 I remember when we were doing the Chinese fraud trade, there was one fund. If they were invested, you know, we sort of, for a while, for a couple of months, we just went after all the names in there. And it was just like, okay. It was, you know. Have you ever been stopped out of a short and then ultimately been proven wrong and kind of missed the move that later came? Or have you never really had to deal with that yourself? Oh, all the time. Yeah, I mean, if you like, if you stick to your guns on shorting, as a hedge fund, you'll be out of business. As a trader, you'll lose all your money. You know, shorting is not anywhere. It's not the place you want to be a hero. Correct. You'll get your face ripped off. Yes. You'll be stopped out of it all the time. 14 years of doing this. Yeah. You're a thick skin. I can't even, I can't even, you know, unless it's a number of times I've been stopped out and then like been right about the pieces. I find we're typically right about the pieces, but that doesn't necessarily mean the trades are profitable. Yeah. As a fund manager, how do you determine risk on certain trades like that? Are you, like do you have an, is it like an A plus set up to you, right? Like that kind of idea? Or is it like, you know, each different time you attack a company, you're going to increase your risk depending on your, how certain you are that it's going to go down kind of thing. How do you determine that? Yeah. Yeah. So some ideas, you know, we like better. Some ideas, you know, we believe in the fundamentals, but from a risk management standpoint, you know, we make those positions smaller. There's a lot that goes into it, you know, the quality of the idea, the market environment, you know, April 2021, you're probably sizing things differently than, you know, middle of 22, for instance. I remember Hindenburg came out with a report back then. I think it was like February 21, and he like came out with a report and he's like, we don't have a position. The market environment definitely impacted his position sizing there and that he had no position. He had the report then, so he came out with a report. Well, all this work went into this research, so I guess I'm just going to put it out there, but I'm not sure. Yeah, Hindenburg knew that, and I think that was within weeks where Citron announced that he was no longer shorting and that was like the top of the market, you know. Yep. Destroyed over the next 18 months. Refrespect, that's obvious. But, yeah, you know, so market environment will impact our position sizing. Yeah, there's a lot, you know, we've just done this a lot over many years. And so, you know, I think we have a sophisticated perspective on how to go about the strategy. Absolutely. That's super cool. Recently, like about in the past six months, we had this sector where there were tons of like China junk stocks just going like to the moon. Did those ever hit your radar to maybe do some like activism on, or maybe you did some? I think all of those are just too small for us. You know, we want at least like 10, $15 million ADV and borrow available. And I think a lot of those like China, like I don't know what that stuff is, right? Like who's doing it and treating it? Like we watch it, but it's just too, like a lot of that stuff's just too small for us to trade. So our focus isn't there versus stocks where we can build sort of more meaningful positions and get borrow and stuff. Yeah. And also recently you did the whole short report on Tilray. Maybe you could kind of explain how you went about that process to our viewers. Yeah. So, you know, we like stocks that are on the shorts where management is constantly diluting shareholders. And, you know, I think on the short side, we like situations where, you know, the crowd has gotten to the stock and sort of, you know, the long side gets crowded, but the thesis is wrong. And so what's happened, what happened with the marijuana stocks is that the legislation, the progress on legislation in the US is good for most weed stocks like the MSOs, but it doesn't really help the Canadian licensed producers. And yet they participated in the rally, partly because, you know, they've been heavily shorted and the stocks have done so badly. And so, you know, Tilray benefited from that. So it was up a lot on the marijuana news, but really wasn't benefiting from the legislation. And then, you know, those Canadian players are just continued just to be in a world of hurt because they're really competing with, you know, individual private farmers and much smaller companies. And it's an oversaturated market. Supply and demand is not in their favor. They're not generating profit. Tilray's been trying to diversify into other lines of business. They bought and has a craft beer business. We think that that acquisition doesn't make a whole lot of sense. It won't be successful and... Well, it goes better than beer and weed. Yeah, I didn't like it. I think just for them, you know, that craft beer is... It's a very local market, you know, so acquiring all of these sort of like craft beer brands that Inhaz and Bush wants to get rid of is probably not going to be very successful. Seems kind of like just a guilty pleasure of someone in on the board or in very far upper management, as you're saying. You know what? I want a craft brewery. It's a vanger. Yeah, you know, we talk about this in the report, but I think, you know, the CEO or Irwin Simon has a prior track record. You know, he sort of ran Hain and the stock went up a lot and then it went down a lot. And we have this sense that he just likes to acquire things and like make deals, but like the whole thing doesn't really make much sense. And Hain was a good example of that