 Part one of Works of Salist. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Mark Harrington. Works of Gaius Celustius Crispus, translated by Alfred W. Pollard. Note on Salist. The facts which we know about our author's life are sufficient to prove that he was at no time an important man at Rome. A member of a Plobian family, Gaius Celustius Crispus, was born in the year BC 86 in the town of Amaterna. Until BC 52 when he was one of the tribunes of the commons, we hear nothing of him. But he then took an active part against Cicero's client, Titus Anius Milo. Two years later he was removed from the Senate by the censors Appius Claudius and Lucius Calpurnius Paizo. But his expulsion was probably only a party measure as other Caesareans were similarly treated. And even if the story about his intrigue with a wife of Milo was true, adultery was at this time too common at Rome to exclude the offender from the Senate. It is said, without much authority, that immediately after his expulsion, Salis joined the army of Caesar. Anyhow, in BC 48, we find him in command of a legion in Elyricum. The following year he was one of the priders-elect, when he had been queester we do not know, and thus regained his place in the Senate. In September he was employed by Caesar to check the mutiny in Campania, but his efforts to do this were unsuccessful. Salis took part in the African War, and on its conclusion was appointed the first governor of the newly formed province of Numidia. In BC 45 he returned to Rome, so enormously enriched as to give color to the charges of extortion which were vaguely, though probably never formally, brought against him. He now laid out the Horti Salustiani in the valley between the Quirinal and the Pincus, and lived here in retirement until his death in BC 35. It is probable that these 10 or 12 years comprise the whole period of his literary activity, and that during them he wrote not only the Catiline and Jugurtha, but the other essays which were joined together into a continuous account of about 20 years of Roman history. On Salis's death his property all went to his grand-nephew, who became a man of some note under Augustus and Tiberius. The story that the historian married Terencia, the wife whom Cicero divorced in BC 46, is worth mentioning, though the authority for it is not good, and it seems intrinsically impossible. The preceding brief sketch of Salis's life enables us to gather that throughout his career he was a consistent Democrat and supporter of Caesar. This Caesarism is often alluded to as detracting from the value of his work, but it would be much truer to say that it constitutes his first qualification as a historian. There is a wrong and a right side in politics, as in everything else, and in the struggle which brought the Roman Republic to an end, the partisans of Caesar, as we now see, were in the right. It need not greatly alter our estimation of Cicero and Cato as men, or even as statesmen, that in that struggle they did battle for a constitution whose continuance would have been Rome's ruin. Their position was intelligible, consistent, justifiable, as it appeared in the heat of the contest even noble, for they were fighting for an idea and Caesar for his personal gain. But despite Cicero's literary power and Cato's force of character, a history of Rome for the century which followed the fall of Carthage, if written by either the one or the other would have been a very lamentable production. They would have misunderstood everything, and consequently, mis-explained everything. The way in which Cicero alludes to the men in the events of the period of the groggy should be sufficient to convince us of this. Salast, though vastly inferior as a man to either of the optimal leaders, was extraordinarily successful in seizing the thread of events. The chapters on politics in Rome in the year which succeeded the groggy revolution, and again after the consulship of Pompey and Crassus in BC 70, can hardly be too highly praised, especially when we consider how soon after the events narrated they were written. Salast, indeed, except when speaking of the dictator himself, never allowed his Caesarean sympathies to carry him away, and it is difficult to understand how Professor Momsen could permit himself to speak of the Catiline and Jugurtha as partisan pamphlets. If Salast was a party writer, then Defoe himself must yield him the palm for cleverness in concealing his real object, and one could almost wish Momsen's theory correct, for the ingenuity of the elaborate contrast which Salast draws between Caesar and Marcus Cato, the one man for whom the dictator entertained an uneasy hate, would then be without a parallel. But the whole tone of Salast's two essays forbids the idea that he was writing for any immediate purpose. The elaborate care bestowed on the style, the recurring pompousness, the effectation of an extraordinary virtue, all betray the vanity of a man who wrote with Thucydides' to be an everlasting possession ringing in his ears, and who probably esteemed his own work little less lightly than that of Caesar. Over passages in the latter's career which he might not care to have revived, Salast was sufficiently prudent to draw avail. The different manner in which he alludes to the rumors of the complicity of Caesar and of Crassus in Catiline's conspiracy is an instance of this, and certainly we should never have learned from our author how close was the political connection of Catiline and Caesar down to the end of 64. But when not dealing with the dangerous subject of the dictator's conduct, it is difficult to find any trace of partiality in Salast. Illusion has already been made to his character of Cato. A like impartiality marks the sketches of Metellus, of Marius, and of Sulla, and there is hardly a single passage in the two essays he has left us in which one political party is unjustly exalted at the expense of the other. So far we have been dealing with Salast as a political historian, and here there is little to do but praise. There are, however, other aspects of his work in which it appears less satisfactory. Of his defects as a military historian, and of the excuses which may be alleged for such defects, something is said in the introduction to the gigurtha. His contempt for details of chronology and geography forms a subject of many of the notes. Neither of these points, therefore, need be more than alluded to here. There is, however, another side of his writings on which a few remarks may, perhaps, be profitably made. If by the pains which he takes to link together events and their causes, and to find the key of each period of history in that which preceded it, our author has justly earned himself the title of a philosophic historian. It must unhappily be added that by the way in which he draws on his imagination, he exhibits himself as the earliest of historical novelists. It has been remarked that there are often two ways in which the same set of facts may be described. We may say that we saw a man snatch up a stick and strike a dog, or that we knew the man was angry and resolved to punish the dog. In very simple cases it does not much matter which form of expression we use. Salus, however, has a perverse propensity for using the second form where it is entirely inapplicable. To speak pedantically, he interprets material in terms of mental phenomena in a most illegitimate manner, and often seems to do this merely to conceal his ignorance of some historical detail. He is constantly supplying motives and reasons, constantly telling us what his characters thought, and describing mental conditions of which he could by no possibility have known anything. In the history of the Jigurthian War, the effect of this is chiefly ludicrous. The elaborate account of Makipsa's motives in sending Jigurtha to dementia, the inscription of Hiemsal's murder to the terror he caused Jigurtha by his supposed remark, the mental pictures of the Numidian and his opponents presented to us on each change of tactics on either side, all these we may value as highly or as cheaply as we like. However we rate them, they will not alter our views as to the nature of the war. In the case of the Catiline, it is different. Here much depends on the opinion we hold as to the personal character of the conspirator. And Salus, in his foolish straining after effect, has perhaps done more even than Cicero to elevate Catiline into the portentous stage villain with whom we are familiar. To trace the conspiracy to the madness which resulted from a guilty conscience, to portray the man whom Caesar and Crassus supported for the consulship as a kind of dissolute maniac, to say that he had made his followers commit aimless crimes in order to keep themselves in practice, to alter the date of a speech in order to give the conspirator an effective exit from the Senate House, to introduce some foolish talk about the Roman women as an excuse for a dashing sketch of Sampronia. All this is characteristic of an historical novelist, not of a philosophic historian. It detracts from the value of Salus' work. It makes us receive his statements with suspicion and treat his soberer judgments of men and things with less attention than they deserve. Enough, however, has been said as to Salus' defects, especially as in the notes from the nature of the case it is chiefly to his defects that attention is called. He may not be the equal of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Tacitus, but by his combination of excellence of style and of matter he is at least worthy to be ranked in the same class with them. End of Note on Salus Part 2 of Works of Salus This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Mark Harrington Works of Gaius Solustius Crispus, translated by Alfred W. Pollard Introduction to the Cataline Conspiracy The history of the years BC 66 to BC 62, in which the activity of Lucius Sergius Catalina was chiefly manifested, like that of every other period in any nation's existence, can only properly be understood when viewed in connection with the history of the years which preceded and followed them. The century which elapsed between the final establishment of the provincial system and the Battle of Actium was occupied at Rome with the struggles of a people great in themselves, greater still in virtue of the dominion over which they ruled, to throw off a system of government which had become antiquated, and to find one which should be capable of satisfying the new wants that had arisen. But the change from the rule of the Senate to that of the Caesars was no easy one for such an unwieldy mass as the Roman Empire to accomplish. And from the tribunate of Tiberius Grocus to the assumption of the tribunition power by Augustus, we have to watch the miserable experience by which, blindly but surely, it was led to accept the government which alone could bring it peace. No mere fluctuations in Roman politics, persecution of the Democrats by the Senate or persecution of the Senate by the Democrats could bring this change about. These had their place, their necessary place in the chain of causes, but in themselves were only one element out of many which contributed to the result. Rome was not like Athens where the eloquence of a Pericles could gain its possessor a practical dictatorship for life. The voice of an orator in the forum was insufficient to change the destinies of an empire which stretched from the Straits of Gibraltar to the river Euphrates. Such a change could not be affected without bloodshed and that on a larger scale than the breaking of a few heads in street riots at Rome. Sulla and Marius had first a battle for dominion in Italy. Farsalia, Thapsis and Munda had first to be fought. And even so the tale of horrors was not complete till Antony and Octavianus had finally wearied the world with war. Then at last the empire was firmly established and Rome had peace for a hundred years. Let us look at some of the causes by which this momentous change was brought about. Abroad, the rapid succession with which, in the middle of the second century BC, nation after nation was reduced to the form of a Roman province made their government by the 200,000 moralized men who had the right of attending the comitia in the marketplace of a single city and absurdity which could not long continue. The extent of the Roman Empire demanded a ruler who would not only govern his subjects for their own good rather than for the wealth to be gained by their plunder, but who would in some sense represent them far more truly than could be done by any pseudo representative assembly in which Greeks and Spaniards, Africans and Asiatics should come together in unsympathetic union. At home, on the other hand, there was needed a strong executive government to meet the existing