 So we're taking up S1, S something today. I think it's age 133. It's 133. Bill that has to do with a little procedure during a hearings. Eric will happily go through the bill with us. So if you would Eric, if you could lead us along. Yes, I'd be happy to. It has to do I. It has. I'm sorry. I'm going to give you the, the action. I think we should do a little bit more of that. So I would like to add to this. I would like to add to this. I would like to add to that relating to a emergency relief from abuse, orders, and relinquishment of firearms. Yes. Thank you. Senator Sears. Eric, it's Patrick with the. Office of legislative council here to walk the committee through. The bill that center Sears just mentioned age. One 33 and act relating to. Emergency relief from abuse orders. And relinquishment of firearms. As it passed the house. that it's dealt with relief from abuse orders, which are known as RFA's, quite a bit off and on over the years, but I think it might help to just refresh the committee's recollection for a moment and as to what they are and how they come about. An RFA, a relief from abuse order is an order that the court can issue to protect a family or household member from abuse by another family or household member. That's kind of it in a nutshell. The way it's obtained is that a family or household member can go into court and they file a complaint to have an affidavit attached to it. And if the court finds based on the affidavit and other evidence by a preponderance of the evidence, so it's a preponderance of the evidence standard more likely than not. If the court finds by that preponderance standard that the plaintiff, though the family or household member has been abused by the other family or household member in the past and that there's a danger of future abuse, so it's got to make those two findings, abuse in the past, danger of future abuse, by a preponderance of the evidence. If it makes those findings, then it can issue the RFA, the relief from abuse order in order to protect the plaintiff from further abuse in the future and that order can contain a variety of things. We'll look at the language in a moment, but it could say that the person can't have any contact with the plaintiff. They have to remain a certain distance from the plaintiff. Maybe they can't have any contact with the plaintiff's children. They have to move out of the house. There's a variety of things that could be in the order. But the point is that it restricts the ability, what the defendant can do with respect to the plaintiff. That's the big picture of what it does. And the couple of things I think that will be helpful for the committee to keep in mind as we look at the language of the bill, is that there's two types of RFA, two types of relief from abuse orders. There's a final order and there's an emergency order. And the structure actually may seem familiar to the committee, not only from looking at RFA's in the past, but the ERPO orders, the emergency relief protection orders that the committee drafted several years ago were based on this exact same structure. There's a final order and an emergency order. And the way the final order works is that the defendant has to, the court has to hold a hearing and the defendant has to be present at the hearing. So they have to get notice of the hearing, they have to be present there at the hearing. And the court can only issue a final order after having had that hearing with the defendant present. And the order can remain in effect for any period specified by the court. In other words, there's no maximum period for the effectiveness of this final relief from abuse order. It's common for them to be a year, but it could be more, some are longer. On the other hand, the emergency relief from abuse order can be issued ex parte. Remember that means that the defendant does not have to be present. It can be only the plaintiff who is present when the motion is filed and when the order is issued. Now, the reason for that, as you can guess from the title of it, is it's called an emergency relief from abuse order. Remember, I mentioned that generally the standard is that there has to be the court has to find a danger of future abuse. For an emergency order to issue, there has to be an immediate danger of future abuse. So it's a different, it's a different standard, has to be immediate. And the emergency order can only be in effect for 14 days. So you've got those distinctions there. Yes, that can be issued ex parte, in other words, without the defendant's presence, but it can only be last for a maximum of 14 days. And within that 14 day period, the court has to schedule a hearing. And the way it ordinarily works is that at that hearing, either the plaintiff will then file for the final order, because for the final order situation, the defendant has to be there. So they can file for a final relief from abuse order, which can be for a longer period than 14 days. Sometimes they agree, there are times when it goes away within that 14 day period for whatever reason. But if they want it to, if the plaintiff wants it to be in effect any longer, they have to come to that hearing, the defendant has to be there. And then if the