 Hello, everyone, and thank you for watching this video. I'm Jia Mincui, and today I will briefly introduce our work named on the field-based division property, applications to Mimise, Festum Mimise, and Gymimise, and it is a joint work with Kaihu, Meiqinwang, and Puwenwei. The main topic is symmetric key primitives that are efficient in several applications like multi-party computation, fully homomorphic encryption, and zero knowledge proof. In this case, the designers need to reconsider which operations are costly and which cost almost free, and it is quite different from usual symmetric primitives which are defined on binary fields. New cost metrics like low number of multiplications and low multiplicative depths are designed. These primitives usually work over large binary extension fields, F2 to the N, or large point fields. Since the size of the field is large, the S-box cannot be pre-compute or pre-stored, as in the traditional one. So they have simple algebraic representations like parmaps, x maps to x to the N, or the inverse of x. As a result, these new primitives are often algebraically simple. Since these primitives can be represented by simple algebraic representations, they are vulnerable to algebraic attacks naturally. And attacks like Gropner-Basey's attack and high-order differential attacks have shown powerful against these primitives. We have Gropner-Basey's attack on Javas and Friday, and high-order differential attacks on 4-round Mimici and Mimici. So a natural problem is how can we study the algebraic representation of the cipher? In this paper, we focus on the polynomial representation of ciphers over F2 to the N. First, we propose general monomial prediction, and this technique is used to detect the algebraic representation of field-based ciphers by tracing the so-called general monomial trials. It is an extension of division property over binary field. By using these two, we propose a new algorithm for degree evaluation based on the link between binary field and binary extension field, and we get tighter algebraic degree bounds. And we can no longer only rely on the theoretic proof to estimate the algebraic degree over finite fields. We analyze the security of Mimici, faster Mimici, and G-Mimici, and present the best high-order differential distinguisher and zero-sum distinguisher for different instances to guarantee the security level. Here is the result of our algorithm. For Mimici, we present the exact algebraic degree when D is equal to 3, the same as the theoretical proof in the recent paper. For faster Mimici, the previos only attack for 83 rounds, but we can attack for 124 rounds, and we can also give a 4-round knowing key zero-sum distinguisher. For Mimici, we search for a 50-round high-order distinguisher for the instance with block size 33 and 8 branches. This is the short summarization of our paper, and thank you for listening.