 Beth yw'n bwysig o'r hyn yn effaith. Beth Putin efallai cyd-reinfaith ynglynig? Yr wych chi'n gweithio'r wrth gwrth ddiddordeb? Yr wych chi'n gweithio'r wrth gwrth gyffredinol? Yn rhai gwlad, ddim yn ddweud o'r wlad yn gweithreun. I think that most countries, including Australia, are captives of their geography, their history and their culture, and actually none more so than Russia. Talking about history, there's a particular Russian saying about history that I want to say and it goes as follows. For we Russians, the future is certain. It is only the past that is unpredictable. And talking about the past, here's another quote. The reasons for Russia's military setbacks are manifold, abysmal preparation, a monstrous lack of coordination between the generals, and scant information on the number of enemy troops to name a few. Russia's war with Japan, Port Arthur, 1904. Doesn't that quote describe what's happening to the Russian army now? Sometimes nothing changes. And I find that very disturbing, and I know Kyle Walson does too, about today's Russia, just bear with me. In my view, Russia has no obvious or clear cut cultural or geographical borders. Think about that. It's not a European country and is not accepted by Europeans as a European country. Amongst other reasons, that's why it was never going to be a member of NATO. There are trendy types in Russia today, particularly a bloke called Alexandra Duggan and my old mate Sergei Karaganov, who conjured up yet a new geopolitical entity that is even worse than Indo-Pacific. And it's called Eurasia. I don't know what that means, frankly. I don't know where it starts. I don't know where the hell it ends. But it's very popular. As Kyle Walson has taught me, Russia is simply Russian, and therein lies the challenge if you're not a Russian. In the 19th century, the Slavophile movement saw Russia as a nation apart, and Putin is pushing that to the nth degree now. While I talk about history, and this is a bit self-serving, but bear with me. In 2016, I wrote an article for a moderately right-wing American journal called The American Interest. Nowhere near as right-wing as the national interest. I said that the Kremlin is now feeling its most confident state since 1991. It now feels it has a choice between accepting subservience and reasserting its status as a great power. And it has clearly and decisively chosen the latter course. This direction almost surely promises greater tension, perhaps serious tension, between Russia and the West. Ukraine is as likely a setting as any for the eruption of such tensions. And that is because Russia will pursue a foreign policy that re-establishes as a first priority Russian dominance in its neighbourhood, especially in Ukraine, and forgive me, Ambassador, the Baltics and Eastern Europe. If this means clashing with NATO, it will be prepared to threaten the use of force and re-established old understandings about spheres of influence in Europe. Now, I'm really sad to say that things are a lot worse than that prediction in 2006. I will come on to this, but I think that we're in not only the most serious military crisis in Europe since 1945, but, as you'll hear me say later on, I find it hard to imagine how this war will be satisfactorily concluded. I find it hard to imagine that one or the other is going to be easily the dictator without this war extending into Europe itself. Putin, in particular, casts around with the phrase nuclear weapons as if this is just a casual normal extension of conventional conflict. Sorry, but up with the volume a bit. Okay, okay. So the three things that I'm going to address are as follows. The first one is, as I've said, why Putin decided to reinvade Ukraine. There are four elements to that. I'm not one of those academics who believe that I've found the magic solution, that my particular theory of international relations is the explanatory variable for everything that happens on the planet. Real life and real policy is rather different from that, in my view. First of all, Putin argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe that Russia had experienced. He uses phrases like, Russia was robbed, and more than robbed, it was plundered. And he cites Crimea, Nashkrim, our Crimea, as that example. Secondly, he talks about the expansion of NATO. And if you'll give the language I use, but he uses a lot of harsh criminal type language, he says that NATO has expanded to within piss-in distance of Russia. Quote unquote. Third, there is his weird obsessive attitude towards Ukraine. And fourth, that his view is that Russia is returning as a great power. Let me just quickly go through those. Each one of those is worth a lecture in itself. And certainly there are some excellent books just out, which I will refer to as I go along. Fundamentally impressive books, not just because they're the best of scholarship on Russia, and not just because they're over 500 pages long, but because in each case they are fundamentally footnoted to primary sources. And I'll come to some of those. Those of you who were in Russia at the time, the Soviet Union, I wasn't when it collapsed, say that it was an unimaginable experience. You've got to remember that for 70 odd years, the Soviet Union had a unique social experiment. And its theory of communism and the dictatorship wither in a way, and the place running itself