 Welcome everyone. My name is Tanya Hood and it is my pleasure to provide you with introductions for this meeting. It is being held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission hereafter being referred to as the NRC. This meeting is to provide information related to emergency preparedness and security requirements for nuclear power reactor facilities as it relates to those undergoing decommissioning. This meeting is scheduled from 3 p.m. until 4 30 p.m. Standard Time. This is a question and answer session that allows attendees an opportunity to ask questions of the NRC staff or make comments about the issues discussed throughout the meeting. However, the NRC is not actively seeking comments towards regulatory decisions at this meeting. This meeting is being hosted virtually through the use of Microsoft Teams. Should you have trouble with the Teams application, I recommend that you first use the Microsoft Team link that has been provided in the meeting notice as opposed to the Microsoft Teams app. If you still have difficulty, then disconnect and try to reconnect to the Teams meeting. Or if you're using the telephone, it is easier to use the telephone conferencing number that has been listed in the public meeting notice. The Teams meeting has been set up as I stated previously as a webinar, so microphones are disabled for the moment. When we get to the question and answer portion of this meeting at that time, please type your questions in the chat box so that we can share them when we arrive. I will start with the questions and comments that are in the chat box and then go to the phone lines. If you're on the phone, I'll ask you to come off of mute and share your questions or comments when we arrive at that portion of the meeting. I will then provide more instructions about how you can do so at that time. At this point, I'll take a few moments to introduce a few participants for this session and then turn it over to Sean Anderson, Chief for the Reactor Decommissioning Branch and the Division of Decommissioning Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs from the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety Safeguards. Today, we have Jesse Kichuchu, Chief of the Reactor Licensing Branch and the Office of Nuclear Security and Incidence Response, Deb Garner, Security Specialist in the Materials Security Branch. And we also have other participants that are from the NRC staff that will introduce themselves when they are ready to speak. At this time, I want to let you know that if you are want to send information regarding to feedback to this meeting, you will be able to provide that information to me via email and I will share a slide at the beginning and at the end of this meeting so that you can be aware of where to receive your meeting feedback forms. Now, I will turn the meeting over to Sean Anderson for our opening remarks. Sean? Thanks, Tanya. I appreciate it and thanks for everyone else for joining us today. I just want to provide a little bit of context between, you know, I guess from while we're here and, you know, in the recent months, there's been a lot of increased interest from members of the public, state representatives, advisory panels related to emergency preparedness and security reviews as it relates to decommissioning activities, even the exemptions and some of the requirements and, you know, we've been providing numerous written responses and verbal responses to questions regarding some of our light screen reviews and also inspections in that area and we thought, you know, this might be a good opportunity just to, you know, let's have a webinar to provide some of this background and some of the context to a more broad audience. So we thought this would be a good way, a good opportunity to provide some of that feedback and, you know, we're also welcome, always welcome some of the feedback and from the members that are stakeholders and members of the public. So after the meeting, feel free to provide some of the feedback to this session as part of the meeting feedback forms and we'll also provide, we're also providing, presenting at the New York State Decommissioning Oversight Board regarding some of the IT to C questions and specific activities at Indian Point on December 7th. So with that, you know, I just want to thank everyone for coming here again and that we can transition over to Jesse to start the presentation. All right. Thank you, Sean. Can you hear me? Yes, loud and clear. Great. Thank you. Good afternoon. My name is Jesse Kitchchew and I am the Chief of the Reactor Licensing Branch in the Office of Nuclear Incident and Security Response. I'd like to take a moment to describe what I oversee. I oversee the technical reviews of emergency preparedness amendments to NRC licenses from a variety of licenses. We're talking decommissioning, operating reactors, research and test reactors, medical facility isotopes, production facilities. So my branch really oversees a large amount of emergency preparedness reviews. With me attending today is Michael Norris. He's one of our senior emergency preparedness specialists and has, gosh, over 30 years of experiencing emergency preparedness. Thank you for those of you taking the time to attend this meeting. Next slide. All right. When the NRC approves an operating license, licensees are required to establish emergency plans that provide reasonable assurance that adequate protection measures can and will be taken to protect public health and safety in the event of a very logical emergency. It is important to note that NRC emergency preparedness regulations do not distinguish between an operating reactor and one that is permanently shut down and defuel. Next slide. We're on slide five, I believe. Okay. Thank you. The NRC mission is focused on safety of the public. As such, these emergency plans that are established for operating reactors provide capabilities to mitigate potential reological events on-site emergency planning that provides classification of emergencies, notification of off-site government authorities, and coordination of off-site organization response to name a field. Next slide. After the plan is shut down, the risk associated with potential accidents is significantly reduced. This is because the majority of the risks during planned operation is when the reactor is in operation in use. Since the current NRC emergency planning regulations do not distinguish between an operating reactor and one that is permanently shut down and defueled, the exemption process is used to seek regulatory relief commensurate with the risk at a facility while ensuring reasonable assurance to public health and safety. Next slide, please. This slide shows the life cycle of an operating reactor plan from the point of fuel in the reactor vessel, fuel in spent fuel pool, and finally in drycast storage on the horizontal line at the bottom of the figure compared to the relative rheological risk on the vertical line. As you can see in this figure, when the fuel is in the spent fuel pool in preparations for and during decommissioning, the rheological risk become extremely lower as compared to when the fuel is in the reactor vessel during normal reactor operations and another step lower when the fuel is moved to drycast storage. Next slide, please. This slide identifies the regulations that licensees use for exemptions to seek regulatory relief. I do want to point out that unlike license amendments where licensees must comply and meet regulations, the exemption process is one where licensees are seeking regulatory relief. One of the