 It's lovely to see you all and welcome to this, our foreign policy and politics session of the 2023 Japan update. My name's Amy King and I'm a Fellow at the Australia Japan Research Centre and a member of the Coral Well School of Asia Pacific Affairs here at the ANU. It's wonderful to be chairing this panel session this afternoon. I'd like to acknowledge and celebrate the first Australians on whose traditional lands we meet today and to pay my respects to elders past and present. I think it's fair to say that it's been an extremely eventful year in Japanese foreign and security policy. In December, Japan released the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program, which together detailed Japan's plans to respond to a security environment, which it deems to be the most secure, sorry, the most severe, not secure, the most severe and complex since the end of World War II. It perceives that security environment as being particularly challenged by North Korea, by China, and by Russia. In response, the Japanese government plans to expand its military capabilities, including by acquiring a counter-strike capability and to increase military expenditure from its historic limit of 1% of GDP to 2% of GDP by 2027. Japan's external strategic relationships are also changing. Although the alliance with the US has remained central to Japan's foreign policy strategy, Japan has made significant efforts to increase its strategic cooperation and military interoperability with a range of partners, both in the region and further afield. In the past year, Japan has signed reciprocal access agreements with both Australia and the UK, has committed to expanding its strategic relationships with India and Italy, has plans to establish its comprehensive strategic partnership with ASEAN, and has initiated a new Official Security Assistance Policy, which will fund and transfer military equipment and weapons to like-minded countries. Japan's understanding of the deeply intertwined relationship between economics and security is something that goes back to the Meiji restoration and has shaped Japanese policy and foreign relations fairly consistently since then. Perhaps for this reason, Japan in 2023 continues to be at the forefront of global efforts by countries trying to knit together their economic, technological, industrial, foreign aid and development and national security strategies. Over the last 12 months alone, Japan has taken steps to fortify itself and its regional partners against economic coercion to strengthen supply chain resilience in critical materials, and to more proactively align Japan's provision of official development assistance more closely with its wider national security and foreign policy goals. So there's been a lot going on. And to help us think through these and many other issues, I'm delighted to have an all-star panel joining us today. I won't provide extended biographies of our panelists. Their achievements are many, and their biographies can be found in the program. But let me please welcome Soya Yoshida Hideh, Professor Emeritus at Keio University, Mia Oba, Professor of International Relations at Kanagawa University, and Mike Green, Professor and CEO of the United States Study Center at the University of Sydney. I'm going to ask each of our panelists to speak for about five to seven minutes in turn on key issues in Japan's foreign and security policy over the past 12 months. We'll then open up to questions and discussions, both from the audience as well as from our live stream. So Yoshida Hideh, turning to you, you've recently co-chaired, and I'm going to show this off, a major report entitled Asia's Future at the Crossroads. Could you tell us a bit about the nature of that crossroads and how Japan is positioning itself in the face of it? Thank you, Amy. It's good to share this panel once again. As I checked the past history of this update, I was invited in the second update. And Shiro-san has been very kind since then. I really appreciate your friendship and professional kind of contact. And well, I'm not here to publicize the report, but I will basically talk about why I decided to sort of work on this and the kind of a sense of problem that I have and allow me to start from there. And it may sound a little bit critical about the current sort of state of Japanese government approach to traditional security, but it's an intellectual criticism. Policy-wise, I support it, but partly. And the point is, if this is everything, we are perhaps in the course of collision course. And we cannot move from the region. And I don't like war between China and the United States. And therefore, how to avoid this, this sort of worst case is also very important. But according to the current paradigm, so to speak, of the government, only one sort of preparation for this worst scenario is deterrence. Deterrence, deterrence, deterrence. And deterrence is, of course, important. And preparedness in the traditional sort of power politics is, of course, very important. But the more important thing is what to build upon those foundations. I think that is a key to the second set of problems that I just raised, which is how to avoid this kind of self-fulfilling prophecy coming to true. And if deterrence works, of course, it would be a happy ending. But of course, there is a worry about this collision course to be frank. And economically and otherwise, this is a tragedy, catastrophe for everybody, including the Chinese, of course. And so that was a sort of problem, since the problem that I had. And from this perspective, our take, or not, so to speak, of the current existing document is as follows. It's a paradigm shift, really. The framework represents virtually a paradigm shift of Japanese security approach in several dimensions. The so-called post-war Japanese framework of security defense policies. Number one, we virtually stepped down from the stage of power politics. There was a sort of self-conscious kind of determination among the government people. And the security analysts as well, the post-war Japan cannot directly play power politics. And number two, defense preparedness is justified in the name of Tosenshu Boe, a strictly defense-oriented approach. And Kibanteki Boeiruku, which is basic defense force, that was the concept. But in the current document, these two are totally changed. Document is facing current security environments squarely and talking a lot about balance of power, power politics, geopolitics. And secondly, it says the core of Japanese approach is its self-defense capability. And the document explicitly says, we do not subscribe to the previous basic defense force concept. New concept is concept of Shoyo Boeiruku, required defense force. Its document says explicitly. So as a concept, it's a paradigm shift, really. And so it's important, very much important. But we don't see much debate among the Japanese. The