 6. All religion inspires contemptible fears. Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion and superstition. They say that the latter is only a base and inordinate fear of the deity, but that the truly religious man has confidence in his God and loves him sincerely. Whereas the superstitious man sees in him only an enemy, has no confidence in him, and represents him to himself as a distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his benefits, lavish of his chastisements. But in reality does not all religion give us the same ideas of God? At the same time that we are told that God is infinitely good, are we not also told that he is very easily provoked, that he grants his favors to a few people only, and that he furiously chastises those to whom he has not been pleased to grant favors? 64. Religion the same as the most somber and servile superstition. If we take our ideas of God from the nature of things where we find a mixture of good and evil, this God, just like the good and evil of which we experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant, sometimes good, and sometimes malevolent, and therefore, instead of exciting our love, must generate distrust, fear, and uncertainty. There is then no real difference between natural religion and the most gloomy and servile superstition. If the theist sees God only in a favorable light, the bigot views him in the most hideous light. The folly of the one is cheerful, that of the other is melancholy, but both are equally delirious. 65. The love of God is impossible. If I draw my ideas of God from theology, he appears to inspire aversion. Devotees who tell us that they sincerely love their God are either liars or fools who see their God only in profile. It is impossible to love a being, the very idea of whom strikes us with terror and whose judgments make us tremble. How can we, without being alarmed, look upon a God who is reputed to be barbarous enough to dam us? Let not divines talk to us of a filial or respectful fear mixed with love which men ought to have for their God. A son can by no means love his father when he knows him to be cruel enough to inflict upon him studied torments for the least faults he may commit. No man upon earth can have the least spark of love for a God who reserves chastisements, infinite induration and violence for ninety-nine hundredths of his children. 66. An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being. The inventors of the dogma of eternal hell torments have made of that God whom they call so good the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in men is the last act of wickedness. Every sensible mind must revolt at the bare recital of the torments inflicted on the greatest criminal, but cruelty is much more apt to excite indignation when void of motives. The most sanguinary tyrants, the Caligulas, the Neros, the Dometians, had at least some motives for tormenting their victims. These motives were either their own safety or the fury of revenge or the design of frightening by terrible examples or perhaps the vanity of making a display of their power and the desire of satisfying a barbarous curiosity. Can a God have any of these motives? In tormenting the victims of his wrath he would punish beings who could neither endanger his immovable power nor disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the other hand the punishments of the other life would be useless to the living who cannot be witness of them. These punishments would be useless to the damned, since in hell there is no longer room for conversion and the time of mercy is passed. Whence it follows that God in the exercise of his eternal vengeance could have no other end than to amuse himself and insult the weakness of his creatures? I appeal to the whole human race. Is there a man who feels cruel enough, coolly, to torment? I do not say his fellow creature, but any sensible being, whatever, without emolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having anything to fear. Confess, then, O theologians, that even according to your own principles your God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst of men. Perhaps you will say that infinite offenses deserve infinite punishments. I answer that we cannot offend a God whose happiness is infinite, that the offenses of finite beings cannot be infinite, that a God who is unwilling to be offended cannot consent that the offenses of his creatures should be eternal, that a God infinitely good can neither be infinitely cruel nor grant his creatures an infinite duration solely for the pleasure of eternal torments. Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery, or the blindest ambition, could have imagined the doctrine of eternal punishments. If there is a God whom we can offend or blaspheme, there are not upon earth greater blasphemers than those who dare to say that this same God is a tyrant, perverse enough to delight during eternity in the useless torments of his feeble creatures. 67. Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions. To pretend that God can be offended at the actions of men is to annihilate all the ideas which devines endeavor to give us in other respects of this being. To say that man can trouble the order of the universe, that he can kindle the thunder in the hands of his God, that he can defeat his projects, is to say that man is stronger than his God, that he is the arbiter of his will, that it depends upon him to change his goodness into cruelty. Theology continually pulls down with one hand what it erects with the other. If all religion is founded upon a God who is provoked and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpable contradiction. All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of the deity, but no sooner do they display his conduct than we see nothing but imprudence, wanton foresight, weakness, and folly. God, it is said, created the world for himself, and yet hitherto he has never been able to make himself suitably honored by it. God created men in order to have, in his dominions, subjects to render him their homage, and yet we see men in continual revolt against him. 68. The pretended works of God do not prove divine perfections. They incessantly extol the divine perfections, and when we demand proofs of them, they point to his works, in which they assure us these perfections are written in indelible characters. 68. All these works are, however, imperfect and perishable. Man, who is ever regarded as the most marvelous work, as the masterpiece of the deity, is full of imperfections which render him disagreeable to the eyes of the Almighty Being who formed him. This surprising work often becomes so revolting and odious to its author that he is obliged to throw it into the fire. But if the fairest of God's works is imperfect, how can we judge of the divine perfections? Can a work with which the author himself is so little pleased induce us to admire the ability of its maker? Man, considered in a physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberless evils, and to death. Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of faults, yet we are unceasingly told that he is the most beautiful work of the most perfect of beings. 69. The perfection of God and the pretended creation of angels. In creating beings more perfect than men, it appears that here to fore God has not better succeeded, nor given stronger proofs of his perfection. Do we not see, in many religions, that angels have even attempted to dethrone him? God proposed the happiness of angels and men, yet he has never been able to render happy either angels or men. The pride, malice, sins, and imperfections of the creatures have always opposed the will of the perfect creator. 70. Theology preaches omnipotence of its God, yet makes impotent. All religion is obviously founded upon this principle that God does what he can and man what he will. Every system of religion presents to us an unequal combat between the deity on one part and his creatures on the other, in which the former never comes off to his honor. Notwithstanding his omnipotence, he cannot succeed in rendering the works of his hands such as he would have them. To complete the absurdity, there is a religion which pretends that God himself has died to redeem mankind, and yet men are not farther from anything than they are from what God would have them. 71. Per all religious systems, God is capricious and foolish. Nothing is more extravagant than the part theology makes the divinity act in every country. Did he really exist, we should see in him the most capricious and senseless being. We should be compelled to believe that God made the world only to be the theater of his disgraceful wars with his creatures, that he created angels, men, and demons only to make adversaries against whom he might exercise his power. He renders men free to offend him, malicious enough to defeat his projects, too obstinate to submit, and all this merely for the pleasure of being angry, appeased, reconciled, and of repairing the disorder they have made. Had the deity at once formed his creatures such as he would have them, what pains would he not have spared himself, or at least, from what embarrassments would he not have relieved his theologians? Every religion represents God as busy only in doing himself evil. He resembles those empirics who inflict upon themselves wounds to have an opportunity of exhibiting to the public the efficacy of their ointment. But we see not that the deity has hitherto been able radically to cure himself of the evil which