 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Karl Manchester 2007. Leviathan. Or The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil. Books 1 and 2. By Thomas Hobbes. Printed for Andrew Crook at the Green Dragon in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1651. To my most honoured friend, Mr. Francis Godolphin of Godolphin. Honoured Sir, your most worthy brother, Mr. Sydney Godolphin, when he lived, was pleased to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me as you know with real testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves and the greater for the worthiness of his person. For there is not any virtue that disposes of the man either to the service of God or to the service of his country, to civil society or private friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity or affected upon occasion, but inherent and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honour and gratitude to him and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate unto you this my discourse of Commonwealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it, for in a way beset with those that contend on one side for too great liberty and on the other side for too much authority, it is hard to pass between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the civil power should not be by the civil power condemned, nor private men by reprehending it, declare they think that power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but in the abstract of the seat of power, like to those simple and impartial creatures in the Roman capital, that with their noise defended those within it, not because they were they, but there, offending none, I think, but those without, or such within, if there be any such, as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend a certain texts of holy scripture alleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they used to be by others. But I have done it with due submission and also, in order to my subject, necessarily, for they are the outworks of the enemy from whence they impugn the civil power. If not withstanding this you find my labour generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself, and say that I am a man that love my own opinions and think all true I say, that I honoured your brother and honour you, and have presumed on that to assume the title, without your knowledge, of being as I am, sir, your most humble and most obedient servant, Thomas Hobbes. Paris, April the 15th, stroke the 25th, 1651. Introduction Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principle part within, why may we not say that all automata, engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth the watch, have an artificial life? For what is the heart but a spring, and the nerves but so many strings, and the joints but so many wheels giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man, for by art is created that great Leviathan, called a Commonwealth or State, in Latin, Civitas, which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended, and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body, the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints, reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat of sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, as the nerves that do the same in the body natural. The wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength, Salus Populi, the people's safety, is business. Counselors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory, equity in laws, an artificial reason and will, concord, health, sedition, sickness, and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together and united, resemble that fear or the letters make man, pronounced by God in the creation. To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider, first, the matter thereof, and the artificer, both which is man. Secondly, how and by what covenants it is made, what are the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign, and what it is that preserveeth and dissolveeth it. Thirdly, what is a Christian commonwealth? Lastly, what is the kingdom of darkness? Concerning the first, there is a saying, much usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired not by reading of books but of men. Consequently, where and to, those persons that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise take great delight to show what they think they have read in men by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying, not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another if they would take the pains, and that is, no say, teyipsum, read thyself, which was not meant as it is now used to countenance either the barbarous state of men in power towards their inferiors or to encourage men of low degree to outsource their behaviour towards their betters, but to teach us that, for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc., and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, etc., not the similitude of the objects of the passions which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc. For these, the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge that the characteristics of man's heart blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counter-fitting, and erroneous doctrines, are so simple only to him that searcheth hearts. And though by men's actions we do discover their design sometimes, yet to do it without comparing them with our own and distinguishing all circumstances by which the case may come to be altered is to decipher without a key, and be for the most part deceived by too much trust or by too much diffidence, as he that reads is himself a good or evil man. But let one man read another by his actions perfectly. It serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation must read in himself not this or that particular man, but mankind, which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science, yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly and perspicuously the pains left another will be only to consider if he also finds not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admiteth no other demonstration. End of introduction. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Karl Manchester, 2007. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. The First Part of Man. Chapter 1 of Sense. Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly and afterwards in train or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears and other parts of a man's body, and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances. The original of them all is that which we call sense. For there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original. To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary to the business now in hand, and I have elsewhere written on the same at large. Nevertheless to fill each part of my present method I will briefly deliver the same in this place. The cause of sense is the external body or object which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch or immediately, as in seeing, hearing and smelling. Which pressure, by the mediation of nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeeth there a resistance or counter pressure or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because outward, seameth to be some matter without. And this seeming or fancy is that which men call sense, and consisteth, as to the eye, in a light or colour figured, to the ear in a sound, to the nostril in an odour, to the tongue and palate in a savour, and to the rest of the body in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities called sensible are, in the object that causes them, but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but diverse motions, for motion produces nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking that dreaming, and as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye to us as fancy a light, and pressing the ear produces a din, so do the bodies also we see or hear, produce the same by their strong though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses and in echoes by reflection we see they are, where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at some certain distance and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us, yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another, so that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy caused, as I have said, by the pressure that is by the motion of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs, there and to ordained. But the philosophy schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say for the cause of vision that the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible species, in English a visible show, apparition or aspect, aura being seen. The receiving whereof into the eye is seeing. And for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard sendeth forth an audible species, that is, an audible aspect or audible being seen, which entering the ear make a hearing. Nay, for the cause of understanding also, they say that the thing understood sendeth forth an intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen, which coming into the understanding makes us understand. I say not this as disapproving the use of universities, but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions, what things would be amended in them, amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Carl Manchester, 2007. Leviathan By Thomas Hobbes Chapter 2 Of Imagination That when a thing lies still unless somewhat else stir it it may lie still forever is a truth that no man doubts of but that when a thing is in motion it will eternally be in motion unless somewhat else stays it though the reason be the same namely that nothing can change itself is not so easily assented to. For men measure not only other men but all things by themselves and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude, think everything else grows weary of motion and seeks repose of its own accord little considering whether it be not some other motion wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves consisteth. For hence it is that the schools say heavy bodies fall downwards appetite to rest and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them ascribing appetite and knowledge of what is good for their conservation which is more than man has to things inanimate absurdly. When a body is once in motion it moveeth unless something else hinder it eternally and whatever hindereth it cannot in an instant but in time and by degrees quite extinguish it in the water though the wind cease the waves give not over rolling for a long time after so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the eternal parts of man then when he sees dreams etc. For after the object is