reason may be, you know, international environment, security environment may be that difficult. So there is such an air, so to speak, which covers not only Japan, but everybody pops in the world today. But lack of debate, I think, is intellectually a problem, of course. If paradigm is perfect, of course, everybody should welcome it. But I think it's only partial. Effectiveness could be partial. So our interest is, again, what to build upon this. And so this is not arguing against my green. You may not like it, so I'm not going to give it to you. But anyway, what to build upon this on the kind of things which Mike is working on. So it's complementary to be frank. That's my thing. But anyway, so that's a sense of problem. And if things move on this track, I think Asia will be divided eventually. We don't like to be pushed into the corner where we have to choose between US and China. That's what ASEAN people say. I think most of Asia people say that. And I think Japan should be the same. We don't want to be pushed in that very end of the corner where we have to choose between US and China. If choice is there, of course, we're going to choose US, no problem, and no question. I think that's the attitude of many, but if not all. So Asia may either be divided or will be in a catastrophe. So continuing to tread on this course, I think, and without really serious public debate, I think that's a problem. And so that's the nature of this report. And I've run out of my hard copies. So if you're interested, if you give me my email address, I will send you a PhD file of this. Yeah, I'm serious. Well, so what's the substance of this? For the lack of time, I will just present my pet theory of sort of middle power cooperation. And I sometimes use the term squeezed middle between US and China. So effective cooperation among the squeezed middle. I think that's what we are aiming for and what has been terribly lacking in our region. And Japan-Australia relationship is very important from this perspective to me as a cooperation between squeezed middle. So that's a strategic position, a position that I have between US and China. In reality, we are on the side of the US, of course. But conceptually, sometimes it's useful to think that you are just in between. And that gives up a kind of new horizon in thinking about potentials as well as problems. And the last thing that I want to say is about South Korea. From this perspective, South Korea is terribly important. And the lack of effective cooperation between Japan and South Korea is a huge loss, huge opportunity cost for the entire region, not only between Japan and South Korea. And if Japan-South Korea relationship gets in shape, then I'm dreaming about a time when effective actual cooperation among Australia, Japan, South Korea, taking some shape. I have my pet idea, but I don't have time during discussion if there is a time. And I think these kind of efforts were terribly lacking as a concept in the current government document. And even among experts in the debate about security and national policies. So those things are in my report. So if you are interested, give me your email address. So thank you. I'll finish here. Thank you. Mia Oba, as Soya Sensei has remarked, well, then that's exactly what we'll come to, particularly because as 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of Japan-Azian friendship and cooperation. And you have recently chaired the government's expert panel on this relationship. I guess I'm curious to ask you how that long-standing Japan-Azian relationship is changing given what we've just heard about all of these new developments in Japan's own paradigm shift in terms of its foreign and security policy. And I guess in particular on this question of we understand the long-standing view within ASEAN of wanting to avoid choosing sides between the US and China. Is this a view that Japan also shares? Or is this an area where there will be, I guess, a challenge in the Japan-Azian relationship? Interested to hear? Yeah, thank you very much. Thank you very much for your introduction and the question. And thank you for the AJLC staff and all the people who prepare for this big event. Thank you very much. So my specialty is now regionalism in Asia and Asia-Pacific, including the ASEAN. So sometimes I write about ASEAN and the Japan-Azian relationship. But before that, so I studied the development of the Asia-Pacific regionalism. And then at that time, I focused on the Australia and Japan. And then so Canberra, I had many, many memories in Canberra for my research, for my dissertation. But anyway, then anyway. And then so, yes, I talked about the brief history, so the relationship between the ASEAN and Japan. So at the starting point of the ASEAN-Japan relations was in 1974, 1973, I'm sorry, 1973. So when the Japan-Azian held the synthetic labor forum. So it means that at that time, Japan, Japanese companies, and exported synthetic labor to all over the world, it provided a negative impact on the natural labor industries in the some ASEAN countries, especially the Malaysia and Indonesia. And then so they tried to negotiate this issue with Japan. But so individual, so negotiation was not so good for them. And then so they used the ASEAN as a forum to negotiate with Japan. This is the first time. So it means that it was not so happy starting point for Japan. So at that time, so Japanese and economic power and the presence was prominent in the Southeast Asia. Japan provided a huge amount of ODA into the Southeast Asia and exported the trade, exported many goods to Southeast Asia. And so Japanese company began to invest the huge amount of the finance into the Southeast Asia. And then so Japan's economic presence was so big at that time. But on the other hand, you know, Japan has a very negative legacy, so during World War II. And then so that legacy related to the bad memory about Japan in the Southeast Asia. And such a Japanese big presence and economic presence in the Southeast Asia sometime led to the very strong criticism from the Southeast Asia against Japan. So for example, in 1974, Prime Minister Tanaka visited the Southeast Asia, so Jakarta and Bangkok. So they faced a very big anti-Japanese riot at that time. That's good. That is a story. So at the starting point, so in the 1970s, so there was a very big power gap between the Southeast Asia and Japan. And so the Southeast Asian perspective towards Japan, it was forced. As an economic partner, it was OK. But on the other hand, people in Southeast Asia have signed a kind of resentment or the kind of negative image against Japan. So Japan had a Japanese Prime Minister Fuku-da and had to deliver the Fuku-da speech in Manila in 1977. So which emphasizes the importance of the relationship between the ASEAN and Japan. And he also said Japan and ASEAN should be the equal partner. So in 1977. So but now in the 