 Ieithio gweithio chi'n gweithio eu sylwgr ar y cyfnodau arweinio Peter Prott. Rydyn ni'n mynd i'n gweithio cyfnod ym 8 yn EECB sydd yn bwysig. Mae'n gweithio gweithio'r gweithio yn y fwy fath o'r bank yw'r ddechrau'r cyfrannu. Mae'n gweithio gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio. Ond dwi'n amlwg, roeddwn i'w cwbwyr a'r panel yw'r EMU yn y cwbl ac ar ôl mewn dynodau. Mae'r e-methaf yn y pethau sy'n gwybod o'r pwn o'r e-methaf sy'n gwybod o'r E-methaf. A'r panel yw'n gwybod o'r e-methaf sy'n gwybod o'r rhanol. Ychydig i'n gwybod i'r panellysau. Felly, mae'n cymdeithasio'r CBC i ddweud, a mae'n cyd-dweud i'r cyd-dweud i'r ymwneud y 27 yma? Mae'n cyd-dweud i'r adyn Posen. Ddodd ychydig, Clare. Felly, rydyn ni wedi'i ddweud i'r ddweud i'r cyd-dweud i'r panellysau i ddweud i'r ddweud i'r cyd-dweud i'r cyd-dweud, i ddweud i'r cyd-dweud i'r ddweud i'r cyd-dweud, a fyddcal dw i'r Cyflaid Jagadiriaeth. Yn ddweudкиwch Peder, y flwyddyn ni dyfu'r ddweud, mae'n hyn ymhyngwys i fynd eu cyd-dweud ac yn gyntaf y Cymru Cynllunol, ac rhaid ddim yn cymdeithasol i ddweud o'r cyd-di-wch-kameil a'u cyd-dweud, cyd-dweud i'r pethau, cofnodd, cyd-dweud i'r cyd-dweud i'r cyd-dweud. A os Gaf i'r cyd-dweud i'r Peder. Rydw i ddim yn ôl i'n meddwl wir yn rhaid amgylcheddol am adnodol Edryfu. Rydw i'n meddwl pech chi a eto. Maen nhw'n cael ei chyfnodais arwyr wedi'u pumbledlaethu pan o'r rhaglen cyd-dorog wedi gweld gysig ar ei bodndog ystyried ar gael gwirio ulyniau, penderfynol yng Nghymreddydd ymometeru i'r rhumpfynol sy'n cyd-dorog ar y Ffyrwyr, This panel is to talk about what's inside this building, and what I want to start with is to be international, deputy governor Gouloud talked a little bit about international, but mostly in the sense of comparisons is Europe doing well on this or that, I'm going to talk internationally to start because I think we have to remember that all the major central banks are facing a common threat, I'm going to talk internationally to start because I think we have to remember that all the major central banks are facing a common threat, a rather two common threats. The first common threat is a variant on what Larry Summers called secular stagnation, what has many names, but essentially is the low interest rate, low investment, low risk taking environment that we can't seem to get inflation up. The second common threat is none of us, especially in an institution like this committed to liberal European ideals and transnationalism, wants to face what happens if the extreme right wing wins. And so these are two threats that I think are central not just to the existence of the euro, but are motivating and have to be the central concern of all central banks at this time. But of course the problems we've talked about or let us say the challenges we've talked about about the incomplete monetary union in Europe make European central bank particularly vulnerable. That these threats you not only have to respond to for the good of Europe and the world, but that potentially these are threats that get compounded by the incomplete nature of the monetary union. And so what can we think about that? How should we think about that? And there's essentially two ways of thinking about this. The first is to think about what was in the previous panel to go forward and say well monetary policy can only do so much. We stand at risk of losing credibility and losing popular mandate if we tried to do too much. And therefore we're going to spend our time pointing out where we think the priority should be especially where they touch upon our mandate. So calls for capital market union banking, further banking union and so on. And then you can always do that and sign on to every G20 accord that said starting eight years ago monetary policies carrying too much of the burden and therefore we need fiscal policy. The second option is to say well the extreme version is Muhammad El-Aryan's very apt title only game in town. And to say sometimes a little too arrogantly we're the grown ups in the room. We're able to act we at least have the presumption we're acting on a non selfish parochial basis. Let's try to act and sort out the rest later. It probably will not surprise you that I'm in the second camp. But what matters is not what camp I'm in or even nowadays not what camp Peter is in. It is what camp those of you who are still on the governing council and who will be succeeding Peter like Philip are in. And I want to very strongly echo something Mario Monti just said, which is, you know, the Bank d'Italia would sit there and say we need the following structural reforms. And a week later somehow those reforms had not happened and the remarks were forgotten no matter how well argued and no matter how apolitically and persuasively they were put. And I think that looking back at the last 20 years one needs to go beyond looking in the Euro area and saying just oh there hasn't been as much exogenous excuse me endogenous real convergence as we would like. But that the record of the ECB deterring and brow beating other countries into doing reforms is quite poor. And I think some of us warned ahead of time that was likely to be the case. But more importantly I think you cannot look back at the last 10 years and say okay notwithstanding class regulings valid points about conditionality in the OMT and the ESM. That we have achieved a great deal of structural reform as a result of being tough or being conditional or being political with our monetary policies. And so when we face, and I forgive me for the arrogance of saying we because I view myself as just part of this community. When we face this dual challenge of a very low interest rate, low growth, low inflation world and the potential for nightmarish political consequences if the system breaks down again. It seems to me that therefore there is reason to think much more aggressively about monetary policy in a way that the ECB has not done so far or at least has not publicly done so far. And so the first point is you have to think about essentially abjuring withdrawing from the strategic game. Whether we can pick the country of your choice normally in southern Europe, I don't know if they're the good countries or not to use class's term. But just say the ECB has to decide it's not playing that game. It's going to stick to its knitting. But if it's going to stick to its knitting, it's going to stick to its knitting very aggressively. And so it is disappointing to see in the German press and other parts of the European press in recent weeks going back to old issues of lender of last resort and of the appropriateness, sorry just checking the time, of the appropriateness of so-called unconventional monetary policy as a sort of symbolic gesturing to the German public over who's going to get to be the next ECB president. It is very disappointing because this is at best disingenuous and will cause problems later when reality intrudes and you're forced to reverse. Or it is at worst a terrible mistake in understanding the role of the central bank and what we know is necessary and what Mario and Peter and Benoit and Vitor and others who served in this council demonstrated in the last ten years. And so, you know, this isn't about who just gets selected to be president and that's not appropriate for today, but it is to say that we should not hold back. Someone who does not believe that the lender of last resort is the basic function of a central bank and that that should go without saying is someone who should not be leading a major central bank. Full stop. And this is not a matter of personalities or nationalities, it is a matter of economic realism. Now of course, what this falls up against is the idea that there is a central bank independence problem for the ECB that the ECB must be careful because it is a super national institution in a context where European institutions do not seem to be doing that well. I think this is exactly wrong. I echo some of the things Deputy Governor Golud said. If you look at what the approval ratings for the euro, the approval ratings for Europe in the current context in part because of the foolishness of my alma mater in the UK being so visible to everyone, you have a lot of goodwill. Moreover, your independence is not under threat. The ECB went through some silly cycles at the start of the crisis worrying about the capital position of the ECB, which all of us in this room know is a non-issue. We have seen through the ridiculous court cases. We know what we can do, again forgive the we, because I think it's about this institution that we're all invested in to help save and lead Europe. And so I think you should go back to something which I said long ago and which I hope you all recognize. The European Central Bank is the only central bank in the world whose institutional independence is preserved by international treaty. You are fundamentally more important and more secure than any other central bank in the world. And you've bravely used that and you should think about that using that even more going forward. Be an advocate, don't worry about your independence. So finally, in practical terms, and there are many people, many distinguished scholars and practitioners in this room who can debate with