by the proletariat, and everybody having equal opportunities, a lot of people found attractive. But once you'd visited there and found it to be a third world country or worse in its standard of living and the way things did not work, and the more you heard people's attitudes using phrases such as, they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work. In the Metropolitan restaurant where the people are lined up who are going to serve you with their arms folded in their neat sort of official uniforms and ignoring you. Then when eventually they come to see you because they want to have access to foreign currency, which was illegal to exchange at great risk, you'd go down the menu and order and they'd say, we don't have that, we don't have that, we don't have that. And nearly all the shops you would go to and forgive my pronunciation, Kyle, you'd look in the window and you'd go, oh, I'd like to go in there. It would say, Zacrete y Remont, closed and being refurbished. And I could go on, but they'd worked upon this concept of the Soviet man and what they experienced was in 12 months flat in 1991, the GDP fell by 40%, life savings, critical jobs, in for instance a foreign ministry, a foreign ministry all of a sudden ceased to exist. The seniority and where you were looked upon, if you were in the side of the clique, particularly for a member of the party, all of a sudden disappeared. Rough figures in 12 months flat when the Soviet Union disintegrated and the three leaders of Russia, the drunken Siberian peasant and the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine met, the Soviet Union became 15 different countries, 15 which we have a representative here. The largest country in the world lost 40% of its territory and that 40%, by the way, was equivalent to three quarters of the size of Australia. Think about that. Russia is now of the smallest territorial size since Catherine the Great. We'll come back to her and her longtime lover Pachomkin and what he did in the Ukraine because it's still relevant. There are different views in the west about this. It is true that Gorbachev approached George Bush Sr for huge massive amounts of economic aid. He wanted a Marshall Plan and he wanted $100-140 billion US and I'm told by those who were there, but it's also in the literature now that before this the Federal Republic of Germany and America were giving millions of Deutsche Marks of Dollars and Gorbachev acknowledged it disappeared into the moor of the collapsing Communist Party and the KGB. And so Nicholas Burns, I think his name was, the US Secretary of the Treasury said to George Bush Sr, We can't be given this sort of money. It is our strategic interest to have a Russia that is capitalist and cannot afford a major defence capability and listen to these words and will be a third-rate power and will be a third-rate power. Now you can imagine the impact of that on people like Gorbachev and his surrounding KGB types. Second, by the way, Collapse of the Soviet Union, Vladislav Zubach, who is a professor of international relations at LSE, his book called Collapse, You Should Read. It is really worth reading because it will walk you through all this. The second one by Mary Sarot, who is Johns Hopkins. This is both the 500-page books, but read them. It's called Not One Inch. Let me explain that. It's all about NATO, that book, and naturally I've read it. In 1990, February, James Baker, the Secretary of State met Gorbachev and said, Look, Gorbachev, I know you won't like this, but what would you rather have? A NATO that is unified, but not under control, or a NATO that is unified, but not under control, or a Germany that is part of NATO. If you can agree to that, I promise you, NATO will not be expanded one inch further. That's why the book is called that. There are certain people in this town to the right of Genghis Khan who would disagree with that. When you look at Sarot's footnote, it is the day after Baker's meeting with Gorbachev that he, Baker, writes to Helmut Kohl and she has read that letter in the Chancellor's archives in Berlin. She also footnotes on the same day as Baker was saying that not one inch further to Gorbachev, the Deputy National Security Advisor, an old mate of mine, Robert Gates, was talking to the head of the KGB and said the same. That footnote, by the way, is not National Security Archives. It's the NSA, and you might want to think about how that was derived. This is not to say that NATO was bossed around by America and indeed the other European members to become members. We all know, particularly countries who had been occupied for 45 years by the Soviet Union, what a cruel, vindictive, nasty operation it was. My first trip to the Soviet Union, including going across Siberia, was in 68 after the invasion of Prague. So it is wrong to say that this was some plot. These countries were only too anxious and keen, and indeed were lined up to be members of NATO. By the way, I forgot to mention Baker in a recent interview said he acknowledges when he used that word or phrase, not one inch further, quote, I lent a bit far forward in my skis, but he didn't contradict it. We all know the Russians, like most countries that have long, porous land borders, are obsessed about borders and security. The problem is Russia carries it to the nth degree. As you know, the process has