 Alex has already pegged me as somebody who's going to talk about human rights. I'm actually not going to do that, at least not as such. I was going to start off by saying that we are at a critical juncture in Afghanistan, but it does seem like we're always at a critical juncture in Afghanistan. And at least as long as I've been working on it, which goes back further than I actually care to specify. But the question I'd like to probe here is, it was one Michael raises toward the end of his talk and also in the book, which is what is the broader strategy, the broader reform strategy that any kind of successful reconciliation effort has to be a part of? And what role or what part of that really will include accountability? What place does accountability have as part of that larger reform and reconciliation effort? Right now we've got what, five, six weeks before the elections, an election that seems likely to return the Karzai administration to power and with his new alliances with a lot of the some of the people Minister Jolali mentioned as having had fairly dubious track records in the past. People who were co-opted or accommodated as part of the initial bond process. But without, I would say without any kind of built in accountability as part of the terms of that bargain. And I don't know now, I guess the question is how do we not only ensure that that is part of whatever terms we agree on for reconciliation process, but in a sense how do we retrofit that whatever process we have on the ground now to ensure we've got our track for state building and successful institutional reform in Afghanistan. Michael, you mentioned that in the sense that everyone, there's a general agreement among the different sides of the insurgents and the rest about wanting a just government, stability in Afghanistan and justice. But if we go back to, again, the bond process, I'm not sure we would say that that really was something everybody was in agreement about. In one hand, yes, we all wanted stability. But at what cost really, what does stability really entail? Was it really the co-option that took place as part of the bond process, the accommodation of many of the former Majahidean leaders, was to ensure that they were on board in bond in agreement with the general framework of the bond process. But there was very little required of them to, that they had to, the very constraints on behavior, very little required of them other than that agreement and technically agreement to disarm. But even that was very vague in the provisions of the bond document. Although the bond document does say, the bond courts do say that all weaponry, eventually they all should be part of a, I can't remember the exact wording now, but it was disarmed essentially, that wasn't the exact terminology. Disarmament became then a critical, very complicated and delayed part of the reform process immediately after bond. Michael, you mentioned the confrontation between Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani and Defense Minister Faheem over funding for the Ministry of Defense and primarily over this continued funding of militias and the failure to disarm very many of the militia forces. And even after that somewhat successful confrontation, which did finally pave the way for DDR to get underway, we still today have an enormous problem with illegal militias and that many of them loyal to people who still manage, still hold positions of power at various levels within the administration, within the parliament or outside. And that failure to find a way to ensure that these, the accommodated leaders, those brought into the process at bond or that came on board at bond, followed through and were held to account to at least that part of the bargain to disarm, undermine much of the other efforts at institution building in Afghanistan. The Ministry of Interior still remains largely unreformed, huge problems with the police building a competent professional police force and the rest. We have enormous problems now throughout the administration with allegations of corruption at all levels. I don't know, I guess the question to me is how do we build in some kind of measure that those being brought in or given a place at the table or given a piece of the political pie as it were are held to account in this way, that they are held to some kind of terms of how, so they end up then undermining what we're trying to achieve in terms of state building in Afghanistan. Stability of to say laying down arms and agreeing not to continue fighting either the government or international forces is one thing, but stability in the broader sense of not undermining the institutions of the government is a larger part of the overall, the end result that we want to achieve. And I guess I would see that, one of the questions I guess then if we pursue that, I think I would agree when Alex mentioned the kind of three choices before us and then the more than that, but I think many of us would agree that we're going to have to come to some kind of negotiated settlement if we're ever going to achieve an end to the conflict in Afghanistan. But if reconciliation would eventually, would mean only accommodating another set of militia commanders without some kind of agreed upon set of rules or their agreement to kind of rules of the game, the rule of law, then it would not then I think contribute overall to stability in Afghanistan. But this would apply not only to these commanders being brought in, but obviously back to the initial group of commanders who were part of the post-2001 settlement. And if we don't have at this point a state that is functioning very well to ensure that there are some kind of constraints and checks on behavior, who is going to enforce this kind of these rules of the game? Who's going to ensure that those new, those brought into the process will abide not only swear allegiance to the government and agree to lay down their arms, but disband, disarm militia commanders and essentially cooperate with the institutional reform that's underway. And I'll leave it there.