 Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Joe Rosick, Chairman of the ENSA Homeland Security Intelligence Council and Senior Associate at CSIS. Good morning and thanks for coming out in this rainy Washington morning. I had the honor of introducing the first panel today. And if they'll come out on stage, the first panel we'll unveil and discuss with you the latest thought leadership paper from CSIS confronting an uncertain threat, the future of al-Qaida and associated movements. I'm going to be very brief in my introductions. These three gentlemen are steeped in terrorism, counterterrorism. I've known them in the past. First and foremost will be the moderator, Juan Zarate, who was the Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combat and Terrorism. I'm Sanderson, former Defense Intelligence Analyst for SAIC, who has conducted several in-depth studies of terrorist groups for DIA, and one, and Ozzie Nelson, who is a former naval pilot, helicopter-type pilot. He also served on the National Security Council where he drove our nation's strategy in maritime counterterrorism and is a plankholer of NCTC. Juan? Thank you, Joe. Good morning, everyone. Good to see you all. It's an honor to be here to be part of this incredible conference today. Really a pleasure for us and a proud moment for us as well to unveil the report confronting an uncertain threat, the future of al-Qaida and associated movements, which is the culmination of a year-long study undertaken by Tom and Ozzie and overseen by Arnaud Borschrave and myself at CSIS, looking at the future of al-Qaida. This is the culmination of a year-long series of products and work, the first product being a report in February of this year looking at the state of al-Qaida, entitled A Threat Transformed. Research was then conducted in nearly 20 countries around the world, case studies for 10 movements associated with al-Qaida, culminating then in this report, which looks to the future of the movement, not just in the next year or two, but looking out to 2025. I want to thank the sponsors of the report that not only supported us financially and otherwise, but also pushed us to look to the future of these movements, the Department of Defense, the government of Singapore, and I want to thank them for being here today. I also want to thank the senior advisory group members, a group of esteemed experts, counterterrorism, intelligence, futurists from around the world who helped advise and supervise the study. Some of them are here today. So we're really honored to be here today and I want to thank Ozzie and Tom for their fine work. The report, I think, is an important one for three principal reasons. The first, it deals, I think, in a very serious and rigorous way with what lies beyond the al-Qaida that we've known to date. The al-Qaida of 2011 is not the al-Qaida of 2001, and certainly looking out to the future of the movement requires in-depth study and some rigor, and this study does that. Secondly, it provides a sense of what the landscape may look like in the future, given past factors also looking at the future environment. Finally, it challenges, I think, policymakers not just in the United States but around the world to imagine what the end of al-Qaida looks like and how we can condition the environment and the ecosystem so that that end actually comes to pass. And so I'm excited about the study. I think it's an important report coming on the 10-year anniversary of 9-11 and something that is worthy of study. The report is structured and broken up in four principal categories, and we'll use that as the construct for our discussion here. You have the future environment looked at and studied, the future paradigms of al-Qaida, strategic shocks, and then policy recommendations. And so that will be the basis for our discussion. I'm going to pose some questions to Tom and Ozzie about the report. We're going to welcome questions from the audience. I would ask you to submit your questions in writing. We're not going to have a lot of time, but if you will, use the note section in the back of your program to submit questions, and I'll submit those to Tom and Ozzie, and we'll take those at the end of this presentation. So with that, I'd like to start, Tom, with you. There's a lot of debate, Tom, about the end of al-Qaida, especially with the death of bin Laden. Now we're looking at the 10-year anniversary of 9-11. Tell us a little bit about the study and what it says about the current state of al-Qaida, and tell us as well what the case study reviews told us about, not just current state, but how this framed the future of al-Qaida study. Absolutely, Juan. First, I'd like to thank you for all your tremendous work. You and Arnold de Borger of my boss provided invaluable guidance and insight throughout the course of the study. And I'd also like to give a special thanks to David Gordon and to Ben Bodurian and all the research staff who really brought this all together. It was really quite a tremendous effort. Juan, as the report's title says, it is an uncertain threat. We've watched al-Qaida transform from a fairly well-defined hierarchical organization, then into a network of networks, and eventually into an ideologically driven movement. And that certainly contributes to the challenge of identifying and characterizing the threat in discrete terms. Al-Qaida and Associated Movements presents a complex challenge to all in the US and those who seek to confront it. We've seen in recent months, weeks, and even in days, senior al-Qaida leaners, at least al-Qaida core in Pakistan, being killed or captured. And many believe that we're seeing al-Qaida core at a tipping point. And while that may be very encouraging, I think there's still a lot to worry about, and we heard some of that from Secretary Napolitano. We have to be very mindful of some of the realities that we see out there. The al-Qaida message was sewn a long time ago that is very difficult to dislodge. Senior al-Qaida Associated Groups, al-Shabaab and Somalia, it all kite in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali in Algeria. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. Several other groups, Lashkar Taiba in Pakistan, all are very potent and very serious threats in showing little sign of going away. In fact, I think a lot of them are well positioned to persist or grow as threats. Furthermore, we have an uncomfortable number of recent homegrown threats, something that Ozzie Nelson, my colleague at CSI says, done a tremendous amount of work on. And we've seen that pop up with uncomfortable regularity over the past few months. So we do have this diminution of the threat of al-Qaida core, but we have the affiliates and the homegrowns rising in their place. So if you take a look at that threat and look into the future environment, you see a number of problems that or external factors to al-Qaida that could exacerbate the challenge that we see today. Among those are demographics, resource challenges, changes in the global balance of power, innovations in technology, interconnectivity, challenges posed by identity, and of course, governance. If you take that together, the universe of al-Qaida threat certainly remains potent. Not well understood enough, fueled by persistent ideology, global conditions that will enable strategy, recruitment, and fundraising and communications for them. So I would say there's some positives, but quite a few negatives that remain. Second half of your question dealt with the case studies. Now we conducted case studies on al-Qaida core on the homegrown threat and then on a series of al-Qaida affiliated groups. And in order to look forward in the future, into 2025, it's a tremendous challenge. But you can do that and use one of the few tools at hand, and that is to look historically at some of the factors that impacted the trajectories of al-Qaida and other terror groups. So what we did is we looked at factors such as charismatic leadership, foreign troop presence, the sponsorship from outside groups, safe havens. And then in order to project in the future with some accuracy, we had to carry those factors forward in order to help define and make our five paradigms or five scenarios in the future a reality. So that's why we did the case studies. Contributing to that or complimenting our effort to get a real sense of what's happening presently and in the future is the field work that we did. Ozzy and I, Dave Gordon and Zach, Philman went to Europe, spent a month in Africa traveling across six countries, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and Russia in Western China and Xinjiang to look at that. So taken together, we took those historical factors. The future paradigms define those factors going forward, the field work and the current threat assessment of al-Qaida. And that's how we came up with what we see as a threat today. Perfect, tremendous amount of work. Ozzy, a core part of the study is looking at potential paradigms for the evolution of al-Qaida and associated movements. Can you talk a little bit about what those paradigms look like and what the study projects in terms of potentials for the future of al-Qaida? Sure, thank you, Juan. And again, thanks to all my colleagues who helped participate in on the study. Really happy with how it turned out. We obviously there's an infinite number of possibilities of how al-Qaida might look in the future. Our goal was to put a sample set out there for policymakers, for analysts to react to. To say, that's never going to happen or if that could happen, but maybe in a different time or a different place in different location. And obviously extrapolating from where we are now in history to where we may be in 2025 as a really poor predictor, but you have to base it somewhere. And that's where we kind of started with al-Qaida core and the contract of Tom laid out. So we put ourselves in 2025 and we looked around and said, what could al-Qaida look like? The first scenario is one we call it the reemergence of al-Qaida core. We're obviously being very successful, as been reported in the media, brought bringing out the end of al-Qaida core. What if there's a construct where another part of the world, we see al-Qaida come back in 2025. It is a centralized movement as it once was, 10 or 15 years ago. And it is a global leader of this jihadist movement. The second scenario is one we call the rise of the affiliates. Obviously, the affiliates, Al-Qaida Arabian Peninsula, pose the greatest threat in many ways to the United States. But we're talking about a group of militant groups that are aligned and are working not so much under a common ideology or common narrative the al-Qaida core brings, but more of a relationships by convenience, sharing tactics, techniques, procedures, and resources. And again, we're talking about al-Qaida Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab, al-Qaida, and al-Qaida and al-Muqreb. The third scenario, one as Tom pointed out that we've written about in the past that I find most troubling is the rise of the individual or small cell domestically inside the western countries, in particular even any democracy. And it's these individuals that are inspired by a narrative, by a common ideology, but aren't receiving any operational guidance per se. These are the individuals that some people say there's no such thing as self-radicalization, but these are individuals that would radicalize through the internet, they would communicate through the internet, as we've seen with how social media has been used over the last month or so, and then responding and crossing the line and