distress with some measures of relief to keep the disorderly rabble of the capital in check and to render traveling in Italy and on the high seas at least a little more secure. The government actually in power at this time was composed of the grandsons of the men who, in Rome's long struggle with Carthage, had been their country's bulwark. With the close of that struggle, the Roman aristocracy had lost their excuse for existing at any rate as a governing body and the inevitable conflict had already begun, the end of which was to see the Senate reduced to impotence. The nobility fought for their privileges with unexampled peritonacity and had they only shown a little temperance in their exercise might have postponed their extinction almost indefinitely. As Professor Gardner remarks of an epic, not altogether unlike in our own history, quote, the overthrow of the predominance of the aristocracy would not come from a mere jealousy of their supremacy. It is not in this way that the great constitutional changes are affected. There must be some actual sin of omission or of commission on the part of the rulers to stir up the desire for change, unquote. It is only indeed because it supplies the record of such sins and of their effects that the history of Roman politics during the century of transition is really interesting. The objects for which the Democrats strove against the Senate were sometimes good, sometimes bad, but always in themselves comparatively unimportant. To one of the two really great measures of Gaius Grocus, the enfranchisement of Italy, both parties alike were opposed and the Italians had eventually to win it by their swords. To the other, the establishment mainly of transmarine colonies, the Senate was opposed while the people were only lukewarm and half-hearted in its favor. The allotment of land in Italy to the poorer citizens, which formed the great feature in the legislation of the Elder Grocus, was successful as a measure of temporary relief, as we see by the sudden addition of 5 and 20% to the diminishing muster-roll of Roman burgesses. The very frequency, however, with which such proposals were repeated, shows how little permanent good they affected and how fruitless was the endeavor to maintain a system of peasant proprietorship side-by-side with the huge farms of the capitalists. This, in fine, in common with every other measure of domestic reform, which formed the subject of contention between Senate and plebs, was ultimately useful only insofar as the struggle it occasioned helped to diminish the power of the aristocracy and paved the way for the abolition of its rule. Of the effete-ness of this aristocracy, the provinces, meanwhile, had their experience in the exactions practiced upon them by each successive governor, and at home the people were learning to despise it by their success in bringing its members to trial after such disasters to the Roman arms as those which occurred in the Jigurthine and the early part of the Kimberian War. Sulla gave the aristocracy one last chance, but this also it threw away, and its impotence in the face of Spartacus and his gladiators and of the pirates of Cilicia and Crete, proved to Italy and the whole Roman world its unfitness to rule. At the date when Sallist's narrative begins, the end of BC 66, this feeling in the part of the people of the utter incapacity of the aristocracy had just taken decisive effect. The Gabinian and Manilian regations had been passed, the generals of the Senate had been superseded, and the whole forces of Rome were placed at the disposal of Pompey. The object for which the democrats had unwillingly fought was practically attained, and the end was beginning slowly to come into sight. By the immense powers conferred upon him, Pompey was placed in a position to enact on his return from Asia Minor the part which Caesar subsequently played on his return from Gaul, and nothing but his own sluggishness and timidity of disposition stood between him and the perpetual dictatorship of Rome. By these two laws a new power was created in the state, a power which, though in the hands of Caesar it became essentially democratic and the hands of Pompey, as the popular leaders clearly saw, might become a fatal agent of reaction. With the rise of this force, the power of the Senate was definitely crushed, and, as a consequence, the old democratic battle cries lost all their meaning. The authority against which they had been useful as levers was overthrown, and to quote the evils against which the grochie had striven as the object at this period of the popular party's attack is as idle as it would have been to support the reform bill of 1868 with the arguments used for that of 1832. In BC 67 the partisans of Pompey had forced the hand of the popular party and compelled them to support the proposal of Gabinius. The proposal became law, and for the next five years it was not the Senate, but the suspected military dictator that was the object of the democratic hatred and fear. It is at this juncture that Catiline appears on the scene. To say with Professor Beasley that, quote, he was the successor in direct order of the Gracchi, of Saturninus, of Sulpicious, and of Drusus, of Sina, unquote, is in one sense true for every great political movement has its temporary side, which ends in a caricature, as well as its lasting side, which does not end but only merges itself in a higher order. The legitimate successor of Gaius Gracchus in his noble aspiration towards Italian unity and in his clear perception of the necessity for Rome of an absolute ruler is Caesar or Augustus. His legitimate successor on his lower side, on which he pandered to the Roman mob, is Catiline. Nor was it only the leaders of the democratic party who found here their fitting and final caricature. Catiline was a Sergius, a member of one of the noblest families in Rome, and in his selfishness, his incapacity, and his unclean life, he only exaggerated the vices which had been prevalent among the aristocracy for the preceding century. A like in the character of its prime mover, in the blindness and feebleness of aim which it indicates in the democratic party, and in the impotence which the senate displayed in their measures for its suppression, the conspiracy of BC 63 forms a fitting prelude to the new epic which states from Caesar's departure to gain himself an army in Gaul. On his return in BC 66 from the government of Africa, Catiline, according to Professor Beasley, assumed the leadership of the democratic party at Rome. Mr. Beasley is undoubtedly right in pointing out that at this time the leadership was not possessed by Caesar, but we are not for this reason bound to conclude that it lay with Catiline. If Caesar is mentioned in no oration or letter of Cicero's before BC 63, on the other hand, until the delivery of the election speech before the senate about June 64, Catiline's name only occurs in connection with his trial for extortion. If we may argue back from the ladders being engaged in a democratic plot to the likelihood of his being the democratic leader, the same argument would apply equally well to Caesar and several other members of the party. In fact, either Gnaeus Paizo, whom the senate dispatched to Spain to get him out of the way, or Publius Otronius, the unceded consul-elect, would have had a better claim to this title of leader than Lucius Catilina, who seems only to have been known hitherto as one of Sulla's assassins and in connection with a charge of intrigue with a Vestal virgin. The truth, however, appears to be that after the departure of Pompey, for the east, and the extension of his powers by the Manilian Rogation, the democratic party at Rome was without any recognized leader whatever. Caesar was coming into notice, and three years later may fairly be said to have been its most important member, but in 66 BC all was confusion. The democrats had been entrapped into assisting to place an immense force at Pompey's disposal, and they were now in abject terror as to how he might use it. It is at this conjuncture that we hear of the plots which are described under the general head of Catiline's first conspiracy. If we will remember that the real object of terror to all but the aristocratic party at Rome was, not the senate, but Pompey, that Crassus, a personal enemy of Pompey, was at the head of the knights or capitalists, and that Paizo and Otronius, Caesar and Catiline were all important adherents of a popular party which leaned on one side on the support of the knights, on the other of that of the rabble. This conspiracy may lose some of the mystery which is generally attached to it. Historians have found a considerable difficulty in the fact that the plots which Salist and Suetonius respectively assigned to this period are puzzlingly alike, and yet differ in important particulars. Salist speaks of a conspiracy of Paizo, Catiline, and Otronius to murder the consuls for BC 65 on the first day of the year and seize the reins of government. Their designs, he says, were discovered, and they postponed their execution until the fifth of the following month, when the precipitants of Catiline brought about an utter failure. According to Dian Cassius, the senate was aware of the conspiracy, but was prevented by the veto of one of the tribunes from doing more than grant the consuls a special guard. From Cicero we learn that Torquatus, one of the consuls who were to have been assassinated, subsequently supported Catiline on his trial for extortion, and declared that, although he had heard something about a conspiracy, he did not attach any belief to the report. And this incredulity, real or pretended, on the part of one of the intended victims, has led some writers, including Professor Tyrell, to doubt Catiline's complicity in any plot prior to that of BC 63. If we turn now to Suetonius, we find an account of a conspiracy also planned to take effect about the beginning of the year, in which there is no mention at all of Catiline, but the chief parts are assigned to Caesar, then Edel, Marcus Crassus, and the two unceded consuls, Sulla and Otronius, the former of whom, if we may trust Cicero, is wrongly included among the conspirators. The objects of this plot were to make away with certain obnoxious members of the senate, to raise Crassus to the dictatorship, with Caesar as his master of the horse, and subsequently to restore the consulship to the unceded candidate. And the fiasco in this instance was brought about not by any undue haste in giving the concerted signal, but by the timidity of Crassus, who failed to appear at the appointed time. The discrepancies between these two accounts are obvious, yet for the existence of the plot mentioned by Salist, we have the authority not only of that historian, but of Cicero, whom more than once alludes to it, and it is further vouched for by the fact that more than one person was subsequently tried for complicity in it. On the other hand, Suetonius adduces as evidence for his own narrative the edicts of Bibulus, a speech of the elder Curio, and the history of Tannousius Gueminus, authorities too weighty to be disregarded. The obvious conclusion appears to be that there were actually two plots with very similar objects planned to take effect in the beginning of BC 65. And this conclusion is greatly strengthened by the assertion of Curio and Octorius Nazo, as reported by Suetonius, that Caesar at this time was engaged in another and distinct conspiracy with the young Gnaeus Paizo, whom Salist and Cicero both represent as one of Cataline's most active associates. We should believe then that there were two separate plots formed at this time, in both of which Caesar and Antonius were engaged, in the one they united with the head of the equestrian order, Marcus Crassus, and planned a legitimate coup d'etat. In the other, they joined their fellow Democrats, Cataline and Gnaeus Paizo, whom we shall probably not wrong by crediting, even in BC 66, with some connection with the anarchists. And, if we may believe Salist, contemplated, besides the establishment of a military power to counterbalance that of Pompey, a more widespread and indiscriminate massacre of the nobility than Crassus would have thought needful. The two conspiracies, with such similar aims, should have existed side by side, is undoubtedly strange. But, on the one hand, the success of Caesar's assassins shows us that if they could only have exercised secrecy and discretion, there was really no need for their promoters to unite their forces. And, on the other, though the capitalists and the anarchists might each ally themselves for their own purposes with Caesar and Antonius, it by no means follows that they would have been equally ready to combine directly with each other. For the rest, the fear of