expanded and expanded and expanded from the late 1500s. I mean, we think Australia was a big territory to expand. Siberia is 9,000 km from Vladivostok to Moscow, and Russians were at the Pacific coast, by the way, in 1643. A bit before my countrymen, the Yorkshman called Cope, and that tells you something, but it's the sense of there are no natural borders. The longest border in the world is between them and the Chinese, and yes, they've negotiated it and concluded it some years ago, but towards the end I'll talk about some of the natural antagonisms between Chinese and Russians. Third, the attitude of Putin to Ukraine. June, July last year, he allegedly wrote a 7,000-word document about why we Russians and Ukrainians are one people, one culture, one religion, and he goes back to the time of when Christianity was introduced and before that, the auroric Scandinavian dynasty that started Russia off. And those who know their Russian history a lot better than me say, he carries it to the nth degree. He distorts and twists it. But even if he believes in it, how can Ukrainians, whether they're a Russian dissent, as many Ukrainians are, or Ukrainian Ukrainians, accept that they're now one people, one religion, one philosophy. That has now been broken and ruined for the foreseeable future, I would have thought. Putin, like some other Russians, probably many, has a peculiar attitude to Ukraine. I mean, the geopolitical complexity of Russia and Ukraine is probably worse than that between the country I was brought up in England and a place called Ireland. But the issue that Putin believes that Russia is not a real power and will not be a real power again if it doesn't have Ukraine. And he has said to people, including in the West, there is no such state. It does not exist as a state. Now clearly, not least thanks to Zelensky, who's going to be speaking to us remotely here in this university on Wednesday, this has changed Ukrainians enormously. They were already moving in that direction. They were struggling with problems, let's be frank, corruption and a judiciary of very doubtful independence. But again, as somebody has reminded me, they've had six changes of government in 30 years. Finally, Russia is a great power. He thinks that, as I've mentioned, that Russia without Ukraine is not completed as a proper great power. He talks about Roskymyr, which is the greatest Slavic state of Russia, great Russians, Ukraine, little Russians and Belarus, white Russians. And you see, it's not only him that has pushed that line. 1997, I think it was when Solzhenitsyn was about to die. He said, and by this time, of course, in six years, the 15 different countries are in existence. Solzhenitsyn said, Russia must have one Slavic country, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus. There are other elements of a great power that he believes in and that is both he and his mate, Xi Jinping. Remember how just how close they are, they've seen each other more than 30 times. A relationship quote without limit, you remember, in February this year, that the West, both of them believe, China and Russia, these two leaders, is weak, decadent and disorganised. And if you're them looking at what happened in America under Trump's lot of which pleased both of those autocratic leaders, you'd be beginning to wonder how Putin might have thought, now is the time for me to chance my arm, because he was looking at a Europe that was weak and divided. You know, a Britain that had pulled out of the EU with all that that implied. Certain states in Europe, not least Hungary, hardly showing signs of being a democratic member of the EU. And now he must be scratching his head because that weak and divided EU and Europe is pulling together in a way that I have never seen. And neither has he. And now this EU and the United States have imposed economic sanctions the like of which the world has never seen. He thought, because oil prices have been high for a long time, he'd scrolled away $650 billion US, 650, that would be his iron war chest that would enable not only to finance the war but to use it as leverage. And now, of course, these financial sanctions, the likes of which we've never seen before, put in barriers on access to the swift system, you know, banking system, and he cannot easily get hold of his foreign currencies invested overseas. So those are some of the reasons I believe he decided to reinvade Ukraine. Look, part of it is you have to try and get in this man's mind. I'm not a psychologist. I note by the way that the head of CIA, who was a former ambassador in Russia, speaks from Russian, has said recently, he doesn't believe that Putin is ill. Putin doesn't look all that well to me, but I'm no expert on that, and will come on to whether anybody's going to challenge him. So, I won't go into the military details of this war. I'm not a military person, although I was a former head of Defence Intelligence, and I can find my way around. I got the invasion wrong. I watched through December and January, the Americans were releasing a lot of what was clearly, certainly to me, classified intelligence, the likes of which have never been seen released before. 