 Question 101 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 101 of Piety in four articles. After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly, four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety. First, to whom does piety extend? Second, what does piety make one offer a person? Third, whether piety is a special virtue? Fourth, whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion. First article, whether piety extends to particular human individuals? Objection one, it seems that piety does not extend to particular human individuals. For Augustine says in On the City of God 10, that piety denotes, properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term Eusebia. But the worship of God does not denote relation to man, but only to God. Therefore, piety does not extend definitely to certain human individuals. Objection two further, Gregory says in his commentary on Job 1, piety on her day provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy. Now the works of mercy are to be done unto all, according to Augustine in On Christian Doctrine 1. Therefore, piety does not extend definitely to certain special persons. Objection three further, in human affairs there are many other mutual relations, besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the philosopher states in Ethics 8, 11 and 12. And on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety according to a glass on 2 Timothy 3.5, having an appearance indeed of piety. Therefore, piety extends not only to one's kindred and fellow citizens. On the contrary, Tully says in Rhetoric 2 that, It is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful service. I answer that, man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. On both accounts, God holds first place, for he is supremely excellent and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently, man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country after God. Wherefore, just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety in the second place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country. The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kindreds folk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the philosopher in Ethics 812. The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore, piety extends chiefly to these. Reply to Objection 1. The greater includes the lesser, wherefore, the worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. Hence, it is written in Malachi 1.6. If I be a father, where is my honor? Consequently, the term piety extends also to the divine worship. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in On the City of God 10, The term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy in the language of the common people, the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word pious to God Himself. Reply to Objection 3. The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than other relations. Wherefore, the term piety is more applicable to them. 2. Whether piety provides support for our parents Objection 1. It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents. For seemingly, the precept of the Decalogue, Honor Thy Father and Mother, belongs to piety, but this prescribes only the giving of honor. Therefore, it does not belong to piety to provide support for one's parents. Objection 2. A man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the Apostle and 2 Corinthians 12-14, neither ought the children to lay up for the parents. Therefore, piety does not oblige them to support their parents. Objection 3. Piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one's fellow citizens, as stated above in Article 1. But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and fellow citizens. Therefore, neither is one bound to support one's parents. On the contrary, our Lord, in Matthew 15-3-6, reproved the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their parents. I answer that, we owe something to our parents in two ways. That is to say, both essentially and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as such, and since he is his son superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which obefits him to receive in respect of something accidental to him. For instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure. If he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him, and so on, in like instance all of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says in his rhetoric too that, Piety gives both duty and homage, duty referring to service, and homage to reverence or honor, because as Augustine says in On the City of God 10, we are said to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honor. Reply to Objection 1. According to our Lord's interpretation in Matthew 15 verses 3 through 6, the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them, and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father because it is due to him as to one greater. Reply to Objection 2. Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son, and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental arising from some momentary necessity wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents. Reply to Objection 3. As Tully says in his rhetoric 2. We offer homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country. Not however equally to all, but chiefly to our parents and to others according to our means and their personal claims. 3. Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds from love, but it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity. Objection 2. Further it is proper to religion to give worship to God, but piety also gives worship to God according to Augustine in On the City of God 10. Therefore piety is not distinct from religion. Objection 3. Further piety whereby we give our country worship and duty seems to be the same as legal justice which looks to the common good. Objection 4. But legal justice is a general virtue according to the philosopher in Ethics 5, 1 and 2. Therefore piety is not a special virtue. On the contrary, it is accounted by Tully in his rhetoric 2 as a part of justice. I answer that a special virtue is one that regards an object under a special aspect. Objection 5. Since then the nature of justice consists in rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way to that which is its conatural principle of being in government. And piety regards this principle in as much as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country and to those who are related there too. Therefore piety is a special virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is a protestation of faith open charity whereby man is primarily directed to God. So again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country. Reply to Objection 2. God is the principle of our being in government in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 1. Wherefore by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God even as God by way of excellence is called our Father. Reply to Objection 3. Piety extends to our country insofar as the latter is for us a principle of being. But legal justice regards the good of our country, considered as the common good. Wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has. Fourth article. Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. Objection 1. It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For our Lord said in Luke 14 verse 26, If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. And it is said in praise of James and John in Matthew 4.22 that they left their nets and father and followed Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites in Deuteronomy 33.9, Who hath said to his father and to his mother, I do not know you, and to his brethren I know you not, and their own children they have not known, these have kept thy word. Now a man who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them must need omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion. Objection 2 further. It is written in Luke 9 verses 59 and 60 that in answer to him who said, Suffer me first to go and bury my father. Our Lord replied, Let the dead bury their dead, but go thou and preach the kingdom of God. Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion. Objection 3 further. God is called our Father by excellence. Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety, so do we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of the worship of religion. Objection 4 further. Religious are bound by a vow which they may not break to fulfill the observances of religion. Now in accordance with those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both on the score of poverty since they have nothing of their own, and on the score of obedience since they may not leave the cloister without the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. On the contrary our Lord reproved the Pharisees in Matthew chapter 15 verses 3 through 6 who taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying one's parents the honor we owe them. I answer that religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue since according to the philosopher in his book on the categories, good is not opposed to good. Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one another so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other. Now as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde question 7 article 2 as well as in question 18 article 3, the act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances do thereto, and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer a virtue but a vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents according to the doom mode. But it is not the doom mode that man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but as Ambrose says on Luke 12 52, the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of kindred. Accordingly if the worship of one's parents take one away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says in his letter to Helodius, Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross. It is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter. Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents we are not withdrawn from the service of God then it will be an act of piety and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion. Reply to Objection 1. Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says that when we find our parents to be a hindrance in our way to God we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them, for if our parents incite us to sin and withdraw us from the service of God we must as regards this point abandon and hate them. It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their kindred because they obeyed the Lord's command and spared not the idolaters. Confer Exodus 32. James and John are praised for leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means of livelihood if they followed Christ. Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father because, according to Chrysostom in one of his homilies on the Gospel of Matthew, our Lord by so doing saved him from many evils such as the sorrows and worries and other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided and so forth, but chiefly because there were others who could see to the funeral, or according to Cyril's commentary on Luke chapter 9. This disciple's request was not that he might bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in the latter's old age until at length he should bury him. This is what our Lord did not grant because there were others bound by the duties of kindred to take care of him. Reply to Objection 3. Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred by us to God, just as other works of mercy which we perform with regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God according to Matthew 25 verse 40. As long as you did it to one of my least, you did it to me. Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance so that they have no other means of support provided they incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful to forego their service so as to give more time to religion. Reply to Objection 4. We must speak differently of one who is yet in the world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without him, he must not leave them and enter religion because he would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honor of parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them and leave them in God's care. But this considered a right would be to tempt God, since while having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger in the hope of God's assistance. On the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world, therefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless, he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors and his religious state with all, to make efforts for his parents' support. End of question 101, read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triities on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 102, of observance, considered in itself and of its parts, in three articles. We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices. Under the head of observance, there are three points of inquiry. First, whether observance is a special virtue distinct from other virtues. Second, what does observance offer? Third, of its comparison with piety. First article, whether observance is a special virtue distinct from other virtues. Objection 1, it seems that observance is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety. For Telly says in his rhetoric, too, that it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity. But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore, observance is not a distinct virtue from piety. Objection 2, further. Just as honor and worship are due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore, observance whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in dignity is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. Objection 3, further. We have many duties towards those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfillment of which is required by law according to Romans 13.7. Render to all men their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, etc. Now the fulfillment of the requirements of the law belongs to legal justice or even to special justice. Therefore, observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues. On the contrary, Tully, in his rhetoric 2, reckons observance along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues. I answer that as explained above in question 101, articles 1 and 3, as well as in question 80. According to the various excellences of those persons to whom something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a universal way. So to a person who in some way exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life. While a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things, for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are designated as fathers on account of their being charged with like cares. Thus the servants of Naaman said to him in Fourth Kings 513, Father, if the prophet had bid thee to do some great thing, etc. Therefore, just as in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents. So under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above in Question 101, 3. Religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety, properly so-called, is distinct from religion. And in the same way, piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although observance, properly speaking, is distinct from piety. Reply to Objection 2. By the very fact of being in a position of dignity, a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered as a principal in as much as he is the governor of others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of a principal in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet for as much as science, virtue, and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue. Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous and to those who make good use of their position and dignity as neither can it be done to God nor to our parents. Consequently, these matters belong to an annexed virtue and not to special justice which is a principal virtue. Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above, in question 58, article 6. Second article. Whether it belongs to observance, to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity. Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to Augustine and on the city of God 10, we are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Objection 2. It belongs to justice that we pay what we owe. Therefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor to all. Objection 3 further. Not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who are placed over us, we owe them also fear and a certain payment of renumeration according to Romans 13.7. Render to all men their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor. Moreover, we owe them reverence and subjection according to Hebrews 13.17. Obey your proletes and be subject to them. Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and honor. On the contrary, Tali says in Rhetoric 2 that it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity. I answer that it belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end. Thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence in power over that which is moved. Therefore a position in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration. First, insofar as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects. Secondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence, there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence. And in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service by obeying his commands and by repaying him, according to one's faculty for the benefits we received from him. Reply to Objection 1. Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above in Question 80, debt is twofold. One is legal debt to pay which man is compelled by law. And thus a man owes honor and worship to those in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty. It is in this way that we owe worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity, even though we be not their subjects. Reply to Objection 3. Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity on account of their higher rank, while fear is due to them on account of their power to use compulsion. And to the exercise of their government, there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labor. Third article. Weather observance is a greater virtue than piety. Objection 1. It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor, because the household which a father governs is part of the state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors are more subject there too. Therefore, observance is a greater virtue than piety. Objection 2. Persons in positions of dignity take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good which we ought to set aside for the common good. Wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good. Therefore, observance whereby worship is paid to persons in positions of dignity is a greater virtue than piety which pays worship to one's kindred. Objection 3. Honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above in article one third reply. Therefore, observance takes the first place after religion. On the contrary, the precepts of the law prescribe acts of virtue. Now immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order of excellence. I answer that something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good as when one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to observance but to piety which pays worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers especially to their personal usefulness or renown and this belongs properly to observance as distinct from piety. Therefore, in comparing observance with piety, we must needs take into consideration the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity. Since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's substance than external government, the principle of which is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason, piety takes precedence of observance in as much as it pays worship to persons more akin to us and to whom we are more strictly bound. Reply to Objection 1 The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular power as regards external government but not as regards the father being a principle of generation. For in this way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all things derive their being. Reply to Objection 2 Insofar as persons in positions of dignity are related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to observance but to piety, as stated above. Reply to Objection 3 The rendering of honor or worship should be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid, not only as considered in himself but also as compared to those who pay them. Reply to Objection 4 Though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation on account of the benefits they have received from their parents and their natural kinship with them to pay worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred. Reply to Objection 5 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Reply to Objection 6 We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider 1. Whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining there to, to those who are in a higher position. 2. Obedience, whereby we obey their commands. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing. 2. Second, whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position. 3. Whether dulya, which pays honor and worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue distinct from latria. 