underlying purposes for exemptions is because the regulations as written may not be necessary to achieve the underlying purpose. I'll provide an example of this later in my presentation. Next slide, please. So going back to what I said previously, when an operating license is issued, an emergency plan is approved because of the lower risk at the site and as the plan enters decommissioning, licensees would submit an exemption from NRC regulations. When an exemption is requested by a licensee and once approved by the NRC, the NRC reduces the requirements consistent with the risk of the facility and approves a permanently defused emergency plan. The exemptions would remove operating reactor emergency action levels such as automatic reactor trips, inability to shut down a reactor, but would still keep some emergency action levels associated with the configuration of the plan during the decommissioning such as spent fuel accident. The emergency preparedness requirements for wet and dry storage are the same in part 72. Thus, when you go from a wet spent fuel pool to a drycast storage, exemptions are not necessary. Next slide, please. All right. A few of the significance considerations during the NRC staff technical review are shown on this slide. Traditional accidents that are the most risk to the plant are no longer applicable such as loss of coolant accident, steam generator, tube rupture. The risk to the public is more focused on fuel handling accident and cast drop. Two months after shutdown, radio iodine has decayed away and no longer a concern. When fuel is in the spent fuel pool, there is no driving force like an offering reactor to force the water out. So the focus will be on ensuring leakage from the spent fuel pools are addressed. And because these events evolve slowly, the NRC ensures the emergency plan provides mitigation measures and if necessary adequate time to conduct protective actions. Next slide, please. This slide shows the studies performed for spent fuel pool events. In 2000, the NRC went into rulemaking for decommissioning reactors and issued new reg 1738 as its regulatory basis. The staff uses this regulatory basis as part of our evaluation for exemptions. This rulemaking was stopped due to events of 9-11 and other agency priorities in 2001. More recently, the NRC performed an issue to study on how earthquakes affect spent fuel pools, new reg 2161, which provided results that are consistent with earlier research, conclusions that spent fuel pool are robust structures that are likely to withstand severe earthquakes without leaking. The NRC continues to believe, based on this study and previous studies, that high density storage of spent fuel in pools protects public health and safety. Next slide, please. This table is here to show a few of the differences of what is contained in an emergency preparedness plan between an operating reactor and a decommissioning site. For example, an operational reactor has a formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan with its focus on prompt protective actions for the public versus an offsite response from first responders, medical and law enforcement to the site. In the highly unlikely event at a decommissioning site should protective action be needed to protect the public, a comprehensive plan is in place similar to a hazardous waste traffic accident, for example. Another example is the difference in event classifications, where classifications for operating reactors may lead up to a general emergency, however, for a decommissioning site, the highest level may be an alert. Next slide, please. This figure provides a pictorial that shows an emergency planning zone for a typical operating reactor. An emergency planning zone is a tool to aid implementing pre-determined prompt action. During decommissioning, sufficient time is available to mitigate the accident or initiate protective actions as conditions warrant without the aid of an emergency planning zone. Next slide. The figures here shown illustrates the difference of an emergency planning zone at an operating reactor measured in miles on the bottom right of the slide compared to the boundary at a decommissioned facility measured in meters on the top left. The smaller size boundary is based on lower radiological risk at this decommissioned facility. Next slide. Here since 2014 is a list of nuclear power plants that the NRC issued exemptions for where the staff sought commission approval. And this would conclude my presentation. Tanya, back to you. Thank you so much for that, Jesse. And now we'll have a security presentation from Doug Garner. And after we have that presentation, we will go to the questions and comments from the public. We thank you so much for your time and patience. Doug? Can you toggle the slides, please? Hi, good afternoon. My name is Doug Garner. I'm a security specialist in the Material Security Branch of the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. My role is in responsibilities in the branch primarily related to reviewing associate security plans, any license amendments or requests that licensees may submit, and evaluating those. Similar to emergency preparedness, all licensees are required to establish security plans which provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the public health and safety. These security requirements are contained in 10 CFR7355 requirements for the physical protection of license activities and nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage and NRC security worse. It's important to note that the physical security regulations do not distinguish between operating reactor and one that is permanently shut down or defueled. Next slide, please. This slide shows the regulatory approach as a licensee transitions from an operating power reactor to a dry storage, independent spent fuel storage, insulation, or SOC. A licensee notifies the NRC of permanently cessation of operations in a course with applicable regulations. During this time, 10 CFR7355 and the NRC secures still apply. And the protective strategy remains exactly the same as an operating reactor while the fuel is in remains inside the spent fuel pool. Fuel is only moved and stored on site to the end of the SOC when appropriate conditions are met. Next slide, please. This slide indicates that the scope of the physical security protections are based solely on safety functions that remain and it must be protected. Licenses are required to maintain a security force on site that is equal to the threat to the spent fuel. And a licensee, they can request licensing actions or exemptions to modify the security plan program for the protection of the pool. Licensees will continue to conduct inspect. The NRC continues to conduct inspections versus the security requirements and ensure that they are met, including inspections to evaluate any changes to the security posture. Cyber security protections are gradually reduced as safety and security and emergency preparedness systems are moved from service. The Cyber Security Roar 10 CFR7354 is no longer applicable after cessation of operation letters have been submitted. However, by condition of the license, the requirement remains in place. The licensee may submit a license meant requesting removed with cyber security license condition after all the fuel is moved to the spent fuel pool and has been sufficiently cooled. The licensee must provide protection for the NRC into all fuels removed from the site. NRC approved physical security plan and post-911 security orders are in place to enhance the security. There are no cyber