removed or the eyes shut we still retain an image of the things seen though more obscure than when we see it and this is it the Latins call imagination from the image made in seeing apply the same though improperly to all the other senses but the Greeks call it fancy which signifies appearance and is as proper to one sense as to another imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense and is found in men and many other living creatures as well sleeping as waking the decay of sense in men waking is not the decay of the motion made in sense but an obscuring of it in such a manner as the light of the sun obscures the light of the stars which stars do no less exercise their virtue by which they are visible in the day than in the night but because amongst many strokes which our eyes ears and other organs receive from external bodies the predominant one is sensible therefore the light of the sun being predominant we are not affected with the action of the stars and any object being removed from our eyes though the impression it made in us remain yet other objects more present succeeding and working on us the imagination of the past is obscured and made weak as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day from whence it followeth that the longer the time is after the sight or sense of any object the weaker is the imagination for the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved the distance of time and of place has one and the same effect in us for as at a great distance of place that which we look at appear dim and without distinction of the smaller parts and as voices grow weak and in articulate so also after great distance of time our imagination of the past is weak and we lose for example of cities we have seen many particular streets and of actions many particular circumstances this decaying sense when we would express the thing itself I mean fancy itself we call imagination as I said before but when we would express the decay and signify that the sense is fading old and past it is called memory so that imagination and memory are but one thing which for diverse considerations have diverse names much memory or memory of many things is called experience again imagination being only of those things which have been formally perceived by sense either all at once or by parts at several times the former which is the imagining the whole object as it were presented to the sense is simple imagination as when one imagines a man or horse which he has seen before the other is compounded from when the sight of a man at one time or a horse at another we conceive in our mind a centaur so when a man compounded the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of romances it is a compound imagination and properly but a fiction of the mind there be also other imaginations that rise in men though waking from the great impression made in sense as from gazing upon the sun the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after and from being long and vehemently attempt upon geometrical figures a man shall in the dark though awake have the image of lines and angles before his eyes which kind of fancy has no particular name as being a thing that does not commonly fall into men's discourse imaginations of them that sleep are those we call dreams and these also as all other imaginations have been before either totally or in parcels in the sense and because in sense the brain and nerves which are the necessary organs of sense are so benumbed in sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external objects there can happen in sleep no imagination and therefore no dream but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of a man's body which inward parts for the connection they have with the brain and other organs when they be distempered to keep the same motion whereby the imaginations there formerly made appear as if a man were waking saving that the organs of sense being now benumbed so as there is no new object which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression a dream must needs be more clear in this silence of senses than our waking thoughts and hence it comes to pass that it is a hard matter and by many thoughts impossible to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming for my part when I consider that in dreams I do not often nor constantly think of the same persons places objects and actions that I do waking nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts dreaming as at other times waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts I am well satisfied that being awake I know I dream not though when I dream I think myself awake and seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body diverse distempers must needs cause different dreams and hence it is that lying cold breatheth dreams of fear and raises the thought and image of some fearful object the motion from the brain to the inner parts and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal and that as anger causes heat in some parts of the body when we are awake so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causes anger and raises up in the brain the imagination of an enemy in the same manner as natural kindness when we're awake causes desire and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body so also too much heat in those parts while we sleep raises in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown in some our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations the motion when we are awake beginning at one end and when we dream at another the most difficult discerning of a man's dream from his waking thoughts is then when by some accident we observe not that we have slept which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts and whose conscience is much troubled and that sleepeth without the circumstance of going to bed or putting off his clothes as one that nodded in a chair for he that taketh pains and industriously lays himself to sleep in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him cannot easily think it other than a dream we read of Marcus Brutus one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar and was also his favourite and not withstanding murdered him how at Philippi the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar he saw a fearful apparition which is commonly related by historians as a vision but considering the circumstances one may easily judge to have been but a short dream for sitting in his tent pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act it was not hard slumbering in the cold to dream of that which most affrighted him which fear as by degrees it made him wake so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish and having no assurance that he slept he could have no cause to think it a dream or anything but a vision and this is no very rare accident for even they that be perfectly awake if they be timorous and superstitious possessed with fearful tales and alone in the dark are subject to the like fancies and believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in church whereas it is either their fancy only or else the navery of such persons as to make use of such superstitious fear to pass disguised in the night to places they would not be known to haunt from this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams and other strong fancies from vision and sense did arise the greatest part of the gentiles in time past that worshiped satires fawns, nymphs and the like and nowadays the opinion that rude people have of fairies ghosts and goblins and of the power of witches for as for witches I think not their witchcraft is any real power but yet that they are justly punished for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief joined with their purpose to do it to trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science and for fairies and walking ghosts the opinion of them has I think been on purpose either taught or not confuted to keep in credit the use of exorcism of crosses of holy water and other such inventions of ghostly men nevertheless there is no doubt but God can make unnatural apparitions but that he does it so often as men need to fear such things more than they fear the stay or change of the course of nature which he also can stay and change is no point of Christian faith but evil men under the pretext that God can do anything are so bold as to say anything when it serves their turn though they think it untrue it is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes that which they say appear credible if this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away and with it prognastics from dreams false prophecies and many other things depending thereon by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience and this ought to be the work of the schools but they rather nourish such doctrine for not knowing what imagination or the senses are what they receive they teach some saying that imaginations rise of themselves and have no cause others that they rise most commonly from the will and that good thoughts are blown, inspired into a man by God and evil thoughts by the devil or that good thoughts are poured infused into a man by God and evil ones by the devil some say the senses receive the species of things and deliver them to the common sense and the common sense delivers them over the fancy and the fancy to the memory and the memory to the judgment like handing of things from one to another with many words making nothing understood the imagination that is raised in man or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining by words or other voluntary signs is that we generally call understanding and is common to man and beast for a dog by custom will understand the call or the rating of his master and so will many other beasts that understanding which is peculiar to man is the understanding not only his will but his conceptions and thoughts by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations negations and other forms of speech and of this kind of understanding I shall speak hereafter All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org this reading by Karl Manchester 2007 Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter 3 of the consequence or train of imaginations by consequence or train of thoughts I understand that succession of one thought to another which is called to distinguish it from discourse in words mental discourse when a man thinketh on anything whatsoever his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently but as we have no imagination whereof we have not formally had sense in whole or in parts so we have no transition from one imagination to another whereof we never had the like before in our senses the reason whereof is this all fancies are motions within us relics of those made in the sense and those