going to violent action. Scenario number four is where we see al-Qaida take over roles as a state actor, where you see them carve out some part of a country, even an entire country, where they're actually providing governance, they're providing judicial services, they're providing social services, they have a militia, and they're actually operating and have taken over that country. And then the last scenario is kind of a little bit different than the first four, in that we say a scenario where al-Qaida kind of goes away. Not that this Islamic militancy goes away, but the common ideology, the common narrative that al-Qaida needs, which is that the US and the West are at war with Islam, kind of disintegrates. And the threat of Islamic militancy goes back to the regional and even the local level. And we kind of looked at that scenario slightly differently so that we could pose some ways that maybe we can get out of our way, the US government, the international community, how we can precipitate the end of al-Qaida and maybe not take actions that may keep that from happening. That's good, Ozzy. And I think one of the interesting things about the report, too, is that the conclusion that these paradigms aren't mutually exclusive, that you could have the emergence of a number of them at the same time or in ways that affect each other. Absolutely, it's interesting. Tom, again, predicting the future is impossible and proves folly when you try to do it, but the report not only sets out the paradigms but also sets out future shocks that could impact the evolution, not just about Qaida but how the United States and other countries deal with the problem. Can you talk a little bit about that section and why it was important? Absolutely, these are what we call strategic surprises. Now the report has a component that looks at the future environment, which we lay out a number of factors that we can look at in a linear fashion and sort of determine how they may affect and impact the environment to find it in 2025. But what we also understand is that there are surprises that are out there. They may be events that are not unknown to us or not a surprise. But when they happen, they provide tremendous change. Some of the examples related to Al Qaeda would certainly be the 2006 invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian forces. This really propelled al-Shabaab to the forefront. Also the US invasion of Iraq energized a foreign fighter pipeline. It also helped create Al Qaeda in Iraq. Those are some of the examples that we have to think about as we move forward with the paradigms that Ozzie laid out. Some that are better known historically, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the introduction of nuclear weapons. These are things that quickly changed mindsets, changed calculations, and changed how people view the environment. So we knew that even with the five paradigms, the five scenarios that we put out there, there could be things that would change it. And so we listed and developed a number of these seven of them. And we also understand that this number is basically infinite. You could come up with all sorts of different things. But we did this so that we could show that projections about 2025, as detailed as we can make them, can change quickly and overnight and in profound ways. We had some fun thinking about this. We sure did. We came up with quite a few provocative strategic shocks or surprises. The first, and again, some of these are not unpredictable. But when they happen, they just bring dramatic change. So keep that in mind, please. Al-Qaeda and associated movements detonating a weapon of mass destruction. We can all imagine what sort of impact that would have on counterterrorism planning, on relationships, on the movement of people, on intelligence. And that would be tremendously disruptive. One scenario is Pakistani and Saudi Arabian governments falling to radical forces and what this dramatic development would be. And a lot of people say this is unlikely. But I'd like to remind people how many people predicted the Arab Spring. And that is a very strong example of how you need to understand that things can come essentially out of the blue. So that was the second one that we had. We saw some terrible violence in Norway just a couple of weeks ago. What if there is widespread violence against Muslim communities across Europe and this draws fighters from around the world into Europe? This could be precipitated by a depression in Europe. But I think actually we dodged a bullet when the gunmen in Norway, as terrible it was for him to kill those individuals. If he had focused or targeted Muslim communities in Oslo or other places then I think we would have had a tremendous battle ongoing. Israel and Iran going to war, again, not a surprise. People talk about this all the time. But if it were to happen, the calculations we have I think would go out the window. Palestinian statehood in the recognition of Israel. What would this do similar to the Arab Spring? What would it do to Al Qaeda's ideology into their mantra? It would really upset it in significant ways. One of the more interesting ones that we came up with was the dissolution of OPEC combined with advances in hydrocarbon technology and efficiency and product design. And what this would do if certain states particularly in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf were marginalized by this. And what impact that would have on Al Qaeda and associated movements. The final one we came up with is a favorite of mine. And that is Al Qaeda striking China. And I think a lot of people would say that is a tremendous surprise. But think about it this way. And you also look at our future environment description of a global shift in power. If you are Al Qaeda and you're looking out