 Welcome folks, this is Friday, February 16th and we are having a joint meeting this afternoon, the House Corrections and Institutions Committee and Senate Institutions Committee, and we're going to be spending our time getting updates on the Waterbury Dam project. We've been working on this for a number of years. Just to remind folks, we put in in the cash area, 4.5 million and that was anticipated to finish the project over the next few years. It was going to be done one fiscal year over the next, I think it was up until 2627 was the target date at this point. So, the Department of Environmental Conservation came to us and wanted to give us an update and we decided to have a joint meeting. So we also have members of the Senate Institutions Committee here. Thank you Madam Chair for the invite. We appreciate it very much. Welcome to our room upstairs. So, we're going to start with the commissioner of DC, Jason Batchelor. Welcome and you're going to introduce your testimony and then we do have a document. First, we do have a document. It's on our House Corrections and Institutions webpage. I don't know if it's also been posted to the Senate Institutions page or not. It will be me if it hasn't already. Did we want to put this up on the screen when we're ready? Jen is going to run the slides. Thank you. So, commissioner, welcome. Thank you so much for having me Madam Chair. This is your first time I think in our committee. It certainly is. It's wonderful to see you all. Yes, yes. And I think that's one of the main reasons why the secretary asked me to the intro at least is so I can meet everyone. My name is Jason Batchelor and I'm the new DC commissioner as of late September, formerly director of the warden service and. 20 year agency employee, but in a new role here and very gracious that you accepted our invite to host us here today and I think you'll be, I think to be. Rapid is compelling testimony you'll hear from, from Ben and Neil's team, Eric, you'll hear from Neil, you'll hear from Eric and you'll hear from Ben. In case you haven't met them, Neil's the director of the, of the with the water investment division, Eric's the chief of engineering, Ben's the chief, the dam step dam. He is the dam. The dam section chief. Many, many jokes that that I think I'm missing out on when I introduced them. Yeah, I think I think I need to just sit down and write them all down. I'm not, but I've been asked that I've been asked that I think she may be the only one. Madam chair, did you tell them for people who are here first time we have an initiation. Right. But you seem to be very familiar with the amount that I think the ultimate amount may wiggle a little bit we're ultimately looking into in the realm of between $66 and $94 million for this, for this ultimate price tag. Certainly by the end of 2027 when we hope to begin, that will have been a moving target. This ask is tied to significant state liability in the way of the obvious. This dam is just performing as it should, and then we'll get into that, but there are, we aren't, we aren't without concern. So that's 68 to 94 million is not all. Working with the army for engineer. There was a lot of upfront costs. In terms of the study and assessment in terms of how. And then you get into the actual constructions. So that 4.5 million that was put aside is not going to be expended in one just for you. We were banking correct. And I think what went into some of the work that's led up to and the work that we still have to do to get to that. So, I won't take up any more. I realize it's Friday. Then we'll be next. I think. And I. Appreciate the attention and think I think you won't have any trouble giving it to them. It's very, very interesting topic. So all yours. Thank you so much for having us. And there are any questions of the police. The senators want to speak just raise your hand. In the same order that I follow on house members. So thank you. Thank you for having us. Any time. Please. I want to talk to Eric black. You can actually be. Back then you were here at the beginning of the week. You could also identify yourself for the record. For the record, my name is spend green on the section chief. And I'm here today to provide a briefing on the water very damn spillway project. This drone photograph here in this cover photo is of the dam from the upstream side. The spillway, which is larger the subject of this project. You can see on the left side of this photo. You can see the three gray steel gates on the farm. The most left area of this photograph. Those are the floodgates and then to the right of that, you can see the concrete spillway and the remainder of the dam, the embankment section and the white gate house. You can see on top of the crest. I just want to again introduce the water race dam spillway team damage owned by the state of Vermont. We have operational responsibilities that was delegated to us in the water investment division dam safety program. Neil and Neil and Eric, who you know, and we're introduced to our largely performing financial and project oversight. And again, I'm Ben green. I'm doing the dam safety work, the lead owner operator as well as technical oversight for the project. I'm fortunate to be teamed with the army core of engineers in New England district on this project. They're providing both technical oversight and financial assistance. I'm going to send a lot of this presentation going through some of the technical elements and kind of where we've been and where we're going to. And then Neil's going to step in and go through some of the financials at the end of the presentation. So just an overview of Waterbury dam for those not familiar. The drainage basin or area that flows to the dam is 109 square miles. Bound into the north by the peak of Mount Mansfield to the west by the green mountain range to the east by the Worcester range. The dam is 187 feet tall and 2100 feet long. That makes it the third tallest dam in the state and the fourth largest in terms of storage capacity. And it's the largest state owned dam that we have has three primary purposes. The purpose number one is flood protection reduction in the Manuski basin. Number two is hydro power green mountain power has a five megawatt power plant tied into the dam. And number three is recreation. There's little river campground. Waterbury day use center as well as several public ramps and access points. Make this a very popular place in the summertime. The dam is rated as a high hazard potential dam. That means in the event of a dam failure or uncontrolled release result in probable loss of life. Based on current estimates, we have a population at risk, which is based on the number of people estimated to be within the potential inundation zone of a failure. At 5000 people with a potential life loss between 800 and 900 people during a if we had an incident during a flood event. With monetary losses approaching 850 million. Approximately 1400 structures could be damaged. And just to give you some further context, perhaps you're familiar with the state emergency operations center in downtown Waterbury. That could be under as much as 40 feet of water if we would have a failure to stand during a flood event. And a lot of very complex. And a lot of very complex nearby. 