2020s, so the situation has drastically changed. So then so in our expert panel for the ASEAN Japan 50 anniversary, so we held the meeting once a month from the last May to the end of December. So then so we have to focus on how change so all the Japan-ASEAN relationship and how change the Japan and the ASEAN. And so we submitted the final report recommendation to the government. And then so of course it was written in originally Japanese. But I asked Mofa to translate it into English so you can read it this one in English. So if you are interested in that, so please access to the Mofa website. You can easily find it. But anyway, so I would like to focus on some point from my point of view. So then the first one is the power gap between the ASEAN and Japan is shrinking. So now the total GDP in 2022, total GDP of the ASEAN, 10 ASEAN countries, reached maybe 3.5 or 6 trillion US dollar. And then Japan, as for Japan, 4.2 or 3. So then so the gap between the ASEAN and Japan is very shrinking. It's a very drastic change compared to the situation in the past. The second one is, of course, against such economic development, so the ASEAN has become to be a more active player, proactive player. And their voices become so loud, so in the regional and international scene. So examples of the last year, so Indonesia was a cheer of the 2020. Joko and the Indonesian government so succeeded in delivering the joint communique of the summit and to deliver it, deliberately manage the G20, so meeting. So and then so it's a case. And then so now the ASEAN is not the association of the small countries. So now it has a very big voices and influence in not only the East Asia and the Southeast Asia, but also in the world. And the second one is, so Japan's policy shift. So I want to focus on this one. So in the past, Japan tried to or Japan had to consider the negative legacy. So with the end of Southeast Asia. And then so they did not want to take the role in the political and the security field. So then so Japanese government rather emphasizes the focus on the economic cooperation so with Southeast Asia. So but now, so especially in the during 2010, so since the second of the era of the administration and Japanese government tried to promote not only economic cooperation, but also defense cooperation, defense cooperation and security cooperation. So with Southeast Asia or the ASEAN. So for example, so now Japan and Indonesia and Japan and the Philippines has two plus two, two plus four framework. And so Japan signed the agreement of the transfer or the defense equipment and technology. So with five ASEAN and five from the ASEAN countries. So and so Japan provided actually provided the partnerships to the some course guard. So in the Southeast Asian country, like some Philippines and Vietnam or such as. So so many examples, so which demonstrate such a change of the Japanese policy towards Southeast Asia. Of course, economic cooperation is also still very important for Japan and ASEAN. But on the other hand, so Japan tried to diversify the contents of the cooperation with Southeast Asia. So and then so yeah, so why promoting the, why did and do the does Japan promoting such cooperation? So from my point of view, Japan tried to be the proactive so regional trade promoter. So instead of the very passive so player. So food just be provided by the regional order. So by the United States, I mean. So the passive attitude to the very proactive attitude. So and then so now so Japan Japan Japanese government. So emphasizes the rule based regional order or something. Yes, so and then so at least from their perspective. So the Japan should be the promoter or the such a rule based international order. And from this point of view, Southeast Asia and ASEAN country should be the very good partner for that. So but on the other hand, we have to focus on the perspective for the ASEAN. So everybody know that ASEAN do not ASEAN country. Any ASEAN country does not want to take one side. So even though the U.S. and the U.S. and the China library is escalating. So and so I think Japan could not and can not and will not pull them to us. So but maybe so Japan try to get support so from the Southeast Asia as much as possible. And then so they try to deliver it approach to the Southeast Asia depend on the issue base. I mean issue based. So and then so for example, so the Kishida administration proposed the Asia zero emission community. So which is very deeply related to the energy security and climate change, climate change or the such a specific project and the content. So are the very key key key points. So provided by the Japanese government now. But I think this is my, it's not my own opinion about the current situation in world in the region. Yes many people say that so decoupling at the risk or the competition between the liberal world and also Italian world. So but I don't think that the world is so simplistic I mean more complicated. So we are living in the more complicated world and Asian country so understand that. So Japan should understand that. So for example, so we of course we have a many, many problem with China. So but we cannot cut off the relationship with China because China is a very close neighbor of Japan. And Japanese companies has many, many production bases and the market in China. Can you cut it? Cut it totally not. And so China never move from East Asia. So then if so, so we have to think about how to stabilize the relationship with China. And then so maybe so Asian country so think the same thing. So they know much about the risk of the over-reliance of China. So and so China's economic threat. So I mean so they some of their some of some of the Asian country have a South China Sea issue. And then so Asian also understand that. So and then so I think and from this point of view Asian and Japan have the same problem. How to US and China relation compatible one. And then so I think it should be the very long term so issue for not only Japan but also Asia. So I stop here. Thank you very much. I'm sorry, so I talk too much. Not at all. That was wonderful, thank you. And just to reinforce that point that if you'd like to read the English or Japanese language version to have a look at the MOFA website for that report. Mike Green turning to you. And it's again picking up a theme that Orba Sensei just referred to about Japan perhaps being more proactive particularly in the Asian relationship right now. I mean for decades I think scholars and pundits alike have perhaps unfairly cast Japan as fairly reactive in terms of its foreign policy. A country that doesn't have a strategy. I think that's perhaps a bit of an unfair characterization. But I think it's certainly fair to say that Japan is now more proactively shaping the regional order. Do you agree? And if so, who are the cast of characters within Japan that are really leading this and prosecuting