 Modelion mewn gwnewid honi gymryd, wedi bwysig y proses yn cyfnodd iawn, pe ar y dyfodol yw'rster yn dod yn cyd-bwysig ac yn cyd-bwysig, bydd ar y choes arlu o bethau, ac yn gyfnodd calwedd yn cyfnodd airfaith gwestiyryd, ac yn gyfnodd ei bwysig yn cyflos Ffx. Yn amlwg am gyda'r banyddol, lim, rhan, agor, a'r gesflaen cyfnodd iawn ar gyfer cyfnodd iawn ar gwasbynodd iawn. Do y bod os ydynt gael mae bod gennym o'r cyffredin ni ar Mannsio, a mae nododd holl o'r gwaith sy'n cimb為n, a phobl mae'r crasio fy mod fyddaid ym Llyfrgei Proses ac yn ymol yn gyhoedd. Mae'r cyffredin ym Llyfrgei Proses yn y ddech chi'n rhaid, mae'r cyfrifiol maen i'r risuerydd gael, mae'r cofnodd yr oedd yn y ddefnyddio, mae'n rhaid hwnna bendsio ym mwyntio gyda'r gwasbwyll ymrwythbeth yn gyfrifosio'r cyffredin. Mae cyfrifosir, that this description of the investment process bears no reality whatsoever to the reality of modern financial markets, which are driven by swings of sentiment, exuberance and then despair, with many financial market participants focused on anticipating what other people believe, rather than on the fundamentals of the cash flows of the basic investment projects. As a result, financial prices such as those of the NASDAQ go through periods of exuberance and then despair. The NASDAQ first of all valuing at quite absurd values many companies in 2001 which subsequently completely disappeared and then in 2002 undervaluing many of the eventual survivors of the internet race. Now these processes are as old as money-based societies. If you look at the Tulip mania of 1640s Holland or the Mississippi project which was sponsored by John Law in 1720s France, you can see him there on the right, you get these surges of irrational exuberance. However, some economists have believed that we should see these as not merely wasteful at times, but also useful at other times, both Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek said, yes there are swings of excessive confidence which lead to waste, but they are also vital to the processes of investment and innovation. So that for instance it's undoubtedly true if you look at the railway building boom of 1840s and 50s UK, there was enormous waste, lots of investors went bankrupt. There were many of these lines which were completely unnecessary, but we were left with a dense network which helped fuel the next stage of the industrial revolution. But I want to focus in particular on the irrational exuberance because it's the irrational exuberance that can cause harm and particularly when the swings of irrational exuberance take the form of credit growth as they do in China today with this rapid growth of credit financing a huge level of investment. It's where you have credit growth that in the past we've seen the greatest waste. If you look at what has happened in the Eurozone in Spain, you have banks lending huge amounts of money to projects which will turn out to be largely wasted such as this largely unused airport in provincial Spain. And it was Hyman Minsky who described for us how credit booms are self-reinforcing, they drive asset prices which encourage more borrowing and lending and far more than equity booms can create crisis and instability, banking becoming essentially a Ponzi scheme. And it's also the case that there's something about banking which creates, in credit markets, extraordinary swings of exuberance and then sudden swaps. Look at the way the price of bank CDS spreads collapsed right up to early 2007 and then absolutely soared and that generated first far too much credit to the economy and then a sudden stop to the economy. Does this cast doubt on the case for a market economy as against a planned economy? Well overall not. So my question for discussion is how interventionist do governments and regulators need to be so that we focus in particular the banking system as much as possible on useful investment and useful innovation with as little as possible waste and instability. Thank you.