me and others very fruitfully, what are the practical terms to go forward? But I would just suggest two things. First, I know this is going to lead to my losing every future invitation at this bank forever. It's time for the major central banks to come together on raising their inflation targets. And no single central bank can do it, single major central bank can really do it alone. The 2% target, which I co-authored arguments for 20 years ago, has outlived its usefulness. The stickiness of inflation at low levels and the dangers of the zero lower bound and the credibility problems of not achieving such target mean that you need a more aspirational target. I realize this is not an open and shut case. But neither is it something that can be totally ignored at this point. The second point I would make is we're seeing a lot of discussion quite usefully and rightly about issues of fiscal monetary coordination. And this is critical and I agree with my colleague Olivier Blanchard, as well as I'm sure many of you in this room, that the next main step for stabilization in the next crisis will have to come through fiscal policy. But I think there is more that the ECB can do and more that central banks can do in general about pre-committing their ability to purchase certain kinds of assets in larger quantities and how it would be done, rather than waiting for the crisis and seeing how it gets done. I would just conclude by reminding people that everyone gets caught up in is it unconventional policy and what should you do, but the fact remains that what was called unconventional policy in the US, the Federal Reserve was about by all kinds of assets as long as they were public and had to abjure all private assets. And in the Euro area it was the mirror image that the ECB could buy many, many private assets or finance or discount many private assets, but was not allowed to engage in buying too many public assets absent OMT. The reason I point out this mirror image is just to emphasize that there's nothing inherently unconventional. This is all about persuasion in your political context and it would be good for the ECB to engage in that. That is part of its mandate. Thank you. Thank you. Adam, I think we chose you to go first on the panel because we thought you'd do a good job of firing the audience up and I think you certainly lived up to that. I think I lost count of the amount of sacred cows that got slaughtered in that ten minutes, so well done. I'd like to turn now to Isabel. Thanks. Thank you very much. It's a great honour and a great pleasure to be here on this panel, especially given that Peter himself is on this panel. Thank you very much for having me and congratulations to all your achievements. It is very impressive. Clare asks us to talk first about the situation that the ECB is in right now. Of course this very closely connects to what we've been discussing in the previous session, namely that the euro area faces different kinds of weaknesses, financial, fiscal, structural. This makes the euro area fragile and it may also impair monetary transmission. When we think about financial weaknesses, what I find still very important is the sovereign bank nexus. There are various ways in which sovereigns and banks are connected, both directly and indirectly, directly through the sovereign exposures of banks through the implicit bailout guarantees which are still there somehow. Of course also through national deposit insurance and then indirectly through various channels working through the real economy. Then, as was mentioned already, there is this issue of the segmentation of the European banking and capital markets leading to very little private risk sharing. Then we have all these structural problems in the financial sector. The European financial sector remains mainly bank based, which means that we rely very much on bank financing. At the same time, the European banking sector remains very weak. It lacks profitability and this is partly due to overcapacities. Then we have the fiscal side. The fiscal framework is not yet fully credible and tends to be prosyclical. We have limited fiscal space in some member states due to the high debt levels. There is very little fiscal risk sharing at the euro area level. Then of course we have all the structural weaknesses. There is a lack of convergence. There is even the danger of higher divergence. The political constellations make structural reforms very difficult or even lead to a reversal of reforms. The dilemma of the ECB is that it cannot really deal with any of these weaknesses directly. It has to rely on policy makers to deal with that, but the political process is very slow. This is partly due to the fact that there is not really a sense of urgency. I feel that very clearly in Germany that there is not the feeling that the euro area is unstable. So there is a feeling that you can move on very slowly and eventually you may eventually get to, I don't know, EDIS, but it doesn't really matter when that happens. At the same time, politicians seem to have the idea that if there is another crisis, they can again rely on the ECB to the same extent. As they did in the past crisis. But that may actually not be as easy as last time because in my view there is less room for maneuver. Of course the ECB can always design new instruments, but these new instruments may become increasingly controversial. I do think this could threaten the ECB's independence. This constellation with limited fiscal space, at least in some member states, and this limited room for maneuver of the ECB makes the euro area fragile. So where could the next crisis come from? I mean we're seeing the slowdown of economic growth in the euro area. I mean it's not dramatic. It's just a slowdown, but the downside risks are enormous due to the Tweet War, due to the situation in China, due to Brexit. And also there's always this looming danger of a resurgence of a euro area crisis. And what worries me a lot is that at the same time I believe the financial sector is still very vulnerable to a recession. And they are very much in line with what Mathias said. So many people are saying the financial sector is doing fine. It's much more resilient than it was before the crisis. But I think this is actually partly a misperception. So we've had this very benign period with historically low default rates. This has, however, translated into very low loan loss provisions, very low risk rates. And so actually the bank capital ratios may not be quite as high in reality as they look. And also the decrease in NPLs may not be quite as positive as it looks. Because if we enter a recession, bank capital ratios may adjust very sharply and the same is true for NPLs. We are also seeing that there are some risks related to the low interest rate environment. We see inflated asset prices. We see a search for yield of financial market participants. A very strong maturity and liquidity transformation. And so you could of course say, OK, that's not the business of monetary policy. This is what we have macro-prudential policy for. But I must say, if I look at what happened in macro-prudential policy, I'm a bit disappointed. We've seen a lot of inaction bias, especially when I think about Germany. I see that very clearly. So there are quite a few people who think, for example, that the counter-cyclical buffer should have been raised already some time ago. But it's not happening. It's not happening because there are always good arguments not to raise the buffer. So the risks are not visible. So why should you raise the buffer? And then at some point people say, OK, now the recession is coming, so we cannot raise the buffer. So we can never raise the buffer. And so these counter-cyclical instruments are very difficult. The timing is very demanding. And there is then the danger, of course, of these instruments becoming in the end pro-cyclical. At the same time, the SSM has never really used its topping up power, which should, I believe, be used in this kind of situations. There is the ESRB, which I find an incredibly useful institution, but it's not very powerful. And of course also there's a lack of instruments. There are not many instruments for macro-prudential policy beyond banking. My feeling is that we do not understand macro-prudential policy very well. We understand monetary policy much better. So we don't know really how to deal with the potential conflict of objectives between price stability and financial stability. Some people discuss that macro-prudential policy should become more rule-based. And actually what I find very attractive is that you have these counter-cyclical instruments more as a kind of automatic stabilizer so that you get rid of all this political decision making which slows down the process. So is there a need to co-ordinate macro-prudential policies internationally? And is the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy limited by the rise of non-bank financial intermediaries? So the bottom line for me is that it's not so clear how much trust we can have in macro-prudential policy dealing with financial stability issue. And then the question comes back to monetary policy. So what is the role of monetary policy? So I don't have an answer to that but