motions that immediately succeed one another in the sense continue also together after sense in so much as the former coming again to take place and be predominant the latter followeth by coherence of the matter moved in such manner as water upon a plain table is drawn which way any one part of it is created by the finger but because in sense to one and the same thing perceived sometimes one thing sometimes another succeedeth it comes to pass in time that in the imagining of anything there is no certainty what we shall imagine next only this is certain it shall be something that succeeded the same before at one time or another this train of thoughts or mental discourse the first is unguided without design and in constant wherein there is no passionate thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself as the end and scope of some desire or other passion in which case the thoughts are said to wander and seem impertinent to one another as in a dream such are commonly the thoughts of men that are not only without company but also without care of anything though even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times but without harmony as the sound which elute out of tune would yield to any man or in tune to one that could not play and yet in this wild ranging of the mind a man may oft times perceive the way of it and the dependence of one thought upon another for in a discourse of our present civil war what could seem more impertinent than to ask as one did what was the value of a Roman penny yet the coherence to me was manifest enough for the thought of the war introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ and that again the thought of the 30 pence which was the price of that treason and thence easily followed that malicious question and all this in a moment of time for thought is quick the second is more constant as being regulated by some desire and design for the impression made by such things as we desire or fear is strong and permanent or if it sees for a time of quick return so strong it is sometimes as to hinder and break our sleep from desire arises the thought of some means we have seen produced the meaning of that which we aim at and from the thought of that the thought of means to that mean and so continually till we come to some beginning within our own power and because the end by the greatness of the impression comes often to mind in case our thoughts begin to wander they are quickly again reduced into the way which observed by one of the seven wise men made him give men this precept which is now worn out that is to say in all your actions look often upon what you would have as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it the train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds one when of an effect imagined we seek the causes or means that produce it and this is common to man and beast the other is when imagining anything whatsoever we seek all the possible effects of why it be produced that is to say we imagine what we can do with it when we have it of which I have not at any time seen any sign but in man only for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual such as a hunger, thirst lust and anger in some the discourse of the mind when it is governed by design or the faculty of invention which the latins call sagacitas and salatia a hunting out of the causes of some effect present or past or of the effects of some present or past cause sometimes a man seeks what he has lost and from that place and time wherein he misses it his mind runs back from place to place and time to time to find where and when he had it that is to say to find some certain and limited time and place in which to begin a method of seeking again from thence his thoughts run over the same places and times to find what action or other occasion might make him lose it this we call remembrance or calling to mind the latins called it reminiscentia as it were a reckoning of our former actions sometimes a man knows a place determinate within the compass whereof he is to seek and then his thoughts run over the parts thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find a jewel or as a spaniel ranges the field till he finds a scent or as a man should run over the alphabet to start a rhyme sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action and then he think of some like action past and the events thereof one after another supposing like events will follow like actions as he that foresees what will become of a criminal reckons what he has seen follow the like crime before having his order of thoughts the crime the officer the prison the judge and the gallows which kind of thoughts is called foresight and prudence or providence and sometimes wisdom though such conjecture serving all circumstances be very fallacious but this is certain by how much one man has more experience of things past than another by so much also he is more prudent and his expectations the seldomer fail him the present only has a being in nature things past have a being in the memory only but things to come have no being at all the future being but a fiction of the mind applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience but not with certainty enough and though it be called prudence when the events answer us to our expectations yet in its own nature it is but presumption for the foresight of things to come which is providence belongs only to him by whose will they are to come from him only the best prophet the best prophet naturally is the best guesser and the best guesser he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at for he hath most signs to guess by a sign is the event antecedent of the consequence and contrarrelly the consequence of the antecedent when the like consequences have been observed before and the oftener they have been observed the less uncertain is the sign and therefore he that has most experience in any kind of business has most signs whereby to guess at the future time and consequently is the most prudent and so much more prudent than he that is new to any kind of business as not to be equaled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit though perhaps many young men think the contrary nevertheless there be prudence that distinguishes man from beast there be beasts that at a year old observe more and pursue that which is for their good more prudently than a child can do at ten as prudence is a presumption of the future contracted from the experience of time past so there is a presumption of things past taken from other things not future but past also for he that has seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state must come into civil war and then to ruin upon the sight of ruins of any of the state will guess the like war and the like causes have been there also but this conjecture has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future both being grounded only upon experience there is no other act of a man's mind that I can remember naturally planted in him so as to need no other thing to the exercise of it but to be born a man and live with the use of his five senses those are the faculties of which I shall speak by and by and which seem proper to man only are required and increased by study and industry and of most men learned by instruction and discipline and proceed all from the invention of words and speech for besides sense and thoughts and the train of thoughts there is no other motion though by the help of speech and method the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures whatsoever we imagine is finite therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite no man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude nor conceive infinite swiftness infinite time or infinite force or infinite power when we say anything is infinite we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named having no conception of the thing but of our own inability and therefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him for he is incomprehensible and his greatness and power are inconceivable but that we may honour him also because whatsoever as I said before we conceive has been perceived first by sense either all at once or by parts a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense no man therefore can conceive anything but he must conceive it in some place and endued with some determinant magnitude and which may be divided into parts nor that anything is all in this place and in another place at the same time nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once for none of these things either have or can be incident to sense but are absurd speeches taken upon credit without any signification at all from deceived philosophers and deceived or deceiving school men Chapter 4 of Speech he that brought them into Greece men say was Cadmus the son of Aginor king of Phoenicia a profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past and the conjunction of mankind dispersed into so many in distant regions of the earth and with all difficult as proceeding from a watchful observation of the diverse motions of the tongue, palate lip and other organs of speech whereby to make as many differences of characters to remember them but the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of speech consisting of names or appellations and their connection whereby men register their thoughts recall them when they are past and declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth nor society nor contract nor peace no more than amongst lions, bears and wolves the first author of speech was God himself that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight for scripture goeth no further on the matter but this was sufficient to direct him to add more names as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion and to join them in such manner by degree as to make himself understood and so by succession of time so much language might be gotten as he had found use for though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of for I do not find anything in the scripture out of which directly or by consequence can be gathered that Adam was taught the names of all figures numbers, measures colors, sounds fancies, relations much less the names of words and speech as general special, affirmative negative, interrogative optative, infinitive all of which are useful and least of all of entity, intentionality quiddity and other insignificant words of the school but all this language gotten and augmented by Adam and his posterity was again lost at the tower of Babel when by the hand of God every man was stricken for his rebellion with an oblivion of his former language and being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world it must need to be the majesty of tongues that now is preceded by degrees from them in such a manner as need