is Chatham House. Congress for many, especially in the Department of Defense is that thing you just don't touch. And if you're asked to go up there, you keep yes and no answers and then you turn around and you go back to work. I'm here to say it's not that scary. There's a lot of really good material going up on the hill. Congress likes to pride themselves that they're here to help. Sometimes they do and sometimes they don't. But I wanna take you through kind of three main themes that I think Congress brings uniquely to the future and security environment conversation that will hopefully help you all kind of understand how that piece of it fits into what you do every day both here and where you go next. The first thing is, what can Congress uniquely bring to the conversation that perhaps the executive branch and other pieces of the national security community can't? Looking back on my time on the hill, Congress has access to perspectives and insights that a lot of people don't really get on a usual basis. They get asked for a lot of meetings with a lot of different groups, NGOs, think tanks, partner nations, opposition parties from different Congresses and parliaments throughout the world. That has a lot of advantages and disadvantages. You wanna make sure that the information you're receiving is accurate, you take everything with the grain of salt. But it allows a very different perspective about the needs around the world and the needs of our own domestic concerns as it relates to national security. So they come to the table of conversations very differently than I would say a lot of people in the executive branch. And that changes the tone and the flavor of the conversation to some respect. To that point, and I'm very thankful for Speaker Pelosi doing a trip right before and while I'm here. Diplomacy, it's not a very automatic thing that people understand that Congress actually plays a huge diplomatic role internationally. Maybe you all in previous posts have had to deal with staff delegations and congressional delegations in different countries. Let me go ahead and apologize, I know they're horrible to plan and execute and we appreciate it. But they're vitally important and those members that go on those delegations, they carry messages, they carry perspectives, they carry opinions and they carry leverage to bring home and use in their job day to day. The reverse of that is reverse diplomacy and we were just talking about this this morning. You know, there are countries that understand the system by which America runs. And they take it upon it very seriously. If they have been the benefactor of assistance and help and support from the United States, they are savvy at appealing to the people that they know, write the authorities and write the checks. And, you know, we can call it lobbying, but advocacy from a reverse diplomatic perspective is hugely important on the Hill. And I'm sure sitting around here, you all can name the countries that are probably really, really good at it and you would be right. And it is fundamentally important because from that perspective in a reverse diplomacy, they're also, Congress is also hearing a unique perspective that perhaps those countries aren't sharing with the White House or the executive branch. So it's just something to keep in mind that they bring a different flavor to the conversation. The next thing I'll come out is it's a little alliterative so I apologize, but policy, parochial issues and pet projects. Policy is something that Congress has taken upon itself and takes it very seriously and does it to varying degrees of success. And I think something that is hard perhaps for the executive branch to understand is that Congress in its oversight role has taken on a role of driving policy, especially as it relates to the National Defense Authorization Act, which I'm sure you all read word by word every year. All 1100 pages of it. And it is something that Congress can take risk with. So, you know, there's multiple bites at an apple in the National Defense Authorization Act. I'll just use that as an example because that's my background. Members of Congress have, I would say, five to seven opportunities to throw ideas at the National Defense Authorization Act every year since we do this every year. And they kind of sometimes throw things at the wall and see what sticks. They have an issue. They have a policy change they'd like to see. They have an authority that they'd like to implement. And that policy drive sometimes differs from what the administration would like to see happen and the example I'll use is the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. So, I had the honor of helping craft that legislation back in 2015 and it's, you know, I will say for us kind of mid-career people to see something you started and to see its implementation and its execution is something that I take a lot of pride in. When the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative was written bipartisanly, it called for the provision of lethal defensive assistance to Ukraine. This was in 2015. The Obama administration at the time did not want to supply lethal assistance to Ukraine, but members of Congress sure did. So every single year in the National Defense Authorization Act from 2015 onwards, not only did they authorize the use of providing lethal assistance to Ukraine, we fenced off money for it too. And if that money didn't get used for lethal assistance, there were a lot of hoops people had to go through in order to use that money. The Obama administration chose not to pursue that authority for the rest of the term. And then in about the first year of the Trump administration, they made a policy decision to implement it and started providing lethal defensive assistance. I use that as an example because that is Congress taking its role and trying to drive policy change and force that decision on to an