 I would like to, we have about 9 minutes, 10 minutes left, and I would be happy to take interventions and questions from the floor, there are many distinguished Europeans. Is it Karl? I don't, I can, I don't know, Mr Narayanan, yeah, from India, former National Security Advisor. Yes. You are going to speak as a European. No, I'm going to speak as an admirer of the UAE. Thank you, sir. Thank you. I would like to say that I'm very impressed by what you are saying, but I've been even more impressed by what you have achieved. I think I've known the UAE in my years when I was a National Security Advisor and even otherwise. I think in the recent period, the UAE has really emerged as a peacemaker, a peacemaker in the region and beyond. What you have done with regard to the disputes that we have seen in the Middle, in the Near East or West Asia, and I almost, I would say the dramatic thing of providing my friend Ashraf Ghani, a home to come to in, in the UAE when he faced almost extinction shows a great deal of innate wisdom. I would like to know from you, your Excellency, how is it that the UAE has suddenly really become in one sense the savior of the part of this part of the world? Since I come from India, I'm saying this part of the world because I think we've now faced a whole series of problems. You mentioned Afghanistan, but there are many other issues. We have the problem, we were discussing this morning between India and China and many countries with China. We need, we need somebody who can, is almost in it and yet out of it. You're a friend of many countries of the region, yet I don't think you are involved in deeply in the politics of the region. So is it possible for you to do this? And if so, how would you do it? I would just want to do that, and I'm not trying to be facetious. I think it's true that people like me who have been around see what you've done in the recent period as a great service to humanity. Thank you very much. I, I, I want to use the, thank you for the question, sir. And I want to use this opportunity to highlight a little bit of our, let's say, new thinking on the region. And this new thinking really is largely influenced by what we just talked about. So part of the new thinking is that the region is a pressure cooker. And because it's a pressure cooker, we do need to think again and we need to de-escalate. De-escalation does not mean that we will change the policies of countries, regional players around us. But it will also mean that we will avoid confrontation, confrontations that we will all pay a very heavy price for decades to come. So I think we need to really come and understand the concept of de-escalation and what that de-escalation will allow us to achieve. That's number one. Number two is we also, we have today the third largest economy in the Middle East. So with the COVID pandemic, we can clearly see that it is extremely important also to concentrate on the competitiveness of the home front, to make the UAE more competitive, more attractive. And this is not an issue of incentives or financial injections or things like that. But it is also about making the UAE more global. So for example, one of the changes that we have done in our laws is to allow, for example, long families of, let's say, Hindu or other religions to govern their inheritance through their religion rather than national UAE law in order for us to give that sort of competitiveness to the UAE. That's just one example of a whole myriad of laws, etc. I want to come to your second point because I think it's extremely important. I think it will be hubris for the UAE to think that it can actually moderate or mediate in issues that have historical and cultural and religious roots that are very deep, or in fact, geographical roots, etc. But what the UAE could do is the UAE could be a facilitator, a good friend, a conveyor. I remember the confrontation between India and Pakistan a couple of years ago, I think maybe more than two years ago, and we were on a trip with His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Ben Zayed. Sheikh Mohammed understands that the issues between India and Pakistan are deep historical issues and they are very emotional, very emotive, etc. But he can do one thing and that's what he did. He called Prime Minister Modi and he called Prime Minister Khan of Pakistan and spoke to them as a friend and urged de-escalation without really going to the core issue here, because the core issue I think for a country like the UAE to come and say we can address it will be hubris really. But there are things that countries can do. And I think this is something that the UAE is doing in many, many arenas behind the scenes is trying to de-escalate tension, trying to make sure that dialogue and communication among friends, you know, we're not talking about friend and foe. We're talking about countries that are friend and friend and to try and do something in this area. So I think this is extremely essential. And while we're at this, I have actually seen this transformation, strategic transformation of our relationship with India. I mean our relationship with India has always been fantastic. But I would say on the government level, the work that has been done over the last few years and the trust that has been built, you can do work. But trust is a long-term investment and commitment. And I tell you one thing. If there is something that I give to Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed is his clear understanding of the fabric of trust in international relations. It's a long-term issue, whether it's with Russia or whether it's with India or whether it is with any other country. It is when you build this fabric of trust and you maintain it that you can play a role in de-escalation. But I think also we have to also understand that many of the issues that we face are issues that are entrenched in countries own national interest. And there is no way that a country like the UAE will change the perception of national interests of our friends. But what we can do is we can actually help de-escalate and make sure that the dialogue is going on and make sure the confrontation is not a replacement for discussion and dialogue. Well, unfortunately, time goes too fast. So time is up already, but I will take one more. Well, Daniel, check and maybe two questions and you, sir, from from half. OK, so Daniel first. Thank you very much, Thierry, your Excellency. I came from Tel Aviv on a direct flight and I'm obviously very excited about that. And I would like to ask you about the aftermath of what was probably the most applauded and popular achievement in international diplomacy of 2020, the Abraham Accords, in which the UAE played a significant leadership role. It was so applauded and so unanimously supported that even the Biden administration adopted the support of it. It's a rare exception from the heritage of former President Trump. But there is an exception in our region and that is our Palestinian neighbors who for reasons that one might accept or not felt frustrated about that development. So I would like to ask you, Excellency, if you're feeling that there is sort of things are calming down with them and if you see the UAE in the future, in the spirit of what you just said, trying to play a role in the Palestinian Israeli conflict in view of your new newly achieved role in our region. Thank you. So if you allow me, you will take the other question at the same time. So that will go well. OK, so you don't know your name. Sorry. Thank you. Your Excellency, I hail from Istanbul, Turkey. Thank you very much for your gracious hospitality. And in our region, the tradition is to honor our host. So I will ask somewhat of a contrarian question, but I will do it in the spirit of dialogue and friendship. Now, you depicted a picture of UAE based on dialogue, conciliation and, you know, a general, a positive sort of approach to international affairs. But unfortunately, at least in some parts of the world, my country included, there is an alternative narrative where your presence in places like Libya, in East Med, in Greece is perceived and can be portrayed as more of a nonconciliatory escalatory in some ways projecting power approach to international affairs. Is this, I mean, how, why do we have this sort of contrasting view of UAE's international approach to international affairs that really contrasts with the very constructive picture that you simply painted for us? Thank you so much. Thank you very much for this nice question. And the one last maybe John Andrew. Yes. Thank you very much for excellent comments. I was impressed by what you were saying about confrontations and also about managing the region. It seems to me that one example where the region did not manage well was the confrontation with Qatar. Now, I wonder if you could say a few words about why that confrontation took so long to resolve and be de-escalated. And I see the gentleman from Turkey. Obviously, Turkey was an ally of Qatar and did a lot to help Qatar. Is there an aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood underlying these policy differences and how can you resolve those inherent tensions? So normally I stop here, unless there is another question of the same, you know, if another last provocative question. I'm sure that Dr. Gargash would enjoy it. So is it a provocative question? If not, no, I see a hand, but I don't see who is raising that. I wonder your accent, see if you might also comment, especially with respect to guiding. Can you raise your voice slightly? Can you? I also wonder your accent, see if you could comment, particularly with respect to guiding the future of the UAE on your very close neighbors, Iran and Iraq. After all, in the second half of the 20th century, regime change in both these nations must have had an impact on your policies. And how do you guide your future with respect to any further changes that may occur in those countries? Well, I think the plate is full enough. This looks like a whole buffet. Well, I want to address the four issues because I think they are all pertinent and extremely important. I think the first thing I want to say about the Abramic Accords is that the Abramic Accords have been a success. I think that's the first thing we need to really say. It has achieved in its one year more than expected. And let's look at these achievements. I think number one, it has actually broken a very important psychological glass ceiling or door or whatever. I think the idea that we can clearly say, and I said this two years before the Abramic Accords, decades of not talking to Israel has not really brought us any closer. And if you really think about it, the two countries that have been able to help the Palestinians, mostly Arab countries are Egypt and Jordan, simply because they have that relationship with Israel. So