what Pompey might do on his return was so entirely reasonable that there is little difficulty in believing that the three non-aristocratical parties at Rome were simply honeycombed at this time with plots. And the Senate and Torquatus had both ample justification for ignoring the existence of intrigues, which, even after they had failed, could not have been punished without the crisis of a revolution. Lastly, all the chief members of the conspiracies had powerful motives for action. Crassus found his, in personal, enmity towards Pompey, Caesar, in his desire for military command in Egypt. Antonius would wish to regain his lost consulship, Paiso, his seat in the Senate, Catiline, to be freed from prosecution. With our knowledge of the presence of such incentives to revolution, and of the abundance of material that was ever to be found ready in Rome, we should almost have been justified in postulating the existence of conspiracies at this period, even if no ancient author mentioned them. As it is, in the face of so much contemporary evidence, the attempt to disprove their reality becomes almost absurd. The history of the two following years is chiefly remarkable for the great strides made by Caesar in the popular favor. His munificence when Edel, his boldness in reviving the memory of the triumphs of Marius, his success in bringing Sulla's blood-stained instruments to tardy justice, would prepare us for much, but heartily for his astonishing triumph in resting the pontificate from such a man as Quintus Lutatius Catulus in March B.C. 63. It is well not to make the mistake of imagining him in the early days of his career to have been as important a personage in the eyes of his countrymen as subsequent events make him in ours. But after an achievement like this, it is idle to talk of any but Caesar as a champion of the popular party and of the future dictator having first made his mark by his speech in the Senate at the close of the year. If, when he left his home overwhelmed with debts on the morning of that 6th of March, he felt that to fail for the pontificate would involve his ruin. When he returned that evening, he must have felt that the advance he had made towards ultimate success was indeed immense. Meanwhile, however, the events of B.C. 66-65 had left him closely connected with Catiline, in whose favor Crassus also was now working. For Catiline these two years had not been so fortunate as for Caesar. His trial for extortion had been delayed until the end of 63 B.C., and though it resulted in his acquittal, unless Cicero had the power of making mountains out of not molehills but absolutely nothing, was attended with some loss of credit. He had also been one of those tried for the part they had taken in Sulla's murders, and though here also, possibly through Caesar's influence he was acquitted, the reminiscences revived must have been of a character highly inconvenient to a member of the Democratic Party. He was now a candidate with Marcus Antonius for the consulship of 63 B.C., and the pair were supported with all the influence and, apparently, the money of Crassus and Caesar. Had they been elected, we may suppose that an agrarian law similar to that of Rulis would have been carried, and that sons of Sulla's victims restored to their political privileges, these two measures being probably foremost on their ostensible program. We may conjecture, too, that even as late as this, when Pompey's return could not be much longer delayed, a despairing effort would have been made to organize a rival military power. Cataline, however, was rejected, and the influence of Marcus Tullius Cicero, the senior of the two consuls, was sufficient to prevent the democratic measures from passing. The men who were subsequently implicated in the attempt at the end of the year, whether we like to call them conspirators or regard them simply as members of a large and influential party at Rome, had began to send emissaries to the various districts in Italy to rouse their old partisans and to gain new ones, and it is important here to inquire what objects they could have had in view. Professor Beasley, in his interesting and suggestive, though very one-sided essay, on Cataline as a party leader, enumerates among the evils of the senatorial rule its misgovernment of the provinces, the exclusion of new men from office, and the abolition of the system of peasant proprietorship. And his readers would certainly gather that these were the evils against which the democrats were now nobly contending. Amongst consideration, however, will show how incongruous, with all we know of Cataline, are the aims here attributed to him. Was the man who had been morally convicted of extortion while governor of Africa to take up the cause of the distressed provinces? Was the sneerer at Cicero as a mere citizen at will to advocate the more frequent admission to office of men whose families had hitherto been undistinguished? Was the leader who subsequently found his best soldiers in the discontented colonists of Sulla to advocate a fresh partition of the soil of Italy for the new proprietors to barter away their farms as their predecessors had done before them? Mr Beasley has surely been singularly unfortunate in the evils which he has selected for a Cataline to redress. Moreover, we may fairly ask, are the evils he mentions of a kind which the Italians, whom the conspirators tried to rouse, were likely to be interested in reforming? They may possibly have been anxious to share in the honors of office. If so, Cicero, the aspirate, was surely a better advocate of the Novi hominace than Lucius Sergius Catalina. At all events, for the provincials, the Italians had no fellow feeling, and a proposal for a repartition of the soil could only have filled them with alarm. There had been a time when Professor Beasley's comparison of the relations of Pym or Hampton and the Scotch insurgents would have aptly illustrated the connection of a Roman reformer with the Italians of whose cause he was the champion, the time when Drusus made himself the mouthpiece of the men who afterwards fought Rome in the social war. Now there was but one bond of union between the conspirators at Rome and their correspondence throughout the country districts, and this was the general indebtedness. To an Italian municipality, it could make little difference whether Crassus or Pompey were dictator at Rome, but it was everything to them if they could free themselves from the omnipresent money lender. The more we study the history of the Second Conspiracy, the planer does it appear that it was not, as some have thought, a political revolution to overthrow the Senate, nor yet, as in B.C.66, an attempt at a coup d'etat to obtain a force capable of opposing Pompey. In October 63 B.C. the Senate was too weak for the Democrats as a party to fear, and the time for a coup d'etat was passed, even if the country districts would have taken part in such a movement. What we have here to deal with is a purely social revolution which had, at its object, neither more nor less than tabuli novi or, in plain English, the extinction of debt. Lentulus and Cethigus have been blamed for their overtures to the alabrogace, and circumstances certainly made this intrigue dangerous, but they were only doing then, under the eyes of the consul, what Catiline's agents for the preceding half year had been doing in every district in Italy. The motive to which they appealed in asking the help of the alabrogace was the only motive to which they could have appealed with any success when they were tampering with the inhabitants of the different country districts. The demand for the abolition of debts is the keynote of the Manifesto of Manlius, which Salist could not have invented entirely out of his own head. We may distrust Cicero when, in a public speech, he makes four out of six classes of Catiline's adherents to have been driven to join his conspiracy by the pressure of their obligations. We have no reason whatever to distrust him when, in a private letter to Atticus, he alludes to his suppression of this insurrection as having given him a claim to the title of Champion of the Public Credit. To justify the view here taken of the different character of the movements of 65 and 63 BC, it remains to be pointed out that it harmonizes with all our evidence as to the behavior throughout this period of Caesar and Crassus. We have good authority for asserting their complicity in the earlier conspiracies, which had for their object the establishment of a military counter-poise to Pompey. We see them afterwards in close political connection with Catiline and Gnaeus Paizo, and we know that they were both strongly suspected of complicity in the conspiracy of 63 BC, but that all proof of their guilt was wanting. For this suspicion, their previous intimacy with Catiline and the rumors current about the earlier plot provided ample grounds. The fact that no proof was forthcoming, we may ascribe not only to the danger their would, now as before, have been in provoking powerful men by a prosecution, but also to the probability that they were really innocent. Caesar, it is true, was heavily indebted, but his election to the pontificate must have filled him with hope, and the various gambler will at least see the game on which he has staked a fortune to a conclusion before he begins another. That Crassus, the greatest moneylender in Rome, would for a moment ally himself with the men who rallied to the manifesto of Manlius is simply incredible. End of introduction to the Catiline conspiracy. Works of Gaeus Solustius Crispus, translated by Alfred W. Pollard. Catiline Conspiracy, Part 1 Every man who is anxious to excel the lower animals should strive with all his power not to pass his life in obscurity like the brute beasts whom nature has made the groveling slaves of their belly. Now our whole ability resides jointly in our mind and body. In the case of the mind, it is its power of guidance. In the case of the body, its obedience service that we rather use, sharing the former faculty with the gods, the latter with the brute creation. This being so, I think right to seek repute by my powers rather of intellect than of strength, and since the very life which we enjoy is short, to make the memory of us as abiding as may be. The glory of wealth and beauty is fleeting and frail, but personal merit is held in eternal honor. Now it was long hotly contested among men whether military success was more advanced by mental ability or by bodily strength, for what we need is deliberation before we begin and after deliberation then well timed action. Either of itself is deficient and lacks the other's help. Thus at the outset, those who were called kings, for that was the first title of dominion known on earth, differed from each other, some using their intellect, others their bodily powers. For even as late as this men's lives were passed in freedom from avarice and each was contented with his own possessions. After Cyrus, however, in Asia, and the Lachodemonians and Athenians in Greece, began the subjugation of towns and nations, and, convinced that the greatest glory was to be found in the greatest empire, held their lust for dominion a fair pretext for war. Then at last, by the actual test of results, it was proved that it was intellect which was most effective in war. Were then, the genius of kings and commanders as potent in peace as in war, there would be more smoothness and consistency in human affairs, nor would you see power tossed from hand to hand, and the whole world subject to change and confusion, for empire is easily retained by the very devices by which it is originally acquired. When diligence, however, has been superseded by sloth, arid self-restraint and moderation by lustfulness and pride, a change of fortune accompanies that of character, and thus empire is continually being transferred to the most capable from those who are less so. Whether they be farmers, sailors, or builders, men find that everything is obedient to merit. Many, however, the slaves of gluttony and sloth, without learning or cultivation, have passed their life as though it were a journey in a foreign land, and thus in defiance of nature have actually found their body a pleasure, and their real vital powers a burden. Of these, for my own part, I hold the life and death to be alike, since of neither there is any record. To me, indeed, the only man who really seems to live and enjoy his vital powers is he who, in devotion to some task, seeks the fame of a brilliant exploit or virtuous accomplishment. Where the field is so wide, nature points out different paths to different persons. It is a fine thing to serve the state by action, nor is eloquence without its glory. Men may become illustrious alike in peace and