administration and the president. That happens all the time, but given what's going on today and giving the kind of support and assistance we're currently giving Ukraine, I thought it was a good example of showing you that there is a driver there in Congress and it doesn't always align with the administration. It doesn't, and not even on party, it doesn't always align with the interests and how the current administration takes it. Perochial issues. So it gets a bad rap, but there are reasons that members of Congress are elected and members of Congress are elected because they want to represent their constituency well. And they have an obligation to the people that elect them. And so Perochial issues, especially as it relates to future security environment and defense moving forward, is most prominently basing or where your people are, where your jobs are or economic factors. And those all play a very, very important role. There's a balance to be had there. They won't get reelected unless they help these people out. And that's kind of the role that they play. So they have to balance that with the conversations and the understanding of the actual national security environment and the needs and the needs of our country. And so again, that brings a different conversation to how do we approach things? And I'm sure you all have seen, as the best example, things like BRAC. Some people were winners and some people were losers, but that is something that was heavily Perochial, in essence. And those issues will continue to arise both again, for the good and the bad. And then I'll touch up quickly on pet projects. So it's interesting, especially in the Senate, I found, you know, when it gets back to the fact that they're six year terms, members of the Senate, senators can actually become usually subject matter experts in something. They have time when they're sitting in that office to really hone in on an issue. I had the pleasure of working for John Warner, making rest in peace. But he was at one point the secretary of the Navy and as a senator from the great state of Virginia, focused tremendously on the Navy and shipbuilding was considered a subject matter expert in US shipbuilding. And that was something that he honed both before and during his term in Congress. Pet projects range from platforms, to domestic issues, to humanitarian issues, to regional issues. Senator Inhofe, the current chairman of the Senate arm, excuse me, ranking member of the Senate arm services committee is a huge Africa proponent. And people are usually very surprised at that. You have Rep Turner, Mike Turner from the great state of Ohio who is tremendously involved in Balkans issues. It doesn't hurt that the Dayton Accords for the Balkans were signed in Dayton, Ohio. But that really ranges, it goes from everywhere, as I said, from HR and personnel issues, to sexual assault, and you name it. And these members take on these pet projects and push agendas. Again, for mostly I would say, in my viewpoint and what I've seen for the benefit, you highlight issues that maybe people in the department aren't highlighting or aren't paying attention to, which down the road can be further worsen or better. And so it's very interesting that these pet projects sometimes again get a bad rap and understandably so, but really drive conversations that perhaps the department should be having that they aren't having at the current time. And then I'll close on number three, which is again, more peas, I don't know how this happens, but there's a push and pull. And I think I've kind of laid that out for you. There's the push from Congress to up the defense budget, which both committees just did by a lot. There's the push to provide authorities and assistance and topics that perhaps the department doesn't wanna spend time on. On the other side, there's a push to perhaps keep going on long-term legacy platforms that the military would really like to retire and Congress says not yet. And those again, good and bad. There's also the pull. The administration and the department and the executive branch need Congress and pull them to where they need to be because they understand without money and authorities, they're not gonna be able to execute mission. And so that balance and that culture balance and that difference, that natural tension that occurs between the legislative branch and the executive branch is fundamentally important to how we do business in this country and in government. And it shouldn't be discounted and it shouldn't be thrown away as it's just a problem. It is absolutely vital that things are identified from both perspectives and addressed. And that natural tension, I think predominantly from what I've seen over the years produces better policy and better ability to address a security environment moving forward. And I will leave it there and welcome your questions. Thank you very much, Katie. I just, something that struck me is seeing if Peter Singer could turn your legislative package into useful fiction. Now we're gonna turn over to John Bard. Greetings from Bradislava, everybody. I hope you can hear me. Obviously it's a great honor to be speaking at this symposium. And as you may have gathered from the notes and Sam's introduction, I'm British. I'm effectively an economic migrant or Brexit migrant living in central Europe. I'm on my third career in the think tank world. And I'm in an organization which really wants to make a difference. There's about 70 of us of 14 nationalities and the average age is 27. So I'm basically the diversity hire. So in the think tanks, we can spend too much time thinking, definitely too much time talking and not enough time tanking. So today with a short slot, I'm definitely gonna be tanking through this. Now, what I'd like to do is to take you on a short journey. So we're gonna do a short visit to Ukraine. And I need to mention that Ukraine is very personal for us for Globsec. Many of us have been evacuating family and friends or colleagues from the war. We now have 11 Ukrainians on the team who are working in Globsec to really set the agenda and shape Ukraine's future. And that is actually funded from the US. So a big thank you for that. We then like to move from NATO's Eastern flank and discuss some of the perceptions, challenges, the commitment and the impact of the war. I'd like to say what I've talked about going back to the future. 