mother of all inventions taught them and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious the general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal or the train of our thoughts into a train of words and that for two commodities consequences of our thoughts which being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to a new labor may again be recalled by such words as they were marked by so that the first use of names is to serve for marks or notes of remembrance another is when many use the same words to signify by their connection and order to one another what they conceive or think of each another and also what they desire fear or have any other passion for and for this use they are called signs special uses of speech are these first to register what by cognition we find to be the cause of anything present or past and what we find things present or past may produce or affect which in some is acquiring of words secondly to show to others that knowledge which we have attained which is to counsel and teach one another thirdly to make known to others our wills and purposes that we may have mutual help of one another fourthly to please and delight ourselves and others by playing with our words for pleasure or ornament innocently to these uses there are also first one men register their thoughts wrong by the inconstancy of the signification of their words by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived and so deceive themselves secondly when they use words metaphorically that is in other senses than that they are ordained for and thereby deceive others thirdly when by words they declare that to be their will which is not fourthly when they use them to grieve one another for seeing nature half armed living creatures some with teeth, some with horns and some with hands to grieve an enemy it is but an abusive speech to grieve him with the tongue unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern and then it is not to grieve but to correct and amend the manor house speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects consisteth in the imposing of names and the connection of them of names some are proper and singular to one only thing as Peter, John this man, this tree and some are common to many things as man, horse, tree every of which though but one name is nevertheless the name of diverse particular things in respect of all which together is called a universal there being nothing in the world universal but names for the things named are every one of them individual and singular one universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality or other accident and whereas a proper name and one thing only universals recall any one of those many and of names universal some are more and some of less extent the larger comprehending the less large and some again of equal extent comprehending each other reciprocally as for example the name body is of larger signification than the word man and comprehended it and the names man and rational are of equal extent comprehending mutually one another but here we must take notice that by name is not always understood as in grammar one only word but sometimes by circumlocution many words together for all these words he that in his actions observe a the laws of his country make but one name equivalent to this one word just by this imposition of names some of larger and some of stricter signification return the reckoning of consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations for example a man that have no use of speech at all such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb if he set before his eyes a triangle and by it two right angles such as are the corners of a square figure he may by meditation compare and find that the three angles of the triangle are equal to those two right angles that stand by it but if another triangle be shown him different in shape from the former he cannot know without a new labor the three angles of that also be equal to the same but he that have the use of words when he observes that such a quality was consequent not to the length of the sides nor to any other particular thing in his triangle but only to this that the sides were straight and the angles three and that was all for which he named it a triangle will boldly conclude universally that such a quality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever and register his intention in these general terms every triangle have its three angles equal to two right angles and thus the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as a universal rule and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place and delivers us from all labor of the mind saving the first and makes that which was found true here and now be true in all times and places but the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering a natural fool that could never learn by heart the order of the numeral words as one two and three may observe every stroke of the clock and nod to it or say one one one but can never know what hour it strikes and it seems there was a time when those names of numbers were not in use and men were feigned to apply their fingers of one or both hands to those things they desired to keep account of and that thence it proceeded that now our numeral words are but ten in any nation and in some but five and then they begin again and he that can tell ten if he recite them out of order will lose himself and not know when he has done much less will he be able to add and subtract and perform all other operations of arithmetic so that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers much less of magnitudes of swiftness of force and other things the reckoning whereof are necessary to the being or well-being of mankind when two names are joined together into a consequence or affirmation as thus a man is a living creature or thus if he be a man he is a living creature if the latter name living creature signify all that the former name man signifyeth then the affirmation or consequence is true otherwise false or true and false are attributes of speech not of things and where speech is not there is neither truth nor falsehood error there may be as when we expect that which shall not be or suspect what has not been but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations a man that seeketh the precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for and to place it accordingly or else he will find himself entangled in words as a bird in lime twigs the more he struggles the more be limed and therefore in geometry which is the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind man begin at settling which settling of significations they call definitions and place them in the beginning of their reckoning by this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge to examine definitions of former authors and either to correct them where they are negligently sat down or to make them himself for the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as the reckoning proceeds and lead men into absurdities which at last they see but cannot avoid without reckoning anew from the beginning in which lies the foundation of their errors for once it happens that they which trust to books do as they cast up many little sums into greater without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not and at last finding the error visible and not mistrusting their first grounds know not which way to clear themselves spend time in fluttering over their books as birds that entering by the chimney and finding themselves enclosed in chamber flutter at the false light of glass window for want of wit to consider which way they came in so that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech which is the acquisition of science and in wrong or no definitions lies the first abuse from which proceed all false and senseless tenants which make those men that take their instructions from the authority of books and not from their own meditation to be as much below the condition of ignorant men as men endued with science are above it for between true science and erroneous doctrines ignorance is in the middle natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity nature itself cannot err as men abound in copiousness of language so they become more wise or more mad than ordinary nor is it possible without letters for any men to become either excellently wise or unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs excellently foolish for words are wise men's counters they do but reckon by them but they are the money of fools that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero or a Thomas or any other doctor whatsoever if but a man subject to names is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an account and be added one to another to make a sum or subtracted one from another to leave a remainder the latins called accounts of money rationes and accounting ratiosynatio and that which we in bills or books of accounts call items they called nomina that is names and then it seems to proceed that they extended the word ratio to the faculty of reckoning in all other things the Greeks have but one word logos for both speech and reason not that they thought there was no speech without reason but no reasoning without speech and the act of reasoning they called syllogism which signify summing up of consequences of one saying to another and because the same things may enter into account for diverse accidents their names are to show that diversity diversely rested and diversified this diversity of names may be reduced to four general heads first a thing may enter into account for matter or body as living, sensible, rational hot, cold moved, quiet with all which names the word matter or body is understood all such being names of matter secondly it may enter into account or be considered for some accident or quality which we conceive to be in it as for being moved for being so long for being hot etc and then of the name of the thing itself by a little change or resting we make a name for that accident which we consider and for living put into the account life for moved motion for hot, heat for long, length and the like names are the names of the accidents and properties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another these are called names abstract because severed not from matter, but from the account of matter thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies whereby we make such distinction as when anything is seen by us we reckon not the thing itself the color, the idea of it in the fancy and when anything is heard we reckon it not but the hearing or sound only which is our fancy or conception of it by the year and such our names of fancies fourthly we bring into account, consider and give names to names themselves and to speeches for