war, and many by their own acts, many by their record of the acts of others, win applause. The glory which attends the doer and the recorder of brave deeds is certainly by no means equal. For my own part, however, I count historical narration as one of the hardest of tasks. In the first place, a full equivalent has to be found in words for the deeds narrated. And in the second, the historians, censures of crimes, are by many thought to be the utterances of ill will and envy. While his record of the high virtue and glory of the good, tranquilly accepted so long as it deals with what the reader deems to be easily performable, so soon as it passes beyond this is disbelieved as mere invention. As regards myself, my inclination originally led me, like many others, while still a youth, into public life. There I found many things against me. Modesty, temperance, and virtue had departed, and hardyhood, corruption, and avarice were flourishing in their stead. My mind, a stranger to bad acquirements, contend these qualities. Nevertheless, with the weakness of my age, I was kept amid this sea of vice by perverse ambition. I presented a contrast to the evil characters of my fellows. Nonetheless, I was tormented by the same craving for the honors of office, and the same sensitiveness to popularity and unpopularity as the rest. At last, after many miseries and perils, my mind was at peace, and I determined to pass the remainder of my days at a distance from public affairs. It was not, however, my plan to waste this honorable leisure and idleness and sloth, nor yet to spend my life in devotion to such slavish tastes as agriculture or hunting. I returned to the studies I had once begun, from which my unhappy ambition had held me back, and determined to narrate the history of the Roman people in separate essays, wherever it seemed worthy of record. I was the more inclined to this by the fact that my mind was free alike from the hopes and fears of the political partisan. I am about, therefore, with the utmost truth I can, briefly to relate the history of the conspiracy of Catalan, for I account this affair as in the highest degree memorable for the novelty both of the crime itself and of the danger it involved. Before I begin my history, a few points concerning this man's character must be made clear. Lucius Catalina was of noble birth, of great mental and bodily vigor, but of an evil and depraved disposition. From his youth he had delighted in domestic war, murder, rapine, and civil discord, and among these he had passed his early manhood. His body could bear privation, cold and sleeplessness, to an incredible extent. His mind was bold, crafty and versatile, skillful alike to feign or conceal whatever he chose. As covetous as prodigal, his desires knew no bounds. Not deficient in eloquence, he had little solid wisdom. The aims of his monstrous mind were always immoderate, incredible, and placed too high. This man, after the tyranny of Lucius Silla, had been possessed by an overwhelming passion to control the state. Nor so long as he gained supreme power for himself did he attach any weight to the means by which he should attain it. His headstrong spirit was daily spurred more and more by his want of means, and his consciousness of his crimes, each increased by the qualities I have named. Besides this, he was urged on by the corruption of a society, plagued at once by those worst and opposite evils, luxury and avarice. Since occasion has reminded me of the public morality, I seem called upon by my subject to go back and briefly explain the civil and military customs of our ancestors, their mode of administering the state, the size at which they left it, and how its beauty and nobility were gradually exchanged for vileness and crime. The city of Rome, according to tradition, was originally founded and inhabited by Trojans, who, with Aeneas, their leader, were wandering about as exiles with no settled home. These were aided by Aborigines, a wild race who lived free and unshackled, without laws and without government. It passes belief to tell with what ease these two peoples of unlike race and different language, and each with their own way of life, coalesced after they came within one stronghold. After, however, their state, improved in population, customs and territory, seemed to have gained some degree of strength and prosperity, as is usual in mortal affairs, their wealth gave rise to ill will. The neighboring kings and peoples assailed them, few of their friends came to their aid, and the rest, panic-stricken, held aloof from the danger. The Romans, however, alike active at home and in the field, made their preparations in all haste. With mutual exhortations they advanced against the enemy, and shielded with their arms their freedom, country and kin. When their courage had repelled their own danger, they brought help to their friends and allies, and won themselves friendships by their greater readiness to give than to receive a service. Their government was according to law, and with the name of royalty. Chosen men of bodies enfeebled by age, but of characters strong in wisdom, formed the council of the state. These, either from their age or from a resemblance in their duties, were called fathers. The royal power, which had originally conduced to the maintenance of liberty and the increase of the state, was turned at last into mere arrogance and tyranny. They then changed their constitutions and instituted yearly magistracies and pair of magistrates, thinking, by this way, men's minds would be least able to wax wonton by license. It was at this conjuncture that individuals began more to distinguish themselves and to display their talents with greater readiness. By kings, the good are more liable to be suspected than the bad, and cause for alarm is always found in the merit of others. As soon then as the state had gained its freedom, it is incredible to relate what progress it quickly made. So great was the thirst for glory that had ensued. Now, for the first time, the young men, as soon as they were of age for service, learned warfare by the experience of hard labor in camp. Handsome arms and warlike steeds now formed their pleasures, in preference to women and wine. To men like these no toil was unwanted, no ground rugged or steep, no foe in arms and object of fear. Their courage had subdued all things. But their greatest contests for glory were with one another. Each was eager to strike the foe, to scale the wall, and to be seen so engaged. This they counted wealth, this as good repute, and the highest birth. Greedy for fame, they were liberal of money, and wished that their glory might be unbounded, and their wealth honorably won. I could tell of places in which a small Roman force routed huge bodies of the enemy, and of towns naturally strong taken by assault, were it not that this would be too wide a digression. Fortune, however, is truly everywhere paramount, and she makes known or obscures every event according to her own whim, rather than its real value. The performances of the Athenians, as I esteemed them, were sufficiently noble and magnificent. And yet somewhat less than fame reports. At Athens, however, their flourished historians of genius, and consequently, throughout the world, the exploits of the Athenians are esteemed as of the highest order. Thus the merits of men of action are valued in proportion to the capability of men of genius to extol them in words. Of these the Roman people have never had any great abundance. Among them the most capable men were always the most occupied. No one exercised his mind apart from his body, and the best men preferred action to narration, and to have their own services praised by others, rather than themselves to be another's historian. Thus, as I have said, virtue was practiced both at home and on the field. There was the utmost concord and the least possible avarice. The right and the good obtained among them, not so much by law as by nature. Strife, discord, and enmity they carried on with their foes, citizens contended with citizens only in virtue. In their offerings to the gods they were magnificent, in their domestic expenses sparing, to their friends loyal, their own and their country's interests they guarded by these two devices, hardyhood and war, and generous treatment when peace had ensued. Of this I can adduce a striking proof. In war, punishment was more often inflicted on those who had fought the enemy contrary to orders, or who had too slowly obeyed the signal of recall from battle, than on those who had dared to desert the standard or give way when hard pressed. In peace they governed rather by kindness than by fear, and when they had received an injury preferred rather to pardon than abjudge it. Thus by diligence and fair dealing the state was advanced. Great kings were conquered in war, wild races and vast peoples subdued by force. Carthage, the rival of the Roman Empire, perished root and branch. Sea and land everywhere lay open before us. When at last fortune began to turn cruel and throw everything into confusion. Those who had lightly borne toils and dangers, doubtful fortunes and desperate straits, found the leisure and wealth elsewhere. So coveted a pitiful burden. At first the lust of money increased, then that of power, and these it may be said were the sources of every evil. Averus subverted loyalty, uprightness, and every other good quality, and in their stead taught men to be proud and cruel, to neglect the gods and to hold all things venal. Ambition compelled many to become deceitful. They had one thought buried in their breast, another ready on their tongue. Their friendships and amenities they valued not at their real worth, but at the advantage they could bring, and they maintained the look rather than the nature of honest men. These evils at first grew gradually and were occasionally punished. Later, when the contagion advanced like some plague, the state was revolutionized, and the government, from being one of the justest and best, became cruel and unbearable. At first it was not so. Much avarice as ambition, which spurred men's minds, a vice indeed but one akin to virtue. For glory, distinction, and power in the state are equally desired by good and bad, though the first strives to reach his goal by the path of honor, the second in the lack of honest arts, uses the weapons of falsehood and deceit. Averus, on the other hand, implies a zeal for money, an object for which no philosopher ever yearned. Tainting the body and the mind of the strong, it weakens them by some deadly poison. It is always boundless, always insatiable. Plenty and want alike fail to lessen it. After Lucius Sulla had seized the government by force of arms and made a bad end to a good beginning, robbery and plunder became universal. One coveted a house, another an estate. The victors knew neither limit nor sobriety, and the citizens became the object of vile and cruel outrage. To make matters worse, Sulla, to secure the loyalty of the army he had led in Asia, had treated it in defiance of ancient usage in a lavish and far too liberal manner. Pleasant and voluptuous quarters, while at peace, had easily innervated the hearty spirit of his men. It was in Asia that a Roman army first gained habits of lustfulness and intemperance, learned to admire statues, paintings and plate, stole them from their private or public owners, plundered shrines, and polluted everything whether sacred or common. Soldiers like these, when they gained a victory, stripped their victims bare, for even the wise have their temper tried by prosperity. Much less could men of this abandoned character use their success with moderation. Riches became a means of distinction and glory. Power and influence followed their possession. As a result, the edge of virtue was dulled. Poverty was accounted a disgrace and uprightfulness a kind of ill nature. Riches made the youth a prey to luxury, avarice and pride. At once grasping and prodigal, they valued lightly their own property, while they coveted that of others. All modesty and purity, alike things human and things divine, everything in short, was despised and disregarded. To one acquainted with mansions and villas built on the scale of towns, it is worthwhile to visit the temples erected to our ancestors, the most god-fearing of men. They indeed decorated the shrines of the gods with piety, and their own homes with glory, while they deprived their conquered enemies of nothing save the power of doing them harm. But in this generation the most worthless of men, in the depth of their wickedness, have deprived our allies of everything which those brave men in the hour of victory had left them. As if the one and only use of empire were to inflict harm. Why should I tell of things which no one who