he suffers from man, seventy-two. It is absurd to say that evil does not proceed from God. God is the author of all, and yet we are assured that evil does not come from God. Whence then does it come? From man. But who made man? God. Evil then comes from God. If he had not made man as he is, moral evil or sin would not have existed in the world. The perversity of man is therefore chargeable to God. If man has power to do evil or to offend God, we are forced to infer that God chooses to be offended, that God, who made man, has resolved that man shall do evil. Otherwise man would be in effect contrary to the cause from which he derives his being. Seventy-three. The foreknowledge of God proves his cruelty. Man ascribes to God the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing beforehand whatever will happen. But this prescience seldom turns to his glory, nor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man. If God foreknows the future, must he not have foreseen the fall of his creatures? If he resolved in his decrees to permit this fall, it is undoubtedly because it was his will that this fall should take place. Otherwise it could not have happened. If God's foreknowledge of the sins of his creatures had been necessary or forced, one might suppose that he has been constrained by his justice to punish the guilty. But, enjoying the faculty of foreseeing and the power of predetermining everything, did it not depend upon God not to impose upon himself cruel laws, or at least, could he not dispense with creating beings whom he might be under the necessity of punishing and rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree? Of what consequence is it, whether God has destined men to happiness or misery by an anterior decree, an effect of his prescience, or by a posterior decree, an effect of his justice? Does the arrangement of his decrees alter the fate of the unhappy? Would they not have the same right to complain of a God who, being able to omit their creation, has not withstanding created them? Although he plainly foresaw that his justice would oblige him sooner or later to punish them, seventy-four, absurdity of the stories concerning original sin and Satan. Man, you say, when he came from the hand of God was pure, innocent, and good, but his nature has been corrupted as a punishment for sin. If man, when just out of the hands of his God, could sin, his nature was imperfect. Why did God suffer him to sin and his nature to be corrupted? Why did God permit him to be seduced while knowing that he was too feeble to resist temptation? Why did God create Satan, an evil spirit, a tempter? Why did not God, who wishes so much good to the human race, annihilate once for all so many evil genii who are natural enemies of our happiness? Or rather, why did God create evil spirits, whose victories and fatal influence over mankind he must have foreseen? In fine, by what strange fatality in all religions of the world has the evil principle such a decided advantage over the good principle, or the divinity? seventy-five. The devil, like religion, was invented to enrich the priests. There is related an instance of simplicity which does honor to the heart of an Italian monk. One day, while preaching, this pious man thought he must announce to his audience that he had, thank heaven, at last discovered by dint of meditation a sure way of rendering all men happy. The devil, said he, tempts men only to have in hell companions of his misery. Let us therefore apply to the pope who has the keys of heaven and hell. Let us prevail upon him to pray to God, at the head of the whole church, to consent to a reconciliation with the devil, to restore him to favor, to reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put an end to his malicious projects against mankind. Perhaps the honest monk did not see that the devil is at least as useful as God to the ministers of religion. They have too much interest in their dissensions to be instrumental in an accommodation between two enemies upon whose combats their own existence and revenues depend. Let men cease to be tempted and to sin, and the ministry of priests will be useless. Manicheism is evidently the hinge of every religion, but, unhappily, the devil, invented to clear the deity from the suspicion of malice, proves to us every moment the impotence or unskillfulness of his celestial adversary. End of Section 6, Recording by Roger Maline Section 7 of Good Sense by Paul Henri Thierry, Baron Dolbach Translator Unknown Section 7 Parts 76 through 80 76. God has no right to punish man The nature of man, it is said, was necessarily liable to corruption. God could not communicate to him impeccability, which is an inalienable attribute of his divine perfection. But if God could not make man impeccable, why did he give himself the pains to make man, whose nature must necessarily be corrupted, and who must consequently offend God? On the other hand, if God himself could not make human nature impeccable, by what right does he punish men for not being impeccable? It can be only by the right of the strongest, but the right of the strongest is called violence, and violence cannot be compatible with the justice of beings. God would be supremely unjust should he punish men for not sharing with him his divine perfections, or for not being able to be gods like him. Could not God at least have communicated to all men that kind of perfection of which their nature is susceptible? If some men are good, or render themselves agreeable to their God, why has not that God done the same favor, or given the same dispositions, to all beings of our species? Why does the number of the wicked so much exceed the number of the good? Why, for one friend, has God ten thousand enemies in a world which it depended entirely upon him to people with honest men? If it be true that in heaven God designs to form a court of saints, of elect, or of men who shall have lived upon earth conformably to his views, would he not have had a more numerous, brilliant and honorable assembly had he composed it of all men to whom in creating them he could grant the degrees of goodness necessary to attain eternal happiness? Finally, would it not have been shorter not to have made man than to have created him a being full of faults, rebellious to his creator, perpetually exposed to cause his own destruction by a fatal abuse of his liberty? Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only angels very docile and submissive. Angels, it is said, are free. Some have sinned, but at any rate all have not abused their liberty by revolting against their master. Could not God have created only angels of the good kind? If God has created angels who have not sinned, could he not have created impeccable men, or men who should never abuse their liberty? If the elect are incapable of sinning in heaven, could not God have made impeccable men upon earth? Seventy-seven. It is absurd to say that the conduct of God a mystery. Divines never fail to persuade us that the enormous distance which separates God and man necessarily renders the conduct of God a mystery to us, and that we have no right to interrogate our master. Is this answer satisfactory? Since my eternal happiness is at stake, have I not a right to examine the conduct of God himself? It is only in hope of happiness that men submit to the authority of a God, a despot to whom men submit only through fear, a master whom they cannot interrogate, a sovereign totally inaccessible, can never merit the homage of intelligent beings. If the conduct of God is a mystery, it is not made for us. Man can neither adore, admire, respect, nor imitate conduct in which everything is inconceivable, or of which he can often form only revolting ideas, unless it is pretended that we ought to adore everything of which we are forced to be ignorant, and that everything which we do not know becomes for that reason an object of admiration. Divines, you never cease telling us that the designs of God are impenetrable, that His ways are not our ways, nor His thoughts are thoughts, that it is absurd to complain of His administration of the motives and springs of which we are totally ignorant, that it is presumption to tax His judgments with injustice because we cannot comprehend them. But when you speak in this strain, do you not perceive that you destroy with your own hands all your profound systems whose only end is to explain to us the ways of the divinity which you say are impenetrable? Have you penetrated His judgments, His ways, His designs? You dare not assert it, and though you reason about them without end, you do not comprehend them any more than we do. If by chance you know the plan of God which you wish us to admire, while most people find it so little worthy of a just, good, intelligent, and reasonable being, no longer say this plan is impenetrable. If you are as ignorant of it as we are, have some indulgence for those who ingenuously confess they comprehend nothing in it, or that they see in it nothing divine. Seize to persecute for opinions of which you understand nothing yourselves. Seize to defame each other for dreams and conjectures which everything seems to contradict. Talk to us of things intelligible and really useful to men, and no longer talk to us of the impenetrable ways of God about which you only stammer and contradict yourselves. By continually speaking of the immense depths of divine wisdom, forbidding us to sound them, saying it is insolence to cite God, before the tribunal of our feeble reason, making it a crime to judge our