1985 was when the movie was made. It's a period when I was a, in the fourth year as a commissioned officer on an air defense unit at the height of the Cold War. And I believe that there are some points from that time that are relevant for the Eastern flank nations. And then to wrap it up, I would like to present some points which I would like you as the students to consider and challenge as you move forward and discuss the changing character of war and future strategy during your studies. Please remember, you are only limited by your imagination. So now let's go to Ukraine where I'd like to show a short video from our mission to Ukraine in May when you'll hear from our president and founder, Robert Vass, who founded Globsec 18 years ago at the age of 21. We are in Borodianka, one of the cities close to Kiev that was heavily hit by Russian attacks. There are several buildings like this that you see behind me that were hit directly. That was not a mistaken missile because it's clear that there are several very similar buildings on this road that were hit directly as residential buildings. There were dozens of deaths, children, women, old people that were dragged out of these buildings that collapsed. This is horrifying to see that in a war next to Slovakia in Europe, we can have such a horrible war crimes where you target civilians and they are suffering in this way. I think that the international community needs to come together and make sure that those who are responsible for these horrific events are held accountable and that they will be put charged and put into jail. This is really unbelievable. We've just seen some mass graves of hundreds of people buried that were tortured, shot in the head from the back. This is horrible and these are civilians. This is not, these are not military people. So we've seen these pictures in the TV before but when you see it on your own eyes, it is clear that the targets were not just military because there is no any kind of military infrastructure around or in here. These are simply civilians. And I think that Ukrainians right now are paying too high price for their freedom, for values of democracy, for their willingness to be in the West and we can't leave them alone. So please understand that why we are showing and making our own videos and taking our own mission to Ukraine is our population don't necessarily will believe CNN and the other news articles. And we have a responsibility to keep everybody engaged in this conflict. Now, where I would like to now go to now is to the NATO's Eastern Front and I'm going to show a map. I'm going to talk about it. The change has been rapid. If we look at it, we've moved from four to eight multinational battle groups. 18 nations deployed to the Baltic States. Poland, you're seeing a massive buildup of armored forces and certainly that will continue in the future. The Sue Wild Geek gap has become absolutely strategic. That 40-mile corridor between the Polish-Lithuanian border which connects Kalengrad with Belarus really recognized as a potential hotspot. Carrier groups, pleased to see led by the British in the Atlantic. We see Czech Republic really standing up. They don't have a border with Ukraine but they're an Eastern Front nation and they were the first to move to Slovakia. And we're already starting to see multi-domain operations at the core of defence planning and execution in Central Europe. Now, I'd also like to talk a bit about perceptions and public opinions and we do publish quite a lot of publications. We've got one here, Globsec Trends 2022. Now, what I find is interesting is that the conflicts that are there in our region, 79% the public support for NATO. Russia as a threat, 90% in Poland. The Poles are now always saying, we told you so. But only 33% in Bulgaria see Russia as a threat. In Slovakia, although 72% support NATO membership, only 36%, sorry, 36% do not see Russia as a threat. Hungary always tend to be the bad boys in Central Europe. 85% want to stay in NATO. Only 45% consider Russia as a threat. But interesting to note, this is the only country which has been buying the most advanced main battle tanks, the A7 from the Germans, ahead of the Ukraine invasion and significantly investing in artillery. So yes, Hungary has its public image, but meanwhile, they are rapidly rebuilding their forces. And going to Poland, who have got it so right over the last 20 years with their investments. A quote, without peace in Ukraine, there can be no peace in Poland. And that is now felt certainly in Europe. Now, there has been some real challenges these countries have faced. The Eastern Front nations have literally been emptying their stocks to support Ukraine and trying to maintain their own militaries. And it's been great that the US, Germany and the UK have been backfilling these nations. One example I'd like to talk about is the S 300 deployment from Slovakia, which wasn't necessarily providing a massive capability change to Ukrainian, but we consider it to be a bit of a game changer which really woke up people about what needed to be done. Now, this was being discussed very sensitively in March. And the challenge for the Slovaks was this was their only air defense system. This was their total defense, but it would have a massive impact if it was provided to Ukraine, both psychologically and militarily. And obviously it was going to take a lot of convincing the nation to do it and that the