 Thank you, Jair Salim, from Brookings Institution. A question or a comment for the first presentation on the theoretical foundation of women's empowerment. One question is how your model thinks of a shift in mindset of the destination, the very woman we're trying to help here. It seems to be more focused on the role of the community leaders, but what would be the role of shifting the woman or maybe the parents of the girls who are making the actual decision on FGM. Second speaker, I guess, on price. I think it's interesting to look at if you have in your sample those women with zero price. I am an African woman, married, but I chose not only to reject a price but also the entire institution of having a wedding. But I like to think I am an empowered woman. So how would your regression result account for those type of women? So it would be interesting to look at zero price versus high price and which one predicts higher empowerment in your model. Last speaker on marital shocks. I found it very much interesting. How would you relate with many studies finding using a variable called female-headed household? And I think it's more general, capturing many of the challenges women have. If you look at female-headed household, I have difficulty of defining what it is, but it seems that more general in terms of capturing the dynamics there. Thank you. Thank you. And one over here. Hi. Thanks for the presentations. I'm Maria from the Overseas Development Institute. I have a question for Sarah. In your regressions, when you use brights price as an explanatory variable, I was wondering if you control for collinearity because that might explain why other variables that are included in the regressions were not statistically significant whereas brights price was kind of systematically statistically significant. So thanks. About non-payment of brights price in my sample, it just turned out that basically everyone paid brights price. So I didn't have people who didn't pay brights price. There were three couples that didn't pay brights price and then there was a whole story about it and then the families were mad and it was a thing. So in general, everyone in my sample had reported playing brights price. And then I'm not sure. So we present different specifications where we add additional controls but in the sort of baseline specification, we're just controlling for age and age squared and education. So I'm not quite sure what variable you think would be collinear with brights price but I'm happy to hear more. Thank you. I'm not sure if you had a question. I couldn't understand the end part of on the female headed households. Did you have a question or you were just commenting on the last? I'm not sure if it's a comment or a question but the female headed household, at least in economic literature, it's the most widely used variable. Also in the HSE you will find it. So if you are thinking of empowerment in line with cultural challenges like infertility, fear of not being married are some of the cultural challenges when it comes to Africa. I would say no one would disagree with the challenge with widows. It's universal, not in Africa but in any setting. It's challenging to be a breadwinner. So if we are targeting at changing the norms, maybe female headed household might capture those individuals, not just widows, but being a female headed household more broadly. I'm also doing work on female headed households. The problem with female headed households is they are a very heterogeneous group. So they are households of women whose husbands are remitting. They are households of very badly off women who have been abandoned or widows. So it's such an incredible array of different households. It's very hard to... I think it's a useful concept for certain questions and not at all for others. It's about changing the preferences of the women, what you... Mindset, that's what you mean. I think it's a key issue because unlike what the initial game was saying I think it's too easy to think that... And even in the bargaining game that you have the victims against the oppressors. It's a kind of stylized fight. But in hard realities, women have very often internalized the values of the patriarchal system in which they live for such a long time. And my own experience with female genital mutilation in West Africa, especially Senegal, is that the real defenders of the female genital mutilation are women more than men. They are more, you know, more active as circumcisers, et cetera. So you're right that in this case there is no way out of trying to change the preferences of women. And if you look not in a clear, you know, really directly relate to female genital mutilation which is a very complex problem but you find that experiences of changing preferences are extremely complex, takes a lot of time. I think one of the most illuminating paper I have read on that is a paper in fact by Bijou Ryo, Sanyal and Majumdar on the Givica project in Bihar. But essentially what they show is that it took seven years of a very multifaceted experience in which they had to play on several planes like increasing women's physical mobility, recasting their identity to various methods like singing, prayers, John meetings, et cetera, and changing symbolic boundaries, and they say, and giving them access to new networks of people. So it's a very long and very complex process. And of course the question you have to raise is, yeah, but how much can we do? You know, you do that in one specific area with a lot of results and a lot of time, but how does it percolate and spill over to other communities is an extremely