master, divines teach us nothing but the embarrassment they are in, when it is required to account for the conduct of a God whose conduct they think marvellous only because they are utterly incapable of comprehending it themselves. Seventy-eight, ought we look for consolation from the author of our misery? Physical evil is commonly regarded as a punishment for sin. Diseases, famines, wars, earthquakes, are means which God uses to chastise wicked men. Thus they make no scruple of attributing these evils to the severity of a just and good God. But do not these scourges fall indiscriminately upon the good and bad, upon the impious and devout, upon the innocent and guilty? How, in this proceeding, would they have us admire the justice and goodness of a being, the idea of whom seems comforting to so many wretches, whose brain must undoubtedly be disordered by their misfortunes, since they forget that their God is the arbiter, the sole disposer of the events of this world? This being the case, ought they not to impute their sufferings to him into whose arms they fly for comfort? Unfortunate Father, thou consolest thyself in the bosom of Providence for the loss of a dear child, or beloved wife, who made thy happiness? Alas, dost thou not see that thy God has killed them? Thy God has rendered thee miserable, and thou desirest thy God to comfort thee, for the dreadful afflictions he has sent thee. The chimerical or supernatural notions of theology have so succeeded in destroying, in the minds of men, the most simple, dear and natural ideas that the devout, unable to accuse God of malice, accustom themselves to regard the several strokes of fate as indubitable proofs of celestial goodness. When in affliction they are ordered to believe that God loves them, that God visits them, that God wishes to try them. Thus religion has attained the art of converting evil into good. A profane person said with reason, if God Almighty thus treats those whom he loves, I earnestly beseech him never to think of me. Men must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their God, who is called so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and piercing afflictions are marks of his favor. Would an evil genius, a demon, be more ingenious in tormenting his enemies than the God of goodness sometimes is, who so often exercises his severity upon his dearest friends? 79. God who punishes the faults which he might have prevented. What shall we say of a father who, we are assured, watches without intermission over the preservation and happiness of his weak and short-sighted children, and who yet leaves them at liberty to wander at random among rocks, precipices, and waters, who rarely hinders them from following their inordinate appetites? Who permits them to handle, without precaution, murderous arms at the risk of their life? What should we think of the same father, if, instead of imputing to himself the evil that happens to his poor children, he should punish them for their wanderings in the most cruel manner? We should say, with reason, that this father is a madman who unites injustice to folly. A God who punishes faults which he could have prevented is a being deficient in wisdom, goodness, and equity. A foreseeing God would prevent evil and thereby avoid having to punish it. A good God would not punish weaknesses which he knew to be inherent in human nature. A just God, if he made man, would not punish him for not being made strong enough to resist his desires. To punish weakness is the most unjust tyranny. Is it not columniating a just God to say that he punishes men for their faults even in the present life? How could he punish beings whom it belonged to him alone to reform and who, while they have not grace, cannot act otherwise than they do? According to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in his present state of corruption, can do nothing but evil, since without divine grace he is never able to do good. Now, if the nature of man, left to itself, or destitute of divine aid, necessarily determines him to evil, or renders him incapable of good, what becomes of the free will of man? According to such principles man can neither merit nor demerit. By rewarding man for the good he does, God would only reward himself. By punishing man for the evil he does, God would punish him for not giving him grace, without which he could not possibly do better. A.D., what is called free will, is an absurdity. Theologians repeatedly tell us that man is free, while all their principles conspire to destroy his liberty. By endeavoring to justify the divinity they in reality accuse him of the blackest injustice. They suppose that without grace man is necessitated to do evil. They affirm that God will punish him because God has not given him grace to do good. Little reflection will suffice to convince us that man is necessitated in all his actions, that his free will is a chimera even in the system of theologians. Does it depend upon man to be born of such or such parents? Does it depend upon man to imbibe or not to imbibe the opinions of his parents or instructors? If I had been born of idolatrous or Mohammedan parents, would it have depended upon me to become a Christian? Yet devines gravely assurus that a just God will damn without pity all those to whom he has not given grace to know the Christian religion. Man's birth is wholly independent of his choice. He is not asked whether he is willing or not to come into the world. Nature does not consult him upon the country and parents she gives him. His acquired ideas, his opinions, his notions, true or false, are necessary fruits of the education which he has received and of which he has not been the director. His passions and desires are necessary consequences of the temperament given him by nature. During his whole life his volitions and actions are determined by his connections, habits, occupations, pleasures, and conversations, by the thoughts that are involuntarily presented to his mind, in a word by a multitude of events and accidents which it is out of his power to foresee or prevent. Incapable of looking into futurity he knows not what he will do. From the instant of his birth to that of his death he is never free. You will say that he wills, deliberates, chooses, determines, and you will hence conclude that his actions are free. It is true that man wills, but he is not master of his will or his desires. He can desire and will only what he judges advantageous to himself. He can neither love pain nor detest pleasure. It will be said that he sometimes prefers pain to pleasure, but then he prefers a momentary pain with a view of procuring a greater and more durable pleasure. In this case the prospect of a greater good necessarily determines him to forego a less considerable good. The lover does not give his mistress the features which captivate him. He is not then master of loving or not loving the object of his tenderness. He is not master of his imagination or temperament. Whence it evidently follows that man is not master of his volitions and desires. But man, you will say, can resist his desires. Therefore he is free. Man resists his desires when the motives which divert him from an object are stronger than those which incline him towards it. But then his resistance is necessary. A man whose fear of dishonor or punishment is greater than his love of money necessarily resists the desire of stealing. Are we not free when we deliberate? But are we masters of knowing or not knowing, of being in doubt or certainty? Deliberation is a necessary effect of our uncertainty respecting the consequences of our actions. When we are sure or think we are sure of these consequences, we necessarily decide and we then act necessarily according to our true or false judgment. Our judgments, true or false, are not free. They are necessarily determined by the ideas we have received or which our minds have formed. Man is not free in his choice. He is evidently necessitated to choose what he judges most useful and agreeable. Neither is he free when he suspends his choice. He is forced to suspend it until he knows or thinks he knows the qualities of the objects presented to him or until he has weighed the consequences of his actions. Man, you will say, often decides in favour of actions which he knows must be detrimental to himself. Man sometimes kills himself, therefore he is free. I deny it. Is man master of reasoning well or ill? Not his reason and wisdom depend upon the opinions he has formed or upon the confirmation of his machine? As neither one nor the other depends upon his will, they are no proof of liberty. If I lay a wager that I shall do or not do a thing, am I not free? Does it not depend upon me to do it or not? No, I answer. The desire of winning the wager will necessarily determine you to do or not to do the thing in question. But supposing I consent to lose the wager, then the desire of proving to me that you are free will have become a stronger motive than the desire of winning the wager, and this motive will have necessarily determined you to do or not to do the thing in question. But you will say, I feel free. This is an illusion that may be compared to that of the fly in the fable who, lighting upon the pole of a heavy carriage, applauded himself for directing its course. Man, who thinks himself free, is a fly, who imagines he has power to move the universe, while he is himself unknowingly carried along by it. The inward persuasion that we are free to do or not to do a thing is but a mere illusion. If we trace the true principle of our actions, we shall find that they are always necessary consequences of our volitions and desires, which are never in our power. You think yourself free because you do what you will. But are you free to will or not to will? Desire or not to desire? Are not your volitions and desires necessarily excited by objects or qualities totally independent of you? End of section 7 Recording by Roger Moline Section 8 of Good Sense This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Roger Moline Good Sense by Paul Henri Terri, Baron Dolbach Translator unknown Section 8 parts 81 through 91 81 But we must not conclude that society has no right to punish. If the actions of men are necessary, if men are not free, by what right does society punish criminals? Is it not very unjust to chastise beings who could not act otherwise than they have done? If the wicked act, necessarily according to the impulses of their evil nature, society, in punishing them, acts necessarily by the desire of self-preservation. Certain objects necessarily produce in us the sensation of pain. Our nature then forces us against them and divert them from us. A tiger, pressed by hunger, springs upon the man whom he wishes to devour. But this man is not master of his fear and necessarily seeks means to destroy the tiger. 