that strategy today? Thank you Amy, it's really nice to be here. I looked at the agenda and was worried I was in the afternoon because I'm so used to US Japan conferences where either the Japanese delegation or the American delegation is falling asleep at this point. And then I remember, oh I live in Australia now. You guys are lucky, no jet lag. But it also means if people fall asleep it's entirely my fault. So this is an update and if you were looking at the past year in Japan's foreign policy security landscape, you'd say it was year of implementation. Implementation of the Abe strategy. It's not just Abe's, but Abe consummated it and used his time and power to put it into practice. But really the three secure national security documents, decisions on big things like 2% of GDP defense spending, standoff strike, this is all being implemented now. And pieces that like Yoshi said that weren't in Abe's strategy, the Korea part, which is really critical. And interestingly it's being implemented by Prime Minister Kishida who's not from the right of politics, he's from the center. And arguably that's why it's accelerating because it's an easier sell if it's Kishida. Well, they think you'd also have to give some credit to Xi Jinping for creating urgency and frankly Putin because the impact of the Ukraine war on Japanese thinking if you look at public opinion polls is pretty considerable actually. So I think it's worth focusing on this question you raised which is does Japan have a strategy? Yes, I just wrote a book on this. It's in English and Japanese if you want. But more importantly I would argue that this strategy for shaping the regional environment is the most influential strategy in the world right now. That the approach we're seeing has had more influence on American foreign policy strategy over the last five years than America has on Japan. And I would say the same is true for Australia, for the UK, for India and for Korea and other parts of Southeast Asia and Europe as well and Canada. Abe's sort of left office, there's some controversy but he had in place an approach to a more contested security environment that creates what in Japanese is called the otoshi dokuro, the place where logically other governments that are democracies and maritime powers are gonna go because it's very logical. And as Rick said earlier with respect to economic independence on China, Japan's been thinking about this longer. My only correction would be it wouldn't be 10 years ago it'd be sometime around the seventh century but Japan has first mover advantage and has consensus. The rest of us do not have consensus in our politics or our expert opinion or public opinion on what's happening in the world. I mean, as Rick pointed out, it's starting to emerge in the US. I think in Australia it's just starting to form the UK. Japan had an early consensus and that was part of the source of the influence and thought leadership. You know, the key elements, FOIP, Free and Open to Pacific, defining regional dynamics in a broader geographic scope to bring in India for obvious reasons of balance of power and influence. There's an interesting foreign ministry report that I quoted in my book. It's in Japanese, but they try to figure out where did Abe's idea for an Indo-Pacific come from? Anybody know the answer? Rory Metcalf, whose office is right upstairs. So I don't know if Rory's here, but well done. So it was defining more broadly the region and focusing on maritime democracies and external balancing and balance of power with India, of course, with Australia. And then finally, better late than never, Korea. The Quad was part of that and Outreach to NATO. But the second element was really the economic statecraft, which has been so critical. And I would argue, and Shiro can disagree with me, but this may be the greatest period of Japan's postwar economic statecraft. In terms of effect, you could argue the 80s were bigger because the appreciation of the end really fueled a lot of it. But in terms of foresight and strategy, we talked earlier about economic security. The only disagreement I would have with the earlier panel, which was excellent, is Japan's economic security strategy is not a result of US-China competition. In Washington, 10, 12 years ago, Meti officials were the first ones going to Congress, Commerce, State Department, saying we need a strategy for critical minerals because China just embargoed exports to us. We need a strategy on Huawei. We need a strategy on investment screening, on infrastructure financing. All of these ideas were planted by Meti officials, who then, if you know US-Japan relations, did that classic Meti thing and went back to Japan and told the media, ah, Shohenai, the Americans are making us do all this. It's a little more complicated. But not just economic security. Trade liberalization, when Avi came to power about 16% of Japan's trade was covered by EPAs and FDAs. 16% according to the US-American Chamber of Commerce. It's now close to 85% in about eight years. When Lowy Institute said Japan's the leader of the liberal order in Asia, they're right. Actually, particularly as the US is sort of retreated on that front. And then the investment in quality infrastructure and all of that. Obviously, deterrence, as Yoshi said, 2% of GDP strike, more efficient use of the limited resources in the military. But really importantly, this is not Datsubei Nyuwa. This is not hedging by distancing from the US. The core of Abe's strategy is greater integration with the US. And the change in Article IX interpretation to allow collective self-defense. This was a very deliberate decision that when Japan looked at the US and looked at the threats around Japan, is the problem being entrapped by the US in a war or is the problem in abandonment? That the US won't be there. And the answer Abe had, and I think the public supported him was, we're more worried about abandonment. And so we're gonna risk entrapment by getting rid of this ban on collective self-defense with the US, with Australia and others to integrate more with the US. So it's not a strategy based on distancing from the US. And for the same reasons, a Japan-Australia strategy, a Japan-India strategy, yeah, is this about hedging against the US? Sure. But it's exactly what Washington wants. There's not a sort of contradiction now because of the urgency and desperation that the security problems present. And then very, very importantly, and Yoshi and Mia both touched on this, a key part of the strategy in Japan is seeking a more productive relationship with China. That's exactly, you know, when the LDP put out its report from the National Security Commission last year, right? In April last year, it was famous because it mentioned strike 2% of GDP. But the second paragraph says, our strategic objective is a productive relationship with China. You know what the US national security