complex problem. But there is no shortcut for that. I find the elegance of the presentation that Jean-Philippe gave us really quite impressive. But I'm wondering how do you use theory and empiricism, which one comes first? Because the model can rationalize in a thing almost any behavior that you would like to build into the model. So does it come exposed relative to the empirical exercise, or do you go to the data with the model as a source of hypothesis that you're going to test on the data? So I'm curious as to how you are combining what you derive from theory versus what you get from the empirical work. In the case of food binding and late marriage, one can see that there are sort of natural experiments that can be evidenced empirically, as to when the textile came or when the plague hit different regions of the world. But for the first, for the genital mutilation, where you don't have natural experiments, I think how do you combine, what do you derive from empiricism that you're going to take to the data? Maybe surprisingly, I had very much the same question to you, Jean-Philippe. So I'm giving a little twist relative to what Alain said. I think that for these models to be really useful in a way, I would have liked to start from what are the assumptions. So verify empirically some of the assumptions that you have, some of the premises, some of the context. Is there homogeneous preference or not? Let's first know that. If you have established those different elements of the model, then you can build the model and the games that's being played and see that it produces what's the outcome that you observe. But here, it's hard to verify the validity of the model because we don't verify whether what's model correspond to the reality in terms of the premises of the model. Can I also take advantage of the microphone being here to ask it? One question first to Cherine. I was just curious when you were mentioning the difficulty of ranking jotties, whereas it's reasonably easy to rank the official government categories. Once you look within those categories, it's not that easy to rank them. Is that actually true also if you were to go down to the village level? Would there be fairly clear ranking amongst the villagers themselves? Would they have a fairly good understanding of the ranking of the jotties within the specific village? So that was the question. And for Dominique, I had a question. In the literature, that early literature that you referred to on India and widows, there was this big, a lot of emphasis given to the differential status between widows who were by themselves as opposed to widows who had adult sons. It seems as though having an adult son was very helpful for a widow in terms of escaping poverty. And that was because of the ability to rely on the son's help. I was just wondering whether in Africa you observe something similar, that there's differential sort of status of widows depending on their children and their dependents and their ages. My comment is to Shareen. And Shareen, I do think that you are being a bit too modest with your results. You know what my previous commentator had said that is it possible to rank jotties within these broad categories? I think within Bihar it is. Just looking at the graph that you showed me, showed earlier about labour force participation of different jotties. The Musahars are actually at the bottom of the category and that's where you see the highest labour force participation. So this is followed by the Chamars, then by the Dusads. So if you can get this at least by the broader category of Dalits and Mahadalits, I think your results will be so much more richer and they'll be able to speak much more to exactly the point that you are saying. It's just a minor comment from me. Exciting question. I'll try to answer the best way I can. The only way I can do is to my intellectual approach how I came to that issue. I was attending a conference in New York at the United Nations UNICEF, which had this fighting female genital mutilation as a main objective. At that meeting, my key was there and the explicitly referred to the theory that is represented by the first coordination game. And interestingly, I met the NGOs who are acting on that theory to intervene. And this is where I met the people from Tostan and decided to go to the field, et cetera, and see that. In a sense, I was not completely convinced that things were so simple. No. When I was on the field and I understood the approach of Tostan, I found that they were giving a fantastic test of the coordination game, the simple coordination game, which is this public declaration. Because really that should act. You are just saying in front of everybody, I abandoned the practice, so you are reassuring the others who should not like the practice to follow you. It's like a sequential game, if you know it has the same effect, that the nasty national equilibrium disappears. And I was thinking, if really this game has a value, or this approach, the theoretical approach, we should find that these public declarations have an impact. So, yes, I started from theory, then was, of course, disappointed by the result and then tried to say, OK, but there can still be, if there is heterogeneity, and we found that there is heterogeneity, we can still kind of rescue this approach. But I agree with you that it's still very difficult to disentangle, whether it's the bargaining theory or the heterogeneous game coordination thing that appears. But if you are able to show that people are not so keen on following others, then you could remove this approach. It's more difficult to