 Hello, welcome to this video. If you are interested in the state of the arts for partial K-Explorer attack on CRT-RC, or you are curious about the full recovery of CRT-RC using any one-third MSP or IOSP of landed K, please join this talk on this Friday. This joint work is titled, a third ASOL unit extended partial K-Explorer attack on CRT-RC with adaptive exponent landing. I will first introduce you the current state of the arts of BK attacks on RCA or CRT-RC. Without the exponent landing, the current state of the arts is the recent Eurocrypt work. The authors managed to recover the full key using only one-third of DP and DP-DQ. And in this work, we extend this to adaptive exponent landing case. And this is the current state of the arts in this regard. We also can recover the full CRT-K using the blended DP prime and the DQ prime, one-third of the MSP or IOSP bits. The principle of this extended partial K-Explorer attack is a two-step approach. The first step is we try to find the CRT-K constant, K prime. And for the MSP case, we have two scenarios. The first scenario is we have only one DQ prime available. Then we just do factoring. We will factor a number at the size of 1-6 of the models. And the second scenario is we have multiple DQ prime available. And then we compute the GCD to get the K prime. And the IOSP case, we simply use a coppersmith method to find the roots of 5 variates on the normal to get K prime. The second step, we will use the calculated K prime to estimate the K prime times P. And then we will factor N using this estimate value to get P. In both MSP and IOSP cases, we just solve the root of your variate on the normal to get an unknown part of the P prime and then factor N. In both cases, for this step, we can do in a polynomial time. And in the end, we will show you the experimental results we have done. We used the three different typical KNAS and the three typical blending factor NAS. And in all those experiments, we managed to recover all the CRT case using one sort of MSP or IOSP of DP prime and DQ prime. We also applied this extended FKE attack to Sartan leakage. We were targeting the monogamera ladder implementation in the real life products. And we managed to recover the full key using deep learning profile attack and this extended partial KL plural attack. If you are interested in this work, please join me in this up on this Friday. See you there.