has not seen them could believe, of how often private individuals have leveled mountains and built over seas? Such men seem to me to have trifled with their riches in the haste with which they ignoble abused, what they might have honorably enjoyed. But the passion for defilement, gluttony, and all kinds of indulgence had kept pace with that of for wealth. Each sex alike trampled on their modesty. Sea and land were ransacked to supply the table. Men went to rest before they felt a desire for sleep. They did not wait for hunger or thirst, cold or weariness, but anticipated them by luxurious expedience. Such a life, when means had failed, spurred youth into crime. Their minds, tainted with bad accomplishments, could not endure to be deprived of their sensual pleasures. And they abandoned themselves with all the more recklessness to every kind, both of gain and expense. And of Catalan Conspiracy Part 1 Part 4 of Works of Salast This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Works of Gaius Salustius Crispus, translated by Alfred W. Pollard. Catalan Conspiracy Part 2 It was in a state of this magnitude in corruption that Catalan, as was indeed easily done, gathered round him to serve his bodyguard, troops of men stained by every vice and crime. Every gambler, adulterer and glutton, who by the gratification of his passion had cruelly impaired his patrimony, everyone whose debts had been swollen to buy indemnity for some shameless deed, all parasites from every quarter, all who had committed sacrilege, who had been tried and condemned, or whose deeds made them fear a trial, all who gained a living by polluting their tongues with perjury, or their hands with their countrymen's blood, and fine all who were harassed by need or by the pangs of conscience, it was those who were Catalan's intimate associates. While did anyone as yet free from guilt, chance to become his friend, by daily intercourse and allurement, he was easily made a fit fellow to the rest. It was especially, however, the intimacy of young men that Catalan affected, and their pliable and unformed minds fell an easy prey to his wishes. Complying with the several forms of youthful passion, he helped some to mistresses, bought hounds and horses for others, and, in fine, spared neither his purse nor his honour to make them his faithful creatures. I am aware that there were some who held the belief that the young men who made Catalan's house their resort behaved with too little regard for decency, but the report obtained credence rather from other considerations than from any direct testimony. At the very outset of his youth, Catalan had engaged in many scandalous intrigues. One with a high-born maiden, another with a priestess of Vesta, and others in like manner set law and morality at defiance. Finally he was seized with a passion for Aurelia or Estilla, a lady in whom no respectable man ever found anything to praise except her beauty, and, on her hesitating to marry him in her dislike for a grown-up stepson, killed the youth, so it is positively believed, and thus cleared his house for the unhollowed union. In this deed I trace one of the chief causes of Catalan's bringing, his attempt to appoint. His impure mind, hateful alike to gods and men, could find rest neither awake nor asleep. Terribly was his frenzied soul ravaged by the pangs of conscious. His countenance grew bloodless, his eyes haggard, his pace now hurried and now slow. Madness had plainly stamped upon his face an expression. The young man whom, as narrated above, he had enticed, he kept instructing in many varieties of crime. It was from their ranks that he provided false witnesses to facts and documents. He bade them think cheaply alike of honor, fortune, and danger, and then, when he had crushed their sense of fame and decency, his yoke became heavier. If motives for crime were for the moment wanting, they had to ensnare or assassinate the inoffensive, as though they had offended. He would rather, forsooth, indulge his wickedness and cruelty without a cause than allow hand or brain to become sluggish by disuse. In reliance on friends and associates such as these, and encouraged by the enormous prevalence of debt throughout the world, and by the number of Syllas, soldiers, who had squandered their fortunes, and were now dwelling on the memory of plunder and ancient victories, and hoping for civil war, Catiline formed a plan for destroying the Constitution. There was no army in Italy. Nias Pompeius was engaged in a war in far distant lands. He had great hopes of success in his own candidature for the consulship. The Senate was unprepared for any emergency. Everything was in peace and quietness, and here Catiline saw his opportunity. It was the first of June in the year when Lucius Caesar and Gaius Fugulus were consuls that he began making overtures to single individuals, encouraging some and sounding others, and expatiating on his own resources, on the lack of preparation in the government, and on the great prizes a conspiracy would gain. When he had satisfied himself on the points he desired, he summoned a meeting of all those whose needs were the most pressing, and spirit the most daring. To this meeting came Publius Lentulis Sura, Publius Altronius, Lucius Cassius Longinus, Gaius Sathigus, Publius and Servius, the two sons of Servius Sulla, Lucius Vagonteius, Quintus Anius, Marcus Porcus Lyca, Lucius Bestia, Quintus Curius, all of senatorial rank. With them were Marcus Fovius Nobelor, Lucius Statilius, Publius Gabinius Capito, and Gaius Cornelius from the equestrian order, besides many persons from the military colonies and towns, men of rank in their own neighborhood. Many, however, of the nobility were associated in this plot, though they kept more in the background. These were spurred on rather by the hope of power than of want or any other necessity. Indeed, great numbers of young men, especially those of noble birth, were favorable to Catalan's attempt, and though, while tranquility lasted that had every means of living in splendor and luxury, preferred the doubtful to the certain and war to peace. There were, too, at this crisis, some who believed that Marcus Likinius Crassus was no stranger to the conspiracy. Gaius Pompeius, his personal enemy, was at the head of a large army, and Crassus was thought to be favorable to the growth of any influence that might balance his power. In the confident belief that, should the plot succeed, he would easily secure the chief place among its leaders. A few conspirators it must be remarked, of whom Catalan was one, had before this formed a plot against the state, of which I will give the most accurate account I can. In the consulship of Lucius Tullus and Marcus Lepidus, Publius Atronius and Publius Sulla, the consuls-elect, were put on their trial and published under the bribery laws. A little after this, Catalan was charged with extortion and so disqualified as a candidate for the consulship, since he could not give in his name within the legal time. At the same time a certain Nius Piso, a young man of good birth but needy, ill-affected and of desperate daring, was being urged by his poverty and evil disposition to embroil the state. With this man Catalan and Atronius discussed their plot about the first week in December and planned to murder the consuls Lucius Cata and Lucius Torquatus in the capital on January 1st to seize the insignia of office for themselves and send Piso with an army to hold the two Spanish provinces. The plot was discovered and they again postponed their plans of murder to February 5th. On this occasion they were to contrive the destruction not only of the consuls, but of many of the senators and had not Catalan, who was stationed in front of the Senate House, been too hasty and given the signal to his Confederates on that day would have been accomplished the worst outrage of any since the foundation of Rome. As it was their armed supporters had not yet mustered in force and this circumstance ruined the plot. Piso was subsequently sent as Quistor with the powers of a praetor to hither Spain. This appointment Crassus supported as he knew Piso for a bitter enemy of Nius Pompeius, nor was the Senate unwilling to grant him a province in their eagerness to remove so abandoned a man from the sphere of politics. While many of the aristocracy looked on him in the light of a bulwark and were already panic-stricken at the power of Pompeius. Piso, however, was murdered in his province by a troop of Spanish horse at whose head he had placed himself on a march without any other force. Some would make out that the barbarians could not submit to the injustice, arrogance and cruelty that marked his rule. Others that the horsemen were old and faithful dependents of Nius Pompeius and attacked Piso with his consent. The Spaniards, they remarked, had never committed such an outrage on any other occasion but had patiently submitted to much previous tyranny. I shall leave this point as an open question and have now said enough about the earlier conspiracy. When Catiline Saul assembled the men whom I named a little above, although he had held many communications with each of them separately, he yet thought it would serve as purpose to address and encourage them collectively. He conducted them, therefore, to a secluded part of his house, and then, having secured the absence of any witness, spoke somewhat as follows. Had I not myself tested your courage and loyalty, this favorable conjuncture would have offered itself in vain. Our hopes might have been high, and power have laid ready in our hands, but it would have availed nothing. I should not now be abandoning the certain to pursue the doubtful had I only cowardly or frivolous supporters to depend on. As it is, I have learnt your valor and devotion to myself on many important occasions, and my mind is therefore dared to embark on this greatest and noblest of attempts. I am encouraged, too, by my clear perception that, whether in good or evil fortune, your interests are identical with mine, for in this identity of hopes and fears lies the true bond of friendship. The plans which I have been revolving in my mind you have all separately heard ear now. For my own part, however, I find my spirit daily more on fire at the thought of what will be our lot if we fail to assert our claim to freedom. Ever since the government of the state was merged in the prerogatives and authority of a few influential men, it is to these that kings and princes have been made tributary, and peoples and races have paid their dues. We, the remainder of the nation, however energetic and virtuous, whatever our birth, whether noble or base, have formed an undistinguished crowd without interest or influence, and lie at the mercy of a party to whom, where the state in a sound condition, we should be a terror. Thus all influence and power, distinction and wealth remain in their own, or their favourites hand. To us they have left danger, and rejections, prosecutions, and want. Bravest of men, what is the limit of your endurance? Is it not better to die once for all, a brave man's death, than to drag out a life of misery and dishonour, as the butts of your enemy's insolence, and lose it shamefully at the end? But why speak of this? I call gods and men to witness that victory is within our grasp. Our age is in its prime, and our minds at their strongest, our enemies are enfeebled by years and riches. We have only to make a beginning, the course of events will do the rest. And what man, with a temper worthy of that name, can brook their possession of a surplus of wealth, to squander on driving back the sea, and levelling mountains, while we lack the means to procure even the necessaries of life? That they should join house to house, and houses to houses, while we have nowhere a hearth to call our own. They are buying pictures, and statuary, and plate, are pulling down the work of yesterday to build it anew, in a word are squandering and abusing their wealth in all possible ways. And yet, though they indulge every passion to the full, they cannot exhaust their riches. We are met by poverty at home, and creditors abroad. Our fortunes are bad, our expectations still more forbidding. In fine, what have we left except the breath we draw in misery? Must I not bid you awake? Before you there dawns the freedom, for which we have often yearned, and now freedom, wealth, splendor, and glory rise before your eyes. Such, to the full, are the rewards which fortune has decreed to the conquerors. Your dangers and your beggary, the rich spoils which war offers, plead more powerfully with you than any words of mine. Use me as your general, or your fellow soldier. My mind and my body shall ever be at your service. These very plans, I hope, with your aid, to carry into execution