4. Whether it contains several species. First article. Whether honor denotes something corporal. Objection 1 It seems that honor does not denote something corporal. For honor is showing reverence and acknowledgement of virtue, as may be gathered from the philosopher in Ethics 1.5. Now showing reverence is something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear as stated above in Question 81, Article 2, First Reply. Therefore honor is something spiritual. Objection 2 Further According to the philosopher in Ethics 4.3, honor is the reward of virtue. Now, since virtue consists chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of corporal things. Objection 3 Further Honor is distinct from praise as also from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor consists of things internal and spiritual. On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Timothy 5.3, honor widows that are widows indeed, and of 1 Timothy 5.17, Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor, etc., says, Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for renumeration. Now both of these pertain to corporal things. Therefore honor consists of corporal things. I answer that honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their excellence, according to the philosopher in Ethics 1.5 and in Ethics 8.8. Now witness is born either before God or before man. Before God, who is the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices. Wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal movement of the heart. For instance, when a man acknowledges either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But as regards men, one cannot bear witness saved by means of signs, either by words as when one proclaims another's excellence, by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance, by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly, honor consists of signs, external and corporal. Reply to Objection 1. Reverence is not the same as honor, but on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor insofar as one man honors another out of the reverence he has for him. And on the other hand, it is the end of honor insofar as a person is honored in order that he may be held in reverence by others. Reply to Objection 2. According to the philosopher in Ethics 4.3, honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue. Yet nothing in human and corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgement of excelling virtue. It is however due to the good and the beautiful that they may be made known, according to Matthew 5.15. Neither do men light a candle and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house. In this sense, honor is said to be the reward of virtue. Reply to Objection 3. Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor. Secondly, because by paying honor to a person, we bear witness to a person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him, we bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end. Thus we praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the philosopher in Ethics 1.5. Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The word glory signifies this, for glory is the same as cleria, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Romans 16-27 observes that glory is clear knowledge together with praise. Second article. Weather honor is properly due to those who are above us. Objection 1. It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Matthew 11-11. He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist. Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor him in Apocalypse 22-10. Therefore honor is not due to those who are above us. Objection 2. Honor is due to a person in acknowledgement of his virtue, as stated above in article 1, as well as in question 63 article 3. But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them as neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature. Objection 3. The apostle says in Romans 12-10 with honor preventing one another. And we read in 1 Peter 2-17 honor all men. But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above us. Objection 4. Further it is written in Tobias 116 that Tobias had ten talents of silver, of that which he had been honored by the king. And we read in Esther 6-11 that Asuerus honored Mardukeus and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence. This honor is he worthy of whom the king hath a mind to honor. Objection 5. Therefore honor is paid to those also who are beneath us, and it seems in consequence that honor is not due properly to those who are above us. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 112 that honor is due to the best. I answer that as stated above in article 1, honor is nothing but an acknowledgement of a person's excelling goodness. Objection 6. Now a person's excellence may be considered not only in relation to those who honor him in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in itself or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is always due to a person on account of some excellence or superiority. For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who honor him. It may suffice for him to be more excellent than some others, or again that he may be more excellent than those who honor him in some respect and not simply. Reply to Objection 1. The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of honor, but the honor of adoration and latteria which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulya in order to indicate the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equalled him to the angels, according to the hope of glory of the children of God. Therefore, he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior to him. Reply to Objection 2. A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity as being God's minister, and because the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall and should be looked upon as enemies rather than treated with honor. Reply to Objection 3. In every man is to be found something that makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Philippians 2.3. In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves. And thus too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another. Reply to Objection 4. Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of some excellence of their virtue. And in this way Tobias and Madocheus were honored by kings. Third article. Whether dulya is a special virtue distinct from Latria. Objection 1. It seems that dulya is not a special virtue distinct from Latria. For a gloss on Psalm 71, O Lord my God in thee I have put my trust, says, Lord of all by his power, to whom dulya is due, God by creation to whom we owe Latria. Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to him as God. Therefore dulya is not a distinct virtue from Latria. Objection 2 further. According to the philosopher in Ethics 8.8. To be loved is like being honored. Now the charity with which we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulya whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from Latria with which we honor God. Objection 3 further. The movement whereby one is moved towards an image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing represented by the image. Objection 4. Now by dulya we honor a man as being made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked in Wisdom 2, 22, 23 that they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him. Therefore dulya is not a distinct virtue from Latria whereby God is honored. On the contrary Augustine says in On the City of God 10 that the homage due to a man of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey their masters and which in Greek is called dulya is distinct from Latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God. I answer that according to what has been said above in question 101 article 3, where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different aspects, even as lordship is competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount lordship over the creature holy and singly, which is entirely subject to his power, whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine lordship for as much as he exercises a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulya which pays due service to a human lord is a distinct virtue from Latria which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is moreover a species of observance because by observance we honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulya properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master, dulya being the Greek for servitude. Reply to objection one. Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence, in as much as God is our father by way of excellence. So again Latria is called dulya by way of excellence in as much as God is our lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to create by reason of which Latria is due to God, and so this gloss drew a distinction by ascribing Latria to God in respect of creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulya in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature. Reply to objection two. The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from charity in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, Latria and dulya are not the same virtue. Reply to objection three. Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing represented by the image. Yet not every movement towards an image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accordingly, we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulya regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though in respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually. Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence is paid to a person as the image of God redounds somewhat to God, and yet this differs from the reverence that is paid to God himself, for this in no way refers to his image. Fourth article. Whether dulya has various species? Objection one. It seems that dulya has various species. For by dulya we show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under different aspects, for instance, king, father, and master, as the philosopher states in Ethics 9-2. Since this difference of aspect in the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulya is divided into specifically different virtues. Objection two further. The mean differs specifically from the extremes, as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulya is apparently a mean between latteria and dulya, for it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species of dulya, one being simple dulya, the other hyperdulya. Objection three. Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulya, and all the more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as for instance to the wood of the Holy Cross. On the contrary, dulya is condivided with latteria, but latteria is not condivided into different species. Neither therefore is dulya. I answer that dulya may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his Lord, for dulya signifies servitude as stated above in Article 3. Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the species of observance mentioned by Tully in Rhetoric 2. For the reason that a servant reveres his Lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases. Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes dulya in a wide sense. Reply to Objection 2. Hyperdulya is the highest species of dulya taken in a wide sense. Since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to God. Reply to Objection 3. Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself. Indeed, all such creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the King's robe receives the same honor as the King himself according to Damocene in On the True Faith 4. End of question 103, read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 104 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 104 of Obedience in Six Articles We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of inquiry. First, whether one man is bound to obey another. Second, whether obedience is a special virtue. Third, of its comparison with other virtues. Fourth, whether God must be obeyed in all things. Fifth, whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. Sixth, whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power. First article, whether one man is bound to obey another. Objection one, it seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclesiastic is 1514. God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another. Objection two, further. If one man were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the will of the person commanding him as being his rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God. Objection three, further. The more gratuitous the service, the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of the duty is not gratuitous. Therefore, if a man were bound in duty to obey others and doing good deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another. On the contrary, it is prescribed in Hebrews 1317, obey your prelates and be subject to them. I answer that, just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God. And so in human affairs also, the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore, just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order, the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher. So too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors. Reply to Objection 1. God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but has left the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35, When we humbly give way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts. Reply to Objection 2. The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated, and to this rule, one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other man who obeys him. Reply to Objection 3. A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one way, on the part of the deed itself, because to which one is not bound to do it. In another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore, although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before God, who sees not only the outward deed but also the inward will. Second Article Whether obedience is a special virtue Objection 1. It seems that obedience is not a special virtue, for disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general sin because Ambrose says in On Paradise 8 that, sin is to disobey the divine law. Therefore, obedience is not a special virtue. Objection 2. Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised under faith hopper charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess and efficiency, for the more obedient one is, the more is one praised. Therefore, obedience is not a special virtue. Objection 3. Further, Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35 that, obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own. But every special virtue is the more to be praised, the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in Ethics 2.4. Therefore, obedience is not a special virtue. Objection 4. Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which apparently there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore, obedience is a general virtue comprising many special virtues. On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, as stated above in Question 80. I answer that, a special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have a special reason of praise, for it belongs properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now, obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown above in Article 1. And therefore, it is a good, since good consists in mode, species, and order, as a custom states in On the Nature of Good 3. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore, obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command, tacit or express. Because the superiors will, however it become known, is a tacit precept. And a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, for as much as by obeying, he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior's will. Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects, to which two special virtues correspond. Thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfills both an act of fortitude by facing the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly, the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all virtues. But not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above, in the Parse Prima Secundae, Question 96, Article 3. Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance, as are not evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin. Because in this way, it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept, and for disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense, for the performance of any action, that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin. Reply to Objection 2. Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly according to Titus 3.1. Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word, etc. It is however a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it observes the mean between excess and efficiency. Excess thereof is measured in respect not of quantity, but of other circumstances, insofar as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above in regarding religion. Question 92, article 2. We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the philosopher in Ethics 5.4. So too, obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior who does not receive obedience. Wherefore, in this way, obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice. Question 58, article 10. Reply to Objection 3. Obedience, like every virtue, requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore, obedience makes a man's will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake, apart from it being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is no wise willed for its own sake, but considered in itself repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35 that obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters, because to wit one's own will seems to tend principally not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfillment of one's own desire, but that it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters because their one's own will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances, for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters, obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devoutedly to the fulfillment of the precept. Reply to Objection 4. Reverence regards directly the person that excels, wherefore it admits of various species according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically. Third article. Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues. Objection 1. It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues, for it is written in 1 Kings 1522, obedience is better than sacrifices. Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues as shown above in question 81 article 6. Therefore, obedience is the greatest of all virtues. Objection 2 further. Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35 that obedience is the only virtue that engrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when engrafted. Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore, obedience is greater than all the virtues. Objection 3 further. Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35 that evil should never be done out of obedience. Yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing. Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something better. Therefore, obedience for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside is better than the other virtues. On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from charity. For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35 that I answer that Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore, if a man contaminates created goods in order that he may adhere to God his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his contaminating earthly things. And so those namely the theological virtues whereby he adheres to God in himself are greater than the moral virtues whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to God. Among the moral virtues the greater the thing which a man contaminates that he may adhere to God the greater the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man may contend for God's sake. The lowest of these are external goods. The goods of the body take the middle place and the highest are the goods of the soul. And among these the chief in a way is the will. Insofar as by his will man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience whereby we condemn our own will for God's sake is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues which condemn other goods for the sake of God. Hence Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35 that we slay our own will. Wherefore, even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom or to give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the fulfillment of the divine will which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be meritorious. As neither would they be if they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. For it is written in 1 John 2 verses 4 and 5, he who saith that he knoweth God and keepeth not his commandments is a liar, but he that keepeth his word in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected. And this because friends have the same likes and dislikes. Reply to Objection 1. Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different virtues, although considered in itself as regarding the aspect of precept it is one special virtue. Accordingly, insofar as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained in a way under observance. While insofar as it proceeds from reverence for one's parents, it is contained under piety. And insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore, from this point of view, it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice as well as because, in a sacrifice we slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will, as Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35. As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat of animals of the Amalekites against the commandment of God. Reply to Objection 2. All acts of virtue insofar as they come under a precept belong to obedience. Wherefore, according as acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their generation of preservation, obedience is said to engraft and protect all virtues. And yet, it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority by reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede even in point of time all virtuous acts, and in this way, obedience is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature. Reply to Objection 3. There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for instance, to love God and so forth, and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks in his commentary on Job 35, he who forbids his subjects any single good must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from starvation through being deprived of every good. Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods. Fourth article. Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things. Objection 1. It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things, for it is written in Matthew 9 verses 30 and 31 that our Lord, after healing the two blind men, commanded them saying, see that no man know this, but they going out spread his fame abroad in all that country. Yet they are not blamed for so doing, therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in all things. Objection 2 further. No one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue, thus he commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son in Genesis 22, and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians in Exodus 11, which things are contrary to justice, and it was there to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress, and it was there chapter 3, and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things. Objection 3 further. Whoever obeys God confirms his will to the divine will, even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine will, as to the thing willed, as stated above in the Paras primas akundi question 19, article 10. Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all things. On the contrary, it is written in Exodus 24 verse 7, all things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient. I answer that, as stated above in article 1, he who obeys is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just as God is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is he the first mover of all wills, as was shown above in the Paras primas akundi question 9, article 6. Therefore, just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity, so too all wills by a kind of necessity of justice are bound to obey the divine command. Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord, in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle, had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine precept, but as Gregory says in his commentary on Job 19, gave an example to his servants who follow him, that they might wish to hide their virtue, and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will in order that others might profit by their example. Reply to Objection 2. Even as God does nothing contrary to nature, since the nature of a thing is what God does therein, according to a glass on Romans 11, and yet does certain things contrary to the wanted course of nature, so too God can command nothing contrary to virtue, since virtue and rectitude of human will consists chiefly in conformity with God's will and obedience to his command, although it be contrary to the wanted mode of virtue. Accordingly then, the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to justice that he commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are his, and he gives them to whom he will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osea was commanded to take an adulteress, because God himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which he appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons of foresaid did not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey him. Reply to Objection 3. Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes to man's knowledge, chiefly through God's command, wherefor man is bound to obey God's commands in all things. Fifth article. Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. Objection 1. It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says in Colossians 3.20, Children, obey your parents in all things. And further on in Colossians 3, verse 22, Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh. Therefore, in like manner, other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. Objection 2 further. Superiors stand between God and their subjects according to Deuteronomy 5.5. I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time to show you his words. Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed of the commands of God, wherefor the Apostle says in Galatians 4.14, You received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus. And in 1 Thessalonians 2.13, When you had received of us the word of hearing of God, you received it not as the word of man, but as it is indeed the word of God. Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors. Objection 3 further. Just as religious in making their profession take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore, he is also bound to obey in all things. On the contrary, it is written in Acts 5 verse 29, We ought to obey God rather than men. Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are against God. Therefore, superiors are not to be obeyed in all things. I answer that as stated above in articles 1 and 4. He who obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its mover may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other mover, thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the action of heat as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First, on account of the command of a higher power. For as Gloss says on Romans 13, too, they that resist the power resist the ordinance of God. And as Augustine says, if a commissioner issue an order, are you to comply if it is contrary to the bidding of the procouncil? Again, if the procouncil command one thing and the emperor another, will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter? Therefore, if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must disregard the former and obey God. Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says in On Benefits 3, It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man, for the better part of him is accepted, his body is subjected and assigned to his master, but his soul is his own. Consequently, in matters touching the internal movement of the will, man is not bound to obey his fellow man, but God alone. Nevertheless, man is bound to obey his fellow man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body. And yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore, servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority. For instance, a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war. A servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service. A son, his father, in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household, and so forth. Reply to Objection 1. When the apostle says, In all things, he refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority. Reply to Objection 2. Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both internal and external. Wherefore, he is bound to obey him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his subjects. Whereas in respect of other matters, the subject is immediately under God, by whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law. Reply to Objection 3. Reply to Objection 4. Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors. Wherefore, they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection. Provided, however, such things be not contrary to God or the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful. Accordingly, we may distinguish a three-fold obedience. One, sufficient for salvation and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey. Secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful. Thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful. Sixth article. Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers. Objection 1. It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power. For a gloss on Matthew 1725, then the children are free, says, If in every kingdom the children of the king who hold sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that king under whose sway are all the kingdoms should be free in every kingdom. Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to John 1.12. He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in his name. Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power. Objection 2 further. It is written in Romans 7.4. You are become dead to the law by the body of Christ. And the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law, whereby men are subject to the secular power, is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular princes. Objection 3 further. Men are not bound to obey robbers who oppress them with violence? Now Augustine says, and on the city of Godfore, Without justice what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery? Since, therefore, the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised within justice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians ought not to obey secular princes. On the contrary, it is written in Titus 3 verse 1. Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers. And in 1 Peter 2 verses 13 and 14, I answer that. Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice, according to Romans 322. The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ. Wherefore, faith in Christ does not void the order of justice but strengthens it. Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence, faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of obeying secular princes. Reply to Objection 1, as stated above in Article 5. Subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body, not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now in this state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the apostle declares by saying of himself in Roman 723, that in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore, those that are made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as the gloss observes on 1 Timothy 6.1, whosoever are servants under the yoke, etc. Reply to Objection 2. The old law was a figure of the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth, and the comparison with human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow man. Reply to Objection 3. Man is bound to obey secular princes insofar as this is required by order of justice. Wherefore, if the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal or danger. End of Question 104. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 105 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 105 of Disobedience in Two Articles. We must now consider disobedience under which head there are two points of inquiry. First, whether it is a mortal sin. Second, whether it is the most grievous of sins. First article. Whether disobedience is a mortal sin. Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition, given above in Question 104, Article 2, Objection 1. Therefore, if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would be mortal. Objection 2 further. Gregory says in his commentary on Job 31, that disobedience is born of vain glory. But vain glory is not a mortal sin. Neither, therefore, is disobedience. Objection 3 further. A person is said to be disobedient when he does not fulfill a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom if ever possible to fulfill them. Therefore, if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore, disobedience is not a mortal sin. On the contrary, the sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned among other mortal sins. Confer Romans 130, 2 Timothy 3, 2. I answer that, as stated above in Question 24, Article 12, as well as in the Parse Prima Secundae, Question 72, Article 5, and in Question 88, Article 1. A mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity, which is the cause of spiritual life. Now, by charity, we love God and our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey his commandments, as stated above in Question 24, Article 12. Therefore, to be disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of God. Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to superiors, wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God according to Romans 13, 2. He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due. Reply to Objection 1. The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, that only when one condemns a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin. Reply to Objection 2. Vainglory desires display of excellence, and since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not a subject to another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from Vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Reply to Objection 3. No one is bound to do the impossible. Wherefore, if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfill them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore, superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts. 2. Weather disobedience is the most grievous of sins. Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins, for it is written in First Kings 1523. It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey. But idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above in Question 94, Article 3. Therefore, disobedience is the most grievous of sins. Objection 2 further. The sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above in Question 14, Article 2. Now disobedience makes a man contend, a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. Therefore, disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and consequently, is the most grievous of sins. Objection 3 further. The Apostle says in Romans 519 that, by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. Now the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore, disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby. On the contrary, contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore, disobedience is not the most grievous of sins. I answer that, not every disobedience is equally a sin, for one disobedience may be greater than another in two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding, since although a man should take every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is it aside, if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority. Consequently, the higher the person who commands, the more grievous it is to disobey him, so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded, for the person commanding does not equally desire the fulfillment of all his commands, since every such person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore, disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment. Because since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the greater the good, the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently, he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good. Hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous not through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the person commanding. Accordingly, the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the various degrees of precepts, because the disobedience in which there is contempt of God's precept from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's commandment, and if the divine precept be condemned in yet graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin which condemns the man who made the precept. Because reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner, a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy or the like, is more grievous even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the sin, than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone. Reply to Objection 1 This comparison of Samuel is one not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more. Reply to Objection 2 Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added. For it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins. Reply to Objection 3 The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was transmitted to all men, was not disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in relation to every sin. End of question 105 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC