 Now, first of all, I would like to thank you for this opportunity and this invitation. I think it's a great opportunity to exchange views, to exchange ideas with you here at this distinguished institutions. And I must say I like very much this reality check for us practitioners. We value very much your input and also your ideas, because we are all today busy, you know, planning or doing strategic reviews, but we must find some time also to do sometimes out of the box reflection. And I think these are excellent moments to do that. Let me just briefly, I will address three things. First of all, I would maybe say a couple of words about what I would call the strategic context. Secondly, I would say something more about the CMPD, and it's working in this post-littoral environment and the challenges that we face. And thirdly, I would leave you with some thoughts on where we are and what we have so far accomplished and where we are heading to. So first a few words about, well roughly speaking, the strategic context. And I would say, and I would like to start with that, that the EU's role and actions in the field of security and defence are not always too often known, and I would not only say outside of the borders of the European Union, but also sometimes inside the European Union. And many times also we have the tendency to talk ourselves down, Europe being too slow, too divided, too soft. And that is indeed, in the past, it was a little bit the case in the sense that in the 90s we were faced with the Balkan Wars, Europe was unable to deal with the conflict at its stall step, NATO, the United States had to step in. But since then, since then the European Union has developed a wide range of civilian and military capabilities, is currently deploying over 5,000 experts in 12 missions and operations across the globe. That means that European women and men are supporting the rule of law in Kosovo, training and mentoring police and judiciary in Afghanistan, in Iraq for example, but also in the Palestinian territories. We are monitoring a peace plan, like in Georgia, supporting security sector reform in Congo for example, training armed forces in Somalia, Bosnia, fighting piracy of course also in the whole of Africa. And we are starting to help improve the security situation also in the Sahel and South Sudan with three new missions developing and I'll come to that in a minute, but so that means that we will have 15 missions and operations by this summer. Now the second element is of course that over the past decade, the impression is that the European Union has grown into a security provider, or maybe even put it a little bit differently into a sort of a peace builder. And in fact there is a growing need, a growing demand also internationally for the EU to become a greater security provider, a more important security provider that is all the more needed, especially also because crisis is erupt everywhere. We see it now again in the Sahel, with Mali, we have seen it in our southern neighbourhood, and crisis is also becoming more and more complex. And it is not for any reason that in the recent US defence strategy review, European countries are recognised not only as producers, not only as consumers of security, but also as producers and also are called upon to take off a more active role and share a larger part of the burden. Now paradoxically, at the moment that there is a greater demand for crisis management capabilities, European and others, there is also the financial crisis. We are struck by cuts in the budgets in all kinds of department, but also in defence, also in the ministries of the interior. And so it has become more and more difficult to get the necessary resources to do that crisis management in worthwhile and attack crisis. So we need to use that resources that we have in, I would say, a more smarter way to do more with less, it is sometimes said, but also to combine it better with what others do, and I'll come to that also later. Fourthly, it is also clear now that with security crisis is getting more and more complex, that military means alone, I mean, are not sufficient to address this crisis. You need a multitude of instruments and tools in, I would say, a right mix in a good combination based on a strategy to address this crisis and have at least a small chance of success. And I think the European Union there is very well placed because it has a wider toolbox and also can flank actions on the security side by humanitarian and development assistance. We are, of course, the biggest donor in the world. We can also impose sanctions. We have also our diplomatic tools. So that would make us a special contributor to world peace. So if we look now today, a year and a half after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, what difference do European action service has made to all this, and has the Lisbon Treaty indeed empowered the European Union to play a more prominent role as a security provider? And I think it does, although, of course, it's still very much a work in progress. I think the external action services added value in basically three ways. First of all, by making European common foreign and security policy and common security and defence policy more coherent. Secondly, also by providing continuity in external representation, and thirdly also by being a service provider to the member states, but also to the European Parliament. It has done so in what I would call, as I said, a quite challenging environment. For example, with the Arab Spring, the Euro crisis, Eurozone crisis, and also with limited resources at this disposal. On the coherent side, the integration of the common security and defence policy under the external action service, as part of a wider European action, serves the goal of coherence, and also helps to develop this comprehensive approach. It is not for nothing that the high representative has described the external action service as a sort of a machine for conflict prevention, security, and stability. In fact, it covers the whole spectrum of activities from early warning until crisis management, and then afterwards also stability and rebuilding of the societies and the situation. There has been a number of steps, internal steps, that have been effectuated to bring together all the different players in that game, in the service, the geodescs, us in the CSDP structures, the military staff, CNPD, CPCC, the crisis response department, in the crisis management board, and the crisis platforms. We are still, of course, also working very much on furthering the gaps between CFSP on one side and the external aspects of the commission's work. And I'll come to that later also. Secondly, I think it's also important that now with the external action service, you have a kind of continuity. We have, of course, Herman van Rompuy, who is the president of the council, which, of course, brings some continuity, but also Cathy Ashton presiding all the time the foreign affairs councils. And externally also do the representation towards other countries. That brings a sort of a continuity and makes our action and priorities no longer determined by every six months new program by rotating presidency, but by a long term action that translates to European overall activities, objectives into action and also into strategies. Finally, I think also the European action service, external action services, become also a security, as a service provider. And we are, of course, working hard. I think there's a problem also because now that member states don't have in the foreign policy anymore this presidency, there was a risk that the ownership might get lost a little bit. So we are very much working also into working with member states to create that ownership, that common ownership of the common foreign and security policy. And we're also working with the parliament in order to increase their concern, their responsiveness to the foreign action. Also, I think the fiscal authority has meant also that some of the member states in the delegations and then the representations that they have abroad are working closely together with the delegations. For example, in Syria, our embassy or our delegation is now hosting some diplomats from member states. So clearly, when it comes to CSDP, the seats were sewn before 2011. But I think the approach has become much more, was much more ad hoc approach, much less joint approach. So now we are really into a sort of a joined up approach. As a result, there is more coherence, there is more continuity, there is more service orientation. And a sort of a new type of crisis management is emerging. So what does that all mean for my department, for the crisis management planning department? Where does it stand in all this? And of course, you have already told a little bit what our tasks. But maybe it's good also to tell something about the past, because the CMPD, crisis management planning department, was created in 2009 by when the European Council conclusions encouraged the effort by the then Secretary General Javier Solana to establish a new single civilian military strategic planning structure for the CSDP operations and missions. In a letter in December 2008, Solana wrote to President Sarkozy, who was at that time the president of the council, that he was setting up this new department in the spirit of reforms and visits by the heads of state and government and by the ministers of defense to further rationalize and reinforce our structures for planning and to ensure a better synergy between military and civilian needs. He stated that this department would be charged with the political strategic planning and that civilian and military planners would have to work together in planning our missions and operations. And that he stated also that that same concern of coherence and efficiency should prevail through all the stages of crisis management and the crisis management process. So in a certain way, we are a sort of a precursor of this comprehensive approach, where we bring civilian military together into addressing crisis and create synergies in the planning of missions and operations. I think you described already what is our task, but just to come back to that, I mean, we do three main things. First of all, that is strategic planning of CSDP missions and operations. That is basically finding an answer to the question why the European Union should do something with CSDP, what it should do and with whom it should do that. We do that, as I said, in an integrated civilian military way and it leads to what is called a crisis management concept. Crisis management concept, that is in fact basically saying what the European Union is going to do to address a crisis. It has to be approved by the council and it is the basis for all operational planning afterwards. So the crisis management concepts for our three new missions in the Horn of Africa, in South Sudan and in the Sahel Niger, has been adopted by the council of ministers and then was adopted for further operational planning. Again, I mean, we have developed now these three new missions. One is now called UCAP NESTOR. Basically, it's about the regional maritime capacity building in the Horn of Africa. Helping, first of all, countries in the region, namely Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles, to develop their own capacity in order to make sure that they can guard their own territorial waters. And we do that on the basis of training. Training on the job, I would say, at sea, on the boats, but also training of senior management. And the second work strand is try to help Pongland, as one of the authorities in Somalia, to develop their own coastal police, because if they would have an efficient coastal police, they could act against, for example, pirate camps, which could, of course, be great help to our mission at Alantan. The second mission that we have, what we have done some strategic planning for, and that has been adopted by the council, is the one on the Seychelles. We knew that the Seychelles was already a long time a problem because of human trafficking, because of drug trafficking, because of the Tuareg Revolt, because of lack of state control in large parts of zones in Mali, Niger, and others. But member states didn't want to move. I think what has changed is the situation in Libya that has also dramatically changed the situation in the Seychelles and made that member states also agreed to a mission in the Seychelles. Why Niger? Why a mission in Niger? The mission in Niger will especially work together with the gendarmerie force in order to help them tackle the situation in the north. It's basically a training and advising mission. But why Niger? Because Niger was willing to cooperate and was also, let's say, the first front line and next to Libya. Mali on the other hand was in the beginning talking a lot about cooperation. But when we went to them, they were not so keen of cooperating. They had a kind of strange relationship with al-Qaeda in the micro-python. And the third mission, which we have planned now, is the South Sudan mission, the security in the airport in Juba. It's a little bit of a typical mission because it's quite centered on one task being developing security at the airport in Juba. But it was something that member states wanted. They wanted to have something visible. And of course, the Juba airport is the key entry point into South Sudan for all internationals. And so developing security there would be very much helpful. Secondly, we are also dealing with strategic reviews. As you have said, I mean the strategic context is changing. We have existing missions. We have existing operations. We have to look at them in the framework of changing context, strategic context. And sometimes we need to adapt. We need also to see if the objectives that has been set out are still valid, if the missions of course are also still geared enough towards the objectives that they are supposed to reach. There is also the element of coherence with other instruments of the European Union, with what the Commission does, with what the instrument of stability does, with our political efforts, with what partners do. And we have been doing some strategic reviews lately on the Middle East missions, on Georgia, our mission in Georgia, EUAMM, on Kosovo, we are doing now one on Afghanistan, and also one on Congo, that will be soon in the PSC. And we have been doing also one on Bosnia. Our third main task is partnerships. I mean, the question is what is the European going to do and why, but also with whom. That's why we have, when we plan, we do that very much in contact, in close relationship, in close cooperation with partners, the United Nations of course, but also NATO, the African Union, and bilateral countries, United States, Turkey, Norway, and others. And we also try to involve partners in what we do as CSDP. And many countries participate, of course, in our missions, or in the least the United States, but also Norway, Turkey, big provider in Kosovo, but also in Bosnia. One instrument there is the framework participation agreements, but also the many crisis management dialogues that we have with a lot of partner countries. We also deal with creating concepts and lessons learned on how we have approached things in order to feed that back into our planning process. We also deal with exercises and with training. How does that all work? Let me just try to address that by what I would call six challenges. The first challenge is what I would call an added value challenge. Do we have, indeed, an added value with CSDP? Do we need CSDP? We have some say, you know, we have the United Nations. We have NATO. Why do we need CSDP? And till now, I mean, all that has been looked upon sometimes from a very political angle, from a very almost ideological or theological point of view. But if you will look at it from a more pragmatic point of view, from a real concrete point of view, and we ask ourselves, if NATO and the UN cover all needs in crisis management, I'm going to say the answer is no. Let me give two examples. Georgia, 2008, Russians moving. And there is a peace plan led by, at the time, President Sarkozy in the French, European Union in the lead. A mission has to be sent in order to make sure that all troops are remaining what they are and that there is a monitoring being done. The UN had to stop its mission. It was already involved before. NATO was probably a very difficult partner to play with because of the Russians. So the natural choice was the European Union, although we were active, but it seemed to be the natural choice. So that's one issue where the European Union could play a role and has played a role. Same thing, for example, at the elections in Congo, 2006, 2007, U4, RTC. The UN was looking at that, but was apparently not able to mobilize quickly enough assets, was also hesitant. NATO was probably not so much interested. So we moved in and the mission was quite successful. An example now also is maybe Atalanta on piracy. I think we are now the trendsetter in the fight against piracy with our mission Atalanta. Because we have our mission Atalanta not as isolated mission, but we have been able to complement it with the other elements of our toolbox. That means naval capacities supported by justice and penitentiary, sector reform, by capacity building, by diplomatic efforts, by diplomacy, by development. And I think that has made that we, in fact, are the best to address this issue. NATO has also a mission, a still a mission, but it's now down to one ship. And it is really limited to the very military aspects of the conflict answer response. We, of course, sometimes a little bit in a difficult situation because there is a second challenge and that is the member state challenge. I'm sorry, you're a member state. But it's true. I mean, member states created, of course, CSDP. They have also the political control. Everything we do goes to the PSC, to the council. They provide us with stuff and with the necessary forces. But all decisions have to be taken by unanimity. And that, of course, makes action only possible when there is a political consensus. That can be stimulating, like by the creation of the CSDP. It can also be constraining, like on the Sahel, where we have been saying we have to do something because this will explode. Now, it will explode if we would have acted maybe before. It would have been easier. But some member states did not really want to move on that. And so it was only when Libya came into the game that the attitude of some member states changed. So we have to take that into account into everything we develop in planning. So you can develop a nice plan. But if member states do not accept it, you're there with your plan, and you cannot do anything. It doesn't block us all the time. Kosovo, for example, I mean, there are five countries that have not recognized Kosovo in Europe. But still, we have the largest mission that we have, an executive mission. Third challenge is the Comprehensive Approach Challenge. There is certainly an experience of 10 years in CSDP, 24, 25 missions. 80,000 people have been deployed in all continents, Bosnia to chart. But I had the impression that, indeed, before these missions were more standalone efforts. We're a little bit ad hoc. OK, there were integration of civilian and military aspects, but it was, let's say, a little bit ad hoc. Also, I mean, the CSDP and the missions and operations are not a policy. They cannot substitute policy. And sometimes they have done that, unfortunately. We have to be clear, I mean, that CSDP, they are part, missions and operations, are part of the toolbox. They are not the policy. They are not the toolbox. They are part of the toolbox. So the issue is, how can we better integrate them into the wider approach with the other instruments, with the diplomacy, with the development? How can we better join up that? And that calls for coordination. And it's quite sometimes a laborsome process, more synergies. As I said before, we have now created in the external action service the crisis platform. For each crisis that is serious, we create a crisis platform that is chaired by Mr. Miozzo, by the HR, or by Mr. Vimone, or in their absence by Mr. Miozzo. But that crisis platform brings together all the players, geographical desks, us, CPCC, but also people from the commission, IFS. And that is excellent, because I mean, it brings all the information together. It's not a decision-making organ, but it is certainly something that helps bring the minds together. Of course, it's still an ongoing process, but there is some movement. There's also the crisis management board, who has a wider view. It's not directed to one crisis area, but it has a wider view on the crisis management in general. And we try to replicate this crisis platform also at the staff level. So when we prepare our crisis management concept, we bring around the table also these different players in order to make sure that what we do is joined up with what others do. Again, it's a working process, but it's a work that is progressing. And in the field, we look for very much synergies. I mean, like for example, this mission that I was talking about, the region maritime capacity building UCAP Nestor. We're trying to build a synergy with what the commission does in the MASI program. MASI program is a commissions program to help the GPOTI code of conduct put into practice and helps especially on equipment and all these things. Well, it seems logical that if we do training that what is done on equipment side is joined up. It seems logical, but it is not done in one day because that's turned by the commission that has its own logic. We have to sit together and see how we can work. But now we have more or less what I would call a partnership with them. We have also a partnership with IMO, the International Maritime Organization, which is a standard setting organization, important also to add value to our mission. You mentioned the delivery and the process of how from the CMC we get into then the operational planning, which is a little bit different on the civilian side than on the military side. But there I think there is also a big challenge into delivery. That means once the mission is being adopted by the council that we would be able to go quite quickly into delivery into putting this mission in the field. And that sometimes proves quite cumbersome for the moment because there are a lot of rules and regulations that makes it quite difficult. It has been, can happen quickly. For example, in the time in Georgia, in 18 days the mission was on the ground. In Boonia also, one of the earliest mission, also it went quite quickly, one or two months. So I think in the future we should also try to deliver on that. I must say that this is for the moment also a discussion going on on how we could streamline and shorten procedures. Now I think they are a little bit too long, but it's also the issue of member states willing to control all that, which is completely understandable. But we have to find a good balance I think between that and make sure that when we decide something that it doesn't last X number of months before we can do something. I mentioned already the partnership challenge. I think partnerships is the main future for the future, because security challenges are getting more complex, so we have to address the issue in combination with others, because resources are getting a little bit tight for all of us, so we have to work together. And a very good example where the partnership is, for example, key for the success of the mission is a mission work, and thanks again for your excellent cooperation and contribution in that mission, the EOTM European Union Training Mission in Bihanga for the Somali security forces, where Ireland is doing a great contribution and also Colonel Barry is doing an excellent work. But there, I mean, we were extremely scared when we were developing that mission that in the end we would create better pirates or better al-Shabaq fighters, so member states pushed us and rightfully so into putting in place the right conditions so that we made sure that those security forces that we train actually end up to be real soldiers and do the job that they are being trained for. And this is happening, and why is it been happening? Because we have been working together with partners. We have been working together with the United States while paying, we are doing the training, but they are paying the salaries, if you don't pay soldiers, I mean, they live in the nature, that's clear. Secondly, we needed also some command structures. When you train the soldiers, they come back in the fields, well, they have to find some commanders, some structures in which they fall. Well, Amisum has been an essential partner in that. And of course, the Ugandan authorities also, because they do also part of the training and they put at the disposal some of the facilities and we are very much partnering with them also. So because of this partnership, this mission became a success and we are a little bit the translator, the leader in that. Cooperation with United Nations is extremely important. I mean, everywhere where we go in theater, the United Nations is there. We work together with them in the past, in many theaters, in chart, in Congo and so on. I must say we have regular contacts with them, almost daily my stuff, daily contacts with DPGO staff. But we have now also reinvigorated the steering committee, which was a little bit dormant. It's based on the decision in 2003 and 2007 that on the cooperation in crisis management between the UN and the European Union. And it was dormant because, I mean, agendas were overloaded and I think the energy, the dynamism went out of it. So we restarted again with Mr. Lazzuz. We presided one in January in Brussels. And the idea was to target really the agenda on two or three crisis situations. It was in that time Sudan and Somalia. And also target maybe a cross-cutting issue and that was civilian capacities, which is a problem for us and for the UN. And so focusing the agenda, having also the right people around the table. I mean, from our side, it was the USR. From their side, it was their special representative, Johnson on Sudan. So, and that created a lot of momentum. So that steering committee is now reinvigorated. The contacts are intense. We have, of course, with the United Nations also the action plan that we are now putting in motion. As you know, the PSC, the Political and Security Committee agreed on an action plan that we had proposed in order to increase cooperation between the UN and the European Union. And so we are now putting that in motion. Also in close contact with the United Nations. And we will come back to member states in the further, in the month. Cooperation with NATO, of course, also there. Daily contacts, a lot of cooperation in the field. Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan. I mentioned already the cooperation with third countries. Sixth, and not least, there is also the capacities challenge. And certainly those in the military field will know that, I mean, in terms of fiscal austerity, there are decreasing means. And so the answer that we have to find on how we can keep up capacities is a key one. Because if you don't have capacities, you cannot act. And I must say that force generation for our missions is becoming quite a problem. I mean, the most typical one that we face is the one in Kosovo, where we had four police units in the North in order to be able to act there in a very difficult environment. Police units, more gender maleal type units. Well, the member states decided because of internal reasons, because of austerity reasons, they had to pull them back. And so we are now from four to one unit. And so we are very much criticized by the NATO that we don't have enough forces now to really materialize our actions in the North. On the military side, I mean, much to do about the pooling and sharing. If you have to pool and share more of the activities. A lot of work going on there. A lot of political momentum. Some projects, important projects, based on enablers that were key enablers in Libya. Are being addressed, for example, the air to air refuelling. But it remains quite a difficult subject because it touches, of course, in the end, that sovereignty. And willing to give up certain capacities and put in common certain capacities. It's working well, I must say, for everything which has to do with logistics, medical. But when it comes to hard stuff, then it becomes more difficult. Because in the end, if you give up, for example, your airplanes, you have to be able to rely on your partners and make sure that they will intervene whenever you need them. But with decreasing