82 Refudiation of the arguments in favor of free will If everything be necessary, the errors, opinions, and ideas of men are fatal. And if so, how or why should we attempt to reform them? The errors of men are necessary consequences of ignorance. Their ignorance, prejudice, and credulity are necessary consequences of their experience, negligence, and want of reflection in the same manner as delirium or lethargy are necessary effects of certain diseases. Truth, experience, reflection, and reason are remedies calculated to cure ignorance, fanaticism, and follies. But, you will ask, why does not truth produce this effect upon many disordered minds? It is because some diseases resist all remedies, because it is impossible to cure obstinate patients who refuse the remedies presented to them, because the interest of some men and the folly of others necessarily oppose the admission of truth. A cause produces its effect only when its action is not interrupted by stronger causes, which then weakens or render useless the action of the former. It is impossible that the best argument should be adopted by men who are interested in error, prejudiced in its favor, and who decline all reflection, but truth must necessarily undeceive honest minds who seek her sincerity. Truth is a cause. It necessarily produces its effects when its impulse is not intercepted by causes which suspend its effects. 83. Refudiation of the Arguments in Favor of Free Will To deprive man of his free will, it is said, to him a mere machine, an automaton. Without liberty he will no longer have either merit or virtue. What is merit in man? It is a manner of acting which renders him estimable in the eyes of his fellow beings. What is virtue? It is a disposition which inclines us to do good to others. Whether be contemptible in machines or automatons capable of producing effects so desirable. Marcus Aurelius was useful to the vast Roman Empire. By what rights would a machine despise a machine whose springs facilitate its action? Good men are springs which second society in its tendency to happiness. Good are ill-formed springs which disturb the order, progress, and harmony of society. If for its own utility society cherishes and rewards the good, it also harasses and destroys the wicked as useless or hurtful. 84. God, if there were a God, would not be free. The world is a necessary agent. All the beings that compose it are united to each other and cannot act otherwise than they do so long as they are moved by the same causes and endowed with the same properties. When they lose properties they will necessarily act in a different way. God himself, admitting his existence, cannot be considered a free agent. If there existed a God, his manner of acting would necessarily be determined by the properties inherent in his nature. Nothing would be capable of arresting or altering his will. This being granted neither our actions, prayers, nor sacrifices could suspend or change his invariable conduct and immutable designs. Once we are forced to infer that all religion would be useless. 85. According to theology man is not free a single instant. Were not divines in perpetual contradiction with themselves they would see that according to their hypotheses man cannot be reputed free an instant. Do they not suppose man continually dependent on his God? Are we free when we cannot exist and be preserved without God and when we cease to exist at the pleasure of his supreme will? If God has made man out of nothing, if his preservation is a continued creation, if God cannot an instant lose sight of his creature, if whatever happens to him is in effect of the divine will, if man can do nothing of himself, if all the events which he experiences are effects of the divine decrees, if he does no good without grace from on high, how can they maintain that a man enjoys a moment's liberty? If God did not preserve him in the moment of sin, how could man sin? If God then preserves him, God forces him to exist that he may sin. 86. There is no evil and no sin but must be attributed to God. The divinity is frequently compared to a king whose revolted subjects are the greater part of mankind. And it is said he has a right to reward the subjects who remain faithful to him and to punish the rebellious. This comparison is not just in any of its parts. God presides over a machine every spring of which he has created. These springs act agreeable to the manner in which God has formed them. He ought to impute it to his own unskillfulness, if these springs do not contribute to the harmony of the machine into which it was his will to insert them. God is a created king who has created to himself subjects of every description, who has formed them according to his own pleasure, whose will can never find resistance. If God has rebellious subjects in his empire, it is because God has resolved to have rebellious subjects. If the sins of men disturb the order of the world, it is because it is the will of God that this order should be disturbed. Nobody dares to call and question the divine justice, yet under the government of a just God we see nothing but acts of injustice and violence. Forest decides the fate of nations. Equity seems banished from the earth. A few men sport unpunished with the peace, property, liberty, and life of others. All is disorder in a world governed by a God who is said to be infinitely displeased with disorder. 87. The prayers prove dissatisfaction of the divine will. Although men are forever admiring the wisdom, goodness, justice, and beautiful order of providence, they are in reality never satisfied with it. Do not the prayers continually addressed to heaven show that men are by no means satisfied with the divine dispensations? To pray to God for a favor shows diffidence of his watchful care. To pray to him to avert or put an end to an evil is to endeavor to obstruct the course of his justice. To implore the assistance of God in our calamities is to address the author himself of these calamities. To represent to him that he ought for our sake to rectify his plan, which does not accord with our interest. The optimist, or he who maintains that all is well, and who incessantly cries that we live in the best world possible, to be consistent should never pray. Neither ought he to expect another world where man will be happier. Can there be a better world than the best world possible? Some theologians have treated the optimists as impious for having intimated that God could not produce a better world than that in which we live. According to these doctors it is to limit the power of God and to offer him insult. But do not these divine see that it shows much less indignity to God to assert that he has done his best in producing this world than to say that being able to produce a better, he has had malice enough to produce a very bad one? If the optimist by his system detracts from the divine power, the theologian who treats him as a blasphemer is himself a blasphemer who offends the goodness of God in espousing the cause of his omnipotence. 