I think we have to deal with that. So if I think about my vision of the ECB in 2027, I mean I think the major issue is that we should reduce the overburdening of the central bank and of course completing the monetary union plays a crucial role there. And I mean we have to convince politicians that there is urgency, that there is urgency to complete the banking union, to break the sovereign bank nexus, to create integrated banking markets, financial markets. Of course we also need sustainable fiscal policy so that there is fiscal space also at the member state level but I think we also need some fiscal stabilisation mechanism in the euro area. And then of course there is the issue of structural reforms and we have to think about how we can raise incentives for doing that. But we also should think when I come back to financial stability, we also should think about whether we have burdened the central bank in that respect because in the crisis we have transferred additional tasks to the ECB. And I mean I don't see what else could have been done because that was one of the few very well functioning institutions at the time and there was no need for a treaty change. But I'm not convinced that the current situation is optimal because of course the ECB has a primary objective of monetary stability and not of financial stability and these two objectives may be conflicting. So I think we should be open towards a discussion where actually the supranational micro and macro potential powers could potentially be moved out of the central bank to an independent cross-sectoral euro area institution which has a clear mandate for financial stability. So my feeling is that this issue of financial stability is not given the emphasis that it deserves. And finally I think we should think more about strengthening the ECB's crisis management powers. So I think there's very little discussion about ELA and to be honest I never really understood why ELA is at the national level and I think we should get back to that discussion of moving it to the euro area level. I mean I know that many people, maybe my country are not happy about that but I think that would be very important. A second very important issue is that we have to deal with the question of liquidity for banks in resolution. This is a big unresolved topic and again I think this would be the role of the ECB and one has to think about how to design it properly. But that is another very important issue I see and I would like to stop here. Thank you very much. Thanks a lot Isabel especially for raising this topic of macro prudential policy which is another tool in the armory of central banks, well at least in the sense that a lot of central banks now have some responsibility for it but as you say it's rather new and not necessarily well understood. Can we turn now to Jean please? Yes, let me start by paying tribute to an aspect of Peter that hasn't been mentioned so far. I think the reason why I'm here is that back in 2003 when I was busy with the project of Brugel I came to see you and I discovered the sort of government sector venture capitalist in Peter who immediately assigned one of the best brains in the Bank of Belgium. And then Mario Monti joined this. That was before Mario Monti joined. That was before. And so you have sent Stefan so to Stefan Rotier so that they would be someone active, you know, organizing the compromises that eventually led to Brugel and to Mario Monti taking the chair at the first. So I wanted to say that. Now to answer your question you know what tower is CZCB in 8 years? I would wish to see it as boring. You know, is it obviously appropriate for central bank as gray because it's the color of the neutrality of money and as less powerful, which is another way to say, you know, it's not of a burden. And I think actually this would just show that Peter is not needed because he's not boring. He's anything but boring. He's gray outside but colorful inside as soon as he starts speaking. And he's powerful. But I don't think it's going to happen. And I think I would echo what, you know, the previous panel said, what Adam said, what CZCB said, that the overburdening is likely to continue. And I would go as far as saying that we see a very strange consensus or at least very strange trend emerging in this debate in the electoral campaign, which is consensus and zero. Everybody wants to keep the euro. Everybody wants consensus on Europe. So the idea that we can keep the euro without integrating in Europe is worrying. It's understandable because, you know, it's people want to keep the euro. They don't want politicians to play with their currency, but they are not willing to accept what it implies in terms of integration, in terms of further liberalization, and therefore the politicians are not telling them, OK, we keep the euro, but Europe is not part of the agenda. And this is obviously inconsistent and that's going to be a major challenge for the ECB going forward. So in the spirit of, you know, slaughtering sacred cows, I would like to compliment a bit because I agree with much what has been said, addressing two other issues. One is the fact that the central bank ECB is really about price stability, about financial stability. We know the mantra, we know the mandate. And there is a disconnect between that and what younger people care about, which is inequality and climate change, probably the two most important things they would mention, which is obviously not in the mandate of a central bank. And at the same time, you know, if you want to counter populist trends, you have also to care about what society is interested in. And central bankers, including the ECB, have been active saying that there are ways in which, you know, they can take those issues on board. Especially, you know, inequality, there is not much it can do, but climate change. And I think it has been done mostly through saying that there are financial stability ways to addressing climate change and warning the private sector about the consequences of underestimating the risk of stranded assets and what it implies for financial stability. I don't think it's really sufficient in terms of the way we should be dealing with climate change. I think for two reasons. One is that we're speaking of a major transformation that involves genuine trade-offs in terms of what we are able to sacrifice in the name of improving the outlook for climate action. Let me take the situation today. I mean, we're benefiting from extremely low interest rates, and we're benefiting from a windfall that comes from this lower, much lower interest rate on public debt than anticipated even two years ago. We don't have any discussion in Europe on what it implies and how to use this windfall gain. Does it make sense actually to use the large fiscal space and to use the windfall gain coming from the drop in the interest rate burden in public expenditure to invest in accelerating the transition to a low carbon economy? That's not something that's part of the discussion, and that's very strange, I think. So that's a discussion on which it would be important, I think, to have the view of the ECB. Now there are also bad reasons for which the ECB could have to deal with that. That there is, and that's another way of being overburdened, I think there is likely to be a pressure on the ECB to substitute the lack of proper action by governments. Governments face a major difficulty in changing relative prices because climate change is fundamentally about changing relative prices. This should be done, we know, the first best rate tax. This is not being done except in a few countries like Northern European countries. Sweden is an example in this respect. And so they are searched for substitutes. Search for substitutes, like without being able to committing to raising taxes in a way that would correspond to the social price of oil. Or to the shadow price of carbon consistent with the Paris Agreement. Search for substitutes is to use financial engineering as a substitute for it. And so they are increasingly likely to be pressure on the ECB to actually contribute to that. Actually, it's part of the programme of the party of President Macron that climate change should be part of the mandate of every European institution, including the ECB explicitly. We don't know what it means, but it may mean that there will be some sort of suggestion that the ECB should do that. So I think this needs a response on the part of central bankers. What do they consider can be part of the mandate and what do they consider cannot be part of the mandate. So just to mention two things. One is about financial stability. Is it consistent to tell the private sector you shouldn't invest in such and such asset because it involves a risk that these assets being stranded because of climate change policy. And at the same time saying that in the monetary policy operation, the asset purchase of the ECB are perfectly neutral and you don't distinguish between these types of assets. The second issue is more sort of speculative. It's the issue of the credibility. We are looking desperately for some form of credibility in climate change policy. There is no credibility currently in climate change policies. So the question