government had to show true leadership. But what you saw was NATO its best. US, Germany, Netherlands, deploying air defense forces into Slovakia. Slovakia then donating its air defense capability to Ukraine. And you combine these thoughts with what's happening on the ground. I mean, 10 million refugees left Ukraine, tens of thousands crossing individual border crossings a day. 1.6 million have stayed in Eastern flank nations. And of course Poland again is a focus because 1.2 million have stayed there. For balance, Ukrainian is now the second language in Bratislava and most probably the same in Warsaw as well, certainly in the schools. So it has had a massive effect, but the population has really come forward. But what is also important is to understand how you can live in bubbles in Central Europe. You can sit in Bratislava in the offices I'm in now. And in March and April, it's only one kilometer to the refugee center where tens of thousands of people were going through. But you couldn't actually not see them. When you were traveling on holiday, you would see massive weapons congregates going to the front. But unless you paid attention to it, you may just think it's another exercise. So this is one of the factors that really has gripped me about the things are really changing and the character of war is changing. Now, when I talk about back to the future, 1985, if we look at the map of the forward edge of the battle area, it's definitely moved east. From my point of view, 1984, 1985, I was spending my life on two hours notice to come back to Dr. Peter Singer's point about evaluations of leadership. We had things called Taco Bell. It was brutal. We were continually exercising, continually deploying. We were so stretched for the resources that aircraft would join the exercises live art. It's when a friend of mine shot down an RAF Jaguar with his Phantom when he joined one Taco Bell exercise in Germany. Getting to perception, the logistics. In 1984, 131,000 UK troops deployed to Europe as a practice of Asia on exercise line-hards. I mean, you could say this is when NATO really knew how to float, throw a party. And it was massive exercises across Europe. Burning up farmers' fields, damaging everything, but it's a reality of preparation we haven't seen. Another factor that's going to come back is NBC was a core of operations. Possibly a skill the UK has lost where we were a leader. And of course, nuclear weapons were deployed forward. And we will see discussions when we talk about deterrent, where countries in central Europe will be looking for nuclear capabilities to be deployed. So one could say the future of warfare at the NATO Eastern flank is going to be very similar to what we were almost 40 years ago. With the new strategic concept, we're moving from 40,000 troops of redness to 300,000. But to balance it in the mid-1980s, we had over 5 million personnel deployed in Europe, 100 army divisions on the ground. But it isn't going to be the same because actually the Warsaw Pact no longer exists and Russia doesn't have the critical mass. So to finish up, I would like to move to a final slide to just actually things for everybody to consider moving forward. And for Ryan, Australia is obviously a key partner as well in this discussion. US, UK, EU need to cooperate on innovation to keep pace with China. China are not going to hold back. They are going to innovate in all areas. And we've got another publication people may find useful, Adaptive Change. General John Allen, President of Brookings was leading this initiative for us. Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan are all key actors. Japan will also be a key player. Syria, I see most probably more as a puppet for Russia. We talk about climate change as a major threat of world security. And I don't want to sound like an old socialist and tree hugger, but actually if militaries become more energy efficient, they will actually be able to stretch their operational capability. This is why NATO has actually really grasped this and is actually going to set the gold standard for actually combating climate change. I mean, Christ, what the hell are we all fighting for if we can't leave a planet in suitable state? NATO's Eastern flank will invest heavily in conventional capabilities. Europe in 2025, 40 years forward, 40 years back, NATO, NATO, NATO. There may be discussions about an EU army, but it's going to be integrated into the NATO order of battle. Factors to consider, deterrence, deterrence covers everything. It covers innovation. It covers nuclear, it covers conventional diplomacy. I've got to talk about diplomacy. Diplomacy is what kept us safe in the Cold War. And we don't have diplomacy with Russia and diplomacy is critical for the future. Deployable forces, democracy. As democratic countries and democratic almost armies, that is a strength. It is not a weakness. Yes, authoritarian regimes can sometimes act quicker, but they can't act in the same way as a team. And disinformation is here to stay all across and a big responsibility. This is why I say the future of warfare should aim to create and sustain world peace. The world where I am is becoming a really scary place and everybody has a role to make it safer. Thank you for attention and to the military. Thank you for your service. Happy to take any questions. Thank you very much, John. That was great. Listening to our speakers. It occurred to me again, what we want to do at the war college in your curriculum is get you to see both sides of every issue. And Jeff talked about the changing character of war, you have to balance the AI, the new technology, to also the aspect of war. Taking a look at the check in war, Russia against check in war, not too long ago, I mean, they massed artillery and blew the city down block by block. There was no AI, there was no high technology in that. And that too is part of the character of war. When you