number one, breaking that psychological barrier. I would say number two is that they have brought economy and people-to-people relations into peace. And I think this is an important element in the success of the Abramic Accords. So I would say that it has been an unmitigated success. But let me also address the element that's in your question, which is basically the Palestinian statehood, etc. The UAE remains, as in Egypt's case, as in Jordan's case, committed to a two-state solution. And the UAE believes that it can actually do more in the medium term, maybe not in the short term, but in the medium term, to help achieve that through building dialogue and help building that sort of network of trust that I spoke about. Two important things here. Number one is what made or what brought forward our relations to Israel. I was going to come and say this is a relationship that would have been normalized by 2023. But what brought it forward was really the issue of the annexation of Palestinian land. And we've seen that's off the table right now. There were a lot of naysayers about it, but ultimately it's off the table now. The other element that I see also, and this is a very important element, while the Egyptians were doing excellent work in bringing the latest Israeli Palestinian confrontation to an end, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, our foreign minister, had six telephone calls in 11 days with Gaby Ashkenazi, urging Israel to agree to the Egyptian proposal. I'm not going to say we are the only voice. I'm sure there were a lot of other peaceful voices and constructive voices. But imagine for a country that had no relations with Israel, that the foreign minister is able to speak with the Israeli counterpart and come and say, Gaby, this is the time to move on. Let's stop. Let's do this. Let's do that. And I feel that we had supported in some sense through this short duration of the relationship. So I would say that the Abrahamic Accords will actually allow us to help other moderate and constructive Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, others, to reach and help reach the Palestinians and Israelis, that solution that they are looking for. Again, I come back and say, no hubris here. The idea that we are going to change Israel's mind or the Palestinians' mind, I think is something that is exaggeration par excellence in many ways. I think what we are trying to do is to be another helpful and constructive role in ending this state of confrontation that has taken too long, but ending it correctly with Israel's secure and its borders with the Palestinians having that free independent state that they seek, rightfully. I think on the Turkish side, the issue, of course, is the UAE took important decisions at critical junctures, and from our perspective, they were the right decisions. We came in to support the Saudi effort in Yemen because there was a vacuum, because the international system was shifting, because regional players were told you have to be more responsible for your security. Libya, we were the most significant Arab contributor to the NATO effort to unseat Colonel Qadhafi, and there is a legacy issue here, and this is an Arab issue here. So you cannot come and turn us on when you want to, and turn us off when you want to. We took the right decisions at the right time. Libya at that time, there was a legacy issue. We were, as I said, the major, major Arab component in the NATO effort, and thirdly, there was a major, major terrorist threat to the most important Arab country, Egypt, to the west of its border. So I believe fully that the UAE took the right measures in addressing regional vacuums collectively, not alone, collectively. And I have to say, we paid also a very heavy price for it. We paid the heavy price reputationally, politically, et cetera, but this was the position that we took. Now, I am not responsible of the narrative of others about the UAE, and I see that negative narrative. But if you turn things around also, I would say also that Turkey's recent re-examination of its policies towards Egypt and towards the Brotherhood and towards Saudi Arabia and others is very welcome, and I think for us to come midway and reach out is very important. And I was very, very glad, really, and I keep repeating this story because it's a remarkable story on the meeting of our national security advisor, Sheikh Tahnoon and President Erdogan, because that meeting was 85% about the future and about the economy. So coming back and saying, did the UAE really make the wrong choices in those days? Did the UAE made its choices based on the vacuums that were there and made it collectively? I don't think in politics we come back and revisit these things. But I think where we are today is more forward-looking. We're not going to change Turkey's perception of where its national interest is. And you mentioned Greece, for example. I think Turkey's policy at the time made Greece suddenly geostrategically very important. So this was really a case of a policy that actually sort of retracted in many ways. But I don't think this is time really to re-examine these things. I think we did the right choices that we felt were essential because of our fear of vacuums. Our fear of vacuums and escalation continue. And we feel that dealing with vacuums and escalation today comes really with a new set of policies based on regional cooperation, dialogue, talking to