88. Absurd to imagine repair of misfortune in another world. When we complain of the evils of which our world is the theatre we are referred to the other world where it is said God will make preparation for all the iniquity and misery which for a time he permits here below. But if God, suffering his eternal justice to remain at rest for a long time, could consent to evil during the whole continuance of our present world, what assurance have we that during the continuance of another world divine justice will not, in like manner, sleep over the misery of its inhabitants? The divines console us for our sufferings by saying that God is patient and that his justice, though often slow, is not the less sure. But do they not see that patience is incompatible with a just, immutable and omnipotent being? Can God then permit injustice even for an instant? To temporize with a known evil announces either weakness, uncertainty, or collusion. To tolerate evil when one has power to prevent it is to consent to the commission of evil. 89. Theology justifies the evil permitted by its God. Divines everywhere exclaim that God is infinitely just, but that his justice is not the justice of man. Of what kind or nature then is this divine justice? What idea can I form of a justice which so often resembles injustice? Is it not to confound all ideas of just and unjust to say that what is equitable in God is iniquitous in His creatures? How can we receive for our model a being whose divine perfections are precisely the reverse of human? God, it is said, is sovereign arbiter of our destinies. His supreme power, which nothing can limit, justly permits him to do with the works of his own hands according to his good pleasure. A worm, like a man, has no right even to complain. This arrogant style is evidently borrowed from the language used by the ministers of tyrants when they stop the mouths of those who suffer from their violences. It cannot then be the language of the ministers of a God whose equity is highly extolled. It is not made to be imposed upon a being who reasons. Ministers of a just God, I will inform you then that the greatest power cannot confer upon your God Himself the right of being unjust even to the vilest of His creatures. A despot is not a God. A God who arrogates to Himself the right of doing evil is a tyrant. A tyrant is not a model for men. He must be an object execrable to their eyes. Is it not indeed strange that in order to justify the divinity they make Him every moment the most unjust of beings? As soon as we complain of His conduct they think to silence us by alleging that God is master, which signifies that God, being the strongest, is not bound by ordinary rules. But the right of the strongest is the violation of all rights. It seems right only to the eyes of a savage conqueror who in the heat of his fury imagines that he may do whatever he pleases with the unfortunate victims whom he has conquered. This barbarous right can appear legitimate only to slaves blind enough to believe that everything is lawful to tyrants whom they feel too weak to resist. In the greatest calamities do not devout persons through a ridiculous simplicity or rather a sensible contradiction in terms exclaim that the Almighty is master. Thus inconsistent reasoners believe that the Almighty, a being one of whose first attributes is goodness, sends you pestilence, war, and famine. You believe that the Almighty, this good being, has the will and right to inflict the greatest evils you can bear. Cease at least to call your God good when he does you evil. Say not that he is just, say that he is the strongest, and that it is impossible for you to ward off the blows of his caprice. God, say you, chastises only for our good. But what real good can result to a people from being exterminated by the plague, ravaged by wars, corrupted by the examples of perverse rulers, continually crushed under the iron scepter of a succession of merciless tyrants, annihilated by the scourges of a bad government whose destructive effects are often felt for ages? If chastisements are good, then they cannot have too much of a good thing. The eyes of faith must be strange eyes, if with them they see advantages in the most dreadful calamities in the vices and follies with which our species are afflicted. 90. Jehovah exterminations prove an unjust and barbarous God. What strange ideas of divine justice must Christians have who are taught to believe that their God, in view of reconciling to himself the human race, guilty, though unconscious, of the sin of their fathers, has put to death his own son, who is innocent and incapable of sinning? What should we say of a king whose subjects should revolt and who, to appease himself, should find no other expedient than to put to death the heir of his crown who had not participated in the general rebellion? It is, the Christian will say, through goodness to his subjects, unable of themselves to satisfy divine justice that God has consented to the cruel death of his son. But the goodness of a father to strangers does not give him the right of being unjust and barbarous to his own son. All the qualities which theology ascribes to God, reciprocally destroy one another. The exercise of one of his perfections is always at the expense of the exercise of another. Has the Jew more rational ideas of divine justice than the Christian? The pride of a king kindles the anger of heaven. Jehovah causes the pestilence to descend upon his innocent people. Seventy thousand subjects are exterminated to expiate the fault of a monarch whom the goodness of God resolved to spare. Ninety-one. Is God a generous, equitable, and tender father? Notwithstanding the various acts of injustice, with which all religions delight to blacken the divinity, men cannot consent to accuse him of iniquity. They fear that, like the tyrants of this world, truth will offend him and redouble upon them the weight of his malice and tyranny. They hearken therefore to their priests who tell them that their God is a tender father, that this God is an equitable monarch whose object in this world is to assure himself of the love, obedience, and respect of his subjects, who gives them liberty of acting only to afford them an opportunity of meriting his favors and of acquiring an eternal happiness which he does not owe them. By what signs can men discover the tenderness of a father who has given life to the greater part of his children merely to drag out upon the earth a painful, restless, bitter existence? Is there a more unfortunate present than that pretended liberty which, we are told, men are very liable to abuse and thereby to incur eternal misery? End of Section 8 Recording by Roger Maline Section 9 of Good Sense This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Roger Maline Good Sense by Paul Henri Thierry Baron Dolbach Translator Unknown Section 9 Parts 92 through 99 Ninety-two. Man's life deposes against the goodness of a pretended God. By calling mortals to life, what a cruel and dangerous part has not the deity forced them to act? Thrown into the world without their consent, provided with a temperament of which they are not masters, animated by passions and desires inherent in their nature, exposed to snares which they have not power to escape, hurried away by events which they could not foresee or prevent, unhappy mortals are compelled to run a career which may lead them to punishments horrible in duration and violence. Travellers inform us that in Asia a sultan reigned, full of fantastical ideas, and very absolute in his whims. By a strange madness, this prince spent his time seated at a table upon which were placed three dice and a dice-box. One end of the table was covered with pieces of silver, designed to excite the avarice of his courtiers and people. He, knowing the foible of his subjects, addressed them as follows. Slaves, I wish your happiness. My goodness proposes to enrich you and make you all happy. Do you see these treasures? Well, they are for you. Strive to gain them. Let each in his turn take the box and dice. Whoever has the fortune to throw sixes shall be master of the treasure. But I forewarn you that he who is not the happiness to throw the number required shall be precipitated forever into a dark dungeon where my justice demands that he be burned with a slow fire. Upon this discourse of the monarch the company look at each other affrighted. No one wishes to expose himself to so dangerous a chance. What, says the enraged sultan, does no one offer to play? I tell you then you must. My glory requires that you should play. Play then. Obey without replying. It is well to observe that the dice of the despot are so prepared that out of a hundred thousand throws there is but one which can gain the number required. Thus the generous monarch has the pleasure of seeing his prison well filled and his riches seldom ravished from him. Lordals, this sultan is your god. His treasure is heaven, his dungeon is hell, and it is you who hold the dice. 93. We owe no gratitude to what is called providence. Divines repeatedly assure us that we owe providence infinite gratitude for the numberless blessings it bestows. Loudly extol the happiness of existence. But alas, how many mortals are truly satisfied with their mode of existence? If life has sweets, with how much bitterness is it not mixed? Does not a single chagrin often suffice suddenly to poison the most peaceable and fortunate life? Are there many who, if it were in their power, would begin again at the same price the painful career in which, without their consent, destiny has placed them? They say that existence is a great blessing. But is not this existence continually troubled with fears and maladies, often cruel and little deserved? May not this existence, threatened on so many sides, be torn from us any moment? Where is the man who has not been deprived of a dear wife, beloved child, or consoling friend, whose loss every moment intrudes upon his thoughts? There are few who have not been forced to drink of the cup of misfortune. There are few who have not desired their end. Finally, it did not depend upon us to exist or not to exist. Should the bird then be very grateful to the fowler for taking him in his net and confining him in his cage for his diversion? 