170,000 troops, and my old friends in the intelligence world in Canberra, told me blood banks were being put into the front line of the border with Ukraine. Field hospitals were being located there, and they are some of the alarm bells. The intelligence indicators are something is going to happen. By the way, meantime in dear little old Australia, down in the south of the southern hemisphere, what did our press and media cover in December and January? Well, there was COVID, COVID and COVID. There was Djokovic, Djokovic and Djokovic, and there was whatever the hell was going on in sport. You know, we were thrashing the poms at cricket or whatever, and I must say it made me rather peeved to put it politely. And there's all the signs now, and I'm told by a friend of mine who's just been in America, that our media is starting to get a bit bored. Have you noticed? It's not getting the daily, high-level attention that it used to. I actually said, I think in January, Putin's going to do something nasty, but I didn't think it was this nasty. I also said to my wife, but not in public, thank God, the Russians will be through Kiev like a knife through butter three days. I wasn't alone in my own defence. Three weeks before the inversion, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the most senior military person in the world, told a closed session of the Congress 72 hours. I think the sorts of advice and help that some of the NATO countries and America and the UK as a NATO country have been going on for a long time with training and advice, but not like we're seeing now. Putin had put a lot of money into defence, something like 700 billion after the inadequate performance in Georgia, and it was inadequate. We saw what they did in Crimea in 2014, and in Donetsk and Lugansk, Lugansk, and they performed a lot better. They performed even better in 2015 in Syria, if you noticed. If you noticed. Now, that quote I gave you from 1904 absolutely applies, doesn't it? And worse. And it's a lot worse because the behaviour of the Russian troops, if we're to believe half of the stuff we're seeing on our TV screens, is barbaric and an absolute disgrace. And if Putin has been ramming into people's minds, day after day, week after week, month after month, he controls all the media now, knows no wonder that the attitudes are barbaric attitudes by their troops. I understand why Zelinsky is talking about a victory for Ukraine, and they're doing well. And some of these modern Western weapons systems take note of just how accurate they are. This new high mars, high altitude, multiple launch artillery system, I believe has a maximum range of 400 kilometres. 400 kilometres is a distance from the northern Ukrainian border to Moscow, by the way. And the Americans ain't going to allow that. So what are the Americans not going to allow when Zelinsky says in that persuasive way of his, and he's a class act this time. I want to use high mars to bomb Crimea, and I won't put my money on the American response. For too often, we in the Western intelligence game frighten ourselves silly by saying that the opposition have got infinitely better weapons than ours. I can't tell you the number of times when I was head of the National Assessment Staff in the National Intelligence Committee in the late 70s, going as a declared agent to Moscow, and reading all this American stuff about the Russian tanks were better. Well, the Six Day War, the Israelis showed that was wrong. That the cooler class submarine, all titanium hull, can dive at 40 knots. We can't even follow it. Bull, you know what. American nuclear attack submarines followed every Soviet nuclear submarine when they left Severodivinsk, or Petropavlovskamchatsky, at a distance of 500 metres, and followed behind them day and night for months. If you don't believe me, there's an American book called Blind Man's Bluff, and a British book where the British did the same, by the way, called Silent Service. What was the other one I was told in the late 70s by CIA? Oh, Sera, you know, C-U-R, Sera. The Soviets are developing a charged particle beam weapon in the Caucasus that will be able to bring down any known ICBM. Well, we're still looking for it. And we're doing just the same, including in this town today, about China, who have no battle experience in 79. And do we actually believe, as some people in a public organisation in this town declared in public, China now has quieter submarines than the Americans. Oh, really, pull the other one. Have you ever had the briefings? No. Have you ever been on one? No. So it doesn't surprise me that myself included overestimated the Soviet military, the Russian military. I don't know what a Ukrainian victory looks like. I think Zelensky, I understand this. He wants to evict them, including that of Crimea and Donbas, and good luck to him. And we'll come onto, if that happened, what would Putin do? By the way, Putin would have to take a very different approach to Ukraine if the following bit of history had not happened. So when the Soviet Union disintegrated, it had 12,000 strategic nuclear warheads and 30,000 tactical weapons. The Americans under George Bush Sr. worked overtime to get the weapons out of places like Kazakhstan and, guess where else, Ukraine. So Ukraine signed over, and I forgot the name of the treaty, 1994. Ukraine had 1,900 intercontinental ballistic missiles. They didn't know how to operate them themselves because, guess what, the Soviets had a different way of doing that in places like Kazakhstan and Ukraine and