 Good morning, everyone. So obviously, as Cindy just said, I am the weak substitute last minute for Alicia, who was injured in a faculty student softball game, which is never, never a good idea. I remember when I first, I had played basketball for a long time in college. And then when I went out into the world of business and I played in one of these leagues in New York among various professional colleagues, believe me, it was the most dangerous thing I ever did, leaving the serious ranks for that. But speaking a bit more seriously, let me just say that it's a real privilege, under any circumstances, to kick into this discussion that we're going to have today. As so many of you know, we've been through over the past 31 years now since the Rio summits were held that launched the various regimes and biodiversity. But of course, climate and the climate convention that was created at Rio have been the most impactful of these various regimes that were created at the end of the last century. And there have been a million twists and turns ever since that that many of you will have experienced personally, sometimes bearing the scars on your body of these twists and turns. But in the broadest possible framework, we went through a long period that from, I would say, 92, up to maybe 2009 at Copenhagen, where we thought the driving force on regulating climate and managing its risks was going to come through a series of multilateral institutions that were set up under the framework convention. And for a variety of reasons, a number of key problems that included building carbon markets in their purview never really could be agreed sufficiently that the momentum that was building in the world to regulate climate was going to be adequately managed and administered through these multilateral institutions. Of course, they continued to exist, and negotiations go on every year, and there's a flurry of citations in the journals and newspapers when that happens. But consequently, action has moved elsewhere. And a lot of that action has moved into the markets because a number of technologies that were very expensive incrementally over the existing technologies that principally have been in the area of renewable power, but increasingly now in the area of electric vehicles, the market simply took over. And if you build new, generally, you build green, and that doesn't matter whether you're in the US or it doesn't matter whether you're in China, it's simply cheaper. And this green market, of course, has driven a great deal of change for the better. But at the same time, policy continued to evolve. Some of it moved into the central banks who began to realize there were risks to sovereigns, as well as to corporates and financial institutions associated with the changing environmental conditions, the increased need for sustainability. But a great deal of the activity began to move into the private sector or into self-regulation through the various vehicles of TCFD and then more and more into the net-zero world that we are confronting right now. And when you do confront that, as I'm sure people in the room know, there are a lot of open questions about how well-fitted the institutions and the regulatory structures are to the problems that we are facing on a day-to-day basis. And indeed, the world does continue to evolve in interesting fashions, either to correct, patch up some of the more evident problems, or as we'll hear today, some attempts to rethink and say, gee, maybe we should step back from all of this and begin to sort out and manage this problem on a more customized and well-targeted basis. And so those really are the discussions, but as so many of you know, companies around the world, whether they are real economy companies in commodities or steel or agricultural companies in the food system or financial institutions who are financing the global economy, all have fallen under various types of obligations associated with at least reporting. There are carbon emissions, and increasingly, we see a turn to an attempt to go beyond simple reporting and to begin to define pathways that will lead from whatever the current emission structures are toward some sort of low-carbon economy that will be generalized across countries and across sectors. And that's really where we stand right now as people begin to struggle with these issues. But as one begins to define pathways between now and whatever date at the end, 2050, 2060, whatever date one puts on this journey that is underway, it's very difficult to change your business models and your production systems overnight. And in fact, it's probably not even a good thing because you can't take down an existing highly productive economy without having something that is equal value to put in its place. And that's true in the energy sector. It's true in the ag sector. It's true in the heavy industry sectors where climate is concentrated. Climate risk is concentrated. And so we find ourselves in the middle of this continuing evolution. And one of the principal things that we are seeing is that because we do expect new technologies across the next 20 to 30 years to fall in price, become diffusable at a much wider scale, then they are currently deployed, we have a short-term problem. And much of that short-term problem is being handled through carbon offsets. And so the question is, what is the contribution of carbon offsets to the overall climate problem and the attempt to manage those risks adequately? And that's the issue that a group of us are facing here at Stanford. Mark will make that clear. Some teaching, a lot of thinking about this problem. But the interaction with all of you and of course with the people who are on the front line on the panel in some of our leading corporate entities is critical to that issue.