security requirements for an SPC. And I'll just jump in here. I think just want to summarize a couple of aspects here and just touch on the inspection program itself. Just a reminder, NRC, we established an inspection program from the beginning from the site from construction and it goes all the way into the license it's terminated. So as long as there's fuel on the site, the NRC is going to continue to inspect throughout decommissioning for both the security requirements and the EP requirements. So our inspectors have conducted several inspections over decommissioning and ISC programs for many years. And our inspection program remains robust and continues to assure a risk informed safety focus areas. And that the inspection focus is designed to effectively monitor licensee's performance. And next slide. And I know the team and everyone has already covered this, especially Jesse and Doug, but some of the just the summary quick points here is just to remember that the EP and security requirements are not being eliminated. They're just being adjusted based on the overall risk and licensees must maintain an emergency plan. And physical requirements remain in place if the C's are secured 24-7, 365 days of the year. And again, periodically throughout the year, throughout the life of the licensed, the NRC will continue to provide our independent oversight and inspections through license termination. And I'll pass it back to Tanya and see if we get some questions queued up from the numbers of public. So much for that, Sean. At this time, I want to let those in the public know that you have the opportunity to type your information inside of the chat box. We are now at the question or support of this meeting. So we want to let you know that as you type your information into the chat box, I'll begin sharing the questions or comments that you have at that time. Once I've completed the discussion that's inside of the chat, I will then go to those that are on the phone. At this time, I want to let you know that as we go through this presentation, let me share really quick on the screen how you can as a member of the public when you're on the phone be able to participate in letting me know by raising your hand. For those that have called in, we want you to participate in this meeting. You can see from the information and directions that's currently on the screen that you raise your hand by selecting star five. Once you do so, wait about four seconds, then you can unmute yourself by selecting star six. We then get the opportunity to speak into the meeting and I will have that, I will know who at that point will be able to participate in that discussion. This time I will pause for a few moments and then go to the chat box so I can read those questions that we have from the members of the public. Thank you so much for the NRC team that is supporting the chat with me. Here we have a message from Tina Bunger. I apologize if I've missed out your names. Is the NRC OIG determined at the risk method about the AIM pipelines were deficient? The NRC has not provided oversight for the proper risk assessment of the AIM pipelines and plant. How has the NRC done an adequate emergency preparedness plan that doesn't include any kind of gas pipeline rupture at site major components and I'm not able to read other things that was written in that one. At the inside of the NRC staff that will like to address that question. Now this is something that I know that we can take back because I want you to also be mindful that as we go through the discussion points in this meeting we will do our best to ensure that we address as many questions as possible in the allotted time. But if we are not able to get to your comments or questions, please be mindful that we will get the opportunity as a staff to look at them after the meeting. Mike Norris will take that question. Yeah this is Mike Norris. Again as I was in Jesse indicated I'm a senior emergency preparedness specialist here at the NRC. The emergency action levels are based on hazards for the spent fuel and it doesn't matter what the cause of the event was. It's the results of the event that the emergency action levels are based on. So with respect to an ispacy, a dry cast storage installation, if there's an event whatever type of event happens, if it causes a breach of the confinement boundary, there are emergency action levels that drive the emergency plan to go into effect and the licensee will make a mitigated response to that. Same with the spent fuel pool. It doesn't matter the cause of the event, it's the results of the event. If there's an issue, an event that happens that causes a reduction in the coolant level, you know, loss of level, loss of all cooling, there are emergency action levels that would go in be triggered basically to cause the emergency plan to go into effect and the licensee would perform their mitigated actions using whatever their planned procedures are, whether it's their mitigated strategies, their extra equipment, the diesels, the fire hoses to try to get water on it, that. So the emergency plan it doesn't, it's not specific to an event, it's specific to the results of that event. I'm answering that Mike. We have a few more questions that are inside of the audience in a few moments because I want to stop sharing the screen so we can get the opportunity to have over face-to-face engagement. There is a hand that I saw raised earlier. I want to be certain that the person who's raised her hand was there a comment that you've already provided in the chat box because I was going to read those first and then I will go to those whose hands are raised. There was one more question that I thought I saw. It's a question by Larry Camper and asking about an overview of proposed changes for security and EP in the ongoing decommissioning rulemaking. He wants to cite the proposed differences for the basis. Which of the members of the NRC staff would like to address that question? I can go to the slide that we have already prepared for the comparison if you like me to do that. This is Mike Darce again. To be honest, I believe and I'm not an expert on the decommissioning rulemaking that with respect to emergency planning, what we are currently doing with the exemption process and have been doing since 2014 is consistent with the ongoing decommissioning rulemaking. With regards to security, this is Doug Garner. To date, we have not received a licensing amendment request from the licensee to modify the security program. The same bad question. I know that there's a few comments that's in the chat box. So I ask it for you to bear with me as we go through and I read a few of them at this time. I will have a member of the public whose hand has been raised that I know just previously come up. I will have you made a presenter and unmute you at this time. This is Susan Leffer. Please let me know if I pronounced your name correctly or not. You are now unmuted. So if you're going to speak, I have unmuted your line. Let me try this one more time. And so if you are unmuted, you can now push the mute button yourself. I have unmuted you on my end. I'll move to the next member whose hand has been raised. Marjorie Witherspoon. I have now unmuted your line. You can unmute yourself and ask your question at this time. Can you hear me? Yes, you can. Okay. Thank you very much for hosting this. While the plant was operating, there were problems with breaches in the communications of its security staff. Have those been addressed or has that responsibility been shifted to Holtec? And if so, have they found the