general, universal special, equivocal names of names and affirmation interrogation commandment, narration syllogism, sermon, oration and many others such are names of speeches and this is all the variety of names positive which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature or may be feigned by the mind of man as bodies that are or may be conceived to be or of bodies, the properties that are or may be feigned to be or words and speech there be also other names called negative which are notes to signify that the word is not the name of the thing in question as these words nothing, no man infinite, indossable three want four and the like which are nevertheless of use in reckoning or in correcting of reckoning though they be not names of anything because they make us refuse to admit the names not rightly used all other names are but insignificant sound and those of two sorts one, when they are new and yet they're meaning not explained by definition where there have been abundance coined by schoolmen and puzzled philosophers another, when men make a name of two names whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent as this name an incorporeal body or which is all one an incorporeal substance and a greater number more for when so ever any affirmation is false the two names of which it is composed put together and made one signify nothing at all for example if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round the word round quadrangle signifies nothing but is a mere sound so likewise if it be false to say that virtue can be poured or blown up and down the words in poured virtue in blown virtue are as absurd and insignificant as a round quadrangle and therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names the Frenchman seldom hears our Savoir called by the name of Parole but by the name of Verba often yet Verba and Parole differ no more but that one is Latin the other French when a man upon the hearing of any speech have those thoughts which the words of that speech and their connection were ordained and constituted to signify then he is said to understand it understanding being nothing else but conception caused by speech and therefore if speech be particular to man as for ought I know it is then is understanding particular to him also and therefore of absurd and false affirmations in case they be universal there can be no understanding though they think they understand then when they do but repeat the word softly or con them in mind what kinds of speech signify the appetites aversions and passions of man's mind and of their use and abuse I shall speak when I have spoken of the passions the names of such things as affect us that is which please and displease us because all men be not alike affected with the same thing nor the same man at all times are in the common discourses of men of inconsistent signification foreseeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions and all our affections are but conceptions when we conceive the same things differently we can hardly avoid different naming of them for though the nature of that which we conceive be the same yet the diversity of our reception of it in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion gives everything a tincture of our different passions and therefore in reasoning a man must take heed of words which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature have a signification also of the nature disposition and interest of the speaker such as are the names of virtues and vices for one man call with wisdom what another call with fear and one cruelty what another justice one prodigality what another magnanimity one gravity what another stupidity etc and therefore such names can never be true grounds of any riteosination no more can metaphors or tropes of speech but these are less dangerous because they profess their inconstancy which the others do not when man reason it he does nothing else but conceive a sum total from addition of parcels or conceive a remainder from subtraction of one sum from another which if it be done by words is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts to the name of the whole or from the names of the whole and one part to the name of the other part and though in some sense the other part the other part and though in some things as in numbers besides adding and subtracting man name other operations as multiplying and dividing yet they are the same for multiplication is but adding together of things equal and division but subtracting of one thing as often as we can these operations are not incident to numbers only but to all manner of things that can be added together and taken one out of another for as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers so the geometricians teach the same in lines figures, solid and superficial angles, proportions times, degrees of swiftness force, power and the like the logicians teach the same in consequences of words adding together two names to make an affirmation and two affirmations to make a syllogism and many syllogisms to make a demonstration and from the sum or conclusion of a syllogism they subtract one proposition to find the other writers of politics add together factions to find man's duties and lawyers, laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private man in sum, in what matter so ever there is place for addition and subtraction there also is place for reason and where these have no place there, reason has nothing at all to do out of all which we may define that is to say, determine what that is which is meant by this word reason when we reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind for reason in this sense is nothing but reckoning that is adding and subtracting of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts I say marking them when we reckon by ourselves and signifying when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men and as in arithmetic unpracticed men must and professors themselves may often err and cast up false so also in any other subject of reasoning the ablest, most attentive and most practiced men may deceive themselves and infer false conclusions not but that reason itself is always right reason as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art but no one man's reason nor the reason of any one number of man makes the certainty no more than an account is therefore well cast up because a great many men have unanimously approved it and therefore as when there is a controversy in an account the parties must by their own accord set up for right reason the reason of some arbitrator or judge to whose sentence they will both stand or their controversy must either come to blows or be undecided for want of a right reason constituted by nature is it also in all debates of what kind so ever and when men that think themselves wiser than all others clamour and demand right reason for judge yet seek no more but that things should be determined by no other man's reason but their own it is intolerable in the society of men as it is in play after trump is turned to use for trump on every occasion that suit whereof they have most in their hand for they do nothing else that will have every of their passions to bear sway in them to be taken for right reason and that in their own controversies be reying their want of right reason by the claim they lay to it they use an end of reason is not a finding of the sum and truth of one or a few consequences remote from the first definitions and settled significations of names but to begin at these and proceed from one consequence to another for there can be no certainty of the last conclusion without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations on which it was grounded and inferred as when a master of a family in taking an account casted up the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum and not regarding how each bill is summed up by those that give them in account nor what it is he pays for he advantages himself no more than if he allowed the account in gross trusting to every of the account's skill and honesty so also in reasoning of all other things he that takes up conclusions on the trust of others and doth not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning which are the significations of names settled by definitions loses his labour and does not know anything but only believe it when a man reckons without the use of words which may be done in particular things as when upon the sight of any one thing we conjecture what was likely to have proceeded or is likely to follow upon it if that which he thought likely to follow follows not or that which he thought likely to have proceeded it had not proceeded it this is called error to which even the most prudent man are subject but when we reason in words of general signification and fall upon a general inference which is false though it be commonly called error it is indeed an absurdity or senseless speech for error is but a deception in presuming that someone is passed or to come of which though they were not passed or not to come yet there was no impossibility discoverable but when we make a general assertion unless it be a true one the possibility of it is inconceivable and words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound are those we call absurd insignificant and nonsense and therefore if a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle or accidents of bread and cheese or immaterial substances or of a free subject a free will or any free but free from being hindered by opposition I should not say he were in an error but that his words were without meaning that is to say absurd I've said before in the second chapter that a man did excel all other animals in this faculty that when he conceived anything whatsoever he was apt to inquire the consequences of it and what effects he could do with it and now I add this other theory of the same excellence that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to general rules called theorems or aphorisms that is he can reason or reckon not only a number but in all other things where of one may be edited into or subtracted from another but this privilege is allayed by another and that is by the privilege of absurdity to which no living creature is subject but man only and of man those are of all most subject to it that profess philosophy for it is most true that Cicero said of them somewhere that there can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers and the reason is manifest for there is not one of them that begins his reticulation from the definitions or explications of the names they are to use which is a method that had been used only in geometry whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable the first cause of absurd conclusions are ascribed to the want of method in that they begin not their reticulation