court makes that preponderance finding that there's still a danger of future abuse, then they can issue a final order for a longer period of time. So- But they can do that right now, correct? Yes, yeah, exactly. That's, I'm just- The court can do this. And you get, how's this process different than the extremist protection order? Yeah. Well, one of the differences is that the extremist protection order can only be sought by, I believe it's a law enforcement officer or the state's attorney. Whereas in this case, it's a family or household member who typically brings it. I'm looking at the S5. Which is the particularly, in light of what just happened in Indianapolis for mass shooting there, the young man with a history of mental health problems. And for some reason they did not, the extremist protection order wasn't, they took a shotgun, I think, but he was able to go out and buy other salt style weapons. And then, so I'm just wondering, if we wouldn't be better to consider that bill, not obviously not S5, but the process there and consider letting under S5 a person, a healthcare provider, reason of believes the patient poses an extreme risk causing harm to them or herself or another person by purchasing or possessing firearms, blah, blah, blah, would be able to file for a petition. So what you would do here would be add healthcare provider and would be family member. Senator Sears, I thought we did, I thought we did that in a couple of years ago when we were talking about the responsibility of a healthcare provider to report an immediate danger from a patient and maybe- Eric can explain that, we didn't go that far. Oh, okay. Plus, I don't think it passed, did it? It didn't pass. The past was allowing somebody to go to law enforcement, family member can go to law enforcement, accept that and ask for an extreme risk protection order as S5 would allow the healthcare provider to avoid being a hyper violation if they were to- No, this wasn't around extreme risk orders. This was around the Kulagowski decision and the required healthcare providers if there was an immediate risk, it required them to notify. Yeah, but that wasn't just firearms though. No, that's true. Okay, all right. I think that was everything. Okay. If you remember that case, he had assaulted the performer with a wrench. It was the danger, it was the danger part of it. Yeah, the dangerous part of it. Okay. So I'm just looking at that process and this process. I think there are policy decisions for the committee, but just the one distinction to keep in mind under current law is that these relief from abuse orders can be filed by family or household members while family or household members cannot file for an ERPO. Those are law enforcement officers only. I understand. So, but you can certainly make whatever adjustments to either one of those that as a policy matter, you think it's good policy. But I'm trying to understand why we need this bill as it stands, if they can already do it. That's what I'm having a hard time with. Right. Judges can already do this, right? I believe you'll hear from Judge Greerson that it is, and I don't want to put words in his mouth, but that the general practice is that for emergency relief from abuse orders, that some of the forms do include references for firearms, relinquishment by the defendant, and that it is common practice for relinquishment to be ordered in connection with these, but that it's not uniform and that it would be helpful to have it in statute. So I think that's their perspective on that, but I'll let him test it. That's unusual. Usually they don't want us to take away some of their independence. Well, that actually would say maybe right into the language, if you want to take a look at it, Senator Sears, real quick. And I think- Unless the committee has other questions about my questions. I just, I have a question. Is an ERPO order? Is it only able to be filed by a family member or can the neighbor next door file it? Remember, Senator Nitko, we're not talking about ERPOs. Did you mean to be asking about ERPOs right then or the order in this bill? I'm asking about the current one in place with where someone can file for an emergency order. You have- This is an RFA. This is a relief from disorder, not an ERPO. And that's what we're looking at in the bill in front of us. And it's only a family or household member can file for it. Okay, so the neighbor can't. Correct. Okay. Okay, thanks. Yep, sure. And family or household member is defined in the statute. So actually, I'm going to pull up the, unless there are other questions, sorry. Eric, how long ago was it we made changes to the statute to enable that to happen? To enable which part? For the judge to be able to remove on the request of a family member, I'm trying to remember, I know Philip wasn't on the committee at the time. Autumn Water Song and Kara Cookson were involved in the conversations and I went around the building trying to get universal approval from everybody based on the fact that we injected due process into the system. And I'm trying to remember COVID has me totally stumped on how long ago that was. Well, I don't think that one, if you're thinking of the emergency relief from abuse order piece, which a couple of years ago was in a house built that never did pass the legislature. So the current practice of permitting relinquishment or ordering relinquishment of firearms in connection with these emergency relief from abuse orders is based on the courts inherent authority in an emergency situation. It's not based on the statutory language itself. So I think Judge Gerrison again can talk about that in more detail, but it's based on the inherent authority of the court to protect litigants during emergency situations. As opposed to anything express in statute. But I remember the center bang the same language you're talking about, but that ultimately didn't pass. So looking at the language itself, the I'll pull that up real quick, just to sort of ground the committee and where we are. And in fact, the first thing I will pull up is the existing statute, just so you can see what we're talking about here. So this is the relief from abuse statute currently in title 15 domestic relations section, chapter 21, abuse prevention. So as you were asking Senator Nitka as to who can bring one of these actions, it's just a family or household member. And you see in the definitions right there, definition number two, household member is defined. So that obviously family member means someone who's related, but it could also be a household member, but as you say, it's defined as a person. It had either they've been roommates, shared an occupancy or dwelling or had a dating or sexual relationship would qualify a person as a household member. Now, section 1103, this is the final order section that I was talking about. So this is the final relief from abuse order that could be in effect for whatever period of time that the court sets specifically in the order. Again, you see in subsection A, it's a family or household member who may seek relief from abuse by filing the complaint. And then you'll see under subsection B, this is the final order court can grant relief only after notice to the defendant in a hearing. So again, this final order requires that the defendant be present for a hearing. Plain if has the burden of proving of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Now you see under subsection C there, no, this is the, sorry, the preponderance of the evidence standard is also in subsection B. But under C one, that introductory language, the court shall make such borders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or the children or both if it finds, and then there's the findings that it has to make. The defendant has abused the plaintiff and either there's a danger of further abuse, in other words, in the future, or that the defendant is currently incarcerated for one of those listed offenses. Now that language that I, that very, that first sentence, that first clause of C one, court shall make such orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or the children. They're actually, that's very broad. You see that, that is essentially giving the court to make any order that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or the children. That language was interpreted in a Vermont Supreme Court case to include the ability to order relinquishment of firearms. So, but this is only in the final order situation, right? So with respect to the final order, that language has been interpreted to permit ordering firearms relinquishment, but that same language is not in the emergency order statute. And I think that's another reason to respond to your question center series as to why it's viewed as necessary to put something in statute specifically, because that language is in the final order statute, but not in the emergency order statute. This is the final order language, again, goes on to list some of the things that may be included in the order. Again, there's broad discretion that I just mentioned any order to protect safety, but could include, you know, an order that the defendant refrained from abusing plaintiffs or the plaintiff's children in the future, B, vacate the household, C, temporarily award parental rights and responsibilities, D, the parent-child contact can also be in the order. There's a number of different things. And so I'm gonna move then now, so this is all final order down to the next section, which is 1104, you see emergency release. So this is the statute related to the emergency relief from abuse order. And again, under this one, you'll see that it says in subsection A that in this case, contrary to what we just saw, that the order may be issued, this is the second line down under A, may be issued ex parte without notice to the defendant. So in other words, as I said, in this emergency situation, the order can be issued with the plaintiff present, but not the defendant. And this is where I hear some complaints from people when their clothes have been taken, everything is taken out of the apartment that they're most sharing, for example. Am I correct here? I think so, Senator Sears, yeah. So it's not just firearms here. You mean in the bill or what could happen? What can happen? Yeah, I think that's right, yeah. But the difference, Eric, as I understand it with the bill is in the final relief from