cause of the intrusions and blocked them? This is Anthony Demetriatus. I think I could take that one. I'm aware of a number of instances where that happened during an exercise. Correct. Yeah, that has been addressed. And I think that wasn't like over a long period of time. But yes, that's been corrected. And of course, that would be Holtec's responsibility at this point. At the time that you're referring to the licensee was Entergy, and now it's been Holtec. But they have corrected that? They have... As far as I'm aware, yes. Did they find who was intruding or did they simply block the intrusion? I don't know if they found who did it, but they did block the capability to do that. Thank you for taking the details. Okay. Thank you. Sure. Thank you so much for addressing that, Tony. We do have another question that's inside of the comment that I see from Dave Lockbone. I apologize, the screen moved on me. Without naming sites, what kinds of EP and security findings at decommissioning plants have NRC inspections identified? Thank you, Tanya. So I saw that question by Mr. Lockbone. Good question. I'm not aware of any EP findings in Region 1 at least, which is I'm a branch chief with oversight for decommissioning reactors. But for security, there's been a number of violations. We call them findings as a number of results, not as part of the reactor oversight process that we administer for operating reactors. But for security to make a long story short, there's been a number of violations that we've identified and the licensee has addressed in accordance with their corrective action program as mandated. One was related to intrusion detection and alarms. And so that's one thing that was addressed. Another one was related to weapons of maintenance that was not done properly. And I think that they're the two major things that we've seen. And yet that's basically the two groups of categories that we've seen. There hasn't been a lot of those, but I would say the less than a handful. Thank you so much for addressing that as well. Going through the comments, let's see that there is another hand that was raised. I'll try to go back to the hand that was raised at this time. I will raise you up to be able to unmute Tina Bonger by pronouncing your name correctly. My apologies. You are now unmuted. You can speak at this time. Yes. Hi. I would like somebody at the NRC to address this issue, which is that we have found that the whole tech workers who are doing the decommissioning have not been trained in a gas pipeline emergency. And it's of grave concern. And we voice these with the decommissioning oversight board, but I'm wondering if somebody at the NRC can address this. Tonya, I can take that. Appreciate it, Sonya. Thank you. Yes. So for a rupture, a pipeline rupture, of course, would be very serious. And we anticipate that not to be happening, but your question related to how the workers at the site, whether they be whole tech or contract workers at the site, what training they would require is not, right now, it's not part of the requirements that we have our licensees do. Of course, they do have general emergency requirements, and we would look at those so we can look at those during routine inspections. But like was said before by Mr. Naras, the general emergency response is hazard oriented. And we certainly want our licensees to have their workers have people be ready to respond to some emergency like that. But of course, that would be a very extreme case. And we don't expect that to be a normal thing, of course. But we can take a look at that to see what emergency response training the workers would have like to evacuate the site and things like that. So we can take a look at that. May I ask another question too? May I ask another question? Okay. So there's many of us in the community who feel like we need a written protocol from that involves the possibility of a gas rupture and then also radiological release. And I understand that the risk is a lot less. But we on the ground here, I can see Indian Point from my second floor window, we don't have a plan, a community plan, or anything that's been communicated to us about a protocol in case there's an emergency. So I really, and I understand that this is a regulatory chaotic mess. And but I want to keep, you know, keep it front of mind so you know what kind of advocacy we need here in this community while you're doing the decommissioning. I mean, there are all sorts of aspects of this that are, you know, that really feel, you know, there's no oversight in a sense of what these emergencies are. For instance, you know, we know that Indian Point shut down during Sandy, right? But we don't know if that's being, if that's something that, you know, that there's mitigation for like has there been any mitigation for that? Is there really any mitigation when Indian Point was a target 9-11? So those are the major, I just want to tell you what are community concerns here in looking at your emergency plan, right? Okay. Thank you. Thank you for your question. So we don't operate the facility, we regulate the facility for the work that's being done. And as regulators, I can tell you that the requirements to have, you know, plans for like typical, that would be from an operating plan or not required for a decommissioning plan because the hazards are so significantly reduced. Having said that, having said that, there is no obstacle for the decommissioning board to, you know, connect with Holtec to have something like that in effect. Going back to your other question or comment about, there's no oversight, there absolutely is oversight. My staff, and I know Jesse staff and Sean staff have a very strong oversight of the facility during decommissioning. And I just want to emphasize that we work very hard to make sure that that is done effectively. Jesse, did you want to add something? Yeah, if I may. I just wanted to, I want to say thank you. Thank you for your comment. It, you know, my branch, I oversee these technical reviews. They are complex. And I wanted to say that we have very knowledgeable individuals that look at these analyses and evaluate them and, and are very diligent in what we do in ensuring that these sites, whether it's a decommissioned facility, whether it's a wet storage, dry storage, dry cast storage, or even an operating reactor, they are, they have the capabilities to mitigate and conduct and ensure emergency preparedness plans are effective. So I just wanted to say to let you know that we, we do look, we do look at this, we scrutinize the analyses. And I just wanted to, to, to reach out to you to let you know that that's what we do here at headquarters for these licensed reviews. That's all. Before that, Jesse, at this time, we thank you, Ms. Brongo, for your comment. I'm going to take a few moments and ask members of the public that are currently on the phone for your opportunity to comment. If you would like to speak, please raise your hand by pressing star five. Once I identify you, I will give you the opportunity to have your mic unmuted and then we will move on with other comments or questions at this time. So let's take a few moments for members of the public that are on the line. You can press star five. If you are currently on the phone, that way we will give you the opportunity to know if you have a comment or question that you would like addressed. Okay. Seeing none, at this time, I'll bring Ms. Ellen Weineger. I mispronounced your name, my apologies for that, to ask the question that you have at this time of the staff. You're currently unmuted. Please