from definitions that is from settled significations of their words as if they could cast a count without knowing the value of the numeral words one, two and three and whereas all bodies enter into a count upon diverse considerations which I've mentioned in the precedent chapter these considerations being diversely named, diverse absurdities proceed from the confusion and unfit connection of their names into assertions and therefore the second cause of absurd assertions are ascribed to the giving of names of bodies to accidents or of accidents to bodies as they do that say faith is infused or inspired when nothing can be poured or breathed into anything but body and that extension is body that fantasms are spirits etc. the third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us to the accidents of our own bodies as they do that say the color is in the body the sound is in the air etc. the fourth to the giving of the names of bodies to names or speeches as they do that say that there be things universal that a living creature is genus or a general thing etc. the fifth to the giving of the names of accidents to names and speeches as they do that say the nature of a thing is its definition a man's command is his will and a like the sixth to the use of metaphors tropes and other rhetorical figures instead of words proper for though it be lawful to say for example in common speech the way goeth or leadeth hither or thither the proverb says this or that whereas ways cannot go nor proverbs speak yet in reckoning and seeking of truth such speeches are not to be admitted the seventh to names that signify nothing but are taken up and learned by road from the schools as hypothetical transubstantiate consubstantiate, eternal now and a like canting of schoolmen to him that can avoid these things it is not easy to fall into any absurdity unless it be by the length of an account where any may perhaps forget what went before for all men by nature reason a like and well when they have good principles or who is so stupid as both to make mistaken geometry and also to persist in it when another detects his error to him by this it appears that reason is not as sense and memory born with us nor gotten by experience only as prudences but attained by industry first in apt imposing of names and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements which are names to assertions made by connection of one of them to another go to syllogisms which are the connections of one assertion to another till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand and that is it man call science and where a sense and memory are but knowledge of fact which is a thing past and irrevocable, science is a knowledge of consequences and dependence of one fact upon another by which out of that we can presently do we know how to do something else when we will or the like another time because when we see how anything comes about upon what causes and by what manner when the like causes come into our power we see how to make it produce the like effects children therefore are not endued with reason at all till they have attained the use of speech but are called reasonable creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come and the most part of men though they have the use of reasoning a little way as in numbering to some degree yet it serves them to little use in common life in which they govern themselves some better some worse according to their differences of experience quickness of memory and inclinations to several ends but specially according to good or evil fortune and the errors of one another for as for science or certain rules of their actions they are so far from it that they know not what it is geometry they have thought conjuring but for other sciences they have not been thought beginnings and some progress in them that they may see how they be acquired and generated are in this point like children that having no thought of generation are made believe by the women that their brothers and sisters are not born but found in the garden but yet they that have no science are in better and nobler condition with a natural prudence than man that by mis reasoning or by trusting them that reason wrong fall upon false and absurd general rules for ignorance of causes and of rules does not set man so far out of their way as relying on false rules and taking for causes of what they aspire to those that are not so but rather causes of the contrary to conclude the light of humane minds is perspicuous words but by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from ambiguity reason is the pace increase of science the way and the benefit of mankind the end and on the contrary metaphors and senseless and ambiguous words are like Ignace Fatouille and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities and their end contention and sedition or contempt as much experience is prudence so is much science sapience for though we usually have one name of wisdom for them both yet the Lettons did always distinguish between prudencia and sapiensia ascribing the former to experience the letter to science but to make their difference appear more clearly let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms and another to have added to that dexterity an acquired science of where he can offend or be offended by his adversary in every possible posture or guard the ability of the former would be to the ability of the letter as prudence to sapience both useful but the letter infallible but they that trusting only to the authority of books follow the blind blindly are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of fence ventures presumptuously upon an adversary that either kills or disgraces him the science of science are some certain and infallible some uncertain certain when he that pretended the science of anything can teach the same that is to say demonstrated truth thereof perspicuously to another uncertain when only some particular events answer to his pretense and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must signs of prudence are all uncertain because to observe by experience and to remember all circumstances that may alter the success is impossible as in any business where of a man has not infallible science to proceed by to forsake his own natural judgment and be guided by general sentences read in authors and subject to many exceptions is a sign of folly and generally scorned by the name of pedantry and even of those men themselves that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their reading of politics and history very few do it in their domestic affairs where their particular interest is concerned having prudence enough for their private affairs but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit than the success of another's business end of chapter 5 Chapter 6 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 6 of the interior beginnings of voluntary motions commonly called the passions and the speeches by which they are expressed there be it animals two sorts of motions peculiar to them one called vital begun in generation and continued without eruption through their whole life such as are the course of the blood the pulse the breathing the concoction nutrition excretion etc to which motions there needs no help of imagination the other is animal motion otherwise called voluntary motion as to go to speak to move any of our limbs in such manner as is first fancy in our minds that sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body caused by the action of the things we see here etc and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion remaining after sense has already been said in the first and second chapters and because going speaking and the like voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of wither which way and what it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion and though unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there where the thing moved is invisible for the space it is moved in for the shortness of it invisible yet that does not hinder but that such motions are for let a space be never so little that which is moved over a greater space whereof that little one is apart must first be moved over that these small beginnings of motion within the body of man before they appear in walking speaking striking and other visible actions are commonly called endeavor this endeavor when it is toward something which causes it is called appetite or desire the latter being the general name and the other often times restrained to signify the desire of food namely hunger and thirst and when the endeavor is from ward something it is generally called aversion these words appetite and aversion we have from the latins and they both of them signify the motions approaching the other of retiring so also do the greek words for the same which are arm and a form for nature itself does often press upon men these truths which afterwards when they look for somewhat beyond nature they stumble at for the schools find in mere appetite to go or move no actual motion at all but because some motion they must acknowledge they call it metaphorical motion it is but an absurd speech for though words may be called metaphorical bodies and motions cannot that which men desire they are said to love and to hate those things for which they have aversion so that desire and love are the same thing save that by desire we signify the absence of the object by love most commonly called the presence of the same so also by aversion we signify the absence and by hate the presence of the object of appetites and aversions some are born with men as appetite of food appetite of excretion and exoneration which may also and more properly be called aversions from somewhat they feel in their bodies and some other appetites not many the rest which are appetites of particular things proceed from experience in trial of their effects upon themselves or other men for of things we know not at all or believe not to be we can have no further desire than to taste and try but aversion we have for things not only which we know have hurt us but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us or not those things which we neither desire nor hate we are said to condemn contempt being nothing else but an immobility or contumacy in resisting the action of certain things and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise by other more potent objects or for want of experience of them and because the constitution of a man's body is in continual motion it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions much less can all men consent in the desire of almost anyone in the same object but what so ever is the object of man's appetite or desire that is it for which he for his part calleth good and the object of his hate in aversion evil and of his