 Hello and welcome to NewsClick. Today I have Prabir, editor-in-chief of NewsClick with me. We'll be discussing about the Kurdistan referendum which has happened and the offensive by Iraqi forces in Kirkukh. Prabir, Kurdistan regional government today has expressed its interest in ceasefire and initiating dialogue with Iraqi government. Do you think that the Iraqi government will move towards initiating a dialogue on the issue of independence of Kurdistan? Well, I don't think they're going to move towards a discussion of the independence of Kurdistan. So I think that's something they are going to say no to. Let's first look at the aftermath of what you said the offensive on Kirkukh by Iraqi forces and what has happened subsequent to the referendum. It's very clear that Barzani has miscalculated badly. It's also clear that Taliban clan, which is the other big one, the Barzani clan, the Taliban clan being the two important constituents of the Kurdish regional government. Of course, Barzani was the much more stronger force over there. It was also backed by the United States and Turkey. So he was the preferred partner, if you will, of the Americans and the Turks on the issue of Kurdish forces. The fact is the Taliban group seems to have played a role by not fighting for Barzani or with Barzani forces. They seem to have withdrawn when the Iraqi forces came in. It doesn't look like Barzani's Peshmerga forces put up a much of a resistance either. It was quite a quick season of Kirkukh. It showed that the collapse was quite rapid. I also believe that the Peshmerga forces have been thoroughly overrated in the western media because when the ISIS came into Shinjar, if you remember, and took over that entire area, Peshmerga forces withdrew very rapidly. The fact that they advanced and took over Kirkukh at that point of time seems to have been more an understanding they had reached, that they will not fight in Shinjar and ISIS will let them take over the Kirkukh area. It's a possible construction. I don't know how far that is true, but it's something that's a possibility. So if we look at the Barzani's calculation that after referendum, he will be able to halt the Iraqi army and international players would then allow him to go and become an independent region. That's a miscalculation on many counts. Apart from Israel, nobody supported Barzani's referendum. Turkey was completely against it for a very simple reason that they think if they allow this to happen, then the similar demands in Turkey, which PKK has been raising for a long time, and that's the largest number of Kurds in the region, that that would strengthen it. So they did against it. And without the lifeline from Turkey, the oil doesn't go through. Kurdish oil cannot really go through. I think Barzani miscalculated on both his internal strength and his external ability to influence opinions. So I think it is a complete fiasco. Having lost Kirkukh, having lost at least about 35 to 40 percent of the territory he controlled only a few days back, given the fact that he does not have legitimacy even within the regional government, because his government, by 2015, should have really sought another mandate. Given all of this, Barzani is now negotiating for a very weak weekend. So to argue that the Iraqi government is going to discuss independence with him is not a likelihood. What is the possibility? Can he retain his current position within the regional government itself? Because there are really three districts and it is possible for Iraq to say, we'll consider these three districts independently. We'll provide the money that we are now providing to the regional government independently, which would be a violation of the least autonomy principle which they had accepted, by which the Kurdistan regional government came into existence. Whether Iraq would actually not even allow that, what was already granted to them, and would scale it back, try and take over these areas directly or indirectly, that's something that needs to be said. It will depend a lot on how Barzani now behaves with the Kurdish people, with other groups, whether he can maintain an internal unity within the Kurdish people of that region, which is really at the moment the Taliban and the Barzani sections who represent them. How much they have support within that region among the people we have to see. We have seen that Israel and Saudi Arabia are quite active in the region. Israel has been supporting militarily, providing military assistance and training to Kurds since 1960s. What will be the role of Israel and Saudi Arabia in this issue? Well, I think there is a tacit understanding that Saudi Arabia has with Israel that Iran is gaining influence and supporting the Kurdish revolt will destabilize also Iran partially because there is a strong Kurdish section also in Iran. So I think they are trying to fish in troubled waters. Israel openly, Saudi Arabia indirectly. I would think that Saudi Arabia would be hesitant to play a very open role on this and they are in fact would be willing to bankroll a lot of the activities but not really play an open military role in this. Israel and the United States are the two countries which could play a role over here. United States is limited by the fact of their relations with Turkey. Israel is of course limited by nothing in West Asia because United States more or less follows their lead rather than lead the issues or lead on these issues. I think we will have to see what leverage Israel can exert on the United States to also support its policies in Kurdistan. I don't think at the moment that's really going to work. I think what you need to see when you see Saudi Arabia is more towards Raqqa and Syria and what the Americans are trying there. The ISIS has been thrown out from Raqqa with the help of US-backed local Kurdish forces and SDF. What will be the future relationship of Raqqa with the Syrian government? Raqqa presents a rather complex military picture. Of course it's the Kurdish forces, SDF being at least its front organization if not directly controlled by it. Who were in the forefront of the struggle for Raqqa? They claimed a lot of tribal militias also which helped them or tribal groups which helped them but in the forefront was really the SDF and essentially the YPG which is the military arm of the Kurdish forces. It's also clear that the Americans were very unhappy because they also unveiled pictures of Wachalan and so on during this taking over of Raqqa and that has obviously a backlash in Turkey. The interesting part of it is that Maghrik who's the front person or shall we say the points person for the State Department on these issues in Syria, he has said that the Syrian government forces would not be allowed into Raqqa. Now he's an American official. America has no locusts and an international law to speak on any of the subjects particularly about what the sovereign republic of Syria should or shouldn't do or its government should or shouldn't do. Therefore for him to say almost like a pro-consult that what the Syrian government would not be allowed to do seems rather shall we say provocative if not downright reprehensible. So I think we are going to see a picture developed where the Americans would back that the northern part of Syria remains with the Kurdish forces and its allies and they are inviting in Saudi Arabians. In fact one of the major figures in Saudi Arabia visited Raqqa along with Americans and held negotiations with SDF. So I think Saudi Arabian and Americans are hoping that this part of the region would be controlled by the Kurds in alliance with the Americans and the Saudi Arabians. The real battle today developing in Syria is over the oil fields. These are in desert. They adjoin Iraqi territory. They are the ones on one side you have the Iraqi forces advancing who are in alliance with the Syrian government. Other side you have the Syrian forces advancing and right down the middle on the east bank of Euphrates you have the SDF which is backed by the Americans advancing and there is now a race for the oil fields over there in which at the moment the SDF is advantage because the Iraqi forces are still well beyond the borders at the moment and the Syrian forces have to cross Euphrates and that is not proving very easy. ISIS seems to be interested in fighting the Syrian government forces and allowing the SDF to take over large parts of the Syrian territory now. So you are seeing suddenly the huge expansion of the Kurdish controlled territory in Syria which does not represent the demography of Syria. In fact, Kurds are probably about 10% of the Syrian population at the moment the way their occupation or the territory they control is growing they probably control about 15 to 20% of the territory of Syria so this is going to be a long-term problem. There are some indications that the SDF may post the collapse of the ISIS and after this shall we say the battle lines are redrawn it is possible that they will use all this as a bargaining chip to reach an understanding with the Syrian government and therefore we might see something else developing afterwards.