at the far enemy, those states are those powers that perpetuate bad governance in the eyes of Al Qaeda. And you think about who's most damaging to the global Muslim community to the Ummah? Well, the United States, Western Europe. These are typically the countries that Al Qaeda identifies. But is that power shifts to the East. And you think about China's footprint around the world. They also are perpetuating governments that are seen as inimical to Al Qaeda's strategy and to their narrative. And not only that, you have China in western province of Xinjiang. Actually making life pretty difficult to Muslim communities known as the Uighurs out there. And I went out there and went to the border with Tajikistan, looked at the communities out there. And there's a tremendous amount of discord. So if you're Al Qaeda and you're thinking about who is most difficult for you in the future, it could in fact be China. Because not only does it combine the issue of supporting apostate governments in the Middle East, but it's also killing or imprisoning Muslims at home. And China racing for resources around the world. Absolutely. And we've seen Al Qaeda target Chinese sites. We saw this in Norway a year ago. Absolutely. And you do have some militants from the western China in the East Turkestan Islamic movement who have gone down into Pakistan. They've conducted attacks alongside Taliban and Al Qaeda. So this is not too far fetched. It is a possibility. Interesting. Ozzy, I think one of the most challenging parts of this study is kind of the so what, what do you do about all this section? Sort of the policy recommendations. Can you talk a little bit about some of the core recommendations? Because I think sometimes there's a view out there that less is more. Or that the West should not do anything. That we should allow Al Qaeda to implode. To allow its ideology to wither and die. Talk about the policy recommendations and conclusions section if you could. Thanks, Juan. This is a challenge. And the US government international community has started to move in this direction in many ways. So to some of you in the audience, this may not be anything new. We advocate for a more aggressive and a more expedient pursuit of these objectives. The first one that we talk about is what we call a global overwatch construct. And that is, since September 11th, the majority of our counterterrorism policies have been grounded in a few key hotspots. And our resources have been allocated to basically two hotspots, Iraq and Afghanistan. But that's no longer a viable CT counterterrorism construct for obvious reasons. We don't have the political capital do that anymore. We don't have the economic or the financial capital do that anymore. But we still have to position ourselves to be against, to fight the threat of terrorism and particularly the al-Qaeda brand of terrorism. And what we call for is an increase of these resources outside of those areas. And so the US government's international partners establish capabilities well beyond the trouble spots to anticipate where that might be. And this doesn't mean necessarily building capabilities in countries. It means enhancing our international partnerships and our relationships. Law enforcement constructs, civil military relationships, and even the intelligence and the pure military relationships as well. So that we're proactive and we're ahead of the threat. One of the things that's been our policy, counterterrorism policies throughout their history arguably, plagued by is that we get full fledged commitment of resources after the fact. What we need to do is commit these resources earlier on in the front, in front of the threat. And with the theory that over time this will cost us less money and we'll be able to keep the threats from actually destecizing themselves. And so that's the overarching construct. And then we go and we note that there's some of the common themes from all of the scenarios that we pick out that the US government and again the international community have to focus on. And these are things no matter how al-Qaeda moves forward that are so key to ensuring the ultimate demise of the organization. And the first is directed action against the leadership. Leadership remains incredibly important to any organization. And certainly leaderships can be replenished but if you're spending time trying to replenish your leadership, you're not spending time planning and conducting attacks. And if you look at bin Laden, one of the things that we don't know, we don't know if al-Qaeda actually has achieved the status of a self-sustaining movement yet or if it's actually gonna fail with the fall of his cult of personality. And that's something we're gonna have to see going forward. The second is the issue of networking. Obviously, a lot of the militants that we face now developed relationships primarily in Afghanistan during the Soviet war. Where else might these relationships in this networking being created? Is it happening in Yemen right now? Is it happening in Somalia? And these are the individuals that are gonna get the operational experience that perhaps 10 or 15 or 20 years from now can lead that resurgent al-Qaeda, resurgent al-Qaeda core that we mentioned earlier on. The third issue that we talk about is the issue of safe havens. This is not a new issue to US government and the international community, but not enough is being done. And we're not just talking about physical safe havens. We're talking about micro havens such as refugee camps. Micro, we're talking about virtual safe havens such as the internet. And we have to be much more aggressive and assertive in what we're doing to eliminate militant activity in those areas. And then lastly, an argument most importantly is what the United States government has struggled with, I