abuse hearing, there is due process because the defendant has received notice, there's been a hearing, if there's one that was requested and the judge has made, I shouldn't have said it requested, there will be a final hearing, whether the defendant shows up or not is irrelevant, but the defendant does get notice in the difference with what this bill is calling for is to enable that property to be removed in the emergency situation where there is no due process for the defendant because they don't even know necessarily that there's something happening at court. Would that be a fair way to synthesize it? Well, I would agree with you, Senator Benning, to the extent that you're right, that it permits the relinquishment of the firearm without notice to the defendant and without a hearing. But I think that under the due process precedence that there are circumstances under which short-term brief denials of property can be done what's known as pre-hearing. In other words, it's a pre-hearing deprivation of property and they have to be short brief and the defendant has to have a reasonable opportunity to be able to contest that out of hearing within a reasonable time afterward. So the only... But the initial filing to get there is limited to law enforcement or the state's attorney? In this case, no, it could be, it still could be the family member or the household member. I want to make... I'm trying to understand this and you completely confused me, Joe. Are you talking about firearms or let's say that the individual has tools and things that he or she needs in order to perform their job, their infrastructure? Yeah, I'm only talking about firearms, Dick. Okay, Bob, I'm talking about everything. Is there any, can they take everything? No, I don't think so, Senator Sears. So if you look at what can be in this final order, it's listed very specifically in subdivision one there. Excuse me, A through B. And that proposal, in fact, in H-133 is to add an E to that. It now says A, B, C, D. That's what can be in this final... Sorry, this emergency relief from abuse order. So currently it's... You can see A, it can either include an order that the defendant refrained from abusing the plaintiff or children or their animals. In other words, don't commit any more abuse in the future. B, refrain from interfering with the plaintiff's personal liberty or the personal liberty of the children. C, refrain from coming into a fixed... Coming within, sorry, a fixed distance of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's children, residents, et cetera. So a certain amount of space that they can't go within in terms of the plaintiff. Or D, D is the no contact order that I mentioned earlier. Can also have a no contact order that can't contact the plaintiff's children, et cetera. So I don't see anything other than these. In other words, there's no general language in this emergency statute, like what we saw. I'm just gonna spin up real quick just so we can compare it to what was in the final order. Remember the final order included right there in the middle of the page, C1. The court shall make such orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or the children or both. So that's very broad in the final order. But we're only talking about the emergency order situation in which there is not similarly broad language. And that may well be, I don't know. It's been on the books for a while. It may be that that's because it's more narrowly... But it sounds like if they already can take the firearm, they're already interpreting in 11.04, the things that are in the above that you just described, and am I missing something? My understanding is that the taking of the firearm in this situation, the real inquisition under 11.04 is not on the basis of that language that we just saw in 11.03. It's on the basis of the court's constitutional inherent authority to respond to emergency situations. That there's not that parallel language in 11.04 for emergency orders that there is in 11.03 for final orders. So who takes the firearms under this plan? Well, they're relinquished, the order... Yeah, but relinquished at home, that's my question. Yes, that could be, and this will track us to its interesting statute that this committee has worked on a few years ago. You remember, there is a statute on the books in Title 20 that has to do with how firearms are relinquished. So it could be to a law enforcement officer. It could be to a federally licensed firearms dealer. It could be to a family or household member if the court approves that. You remember that process that was written? So that whole process is set up specifically for firearms that are relinquished pursuant to relief from abuse orders. So that's how it could be done. So has the person been charged with a crime? No. Well, I should say not necessarily. They could have been, but not necessarily. Well, how did it get to court? Because the plaintiff came in and filed for the relief from abuse order. They filed a motion. Now would be probably a good time to look at the new language because you see ABCD and what I just went through. So in... Oh, sorry. In age 133, here we are. So you'll see, this is the language we just looked