40 feet. The dam is an estimated annual flood benefit of $3.5 million. The dam was built following the 1927 flood. It was designed by the Army Corps of Engineers. Much of the labor was provided by the CCC. The dam was completed in 1938, along with its sister dams rights fill, which is just upstream here of Montpelier and Eastbury dam upstream of very city. The spillway consists of two main parts and this photograph the lower right kind of show that pretty well the zoomed in photograph you can see the floodgates on the left side of this image. And the concrete spillway to the right. These elevations are listed here just to kind of give you reference elevation 592 is the base of the gates and elevation 617 and a half is the top of the concrete spillway that 25 and a half feet is our flood control band at the facility. Due to some issues and challenges with the structure that we've talked about, we can only handle about 75% of that so we can only go to 610.8 for elevation in this reservoir before we start to not be able to do full flood control. And then just another useful image in this slide here is in the center here is is a cut image of the one of the tainter gates or radial arm gates and how they work. They're essentially they're very simple. They're just large doors on the concrete bridge above is the lifting equipment, which is a cable that goes down and attaches to the lower part of the gate. And the gate is supported on a hinge called a trunnion on the downstream side and simply a winch inside that or hoist inside that building that lifts the front of the edge of the gate up into the upper position which is shown here in dash. So that's how we operate them. They simply just rotate upwards and downwards into position. So, before you leave that screen, the elevation between the 617.5 feet in the 633. Yes, what you're saying, because of the structure and the age of the dam for flood stage right now, would it be 617 is where you'd be concerned or 610. 610.8 and I'll get more into that in subsequent slides, but the structure is originally designed such that we hold a flood pool from 592 to 617 and a half at which point water starts to flow over the uncontrolled over this the exteriors away. And then we start to do some gate operations to start discharging water right now elevation 610.8 we have to start doing that so it's a prior to the designs about 75% of the design load. So when we had the flooding with Irene, we had the event with Irene, then we had the event this summer. Yes. How high did it get. I have some slides where I'll go through those elevations. I guess the short answer to that though is that I think we've had, you know, Irene's a good example we had spring of 2011 we had two flood events actually December flood event this year. I'll go through all this but we've had more high pools more recently than we've had in the 85 year history of the facility so doing more work now that it ever has. I have some questions. I don't want to get ahead of your presentation. I just would like to know what the relationship is with Green Mountain power whether they have any skin in the game as far as the repair costs. Or what their relationship is with the dam as far as rent or whatever so if you're going to cover it later that's fine. I'm not really going to go into that so Green Mountain power, as I understand when the dam was the project was was it was first imagined. Green Mountain power actually owned a lot of the land that was needed to construct the dam. And so I think they, they provide that land to the state and so essentially procure themselves water rights at this at this facility and perpetuity. There's no we don't have a lease agreement or an easement with them in that sense and that they've kind of come sense the damage constructed they've been essentially had that right since day one and they built their their power plant in the 1950s. And we have a good working relationship with Green Mountain power at the site. They do not have a necessarily required position in this project, particularly, but they do typically provide, they do provide some staffing assistance to us for maintenance and operation. So that's sort of their input and they provide no money is paid to the state for them right to generate power there. The state for that their input was sort of an initial project where we're using their land. I believe dream on power had cited this site as a potential dam construction area, and then when this project came along they kind of gave the land to have it to the state built the dam so that they were there first kind of in a way of thinking. Okay. So, how is this monitor now is that a gatehouse of some sort on the top, the white building. At what point is it monitored. I mean, when you're getting a heavy rainfall. How does that work? So we saw my team monitors the site we typically visit at least weekly in person. And then we have automated water level gauges upstream their USGS gauges upstream in the watershed as well in the downstream and on the reservoir level itself so we can monitor those remotely. We operate the dam in accordance with the Army Corps of Engineers regulation manual, which was first developed the 1970s updated in 2005. And we follow that manual in terms of how we operate the decision to operate the gates is based on actually the water level in the Winooski River across at Brook entrance which is actually right in the state complex. When that hits elevation 417. That's our directive to go and close the gates. Sometimes dependent on weather and other considerations, but close a little earlier. The general disadvantage to that. And then under a normal a flood of moderate size those gates essentially remain closed until that elevation at that in Waterbury drops below elevation 417, which is 2 feet from out of bank flooding in Waterbury. And we have a discharge schedule where we're not allowed to exceed 2000 CFS from the gate. In the event we had a very severe, more severe flood than anything we've thankfully seen. We would have to start to operate the gate to discharge water and that's kind of where it gets into that elevation 610.8 or 617 and a half we get up that high. We have to start discharging water. During the storm event and adding additional water to the portion amount of flying that's already going on. Most of that's done remotely. It's done with people on site. Oh, it is. There's no remote operations of this facility. We have to be on site to operate and we have to be on site to do all those very good. Thank you. With explanation. So. It's operating. You can't go all the way up to the other elevation. It's not a function of a problem with the gate itself. I'll go through it and what that is exactly, but the gates have essentially been deemed structurally deficient since 2005. And I hope I'm going to slide as I kind of explain kind of how we got to where we are. Okay. And the last point I was just going to make is on the photograph in the upper side. You see the gate how the white gate house on the crest of the dam and there's a red dash land that goes straight down the intersects a dash land that goes along. Through the dam that is that represents a spillway tunnel that's 100 feet below the water's level it's 14 feet wide 11 foot tall. And that's how water is typically transmitted through the dam and ultimately the green mountain powers facility they make power and discharge the water downstream. So the flood event occurs, the water level rises above and then we start to operate spillway. So under normal operation, the gates are in the fully open position. And, and the water levels below the spillway. That's how the facility is operated. The majority of the water and normal base flows is through that dashed line that represents a tunnel that goes through the dam. This next video is just a it's next flight is a video of example flood release from the 2019 spring flood event. Just meant to give a some scale for those not familiar with the facility on what a flood operation looks like at the facility or roughly 1500 CFS going down to the spillway looks like. Once we do a gate operation we close the gates and then we hit the criteria to start opening the gates that's an incremental process that usually takes us about a week of frequent site visits to bumping the gate slightly to slowly discharge the reservoir and bring it back and save manner to the normal level. I'll play that again. Just play that again. I go back to reverse. So if this dam was to give. The spillway was to get by the gates. All that water that's back here. The water to the face of the structure. It is the water that is. I find the dam is that the pieces that. Are used is that considered a lot of Barry was born to use recreational. Yes, so elevation 589 and a half. I'm sorry to use so much elevation, but 589 and a half elevation is the base elevation for recreation