unmute yourself and ask your question. Thank you. Thank you. Can you hear me? Yes, I can hear you now. Thank you very much and thank you for the opportunity to comment and thank you for the opportunity to view this important webinar. I'm appreciating the comments that have been made and presented about emergency, first responders, emergency planning. We're in uncharted area here with decommissioning at a nuclear facility that is the only nuclear facility in the country that has three massive large-diameter high-pressure gas transmission pipelines traversing the property. So right there, we have a unique situation emergency planning that may normally be in place for other nuclear facilities simply doesn't necessarily apply here because of this dangerous co-location of these hazardous kinds of infrastructure. One of the things that has been mentioned is that even as decommissioning is proceeding that there aren't even any markings of the pipelines in the right of ways so that various decommissioning activities can go on either within a right of way of the pipelines or even in proximity to those rights of way and even Enbridge in its own materials mentions the importance of oversight yet there is none on site and also in Thims's guidance they actually indicate that operators must control construction pipeline rights of right of ways and ensure that they're carefully monitored to keep pipelines safe. I mean this is you know the convergence of decommissioning and pipeline infrastructure with pipeline ruptures being according to Thims's data not uncommon and especially in newer pipelines and there is a new pipeline that was constructed at that location back in 2016. So again I appeal to you to address this unique situation and not using the template of these other facilities that you listed like Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee and the other ones that you had on one of your slides because this is different and indeed the emergency instructions for residents conflict with each other and or really leave residents in a totally unprepared and dangerous situation so if you can answer that question in terms of how will you approach this unique situation it's unprecedented thank you. Thank you for your comment I just wanted to mention two things about the pipeline one is that the NRC has done two separate reviews of the pipeline one in the 2013 timeframe and again in the 2018 timeframe and separately right now or in the recent past the Department of Transportation which has the authority to about pipelines such as this is actually doing a study right now and it's hoping to release their results in soon the next six months. So it does not fall in depth that we've done two separate detailed inspections specific to the plant unrelated to Pilgrim and other sites and we've had the results the first ones were questioned and so the NRC initiated another review about it and separately of course our Office of Inspector General did the same and separately after all of that we the Department of Transportation was also asked to take a look at this and they're looking to issue their report in the near future. So I'm Carl Stursbecker and I'm the project manager for Indian Point and this concern we started last year when we have our weekly meetings with the whole tech we have a line item that they discuss with us what work they're doing near the pipeline and they have a procedure that we have set up where they have to talk to Enbridge and you know we have those discussions every week or every biweekly so that's another item I mean that's been a year now that we've been monitoring this so. Thanks Carl and thanks for that question and we apologize that this slide comes off as if it's you know it's just a similar review but every site you know is evaluated on their own merits and you know we are hearing your concerns a lot of concerns there related to the you know the pipeline itself and potential rushers and making sure there is some type of you know communication to the community in terms of where are some actions that should be taken if there is an event and that's something we can take back to some of the state and local contacts that we have that we communicate with frequently with the agency so we can make sure we're community related concerns that we're hearing today. It's time and you want to move on to the next question. Yes there's another question that has been asked how often does the NRC visit sites during the decommissioning process every year? I guess I could put that off. Yeah so the decommissioning activities are related that the frequency of our visits and inspections are related to the risk activities that are actually going on site as they're actually undergoing physical decommissioning the inspectors are there extremely much more frequently than if they are due to that agency site with not a lot of activity going on however they are still providing frequent monitoring throughout the life of the city. I didn't tone the line so Tony would have been on that. Sure yeah so the number of visits so our inspection activities are commensurate with the risks that are associated with the actual decommissioning so what's decommissioning? Decommissioning involves dismantling and taking apart the the site right and so when they when the site initially shuts down and starts planning the decommissioning there may not actually be a lot of physical activity so our reviews are typically may not be on site as much as when they're actually cutting and dismantling certain things that involve radioactive materials so it does vary so it depends on what's happening on a given week or a month or things like that so early in the process there may not be a lot of on-site inspections there might be there's a lot of review of course and and a review of their plants and things but as the site begins to dismantle cut the reactor vessel internals and things like that our our inspectors are on site more than than other times when that that activity is not done now it's important also state that you know we we are not there the same as we are at operating reactors where we have resident inspectors however that's been deemed that this is what we think that is appropriate given the risks associated with the decommissioning I hope that answers your question. Thank you so much for my answer and I tell me we do have Ms. Susan Lifer I believe five mispronounce your name my apologies for that you are now unmuted you can ask your question at this time isn't you going to unmute yourself Susan I'm not certain what device you are using it seems like you're on a laptop there is a mute button that's next to you at the top it says mic if you can use that not you can move on to the next question I'll give you a few moments to try and locate that come back to Ms. Susan again we have Marilyn Eiley you're unmuted at this time please share your question Marilyn are you able to unmute yourself you are unmuted at this time to be able to ask your question and you move on to the next one give me a few moments let me go back to the chat you can see was there another comment that has been asked yes Ms. Whedon the link there will be a link available and provided when the meeting summary is submitted so that you can get access to the slides they're currently available on the public meeting website and we'll have the link available when I provide the meeting summary for this meeting the question is asked here does the NIC work with the county who we are told will be in charge of the emergency regarding how to implement shelter in place versus evacuation is