94. It is folly to suppose that man is the favorite of God. Notwithstanding the infirmities and misery which man is forced to undergo, he has nevertheless the folly to think himself the favorite of his God, the object of all his cares, the sole end of all his works. He imagines that the whole universe is made for him. He arrogantly calls himself the king of nature and values himself far above other animals. MORTAL! Upon what canst thou found thy haughty pretensions? It is, sayest thou, upon thy soul, upon thy reason, upon the sublime faculties which enable thee to exercise an absolute empire over the beings which surround thee. But, weak sovereigns of the world, art thou sure one moment of the continuance of thy reign? Do not the smallest atoms of matter which thou despisest suffice to tear thee from thy throne and deprive thee of life? Finally, does not the king of animals at last become the food of worms? Thou speakest of thy soul. But dost thou know what a soul is? Dost thou not see that this soul is only the assemblage of thy organs from which results life? Wouldst thou then refuse a soul to other animals who live, think, judge, and compare like thee, who seek pleasure and avoid pain like thee, and who often have organs which serve them better than thine? Thou boastest of thy intellectual faculties, but do these faculties, of which thou art so proud, make thee happier than other animals? Dost thou often make use of that reason in which thou gloriousst, and to which religion commands thee not to listen? Are those brutes which thou disdainest, because they are less strong or less cunning than thou art, subject to mental pains, to a thousand frivolous passions, to a thousand imaginary wants, to which thou art a continual prey? Are they, like thee, tormented by the past, alarmed at the future? Confined solely to the present, does not what you call their instinct, and what I call their intelligence, suffice to preserve and defend them, and to supply them with all they want? Does not this instinct, of which thou speakest with contempt, often serve them better than thy wonderful faculties? Is not their peaceful ignorance more advantageous to them than those extravagant meditations and worthless researches which render thee unhappy, and for which thy zeal urges thee even to massacre the beings of thy noble species? Finally, have these beasts, like so many mortals, a troubled imagination which makes them fear not only death, but likewise eternal torments? Augustus, hearing that Herod, king of Judea, had put his sons to death, exclaimed, It is much better to be Herod's hog than his son, as much may be said of man. This dear child of Providence runs far greater risks than all other animals. Having suffered much in this world, does he not imagine that he is in danger of suffering eternally in another? Ninety-five. A comparison between man and brutes. Where is the precise line of distinction between man and the animals whom he calls brutes? In what does he differ essentially from beasts? It is, we are told, by his intelligence, by the faculties of his mind, and by his reason that man appears superior to all other animals, who, in all their actions, move only by physical impulses in which reason has no share. But finally, brutes, having fewer wants than man, easily do without his intellectual faculties, which would be perfectly useless in their mode of existence. Their instinct is sufficient, while all the faculties of man scarcely suffice to render his existence supportable, and to satisfy the wants which his imagination and his prejudices multiply to his torment. Brutes are not influenced by the same objects as man. They have not the same wants, desires, nor fancies. And they very soon arrive to maturity, while the mind of man seldom attains to the full enjoyment and free exercise of its faculties and to such a use of them as is conducive to his happiness. Ninety-six. There are no animals so detestable as tyrants. We are assured that the human soul is a simple substance. It should then be the same in every individual, each having the same intellectual faculties, yet this is not the case. Men differ as much in the qualities of the mind as in the features of the face. There are human beings as different from one another as man is from a horse or a dog. What conformity or resemblance do we find between some men? What an infinite distance is there between the genius of a lock or a newton and that of a peasant, hot and taut, or lap-lander? Man differs from other animals only in his organization which enables him to produce effects of which animals are not capable. The variety, observable in the organs of individuals of the human species, suffices to explain the differences in what is called their intellectual faculties. More or less delicacy in these organs, warmth in the blood, mobility in the fluids, flexibility or stiffness in the fibers and nerves, must necessarily produce the infinite diversity which we observe in the minds of men. It is by exercise, habit and education that the mind is unfolded and become superior to that of others. Man, without culture and experience, is as void of reason and industry as the brute. A stupid man is one whose organs move with difficulty, whose brain does not easily vibrate, whose blood circulates slowly. A man of genius is he whose organs are flexible, whose sensations are quick, whose brain vibrates with celerity. A learned man is he whose organs and brain have been long exercised upon objects to which he is devoted. Without culture, experience or reason, is not man more contemptible and worthy of hatred than the vilest insects or most ferocious beasts? Is there in nature a more detestable being than a Tiberius, a Nero or a Caligula? Have those destroyers of the human race, known by the name of conquerors, more estimable souls than bears, lions or panthers? Are there animals in the world more detestable than tyrants? 97. A Refutation of the Excellence of Man The superiority which man so gratuitously arrogates to himself over other animals soon vanishes in the light of reason when we reflect on human extravagances. How many animals show more mildness, reflection and reason than the animal who calls himself reasonable above all others? Are there among men so often enslaved and depressed, societies as well constituted as those of the ants, bees or beavers? Do we ever see ferocious beasts of the same species mangle and destroy one another without profit? Do we ever see religious wars among them? The cruelty of beasts towards other species arises from hunger, the necessity of nourishment. The cruelty of man towards man arises only from the vanity of his masters and the folly of his impertinent prejudices. Speculative men, who endeavour to make us believe that all in the universe was made for man, are much embarrassed when we ask how so many hurtful animals can contribute to the happiness of man. What known advantage results to the friend of the gods from being bitten by a viper, stung by a gnat, devoured by vermin, torn in pieces by a tiger, etc.? Would not all these animals reason as justly as our theologians should they pretend that man was made for them? 98. An Oriental Tale An Eastern Tale At some distance from Baghdad, a hermit, renowned for his sanctity, passed his days in an agreeable solitude. The neighbouring inhabitants, to obtain an interest in his prayers, daily flock to his hermitage to carry him provisions and presents. The holy man, without ceasing, gave thanks to God for the blessings with which Providence loaded him. O Allah! said he! How ineffable is thy love to thy servants! What have I done to merit the favours that I receive from thy bounty? O monarch of the skies! O father of nature! What praises could worthily celebrate thy munificence and thy paternal care? O Allah! How great is thy goodness to the children of men! Penetrated with gratitude the hermit made a vow to undertake for the seventh time a pilgrimage to Mecca. The war which then raged between the Persians and Turks could not induce him to defer his pious enterprise. Full of confidence in God he sets out under the inviolable safeguard of a religious habit. He passes through the hostile troops without any obstacle. Far from being molested he receives at every step marks of veneration from the soldiers of the two parties. At length, born down with fatigue, he is obliged to seek refuge against the rays of a scorching sun. He rests under the cool shade of a group of palm trees. In this solitary place the man of God finds not only an enchanting retreat but a delicious repast. He has only to put forth his hand to gather dates and other pleasant fruits. A brook affords him the means of quenching his thirst. A green turf invites him to sleep. Upon waking he performs the sacred ablution and exclaims in a transport of joy. Oh, Allah! How great is thy goodness to the children of men! After this perfect refreshment the saint, full of strength and gaiety, pursues his way. It leads him across a smiling country which presents to his eyes flowery hillocks, enameled meadows, and trees loaded with fruit. Affected by this sight he ceases not to adore the rich and liberal hand of Providence which appears everywhere providing for the happiness of the human race. Going a little farther the mountains are pretty difficult to pass, but having once arrived at the summit a hideous spectacle suddenly appears to his view. His soul is filled with horror. He discovers a vast plain laid waste with fire and sword. He beholds it covered with hundreds of carcasses. The deplorable remains of a bloody battle lately fought upon this field. Eagles, vultures, ravens, and wolves were greedily devouring the dead bodies with which the ground was covered. This sight plunges our pilgrim into a gloomy meditation. Heaven, by special favour, had enabled him to understand the language of beasts. He heard a wolf, gorged with human flesh, cry out in the excess of his joy, Oh Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of wolves! Thy provident wisdom takes care to craze the mind of these detestable men who are