is, you know, is there a way in which an institution that has very strong credibility could help support the credibility of those policies to lending it to embattled governments. Now, let me end on the second perhaps cow I would like to deal with, which is the external dimension of the euro, which we did not address so much implicitly, but in what Adam said. It's been neglected for two decades for very good reasons, I think. There was this neutral stance and either discourage or encourage the external use of the euro. And that was certainly fine for the first two decades of the euro. And Adam and I looked ten years ago into the issue of the external role of the euro and computed that there were limitations. And that was, you know, this neutral stance was part of the limitation, not telling external non-residents what the stance was. I think the reasons to change that stance now. It's time to answer the neutrality of the ECB and the euro in general toward the external role of the euro. One reason is that we, for Europeans, for many years, for many decades, somehow considered that the US dollar was the currency of the US, but was also some sort of global public good. And that we could rely on it knowing that there was a privilege, but that was a sort of critical for the fact that the US was providing it to the rest of the world. Now, what we've seen is that the Trump administration has clearly indicated that it doesn't want to manage the dollar in various ways in the interest of the rest of the world, but in the strict national interest narrowly defined of the US. And not as the US as a leader of the global economy, but the US as a zero-sum game type of country that considers it has adversarial interests with other countries, possibly also the EU. So that's one of the reasons why we should reconsider. The second, which is linked, is that we're most probably heading towards a multipolar currency system, currency world, and that we have to ask ourselves what role do we want to play in this regard. And so the Commission recently published a paper on that, and the Commission actually, in terms of the general stance, started changing the direction, saying we need to do more for the external role of the euro. The question is, what does it mean in practice? And I think it means two things in practice. One, which actually also echoes some issues for domestic monetary policy, is the question of the safe asset. What's the reference safe asset that we are going to offer the rest of the world? It's there one. I'm not speaking obviously of mutualisation, but I'm speaking of the vice-propos that have been made to create a safe asset with domestic benefits, but also significant external consequences because if there is a safe asset of this sort it means that for the rest of the world there is a vehicle to invest in. The second issue is the issue of the swap lines. We know that at the time of the crisis the ECB faced difficulties providing swap lines to other central banks that could help those central banks to serve as a lender of last resort in other currency, in a foreign currency, vis-à-vis their own banking system. The US did that. The ECB did not do it. Again, there are good reasons for that because it would have meant that the ECB would have engaged in something it didn't have a mandate for. Actually that raised question of relationship between the ECB as a monetary institution and political authorities selecting the parties to which such swap lines would be extended and also a treasury because swap lines involves a fiscal risk and the fiscal risk has to be covered in some way. So it was very understandable that at the time we were not ready for that. I think the question, the time has come to ask this question and again to reconsider this stance with all what it implies, both in terms of the safe asset and the swap line. My turn. First, thank you very much to be here. You have noticed the diversity of the panellists. So I think that's the purpose also and we heard very contrasted views. I think what came out very much is the sense of urgency that was I think shared by each of us with different accents of course. Now you asked a question about 2027. What is 27? It's Philip you're there, no? Philip Lane. It's almost the end of your mandate and it will be the end of the mandate of Lewis. I think somewhere, it's seven, eight years from now. So I was thinking, Philip, when you will be sitting here in eight years from now, what will be the farewell for you? And then that was my first dream when I thought about this is actually you will have a good life compared to me, actually. Because, because, because the banking union and the capital market union, they will be completed because they will understand what we say. These are policy makers. They will understand. So the sense of urgency, they get the message. So you get a good conditions actually. The second is indeed that structural reforms will be taken and implemented, which means that the potential growth rate will be up, which means that natural rate will go up, that means the nominal rates will go up, and that means that you get rid of the lower bound issue that we had to struggle over the last years. Menwain and colleagues Eve and others here and colleagues from the governing council. So that's, that's another good thing for you. There was another thing also, which you will benefit very much, Philip, is that fiscal policy will be on a sustainable path in the different countries. And that, as a result, all our discussion, of course, there will be some outliers, but Klaus told us he would take care about the few outliers. So the crisis management framework will work pretty well. Philip and colleagues are still there also. And that means the safe asset problems will be basically solved because they're more sustainable. And we take care for the tails, you know, with Klaus being there and with some OMG sort of support, you know, in that deal. So that was my first reaction when you asked 27. The second reaction then I suddenly actually thought about that's a horrible story I'll tell you. It's a Jean Monnet. I always had big problems with Jean Monnet years and he's a great person. I guess I didn't know him. Start talking like Trump actually when I do that. Great guy. It's a great guy. By the way, I got beautiful letters, beautiful letters from people who are not here. You know what I mean. You're the smartest guy. You are the smartest guy. Right, right, right. You got it right. No, but I mean it's, it is really something. But I'll go back to this question of communication very seriously just after. I'm very serious actually always as you know. I suppose I would not be there if I was not serious. But no, but I had the other Jean Monnet story which I think we should reflect. Europe will be forged in crisis. I mean you know that expression. I was always horrified by this because it's a sort of top down recognition of the elite that you create a tension somewhere and that the movement will go in one direction. So you have different examples. You lock in, for example, in the euro, there will be tension on someone and in the end it will mean more integration. From the top down and the population would follow. I always found it a horrifying story because this sort of positive feedback loop expectation, I think it could lead to a destructive loop and not the other way around. So this Jean Monnet story which I am not the first to say that but I thought that since long time and there's been papers on this as you know. I was thinking Philip, maybe it's not my first dream but it's my nightmare that you will have to go through with the other colleagues being there because that's where we come with a sense of urgency because you cannot expect and maybe we're already in that situation, the population, to just say we need more integration, you need to do this and it's true what Jerome was very fantastically saying and then he has been punished in the elections. He's a great person, again he's a great guy and which is true but you see that he didn't pay politically and that's also one of the reasons to bring these sort of people and there are several in the rooms here. Pierre-Carlo, where you're sitting, you are there. So on some of these people I see here in the room, I can show them, again I am using this communication device that we see but it is true that we need to start to talk differently and I can do that I think to many people here because usually when I communicate people say we hate what you are doing but at least we think you are honest in what you do and I will go to that sort of point which is the first thing of communication is we try to do our best within our mandate and I will defend a little bit very briefly that point of view because sometimes it's a bit difficult you know from what you hear. So this question of Jerome I think has to be taken very seriously and the communication to the people actually in a way which they understand of course and that leads us to this I think Sylvie also you mentioned that very often this gap between ah they love the euro but they don't trust the ECB or they don't trust the commission, they don't trust the parliament, they don't trust the church, they trust the army I think in general