as consul, unless, happily, my mind deceives me, and you are more ready to serve than to command. These words were listened to by men, who had every evil and abundance, but no good fortune, nor any hope of it. Great, however, as the wages of revolution appear to them, many yet asked Cataline to explain what would be the nature of the war, what the prizes their arms were to seek, what help he counted on, or hoped for, and from what quarter. He proceeded to promise them an abolution of debts, a prescription of the rich, magistracies, and priestly offices, together with plunder, and all the gratifications enjoyed by the victors in a war. In hither Spain, he continued, was Piso. In Mauritania, at the head of an army, Publius Sitius Nucurinus, both of them partners in their conspiracy. Gaius Antonius, too, was a candidate for the consulship, and he hoped to have him as colleague, as a man at once intimate with himself, and entangled in the greatest difficulties. When himself consul, he should join Antonius in making the first move. He then railed and invaded, against the whole aristocratic party, made laudatory mention of each of his own followers, and reminded one of his poverty, another of his desires, many of the danger they stood in, or the shame they had undergone, and many more of the triumph of Sulla, in which they had found an opportunity for plunder. At last, seeing every mind thoroughly aroused, he bade them be zealous in support of his candidature, and dismissed the meeting. It was asserted by some at the time that Catiline, when after making a speech, he was preparing to administer an oath to his accomplices, carried round in bowls a mixture of human blood and wine, and only revealed his design after all had tasted of it, with such an imprecration as was customary in solemn rights. This, they maintained, he did that their mutual consciousness of such an abomination might make them more loyal to each other. Some, however, were of the opinion that this story, together with many others, were invented by people who thought that the unpopularity which Cicero subsequently incurred would be diminished if the crimes of his victims were recognized as peculiarly hideous. The evidence I have found for the incident is too slight to support so monstrous a charge. Among the conspirators was a certain Quintus Curius, a man of no mean station. He was covered, however, with shame and crime, and his infamy had caused the censors to expel him from the Senate. The man was as frivolous as bold, and could neither keep a secret nor conceal his own crimes. In short, he was heedless alike of his words and deeds. Between him and a certain Fulvia, a woman of birth, there was a long-standing intrigue. He had lately fallen, in her good graces, owing to his poverty making him less lavish in his presence, when suddenly he began to boast, making her outrageous promises, and threw out at times threats of violence should she fail to be compliant. In fine his old behavior became more haughty than was his want. On discovering the cause of curious, strange conduct, Fulvia did not keep secret a danger so threatening to the State. But while, suppressing the name of her informant, told several persons what and how she had heard of Catiline's plot. This, more than anything else, roused men zeal to confer the consulship on Marcus Tullius Cicero. During that time many of the nobility had been in a ferment of jealousy, and had thought the consulship would be in a manner polluted if obtained by a man of no family, however distinguished. When, however, danger was imminent, jealousy and crime fell into the background. On the poll being taken, Marcus Tullius and Gaius Antonius were declared elected. This, as was afterwards seen, was the first blow that confounded the conspiracers. It did not, however, lessen the frenzy of Catiline. On the contrary, his activity increased daily. He stored arms in suitable places throughout Italy, and conveyed money, borrowed on his own or his friend's security, to a certain Manlius at Faisuli, who afterwards took the first step in beginning the war. He is said also at this period to have gained over many men of every rank with a number of women, who, though at the outset their beauty had provided them means to support their extravagance, they all found their gains, but not their luxury, limited by advancing age, and consequently had contracted huge debts. Through them Catiline hoped to tamper with the slaves of Rome, to fire the city, and either to win over, or murder, their husbands. End of Catiline Conspiracy Part 2 Part 5 of Works of Salast This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Works of Gaius Salustius Crispus Translated by Alfred W. Pollard Catiline Conspiracy Part 3 Among these women was a certain Sampronia, who had perpetuated many crimes, often worthy, of a man's daring. She was well endowed with birth and beauty, and fortunate in her husband and children, was well read in Greek and Latin literature, could sing, play, and dance more gracefully than an honest woman need, and had many of the other accomplishments of a riotous life. There was nothing she held less dear than purity and honour. Indeed it would be hard to determine if she were more careless of her wealth or her repute. So destitute was she of all modesty, that, more often than not, she was the first to begin an intrigue. Often, ere this, she had broken her engagements, foresworn her trust, and been an accomplice in murder, an extravagance which outran her resources, had hurried her downwards. Her talents, however, were by no means despicable. She could write verses, bandy jests, and talk, modestly, voluptuously, or pertly, at will. In short, she was a woman of much pleasantry and wit. Cat's Line, though he had made these preparations, was yet a candidate for the next year's consulship, hoping, should he be elected, easily to make a tool of Antonius. In the meantime he was not inactive, but was using every method of intrigue against Cicero. The latter, however, had no lack of craft and adroitness for his own protection. At the very beginning of his consulship, by dint of great promises, he had, through fulvia, prevailed on the quintus courius described above to betray him Cat's Line's designs. By an agreement about the provinces he had constrained his colleague Antonius to desist from all disloyalty, while he secretly surrounded his own person with a bodyguard of friends and dependents. The day of election came, and Cat's Line failed alike in his candidature, and in the secret attack he had planned against the consuls in the campus. He determined, therefore, to make open war and to go to every length, since his secret attempt had, had so adverse and disgraceful an issue. Accordingly he dispatched Gaius Manlius to Faisulae, and that part of Etruria, a certain Septimius of Camorinum to Pisinum, Gaius Julius to Apulia, and to other quarters such persons as he thought would be in each place able to advance his ends. Meanwhile at Rome he was working at many plans at the same time, directing secret attacks on the consuls, making arrangements for a conflagration and occupying suitable points with armed men. He himself went about armed and bade others to do the same, exhorting them always to be ready and on the watch. By day and by night he was active and wakeful, and neither sleeplessness nor toil could wear him out. When nothing came of all his activity, at dead of night he again summoned the chiefs of the conspiracy to meet, this time at the house of Marcus Porcheus Lycae. And there, after many complaints of their cowardice, informed them that he had dispatched Manlius to head the force which he had collected for taking up arms, as well as other agents to other favorable points to begin the war. He was anxious, he said, himself, to set out to the army if he could first work the destruction of Cicero, who was a great obstacle to his plans. While all the rest showed fear and hesitation, a Roman knight named Gaius Cornelius offered his help and was joined by a senator named Lucius Vargunteius. The two determined to proceed a little later on in the same night with an armed force to gain entrance to Cicero's house, as though to attend his levy, and then suddenly to take him unprepared and assassinate him in his own home. Curious on hearing the greatness of the peril which threatened the consul, lost no time in equating Cicero through Fulvia with a plot laid against him. The assassins were turned away from the gate, and found they had planned their atrocious crime in vain. Meanwhile, in Etruria, Manlius was tampering with a populace whose poverty, combined with their indignation at the wrong they had suffered in losing, under the tyranny of Sulla, their lands and all their property, now made them eager for revolution. With them were joined robbers of every description who greatly abounded in those parts, besides some veterans from the Sulla colonies, whose lavish indulgence of their passions had left them with nothing out of all their immense booty. Cicero, when informed of this, was distracted by the double nature of his difficulty. On the one hand he was unable any longer to protect the city from the conspirator's attack by such measures as he could take on his own authority. On the other he had no certain information as to either the numbers or the designs of the army of Manlius. Under these circumstances he laid the matter before the Senate, which had now for some time been disquieted by the reports prevalent in among the people. Following the course usual in dealing with any threatening emergency, the Senate made the decree, the consuls are to take measures to protect the state from harm. This is the greatest power which the Roman constitution allows the Senate to confer on a magistrate. It authorizes him to raise an army, wage war, control in every possible way both citizens and allies, and exercise the highest military and judicial authority at home and in the field. Without this decree the consul has no power in any of these matters except by command of the people. A few days afterwards Lucius Sinius, a senator, read before the House a letter which he said he had received from Faisuli. It contained the news that Gaius Manlius, with a large force, had taken up arms on October 23rd. As usual in such cases some at once began to report signs and wonders, others to assert that meetings had been held and weapons conveyed, and that Acapua and Apulia slaves were rising. By decree of the Senate, Quintius Marcus Rex was dispatched to Faisuli and Quintus Metellus Creticus to Apulia in its neighborhood. Both these officers were waiting near the city, still retaining their commission as generals. The celebration of their triumphs had been obstructed by the underhand tactics of a clique who were accustomed to set a price on everything, whether honorable or the reverse. Besides these two praetors, Quintus Pompeius Rufus and Quintus Metellus Keller were sent to Acapua and Paisinum respectively with powers to raise an army adequate to the needs of the time and the danger of the state. The rewards were also offered for any information as to the conspiracy against the state. These rewards were, in the case of a slave, his freedom and 100,000 sistercies, and for a free man his pardon for any share he might have had in the plot, and double that sum. A decree was at the same time passed that the gladiatorial schools should be quartered on Acapua and the other borough towns according to their means, and the home, watches, should be sent throughout the city under the charge of the minor magistrates. By these measures the state was violently excited, in the appearance of a capital, quite changed. The life of unrestrained pleasure and indulgence begotten of a long period of peace was suddenly replaced by universal gloom. A state of feverish anxiety ensued. No person or place was thoroughly trusted. There was neither open war nor secured peace, and each man measured the danger only by the terror in his own breast. The women, too, to whom the fear of war, now that the limits of the empire were so vast, had come as an unwanted feeling, were in great distress. They raised their hands in prayer to heaven, wept over their little children, were full of questions, and saw danger in everything. Throwing aside pride and frivolity, they despaired of themselves and their country. Despite these preparations for defense, the ruthless mine of Catiline was busy, with all its former plans, and he was accused by Lucius Paulus under the Plautian law. At last, dither by way of dissembling, or to clear himself should he be denounced, he attended the senate. Thereupon the consul, Marcus Tullius, either from fear of his presence or in a burst of anger, did good service to his country by delivering a noble speech which he afterwards wrote out and published. On resuming his seat, Catiline, following out his determination to disassemble everything, with downcast eyes and in tones of entreaty, began to beg the senators to form no hasty opinion of him. His birth and his conduct from his youth up justified him in cherishing the highest hopes, that would be wrong of them to imagine that he, a patrician born, whose own and whose ancestors public services had been so numerous, could find it in his interest to destroy the state, while Marcus Tullius, a mere citizen at will, was engaged in his preservation. He was proceeding to further abuse when a storm of shouts and cries of enemy and traitor interrupted him. Furious with rage he exclaimed, since I am beset and driven to destruction by my foes, I will quench in a general ruin the fire that surrounds me. With these words he dashed out of the senate house and hurried to his home. There his brain was soon busy, his treacherous attack on the consul was a failure, and he saw that the city was protected from incendiaries by the watch's set. He thought it best, therefore, to increase his army and to employ time before the legions could be levied in seizing the numerous positions that might be useful for the war. At the dead of night he set out with a few companions for the camp of Manlius, leaving instructions to Sothegus, Lentulis, and the others whose readiness and daring he attested to use every possible means of increasing the strength of their party, of pushing forward the plots against the consul, and of arranging for a massacre, a conflagration, and the other horrors of war. He promised shortly to march against the city in person with the large army. While these events were taking place at Rome, Gaius Manlius sent deputies from his force to Marcius Rex, with a message to this effect. We call gods and men to witness, General, that we have taken up arms with no design against our country, nor with any wish to bring others into danger. To ensure the safety of our own persons is our only motive, for, needy wretches as we are, the violence and cruelty of usurers has robbed most of us of our country, and all of fame and fortune. Not one of us was allowed, according to ancient custom, to avail himself of that law by which, on sacrificing his property, his person would have remained free. So pitiless were the usurers and the judge. Your ancestors often, in compassion for the commons of Rome, relieved their destitution by the decrees they proposed, and, quite recently, within our own recollection, owing to the prevalence of debt, bronze was raised for the purpose of repayment to the value of silver, and this with the approval of all honest men. Often again the commons themselves roused either by a lust for power or by the insolence of magistrates, took up arms and revolted from the senate. We, however, ask for neither rule nor riches, though these are the cause of every war and struggle among men, we ask only that freedom, which no brave man ever abandoned while life remained. We abjure you and the senate to take measures to relieve us, your fellow citizens, to restore us to the protection of the law rested from us by judicial corruption, and not to force us to seek a course by which, while perishing ourselves, we may wreck the completest vengeance for our blood. Quintus Markius replied, If you have anything to ask of the senate, throw down your arms and go to Rome with your petition. Such has ever been the clemency and compassion of the senate of the Roman people, that no one ever asked their help in vain. To return to Catiline, on his way to join Manlius, he sent letters to many men of consular rank, and besides these to all persons of any mark, informing them that beset by false accusations and unable to make head against the cabal of his enemies, he was resigning himself to fortune and was now on his way to exile at Massilia. This course he was taking, not because his conscience reproached him with the crimes with which he was charged, but to secure the peace of the state and to prevent any dispute about himself, giving rise to sedition. To a very different effect was a letter read before the house by Quintus Catullus, which he had said had been delivered to him in Catiline's name. Of this letter the following is a copy. Lucius Catilina to Quintus Catullus Your honour, at once so eminent and so practically proved, on which amid my great dangers it pleases me to think, encourages me to commit my affairs into your hands. I have determined, therefore, to enter, on no defence as regards the fresh step I have taken, but have made up my mind, since I am conscious of no fault, to lay before you an explanation, of which I profess you can easily recognize the truth. Roused by the wrongs and insults I have endured, finding myself robbed of all reward for my toil and energy, unable to gain any official position, I followed my usual bent and undertook the championship of the wretched. This I did not because my property was insufficient to discharge my personal debts, on the contrary, the generosity of Orestella was ready to pay off from her own and her daughter's funds, those contracted as surety for others. No, it was the sight of unworthy men raised to the honours of office that impelled me in the feeling that I myself was excluded on false suspicions. For these reasons I have embraced the hope, honourable in my present fortunes, of preserving what position I yet hold. I would write more, but news has just been brought that I am threatened with attack. For the present I commend Orestella to you and entrust her to your honour. I implore you, as you love your own children, shield her from harm. Farewell. Catiline himself abode a few days with Gaius Flaminius at Eretium and supplied the neighbourhood which he had previously aroused with arms. He then assumed the facies and other marks of a consular commission and marched to the camp of Manlius. When this was known at Rome, the senate pronounced Catiline and Manlius public enemies and fixed the day up to which the rest of the conspirators, except those condemned on capital charges, would be held guiltless on throwing down their arms. A decree was also passed ordering the consuls to hold a levy. Antonius was to put himself at the head of an army and pursue Catiline with all haste. Cicero to remain to protect the capital. End of Catiline Conspiracy Part 3 Gaius Celestius Crispus, translated by Alfred W. Pollard Catiline Conspiracy Part 4 It was at this crisis that the empire of the Roman people, in my opinion, reached its most pitiable condition. From the setting of the rising sun, its arms had subdued every land to obedience. At home there was peace and wealth. The first of blessings, as men esteemed them, in abundance. And yet there were found citizens with minds hardened with their own and their country's destruction. Two decrees of the senate had been passed, but of all that host, not one was enticed by the reward offered to betray the conspiracy. Not one deserted the camp of Catiline. So virulent was the disease which had settled like a plague on the minds of many citizens. Nor was disloyalty confined to those who had been admitted to the conspiracy. It may be said that the whole of the common people, in their eagerness for revolution, approved the designs of Catiline. And this seemed but natural, for it always happens in states that the penniless envy the respectable and praise the disaffected hate the old order and long for the new, and in their disgust at their own fortunes are eager for a general change. Careless of everything, they find in riot and sedition their meat and drink, for it is easy for the poor to escape loss. The populace of the capital, however, was especially impestuous, and that for many reasons. In the first place, Rome had become a sink into which there poured all who were in any place notorious for crime or vice. Others who had shamefully squandered their estates, and, in fine, everyone whose disgraceful conduct and actions had made him an exile from his home. Again, there were many whose thoughts dwelled on the triumph of Sulla. They saw some who had been common soldiers, now senators, and others so rich as to live in the style of regal magnificence. Each hoped that, should he take up arms, victory would bring him no less rewards. Besides these, many young men who had starved in the country on the wages of their hands had been attracted to Rome by public or private bounties, and had learned to prefer the ease of the capital to such thankless toil. These, and all like them, found their profit in disaster to the state, so that we need wonder the less that penniless men of bad character were filled with high hopes, and measured their country's interest by their own. Again, all those whose parents had been proscribed during Sulla's triumph, whose property had been confiscated, and their political rights impaired were awaiting the issue of the struggle with like feelings. To these might be added all who, as being in opposition to the senatorial party. Preferred a convulsion in the state to their own exclusion from power. In fine, after many years, the old orders had returned to threaten the state. The tribunal power had been restored in the consulship of Pompey and Craces, and henceforth young men, made headstrong by their age and character, possessed themselves of this important office and began to rouse the maw by attacks on the senate, necks by bribery and promises to kindle their passions, and thus, finally, to attain to distinction and influence. They were strenuously opposed by many of the nobility, who made the defense of the senate a pretext for advancing their own importance. To put the truth shortly, from the time of Sulla forward, though those who busied themselves with state affairs might allege honorable excuses, in some cases the defense of the people's rights, in others the extension of the authority of the senate. Beneath all this pretext of the public good, each was secretly striving to gain power for himself. They showed no moderation, pushed hostility to an extreme, and made a bloody use of victory when won. After the dispatch of Pompey to conduct the wars against the pirates and Mithridates, the power of the commons was broken, and the influence of the oligarchy increased. They held the magistracies, the provincial appointments and all other patronage in their own hands. They passed their days in prosperity, free from trouble and anxiety, and by their control of the courts, terrified all who while in office treated the populace with greater mildness. As soon however as, amid their perilous condition, a hope of revolution was offered to the commons, the old battle cry raised their spirits. Had Cataline come off victor, or even on equal terms from the first battlefield, the state would no doubt have been prostrated by massacre and disaster, while the victorious party would only have enjoyed their success till some stronger champion snatched power and freedom from their tired and enfeebled hands. Even as it was, many persons not connected with the conspiracy at the outbreak of the war set out to join Cataline. Among these was a certain Aulis Fulveus, a senator's son, who was dragged back when already on the way and put to death by his father's orders. At Rome meanwhile, Lentilus was following out the injunction of Cataline and tampering in person or through his agents, with all whose character or fortunes made them, he thought, fit instruments of revolution, not confining himself to citizens, but enlisting men of every class, so long as they would be useful in war. In pursuance of this policy, he entrusted a certain Publius Umbrenus with the task of seeking out the ambassadors from the Alabrogis and inducing them, if possible, to join in the war. Their great public and private indebtedness and the warlike temperament of the Gaelic people led him to hope that they would readily join in such an enterprise. Umbrenus had previously been employed in Gaul and was acquainted with many of the chief men in the different states. He went to work there for it once and on the first occasion of his seeing the ambassadors in the forum asked a few questions as to their public affairs and, as if greed for their misfortunes began to inquire what issue they hoped for to such evils. They complained of the greed of the magistrates, accused the senate for its failure to help them and forboded death as the one cure for their ills. On hearing this, he told them that if they would be men he would show them a way of escape from the great evils they spoke of. Inspired with extravagant hopes by his words, the Alabrogis implored Umbrenus to take pity on them. There was no task so hard a repellent that they would not be most eager to perform it. If it would but free their