not least where the KGB had the nuclear warheads separate from whoever launched the missiles. They had 1,900 ICBMs and one of the very best ones, the SS-18, codename in NATO, Satan, 10 independently targetable re-entry vehicles of one megaton each, 10 megatons, made in Nipropotrovsk. I don't know how to pronounce that, Ukrainian. Imagine where Zelensky would be now if he had 1,900. Putin would have to be excessively careful. Would he not? And that treaty said that the United States and NATO and Russia would protect Ukraine. And again, there's no wonder the Ukrainians are so angry. A victory for Russia looks like this. I'll keep my eye on the time. I see where we are. I'll just quickly read you something that a very good colleague of mine, no names, no pack drill, sent me over the weekend from a very distinguished Moscow commentator. Putin thinks he's winning the war. He has modified his initial plan, a quick overthrow of government and installation of a puppet regime and now basically wants to destroy Ukraine. Putin will keep wearing Ukraine and the West down. Russian military weaknesses may have been exposed, but Ukraine is facing the same pressure. Putin is betting that the longer the war continues, the more the Ukrainian government will face impossible pressures and eventually collapse. Now, you don't have to agree with that, but this has been written by a reasonable person who, by the way, also says about the leadership. Chronically, sorry, domestically, there is little to be optimistic about. No one wants to challenge Putin. The people have largely accepted the situation or feel powerless to change anything. The issue that worries me most, and I've said this at the introduction, and I don't want to be too dark and black about this, but it's a black and dark issue. Putin is using casual phrases about nuclear weapons all the time. The official figures that Russia has 1,550 deployed, long range strategic missiles. Yeah, yeah. But it has a total of 4,500 weapons in stockpile. Not put to one side, 4,500 strategic nuclear warheads in stockpile. Putin has a new, over the last two years, military doctrine which goes like this. In the event that Russia is faced by a technologically overwhelmingly superior force, open brackets, my words, NATO, attacking Russia in its own territory, open brackets, however you define Russian territory to be, we will have the right to use tactical nuclear weapons. And he's got tactical nuclear weapons in artillery shells, landmines, sea mines, torpedoes, you name it. Would he use one? You bet. It ain't going to be humiliated and lose. And that is not me sucking up to Putin. And I have to say things like that in this town, because part of the reaction one gets to a lecture like this in this town, reminds me of the 1980s, when things got very nasty with us people, scholars. In this university we had the most senior group of Soviet experts in this university, led by Professor Harry Rygby. I don't know whether Richard is here, his son, who is another distinguished China expert. Then we dropped all that expertise in this research group, and we weren't alone with it. Foreign Affairs told people we're not interested in Russian anymore, go and learn Chinese. And it went on and on. Right now, and this is not classified in ONI, Office of National Intelligence, there's one person, one who's very, very good, who's expert on, guess where, Russia. So the issue of losing our expertise is serious. Particularly now we're dealing with such a challenging topic of discussion as potential use of nuclear weapons. You can see Putin has made it, and he's covered himself by saying on my territory, well I presume, you know, if NATO attacks him in Crimea or Donbas, that is his definition of Russian territory, he has the right to use one. The problem I have with it, not only morally of course, is, there is no such thing, in my humble opinion, as the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Why? Because you're not going to stand by somebody dropping a tactical nuclear weapon on you without retaliating, and then you're on the escalating ladder. And in this school we're in. One of my predecessors, Professor Desmond Ball, wrote in a Delphi paper, one of our top scholarly papers nationally on limited nuclear war, and Des, ball of this university, so convinced Jimmy Carter, the president, that Carter wrote to Des and said, you have changed my mind and implied with regard to the Pentagon's view, which used to go on endlessly about limited nuclear war. What about a negotiated settlement? Well, if you look at this deal on grain and so on, and then what Putin did the next day, was that in Mariupol? Anyway, even if you negotiated a settlement, would you trust him? I mean, I've toyed with the idea of some of you will remember in your history the Congress of Vienna and the concert of Europe, lots of yes. And let's just remember, initially the leaders of those countries, which included all the ones that for 20-odd years Napoleon had monstered, invaded and occupied, including Russia. The initial view was, we'll settle this new Congress with the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo without the French. And I don't know whether it was Metinich or Talleyrand or Castle Ray or who won the group over to thinking, if you exclude them, things will get even nastier. So imagine if we have a new