I see that but this gap between what we think is good and the perceptions which you alluded also Jean is something any institution dealing with policy has to tackle that as a major problem and not continuing to say the elite needs a response that's fine but you also need to communicate very much to the people what is it and what is it not what we are doing. For example for the central bank now we go for the central bank the first thing I want to say with the central bank I am in this central bank in community I joined it 19 years ago so about 2000 and I discovered also via the BIS club you know that positive I think it's very positive there are some negative images also is to close you know it's not transparent all that. I think this has been a issue of stability in the global environment I mean you have there a number of people I saw them very committed to you know the public good you know basically stability oriented sort of culture and it has proven very much over the years as a very useful in the world environment I would say that for all the multilateral institutions and so I defend very much not only the ECB which came very much in the discussion but I would add something which has not been said very much your system dimension. I'm very grateful to all the colleagues of the governing council and I clear actually you asked me do you have some advice to give to Philip the new guy and well I said I give you my advice yet Philip but I think it's essential to keep this strong you know group team spirit even if they are very different opinions on what should be done or not do I think that's essential because diversity is essential that's what I always wanted in this panel this diversion at this freedom of expressing different opinions. No of course sometimes sometimes it's difficult sometimes to listen when I signed my contract my side the other side was by I think Angela Merkel or Sarkozy I think and these are big names actually so I just signed on my side. And it is true that I my contract you know when you contract now it's very very simple contract is price stability and Isabel you mentioned it also and now certainly certainly I have if all the known objections that we get every day now I signed such a contract actually of course they ask us to do that and we are very loyal following what government but it is true that this issue where you have a central bank in a very difficult framework with low natural rate you know with financial shocks in a bank intermediated environment with very under investment you know in institutions dealing with financial crisis and all this is already a very difficult environment. You put it in I think we did it very successfully and we extremely engaged all your system in that so I think it's a great success but it stretches the institution very much as you were saying I don't I don't say that we should change the environment or whatever I just say this is an issue as in the way you mentioned we have to reflect on this. So we have a separation principle but at the same time we are asked every day almost to non object you know or object to some of the decisions which are not final decision from the supervisory board I mean so these are these are issues we in terms of governance we have to think in the future although I think we we did I mean in terms of organization also very good job I really think that well I was head of human resources by the way at that time so I couldn't say the opposite but it's true that we hired a lot of people in a very short period of time. I think that some of the unions representatives here in the room it's true that also it was very cooperative spirit was a personal here in the bank when we did all this. The question which I think was a bit more difficult is when we go into the well into the mandate actually which is my simple contract on price stability. We always heard this story you came too late the rates where I look a little bit at you Mario Monty actually we should have done more and then we should have done less later on because we should have not because low for too long time means that you get more hazard the spreads are not high enough to discipline the country so we are used to that sort of criticism. I think we try to do the best in the mandate on price stability in a way you could say there has been a for government sometimes a happy coincidence because you know you had low you know price pressures so you have to have low interest rates. There is an external externality on governments they got a free ride because rates gone up but don't forget they should not forget market discipline is still there so you in the market discipline you could say the discipline goes up to the run on the on the sovereigns. I mean that's a that's a dangerous market discipline but when you get the spreads you know in a country like Italy which they are now you could say they could they should be hired to discipline the government but I mean you should you should also see you know what is the optimum level which is very difficult to do. So discipline is still there in the market we have a number of proofs you look at Portugal. Portugal at some point at a high spread which are you there high spread they have gone down you know after signal was taken by government. Now the essential question is all that in the terms of moral hazard and monetary policy. We are guided by the mandate it's true that when interest rates are low we had absolutely risk on deflation risk. I can eloquently if you want explain that in another forum we acted very much and of course the externalities sometimes positive externalities for the free riders and for these sort of issues of course when the crisis came we had two issues. We had the banks and we had the sovereigns on the banks and that came after 2009. So the Philadelphia you know GD 20 was it and there was the quick pro quo we provide liquidity so that's moral hazard not a problem. I mean we just do it and on the other hand we want to be sure that there is a clear agenda of toughening regulation and all these things which we did and I can say we should do more. Matias was explaining and we should have all the instruments and macro proof and all these things on the sovereign side we did and it's unfinished work. So we put in place institutions with conditionality framework and with the liquidity provision with backstop in these crisis. It's true that that has not been sufficiently you know led to a national discipline. Now it's easy to criticize no but what has been said that you have to regain and that's people like Sylvie Goulard and many others who have been in politics also in the parliament. You have to regain the trust of the population and regain that in all these institutions not only we but all these institutions. It is true that in the mindset and someone mentioned this morning who did it the younger generation that have known you know the austerity. I mean think about Yannis is there for Greece. It is clear that for the younger people when you say the year is good because it facilitates transaction. On the hand it's associated to austerity and one of the biggest crisis I mean the country has ever had. So I mean these are the things Greece it's true everybody can insist German on the country like Greece. But on the other hand you also see the sufferings you know of the population. So in my in my in my attitude it was relatively simple because I say we have a mandate. We say risk to price stability very often we had no of course we can criticize you did it too much or too little but I mean that has been the driving force. The asset test of course if it had been different you get price pressures and then you that's maybe Philip you're going to see that one day. But I mean here it is not that we do too too much for governments we are too lenient. No because you have your mandate and I think that's you know we're still struggling you know to get you know that close to 2%. I your question Adam I mean we love each other because Adam because he's a brilliant mind. And you remember we were sitting together years and years ago in the Bellagio group as we call it which brought academics with central bankers and ministers of finance. And it was great people you know Raghu Rajan and plenty plenty of very good Murray of Osfeld and people like this. And Benoit you are also there in that group and we were sitting some very often and it's true that it's important to listen to what you say. You don't you need to put the inflation target hires first you have to do that. I think all discussion I'm looking at some of my colleagues the discussions about strategy has to be very carefully brought. First you know if you say we need a new strategy it doesn't mean that the old strategy has failed. I think the strategy that we have followed works and I really am convinced of that actually you will not believe me but I am convinced of that. And the reason why don't you reach your objective. Well try to do that when you get all these trade shocks you know and Brexit shocks you know that come in. I think the strategy was fine so it's not reminded that's for the past. I acknowledge that discussion for the future if and that's a thing we should have a very open mind on this don't misread