state from debt. Thereupon, Umbrenus took them to the house of Decimus Brutus which was near the forum and was thrown open to the conspirators by the influence of Sampronia for Brutus at the time was absent from Rome. To lend greater weight to his words, he also summoned Gabinius and in his presence disclosed the conspiracy and named his accomplices, including among them in order to inspire the ambassadors with greater courage, many persons of every rank who were perfectly innocent. At last he procured from the ambassadors a promise of their services and dismissed them home. The Alabrogis however wavered for a long time as to what course they should adopt. On the one side was their debt, their love of war, and the great rewards they might expect of victorious. On the other, greater resources an absence of risk and a certain and immediate reward instead of uncertain hope. Thus they examined both sides of the question, but the fortune of the republic at last prevailed. They betrayed the whole affair to Quintus Fabius Sanga whose patronage their state mostly employed. Cicero, informed by Sanga of the plot, instructed the ambassadors to make a great show of zeal for the conspiracy, to visit the rest of the intrigers, make them ample promises and use every exertion for their complete exposure. Almost simultaneously there were risings in Hither and Farther Gaul, as also in Pacinum, Brutium, and Apulia, the agents whom Catiline had previously dispatched on every side were, with a rashness that approached insanity, pushing on all their plans at once. Their midnight councils, their transport of arms and weapons, their general hurry and bustle had caused more fear than actual danger. Many of these agents have been brought to trial by the praetor, Quintus Metellus Seller, in accordance with the resolution of the senate and by him thrown into prison. And Gaius Morena had pursued the main course in Farther Gaul, where he held command as a legate. Meanwhile, at Rome, Lentilus, with the other heads of the conspiracy, had equipped what seemed to them a large force, and determined that, on the arrival of Catiline and his army at Facile, Lucchia Spestia, a tribune of the commons, should hold a public meaning, complain of the steps taken by Cicero and throw the odium of having caused a most terrible war on that excellent consul. Taking this as their signal, the rank and file of their supporters were on the following night to carry out their respective tasks. Reports said that these were distributed in the following manner. Statilius and Gambinius, with a large force, were to set fire simultaneously to 12 suitable points in the town. The confusion thus caused would gain them easier access to the consul and to the others at whom they aimed. Sethigus was to be set Cicero's door and attack him by force. Others of the conspirators had other victims, and the young men, most of them of noble birth, were to murder their parents, and in the general panic that the simultaneous massacre and fire would occasion, a sally was to be made to join Catiline. While these preparations and arrangements were being made, Sethigus was continually complaining of the cowardice of his associates. He declared by their hesitation and delay they had wasted splendid chances. In such a crisis it was action that was needed, not deliberation, and he himself, he protested, were he joined by only a few others, would attack the Senate House. While the rest played the coward, naturally bold and impestuous, he was ever ready to strike a blow and was convinced that prompt action offered the highest advantages. To return to the alabrogis, in obedience to Cicero's injunction, they procured a meeting through Gambinius with the rest of the conspirators and demanded from Lentilis, Sagethis, Stotilius, and also Cacius, an oath which they might bear, duly attested, to their countrymen. Without this it would be a difficult task to make them join in so serious an attempt. The rest did as they were asked without any suspicion, but Cacius promised to go shortly to Gaul in person and, indeed, left the city on that journey some little time before the ambassadors. On the departure of the latter, Lentilis sent with them a certain titus vultursius of Crontona so that, previous to their return home, they might strengthen the bonds of their alliance by exchanging assurances with Catiline. He further entrusted Vultursius with a letter to Catiline, of which I give a copy. Who I am you will learn from the bearer. Consider the danger of your position and remember that you are a brave man. Think what your plans demand. Seek help from all, even from the lowest. Besides this letter he sent a verbal message now that he had been declared a public enemy by the senate, what had he to gain by refusing the help of slaves. The preparation he had ordered in the capital had been made. There must be no delay on his part in advancing nearer to Rome. When matters had gone thus far, on the night agreed on for their departure, Cicero, whose emissaries had informed him of everything, gave orders to the praetors, Lucius Felarius Flacus, and Gaius Pomptanus, ambushed by the Mulvian bridge and seized the alabrogis with their retinue. He explained clearly the object of which they were sent and empowered them to manage the details as need might arise. The praetors, men used to war, quietly stationed their guards and secretly occupied the bridge, according to their instructions. The ambassadors, with Bultursius, had no sooner arrived at the place than a simultaneous shout arose from either side. The Gauls quickly recognized the design and promptly surrendered to the praetors. Bultursius at first encouraged the rest to resistance and defended himself with his sword against his numerous assailants, finding, however, that he was deserted by the ambassadors. After many entreaties to Pomptanus on the score of their acquaintance to secure his safety, he at last, in great fear and trembling for his life, surrendered to the praetors as though to declared enemies. Bultursius was then sent away to the consul, whose mind was filled at once with anxiety and rejoicing, with joy at the news that, by the disclosure of the plot, the state was saved from its danger, but with deep anxiety, in his hesitation as to what must be done with citizens of such rank detected in so great a crime, to punish them, he thought, would bring trouble on himself while to allow them to escape might ruin the state. So Bultulius and Gabinius to be called before him and with them a certain Seperius of Teresina, who was preparing to set out for Apulia, there to rouse the slaves. The rest appeared without delay. Seperius, who had left his house a little before, had learnt the discovery of the plot and escape from the city. Lentilus, as praetor, the consul himself conducted, holding him by the hand, the rest under guard he ordered thither he had summoned the senate and in a crowded assembly of its members he now introduced Bultulius with the ambassadors, while he ordered the praetor flakas to bring the dispatch box with the letters which he had received from the ambassadors. Bultulius was then examined on the subject of his journey, the letter, and finally as to his purpose and motive. At first he made pretenses and tried to conceal all knowledge of the conspiracy. Afterwards, with a guarantee from the state of his safety, he betrayed everything just as it had taken place and informed the senate that as he himself had only been admitted to the conspiracy by Gabinius and Seperius a few days before, he knew no more than the ambassadors. He could only say that he had been used to hear from Gabinius that Publius Atronius, Servius Sulla, Luchius Vargantius and many others were among its members. The confession of the Gauls was a fact and when lentilus pretended ignorance they convicted him not only by the letter but by the words he had often used. The cibillary books he had said prophesied that three Corneliais should rule Rome. Sinna and Sulla had already done so and he himself was the third to whom fate assigned the government of the city. Moreover, this was the 12th year from that in which the capital had been burnt and augurs had frequently declared on the strength of prodigies that it should be rendered bloody by a civil war. All the prisoners had previously acknowledged their seals and, accordingly, after the letters had been read, the senate made a decree that lentilus on laying down his office as well as the rest should be kept in free or private custody. Accordingly, they were delivered to the following guardians lentilus to Publius lentilus spinther at that time in Adile. Cethigus to Quintus Cornificus Antilius to Gaius Caesar Gabinius to Marcus Craces and Sperius, who had been pursued and just brought back to a senator named Ganius Tarentius. Meanwhile, the commons who, at first, in their eagerness for a revolution were too favorable to the idea of war now that the nature of the conspiracy was laid bare experienced a revulsion of feeling. They cursed the designs of Catiline, exalted Cicero to heaven and were as full of joy and gladness as though they had escaped from slavery. Any other outrage of war would rather have given them plunder than have done them harm, but a conflagration they thought, a ruthless and extravagant measure, and one fraught with misery to themselves, whose whole wealth consisted in articles of daily use and personal clothing. On the following day there was brought before the senate a certain Lucius Tarquinius who was said to have been pursued and captured on his way to join Catiline. He offered, if granted a public guarantee, to give information about the plot and was ordered by the consul to make a full confession of all he knew. He told the senate a tale very similar to that of Vultursius about preparations for firing the city, a massacre of the respectable classes, and the approach of the enemy, but added that he himself had been sent by Marcus Cracis with a message to Catiline not to let the seizure of Lentilis to get this and the other conspirators alarm him, but to make it an additional reason for a rapid advance on Rome by which the spirits of the rest would be revived and the prisoners more easily rescued from danger. On the mention, however, of Cracis a man of birth, of enormous wealth, and the very greatest influence some thought the story unworthy of belief, others again deemed it true, yet were of the opinion that at such a crisis a man of his importance should rather be conciliated than provoked, and as most of the senators were, in their private affairs, at the mercy of Cracis all united in a cry that the witness was no honest one, and demanded that emotion should be made on the subject. On the motion therefore of Cicero, and in a crowded house the senate resolved that whereas the witness of Tarquinius appears dishonest, he is to be kept in custody, and to be granted no further privilege of audience, until such time as he confess at whose instigation he fabricated so grievous a charge. It was thought at the time by some that the information was contrived by Publius Artronius in order that Cracis by the accusation might be made to share the peril of the rest, and these then gain the protection of his power. Others asserted that Tarquinius was set on by Cicero to prevent Cracis according to his want, taking the sedition under his patronage and so embroiling the state. At a later period I personally heard Cracis declare that Cicero had actually put this insult upon him. At the same conjuncture, Quintus Cthulis and Gaius Piso failed either by bribery or influence to induce Cicero to have Gaius Caesar dishonestly accused by means of the alabrogis or some other informer. Both these nobles were at bitter enmity with Caesar. Piso he had assailed when on his trial for malversation, on the score of having unjustly punished a certain transpatain. Cthulis hated him on account of their contest on the pontificate, in that at the close of his life and after filling the highest offices, he had been beaten by such a mere youth as Caesar. The state of the Ladders affairs also favored the accusation as his extraordinary profusion and the splendor of his public entertainments had sunk him heavily in debt. Unable to induce the consul to commit such a crime they applied themselves to individual intrigues and, by coining falsehoods, which they declared from Voltercius or the alabrogis, raised much odium against Caesar. So successful indeed were they that some Roman knights who were on guard under arms around the temple of Concord were carried away either by the greatness of the danger or their own excitable character and, on Caesar's leaving the senate, threatened him with their swords in order to show their zeal for the constitution. End of Catiline Conspiracy Part 4