think. And I thought that was one of the ironic pieces out of the Abbott-Abott intelligence, was it been a lot and also thought that they were losing the strategic communication campaign. And the whole time the US government thinks that they're losing. So somebody's got to be winning, but over at the end of the time, the al-Qaeda movement is inspired by the narrative. The toxic narrative is the fuel for this larger movement. And we need to continue to place our resources against that to eliminate that the US and the West is at war with Islam in order once and for all to remove the fuel. And by removing that fuel, that larger narrative that unites all these disparate groups, it'll push the threat back down to the regional, back down to the local level ultimately. And that's the goal with that kind of construct. Very good. That's a great overview. Thank you both. Now we're going to open it up for questions. Rob, we've got a couple handwritten. If you have, we've got about 10 minutes, I think. So if you have any more, Rob can take this. Let me just take the moderator's prerogative and ask one. One criticism of this report could be somebody who doesn't read it and say, look, you're arguing for perpetual war here. You're assuming that al-Qaeda will actually exist, that its ideology will have resonance in 2025. So is this a prescription for perpetual war? Well, one, I would answer that by saying many of the conditions that contributed to the rise of al-Qaeda and to the rise of al-Qaeda associated movements and to the homegrowns still exist, and they are very likely to exist. As we go to a world of 9 billion people over the next 30, 40 years, constrained resources, the demographics, the population bulges, the continued marginalization, ethnically, socially, politically, economically, Muslim communities, but lots of others as well, you're likely to see individuals who will be susceptible to the messages that al-Qaeda puts out there. And I think that's a reality. No doubt about it. I think it's great. And we should recognize the advances that we've made against this group and its network, but nonetheless, so many of those factors will persist. Good. All right, Ozzy, I've got a specific question for you from the audience. Can you expand on the concern about domestic US citizens who embrace radical violent teaching by Muslim leaders and others in the US, similar to the Fort Hood case? What more can be done to monitor and to prevent such activities? No, it's a great question. I think that the issue of domestic extremism, radicalization is going to challenge the United States and challenge our discussion about civil liberties and privacy and security like no other issue has, because that's the crux of the issue, is really that balance. And it makes a law enforcement community job almost impossible because of this, an organization like the FBI has to protect the individual rights, protect our civil rights, but at the same time, they also have the mission of preventing attacks, terrorist attacks inside the United States. So if they wait too long to take action, they fail in their mission. If they get too early in the cycle, then there's people who say they were entrapped and the FBI was, they wouldn't have conduct these attacks, because it's very difficult. And what ultimately you're trying to do is you have an individual who's radicalizing, who's online and getting this content and he takes that jump from rhetoric to violent action and the law enforcement community has to determine when that actually is going to happen. And it's almost impossible. So some of the things that we're going to have to do is basically twofold. One is whatever resources we think that we're putting against the internet, it's simply not enough. And it doesn't mean, it doesn't necessarily mean taking down websites and violating people's civil rights. That's not what it means. It means patrolling the internet and treating the internet as a space that's being to use, to incite violence and to get people to cross that line from rhetoric to violent action. And we have to understand that's what it's being used from. And then the other thing we need to focus on too is these intermediaries, these individuals who may be disenfranchised for whatever reason, they use the internet to find like-minded individuals to further become disenfranchised. But ultimately what's required is for an external actor to come in and get them to cross that line from rhetoric to violent action. And that's the individual like Anwar al-Laki. U.S. citizen, very policy problem for the United States. What do you do with the Anwar al-Laki's of the world? We need to have a very clear and distinct policy about those types of individuals that are getting these Americans to cross that line to violence. And I think there's some very interesting studies in a way places like MIT and elsewhere looking at the role of influencers in social media and online and how that influences people's behavior and mobilizes individuals. I've got a couple of questions here that are related. Let me try to fuse them. This part asks about the study focusing on al-Qaida obviously in Sunni radical organizations. Did you also consider other non-Sunni groups such as Hezbollah? And then related to that a question about, as the CT threat has changed, what groups still present a direct threat to the United States as we look at the landscape? Okay, good. Well, I'll give my own answer and then Ozzy can add his. We had limited resources, limited scope and limited time despite having a superb advisor group and research team can only look at certain issues. And that was the topic we decided was al-Qaida and associate movements and that is a huge group of individuals and groups to look at. And by that again, it's not just the al-Qaida core, it's also inspired