me. And on the future you come with one idea I will come with other ideas on this. You know I'm still you know the governing council but I mean on the other ideas I pick up a few things now and then I stop on this. I pick up the idea of well your idea of the level of inflation you mentioned. I would put on the table this question is it true that this institution has reacted in a symmetric way. I don't well I know the staff is working on this but I know there is a lot of talk about this. I like to clarify that some of my colleagues have done even Mario has alluded to that. I think that's a conversation we can certainly have if it needs to be clarified further because it was a clarification in 2003. The other example is what we call we reach it in the medium term. And then I get in the market sometimes you know I was confronted very much. You know I said medium medium to the long term medium to the long given the nature of the shock which are shocks we haven't seen since the 30s. It's obvious that these sort of things you cannot just do in the normal targeting period of two years and maybe three years. So the flexible targeting where the horizon is medium term and then you stretch your horizon in a you know very much leads to questions about credibility. So it's very important that in that sort of situation you really show determination no compromise and you stick to that and sometimes of course you say that collateral damages and all that. I mean that's mine I think I share that probably a little bit with Mario. You have to go you have to go that way and and you try to deal with the other best you can but I mean you just you just have to do what you have to do. Now I understand this is not easy. The question the next question of course is the the we have a two pillar strategy. Well the two pillar strategy you know you have look at the economy and then you look at the monetary pillar. That was a contribution and we there's a lot of work on this and you have to put it in the context of these years that has evolved very much over the years and it is true. I look again at Isabel a lot of this has been done as a lot of work has been done on what we call the second pillar. Now it was the first in the beginning I became the second which is the monetary pillar. We look indeed at the transmission mechanism in and the amplification mechanism that you can have the fragmentation issues. The enormous knowledge which has been built up you know by the staff and has been extremely useful. I will mention that in Sintra maybe that sort of issue. The next one of course in this in sort of strategic reflection that everybody has you know anyway in the staff. I mean everybody has that on the mind is of course to and that's Isabel again. How much do you integrate the financial stability consideration within the normal monetary policy discussion. And we have to reflect very careful about this sort of thing. It's not obvious and you quickly go with an additional instrument question which is an instrument which is shared with usually with other authorities. So that reflection is not something going to just launch like this and it's careful reflections on this. I think I had a few other points for example the non standard measures. If we think the non standard measures are going to become the standard measures because you get low rates now at the peak of the cycle. And suppose you know the cycle goes down from that level. It is clear that you have to think about your toolbox. The non standard becomes a standard. I think Victor in your farewell last year you are you are you. That was one of the points. So you have to think in terms of how do you work given of course the difficulties of using and also the political related issues that you have to that to very conclude on this. From the beginning I think there is a big priority because yes we clear always the priorities. I think the conversation with the people with the population is absolutely of key and I know we are convinced of that. I'm not afraid of that. They don't understand very much what's inflation. They are very confused with different things. But people are not unreasonable in general. But they are very bit captured by some people. So it's easy in a way to capture the attention the other way. You have to find the people doing that. But it's a lot of work because we took a lot of distance from those being able to talk to the people in a wrong way. And I think that we need this reflection among people, the elite sort of communication. It's difficult to do in a way but it's not that difficult because people in the end are relatively reasonable in the end. If you can really explain what you're doing. But maybe that's my dream. But we'll see. So could we take some questions from the floor please? I'll do what we did in the previous panel and take three and then return to the panel. So first Vito please. Thank you Claire. I just wanted to speak from the floor first and foremost to pay my homage to Peter Pratt for all the work that he has done. And the way he has worked to really keep consensus and team spirit in the governing council which has been very important. But I have two points. The first one is to underline the importance of what Jean said for the first time in the two panels raising the issue of the European safe asset. Because it's something that is crucial in my view. It serves several objectives. It's essential for several objectives. We won't have a CMU without having a real European safe asset. And by the way the European safe asset cannot be just transforming each sovereign debt of each member country as safer than what they are now. There will be always nuances in credit risk and other factors liquidity and so on affecting the different countries. So we need really something at the European level. So no CMU without the safe asset. No more internationalisation of the euro without the safe asset. And no solution, no smooth solution to the problem of the concentration of a bank's portfolio in domestic debt without the European, a true European safe asset. And there are solutions that do not involve mutualisation. So the question is how to motivate the government, the politicians really to buy this idea because they speak a lot that they are all in favour of CMU. That they have not moved one inch in any domain that is essential for that project. The second brief comment reaction was to what Isabelle said about transferring ELA to the European level, meaning the euro system level. Well, I am told that there are legal problems with that in the treaty. We say fortunately because I think it would be something that is not useful and could even be detrimental. Why? Because already now the governing council has to authorise when the levels, the amounts raise. And so there is a lot of control coordination and all that. So no need to transfer just because of that reason. But then think about what would happen in the big crisis. In normal times it could work. Think what would happen in big crisis like the one we had where for two countries ELA attained almost 100% of the GDP of those two countries. Who that sort of ELA would have been granted if the decision was and the risk was taken up at the euro system level. So I leave you with that question and for you to really think about the role of ELA in big crisis management. Stefan Collignon. Thank you. Jean and his contribution dismissed the role of inequality for monetary policy. But I think your staff is probably the only central bank in the world as far as I know who has done studies on the impact of inequality and wealth inequality. And the implications that it has for monetary policy in particular it seems that there is higher volatility of wealth inequality due to the unconventional monetary policies. So I wonder if you could say something about that and put it in context. Thank you. I'm Livia Stracca from DCB. I just wanted also to give a bit the perspective of DCB staff in inter-Russia with Peter. I always find it very enriching. And Peter always had very difficult questions which I personally always found difficult to answer. So has been a reasonable so demanding on our side on set of stuff. And in terms of the question I would have is so I find it very true that especially young people don't care too much about really especially the decimals of inflation. So it's very hard to then to say is it a big problem that inflation is 1.5 as opposed to 2%. Nobody really cares about that. Everybody cares about climate. That is entirely true. But the question is what can we do within our legal mandates and what we can do in practice to make progress on that. So in practice what can we do on that. That's a Greenspan's curse what you mentioned. Thank you. I'd just like to add one question myself. I mean something that's come up a lot in the remarks is that either directly or indirectly is that we're operating in this era where there is a lot of. Public anger. I mean Peter you note that people are not unreasonable but you do get the sense that people are scared. And there's a sense to where people are saying that central banks should be or should not be in some cases engaging in these debates. So I think I'd like to ask the panellists in the era of fake news. The central banks