someone at the NIC staff like to address that question at this time can you repeat that this is Mike Norris can you repeat that again does the NIC work with the county who we are told will be in charge of emergency regarding how to implement shelter in place versus evacuation uh not really the off-site protective actions to the public are either a county responsibility or a state responsibility depending on the state and the NRC is only their emergency plan only really addresses the onsite and we relieve you know we respect the authority of the off-sites to protect the public so no we don't we don't tell them what to do we have guidance for you know recommended shelter versus evacuation but that that's just guidance because it's all under the authority of the off-site air authorities not not the NRC Mike would it be fair to say that the evacuation or sheltering would be very very remote chance in a decommissioning site it would be for a radiological release at a decommissioning site because all the studies show that we the any release would be very small if any so yet there it wouldn't be a it would be a very highly unlikely event at a decommissioning site versus a reactor thank you you mean an operating reactor that's what I said I thought thank you at this time we'll go back to those there in the tennis that have their hand raised John Sullivan you're currently unmuted at this time you can unmute your mic hi I'm the person who asked the question about the NRC working with the county just I want to just expand upon that a little bit as people of the NRC probably realized we were in a very heavily populated area even though it's an unlikely event that there would be a large radiological release what we get from the county right now is just like a trifle that says don't worry we'll tell you whether shelter in place or or evacuate I could just see chaos you know it would be impossible to deal with this so I would encourage the NRC to work very strongly with Westchester County about guidelines I'm assuming it would have to do with weather as well as what the event is so I just we had a DOB meeting the county kind of stepped up and said don't worry we'll take care of this but we've yet to see anything provided in detail other than this general trifle that they hand out every year it says don't worry we'll tell you what to do so I think we feel a lot more comfortable with the NRC was really involved with Westchester County to delineate what happens in an emergency in terms of sheltering in place and evacuation thanks thank you for that do we want to expand any further on the comment that has been addressed we had answered the previous question is there any other expansions before we go on because I'll go back to the phone lines to see if there's anyone there that would like to ask a question at this time I would just say thanks for that and as I mentioned before we can take that back and share with our our state federal and our local stakeholders especially around the Westchester County we can definitely do that and we did have a comment Tanya if you wouldn't mind just repeating instructions for those that are on the phone that there may be a couple that just wanted there may be a back phone not be able to see this visually yes that's what I was going to do at this time I was trying to get a few people that I've raised up to see if they were able to get back online but for those that are on the line you want to participate in the meeting you can raise your hand by pressing star five that will let me know that you have a question or comment that you like to ask at that time I will open up your microphone and you'll get the opportunity by pressing star six to unmute yourself I'll wait a few moments and go back to Miss Susan Leffer see if you're able to find the mic if you're on the computer Susan Leffer you can click the mic button you should have a line across it to show that it is out that way you can okay yourself because you're unmuted at this time I'm unmuted okay yes you are unmuted yes okay I have been listening to this conversation for multiple years and it seems that no one has ever addressed this when my gas company sends me a notice it says in light of if you smell gas run take everybody with you and run and then make a call if you have a big community there's no place to run and I don't understand this department when 9-11 went down the fire department couldn't speak to the other departments and made life much worse it made many more deaths the idea that this isn't a known configuration of how all of you react to this it's so frustrating and you never even send information out that if a double accident should happen what should we do I don't think the people at the plant know what to do if there's a gas pipeline it's it's all vague this department does it and that department does it I'm sorry to sound very irritable but this has been a long long time and we have never never got answers I was told years ago that PACE and a few other colleges if there was a nuclear accident would on the 12 since the 12 miles they would take people in I went and talked to these colleges and they didn't even know what I was talking about oh well we have a gym so pleasant I said do you have bedding do you have food do you have water no we don't know what's happening it's all the fact that too many departments are taking care of this beings that there's a lot of information that's falling between it it's very frustrating and I do not understand how it's possible that you are going to figure it out on as the accident this happening thank you miss forgive us a few moments so that we can address that question do you remember the staff that would like to address the question at this time if we can get a this Tony I thought that maybe if the young lady could ask us the question directly obviously there's frustration and she expressed and I get that and you know I'm not sure exactly what the question is regarding is it the wishes to have some direct direction in the event of an emergency that Enbridge could provide and how I'm not sure if it's a question to the NRC or for Holtek or for the owners of the pipeline I'm not sure what the I'd like to think to just make a quick statement overall there's general concern about what to do in the case of an emergency so that you're aware miss Leffer the NRC is in conjunction with the state with the county and how to prepare for emergency evacuations it's not something specific that we can address just on what we do alone at this time but there is coordination that does take place what we can do is okay because there's several other previous discussions that we've had related to this so we can coordinate get a response to you and I can have that email to you we do have your email address because you're participating in this meeting and we can send you some information at that time because it's a coordinated discussion they'll be able to address that we aren't able to address in this meeting at this time to give you a complete answer we do hear your frustration we do acknowledge and appreciate you participating in this meeting to give us further insight about how you feel as you move forward through emergency preparedness and at this time I will pause for a few moments and give another instruction because we're getting close to ending the meeting I want to ensure that we have members of the public because I want to ensure that you are able to unmute yourself again to raise your hand if you are on the phone press star five at that time I will know that you want to ask a question I will then unmute