strategy said? Peaceful coexistence with China is not necessarily impossible, which is like it was written by Spock from Star Trek. What does that mean? So the US debate right now is just not capable of settling on what a long-term relationship with China looks like. Japan knows that answer largely. I think Australia would as well. So that's also very influential. All of these things are why both Trump and Biden embrace the Quad, use the word free and open into Pacific, tried to get an infrastructure financing. And it is a legacy that's very, very powerful. The question is, I guess, you know, when you have this update next year, will it still be moving forward? And there are things that, you know, I could think of that would make it more difficult, including political instability. You know, Australia and Japan have both experienced that one Prime Minister of your thing. Very difficult to execute strategy-build partnerships. You know, Taiwan in particular or South China Sea could become more intense, more difficult. It's 2% enough defense spending. Are the changes that are happening enough? And then the economy, although I think we all came away from this morning's panel more reassured on the economy. So there are things that could interrupt this. What I don't see interrupting it is another strategy. I don't see a sort of alternate plan emerging from parts of the LDP or even the opposition. That's why some people are bored studying Japan. But actually, I think it should be really interesting because what it tells you is, this is not a bipolar region like Athens and Sparta where the US and China, the strong do what they will and the weak endure what they must. Powers like Australia, India, Korea, Japan, Indonesia have real agency in Washington and in the region. I think Japan has demonstrated that particularly effectively. Thank you. So in just a moment, I'm going to open up to questions from the audience to give you a moment to think of those questions and to get your hands ready. I'm going to first put a question to Yoshihide Soeya. And again, sort of touches again on just sort of the themes brought up by Mike Green there. And particularly that point around Japan wanting a productive relationship with China expressed there in the positive phrasing rather than the negative phrasing of the perhaps the US equivalent. Do you agree with that view? And I suppose I'd be curious, from the work that you've done recently, what would be some concrete examples of how Japan might actually develop that more productive relationship with China and South Korea, for that matter? What would look different in your view in terms of Japanese policies towards those two countries with some specific examples if you can give them? Well, I'm going to ask the question and answer from Mike, but I think, I wouldn't say it's cosmetic, but economically, we cannot detach ourselves from China. So it's natural to talk about stable ties with China. Nobody would disagree with that. But concretely, the specific examples, I don't know. Our foreign ministry is trying to approach China, yes, in its own way, but given the current state of emotional sort of bad state of the relationship, those initiatives may not work, may not get any response. And even this process water issue, Fukushima water issue, the story is, Japanese are trying to approach China to establish a joint sort of framework among scientists to inform about so-called scientific facts. And that kind of initiative itself is rejected by China according to what I hear. And so there is a statement to that effect, yes, in our documents, and that's not bad, of course, but concretely speaking, I'm not sure. But what I'm more concerned about is, as I said, the central paradigm of the new approach, which makes China virtually an enemy, or at least a long-term concern, naturally so. And many things are sort of wrapped up on the basis of this, yeah. And when people say Abe is a strategist, many people used to think in terms of Japan's China strategy. But Mike is suggesting something different here, which is interesting. And you sounded like a Japanese architect of our strategy, but that's not bad. So that will be the answer to your question. I have something else to say, but we'll defer. So let's go to questions from the floor. I can see we've got one hand up here, we'll come to, and then a woman in green here. So start in the middle section, and then I'll move around the room. Oh, that's fine, yep, that's fine. Thank you for your talk. I'm Hannah, a student from Australian National University. I have two questions addressing a specific person, actually. So I have first question for Miye. So in your article in the East Asia forum, you mentioned the rising importance of Asian countries and the situation where these countries ask for equality as their status has grown. But do you think there are like demand for equality or a hedging position between US and China will be an obstacle or catalyst for Japan's, or Kishi does, a free and open, in the specific framework? That's my first question. And I have second question for Yoshi and Michael. Michael, you mentioned the Quad and Soya, you commented that if Japan and South Korea relations improve, there's an optimism to build Australia-Japan-South Korea cooperation in the region. If so, since Australia and Japan are in Quad, do you see the possibility of South Korea joining the Quad in the new future? And how it would reflect on Japan's relationship with China, especially the strategy of separating politics and economics. But thank you. Thank you. Miye, why don't we come to you first? Thank you very much for the question. So I'm afraid so totally I can understand what you said, but I tried to reply that. So equal partnership is a very, I mean, ideal sort of world. So and then so, of course, so in the specific politics, so the Japan tried to promote a more deliberate approach to Asian countries. So because, for example, the level of the Asian countries economic development are diverse. So very different among Asian countries. And then so, for example, so the Singapore is now the developed one developed country. And so Malaysia and Thailand and Indonesia and the Philippines are such countries. So now is succeeded in the bettering its economy in the globalization. And they succeeded the economic development so high level. But on the other hand, so Cambodia and the Laos. So the world are less developed. And so the Myanmar has a very serious issue so inside. And then so on the other hand, the wild Japan have to be the equal, equal with the Asian. But specifically the Japan tried to and do, the did does the more so flexible and the deliberate approach to each Asian countries. And then so, but the point is that so Japan is now the not prominent power so towards against Southeast Asia. So and then so, for example, so the DX field. So Japan and Southeast Asia, so