 Madam Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, France and Germany are the indispensable member states of the EU for reasons of history, geography, economic weight. For both of them, they had to solve the riddle of the Rhine. And the way they solved that, and it's simply that all the Elysée Treaty does is it manifests the fact that both countries had arrived at a modus vivendi, they had reconciled after the war, and that they had solved finally the riddle of the Rhine, a very old riddle. And how do we describe that relationship? Well, you hear talk of Le Coupre, Franco-Almond, so the couple, that implies a relationship. You hear of the engine or motor of integration, that implies the purpose. So in terms firstly of the relationship, they obviously reconciled within the EU, but also their reconciliation is probably the most powerful symbol of the success of the EU itself as a peace project. And that has projected itself both beyond the original six to many other member states and now to the full continent of Europe and internationally. It was probably for me symbolized most acutely in 1984 when, as the Marseillais was being played at Verdun, when Mitterhaud, he stretched out his hand to coal. And I think for me, and I show it to my students, it is perhaps one of the most moving symbols of two peoples that were finally saying it is truly over. But I think the relationship goes much deeper than this. It is the most institutionalized bilateral relationship between any two countries, I think in the international system. The meetings for breakfast between the cabinets, the bilaterans right across the ministerial system, and of course then the meetings at the heads of state and government. I don't think there are any other two countries in the world with that level and intensity of bilateral relations across the entire spectrum of the state and public policy. Also the relationship particularly in the 1960s, and we heard about it, was also people to people. It started what has now become commonplace in Europe, Erasmus, but the student engagement in the 1960s, the town twinning, but that has changed and it's changed because in the 1960s it might have been very exotic to go from Bonn to Paris. Nowadays young people want to go to Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires or Bangkok or wherever. Going to Paris is no longer quite as exotic as it once was. So I do understand that the people-to-people relationship is now different. In terms of the purpose of this relationship for the EU, I would say it has two interrelated purposes. The first is positive and active leadership and that manifests itself in the big big projects. And I look back, Brant and Pompidou, it was enlargement and the relaunch of integration post-agol, Schmidt and Desta, the EMS, it would not and could not have happened without them. Colin Mitterrand, well that was probably in the history of integration, in a sense one of the most long-lasting because it had to deal with a very complex set of issues. Shirak and Cole, not so close, no evident big project emerged. Shirak and Schroeder, again not so close but they did manage a reform of the cap and they did launch the Constitutional Convention. Mercosi, this was not a cozy relationship. It was a partnership of necessity driven from the extraordinary crisis that the Euro faced. It was not based on a convergence of views but it was indispensable to keep, so that the Euro states could finally begin to deal with the crisis and respond. And the relationship between the now Chancellor and the now French President has not settled into a predictable pattern. There isn't no Merkel on or whatever phrase one might use for it. It's not functioning as an inner core or a privileged partnership in any in the way in which those relationships have functioned in the past. That doesn't mean that of necessity post the election that they will not begin to function in this way again. The other important role that the Franco German relationship plays in the EU is that because they are so different and that's been referred to already, because they are so different and because they very frequently have very different preferences about policy solutions, their relationship, what they must do is prevent their disagreement becoming a serious cleavage in integration. And therefore what as functionally within the EU, what it does is if the Franco German relationship can manage and mediate their internal conflict, it makes the rest of the management of the EU system simpler. But to move from the purpose and function and the how of this relationship to whether or not we're seeing shifts, in other words the continuity and change, I think there has been a shift in the power balance in this relationship. When De Gaulle and Adonar signed the Elysée Treaty in the 60s, one could argue convincingly that French political power somehow or other mediated German economic power. France was one of the four powers in Berlin still, had a seat on the European Security Council and had its force de frappe. Over the years as and particularly post unification and again now with the performance of the German economy, I think there has been a shift. I think that France, it is not a co-equal relationship anymore. And I think that's probably structural. In other words, and this is particularly in the economic realm, France has influenced but not quite the power that it once had. And remember also that in an EU that stretches from southern Portugal right up to the borders of Russia and down into the Balkans as we will have, then Germany is geographically located in the centre of Europe and France is a West European power. And I think for reasons of geography also there have been shifts. In terms of the future, these two countries have very different views and continue to have very