need to get more involved in speaking with the public or is there not a risk that that could backfire and you end up looking to politicised. And if we can start with with Peter's remarks on the questions that would be great. Really really. But that's OK with you. But I can start the answers or to yours first. You can start the others. So leave your anticipated what I wanted to say about the staff. Later I will say one thing on the journalist in the media. But the other thing I wanted to say before you as the question is grateful to the staff. There are many of my collaborators here and I really are collaborators. So I hope I have been always not very hierarchical with the Dutch way you know where we really are flat you know when people can come up with their ideas. I hope I hope you never know how people judge you. But that was I hope the spirit as you said leave you. I hope maybe difficult questions I don't know. And the staff has been very creative actually maybe too according to some of you. But that means something that means that you know that they have some freedom of thinking about what to do. So the inflation one point five it is true. And that's also a bit related to you. I mean you're doing all this from going from one point five to one point eight or one point nine. It's a little bit the very difficult to explain. It's a green spans curse in a way that you succeed. But why you said that it's in the last year. You succeed in inflation when people don't in their decisions don't look at inflation anymore. Now there is a little bit of problem with that of course because if they don't care between zero and two percent you have a sign of the incurring. So that's why we call it a little bit a curse that it's very difficult to explain why it's better to go close to two. That's why some people like you say you should go for three or something like this. Because if people don't really care anymore it could go be zero or it could be two. So what what is the anchor of the system. And then of course you know me on rates you know start from a very low level if it's closer to zero in 2003 DC tries to decide the definition of price stability. Victor you and some others where it is between zero and two percent. So if you go to zero you fulfill your mandates go to two you fulfill your mandate. And then in 2003 for these reasons you say it's better to be close below but close. Then came the question of asymmetry. It's two is a hard border and you are not so concerned you go to zero. So I mean these are the things I mentioned in strategic sort of reflection. It's one part that if needed if needed you have to clarify. But leave your your quite right. I mean it's difficult to explain this question that it makes a difference indeed. If people don't care it's a success. If they don't care you are closest to zero it's a curse of Greenspan. I think it was called Greenspan's curse. And all you deal I don't know. We stick to close to two percent or something like this. But the question of Stefan Stefan on monetary policy and wealth inequality. I mean my position is Matthias you remember we worked many years ago about the impact of inflation and expected inflation. You were young you're still younger than me. I think it remains it remains. And it's true that with Matthias I worked you know on the redistribution impact of inflation. And not of monetary policy. Well in a way yes because monetary policy tolerated inflation. There were huge redistribution shock. I didn't have many ideas about academic work. But I had this idea that when you look at the national accounts you don't see this redistribution impact of inflation. That's how I got to in the IMF I think because I thought it was good that people worked on that idea AD. Which was at that time not very much. And when you came back from Harvard you say you have to look at human capital also. There can be capital losses on human capital. And then that's how we started. But to go back on the question about wealth effects. Well what we think is in a monetary policy is that if you can stabilize inflation. Well you minimize the redistribution effect of unexpected inflation. But also unexpected deflationary question. Now the instruments you use indeed for example if you do QE. And you say I do QE buying equities directly. Obviously it has an impact of course a direct impact on equity prices on wealth distribution. And then we can discuss about other ways to do that. It is true that it's challenging because if you would go in equities. Because I take the extreme case just for the discussion. You immediately get the question from the people. Why don't you do QE for the people then rather than QE for the capitalist. And so it's true that these are whole new challenges of communication. And when you get this instrument you know this lower bound issue. There are plenty of political questions coming in of course like this. So it is indeed I talk to Philip and the colleagues here. It is not an easy situation when you are in the zero lower bound. So you need the tools that you have. There are a few issues as the one you mentioned. But we have these big redistribution issues. But the population very often doesn't know that. You see the real rates in Germany were negative for many years. There were a lot of redistribution for inflation because the central banks were not active enough in cutting euro and unexpected inflation. But now we get I think income distribution promise to be dealt by the government. And they don't have the courage to do that. So they go to the central bank. They can criticize the central bank. And I think that's something. I'm sorry. They say you escaped the question. And you put it to the government. I didn't sign a contract to deal with income distribution. Well, distribution. We didn't see the contract on this. We know there are externalities of our policy. Government should discuss that and should act. And not just put it to the instrument. I mean that's my point of view since always. I mean I have a simple contract. In that way it's too much honor what you do now. I'm a simple bureaucrat I would say. Trying to do the best. If that's what history remains, it's already something. I mean we try to do the best in that contract, in that contract. Which was given a sign, don't forget, by Merkel, Sarkozy and plenty of important people. How could I forget? Yeah, you get it, no? So maybe I, so I won't discuss the ELA issue because I will discuss that with Peter over lunch because he's willing to, so it would be great. So I would like to discuss the issue of communication because I think that's actually crucial. So if I look at the perception of the ECB in Germany, this is very much dominated by simple narratives. And this is also true about for example four European deposit insurance. And so there are these narratives, so the ECB is stealing the savers money and target two is a time bomb and everything will be terrible. And I think the central banks have a very important educational role here to talk to the people and explain the simple mechanisms. I think it's very dangerous to say they are not able to understand. I mean I always say when I teach my students also they have a hard time understanding. But I try to kind of boil it down the way that they understand. Yeah, but they don't read the bill site on your screen. That's true. It's a different, it's more challenging. But I mean this is something I think that central banks have to do. They are partly already doing it. But I think this should be intensified because for the acceptance of monetary policy and especially in Germany that would be crucial to get these narratives out of the heads. But that is very hard. Once they are there, it's very hard to convince people that that is not true. So when I give a public speech on something in the end someone sends up and asks so Hans-Werner-Zinn told me about target two. How terrible is it? I mean every time. Every single time. And so I mean I can then respond but that's not enough. I mean so the... That's why you're sitting there by the way also. It's because of what you say now. No really, really Isabel. Thank you. So I was the one who, for all what I said who ducked saying what would the world would be like in 2027 because I had of course, I had the negative opposite of Peter's lovely story of the world that Philip will get to rule over. So let me just put on one more positive spin. I think that there are two great opportunities here for the European Central Bank and one is just to emphasize what John said. The US government is throwing a lot away. It's not going to get it back anytime soon even if it pretends to. There's both a need and an opportunity for the international role of the euro and that will I think increase as Vitor said, as John said, as others have said the possibility and the feasibility and the viability of a euro safe asset which has major views. So I just want to strongly associate myself with John on that point. The second point is I want to take something Isabel said and others have said about the overburdening of the central bank and flip that around. I think you should actually look at the fact that the central banks now have to deal with financial stability in a more overt way as an opportunity