look at, I always say the future is history continued. When you look at many of the conflicts, you see that even advanced nations or nations that had technology that was slightly better or even a little bit better than their opponent still lost to mass. So you need to think about these changing character of war and everything in both ways. We talk future security environment, we think of AI, we think of those aspects of it, but there's the character of war that is actually unchanging. Now we're gonna go to questions. We started about 10 minutes late with this panel, so we'll take some, we have time for questions. So, sir, right there. Good afternoon. I come from Baltic region. My name is Talis Dzerv and I am a Latvian Navy officer. So I have a question to Ms. Sandek or Mr. Barter. So in international relations, the best way of solving conflicts is diplomacy, as we know. But in my opinion, it works only with civilized countries. So in last months, Russia has proved and showed very well that diplomacy can be degraded to farce when highest state officials such as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Speaker of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President himself is lying to hold the world and do not stop it all the time. So the question is that is there any policy how to deal with such countries, especially if it's a nuclear power and at the same time aggressor, which do not take in consideration any deep concerns of West and so on. In my opinion, so there is nothing but military force. Thank you. I think the question was, is there a policy relating to the diplomacy with these nations? I'll take a first cut of that. Thank you, appreciate it. Diplomacy doesn't work when, as you aptly described it, if there's no good faith, right? And that is a continuing concern. That's been a concern for US policy for years with Russia since 2014. From where I sat in previous positions, we only wanted to talk to the Russians when there was something productive to talk about, not just to talk. And the Russians wanted to talk because they wanted to go around and tell people, everything's back to normal. We're talking to the US, we're getting what we want. Look at us, we're still on the world stage, we're still a world power and you have to thread that needle very, very carefully. You can never eliminate diplomacy because ultimately decisions are going to be made at a table, sitting down and negotiate. I don't think we're there yet in the current conflict. I hope to see different things happen that force people to force the Russians to the table, but you are correct. It's very difficult to conduct diplomacy with people, others who are not doing it in good faith. In my opinion, I don't think that should mean that we should stop trying. We just need to be very honest with ourselves about the parameters by which we think we're gonna be successful at this point. And that is something that we have to continue for in our sort of existent relationship with Russia right now. But I think that applies to all adversaries and aspiring competitors is, the risk of miscalculation as you noted is high enough where that conversation has to continue at some degree. John Barder, do you have a comment? Not much to add, Catherine nailed it. I mean, Russia is an expert at, let's say, making best use of useful idiots, formal politicians to push its way. At the moment, opening diplomacy with Russia for me is like letting down the Ukrainians, but it has to continue. And there will be subjects where there can be discussions on such as getting grain to African countries where there could be a small breakthrough. So diplomacy underpin this, but now is not the right time to have massive diplomatic efforts. We need to show military strength. Thank you, John. I'm gonna use the Peter Singer technique. And do we have any questions over here? Sir, over there. Hello, BGLM, US Air Force just came from the Pentagon. Question is to Ms. Sendak. I just left the log panel working POMP stuff within the Air Force. And your, I think, points on that you had mentioned earlier regarding some of the funding and divestments and interaction with Congress. I thought we're very poignant because I literally just lived through the 24 POMP. The question I have for you is, what do you see from your perspective that the services can do better to advocate for the resources we need? You know, it's one pie. There's not more money. And we need to fully divest certain airframes. There's a lot of money there. What do you see the services are doing wrong in order to get our message across, get what we need? Thank you. So this is way better than the Pentagon, by the way. I have to say. So great question. And I would say I would start with the services, from my perspective, aren't doing anything wrong. There are tools to use to appeal to Congress as a whole and to individuals to make a case for why your piece of the pie has to change or be altered or increase. And those are well known to all the services. Y'all are great at it. The key here is Congress, there's been a lot of discussion earlier this morning about machines, about robotics, about AI, about the future of technology in warfare. There's always a human element that's never gonna go away. And as you relate to people like Congress, Congress is 535 foreign policy experts, according to them. And they're all human. And they wanna feel like they understand. They wanna feel like they're brought into the conversation. They wanna feel like they're not being told 50% of the story to get a decision that people are advocating for. And I have noticed, especially for new members who spend the first couple of terms just trying to learn what the heck is going on, for them to have a connection in a relationship, not just at the constituent level or an installation level in their home district, but to really understand the issue and have people volunteering that