security order in Europe, which has now just been destroyed single-handedly by Vladimir of Vladimirovich Putin, there are those who think, and I won't be surprised if this is Zelensky's thinking. I understand his anger, who think that there is no way we will ever talk to the Russians again and will exclude them from any new security program. Well, I know some of you, maybe a lot of you, unlike me, don't have time for Kissinger. Kissinger's PhD was on the Congress of Vienna. It was called a World Restored, worth reading by the way, particularly now. And he's right when he says there has to be an accommodation to Ukraine, there has to be an accommodation of some sort to Russia. Now his idea of accommodation to Russia is to reinstate the status quo anti. That is, they still keep Crimea, Donbass and Donetsk. That ain't going to work, Henry. But his philosophy is dead right. But you may well disagree. Final few words. I need to just, it'd be remiss if I didn't just say a few words about Russia and China. I've written a lot about this, including a public lecture in honour of Desmond Ball last October. Russia and China are now in a de facto alliance. It will not be a NATO alliance. It won't have an article five, you know, an attack on one is an attack on another. It won't be that. But those who say that it's going nowhere are not looking at just what these two countries are doing together militarily. And that's my game. It's easy to dismiss them and say it's a marriage of convenience. Well, there's plenty of those around. It's easy to dismiss it and say there are fundamental racial, cultural and potentially boundary issues, maybe. But on the military side, listen to this. So Russia, until recently, deliberately did not export its most advanced military technology to China. And one understands that. It's now doing the following. Just give you two or three examples. I won't be too technical. So the Chinese have now got Sukhoi 35s. The most advanced fighter aircraft Russia has. And remember, by the way, that China has been trying for 35 years to make its own high-performance military jet engines. And guess what? Has not succeeded and wanted to buy the factory at Nick Probotrovsk that makes them. And the Americans stopped that. Stopped that. I'm not saying that the 35 is as good as the Joint Strike Fighter. I don't think anything is. The first thing the Chinese would know in the South China Sea should we ever be going down there would be when the Joint Strike Fighter releases a missile. They won't see it coming. The second thing is kilo-class submarines. The Russian submarines are still a bit noisy, but not as noisy as the Chinese ones. The kilo is not bad. They're so vast at China. The S-400 air defence system is probably the best air defence system in the world. The Ukrainians have got the 300 version, I think. If we came up across that to our north, we would have to use the electronic warfare version of the Super Hornet called the Grower. The world's best electronic warfare. Even worse, Putin two years ago offered to build for Xi Jinping something the Chinese did not have, a ballistic missile early warning radar. Finally, I mentioned that Xi Jinping should be looking at the problems the Russian army had and having a real look at his own so-called modern army. Remember that the PLA, the People's Liberation Army, Oath of Allegiance is not to defend China. It is to keep the Communist Party of China in power. The Red Army and the Soviet Union did not have that. It was to defend the USSR. It's a worry, frankly. If I was talking to Xi Jinping, I would say, so the Russians have had poor inadequate joint military operations between the three services. You need to look at Iran. They have scattered forces in battalion groups around Kiev in the first few days and to no avail. Russia's real military doctrine is about building up overwhelming force as in the Second World War and releasing it on one overarching goal, not penny packets of battalions of 800 people. You need to look at your own force structure. Conscripts have performed poorly. You've got conscripts. Russian conscripts were not told they were going to war. They were told they were going on an exercise. By the way, the Ukrainian ambassador here, Vasyl, has told me when I said to him, so what do you do with Russian prisoners of war? We frisk them down. We find their mobile phone. We find their mother's telephone number. We ring their mothers and say, this is Vasyl from Ukraine here. We've got your son, Ivan. Why don't you come and pick him up? How clever is that? That is seriously clever. I doubt Xi Jinping has that in him. There is the issue of poor logistics, dismally poor logistics, Russian tanks running out of fuel near Kiev, the soldiers running out of food and robbing IGAs, if that's what they have. The other issue is the breakdown and poor quality of components. Xi Jinping, your mates in Russia, have a corrupt military acquisition organisation. What's yours like? You wouldn't want to bet money, would you? My final sentence. There's a very good friend of mine who's here, told me this joke. It's a Russian joke. So I see her 2040, and Sergei and Ivan are walking together. Sergei says to Ivan, Ivan, do you remember way back in 2020, when we said that China would never attack us, as the pair of them crossed the Chinese border with Finland? Thank you.