where he was just acquiring a bunch of stuff, but you know, those acquisitions didn't play out as originally anticipated and the stock has done pretty badly. Hain's done pretty badly and he's sort of doing the same thing with Tilray, in our opinion. And, you know, I think when you acquire stuff, you have to have, you know, a sound basis for doing so and should be accretive and not really sure that's what he goes for, his track record of not really. So you mentioned these particular CEOs that kind of have a habit of going off of the rails. Is there kind of like a little list, like a black list of, if these particular CEOs take a role in a company, you immediately target that company as a potential short later on. Are you following any of these people in what they do professionally? There are actually some that we do follow, yeah. The habitual offenders. Yeah, I find, I don't know if it's like our, it's not like our number one screening tool. You know, we have a team, right? So, you know, some of the investment professionals probably use that as more of a sourcing tool than others. For the most part, you know, our team's pretty experienced. And so I let them source ideas, you know, how they think is best versus sort of superposing some process on what they do. And I'm sure, you know, they do look at the players, but we like situations where, you know, the stock has done well and people have crowded into a name and we can publish on it and sell. Sometimes we're reacting to things that have gone parabolic, areas of the market that have gotten hyped up, and then we do research on it and we say, oh, well, there's that CEO that we saw before or that, you know, pipe fund and their capital structure or whatever the case may be, you know, whatever sort of some of these players that we've seen before. And we like to take the other side of, I remember when we were doing the Chinese fraud trade, there was one fund that if they were invested, you know, we sort of, for a while, for a couple of months, we just went after all the names in there. Not one of the analysts from it, like we're really good friends, but. Yeah. Just business. They thought that the companies were real. And then as the short activism came out, you know, they sort of realized that they weren't real. And so then they started shorting the stocks themselves. I mean, as day traders, that's a side of fundamentals that we can really appreciate is there are those particular funds that just have a tendency to do that really toxic financing. And you know, if they're involved, there's some shiesty business going on and they're gonna offer it some ridiculous price based on these warrants or this or that or anything. And you mentioned pipes as well. There's a Twitter guy, Auspex Research, that is, he wrote this huge back in the day of when twit longer was a thing. He wrote this huge thing about the habitual offenders on the pipe, on the pipe list. And I think that's one that day traders can really appreciate is... Yeah, we actually wrote a report on a FFIE, Fair Day Future. Oh, cool, yeah. And we had the report and we're sort of sitting on it. And you know, we started seeing these pipe funds in there. And I'm like, you know what? We won't issue the report. It's like, I don't want this trade to be crowded. This is just gonna be the gift that keeps on giving. So we're just short of the stock going down. And then like every time it would pop, I'm like, should we come up with a report? I'm like, no. Like short, the bar cost is still below the temperature. I was just like short, short more. And we sort of like actually didn't put out the report because it's sort of like rather than getting the name credit because part of the problem with our reports is, you know, we get some of these names crowded and we look at what happened with AI, et cetera. You know, like is part of that squeeze because Kerasdale came out with the report, right? And so the case can be made. In that situation where now you have that knowledge, are there any situations where you are in terms of like protecting risk profiles and things like that? Are there strategies that you put in place that you know, when you put this short report out, you need to put it out. But the herbs of the retail world are probably gonna try to run this up. Do you do anything as a fund to protect against that and maybe hedge that position? Yeah, so I don't, I actually was saying, I think that it's, I think one of the impact of the increased participation by retail in the stock market is actually, there's a lot more people shorting stocks, right? You sort of don't talk about you, talk about you, you hear about the apes and you know, people buying AMC and Robinhood, but as retail's got like most, most investors aren't like buying AMC stock on the long side, you know? Like some of them talk about it and they put out eight means, but like most people don't want to lose money in the market, right? They wanna make money in the markets. You're likely to have your sort of typical retail investor actually be short AMC than be long AMC. People don't really talk about this, but like it's sort of intuitive, right? Like AMC has been short for a long time, you know? Like the lever, these movie theaters aren't gonna generate enough cashflow to cover their debt, right? And so you sort of, you know, they get heavily shorted and people think it's just hedge funds shorting the stock, I'm not sure that's true. I think it's a lot of retail shorting these stocks. These names, they get crowded. I don't know if like Carmani gets crowded or ANC gets crowded. I think it's a lot of retail shorting the stocks that's making it a crowded short, causing those high short interest then causing those.