purposes. Elevation 592 a couple feet above that is the base of the spillway. Under normal conditions, if you were go out there, most days of the year, except for the case of sometimes the winter when the water level is drawn down, we have a flood event when the water level is up. The elevations at 589 and a half. It's fairly static. We mount power. Make, you know, put more water through the turbines. When the flows peak up a little bit and less when we're in drought conditions and kind of maintain that consistent 589 and a half elevation. Of course, we have a flood. The inflows overcome what GMP can put through their facility and then we start to store water in the facility and then we turn to the spillway. How many acres in the reservoir normally? I don't have that number off the top of my head. I have to look that up. Okay. So there's really only two feet of storage before it hits the spillway. It's correct. During a anticipated flood event, do you try to get it down any? No, the facility is designed to handle what's called the probable maximum flood, which is essentially the worst combination of meteorological and hydrological events that can occur in the drainage basin. So there's the facility is designed to start of starting elevation at 589 or actually 592 or. Based on the 27 blood. That's based on an analysis that's based on an analysis that's having empirical analysis that makes some assumptions as to what again, what the worst combination of rainfall and ground conditions you could possibly have to have the most rain possible. When you are going to release in the air, you're worried about, you know, you want to get rid of some water. Is it our requirement that you notify the people in the path of the dam? We do it. We have a ramping schedule. So we don't just go. So in 2000 CFS is our maximum, which may sound like a lot, but it compared to the water that's in the Winooski. It might be 10 or up to 10%. It's actually a relatively small amount, but we do have a process where we have an email notification where we notify downstream towns and state officials and local officials of the operations as well as we have some ties with local recreation folks who use the use the use the water. So anytime we do an operation during a flood event, we send that out prior to doing it. So people are generally aware of what's going on. Thank you. Just to follow up on that when you send it to the municipalities, you send it to the emergency management directors or to other folks. It's about 45 people on the list in total. I know a water beret. I believe we sent it to the fire chief and the town manager and sometimes those folks. So just to give you an overall project background, again, the project was constructed in 1938 completed 1938 following the 27 floods. The first major modification came in 1957. Where the embankment was raised 3 feet and the third gate was added the third gate in the bottom photograph the one on the left, which is, which is 35 feet wide. The original 2 gates are 20 feet wide. This was due to updated. Hydrologic and hydraulic analyses that were done at that time. In 1985, there was a passive seepage remediation system added to the embankment due to some seepage issues at the dam head. In 2002, there was additional seepage remediation work done that perhaps some of you are familiar with an active dewatering system was installed in the embankment of the dam at that time that my team operates still to this day. In 2004 during a test operation of the gates, one of the gates jammed in the partially open position. And that was really what prompted the start of this entire project back in 2004. In 2004 at that time, they did some temporary repairs that had a noted 15 year design life. And we're already past that now, but to make the gates operable. So the gate jamming issues also prompted a structural study of the analysis of the gates themselves. Also, during this period in the mid-1990s, the Folsom Dam in California, which has tainter gates, very similar water buries, the gate, those gates failed. And it was determined during that failure that there's friction that builds up in that trunnion or hinge that the gate rotates on and the design guidance from the 30s and 40s did not include that that frictional component in the design. So water burry was analyzed with the potential for if we have frictional buildup in our trunnions and we were found that our system is susceptible to having that. So at that point in 2004, that load restriction was placed on the gate. We're only able to load the gates to 75% of flexible capacity. So that's really the main driver of this project is that we're unable to hold a full flood pool due to the gate, the gates being deficient. The spillway project is also prompted by a water quality certification when the green mountain power was getting the new Federal Energy Regulatory Commission license. The water quality standards placed on the project and one of them was the elimination of the winter drawdowns to improve water quality. But due to our deficient gates, the desire was to keep the winter drawdown until the gates were in good shape enough to code and could handle a full flood pool. In theory, the results of this project will be improved O&M, improved structures, as well as improved water quality. And the project is funded through, at least partially through section 1177 of wind funding with the Army Corps of Engineers having a large cost share and Neil's going to go through that in the presentation. So project goals are pretty straightforward. Restore flood full capability while reducing dam safety risks. Continue to support hydropower recreational uses and seasonal drawdowns, which should have an improved water quality and then just improving 85 year old equipment, improved operation, improved maintenance. That's the overall goals of the project. So we have another question, Wayne. So I recall back in 2004 to the point here. Did you have any permitting problems downstream? Or for extreme flow or anything like that? Is there something on this? There was so the day to day outflows are controlled by green amount of power through their hydropower facility and they're under a water quality certification where they have to run this system as a run of river style system, which was like a change for them. Where they have to basically, they measure the inflows and they put the same amount of water through their turbines and downstream. So, theoretically downstream is seeing the same flows as upstream of the dam so it operates like a more natural system. Yeah, I understand. So it does have anything to do with this. I mean, it's three non powers that last three mountain powers, direct responsibility, but it means also what needed to gather, but which we are two separate entities at the same facility. I have a question so close. Neil just pinged that standard elevation normal elevation reservoirs with 850 acres. So project steps so far we're following the army form engineers process. Step one was a risk assessment or risk assessment is basically an initial step. It was the holistic look at the entirety of the dam. We knew we had these fragilities at the spillway. But the first step would take a step back actually and assess the entirety of the dam to make sure they're not any other deficiencies that were of similar or greater risk than the spillway was. So, make sure we're putting funds after the highest risk element with the dam and the risk assessment came out that in fact we were this the highest way is in fact the highest risk element of the dam. So, essentially, you know, prove this was the project work doing step number two, which we're currently in now and kind of getting towards the later stages of the dam safety modification study. So, this is an additional spillway assessment work and engineering field data collection, engineering analysis, partial design or at the 10% design was recently completed and cost estimating so hopefully by the end of 2024 will be at the 30% design phase and 30% cost estimate. But right now we're largely reporting