especially Singapore and Malaysia and Indonesia, such a country should work together so more equally. And it's the issue basis. And then so anyway, so we have to take into account always take into account equality. But on the other hand, we have to adopt so more deliberate approach to each Asian countries. This is my question. Thank you. Mike, come to you on the Quad and South Korea. Yeah, I don't think Korea will join the Quad. I don't think Canada will join the Quad. I don't think the UK will join the Quad. I think the Quad members, they took a long time to arrive on the title, the Quad. But it's not just bureaucratic politics. The Indians in particular don't want to complicate it. And it points to a larger, more interesting dynamic. I just have a piece out today in foreignpolicy.com about why there's no NATO in Asia and why there could be. If you look at a rising challenge to the security of everyone in the neighborhood, which China is, even though it's also an important economic partner, one rational option would be a collective security arrangement like NATO. But it's not going to happen in the near term, and nobody, including the US, wants it, because it creates so many other problems. Obviously, interrupting economic opportunity, it also alienates Southeast Asia. It just brings nothing but problems. But if things get really bad, you'll want one. You will want one. And so I think, instead, what you're seeing is just as Korea won't join the Quad, and Japan won't join AUKUS, and Australia won't join the US, Japan, Korea, Trilateral Cooperation Ownersite Group. There's just a proliferation of these things. There are about four quads, by the way, in this region. But if you look at them, it's becoming a federation of interoperability and capabilities so that Korea and forces participated in talisman saver in the Northern Territories, doing stuff that they were doing with the US and Japan trilaterally. So these things build interoperability, capabilities building, and it's a sort of federated arrangement, but not a collective security arrangement. And that's, I think, where Korea's gonna play, Canada's gonna play, how the Quad and AUKUS will have a relationship, but it won't be a formalized thing because that would just create more trouble than it's worth. So, Sensei, you've spoken recently about South Korea and the Quad in particular. What's your sense of this? Well, I think the virtue and merit of Quad is the involvement of India in this multilateral setting. And so chasing away India would be a bad thing. And so that's one consideration. And, but on the assumption of this, I mean, India being involved, and we have to try that, continue to try that. I think dominant image in Japan about Quad is this is a framework sustained by the US-Japan Alliance as a foundation and involving Australia and India. So US-Japan plus Australia-India. But from the perspective of myself and the report, Quad can also be considered as Japan-India-Australia plus the US. And if you look at the actual agenda of leaders' statements, foreign ministers' meetings, you know, statements, substance, virtually middle-power agenda, rather than traditional security agenda involving the US. I think Mike would agree, you know, right? And that would mean, and there is a commonality here among Japan, Australia, India. And India is, of course, by nature an independent country. But its actual policies at the moment are quite similar to those of Japan and Australia, regional policy, their way of approaching ASEAN and so forth. So on the basis of this trilateral substance, adding Korea to this trilateral framework is easier than adding Korea to US-Japan Alliance, you know, under this Quad. I think that's one logical way of thinking about the future. And this is exactly what our report is discussing. And of course, actually, realizing this involves lots of difficulties, you know, bureaucratic and otherwise. So I think practitioners wouldn't want to be involved in this, but as an intellectual, academic argument, I think this is what we present. Can I just add? Oh, sorry. Yeah, sure, go ahead. Just a quick, I do agree with that. The Quad was formed after the boxing day tsunami in 2004 and I was in the White House and in charge of it at the time. And it was the US, Japan, Australia and India forming a joint naval, primarily naval task force because these were the four biggest navies in the region disposed to and capable of providing humanitarian relief in places like Bandache that were wiped out. So it began as a coalition to deliver public goods and that's what it remains, primarily in its focus. It's also the foremost powerful navies in the Indo-Pacific, by the way. So there's that subtle subtext as well. But I think it's very smart that the governments have kept the focus on public goods it's needed and it just resonates better with the region and it avoids hard choices for the four countries and everyone else. And there is no, go ahead, yeah. I have a, yes, so I almost agree with Soya-san's view on the Quad, but a little bit different view. So I have a little bit different view. I think from my point of view, Quad is Japan, Australia and Japan, Australia, I don't know, of, US? Yeah, US, Japan also US and India. So because, so Japan, yeah, US allies. So and US, Australia allies. And Australia and Japan and the Quad allies. And then there are the three, and three trade, the defense cooperation promoting. But India, India is a very difficult country. So always three countries have to consider the reaction of the India to keep the Quad, including India. And then so the Quad should set the substance which is very, very favorable to the India. And then so it's dominated by the middle class powers, not the traditional security. And then so from my point of view, the three plus India and the three half two always. So consider the preference of the India and then some compromise. So lead to the, lead to the substance of the Quad cooperation. This is my, this is my, yeah. I have a different view on this. We might pause there. Yeah, so, so yeah, yeah, Japan is. Okay, 30 seconds, very great. India aligned with the logic of US, Japan, Australia security cooperation. It's hard to imagine. I think this will be the last thing which India may want, you know. And, but, but anyway, and I just wanted to follow up just on my remark, previous remark that is there is a new horizon of new Quad opening up. I don't think it's going to be realized, but there was a, you know, Camp Quad, Camp David, you know, trilateralism among US, Japan, South Korea. And if Australia joins this logic, this is a new Quad, you know, it'll stop here. Reminds me of when I teach all the Quad, the multiplicity of perspectives on this very topic. So I'm going to take a handful of questions now. We had patient gentlemen up here in the back row, and then I'll come down here to the front. And then Don Kuhn, I think