each other, and understanding that sometimes we will not be able to twist and turn other countries' perceptions of their own foreign policies. This leads me also to the issue of Qatar. Again, I don't really want to dwell on issues of the past. But I would say that our view of the region was very different and continues to be different. The region needs to be more institutionalized. The region needs to be more, I would say, civil rather than religious. We have seen, for example, somebody looked at this resurgence of political Islam and on a tombstone and put it 1980, 2017. I'm not sure of the 2017 part, but clearly this sort of an ideological religious view of the region has been too costly. And the UAE believes, as you see in everything we do, I mean, this has been a remarkable year for us with Mars and Expo and nuclear power and various, various really achievements. We are really trying to put, what I would say, a secular, positive agenda forward. Because we believe that for the last four decades, we have really tried what I would call a political Islamist agenda, and the cost has been too, too high, to be honest. And I don't think we can continue on the same path. It doesn't mean that we will change others. I think this is something that is extremely important. But I think also trying to make sure, and this is also part of our approach, is to try and make sure that we work on bilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation. And we ensure that this bilateral and multilateral is all-inclusive, will include every single country in the region. Now, some will join, as the Turks have been very sort of positive about what we are saying to them. Hopefully, the Iranians also will be very positive. And we hope, as I said, our fear is vacuums and our fear is escalation in the coming period. And I don't say this as our fear as the UAE. I think this should be a collective regional fear. If we can, in my opinion, calibrate that and control that, I think we will be able to build networks of trust for the decade after that will be much more positive. I'm sorry, but the last comment I sort of forgot. No, Qatar, I think I addressed. But I think there was a last comment there. Yes, I think Iran and Iraq. Again, I was in Baghdad at the neighbors of Iraq conference. And it was really fantastic. I would say it was more form than substance at this stage, great success for Iraqi diplomacy, great success for French diplomacy. We have to give credit where it's due here. But in my opinion, this is really a forum of things we want to see in the future, a forum where we need to be able to meet together. And perhaps in the beginning, it will be small steps. But I hope that this is very positive. I mean, Iraq is going to go through an election in 90s. I think it's 90s. And clearly, we hope that the Iraqis are reconciled, really, with their political system. And as I hear from more and more Iraqi experts, really it's number one not about geopolitics. Number one, it's about service delivery. And I think this is extremely essential. The ability of the states of our region in a more youthful population and a larger population to deliver services to these people, whatever these services are. I flew from Abu Dhabi to Baghdad for that conference. And Baghdad felt warmer than Abu Dhabi, if you can believe it. So I can understand, really, the idea of service delivery. I think with Iran, we have to understand also. And I have to say that the Biden administration has been very, very encouraging in our efforts to de-escalate with Iran also and with our neighbors. Now, does this mean that issues are resolved? No, it doesn't. We remain very concerned with regards to the nuclear program. We remain very concerned with regards to regional policy and drones and missiles and so on and so forth. But at the same time, the last thing we want is a confrontation. Because if this region is mired in confrontation, we will all pay the price for decades to come. And I think coming back here on the Abrahamic Accords, one thing that we have insisted publicly and privately, the Abrahamic Accords are not a new alliance against Iran. I know that Iran doesn't believe us, but Iran will ultimately believe that, because that's the reality. And I think the Israelis are also starting to believe us. We have no interest, really, in a new confrontation in the region. But am I very positive about the reach out to Iran? Yes, I am. Am I very positive that Iran will change its regional course? I have to say that I am more realistic here. But I am also betting that Iran is concerned about vacuum and Iran is also concerned about escalation. Thank you. Well, I thank you very much for these extremely important and precise comments. You referred several times to the issue of trust. And I was thinking about one of the great assets of the Cold War that we have allowed to die, which has the concept of confidence-building measures of the arms control times during the Cold War. And I think that we have to reinvent this concept of confidence-building measures and try and apply it not only in the context of the relationship between the superpowers of the day, but also among most of the metal powers, as you have said. So we are running behind schedule. But I think it was one of the most important geopolitical sessions. So I thank you very much, Anwar. And I thank the UAE. So you see, their applause are there. And I don't need to add any word.