different views about the trajectory of European integration. France remains a country that is, it is statused in its history, it is statused in its reflexes. And Germany also has a very strong sense of how you run an economy, the Ordo liberalism. So these are very different ways of running an economy. Germany would be at the more open end in terms of trade. It is a very powerful trading state, whereas France is constantly worried about liberalisation unless it is liberalisation in areas where they are very strong, in other words in electricity or whatever. Let's have lots of liberalisation in electricity but not so much in other areas. And in terms of the relationship to the global international trading system, France would tend to be more protectionist in its instincts than Germany. Also very different views about the future of integration. If one listens to what Olonde is saying today, he wants a social Europe followed by a political Europe, where in other words solidarity followed by the politics, whereas from Berlin the view would certainly be that you must have stronger political interaction and political union. And then maybe you talk about mutuality and solidarity, et cetera, et cetera. And these are very, very different. We also need to think about the other dynamics in the EU. What are the other potentials of subsystem politics in the EU? There was a time in the 1980s when you could argue that the EU had a Paris-Bonne-London triad. Although Paris-Bonne was much stronger than Paris-London or Bonn-London, but there was a sense in which that there was a triad. That's not there now. There's no evidence it will be there again. I think it's a major shift in the dynamic of the system in terms of subsystem politics. In other words, what will the United Kingdom do about its relationship with the system? And I also think we need to think a little of Poland. It is too early because Poland still needs a lot of economic modernisation and has a long way to go. But I think 20 years down the line one will see a Warsaw, Berlin, Paris. And one needs to think about that. In other words, that it's not just the Franco-German couple at the heart of the system, but those other changing dynamics matter. In terms of the future relationship, I'm very glad that both speakers referred to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or ESDP, because this is where this relationship barely doesn't function and has no role to play. And I was very struck again on Mali that it was the British that offered the two transport planes immediately to France. And these are Britain and France are the only two countries in Europe that have both a capacity but also a willingness to deploy force. And that, again, is something that distinguishes both those countries as large countries from Germany. And whether Germany can afford to retain this position over the next 20 to 30 years, given the security environment around Europe, is another matter. I'd like to end by saying something about what the nature of this relationship and what its implications are for other member states and particularly small member states. Every small member state in the EU has got to be extremely attentive to the Franco-German relationship. They've also got to ensure that that relationship is exercised in a way that aids rather than undermines the formal structures of the EU. And one of the really worrying issues in the EU during this crisis is that time and time and time again the informal was trumping the formal institutions of the EU. And I think that the so-called beach walk in Deauville was for me where it was really symbolised that here were two heads of state and government meeting on a beautiful beach in Normandy discussing the future of the euro. At the same time the euro group was meeting in Luxembourg and working all day long to come to an agreement on economic governance and at five o'clock in the evening got a phone call to say what had been agreed by the two political leaders. So I think there needs to be, it is indispensable, it works for the system, it is necessary for the system, but it does matter how both these large states behave and they must always bring issues back on into the formal structures of the EU because it is only in the formal structures of the EU both in terms of institutions and process and procedure that small states get essential protection in the system. There's been a lot of debate over the years as to whether the EU needs a directoire and of course the small states always worry about a directoire. I don't think there ever will be a formal formal directoire but there could be a de facto directoire operating within the system anyway. So I think that it is really important for small states to be attentive, to be vocal if necessary and to ensure that the way in which decisions are made to marry the importance of this unique relationship but also with the right of all states in the EU to have voice and presence on issues that affect all of us and so in other words I would sum that up by saying it is important for small states to ensure that the informal does not trump the formal. That said this is an indispensable relationship to the EU, it has functioned to the benefit of all of Europe and the EU by and large with some neurologic issues from time to time and it does matter to the future of the EU that these two large states at the core of the core continue to ensure that their relationship is functional for the rest of Europe but it is in my view entering a difficult time as the EU and particularly the euro area struggles to retrofit a system that was clearly not fit for purpose and the stakes are very high over the next five to ten years as the euro area just as the euro area decides on what are really major issues for all of us as citizens of this part of the world. Thank you.