contempt vile and inconsiderable for those words of good evil and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that uses them there being nothing simply and absolutely so nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves but from the person of the man where there is no commonwealth or in a commonwealth from the person that represented it or from an arbiter or judge whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof the latin tongue has two words whose significations approach to those of good and evil but are not precisely the same and those are polkrum and terpe whereof the former signifies that which by some apparent signs promiseeth good and the latter that which promiseeth evil but in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by but for polkrum we say in some things fair in others beautiful or handsome or gallant or honorable or comely or amiable and for terpe foul, deformed, ugly base, nauseous and the like as the subject shall require all other words in their proper places signify nothing else but the mean or countenance that promiseeth good and evil so that of good there be three kinds good in the promise that is polkrum good in effect as the end desired which is called jakundum delightful and good as the means which is called utile profitable and as many of evil and promise is that they call terpe evil in effect and end is molestum unpleasant troublesome and evil in the means inutile, unprofitable hurtful as in sense that which is really within us is I have said before only motion caused by the action of external objects but in appearance to the sight, light and color to the ear, sound to the nostril, odor, etc. so when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears and other organs to the heart the real effect there is nothing but motion or endeavor which consisteth in appetite or version to or from the object moving but the appearance or sense of that motion is that we either call delight or trouble of mind this motion which is called appetite and for the appearance of it delight and pleasure seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion and a help therein too and therefore such things as cause delight were not improperly called jakunda javando from helping or fortifying and the contrary molesta offensive from hindering and troubling the motion vital pleasure therefore or delight is the appearance or sense of good manifestation or displeasure the appearance or sense of evil and consequently all appetite desire and love is accompanied with some delight more or less and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offense of pleasures or delights some arise from the sense of an object present and those may be called pleasures of sense the word sensual as it is used by those only that condemn them having no place till there be laws of this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body as also all that is pleasant in the sight hearing, smell, taste or touch others arise from the expectation that proceeds from foresight of the end or consequence of things whether those things in the sense please or displease and these are pleasures of the mind of him that droth in those consequences and are generally called joy in the like manner displeasures are some in the sense and called pain others in the expectation of consequences and are called grief these simple passions called appetite, desire love, aversion, hate joy and grief have their names for diverse considerations diversified at first when they one succeed another they are diversely called in the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire secondly from the object loved or hated thirdly from the consideration of many of them together fourth from the alteration or succession itself for appetite with an opinion of attaining is called hope the same without such opinion despair aversion with opinion of hurt from the object fear with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance courage sudden courage, anger constant hope, confidence of ourselves constant despair diffidence of ourselves anger for great hurt done to another when we conceive the same to be done by injury indignation desire of good to another benevolence, good will, charity if to man generally good nature riches, covetousness a name used always in signification of blame because men contending for them are displeased with one another's attaining them though the desire in itself to be blamed or allowed according to the means by which those riches are sought desire of offense or precedence ambition a name used also in the worst sense for the reason before mentioned desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends fear of things that are but of little hindrance pusillanimity contempt of little helps and hindrances magnanimity in danger of death or wounds, valor, fortitude magnanimity in the use of riches, liberality pusillanimity in the same wretchedness miserableness or parsimony as it is liked or disliked love of persons for society kindness love of persons for pleasing the sense only natural lust love of the same acquired from humiliation, that is imagination of pleasure past luxury love of one singularly with desire to be singularly beloved the passion of love the same with fear that the love is not mutual jealousy desire by doing hurt to another to make him condemn some fact of his own revengefulness desire to know why and how curiosity such as in no living creature but man so that man is distinguished not only by his reason but also by this singular passion from other animals in whom the appetite of food and other pleasures of sense by predominance take away the care of knowing causes which is a lust of the mind that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatagable generation of knowledge exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure fear of power invisible feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed religion not allowed superstition and when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine true religion for without the apprehension of why or what panic terror so called from the fables that make pan the author of them whereas in truth there is always in him so that feareth first some apprehension of the cause though the rest run away by example everyone supposing his fellow to know why and therefore this passion happens to none but in a throng or multitude of people joy from apprehension of novelty admiration proper to man because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause joy arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability is that exultation of the mind which is called glorying which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions is the same with confidence but if grounded on the flattery of others or only supposed by himself for delight in the consequences of it is called vain glory which name is properly given because a well grounded confidence begetteth attempt whereas the supposing power does not and is therefore rightly called vain grief from opinion of want of power is called dejection of mind the vain glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves which we know are not is most incident to young men and nourished by the histories or fictions of gallant persons and is corrected often times by age and employment sudden glory is the passion which maketh those grimaces call and is caused either by some sudden act of their own that pleaseeth them or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves and it is incident most to them that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves who are forced to keep themselves in their own favor by observing the imperfections of other men and therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity for of great minds one of the proper works is to help and free others from scorn and compare themselves only with the most able on the contrary sudden dejection is the passion that causeeth weeping and is caused by such accidents as suddenly take away some vehement hope or some prop of their power and they are most subject to it that rely principally on help's external such as our women and children therefore some weep for the loss of friends others for their unkindness others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge by reconciliation but in all cases both laughter and weeping are sudden motions custom taking them both away for no man laughs at old jests or weeps for an old calamity grief for the discovery of some defect of ability is shame or the passion that discovereth itself in blushing and consisteth in the apprehension of something dishonorable and in young men is a sign of the love of good reputation and commendable in old men it is a sign of the same but because it comes too late not commendable the contempt of good reputation is called impudence grief for the calamity of another is pity and arises from the imagination that the calamity may befall himself and therefore is called also compassion and in the phrase of this present time a fellow feeling and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness the best men have the least pity and for the same calamity those have least pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same contempt or little sense of the calamity of others is that which men call cruelty proceeding from security of their own fortune for that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms without other end of his own I do not conceive grief for the success of a competitor in wealth honor or other good if it be joined with endeavor to enforce our own abilities equal or exceed him is called emulation but joined with endeavor to supplant or hinder a competitor envy when in the mind of man appetites and aversions hopes and fears concerning one in the same thing arise alternately and diverse good and evil consequences of the doing the thing propounded come successfully into our thoughts so that sometimes we have an appetite to it sometimes an aversion from it sometimes hope to be able to do it sometimes despair or fear to attempt it the wholesome of desires aversions hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done or thought impossible is that we call deliberation therefore of things past there is no deliberation because it is justly impossible to be changed nor of things known to be impossible or thought so because men know or think such deliberation in vain but of things impossible which we think possible we may deliberate not knowing it is in vain and it is called deliberation because it is a pudding and end to the liberty we had of doing or omitting according to our own appetite or aversion this alternate succession of deliberations hopes and fears is no less in other living creatures than in man and therefore beasts also deliberate every deliberation is then said to end when that whereof they deliberate is either done