capacities, we also need to work more with others and use them more smartly. That means that we use the resources that we have in a better combination with other instruments. In a better combination with what others do. So where are we now with the CMPD on all that? And I'm sorry to be a little bit long. We developed a more integrated, I would say, a more focused and more efficiency-oriented approach to crisis management that should help improve the efficiency of our CSDP engagement. And focus also our CSDP instruments on where we can really add value. First of all, the more integrated approach to crisis management, I see three elements. First of all, we base our action now on what I would call the European strategies and frameworks that have been developed by the geographical desks, for example, the strategy on the Horn of Africa, to provide a political framework in which all European activities could be placed. This is a key element, of course, into forging a real comprehensive approach to crisis and therefore optimizes also the effect obtained by each of the EU tools deployed. So, example is a strategy of the Horn of Africa where we can indeed have a sort of reference point, a framework where we put the Atalanta mission, the regional maritime capacity mission, EUTM, and we have the wider objective, the wider framework in which we can not only plan our missions, but also evaluate and review our missions for the future. Secondly also, apart from these strategies that we have now, we plan efforts towards more integration of CSDP activities with community instruments. In Iraq, in Kosovo, in Jordan and Bosnia, also in the DRC, our strategic reviews have taken into consideration the ongoing programming exercise for the cooperation instruments. With a view to maybe transferring some of the concrete activities of the CSDP into community instruments. For example in Bosnia, the police mission there that we have has basically done this job and so we have proposed to decrease and to stop that mission and transfer the mission into a community instrument. It's the oldest CSDP mission, but we are now transferring it into a new instrument that is based in the office of the EOSR for Bosnia and a specific program of the commission. You have a transfer there of CSDP into a community-based instrument. And that's part of the exit strategies. We should have exit strategies. Same thing is now applying for Congo. We're doing the strategic review for Congo. Well, there also in the end, missions and operations are of course a crisis management tool. And here we are no longer any more in a crisis management. We are becoming more and more in sort of a longer term development of capacities. And so this is more linked to commission instruments. So here also we will try to switch over term giving time of course for the commission to phase in the possibility or we will propose to member states that it will phase into a commission instrument in 2014 or maybe a little bit later. Thirdly also in this integrated approach we use very much our expertise on security for the benefit of our delegations. In Ivory Coast for example, with all the problems that were there we have reinforced the delegations with some of our experts in security sector reform. But also in Libya we have been able to send out experts to Libya on the police, on the border security led by us, but paid by another instrument being the instrument of stability. And so that is also something that is more and more developing that we put at disposal expertise whether it's sometimes paid or managed by other instruments. What we try to do also and that's the focus our CSDP missions before, I mean sometimes the objectives were quite large. I think if you want to be effective you need to have clear objectives. And so in the strategic reviews we put also clear objectives. For example, our mission in Bosnia, Altea, the military mission, we are focusing it now into capacity building and training, although of both certain members that still insist on the executive function. Also in Kosovo we are now downscaling our activities in the South, not because this is good to downscale but because the Kosova's have been able to take up certain tasks. For example, in policing in the South they are now able to execute certain executive functions. And so there is no need for us to be there en masse with a lot of policemen. We will continue following them but at a more supervisory level, the district and national level, but they will do actually the function. So we will scale down our missions in the South with about 30%, same thing on the customs side in the South. Of course in the justice sector, there is still a need for war crimes, for the crimes of corruption that we continue our executive functions there. But I mean, so we refocus a little bit our mission into certain activities where we think we can have added value. Same thing in Afghanistan where also the strategic review is going on and where we will focus our mission also into more concrete things. I think I've been too long, but I will stop here. I hope I have given a little bit, maybe an impressionist view from an insider's perspective. I think we are maturing as a security provider. It is still much work in progress but I think we are making progress as shown in the Horn of Africa, for example, and hopefully also in the Sahel. And I must say in the UN, people are quite appreciative of our efforts and our approach in the Horn of Africa. We as CMPD are quite a crucial player in all that. We have a little bit of pivotal role in it and we will certainly continue to do what is needed in order to make our actions more coordinated, more focused and I would say also more effective. So to be so long, but I'm open also to questions.