to you as a result of the 10% design and 10% cost estimate. Is that calendar year or state fiscal year. That's calendar year. So, we'll start at 25 will start design will be will be upcoming. They've estimated a two year period for design so 25 2027 again this is calendar year and then construction during the starting in the 2027 construction season and going to the 2029 construction season. So that this point that is the plan schedule. We don't have an event before that. Great. What would happen if, if one of those skates fails, or you can't open it. I mean, that could be a real possibility we've got six more years five more years. I have a slide about this later actually implementing some temporary improvements to the most fragile gate and the spillway bridge to improve operability and reliability at least in the interim until this project can. If one of those don't open is our natural spillway after the fact, I mean, is there a natural runway that can go like that actually breaches the dam before it just starts come pouring over the top and there are lower section on this side of that. So, so I guess the situation where we're unable to open any of the gates, which we have, you know, we have backup plans in place. And that's why one of the reasons why we have to open the 610.8 is that number that we start to open the gates, which it should be 617 and a half. Why we have that 75% load restriction is we do not want to get more than that much load on a gate because after that point it's been determined they may have difficulty in operation. So we would actually sort of prematurely start operating the gates if we were to get to a flood of that level and just charging water downstream. If for some reason the gates didn't operate under that scenario. In terms of discharging water downstream, the water level would rise, which bill over the auxiliary spillway on the right side. We also do have a cone valve at the downstream end of the dam that can discharge about 600 CFS frankly during a flood events a bit of a drop in the bucket, but those are really convenient ways to convey water out. You know, again, we're implementing some temporary improvements to the gates and things to improve their reliability in the short term. So the worst case when you talk 40 feet water over water barrier that that would be the whole structure failed. Correct. So if a single one of these gates failed to then it would be a lesser very much lesser impact we had one gate failure it's unlikely all three would fail at once but yes we had a single gate failure. The numbers I quoted were sort of a worst case scenario if we had a single gate failure we'd be looking at a lesser downstream attacks. So structurally if you can get the AIDS opening the thing over top structurally. What's the estimate of the probability that you could have a complete failure. Um, the entire dam over tops. I mean that that that that would be those that would be near the numbers I gave would be that's where worst case scenario. Um, the gates, an individual gate failing those population at risk numbers and lost loss of life numbers are much, much lower. So you think if it's over top again, you could blow out on all its gates. Try the truth of the matter is, is that the structural hergility with the gates is associated with with operating them under a load is actually picking them up is the problem, not them being stationary in place. So when the gates are in the closed position they are stable under flood condition. The analysis just show that when we need to operate them that that's where the problem arises. So just to review some of the completed and ongoing work. The risk to go a little bit more detail into the risk assessment. And you know, that's improved that the spillway holds the greatest risk for the project and sort of a sensible investment. We looked actually started out by doing what's called a potential failure mode analysis where we looked at over 50 potential failure modes for the dam, not including the spillway, but just different ways that dam could possibly fail. Roughly five were selected from that of ones that seem like the highest probability of occurring. And then those five by far the most of the highest risk one was a tainter gate failure. And the determination of all of that. Some of the things that we learned was that the pedestrian bridge that provides access to the gates as well as supports the white system is overstressed even under normal operations. We learned that the center gate is overstressed also during normal operations is by far the most stress though actually the gates on the right and left are far better conditioned than the one in the center. So we, we learned to continue to learn that the, but there's moving movement until thing up the peers underneath the bridge that have originally that's actually what called the cause gate jamming as well as this call some of the issue cost of the issues that we have. And sort of a new issue that arose was that we're actually having some we knew we're having some level of bedrock erosion downstream of the spillway. And I want to know more on that but that was sort of a new finding was that that was a potential failure mode for the dam. So, in 2022 we did a bunch of field work with the Army Corps of engineer the program of subservience explorations of bedrock and concrete was performed this was done to support the to evaluate the quality of the concrete in the dam, as well as underlying bedrock, which also supported the erodibility of bedrock analysis that was done downstream of the spillway. And what we also performed was called trunnion friction testing this image on the right shows it pretty well. Essentially, we, a company came and you see these red boxes and red wires. They instrumented all three of the gates and we operated them under different situations and they measure that was that they were able to calculate the friction building up in the trunnions which are the orange shripled hinges in the back of the gate. And through that analysis that we learned that actually gate one is better off than we thought and gate three is better off than we thought gate two is worse off than we thought. So just to be clear, if it was a failure, when lifting up one of those gates, that would be those red circles that trunnion friction area is what would fail. What would actually fail is be able to work these strut arms right here with bubble. Okay. What would happen is that there's a cable attached to the leading edge of the gate and we start picking up and the voice has the capacity to pick the gate. And so what happens is the trunnions wouldn't rotate on the trunnions as designed and we put a lot more load into the strut arms and we buckle strut arm that that's the leading concern is a buckling strut arm. So, do we get a normal deterioration of concrete involved or is there a special concrete that's being used to avoid that we have concrete deterioration is a size for this site as well. Yep, I'll go on that. Thank you. So are we under any pressure from the Army Corps of Engineer to I mean, where this is part of this is part of their dam structure as well. The Army Corps. I know we're working with them. Right. We under any pressure from them to do the work quicker, or are we pretty much. You know, they, their sense of risk is a little bit different. They compare, you know, when they compare risk, they compare to their national portfolio of dance, and they have dance the national level that are worse off than this one. So from their standpoint, while it's still an important project, it probably wouldn't rise to the top of their list when they make it nationally with some of their projects they have in the rest portfolios they have of course they have dams upstream of tremendously populated areas in Vermont. So, but, again, they're very supportive of our temporary risk reduction measures that we're taking to, you know, again, improve temporary improvements until the project. But they're there was not that was not mandated by them or anything that was a decision that was