at. That's existing law 1104, the emergency situation. Ex parte, no notice required as Senator Benning mentioned. And so can be done without the defendant being present. We just looked at this as the existing ABCD. And then the bill proposes to add an E that the order may include in addition to what we just described, the no contact, don't abuse in the future, et cetera, could also include a provision that the defendant immediately relinquish until the expiration of the order, which remember is 14 days maximum. All firearms that are in the defendant's possession, ownership or control, and to refrain from acquiring or possessing any firearms while the order is in effect. Again, that maximum 14 day period that the order would be in effect. And then if the circumstances warranted and the plaintiff wanted to do so, they could try and get the final order at the hearing. Which could include firearms relinquishment as well. But as I mentioned, that's already covered under the existing final order statute. And how does the order work to prevent the person from acquiring any firearms while the order is in effect? And this question goes back to Indianapolis. Yeah, I think it's a legal obligation on the part of the defendant, and then if the person- But the seller would have no idea that this person is not on any, you know, if the seller, the person walks into a gun shop, decides to buy a firearm, the seller would have no idea that this person is on a list, wouldn't they? That's a good question, Senator Sears. And I would wanna follow up with Jeff Wallin on that. And it might be a good question for Judge Gerrison as well as to whether when the court issues these orders, do they submit the names to the NCIC or the NICS database that would put someone on that list? I'm not- I don't think there's time, my understanding. It takes quite a bit of time to, I'd love to hear from the witnesses how they prevent somebody from acquiring a firearm during the period of this temporary order. May I also ask the question? Sure. So does the court make a decision here about all of these things? So somebody comes in with an emergency relief from abuse order asking for it and asks that all the firearms be removed and all the rest of it. Does the court actually just grant it or do they? I guess my question is how much discretion do they have in terms of ordering this if they suspect that there may be some, that it isn't a legitimate complaint or it's, I'm not exactly sure how to phrase this, but if it isn't, does the court have any discretion in saying, you know, you're right, we need to do this right away or you've been here 20 times before and then you keep dropping it. Does the court have any discretion here? I think the answer to that is yes, Senator White. And I think I understand the point you're making. It's that as you see in lines, well, and there's subdivision one there, the order may be granted. So my understanding is that based on the facts and circumstances, the court's gonna decide whether or not there's been a sufficient showing that there's danger or that these weapons exist or that something supports the order. It's not just the pro forma, in other words. Okay, thanks. That was my question, much better said by you. Well, thank you. Well, I'd love to hear anything else, Eric, that you wanted to cover. No, I don't think so. I think that gives kind of the committee the sense of what the proposal is. And then, you know, I'm sure witnesses so we'll have helpful testimony as well. Yeah, I know a lot of times, you know, we certainly want to keep the victims of domestic violence safe as possible. But I think there's a lot of questions here about how this would actually work in real time and how they would prevent somebody from wiring. Senator Nica. Nice question. I think Eric, you said something about the plaintiff could request the final hearing at the same time when they come in for the emergency order. And what's the situation with that? I think actually the typically the emergency order sets the date right in it for the date of the final order. So when they issue the emergency order, it'll say right in the order, here's when the final order is. But my understanding, I think the practitioners will know this better is that there are times when the parties just don't show up for the final order or they drop, sorry, for the final hearing or the case is resolved or somehow reached, there's an agreement reached so that the final hearing doesn't always necessarily happen, but that the date for it is set right in the emergency order. So as long as the defendant gets notice, then what doesn't show up, then the whole thing can go forward without the person being there, is that correct? Which would be the final hearing. As long as they've received actual notice, yes. Yes, they have to, as long as they've been notified of the hearing, they can choose not to attend certainly. And this does not require any crime having been committed or any charge being levied against the defendant, correct? That's correct. This is based on the finding of... It's a whole different matter. Had nothing to do with somebody being arrested and charged with domestic violence or abuse. Right, this is the