or thought impossible because till then we retain the liberty of doing or omitting according to our appetite or aversion in deliberation the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action or to the that we call the will the act not the faculty of willing and beasts that have deliberation must necessarily also have will the definition of the will given common name by the schools that it is a rational appetite is not good for if it were then could there be no voluntary act against reason for a voluntary act is that which preceded from the will and no other but if instead of a rational appetite we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation then the definition is the same that I have given here will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating and though we say in common discourse a man had a will wants to do a thing that nevertheless he forbear to do yet that is properly but an inclination which makes no action voluntary because the action depends not of it but of the last inclination or appetite for if the intervenion of the appetite make any action voluntary then by the same reason all intervenient aversions should make the same action involuntary and so one in the same action should be both voluntary and involuntary by this it is manifest that not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness ambition lust or other appetites as to the thing propounded but also those that have their beginning from aversion or fear of those consequences of the admission are voluntary actions the forms of speech by which the passions are expressed are partly the same and partly different from those by which we express our thoughts and first generally all passions may be expressed indicatively as I love I fear I joy I deliberate I will I command but some of them have particular expressions by themselves which nevertheless are not informations unless it be when they serve to make other inferences besides that of the passion they proceed from deliberation is expressed subjunctively which is a speech proper to signify suppositions with their consequences as if this be done then this will follow and differs not from the language of reasoning save that reasoning is in general words but deliberation for the most part is of particulars the language of desire and aversion is imperative as do this for bear that which when the party is obliged to do or for bear is a command otherwise prayer or else counsel the language of vanglory of indignation pity and revengefulness operative but of the desire to know there is a peculiar expression called interrogative as what is it when shall it how is it done and why so other language of the passions I find none for cursing swearing reviling and the like do not signify a speech but as the actions of a tongue accustomed these forms of speech I say are expressions or voluntary significations of our passions but certain signs they be not because they may be used arbitrarily whether they that use them have such passions or not the best signs of passions present are either in the countenance of the body actions and ends or aims which we otherwise know the man to have and because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate the good or evil effect thereof dependent on the foresight of a long chain of consequences of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end but for so far as a man seeeth if consequences be greater than the evil the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or seeming good and contrarily when the evil exceeded the good the whole is apparent or seeming evil so that he who hath by experience or reason the greatest insurus prospect of consequences deliberate best himself and is able when he will to give the best counsel unto others continual success in obtaining those things which a man from desireth that is to say continual prospering is that men call felicity I mean the felicity of this life for there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind while we live here because life itself is but motion and can never be without desire nor without fear no more than without sense what kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honor him a man shall enjoy being joys that now are as incomprehensible as the word of schoolmen be a typical vision is unintelligible the form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of anything is praise that whereby they signify the power and greatness of anything is magnifying and that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called Makarismos for which we are in our tongue and thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions end of chapter 6 chapter 7 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recorded by Gazina Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter 7 of the Ends or resolutions of discourse of all discourse governed by desire of knowledge there is at last an end either by attaining or by giving over and in the chain of discourse where so ever it be interrupted there is an end for that time if the discourse be merely mental it consists of thoughts that the thing will be and will not be or that it has been and has not been alternately so where so ever you break off the chain of a man's discourse you leave him in a presumption of it will be or it will not be or it has been or has not been all which is opinion and that which is alternate appetite concerning good and evil the same is alternate opinion in the inquiry of the truth of past and future and as the last appetite in deliberation is called the will so the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future is called the judgment or resolute and final sentence of him that discourses and as the whole chain of appetite's alternate in the question of good or bad is called deliberation so the whole chain of opinions alternate in the question of true or false is called doubt no discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact past or to come for as for the knowledge of fact it is originally sense and ever after memory and for the knowledge of consequence which I have said before is called science it is not absolute but conditional no man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been or will be which is to know absolutely but only that if this be that is if this has been that has been if this shall be which is to know conditionally and that not the consequence of one thing to another but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing and therefore when the discourse is put into speech and begins with the definitions of words and proceeds by connection of the same into general affirmations and these again into syllogisms the end or last some is called the conclusion and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge or knowledge of the consequence of words which is commonly called science but if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms then the end or conclusion is again opinion of the truth of somewhat said though sometimes in absurd and senseless words without possibility of being understood when two or more men know of one and the same fact they are said to be conscious of it one to another which is as much as to know it together and because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another or of a third it was and ever will be reputed a very evil act for any man to speak against his conscience or to corrupt or force another so to do in so much that the plea of conscience has been always harkened unto very diligently in all times afterwards men made use of the same word metaphorically for the knowledge of their own secret facts and secret thoughts and therefore it is rhetorically said that the conscience is a thousand witnesses and last of all men vehemently in love with their own new opinions though never so absurd and obstinately bent to maintain them gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them and so pretend to know they are true when they know at most but that they think so when a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions it beginneth either at some contemplation of his own and then it is still called opinion or it beginneth at some saying of another of whose ability to know the truth and of whose honesty in not deceiving the discourse is not so much concerning the thing as the person and the resolution is called belief and faith faith in the man belief both of the man and of the truth of what he says so that in belief are two opinions one of the saying of the man the other of his virtue to have faith in or trust to to believe a man is the same thing namely an opinion of the veracity of the man but to believe what is said signifies only an opinion of the truth of the saying but we are to observe that this phrase I believe in as also the Latin credo in and the Greek are never used but in the writings of divines instead of them in other writings are put I believe him, I trust him I have faith in him I rely on him and in Latin credo ili fido ili and in Greek and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word has raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith but by believing in as it is in the creed is meant not trust in the person but confession and acknowledgement of the doctrine for not only Christians but all manner of men do so believe in God as to hold all for truth they hear him say whether they understand it or not which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had but they do not believe the doctrine of the creed from whence we may infer that when we believe any saying whatsoever it be to be true from arguments taken not from the thing itself or from the principles of natural reason but from the authority and good opinion we have of him that hath said it then is the speaker or person we believe in or trust in and whose word we take the object of our faith and the honor done in believing is done to him only and consequently when we believe that the scriptures are the word of God having no immediate revelation from God himself our belief, faith and trust is in the church whose word we take and acquiesce therein and they that believe whether it relates unto them in the name of God take the word of the prophet do honor to him and in him trust and believe touching the truth of what he related whether he be a true or a false prophet and so it is also with all other history for if I should not believe all that is written by historians of the glorious acts of Alexander or Caesar had any just cause to be offended or anybody else but the historian if Livy says the gods made once a chaos speak and we believe it not we distrust not God therein but Livy so that it is evident that whatsoever we believe upon no other reason than what is drawn from authority of men only whether they be sent from God or not is faith in men only end of chapter 7 recorded by Gesine in January 2007