disentangle the bargaining theory and my theory with Hagen-Aldercheff that there is a customary authority. And even though there are some ways of doing that, and I could speak about that, but no, in a sense I want to add something that is an answer, not an answer, but a comment on the question of Betty, is that it's extremely difficult to test the assumption. And I tell you that when Tostan showed me the evaluation study, badly done, I agree, but it's based on direct question to the people of before and after, are you for or against, cutting the daughter, et cetera. And I just couldn't believe those. On such sensitive matters, you don't go with just naive questions like that, it makes no sense. And in fact, I trusted more the study because we were thinking, how do you know that the people you're talking to have cut their daughters or no? Will they tell you the truth? It's a very difficult question. And the way I found was the following. We didn't ask the question. We didn't ask did you cut your daughter or no. You straight away say, at what age did you cut your daughter? And those who didn't come say, no, no, we didn't do it. But very few of them say that. And most of them would directly say, you know, when she was four-year-old, when she was six-year-old, so we recorded the age. But in many kinds of study on female genitals, most of them, they just ask straight-forwardly the question. But can we trust that? So, you know, in a sense, we are in this question on social norms. I don't think you have many other ways than looking at outcome and saying whether they are compatible with theory. And as I say, even that is difficult because sometimes several theory can become compatible with a single-factor. But for instance, no, just to finish with the theory of the customary authority, one of the predictions of the theory is that you should never have a total abandonment of a customary practice. It should be partial. That the theory says that. That if there is a recommendation to stop cutting daughter or, you know, to marry your daughters later or whatever to change the succession or inheritance law, you should find that there is an accommodation that is done by customary authority. And in a sense, there are some papers which are exactly that, who show, for instance, and I believe in that because I have seen that on the field so often in Africa, is that, you know, for instance, no, the daughter will not really inherit, but she will be compensated. For instance, in Ghana, there's been the PNDP law saying that the girl should inherit and there are shares that are spelled out by the law. And it is not true that the law had no effect, but you see that there had been some way going towards giving some rights to women, not a squarely succession right, but a compensation. And we have evidence on India in the same. That goes very much in the line of theory. But again, we have to be careful. Thank you. So to this question of, you know, can you rank jyatis? I think, you know, so your question, Vidisha and Pete are similar. You're saying, can you rank them at the village level? I think the answer is yes, but I'm going to qualify it and say, what I meant in the presentation is there's no pan-Indian system of ranking jyatis. I think there are systems to rank them locally, but they're highly contested, right? So it's not easy to rank them even within a particular village. What metric you use, you know, there's the famous sociologist Ian Srinivas who talked about dominant costs. Do you use numbers? Do you use ritual status? Do you use wealth? Like I think the criteria are many. And I think the important thing for India is that these are fluid, right? And even after the Government of India Act where you have SC, SD, I think they remain fluid in terms of how people talk about it, how people frame it, and they're constantly being negotiated. So I agree that in the context of Bihar, you could have Dalits and Mahadalits. You could do that. And, you know, we talk about that in the paper. And I know Rohini Somnath has done some work on this. It's very good to think that way. I think the only point we wanted to make is that this is quite nuanced, even at this aggregate level. So if you go down to an even more granular level, the nuances will just grow, if anything. But on the Dalits and Mahadalits, yes, I think you're right, the Musahars, the Chamars. Even there, I would say, you look at the Yadavs, you look at the Chamars, these are contested rankings. Even politically, you see this play out in terms of whose community is more worthy of reservations and so on. So we didn't open that can of worms. You're right. But our point is purely that it's nuanced. So I'll stop there. Peter, thanks. Yes, totally. Having a son is crucial. So because under the Muslim religion as practiced in most of Africa, a son inherits more than the daughters and certainly part of the land and so on. So if the son's young, the woman can continue to farm that land until he's old enough, so that's one issue. And then under, I don't know if you think the rest of Africa, it's true too. In fact, one of the papers I mentioned on behavioral responses shows it's a paper in the jelly by Sylvie Lambert and Pauline Rossi where they basically show that women whose husband has other children and hence rivals for the inheritance of her own children and don't have a son go to extreme lengths to have one. So they do all these dangerous things like very, very short spacing and very little breastfeeding of the daughters in order to have a son. So it's kind of insurance against widowhood. And they find very strong, strong effects.