process we have in law that's separate from that, yes. Well, Eric, correct me if I'm wrong, but the judge has to find on the basis of the evidence that there has been abuse. Yes, not a crime necessarily. Not a crime, right, yeah. No, but this is all based on a finding, at least a temporary finding that there has been abuse. Yes, correct. And there's likely to be immediate abuse again. Right, both of those are required for this emergency order. You have past abuse, there was abuse in the past and there's an immediate danger of further abuse. But that is all based on the word of the person. I think it's, yes, I think you're right. A lot of that is based on the affidavit and the testimony of the plaintiff that the judicial officer asked them questions, that sort of thing. But it may never get to the criminal courts. Yeah, that's certainly possible, yeah. So when I hear the opponents of this talk about due process, that's part of what the issue is, correct? That's all of what the issue is. What I'm trying to get at, Joe, is that they could take other things beyond firearms. Well, what they can do right now is limited to what you saw in the emergency order language. I mean, this edition is E, if you take A through D, that's what can be done. Those provisions are all basically designed to protect the individual, but they don't require loss of liberty or loss of property. But E brings in loss of property to the equation. But my product, here's the problem. If they can already do E, why do we need E? And what is to prevent them from taking other items? Eric, if I misspeak here, correct me, my understanding from your walkthrough is they can't do E now during the emergency order, but they can do it during the final order. Well, I think my understanding is that they are doing E. And when I say they, I'm referring to the court putting it in an order, and that they're doing it not pursuant to any express language in the statute, which is what they are doing with respect to the final order. It's pursuant to that language in the final order that provides broad discretion. So that's what you meant about the distinction between the inherent authority of the court versus the statutory authority. Exactly, exactly. Okay, got it. So you were correct, and Dick, my mistake. Yeah, they're already doing it. And people are, I mean, in order to prevent it, you would have to say you can't do it. If the opponents of this bill don't want this done, then you would need to switch the language to say you can't do it. But this bill means that it's just codifying what is current practice as far as I can understand. Yeah, I think that's right, Senator Sears. I think that's one of the ways that it was described in the House. It's codifying current practice. So if you're opposed to this, you would want language that would prevent the court from doing, from E. Well, and I think also if you're opposed to it, you might say having E in there would suggest to a judge going down this path as opposed to, you know, if it's not there, but it's theoretically in their ability. So maybe this would make it more common so I could see that objection to it as well. Yeah, but to best of my knowledge, nobody has challenged the courts authority to do this. But should we codify just because it's current practice? Good question. From an individual standpoint, an individual can argue that the judge has basically crossed a line and then forced the issue to get their weapons back. Here you're saying, no, the legislature has actually endorsed this, which makes that argument all the more difficult. Yeah, I mean, I think we're right on target here. But I'm still focused on how they can control somebody from acquiring. I realize they'd be violating court order, but other than that, what can they do? So those are a lot of questions, Judge. Well, and Senator Sears, if I could just point that question in 2015, we passed legislation that required reporting to the NICS database. And I'm wondering if that piece of legislation covered this situation. I don't know, but doesn't it take a couple of weeks to get into the database? Yeah, I'm sure. And then it takes a period of time to get out. So if the person, you know, I mean, you're talking about banning somebody from acquiring firearms. The order has been lifted. There is no order yet. They can't get them because they're in that system, if that's what they do. I don't know. Hopefully Major Jonas or Jeffrey Wallin can clear that up for us. All right. Should I pull the language down, Senator Sears? Yeah, please. And I think our next witness is, well, it was supposed to be David Sher, but I'm going to jump right to Judge Grierson. Hopefully David will object. Objection. Thank you, David. Good morning, Judge. Morning, Senator. And good morning to the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify on this bill. I've obviously been listening and I think the committee has been asking all the right questions for the record. Brian Grierson, Chief Superior Judge, testifying on, I believe it's H-133. I think one place to start on understanding this bill or the issues around this bill are to understand that there are really three, at least three different scenarios that