information as opposed to going to hunt it. I know that sounds very basic, but truly a lot of consternation out of members of Congress that I have seen is that they felt like they were given a partial part of the story and were asked to make a decision. And then we're told the later part of the story and don't agree with it. And it sounds really, really basic and it is really, really basic, but the keep away from Congress and sometimes how that filters through how the executive branch presents information more often than not does not go over very well. Now, you're never, you know, the fight and I know they're, we're all talking about the same airframe that we'd like, you know, that's a pet project that the convincing is gonna take a little bit more time. But if you're talking about specific programs or platforms, I would just say that the more transparency you have with Congress and who you're trying to target, the better off you'll be. Thank you, Katie. Do you have a question from this section? Anybody from this section would like to ask, sir? Hi, I'm Lieutenant Commander of Organis from Norway. It's been nice meeting you so far. Well, some context to the question. In 2021, Norway or Rolls Royce was nearly by an inch sold to a Russian Koglomerate which for apparent reason needed diesel engines for their new frigate class, the Gostkov class because they invaded Ukraine basically in 2014 and that was where they got diesel engines for the new frigates. So yeah, obviously they were very interested in this Norwegian Rolls Royce plant. Point this, I think that many challenges for our defense is not within the military branch, it is within other sectors. This was the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. Now, Ministry of Finance kind of snoozing off until the media got on the tail. But how do we convince our populations to endure all these very bothersome things you have to implement then? Like lining up for Iodon tablets in the schoolyard. The music room has to be refurbished back into the NBC shelter that it originally was. And basically how do we counter then nations that regards all the various sectors, the whole population, the whole country as an instrument of warfare like China does and like Russia does? How do we convince our populations? That is basically the questions to the panel, feel free. This is a broad question because it ranges all the way from sales of corporations to other nations to all the way to whole of government sort of issues. Who would like to take a stab at that? Just to start out, I think what you alluded to is a great example of when I was talking about how adversaries are outflanking us in an expanded competitive space. The joint force in the military only covers a certain frontage of that competitive space. And we have to bring our partners along as well. And I think it goes both ways as well, there are things that in the finance industry and in some of the other organizations that we don't fully understand as well. And so I think making the joint force as cognizant of those things in order to fight in that space is gonna be something we need, but we have to understand it first because really the military has really four things that it can change. What it's looking at, it's intelligence, it's posture, it's authorities and it's employment of current and advanced capabilities. So in your case, I think providing intelligence and understanding to the connections and the implications of those connections are really what we're gonna have to do and present them to Congress as we do it. That's the role of the joint force, thanks. I would just attack on that quickly. All that is old is new again and populations need to understand at a very basic level why something in Ukraine affects them, why something in Taiwan would affect them, what that means for their day-to-day lives and that's prudent upon every government, whole of government to do that and everybody plays a role. And in a democracy, it gets real messy, real fast, but it's an obligation of the people who serve to make that explanation and make that case to their population. Ryan or John, do you have any comments? I can make a couple. Please, Ryan, go first. We'll go to the next question I've got. Is that a question way in the back? We've got two gentlemen, but the one standing, please. And we'll have time for, I think, two more questions after that. Thank you, sir. I'm Max, but I'll get an intern with the Emerging Ethics or Ethics and Emerging Military Technologies program. My question is to you specifically, Mr. Beckers. You mentioned how deterrence and matter slowly becoming an outdated tactic, so how do we compete with our adversaries who don't play by the same rule book or abide by the same ethical values we do? And if we choose to abandon those traditional rules and values we hold when we militarily engage, how do we tell the rest of the world to still adhere to a rules-based international order? So, yeah, a really broad question there. And there are two pieces of that that I'd like to take on. And first of them is about deterrence and mutually assured destruction, I think. And I think that they aren't, they are still valid. The problem is that the way, again, like I said, continuity and change in military power, the way we understood bipolar competition with Russia, that was a learning experience over time. We built a triad. They built a triad. And we over time engaged in strategic discussions and physical confrontation to kind of come to an agreement of what that meant. Now with China moving towards a strategic nuclear breakout, you've got a tripolar world in the nuclear realm. New capabilities that the PRC and Russia are deploying are not on the triad model, for example. While we recapitalize our nuclear force exactly the same as we did in 1960s only with more modern systems. So we need to be more, think harder about what deterrence and what