so dangerous to our souls. By an effect of thy providence, which watches over thy creatures, these destroyers cut one another's throats and furnish us with sumptuous meals. Oh Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of wolves! Ninety-nine. It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God. Oh Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of wolves! Ninety-nine. It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God. A heated imagination sees in the universe only the blessings of Heaven. A calmer mind finds in it both good and evil. I exist, say you, but is this existence always a good? Behold, you say, that sun which lights, this earth which for you is covered with crops and verder, these flowers which bloom to regale your senses, these trees which bend under the weight of delicious fruits, these pure waters which run only to quench your thirst, those seas which embrace the universe to facilitate your commerce, these animals which a foreseeing nature provides for your use. Yes, I see all these things and I enjoy them, but in many climates this beautiful sun is almost always hidden, in others its excessive heat torments, creates storms, produces frightful diseases, and parches the fields. The pastures are without verder, the trees without fruit, the crops are scorched, the springs are dried up. I can only with difficulty subsist and now complain of the cruelties of nature, which to you always appear so beneficent. If these seas bring me spices and useless commodities, do they not destroy numberless mortals who are foolish enough to seek them? The vanity of man persuades him that he is the sole center of the universe. He creates for himself a world and a God. He thinks himself of sufficient consequence to derange nature at his pleasure. But concerning other animals he reasons like an atheist. Does he not imagine that the individuals different from his own are automatons unworthy of the blessings of universal providence and that brutes cannot be objects of his justice or goodness? Mortals regard the happy or unhappy events, health or sickness, life or death, plenty or want, as rewards or punishments for the right use or abuse of the liberty with which they erroneously imagine themselves endowed. Do they reason in the same manner concerning the brutes? No. Although they see them under a just God in joy and suffer, equally subject to health and sickness, live and die like themselves, it never occurs to them to ask by what crime these beasts could have incurred the displeasure of their creator. Have not men, blinded by their religious prejudices in order to free themselves from embarrassment, carried their folly so far as to pretend that beasts have no feeling? Will men never renounce their foolish pretensions? Will they never acknowledge that nature is not made for them? Will they never see that nature has placed equality among all beings she has produced? Will they never perceive that all organized beings are equally made to be born and die and joy and suffer? Finally, far from having any cause to be puffed up with their mental faculties, are they not forced to grant that these faculties often make them more unhappy than beasts in which we find neither opinions, prejudices, vanities nor follies which every moment decide the welfare of man? End of Section 9 Recording by Roger Maline Section 10 of Good Sense This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Roger Maline Good Sense by Paul Henri Thierry Baron Dolbach Translator unknown Section 10 Parts 100 through 109 100 What is the soul? The superiority which men arrogate over other animals is chiefly founded upon their opinion that they have the exclusive possession of an immortal soul, but ask them what this soul is and they are puzzled. They will say it is an unknown substance, a secret power distinct from their bodies, a spirit of which they have no idea. Ask them how this spirit, which they supposed to be, like their god, holy void of extension, could combine itself with their material bodies, and they will tell you they know nothing about it, that it is to them a mystery, that this combination is an effect of the omnipotence of God. These are the ideas that men form of the hidden, or rather imaginary substance, which they consider as the mainspring of all their actions. If the soul is a substance essentially different from the body and can have no relation to it, their union would be not a mystery, but an impossibility. Besides, this soul being of a nature different from the body must necessarily act in a different manner, yet we see that this pretended soul is sensible of the motions experienced by the body and that these two substances, essentially different, always act in concert. You will say that this harmony is also a mystery, but I will tell you that I see not my soul, that I know and am sensible of my body only, that it is this body which feels, thinks, judges, suffers, and enjoys, and that all these faculties are necessary results of its own mechanism, or organization. 101. The existence of a soul is an absurd supposition. Although it is impossible for men to form the least idea of the soul, or the pretended spirit, which animates them, yet they persuade themselves that this unknown soul is exempt from death, everything proves to them that they feel, that they think, that they acquire ideas, that they enjoy and suffer only by means of the senses, or material organs of the body. Admitting even the existence of this soul, they cannot help acknowledging that it depends entirely upon the body and undergoes all its vicissitudes, and yet it is imagined that this soul has nothing in its nature similar to the body, that it can act and feel without the assistance of the body, in a word that this soul, freed from the body and disengaged from its senses, can live and enjoy, suffer, experience happiness, or feel excruciating torments. Upon such a tissue of absurdities is built the marvelous opinion of the immortality of the soul. If I ask what are the motives for believing the soul immortal, they immediately answer that it is because man naturally desires to be immortal. But because you desire a thing ardently, can you infer that your desire will be fulfilled? By what strange logic can we dare affirm that a thing cannot fail to happen because we ardently desire it? Are desires, begotten by the imagination, the measure of reality? The empires, you say, deprived of the flattening hope of another life, wish to be annihilated? Very well. May they not then as justly conclude from their desire that they shall be annihilated, as you may conclude from your desire that you shall exist forever? 102. It is evident that man dies in total. Man dies, and the human body, after death, is no longer anything but a mass incapable of producing these motions of which the sum total constituted life. We see that it has no longer circulation, respiration, digestion, speech, or thought. It is pretended that the soul is then separated from the body, but to say that this soul, with which we are unacquainted, is the principle of life is to say nothing, unless that an unknown power is the hidden principle of imperceptible movements. Nothing is more natural and simple than to believe that the dead man no longer lives. Nothing is more extravagant than to believe that the dead man is still alive. We laugh at the simplicity of some nations whose customs is to bury provision with the dead under an idea that it will be useful and necessary to them in the other life. Is it then more ridiculous or absurd to suppose that men will eat after death than to imagine that they will think, that they will be actuated by agreeable or disagreeable ideas, that they will enjoy or suffer, and that they will experience repentance or delight after the organs adapted to produce sensations or ideas are once dissolved? To say that the souls of men will be happy or unhappy after death is, in other words, to say that men will see without eyes, hear without ears, taste without palates, smell without noses, and touch without hands. And persons who consider themselves very reasonable adopt these ideas. 103 Incontestable arguments against the spirituality of the soul. The dogma of the immortality of the soul supposes the soul to be a simple substance, in a word, a spirit. But I ask again, what is a spirit? It is, say you, a substance void of extension, incorruptible, having nothing common with matter. If so, how is your soul born, and how does it grow? How does it strengthen or weaken itself? How does it get disordered and grow old in the same progression as your body? To all these questions you answer that these are mysteries. If so, you cannot understand them. If you cannot understand them, why do you decide about a thing of which you are unable to form the least idea? To believe or affirm anything it is necessary at least to know in what it consists. To believe in the existence of your immaterial soul is to say that you are persuaded of the existence of a thing of which it is impossible for you to form any true notion. It is to believe in words without meaning. To affirm that the thing is as you say is the height of folly or vanity. 