made by us that that was something that needed to be done and might need to be spent state level to do that. Neil, you had your hand up. Thank you for the record Neil Cameron director of water investment division. I just wanted to compliment what Ben was saying about the army poor by noting that they are truly an excellent partner in this they are there with us 100% of the way. They're not driving the bus, but they are. They're not holding the bus up either. They have a design team fully arranged and assembled for this work right now. And then they are on speed dial, but they've been very, very responsive. So I just wanted to make sure folks in the committee knew that that partnership is very strong. So the staff that's there is that under the state or is that under army to work under a state and they name is owned by the state and operated by the state so our staff covers this facility. Some other completed non going work. There was a bridge inspection. Again, the bridge supports both the voice equipment as well for the gates as well as access. There was load rating for the gate and there was also tilt monitoring that was done on the peers and these images kind of kind of say it all. The condition of concrete is poor. We took samples of the concrete. In some areas it didn't even attain its original design strength which was even was loaf by modern standard. And then the images on the right here kind of show that what's occurring is what's called alkali silica reaction, which is a reaction in the concrete that makes it expand an expansion of concrete is putting a lateral load on the peers and pushing the peers out of vertical plumb. And that's what the image in the lower right hand corner shows is that offset so much offset has occurred in the peer at which when you're working with a gate with fairly tight tolerances that's problematic. And then the other kind of the other finding was related to the spillway bedrock erosion. The bedrock channel was was blasted out of bedrock. This was a hillside prior to the dam being constructed in the 1930s, but they blasted the rock out to make the take the spillway. Typical floor releases can be as much as 2000 CFS out of the spillway and we have a we have documented rock erosion that's occurred over the last 85 years. Keep in mind if we had that much larger flood and we had to do a major discharge and we had to open multiple gates we could be putting out as much as 80,000 CFS. So continue rock erosion at 2000 CFS versus versus a high flood load to 80,000 CFS. We raised a lot of concerns about the stability of the bedrock to support the gates and support good operation, no major flood. So, yes, I was noted. We have a question. It's pretty poor quality bedrock. This whole site is built on essentially poor quality bedrock. That was the poor quality bedrock. I mentioned in the early 2000s we had that seepage project that was done. That was really also project related to the poor bedrock under seepage of the stem has been problematic and it's largely due to the poor bedrock conditions and unfortunately the spillway. We have the same same rock. So there's a continuation of a different problem kind of showing yourself in a different way. You think about it, it's been there for over 80 years. You've had a lot of water pressure coming down and it's going to wear it away over time. Indeed, by guessing comparison, we have East Ferry and Riceville, which have all had the same service histories and have had none of these problems. So this stem has had more portions. But you shouldn't have too much sand and think abrasive. Yeah, too much turbidity in the day in the town. At times during flood conditions, you can, but the bedrock is just fairly highly roadable, unfortunately. So, I think I can take a quick step back and I want to do an overview of the 2023 flood events facility, which we had to. For people are very familiar with the July flood event. We reached a peak pool elevation of 604.33. That's 6 and a half feet below that action level where we'd have to would have had to start kind of pre operating the gates. But for just for context in terms of project history of the 4th highest pool that we've ever experienced the facility. And then in December, we had that regional flood of several inches that was on top of snowpack. This has Mount Mansfield in the Green Mountains and strange places. So we actually had a decent snowpack here. So our runoff here was higher than most other places. We actually end up reaching the 6th pool of record just a few tenths of a foot below the July event. So those are both high events and sort of the other takeaway here is that if you look at the project history and the high pools, we had the 4th and the 6th and highest pool in 2023. But the 3rd, the 4th, the 5th and the 6th have all occurred in the last 12 years of the year service history of this facility. So we're essentially asking this to do this facility to do more than we ever had at this point in its life and life cycle. And then just about our flood operation channel flood operation challenges. We have a little restrictions on the gates that have been on there since 2004. We know that our bridge and gate 2 are overstressed. And we know that that essentially leaves us with our cone valve and gate 3 for water releases during a major flood. So during the July flood in the December flood, those were sufficient, but during a larger flood, we have to make a tough call to operate pre operate gate 1 and 2. So that brings us to our temporary risk reduction project. This is a state driven initiative on the court very, very supportive of it, but didn't require it. But following what we learned about the fragility in the center gate and the fragility in the bridge. We've worked with a consultant and PC construction and we're working on shoring both of them. The image in the upper left hand corner is we're plating the strut arms on the center gate the weakest element in the system. Sorry. That was completed right around Christmas time. And so that gate is now capable is back to being able to be operated up to elevations 10.8 back to the original 75% load restriction. The bridge we're going to be underpinning technically overpinning it with steel steel beams cast across the top and bottom of the bridge and basically connecting them. That that project is that part of the project is hopefully going to start very soon and hopefully before the spring run off. And this design and construction of these temporary measures has been a budget about $727,000. And again, this should this should basically get us the operability that we need to back to our back to our operability before we've learned everything that we learned back to that is that 75% load restriction which will be operate all three gates up to that point. So now for the permanent project the one that's coming, one that's coming. These are the recommended rehabilitation measures by the Army Corps of Engineers. We're starting with the gates. So the gates are numbered here in this image gate one and two or the original 1927 of 1938 gates. Those are going to be replaced in their entirety. Gate number three, which was put on in 1950s that one is going to be refurbished. That's the first part of the project. The second part will be removal of the entirety of the hoist equipment and the existing bridge and replacement with a new bridge to modern code and to vehicle widths. That'll give us a lot of a lot better chance when we have to do maintenance on the equipment is very hard to get in and out of there because it's all this pedestrian access right now as well as bring the bridge up to the capability to safely handle the load of the gates. The entirety of the concrete in the system has suffered alkalis look a reaction so that concrete will be chip back to solid concrete which is estimated to be, you know, six to eight inches of concrete removal throughout the entire system and replacement with new concrete surfaces. And then downstream of the spillway this blue shaded area will have a concrete will be removed down about six feet