a court may be confronted with, all involving similar behavior, but ending up seeking different forms of relief. So take the hypothetical partners, domestic partners, husband and wife, spouses, whatever term you want to use. If there is domestic violence, physical abuse, as we think of that, the individual, the victim, can contact the police, report a crime, the police will investigate it. That would end up in the criminal court, in the adult court. And as a condition of release, perhaps they would order no possession of firearms. The victim, if they're one of the protected family members under an RFA order, could separately pursue a relief from abuse order, separate and apart from the criminal case. And that would be a plaintiff spouse versus defendant spouse, completely civil proceeding. And that's why you have a different standard of proof. But again, as a result of that proceeding, there could be an order of no possession of firearms. That same individual, and I'm referring to the hypothetical victim spouse, could be concerned about their partner's behavior, erratic behavior, mental health issues. And for that reason, seek assistance from law enforcement or state's attorney to obtain what has been referred to as the ERPO order. And that would be, again, be a separate proceeding. It follows a similar format to relief from abuse, but it does not involve a crime of domestic violence. And it does not necessarily involve abuse or a threat of abuse towards the victim. And therefore, that would be a separate proceeding. And that's why the procedures around ERPO orders are different from relief from abuse. There are times, and have been times certainly, since the introduction of an ERPO order, that a person is charged with a crime of domestic violence in adult court, criminal court. The victim spouse seeks a relief from abuse order on their own, and the state's attorney and or law enforcement for their own reasons may seek an ERPO order. So it doesn't happen very often, but there is sometimes these different proceedings all stemming from the same set of facts. But they are separate and distinct procedures. I don't know, Senator Sears, any more about the Indianapolis situation than perhaps anyone else, other than what I had heard was that the prosecutor in that particular case chose not to pursue a final order on the ERPO charge. And that's why there was no order outstanding that prevented this young fellow from obtaining further firearms. But they did cease to be shot. Apparently they sought it. And again, what I had heard the prosecutor say, he was afraid, and I didn't understand this, but he was afraid if he went to court and lost the hearing to issue a final order, if you will, on ERPO, that they would have to return the shotgun. So rather than taking the risk, they didn't do anything. So I don't think they, I don't know if they returned the shotgun. It doesn't sound like they did, but there was nothing of record that would prevent that individual purchasing further firearms. But to go back to, hopefully that explains the difference between the three types of proceedings. The three process, that's helpful, Judge. So with respect to this order, the committee should have in mind that this Sarah Robinson and her organization, I believe were the folks who originated this, or this bill originated in the house with their support and we were asked to testify and offer comment on it. And the form that you now see it in, I will tell you is what I'm talking about. That's my only judge because I was told that you're the one that sought this change and that. No, I was asked to come in and testify for the court's view. This was not a bill that was initiated by the judiciary. I was asked what I thought of it. And I, as you've heard, and I will confirm that I had... No, that's fine. I just wanted you to know why I was smiling because I was told that it was something you saw. No, we support it in this sense. And the committee has indicated this, that I believe, and by far the majority of the judges who have responded to me, and matter of fact, all the judges who have responded to me, believe they currently have the inherent authority to order this relief at the present time. It is not reflected specifically in statute. And so when I was asked to comment on this bill, I did indicate that I believe we have the inherent authority, that this bill certainly in its present form would essentially as I think Senator Benning or others had codified what we now have the authority to do. What I think that codification does, it brings some consistency in terms of the judges knowing that they have the authority to do this by statute, apart from their inherent authority. But it clearly does not mandate that they do it in every case. The bill as it was originally drafted as opposed to the form in which you see it now, I think to a great extent was as a result of my testimony to suggest that you add this as a section E under the current bill. And the reason for that is if you look at the prefatory paragraph to A through E, it's still a discretionary act on the part of the court. All this bill is indicating another form of potential relief if warranted by the facts. And you'll see