104. On the absurdity of the supernatural causes. Are not theologians strange reasoners? Whenever they cannot divine the natural causes of things they invent what they call supernatural such as spirits, occult causes, inexplicable agents, or rather words much more obscure than the things they endeavor to explain. Let us remain in nature when we wish to account for the phenomena of nature. Let us be content to remain ignorant of causes too delicate for our organs. And let us be persuaded that by going beyond nature we shall never solve the problems which nature presents. Even upon the hypothesis of theology, that is supposing an all-powerful mover of matter by what right would theologians deny that their God has power to give this matter the faculty of thought? Was it then more difficult for him to create combinations of matter from which thought might result than spirits who could think? At least by supposing matter which thinks we should have some notions of the subject of thought or of what thinks in us, whereas by attributing thought to an immaterial being it is impossible to form the least idea of it. 105. It is false that materialism degrades. It is objected against us that materialism makes man a mere machine which is said to be very dishonorable. But will it be much more honorable for man if we should say that he acts by the secret impulses of a spirit or by a certain I-know-not-what that animates him in a manner totally inexplicable? It is easy to perceive that the supposed superiority of spirit over matter or of the soul over the body has no other foundation than men's ignorance of this soul, while they are more familiarized with matter with which they imagine they are acquainted and of which they think they can discern the origin. But the most simple movements of our bodies are to every man who studies them as inexplicable as thought. 106. It is false that materialism degrades. The high value which so many people set upon spiritual substance has no other motive than their absolute inability to define it intelligibly. The contempt shown for matter by our metaphysicians arises only from the circumstance that familiarity begets contempt. When they tell us that the soul is more excellent and noble than the body, they say what they know not. 107. Idea of future life only useful to priests' trade. The dogma of another life is incessantly extolled as useful. It is maintained that even though it should be only a fiction, it is advantageous because it deceives men and conducts them to virtue. But is it true that this dogma makes men wiser and more virtuous? Are the nations who believe this fiction remarkable for purity of morals? Has not the visible world ever the advantage over the invisible? If those who are trusted with the instruction and government of men had knowledge and virtue themselves, they would govern them much better by realities than by fictions. But crafty, ambitious and corrupt legislators have everywhere founded better to amuse with fables than to teach them truths, to unfold their reason, to excite them to virtue by sensible and real motives in fine to govern them in a rational manner. Priests undoubtedly had reasons for making the soul immaterial. They wanted souls to people the imaginary regions which they have discovered in the other life. Material souls would, like all bodies, have been subject to disillusion. Now if men should believe that all must perish with the body, the geographers of the other world would evidently lose the right of guiding men's souls towards that unknown abode. They would reap no profits from the hope with which they feed them and the terrors with which they oppress them. If futurity is of no real utility to mankind, it is at least of the great utility to those who have assumed the office of conducting them further. 108. It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling. But, it will be said, is not the dogma of the immortality of the soul comforting to beings who are often very unhappy here below? Though it should be an error, is it not pleasing? Is it not a blessing to man to believe that he shall be able to enjoy hereafter a happiness which has denied him upon earth? Thus, poor mortals, you make your wishes the measure of truth, because you desire to live forever and to be happier you at once conclude that you shall live forever and that you shall be more fortunate in an unknown world than in this known world where you often find nothing but affliction. Consent therefore to leave without regret this world which gives the greater part of you much more torment than pleasure. Submit to the order of nature which demands that you as well as all other beings should not endure forever. We are incessantly told that religion has infinite consolations for the unfortunate that the idea of the soul's immortality and of a happier life is very proper to elevate man and to support him under adversity which awaits him upon earth. It is said on the contrary that materialism is an afflicting system calculated to degrade man. Then it puts him upon a level with the brutes, breaks his courage and shows him no other prospect than frightful annihilation capable of driving him to despair and suicide whenever he is unhappy. The great art of theologians is to blow hot and cold, to afflict and console, to frighten and encourage. It appears by theological fictions that the regions of the other life are happy and unhappy. Nothing is more difficult than to become worthy of the abode of felicity. Nothing is more easy than to obtain a place in the abode of torment which God is preparing for the unfortunate victims of eternal fury. Have those men who think the other life so pleasant and flattering forgotten that according to them that life is to be attended with torments to the greater part of mortals? Is not the idea of total annihilation infinitely preferable to the idea of an eternal existence attended with anguish and gnashing of teeth? Is the fear of an end more afflicting than that of having had a beginning? The fear of ceasing to exist is a real evil only to the imagination which alone begat the dogma of another life. Christian ministers say that the idea of a happier life is joyous. Admitted. Every person would desire a more agreeable existence than he enjoys here. But if paradise is inviting you will grant that hell is frightful. Heaven is very difficult and hell very easy to be merited. Do you not say that a narrow way leads to the happy regions and a broad way to the regions of misery? Do you not often say that the number of the elect is very small and that of the reprobate very large? Is not grace which your God grants but to a very few necessary to salvation? Now I assure you that these ideas are by no means consoling. That I had rather be annihilated, once for all, than to burn for ever. That the fate of beast is to me more desirable than that of the damned. That the opinion which relieves me from afflicting fears in this world appears to me more joyous than the uncertainty arising from the opinion of a God who, master of his grace, grants it to none but his favourites and permits all others to become worthy of eternal torment. Nothing but enthusiasm or folly can induce a man to prefer improbable conjectures attended with uncertainty and insupportable fears. 109. All religious principle are derived from the imagination. All religious principles are the work of pure imagination in which experience and reason have no share. It is extremely difficult to combat them because the imagination, once prepossessed by chimeras which astonish or disturb it, is incapable of reasoning. To combat religion and its phantoms with the arms of reason is like using a sword to kill gnats. As soon as the blow is struck the gnats and chimeras come hovering round again and resume in the mind the place from which they were thought to have been forever banished. When we reject as too weak the proofs given of the existence of a God they instantly oppose to the arguments which destroy that existence and inward sense, a deep persuasion, an invincible inclination born in every man which holds up to his mind in spite of himself the idea of an almighty being whom he cannot entirely expel from his mind and whom he is compelled to acknowledge in spite of the strongest reasons that can be urged. But whoever will analyze this inward sense upon which such stress is laid will perceive that it is only the effect of a rooted habit which, shutting their eyes against the most demonstrative proofs, subjects the greater part of men and often even the most enlightened to the prejudices of childhood. What avails this inward sense or this deep persuasion against the evidence which demonstrates that whatever implies a contradiction cannot exist? We are gravely assured that the non-existence of God is not demonstrated. Yet by all that men have hitherto said of him nothing is better demonstrated than that this God is a chimera whose existence is totally impossible. Since nothing is more evident than that a being cannot possess qualities so unlike, so contradictory, so irreconcilable as those which every religion upon earth attributes to the divinity. Is not the theologian's God as well as that of the deist a cause incompatible with the effects attributed to it? Let them do what they will. It is necessary either to invent another God or to grant that he who for so many ages has been held up to the terror of mortals is at the same time very good and very bad, very powerful and very weak, unchangeable and fickle, perfectly intelligent and perfectly void of reason, of order and permitting disorder, very just and most unjust, very skillful and unskillful. In short, are we not forced to confess that it is impossible to reconcile the discordant attributes heaped upon a being of whom we cannot speak without the most palpable contradictions? Let any one attribute a single quality to the divinity, and it is universally contradicted by the effects ascribed to this cause.