individuals and themselves. Sure, AQAP in Yemen, Jamaz Lamee in Indonesia, Lashkar Taiba in Pakistan, AQI in Iraq. Lots of groups and that included a lot of travel. So we couldn't take the entire universe of terrorism that's out there. But having said that, we recognize Hezbollah as a serious threat and also secular terrorism around the world is also a very significant threat. As far as groups that do continue to serve as a threat, that was the second part of the question. There's no doubt about it that AQAP, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula is a serious threat. Many people think it's more significant than al-Qaida core. They were able to get an individual on an airplane into the United States who nearly blew himself up in over 200 passengers December 25th, 2009. They tried to and with the thanks to the help of the Saudi intelligence service blew two of their plans to send toner cartridges with bombs in them into aircraft over the United States. So a group like that is very significant. Al-Qaida in Iraq still doing a tremendous amount of mayhem and then al-Shabaab in Somalia. But I think Ozzy could point to a few others as well. Thanks, the group that troubles me the most, obviously al-Qaida Arabian Peninsula, as Tom is a very direct threat to the United States. But the one I think ultimately has the most power to change the map, geopolitically, is Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, that's the organization that Juan and I talked about, because they have the ability to basically bring two nation states to nuclear confrontation. Given that they're highly capable, they're very skilled, and they have the support arguably of a nation state. I find that particularly troubling. Inside the United States, I think it's important as we tackle this issue of this Islamist militancy or this embrace of al-Qaida knowledge, and the ideology inside the United States, we look at extremism in general. One of the scenarios that I use, I ask individuals, when was the last time there was a domestic act of terrorism using an act of terrorism using an airplane inside the United States? And people say, well, it was 9-11. Well, actually, in my opinion, it was Joseph Stack, the individual who rented the Cezna, equipped it to explode, crash it into the IRS building and kill two federal employees. Now, that hasn't been determined to be an act of terrorism, I think that it is. If he had been an Arab male or a Muslim, we would be viewing that incident very, very differently. So the issue of extremism inside the United States is I find a predictive problematic. One, I would just add one thing. I see my former boss, Steve Rader, here, and we looked at WMD terrorism starting in 1998 for the Defense Intelligence Agency. In the three case studies that we looked at were not Islamist terrorism. They were the Bhagwan Sri Rajneesh cult that used Salmonella in Oregon, the Amshin Rekyo cult in Japan, and then the Sri Lankan, the Tamil Tigers' use of chlorine gas against the Sri Lankan armed forces. So there is a good indicator that terrorism goes well beyond Al-Qaeda and its associated movements. And in the future environment, a blending of these threats could be a huge threat and problem. I think we only have a couple minutes left. There's one very specific question here about specific types of weapons, radio frequency weapons. I want to expand it just quickly. 10 second, 15 second answer from each of you about the role of technology in the future and impacting Al-Qaeda and the study. How did you incorporate technology into this? Yeah, I mean, well, two issues. First, there's widespread acknowledgement of the role of social media and the internet. Again, it is changing faster than our policy and our laws can and our senior leaders still, I don't think understand and comprehend the internet and the power of the internet and social media like the digital natives who have grown up with it. And that's something that we have to change. And the second, which we touch on a little bit and Tom just did as well, is the issue of the WMD. This technology, particularly as it relates to biological weapons, is now widely available on the internet. It empowers the individual to take action for whatever cause they may see. One, technology as we all know is neutral. Good guys and the bad guys can use it. And I think that we're putting power out there that individuals can take up as Hank Crumpton says and give them the power that only states had in the past. And I think that's dangerous and I think that individuals can manipulate that technology faster than we can improvise explosive devices. Think about how quickly insurgents in Iraq were able to modify those and how slow and how long the response was by the United States to counter that. So I think actually technology is often to the advantage of terrorists before it is to the United States or those confronting it. Fantastic. I'll just note for the audience and for folks who may be watching on TV that there's a text box and actually some very good text box in here on different issues, terrorist financing. But there's one on the new social media and AQAM future on page 22. And then finally, there was a final question on the impact of the Arab Spring on AQAM. We don't have time for it but I will point you to another text box on page eight and nine as well as to an article that Dave Gordon and I co-wrote in Washington Quarterly on that topic. So with that, I want to thank you all. I want to thank the audience and everyone for bearing with us on the unveiling of this very important report. Again, confronting an uncertain threat, the future of al-Qaeda and associated movements looking out to 2025. Tom, Ozzy, research team, everybody involved. I want to thank you again. Thanks to the sponsors. Thank you very much. Thank you.