mutually assured destruction may mean in an environment where you have status six sort of capabilities and the things that the DF-26s and hypersonic light vehicles of the PRCs deploying. What does that mean in that more newer complex environment? So I think we need to re-look our deterrent. And your second question, again, was about, I'm sorry. So if we are not gonna play by the rules when we are competing with them. Oh, not playing by the rules, yeah. So again, that's a little out of the joint force realm. But again, it's clearly using that intelligence I talked about to talk about what are those rules and how does the joint force build the best set of capabilities to give policymakers the tools they need to enforce those rules or at least deter the adversaries from contesting them. Thanks. I promise, Stu more questions, but they have to be really quick. So anybody else on that side going once? Anybody in the middle? I've got one gentleman in front and one back. The gentleman in front wins out. He had his hand up first. This is for, I'm Lieutenant Commander Vick Schaefer. I'm a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy. For kind of Mr. Becker, but also Ms. Sindak, I wouldn't mind if you had an opinion on this. The defense industrial complex in any nation, but especially the United States, is subject to a lot of nationalist feelings. You talked, Mr. Becker, about the need for industrial capacity. There are a lot of allies that we have that have a core competency in industrial capacity. South Korea could build ships five times faster and maybe five times better than we could. Germany has a lot of industrial capacity as well. What are your thoughts on leveraging allies to maybe build a couple of berks in South Korea, Arleigh Burke destroyers, or maybe some missiles in Germany, for example? Great question. And again, this gets at the tension you were talking about. There's not a congressman or a senator that would probably vote for building a large surface warship in a foreign country. Now, on the other hand, I think we're moving from a world where the U.S. was the arsenal of democracy to a world in which China is the arsenal of autocracy and we're on the flip side of that equation. So we have to be really innovative and very careful about how we leverage the defense industrial base across all of our allies and partners. And one example of how that may go is South Korea is basically going to rebuild big chunks and recapitalize big chunks of the Polish military over the next couple of years with the agreement they just signed last week. So I think that there are some things that we can do in those, but we have to be really careful about how we, in that push-pull between the Pentagon and the Hill. I'll be super fast. I think Congress is coming to the realization that we can't do it alone. Ukraine is a wonderful example of that, nor I think do we want to. And that entails that we have to work closely with our partners and allies who have major industrial capacity to meet some of these challenges. Here's a research question for you, looking from AI. Comes out of software industry. Software industry expects 40% profit markup on their products. When a defense company has more than 10%, you could correct me, Congress gets very concerned about the waste fraud and abuse aspect. How to reconcile that? That's a question worthy of someone researching. Okay, one more real quick, sir. I'm Domingo from Sri Lanka. Actually, I'm trying to come up with a different opinion. Maybe most of you all not agree with me, but still I thought of coming up with this. This is because this question is for all the intellectual panel not targeted to any single person. But my point is, is that the democracy is suitable for every country? So I doubt it because countries like Sri Lanka, because I feel like the too much of democracy connected with a lot of freedom is not suitable. Because I think we need to have kind of a dictatorship type control for a certain period of time just to make people correct. Then afterwards we can have freedom, I guess. The, my other thing is now since we are talking about the global sustainable peace and security. So I have seen some occasions, especially regarding the Ukraine war, some interesting news channels are banned, like Russia today. Isn't it good, isn't it a good thing? I don't know who has done it, but I found it is, we cannot watch it. You need to give a question, just state a question. Yeah, so that is, I mean, how you justify my question is that the other thing is I feel like every country has a right to develop economy and military. So I mean, do you think China and Russia are really a global threat? I need to hold you to that question. Would anybody like to take a stab? I think if I heard the first part of your question correctly was does democracy work everywhere, right? Should democracy work everywhere? Well, I mean, we need another eight hours for that conversation, I would say. But I would say that democracy and changing and shifting to democracy is a generational change. For countries who were no longer democracies and moving to democracy, this isn't something that happens overnight. But I think that in order to get back to the rules-based order that we like to filter through and live by in this country, that we believe the tenets of democracy can bring security and stability. So how that looks up to other countries. So I just really quickly say, leave it with a quote from Winston Churchill who said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others. With that, we're going to conclude our panel. We could go on all day, but you guys need to take break and move along. So thank you. Thanks to the panelists. All right, thank you to our panelists. Never let a vigorous discussion get in the way of the schedule. With that, back in your sheets at 11.55, please. And remember that we do have the whole year ahead of us. Thank you.