and then a concrete apron will be placed there to arrest that concrete that bedrock erosion. So the total project cost based on the 10% design by the form engineers is their best number right now is 79 million with an estimated range of 60 roughly 67 to 95 million to complete this work. Other elements of the work will be will include a reservoir drawdown during this work. We'll need to provide equivalent flood protection to what we can provide now. And the only way to do that is a drawdown. That will probably persist for the majority of the duration of the project, which has been estimated in about two years. And then just also quite a bit of access issues here for a difficult site to get to and get meaningfully size equipment to do the work to so there's going to be quite a bit of access road construction and things like that just to just to get set up. So, what were these cost estimates put in place? Was it recently? Yes, this is in January. That's what kind of prompted this need for an update. I was was these up in December said. Oh, you need more states on me. I mean, Troy mentioned, I just get a quick sense for me about what that two year drawdown looks like ecologically. Like, how does it look downstream? Does it look at the reservoir? So, we don't quite as we haven't, it's going to be a design drawdown. I know I can't tell you what exactly the number is going to be yet. It could be in the 30 to 50 foot range. It would be a controlled either through our cone valve or through GMPs equipment. That's not entirely clear either. It would probably be about a two year, two year duration during that time. I think it would be managed similar to how it is now or inflow to equal outflow to the extent that you're able to do that. We have increased inflows rather than closing gates and storing it up higher essentially stored in the drain part of the reservoir. So it will somewhat perform similarly in that regard. Okay. Are we at a point to put out an RFP on this or construction or yeah, or is there already one. No, no, we're still a ways away from that we need to, we were 10% design there's gonna be a 30% design as part of the dam safety modification study. So we're essentially set forth all the parameters that need final design, then final design will be done over two year period and then it will be put out, you know, put out to the Army Corps of Engineers for bid. So we're still a lot pretty long ways away from construction bidding construction is our schedule starts with 2027. Yeah, so design if you go back to one of your page eight, page seven, your design is not due to start until 2025 next year and go on for two years. It's a great partner, but they're not very fast. Joe, depends on what's happening. It's somewhere I saw that there was some see between the earth and part is there any, is that any concern or we do anything about it. Yeah, so see which was evaluated during that initial risk assessment. We have an active de watering system in the dam and a passive active de watering and a passive collection system in the dam. That's largely when I say we go on a weekly basis that's largely what we're doing is monitoring that system and making adjustments to that system. The stand is important. We've been somewhat plagued by a history of seepage issues. So we keep a very close eye on it. And at the moment, the passive and active systems are very effective. But yeah, that's kind of something continually monitor. Not putting you on the spot, but it's the risk of failure more acute in the earth and part or in the gate part to the gate part. That's what the risk is. That's the whole objective of doing the risk assessment. The risk assessment was to point us to the highest risk part of the dam. To make sure that you're putting like limited funds to buy down the riskiest element. So that's why that was done initially to make sure we had our, we were our site target on the right, the right thing. That's came back to the spillway. Mr. Green, typically, maybe, maybe it's somebody else that answers this question, but typically what do you see as far as states portion of that money? Is it an 80 10, 80, 20, 90, 10? What do we see? It's far as segues to Neil's part of the. They have technical questions, but this is on the Neil's part with the finance and part. Do we have any more technical questions? Okay, right. Let's do this. So, good afternoon, everybody. It's nice to be here. Neil Cameron director of water investment vision. As I said before, before I jump into the, the side on the funding and the work we're doing along those lines. Just want to kind of say that I sleep better at night knowing that we've got him as the helm and you all should too. It's an amazing piece of infrastructure. I'm always stunned when I have a chance to see it. I think it's great. Here has had the idea for some time and maybe mentioned to you, Madam chair about doing a kind of a joint field visit with you all up there at some point when it was last year, there was a visit. There was one that was the one that was done. We had scheduled one a little bit ago for a couple three years ago when we were first launching the project. Yeah. We could do it on a nice spring day. I'll follow you. The photographs that Ben showed, you know, do it justice and they don't at the same time the scale is remarkable when you are on top and looking down or below and looking up. So, I'm just here to chat a little bit about the funding details. Senator Ingalls will should be able to answer your question here. So, as Ben said, the current construction cost estimate is somewhere between high 60s and low 90s in terms of millions of dollars. These are fresh numbers from the Army Corps based on their. They have a classification for their cost estimates. Hopefully they don't escalate further as we get through design, but I'll just be honest, it wouldn't necessarily surprise me Ben. They have a pretty big range on here but also would. So, I'm going to be talking about a couple different areas of funding and I'm going to make reference to the water resources development act word up. Federal, federal both authorization and appropriation that happens every 2 years. Word is kind of considered must pass legislation. It's also typically highly bipartisan and that's why we never ever ever hear about it. But it typically passes every couple of years by hook or by crook. And so word is our friend. Senator Sanders has a significant amount of leverage over what happens in word. So that is good. The work that the core is doing now is authorized by the water resources development act. It's in section 1177. And section 1177 has an authorization ceiling right now of $60 million. So what that means is that's the maximum federal appropriation that could go into this. Let me get through the slide. Previewing that there'll be questions and then we'll kind of come back through each each bit. So. Authorization ceiling is 60 the current appropriation is 40 million. That's how much federal money that we've got available to us in the bank. We also have what is called a new construction start awarded to us by the U. S. Army Corps. Three years ago that is what enabled us to feel comfortable actually signing the project agreement. A new construction start is essentially solid gold. If you don't have it the core will not work on your project no matter how much you want them to do it and how much you're willing to pay for it. So in 2020 we received that new construction start and that's as I said solid gold in 2020. We signed a cost share agreement with the U. S. Army Corps. At the time the total project cost was estimated at $60 million. And at the time so centered angles to your question the match rates were 50% for the planning and then 35% for designing construction so 50 50 for the work that Ben has described all the way up to date. Now as we segue into design it would have been 35% 65%. So in the 2022 word which is passed and was signed by the president. We achieved we obtained a match rate adjustment and we brought that match rate down to the match rate that existed when