you were up there as well. Okay, so question up here, yes. Thank you to the panel for your remarks. My name is Alexander Scott from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. I was wondering, Professor Green, if you could expand on some of the comments around the national security strategy, particularly as it relates to the acquisition of these counter-strike capabilities, which involves much more interoperability with the US. Do you think this will influence the debate within Japanese politics around the normalization of the Japanese self-defense forces, particularly if we see a return to a Trump administration or a more isolationist US administration in the future? Apologies, we'll come to the question down here. Okay, thanks. It's Felix again from an Australian Nationalistic Research School of Economics. Japan doesn't want to go to the corner where Japan has to pick either from China or US. That sounds very familiar to me because four years ago, during the China-US trade conflict, one of the governor in Australia said the same thing to me. And the question I asked was how, what is our strategy to avoid being pushed into that corner? So that is one of the questions I have to ask to these speakers today. Another one is especially for Ova-Sensei. As you said, the power gap between ASEAN and Japan has been shrinking during these decades. Are we creating another China? Are we creating another China in Southeast Asia? Because considering the political diversity during that area, we got a lot of allies, we got a lot of other countries around this area. Let's just say, maybe take Myanmar as one of the example or maybe another countries. So, what will be the possible positive and negative impacts on that? Thank you. And we'll come up here to Dong-Gun. Just talk, yep. Okay. Hi, my name is Dong-Gun. I'm doing PhD here at the A&U. And my question goes on to general audience, on the general panel speakers on, especially, I think, Soya-Sensei briefly talked about trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and Australia. I'd like to hear more details on some of the policy options possible in the future. And also, what is the boundary of Indo-Pacific from Japan? So, because I was thinking that some of the trilateral cooperation between three countries can happen in ASEAN but also in the Pacific islands where Australia is currently very interested in. And I just was wondering on whether Japan is also wants to be involved in this region as well. Thank you. Okay, so I think probably questions there for each of our panelists. Why don't we start, Mike, at your end and we'll work our way down. So, on counter-strike, it's a big change. For most of the, certainly since the 1980s, the U.S.-Japan alliance had a division of roles and missions where, as the Reagan administration put it, the U.S. was the spear or Japan was the shield. So Japan didn't develop offensive strike capabilities. And in the 80s and into the 90s, frankly, a lot of American officials would have been worried about, you know, Japan having that capability and trapping the U.S. in a fight. The big change over the last few years is that on a bipartisan basis, there's a consensus in Washington that we want Japan to have the capability. The U.S. wants Japan. That would not have been the view in the Obama administration. It would have been a very minority view in the Obama administration. It's now the mainstream view in the Biden administration, a lot of the same people. And it's just because of the threat and the challenges. And of course, in Japan, it's been around since, you know, when Nakasone was a backbencher in the 1950s, he used to wear a black armband in mourning for Japan's sovereignty and to criticize the Yoshida doctrine. And he advocated Japan have strike to establish sovereignty. And so it's been around as a debate for a long time. It's not just Japan. Australia's guided weapons enterprise ordinance, Korean strike, and the U.S. Marine Corps Army are all developing standoff strike because of the PLA's threat envelope. The big challenge, I think, for Japan, there's a bit of a production challenge as there is for Australia, supply chains, workforce. But the big challenge is really command and control. The U.S. is not gonna transfer Tomahawk technology or other things unless the U.S. military is inside the decision-making loop. And Japan and the U.S. or Australia and the U.S. do not have joint and combined commands like the U.S. and Korea or NATO. And that gets to sovereignty. So that one's gonna have to be navigated. In terms of Trump, the Trump administration loved this idea. And so I don't see it changing if the Donald comes back. And in general, I just have to quickly, parenthetically say, although it was not pleasant, I'm sure, for DFAT or PM&C or the Kante or Geimer Show, although it was not pleasant, Japan and Australia managed the Trump years pretty well. And in terms of security outcomes other than trade, and perhaps in some diplomatic areas, but in terms of security outcomes, got what they needed. It's NATO and Europe that has to worry because the right wing of Republican politics since the 1870s has actually been very pro-Asia and anti-Europe. So, you know, Australia survived this once. If it comes again, I think Australia and Japan will survive again. Can I just quick say on how to avoid... Can I just ask one follow-up question on this sovereignty and command and control issue? I mean, this has been an issue for decades, probably in the Japan case, but it has been raised consistently at least since 2015 and those are those set of revisions. What needs to happen in order to actually sort those issues out? Do you see that actually happening? So what needs to happen part is Japan has to implement what they're calling a PG HQ, permanent joint headquarters, which is modeled on Australia's joint operational command very deliberately, and they have to stand it up quickly. They're kind of taking their time. And then the US has got to decide, well, who is the counterpart? And it gets rather technical, but the Indo-Pacific command is not the logical counterpart. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the central command was not the warfighter. So the command and control relationship also means the US has to decide. And oh, by the way, although it's not the topic of today's conference, so does Australia. And why? Because for Australia, so-called warning time has gone from 10 years warning time to basically nothing. And Japan has gone from being in the rear area to being in the front lines. And when you're in the front lines and you have no warning time, you can't in a crisis say, okay, guys, we have a crisis, who's in charge? Yeah, so these are gonna be very, very sort of parallel debates. And we're doing a big project at our center, very parallel debates in Canberra and Tokyo, actually. And a lot of sort of mutual learning and psychological support, and frankly, influencing Washington is needed. Thank you, Ms. Yeah, well, so yeah, it's very hard for me to predict the future. So but, so I think so that any ASEAN countries, a country can be another China in at least in the near and the middle, in the future, in the future. So the reason is that, so the size of the population. So yeah, the total, total now is the population size or the China is double of the ASEAN total population. And so some, of course, China is also, but some ASEAN countries are facing the ASEAN society problem. And then this is a very big problem for them. I'll say this problem, of course, Japan also. So face the same problem. And the second one is the political system. So of course, maybe you know, the some ASEAN countries, democracy is has a very serious problems. So in Thailand and sometimes in the Philippines. So, and even Indonesia. So some countries, so has a very serious each problem. So in the political system as a democracy, but on the other hand, all country tried to show we are democracy. So then, so they keep the electoral system. Of course, it has a very serious problem, but they keep the electoral system and they do not want to beat the Communist Party, Communist Party system like China. And then, so it's a huge gap so between the preference between the ASEAN and China. So, and then, so, yeah. Yes, and so I'm sorry. So, well, yes, that's it, yes. Wonderful, thank you. So there's a question on Japan, South Korea, Australia cooperation and the geographic boundaries of the Indo-Pacific in Japan's view. It extends to Africa. So that's what I know. And to the Pacific at the other end, I assume. It's in the South Pacific at the other side of it. Yeah, I would think so. But anyway, can I respond to the other question? Yeah, I have two points that I wanted to make. I'm not saying the current government security document, national security strategy document is everything. Of course, it's much broader, comprehensive, but the document says this is the core of Japan overall. So it's a core document in that sense. So that's a context in which I'm talking about this. And the, you know, sort of direct assessment of security environments, which are the most severe since the end of the war. And therefore, we need to do our homework. And that's how 2% GNP, right? And, but even with 2%, even with 10%, we cannot deal with security environments, you know, alone, right? We have China, North Korea, and Russia these days. So therefore, structurally, this document does not become complete without inserting the United States in between Japan's efforts and security environment. And with the US-Japan alliance as a core, that's how this document is comprehensive. So we are stuck with the US under this framework. Without the US, it doesn't make sense at all. Japan alone doing its homework, right? It's so obvious, right? So obvious to everybody. So I can see why my green is so happy about this. You know, American strategists are so happy because Japan is now doing what US used to give pressures upon Japan to let Japan do. So we are doing many things spontaneously, you know, because of this framework, because of this new paradigm. So in that sense, we have chosen the United States already, I think, as long as this, you know, new document goes. And so how to avoid this? That's what our report is discussing. So, yeah, because that domain is critically important, you know, because of this document in many ways. And because of the lack of debate. And so that's one thing, the US filling this gap of Japan's, you know, construct of security strategy. And the question about Japan, South Korea, Australia, yeah, I have my concrete idea, which I've been advocating for many years. You know, Japan and Australia signed in the first sub-administration, was it, right between Japan and Australia. Agreement on cross-servicing and acquisition. Yeah, you know, it's not treaty, but that, you know, document. And South Korea followed suit during Immunberg government. You know, between Australia and South Korea has more comprehensive virtual access. And of course areas of military cooperation are so-called in the domain of non-traditional security, you know, human security and disaster relief and UN peacekeeping operation and so forth. No elements of traditional military cooperation. Of course that's impossible for Japan to do, you know, because of obvious limitations. And the Korean ambassador to Canberra at that time was a good friend of mine, former professor Kim Yong-sun, I don't know, Kim. You, hmm? Sorry, sign of getting older. I forget this, this is Kim Yong-sun, Kim Yong-sun. Yeah, Kim Yong-sun was ambassador and we're good friends. And he told me, frankly, in a private conversation before moving on to this, he studied substance of Japan and Australia access very carefully. And to my question, yours is not that different from ours. And he said yes. You know, if that's the case, logically, rationally speaking, there is no reason why Japan and South Korea cannot have similar access, you know. And we have already templates, you know, two templates. And you just translate something from there to between Japan and South Korea. And I think it's feasible given to my personal sort of argument, in my personal argument, this should be the next priority agenda between the current government in South Korea and Japan. I think it's doable, particularly given present in Sonyeo's past records about Japan policy. And then this opens up possibility of trilateral access one US, Japan, South Korea, sorry, US, Australia, Japan. And substance-wise, it's not too much. I mean, it's not a big deal, you know, to China either. And I think it's feasible. And if there is leadership, and that's gonna be a very important kind of record of actual, you know, accomplishment of sort of Middle Power Corporation. And to prevent division of Asia, I think Asian countries should cooperate. You know, Chinese strategy is of course divide and rule. You know, so we should get together. It's simple. But we haven't done that much on this agenda. And this is how, you know, Japan, Australia, South Korea ties are very important. Not necessarily in the context of what military strategists like to think about, you know, as part of deterrence. Conceptually is not as part of deterrence. It's different, yeah. Well, we've reached, I'm afraid, the end of our time, I believe, for this session. And I know there's many, many more questions, so I hope you can perhaps buttonhole our speakers in the break after this. But for now, I think we've heard a terrific overview of the energetic, intellectual underpinnings of Japan's breadth of activity in the foreign policy and strategic space. Not only over the last 12 months, but some of the origins of that as well. Would you please join me in thanking our three speakers, Mike Green, Mia Obe, and Yeselita Soya. Thank you.