you so that you can ask your question of the staff I will go back to a previous number that was if you're able to unmute yourself Tina bonger your hand is still raised I know you asked the question previously I will unmute you at this time to see if there's another question if not we will move on to the next person thank you so much for being in the meeting Susan I mean my apologies Tina bonger you are unmuted at this time did you have another question you wanted to ask the staff or was your hand still raised previously hearing none let me move on to the next person that we have listed here Maryland Eileen I'm going to unmute you at this time you are able to locate your mic let's see if you can have a conversation at the top of your screen if you're using your computer you should see a little mic with a line through it you press that line it will unmute you Maryland Eileen you are unmuted at this time you're able to ask your question of the staff okay Maryland we're having difficulty getting you the opportunity to be able to ask your question please type your information in the chat box I'll move on to the last person that I've seen Roger Witherspoon I'm going to unmute you at this time if you have a question you would like to ask of the staff please ask your question at this time you are unmuted thank you um the comment that colleagues made about the relative danger of the spent fuel pool now that the operating reactor is shut seems to contradict the 2001 study that the nrc did on the dangers of spent fuel pools which found that the contamination was far more extensive than any in just a working reactor some look puzzled by that statement that the danger has been minimized would you please elaborate is this the 2001 study that was in the slides what slide would you like me to go to Sean I'm trying to see if he's looking referencing the slides is he still in the phone 2001 study let me bring him back up thanks slide 14 we were trying to hear you here there is a little feedback in your in your information if you can make a concise statement or type in your specific question if there's a slide that you're referencing because it is difficult to hear some of what you're asking it was not a slide it was in response to a comment by one of your staffers that the danger of radiological contamination was diminished because the plant was shut that is not the findings of your department's 2001 study of the dangers from spent fuel pools Sonny I think I think that's a part of that but I'm not sure I recall for studying that you're referring to 2001 the statement that we make about the not the dangers but the risks associated with operating reactors versus decommissioning reactors is about overall risks and radiological releases large radiological releases that would necessitate emergency response and things like that about evacuations and shelter in place and so do you buy died pills and things like that so that I do stand by that the the risks associated with contamination about risks of spent fuel pools is a different issue I think it is but I don't recall I don't know the study that you're referring to would help if you could maybe give us a specific pointer as to which one you're referring to and this is Mike Norris I can I can elaborate a little bit further some of the the regulatory analysis that was done in new reg 1738 which was the basis for the 2000 decommissioning rulemaking indicated that the enter we could the studies could not determine a time at which a zirconium fire could not occur based on the decay of the spent fuel so based on that study we incorporated a 10 hour time frame in other words the fuel has to be cool enough had decayed enough you know the period of time to decay that there is 10 hours from the time at which all cooling is lost is spent fuel spent fuel to initiation of a zirconium fire and what that 10 hours allows it allows for the time for the licensee to perform mitigated measures using the mitigated strategies type of equipment the pumps the fire hoses the alternate water sources so as part of the exemptions that have been conducted since basically 1999 one of the criteria that the licensee has to meet is that the spent fuel has to decay to such a point where if it loses all cooling there's a minimum of 10 hours at which for the licensee to perform mitigation to prevent the fire and we have to understand really what has to be done to mitigate you know that that fuel from going to a zirconium you know heating up and it's basically just providing some type of cooling you know sprays extra water in the pool and that's what the mitigated strategies equipment that we're that we require the licensees to have by a license condition and it's actually codified now in the regulations that they have the equipment the capabilities the training and the personnel to perform the mitigation of this type of event to provide some type of cooling so that study the new reg 1738 that that's how we took that information and we added additional criteria that the licensee had to meet for us to grant the exemption and that's the process that we've used since 1999 and the later studies the new reg 2161 that basically just validated that successful implementation of the mitigated strategies was reduced the likelihood of that event happening I'm answering that and it's good and I just want to comment that question the slide was showing a extended discussion that was previously asked we will have a meeting summary that will come out that address this difficult for us to type all the responses that are being provided inside of this meeting in the chat we do ask that you have your information in the chat so that we can have a if there's a specific question that you have that we can address at this time they do have one other individual that I know that has had their hand raised. I'm going to make you a presenter and if you can unmute your mic I know you are unable to locate the mic button previously but I see that there's been some assistance from the staff you're unmuted at this time Ellen Weininger I'm mispronounced your name I do apologize but you are able to unmute yourself at this time if you'd like to ask your question and for those that are on the phone we do ask that you press star five so that you can raise your hand and I will know that you want to have your question or the staff address at this time and then we will begin to start closing the meeting we're getting close to time Ellen are you able to say I am here thank you very much for the opportunity to pose an additional question I did make a comment in the chat that I hope that the nrc can address and that is more recent studies that were conducted at Princeton by Dr. Hipple Frank von Hipple and Mark Schopener Dr. Mark Schopener regarding cooling pool fires and those studies demonstrated that there is potential for quite significant radiological releases that would cover a very wide geographical area in the event of a cooling pool fire and indeed would release more radioactivity than a reactor meltdown that would render tens of thousands of square miles essentially uninhabitable these studies were conducted several years ago something like this could occur in the event of a pipeline rupture or for any you know any number of reasons again whether or not a facility has operating reactors or not the cooling pools hold vast quantities of the spent fuel and would appreciate your addressing the studies that were conducted at Princeton regarding this issue and actually direct opposition to what you just said earlier well again this is Mike Nars again we