for broadening the legitimacy of the central bank. We had a speech at our Peterson Institute about a month and a half ago by Lysetia Caganyago, the governor of the South African Reserve Bank which I asked him to do on central bank independence and his message, as I hoped and expected, was that central bank independence isn't really just about the inflation bias and the credibility of that. Central bank independence isn't part about sitting there and doing the right thing apolitically in the society with respect to the monetary and financial system. And obviously in the context of South Africa that's a very high stakes big thing to say. But Stan Fisher, who spoke last night and who had to run off, also gave a talk at our institute two years ago in which he echoed Martin Wolf and said, you know, one problem with the central banks and everybody who thought us to the financial crisis was not enough bankers went to jail. And I would take these two points together and obviously despite the thick walls this building is not meant to hold people in jail. But just to say that central banks can build their credibility with the public by forthrightly dealing with financial issues and that's a way of demonstrating that they are impartial, that they care about welfare, that they're basically trying to do the right thing and it goes to Peter's point about just being reasonable. And so I think rather than looking at that as oh my god we have a burden and oh my god we have dual mandates is an opportunity to deliver on credibility in the broad sense of the central banks as guardians of fair play and decency in the society. Let me say I entirely agree with what Vitor said and Severs said so and it may not go back to it. I'd like to respond to Stefan about inequality and I would agree with you that inequality is fundamentally something that central banks may care about the consequences of what they are doing but they don't have the instruments to address it. I mean that's business of the government for very good reasons. You know we have something that's called a tax system and a transfer system and we have a parliament to take responsibility for it. So I think I would refrain from going beyond the fact that you have to observe and you have to assess the consequence of what you're doing. Now climate change is in my view different because I mean to go back to what Livia was asking. You know I'm not convinced by the strategy that these institutions have followed as we go to climate change. Basically they're following Mark Carney. They say it's a financial stability problem. We can address it within our mandate for financial stability but it has nothing to do with monetary policy except that we may have to take into account the consequence of climate change or of climate policy for the economy and therefore in this regard for monetary policy. I mean I wonder why it's a problem for financial stability more than some other factors of instability like technology risk, like geopolitical risk, like many others that are not addressing the same way by central bank. And turning to the monetary policy dimension I mean certainly it's not something you know I said it's a price, it's a relative price problem fundamentally and this relative problem cannot be addressed by monetary policy. But at the same time it's a major issue of credit allocation for the medium to long term in a certain direction with a major credibility problem behind which is that again governments are just unable to commit to the future price of carbon that would trigger the investment. And I wonder whether the answer to that is just to say we deal with a financial stability issue and we separate that completely from the monetary. So I don't have the response to that but I'm saying the question is deeper than the answer that's being provided which by itself is not entirely convincing in my view. On just very briefly on this in my mind I put it as a sort of supply shock you know what is the impact of China I mean years ago when they joined the WTO and the World Trade System on monetary policy. So there you have changes in relative prices maybe with taxation you know disruptions you know so it's the same sort of supply shock but the point you make here is a sort of lasting shock which so far we don't see much actually but it's a lasting shock that may come. I would put it in the normal framework that we do you know when you assess you know the environment and you say well inflation looks weak you know and persistently weak you try to assess which are you know the sort of supply shock or not and that may explain is it more demand is it supply if it's supply you try to see is it sort of lasting shock which complicates very much the monetary policy of course but that sort of discussion we had about China for example and the impact on inflation worldwide you say there is another shock which is in the making but which we haven't seen yet much actually that may come in the future I think it could come in the normal framework I think so. Wait, what you're saying is that it's a sort of exogenous shock that comes from either I mean the climate shock and the action of governments the response to the climate shock and all that is exogenous for the central bank I mean if you look at what the climate community the way the climate community think they're desperate you know because they're not able to convince government to act through taxation and they're all into you know finding ways to act through essentially credit okay no but that's a different thing no but that's a different thing but that's a pressure you're going to deal with or your successors are going to deal with and what I'm saying is that this is an issue you have to you know I'm not saying you have to just to abide to the pressure to both the pressure it's an issue you have to think about more deeply no that's a good point Just before giving Peter the final word I'd just like to say thanks pay some words of gratitude just for all the help you've given us, me as journalists and the rest of the media I think you mentioned that you always try to be honest and I think that's something that's shown through you've really tried to answer our questions as best as you you couldn't no matter how tough they are and I'd also like to say thanks to you caviat you know caviat but just as a European too that I'm sure I'm not the only one in the room concerned about the elections later this week I think we all know the project isn't perfect but I think your ideas and your commitment of really cushion Europe from some pretty serious blows both from outside and within so you should be just the proud of that thanks a lot as I said you know I'm just a bureaucrat trying to fulfil this simple mandate no but there is one community I didn't think so I wanted to keep it for the end actually as you know I usually cannot read a speech because probably my mother being German she learned French at the same time as me and I can never read a text correctly in French usually so the way of doing that is just I don't read the text I just speak which makes it but which makes it and stun you know that's how we start to know each other better years ago you told me that in Washington once because we stick to our notes no really I mean it very grateful to a number of people sitting here because you always I don't know exactly the reason but you always protected me in a way because you could have really big headlines about what I was saying you never did actually and I'm grateful not only you but a number of people I see in the room here wait another 10 days but you never did that and then I was asking myself the question Claire that two explanations unfortunately they're good and the bad but I think it's a good one the good one they just want to protect me and they just want to iron a little bit what I said so that's the good one the other one is they don't understand what I say and so they go back to the written text you know which and then they just the third explanation I would never take it's that too lazy so they just really take a few quotes from the text but the result actually and what I want to say about the press of course you know you play a key role and it's not always optimum it's available not only in Germany and I can understand that you see and it's part of our efforts also to do I mean it's not I must say the people I met from the press I must say I cannot complain personally maybe my colleagues could I don't know but I personally never complain which you better not do in any case but I must say this my experience has been very good with a number of people here present actually you remember when we met the first time you don't remember she remembered that she doesn't want to say you see that's the issue no you were very young what I mean is that she started she started business and I was in London making speeches as usual I was not yet in the public sector and I remember you had the first conversations we had at that time and it's true that I thought this is a little bit part of my character I only want to teach people things so I remember that you don't remember maybe but that was a long time ago but the age differential has remained that's good thank you Claire thank you very much