in paragraph number 1104, small a paragraph one upon a finding that there is an immediate danger of further abuse and order may be granted requiring the defendant. And all those items in the current bill, A through D are potential relief the court can grant, but they're not required to grant them in every case, nor would they be required to grant the relief that is set forth in the proposed section E. It's just a, if you will, a recitation of the potential forms of relief. And so for that reason, I believe that it does clarify authority that we believe we have and the language that's in front of you now, at least in terms of the placement of it and the wording, to a great extent, was recommended by me for clarification. So the temporary is this order is issued, X part A, without notice of the defendant. And there's a finding, or maybe issued, I should say, and there's a finding that the defendant has abused the plaintiff or the plaintiff's children. That's the judge needs to find that. Yes. In order to do anything else, correct? Yes, and the key to the temporary order as opposed to the final order is number one, it's X part A, meaning the defendant doesn't have the opportunity at that time, but two, there has to be a finding by the court that the order is necessary on an X part A basis because there's an immediate threat of further harm. Senator White asked about to what extent are these granted or not granted? And just by way of example, 2020, I have data shows 2,200 temporary orders were granted, 743 were denied. And those numbers are fairly consistent over the years. So no committee members should feel that there's anything automatic about the granting of a temporary order. There are sometimes the orders, they can be denied outright. There's no evidence of abuse or insufficient evidence of abuse. And they're denied, even when we deny them, the plaintiff has the right to request a final hearing. And then there is no order issued, but it is set for final hearing on their request. Sometimes the order will indicate that there is abuse, but there's not sufficient evidence to show an immediate threat. And therefore the order will be denied, not because there isn't abuse, but because there's no evidence of immediate threat. So this, it is discretionary with the court whether these are ordered and the terms of the orders are discretionary. And the relief that's being sought here as I've indicated, essentially is, this would be codifying what we have. When I canvassed the judges on issues, whether it's this one or others, I never hear from all judges. So I always hesitate to say majority or consensus, but I clearly think there's a consensus on this issue, but I did not hear from any judges saying we do not have the inherent authority. So in that sense, I'm satisfied that this is something that we have the authority to do, but at the same time, it would indicate that it is a form of relief that's available along with A through D. All right. Senator Benning. Judge, I have several questions. First, could you repeat those statistics that you had for 2020? Sure, let me, so 2,200, I'll give you round numbers, 2,200 temporary orders granted, a little more than 700 denied. Then you go to the next step, this helps the final order. Now remember, the final order hearings can be based on a temporary order that's been granted or the plaintiff seeking a final order, even if they've been denied. So the numbers may not match up. So the final orders granted, 1,053 are the numbers that I have. So if you go back to the original numbers, there was about 3,000 requests filed, the 700 plus the 2,200, and a final order granted in about a thousand, little more than 1,000 of those. And a final order denied, that means that could mean either after hearing or the plaintiff did not appear. And these numbers don't tell me. Unfortunately, Judge, and I don't know what to do. We have this issue we are trying to balance 37 things at once here. And this is awesome. And I apologize to you in the middle of your testimony. Sorry. We have to go to a joint meeting of the of the house judiciary at 10 a.m. And we've got like two minutes to get over there. Sorry, I can't bring it back. I apologize. And after this hearing, we are taking up the budgets of the judicial system and state attorneys and et cetera. So I'm sure you'd prefer we take that up as well. So we're going to have to delay this testimony till Tuesday morning and lead off with you. That's fine. And continue this. I'm very sorry about this, but it happens. I really, and to all of you, David and Ingrid and all, I apologize for this. But thank you for making the effort to join us. It's been an interesting conversation. And I look forward to continuing the discussion. Thank you. But one question, if we could check out beforehand, either having Jeffrey Wallen here or find out exactly what happens when there is a temporary order issue. I've written to him as I heard the questions. Yeah, I don't have an answer. That's an important question for us. I understand. And I don't have an answer, but I've written to Jeff while we were, while the testimony was going on. I don't have an answer yet, but I'll have one by next Tuesday. Okay, great.