require the licensee as part of their exemption to maintain the equipment the personnel and the training to perform the mitigated actions that would be required for any event that would result in the loss of cooling of the spent fuel pool so that that is a requirement it's required by their license condition it's required by regulations so they have the equipment they have the people and they have the training to perform mitigation of a loss of cooling of the spent fuel pool no matter what the causes so and if and if there's anything that the licensee is not able to have he's got letters of agreement with offsite response organizations fire departments etc to respond to the site to provide additional resources if they need additional hoses pumps whatever they need I mean that that's part of the emergency plan it's the on site capabilities as well as the off site response to the site thank you so much for answering that Mike I do not see any other comments in the chat box and I do not see any other hands raised at this time to answer a question that has been asked this meeting is being recorded and will be made available for the public to be able to go back to review the NRC staff will answer the questions that we see there's information that was already in coordination and collaboration with other government agencies of state broadies we will have that information addressed at a later point to provide you this time there are no other final comments questions or thoughts and want to direct your attention to the fact that if you have feedback for this meeting you can send that information to me at tanya.hood at nrc.gov t a n y a dot h o o d Tony would you like to have a question yes I thank you Tonya just a comment there is a comment regarding from this Maryland L my mic has been disabled by the program we try to work through that question please be more specific about the procedure the nrc uses to ensure safety especially in regard to the pipeline I think we addressed that the nrc has done two separate studies plus the i g's was also part of the nrc it's a third one and now the department of transportation is doing their study so I think that addresses that and when the that report is issued hopefully it'll you know it'll be made public obviously how often are your inspectors on the ground as I said it varies sometimes it's a week a quarter sometimes it's a couple of weeks quarter depending on what the the the activities that are happening on site as I said if they're not if the licensee workers are not doing physically like risk significant activities like cutting the internals of the reactor vessel or other things like grad waves and things then we may not be there on site as as often as other times so it does vary but we're there typically typically you know at least a week a quarter sometimes more typically more because there's activities that are happening let me see are you relying more on reports from paperwork we do both we're on site observing activities we interview licensee personnel we have conference calls and regular calls with individuals who work at the site and we also review incident reports procedures documents surveys all kinds so it's all of the above to answer that question the information has not been transparent actually it has we actually issue our inspection reports in the public and we issue them through listserv and we can certainly direct your attention madams if you do a search you can see all the inspection reports that I signed out in the last three years for this site how can the public be better informed about this process well this is one of the forms that we use to engage with the public to make sure that we get our message out about what we do we try to make it very pointed depending on what the issue is in this webinar that Sean and Tanya are hosting we try to focus on on security and EP next week we have the decommissioning oversight board which will be doing some focused discussion on ISVC the expend fuel so that's one way and also you can go to our website there's a wealth of information there Sean thanks Tony and thanks for your participation here a lot of questions on the inspection side of the house thanks for the the insert staff in terms of the security and EP and thanks Tanya for hosting and everyone else that might have missed here you know they're just putting a chat just the opportunity for anyone to sign up in terms of getting on the listserv for a lot of communications that's Tony mentioned related to the plant specific activities well definitely as Tony mentioned we want your feedback in terms of you know how you all like this this session itself we do plan on considering additional information set sessions on different topics and definitely a lot of questions about the pipeline and we will take that information back and share it with our state and federal colleagues in terms of the questions and concerns that were raised here and is that for everyone to remember sorry we do have the December 7th New York State decommissioning oversight board just because there's a lot of questions related to Indian Point and we will be participating in that meeting as Tony said so other than that just thanks for your participation and so thank you for that and with that for the members of the public as I stated previously they will be meeting summary developed from this that can give you the information and a link that will be provided that gives you the recording for this information we will do what we can to capture all of the comments and questions that have been asked on this meeting and if you have some feedback for something specific you can as I stated previously send that information to myself Tonya dot hood at NRC dot gov and we have done a great job gentlemen I appreciate it a recap and I do not have to do a quick recap of all of what has been done I truly appreciate that and with that there are no other final comments questions or thoughts we can close the meeting in a one moment thank you Tina bonger question about FEMA I think we've addressed that question previously as well Tina bonger there's a lot of information that is available on the NRC's public website we do our best to ensure that we inform the public of a lot of things so some of the questions that you're asking is already available and addressed on our website information about FEMA can we go back for the NRC share the public how FEMA is involved with their emergency planning process we have about two minutes we do have consistently coordinate with FEMA does someone like to answer that question really quick and then we can close out this meeting session yeah this is Mike Norris for an operating plan the NRC works hand in hand with FEMA again the NRC has the authority on site FEMA has the oversight if you will for the off sites as part of the decommissioning as part of the actual exemption process we do consult with FEMA we do get their comments on our commission papers that we write however it's the NRC's authority whether we grant the exemptions or not and once the exemptions are granted once the licensees met the criteria to implement the exemption then we provide a written notification to FEMA that there's no longer off site radiological emergency preparedness required and FEMA will let the appropriate governmental agencies know that thank you so much for answering that Mike and with that we thank you so much for participating in today's public meeting for emergency preparedness and decommissioning security we thank you for your time and wish you all a great day have a great day everyone take care