 Hello, everyone. Thanks for the chair for the introduction and thanks to Conbridge International Journal for organizing the event in such a special way. Well, firstly, I will give a screen sharing. Of course. So my topic today is the Meringue Genetic Resources, specifically the boundary sharing mechanism of the upcoming baby and J instrument. Well, my presentation is about five parts. Firstly, is the background of the currently negotiated baby and J instrument. And secondly, I'm going to introduce the MGRs and its fundamental contradictions. And next, I will show you some specific design process of the boundary sharing of the MGRs. And lastly, I've analyzed some options of the root selections and give my preliminary conclusions. So let's begin with the background. In 2015, the UN General Assembly decided to initiate an internationally legally binding instrument on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. Well, till now they're helping four prepared committees and three intergovernmental conferences. The first one, which is also the last one was intended to be held in April this year. However, with the influence of the crisis, the conference has been postponed. In November 2019, the president of the IGC has also released a revised draft act that consolidated options raised at previous negotiating sessions. Well, the text is for discussion purposes only. However, it's also very helpful for us to know about what's the progress has been made so far about the IGC. The negotiation has addressed the package deal about four elements, just like as displayed, while my focus is about the marine genetic resources. However, what is the MGRs? What's the definition and contradictions among them? Firstly, there is no international agreed or legal definition of MGRs. However, there are some description about genetic material and genetic resources in the Convention of Biological Diversity. And we can also see from the president's aid to negotiation because it also provides some the MGRs as following. I think they has inferred by the Convention on the Biological Diversity. Besides, there are also some conflicts between about the legal status of the MGRs, whether under the freedom of the high seas or the principle of common heritage of mankind. Well, from my point of view, neither of these two categories is really applicable to the MGRs. The freedom of the high seas means freely occupation, which might bring the tragedy of the commons back again. However, the CHM are only concentrated on the distribution of economic benefits, so it has the implication of property rights. And in practice, the CHM is also manifested as the parallel development mode of the ISA, which makes the distribution of monetary benefits as the main content of the principle. However, its ethical significance has been seriously ignored. Regarding the process of the benefit sharing, there are three main questions, namely the subject, the scope, and the modalities of benefit sharing. Well, in other words, it can also be interpreted as who can share the benefits and who gets the benefits accordingly, what benefits can be shared, and how to share the benefits. Also, about the duty of sharing, the draft tax is now limited to contracting states, but also natural or juridical persons. Regarding the beneficiaries, the draft agreement makes its part in general, however, considering different interests of in situation, special attention could be paid to developing countries. And also, what benefits can be shared are to aid of the draft tax as well as the scope of application of MGRs. However, there are also debates about whether the use of fish adds commodity and the derivatives can be shared. Most countries insist the former does not belong to genetic resources, so as to avoid the shock on existing marine fishery order. There are also objections to the inclusion of the relatives as well. In cases where the scope of the relative is unknown, such claim is not really reasonable. Well, there is also progress about the traditional knowledge of indigenous people and local communities, since this has been included in the draft tax as a separate article. So whether the benefits can be retained is not clear. And there are debates about different access of the MGRs as to be considered separately, especially on the inclusion of acetylxides and acetylxides. Regarding the sharing modalities. There are two main parts of views in the Vivian Gen Lociation process. The first is that it should include both monetary and non-monetary sharing of benefits in which most developing countries firmly support this position. And the second is more restrictive that monetary sharing can only be achieved through non-monetary forms, which was reflected by the developed countries. Since these parties are required to take the necessary legislative or administrative or policy measures as appropriate in order to ensure the benefits are shared in accordance with the agreement. Accordingly, there are different voices on this rule selection of benefit sharing mechanism, especially the mode of international C5 authority and the marine scientific research regime. While the RSA is regulated in the Article 140 of the UN Clause, in general, it has a sound institutional setup and a relatively stable operating mechanism. However, in its practice, it has indeed promoted the implementation of the minor resources sharing system in the area. But if the RSA integrates these functions into the role of genetic resources or the establishment of a separate MGR body, although there is coherence between the RSA regulatory regime of VC mining and potential regime for MGRs. However, such scheme has expanded the authority and surely has some adverse effect. Also, the RSA model does not take the specialties of MGRs into consideration, especially the intangible resources form and its longer benefit cycle. NAPDULAR since the negotiation of the non-clause is a game of interest in 1980s. Most of the content of the R11 part about the area is the compromise between the developed and developing countries. So simply expanding the function and management of the authority is really not a good option. In terms of the marine scientific research regime, which was proposed by the EU as a pragmatic hybrid solution to the opposition of the freedom of Pisces and the principle of common heritage of Mankind. Well, such an option just from part 13 of M-clause will also adapt from the Nagoya protocol. However, the practical significance of the MLSR is rather limited. Since there is no definition of MLSR in M-clause, the contents of each provision are too broad and both living and non-linear resources are integrated. Besides, the MLSR is only conducted for the scientific aim, which excludes the monetary benefits of the factual, and the MLSR has different regimes outside and within the national jurisdiction. If we return a similar rule in the BB&J agreement to the framework of MLSR, even if the content is reasonable, we will face some extremely serious questions of legitimacy, because it blurs the boundary of jurisdiction. So finally, it comes to my preliminary conclusions. While the aim is always to promote a fair and equitable sharing of benefits, however, some elements may not be ignored in this regard. Firstly, the new agreement should not undermine the provision and existing framework of the M-clause. However, there are also some lessons can be learned from the MLSR treaties. For example, to build a global MLSR mechanism from the Nagoya protocol, and also recognize different types of benefits in order to decide whether they are shared on a mandatory or monetary basis in the affiliate of MLSR. As for the guiding principles, the expression of the benefits of mankind as a whole is used in the drug tax. I think such wording is desirable, so as to avoid the controversies of the principle of common heritage of mankind. We also insist the objective will be fair and equitable sharing. Lastly, about the sharing modalities, due to the special character of the MGRs, there are very few products that commercially available and have monetary benefits. So the agreement should give priority to non-monetary benefits, while not to share the monetary benefits before the large-scale commercial uses of MGRs. And a possible solution in the drug tax is the establishment of a special fund to share monetary benefits during the embargo on genetic sequence data or when commercializing products based on genetic resources. Actually, there is only one conference left in the agenda. However, the tax is still largely to be defined and discussed. And some scholars believe that the agreement will finally turn to be a soft treaty in the end. And since lots of divergence may not be solved in a very short time, where the consensus can be reached and what is the final outcome is still remain to be seen. Well, let's just wait and see. And that concludes my presentation. Thank you very much for listening.