the state partnered with the federal government back in 1935 to build this thing. And we got 7.1%. That's great. That means you know anyone can do the math but if it's 100 million dollar project the state's maximum exposure is there's 100 million dollars federal money there you know about 7.1 million. So obviously if the feds never gave us another dollar then we've got a conversation to have. You've got a conversation to have but we are actively working on getting additional dollars and so that happens in two steps so first versus to lift the authorization. Senator Sanders team is working on that for us right now the committee has the authorization lift request to bring the authorization to 100 million dollars. So that's with committee now. That's what I think we'll get out of word up for this cycle. That's what they communicated to me and just for what it's worth I communicated with the senator staff on this just today to provide these same numbers to him. Ethan hinges his name. So then the next step will be of course to get some appropriations against that authorization. We all know what the appropriating environment looks like right now. And so I take no position on that obviously it's it is what it is. But our delegation absolutely knows the need. And so just to kind of summarize where we are right now so we have 40 million dollars of federal money in the bank. We have 4.5 million dollars in the cash fund from your committee's work in the bank. We have an additional 150,000 residual in match money for the design work that has yet to be spent with the core. I think those numbers are right. Okay, right. So 44.65 is in the bank. So we're a little over halfway there. If we receive additional federal dollars and I'm hopeful that we do and we are working on it all the way up. You know, we've done this briefing for Governor Scott is aware. Secretary Moore is clearly aware they communicated different levels that I get the opportunity to write but so everyone's aware of the need. The process as I said right now live legislating at the federal level is that authorization lift. And then I, you know, I have we have to trust the senators and the representative ballot to do the budget work for the appropriation. We have more match than we need for that 40 million dollars, given the 7.1% adjustment. So I think we've got enough match to take on 60 million dollars. I think that's right. We've got enough match to take on 60 million dollars. That's why we came to you last year looking for that money in the cash fund. So, we'll just argue, let's keep it there and keep the, keep the pedal down with the delegation on trying to get this fully funded. So, I'm confused in terms of what our specific share amount is. It was 5050 the design and construction 35% state match. It was, it was, it was, so where, how does that 7.1 play into that. So what happens is the way the, the way the language was put into 2022 word up is it retroactively adjusted the match rate to 7.1 for the entire project. Now, that's cool. That's our interpretation of it. We await US Army Corps of Engineers guidance, which is their term for figuring it out for themselves, right? And letting us know. But what has been communicated to us by our project colleagues over there is they view that match rate adjustment as retroactive to the start of the project. We had pretty much felt we were getting a great deal if we did 5050 on the, on the, on the planning to date, and then the 7.1 was looked forward, but that's what we heard. Yes. They've actually made indications that that could extend back to even the early. One thing I just want to add, because I think it was mentioned, the money being dispersed over a period of time, and that's true. But the one thing that the court has told us is that they won't put the project down to bid unless all the money is in place. Right. That's why we front bonered Wayne and then Mary. So, 40, 40 million funds. 4.65 capital funds. You mentioned a smaller number. What was a smaller number? Yeah, so the four and a half is in that cash fund. Right now, the capital cash fund, and then 150,000 or so that we haven't yet spent from prior capital appropriations as part of this. Yes. Okay, so now the 100 million that could come in 2024. That'll be on top. So, so we get all of that 100 million. So you have 140, 140, almost 150 million dollars now. So, 100 million will cover the project. And the hundred million dollars is the authorization ceiling. So in a federal statute, you know, they, they have authorization and then they, they plus the appropriation to that scene. So we got already got they've already appropriated 40 million. Correct. So the hundred to be six actually 60 million appropriate. Exactly. Exactly. And that is fundamentally, we are after somewhere between 1560. So, Mary. So, when will you likely know what you're interpreting the 7.1% and all of that is when will you actually know if that is actually what it is. Eric, do you have a sense from your discussions with Barbara? There's no set date. In kind of a regular communication with our contact. If not specified today, but the. That's pretty difficult for us to be kind of. Not understanding exactly what these numbers mean. To be able to help. I mean, want to do what we can obviously, but if it's something different than that. I'd offer that sort of where we are now is. We know we need more federal money and we have the money we need to continue with the design work where our agreements are signed to work. The team is there. Are you doing everything wonderfully, but we've got to shore and getting the money. And where it's kind of a guess what the 7.1 is is. Not probably feeling overly comfortable because we've got to get the money to do this project. Is there a way that we can push or would our federal folks have a better idea or able to get that information. Okay, yeah, I actually, I would say yes, they're the core tends to be responsive to inquiries of the senators. Certainly in the past when we felt like they weren't operating. Very quickly. They, you know, Senator, like he was particularly effective. We could ask, I'd love to just continue to keep the committee apprised of what's happening and maybe not take that step just yet. It, you know, things feel from a sort of an organizationally politically, all the things seem like they're in a reasonable place right now. I think. And I wish us that it will continue. Absolutely keep that in mind. We will, we will continue to put a pin on on that. Thank you, Madam chair. So I think it goes to Eric and if I'm understanding the chronology here, the construction part doesn't start till 2027. Correct. So if we were to bond out. And you mentioned that the court needs the money in essence in the bank before that. Okay. Okay, so I think there might be a way to get to that point by the time they actually want to put a shovel in the ground without doing anything more than bottom. So that leads into where I was thinking if we went back to the. Hey, Jay, which goes, that's a project steps. We have enough money right now to get us through 24, which design and cost estimate. And we have enough money to get us through the upcoming design between 25 and 27. So. And that doesn't include the 4.5 million. Then we put in your cash fund or does it. It might include a little bit. Yes. Yeah. Yeah, it would include a little bit, but not a lot. How much is a little bit. I'm going to go back and do a little bit on this. So, if we assume that we get the 7% that we probably have, we haven't changed the numbers total. 2.7 2.7 million worth of design. I think it's about half the design base. Without using the catch. That's a 70% a worst case scenario 35% that you've seen that's sort of that's the standard map for design and construct. We're pretty optimistic that they're going to agree to. We don't have any restrictions before they're matched. Pretty optimistic about it. But we don't have that sort of split me fear on the doctor. That's an important piece. The federal language essentially says that the match rate for this project is adjusted to the match rate. In effect at the time the project was first constructed. We're going to get a little bit of documentation that takes us to that 7.1% and the court has a word such as not with standing. It starts with not with standing because it not with standing is the 35% thank goodness right so hopefully there's not to not with standings in that one clause. Is it. Do you have facilities on there like green mountain power that don't pay a rent on these dams I mean it's what I'm not looking for them to be able to bump up but just future you know we're probably not the last day and we ever built and probably not the last thing that we go so what's what's the standard practice with that. We do have a license agreement with the rights. You do. Yeah. We have two facilities that have hydro power associated with this one here which amount of power kind of been partner since day one so they're sort of in that regard to other facility that has it is right still right over here which we have we have an easement with Washington electric who runs that hydro power facility we do have. We do have an easement with them that is needed being updated because they just got a new for a license. They passed agreement require them to pay I believe $10,000. And they paid that to the beach district for recreational purposes the state didn't actually get any money we've proposed. I guess we can say we propose to uptick and that perhaps I'm coming this way but that's still negotiation. So, right now we have enough money in the bank. I'm basing on 35%. To get us through the design documents. From 25 to 27. So those are calendar years. So you're talking FY 26 and FY 27 capital budgets. So next year. Really talking when the rubber really hits the road that we need to actually find the money. But right now the 4.5 that we put aside for cash in the cash fund for this. And then the previous appropriations we've done in the capital over the years. There's enough in the bank to get us through that design documents to 27. Which then gets into the construction during the summer of 27. So we're just not holding. This sort in terms of the money this is giving us a heads up. This was exactly what's down the spillway. Hopefully not. But yeah, no, I mean, we wanted to make sure that you continued to have the most up to date information we've been visiting with you about this project for some time, but it is. You see it's getting real and it's really it has produced some tangible immediate outcomes that the risk reduction work that Ben is doing now $750,000 or so of work. Super important allows him to operate the dam the way it needs to be operated. When it's done, it's going to be a different landscape up there and we just need to get it to keep him around. If this dam didn't exist more looking at the backup. What's the next highest risk down that we own. So that we'll be looking at. That's right. So there are three control dams that. Okay. So that's the moment where my thoughts are going are that this won't be done until we're probably on most of the money, which is 20 years out how many more we're going to lay on top of. Probably not an answerable question at the moment. No, it's not. But I think we need to keep that in the back of our mind. This isn't the dam. So the best case scenario for us. Is the lucky seven. And if not, then we're looking at. How much more state share. At that 35% from that would be. Let's call it 100 if you call it $100 million project there. 35 million minus the four and a half that we already have. So we'll be looking at $31 million. For two years. To your capital budget. I understand. Let's that that that we worked hard for that match rate adjustment. Have you heard any contrary interpretation of that 7.1? No, no. And in fact, just to be clear, the delegation worked hard for that. And I think if the, if the core were to come back with something that deviated substantially based on the historic record that we provided everybody, I think that. They would probably have something to say about it. And that's an administrative decision from the army core. It would not be, you know, it's it's clear in statute what they want. And where were we at with the other 2 dams similar 7.1. No, the other dams are 50, 50, 35, 65. Those are the, yeah, because that rate adjustment was specific to Waterbury. Okay. By the way, something they also are now aware of because of the floods and the pressures that right so faced. So they, they do know the value of a match rate adjustment across 1177 for all of the dams. Next, there are 4 dams in the United States that are eligible under 1177 and 3 of them are in Vermont and 1, the California one, I believe no longer exists. So, I'm always special. Senator Laney was pretty slain. The other 2. Right. So any spare. Right. And go back to necessarily be somewhere 1% go back to the. The initiation of those projects right. That's correct. And that's right. And I don't know what we have for records on those ones. But. So, I just want some clarity because we've been putting money into this for a while. 2223 we putting 1.5 million where some of that I think probably went into some of the work you've done right now. But last year we were told 4.5 million would be enough to complete the project for a match. That's not 35% of the 60. No. And the reason Madam chair is because we had obtained that 2022 match rate adjustment at that time. The 7.1. So it has changed even though you have been approved at that point. No, we just haven't risked the only the only uncertainty around the 7.1% is the army core putting their final stamp of administrative approval on their understanding of what the statutory language says. Our delegation knows it's 7.1%. We know it's 7.1%. The core staff know it's 7.1%. But the 4.5 million was based on exactly we wanted to get us up to the $60 million we thought this project was going to cost based on our best estimates from last year to the year before. So now we're bumping up to close to 90 million possibly 79 so you're still going to need even at the 7%, you're still going to need more money but it's going to be. Another 3.5 million. Over 2 years versus 31. It's a good investment. You will not. I have my. I think it's worth also trying to bring what you know that the core actually offered, you know, they were. That same percentage could be retroactively applied to the work. So I think the staff that we're working with the core. So agree that the 7.1% is likely to. So we still don't know that retroactivity to further back in terms of the documents. We felt. We know maybe they will in the end, but of course that means a little less money available overall. There's a balance. But if they do agree, I just want to follow Eric and Friday afternoon is tough. So, if they did agree with the 7.1 and it's retroact, it will go back to the design work that we have done. Which then means some of the match that we had there because that was 50 50. Right. Not all be used up on state share which would then go towards the ultimate construction. That's right. Friending that match. It was a little less than one and a half that the. Total cost 3 million that's one and a half. The reason why we've got a little bit more than the four and a half millions because they actually got started a little bit ahead of us. So we had to use some previous appropriation to make that initial amount. Under a couple of hundred thousand. That's why we actually have that. Right. One point hundred and eighty seven thousand. Balance. This is an operation that way 23 to. I said $100,000. The second half. To start. I'll move. Keep working. You will. We will keep the committee's appraise. Thank you. So nothing for this next fiscal year. Is on radar for five twenty six and twenty sevens and whoever's sitting around the table here. Next year. Anything else for folks. If you want to have anything to say. Only to say thank you and this is obviously big. It is not fully funded. Yet and twenty twenty seven. This big day. Thank you all for hosting us. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.