 In August of 1956, CIA and Air Force planners began exploring a follow-up plane to the U-2. On February 28, 1962, that plane, the A-12, arrived at Area 51 to begin flight testing. But by then, the U-2 had been exposed to the world after Gary Powers' downing and public trial, and spy satellites were taking over the reconnaissance mission. Nevertheless, the A-12 represented beyond the state-of-the-art aviation and espionage technology. But on the cusp of its deployment for active missions, the CIA's latest spy plane's future was already in jeopardy. Hello everyone! I'm Amy. This is The Vintage Space, my little home on the internet, where we talk about all things mid-century that, quite frankly, interest me, like Cold War aerial espionage. If you've been following this series, this is the last installment, unless I decide to revisit some element down the line. All previous episodes are linked in the description, covering the U-2 in three parts, the corona spy satellites, and the A-12 oxcar program, the story we're wrapping up today. So let's go! Before we get into the details of the A-12's active life, let's do a quick recap of its genesis. The full story is in this video right up here, but the Coles notes, the need for a manned spy plane arose in the early 1950s because the only way for America to really see past the Iron Curtain and learn about the Soviet's bomber and missile capabilities was to fly over it. That plane was the Lockheed U-2, and though its mission violated Soviet airspace, it was designed to avoid radar detection, and, if seen on radar, be sufficiently high that missiles wouldn't pose a threat. But CIA and Air Force managers knew the U-2's technological edge wouldn't last forever. They gave it two years before Soviet technology would catch up to the plane. Defining the U-2 follow-up started right after its initial missions in 1956, and that plane emerged years later as the A-12. Also built by Lockheed, it represented a technological leap forward. The U-2 was 63 feet long, with a wingspan of 103 feet, had an operational altitude of 70,000 feet, with a 2,000 mile range, and a top speed of around Mach 0.8. The A-12, by design, had an altitude of about 90,000 feet, a top speed of Mach 3.2, and a range of 4,120 miles total, or 3,800 nautical miles range at altitude. It was, in short, a significant improvement. The A-12 also had a significantly longer and messier development. The U-2, which essentially married the F-104's fuselage with sailplane wings, was delivered on time and on budget. The A-12's cost had ballooned as production mows delayed one element after another. It was delivered late, the engine wasn't ready on time, so the plane was underpowered, and the CIA had already considered cancelling the program on the whole because of the cost overruns. But it didn't, and the plane was delivered to Area 51, ready to begin flight tests on February 28th of 1962. The A-12's development problems weren't over just because it had been delivered to the CIA. The first time it was fueled, a new problem arose. It leaked. The tank sealing compound hadn't properly adhered to the metal. Fixing this critical problem added another in a growing series of delays. But Lockheed developed a new compound, and two months later, on April 26th, 1962, the A-12 made its initial, but non-official, first flight. And already changes at the government level meant external factors were threatening the A-12's future. A year earlier, in April of 1961, President Kennedy, just three months after taking office, saw the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs. This U.S.-backed offensive by Cuban exiles who opposed Fidel Castro's rule relied in part on U-2 overflights of Cuba to get the lay of the land. These missions under Operation Kickoff failed to help predict how poorly the U.S.-backed troops would fare. Richard Bissell, the man who'd been in charge of the U-2's operations since its inception, fell out of favor with key players. James Killian, Eisenhower's former science advisor and chair of Kennedy's Intelligence Advisory Board, wondered if Bissell wasn't in over his head. Edwin Land, the man who had championed Ariel Reconnaissance since the Second World War, lost confidence in Bissell. Kennedy, too, began to wonder if Bissell had lost his edge. Then on November 29th, 1961, John A. McCone replaced Alan Dulles as director of Central Intelligence. Another key figure who'd been instrumental in shaping both the U-2 and the Oxcart programs was no longer involved. The ongoing tensions between Bissell, Killian, and Land ended with Bissell effectively being forced to resign on February 17th, 1962. Cuba remained a high priority target a year after the Bay of Pigs incident, since Soviet activity on the island was increasing. In August, additional U-2 flights found at least eight SA-2 surface-to-air missile installations on the island, as well as large groups of MiGs. On October 27th, an agency U-2 was shot down by one of those Cuban-based surface-to-air missiles. With the U-2 at risk, it seemed possible that further Cuban flights would be denied. The need to get Oxcart into the air increased. The problem was, it still needed a methodical flight testing program to clear it for active missions. And that would take time. The A-12's first official flight came on April 30th of 1962 with a Louis Shulk in the cockpit. This simple flight was a stunning success. Lockheed engineer Kelly Johnson said afterwards that especially in light of the development headaches the plane had gone through, it was the smoothest first flight he'd ever seen. The second flight on May 4th saw the plane hit a top speed of Mach 1.1. When the new DCI, John McCown, learned about the flights, he congratulated Johnson and simultaneously ordered him to quote, expedite all aspects of the program in order to attain an operational posture as soon as possible. These early successes didn't change the reality that the whole program was severely behind schedule and dangerously over budget. And that the Pratt & Whitney J58 engines were still far from flight ready. By the end of the year, Oxcart had two aircraft in flight test status, one of which was powered by the smaller J75 engines and the other with one J75 and one J58. The remaining planes were still in the preparation stage. With those two planes flying, the A-12's best performance was a speed of Mach 2.16 and an altitude of 60,000 feet. For the moment, its speed was well over the U-2's capabilities, but its altitude was not. When the nation needed the advanced operating capability of the A-12 more than ever, the program seemed to be at its worst point. 1963 started with 10 engines installed in A-12s at Area 51 and contractors working at capacity with three shift workdays. But the engine issues persisted, notably problems with the air inlet control system. The J58 turbojet engine used the compressor's spinning blades to draw in air that was then compressed and injected with fuel, turning it into a high pressure, high temperature, flaming flow of gas. That flow was forced through the turbine and into the nozzle, extracting energy in the process. The pressure rapidly decreased while the velocity increased. The forceful expulsion produced thrust. The supersonic inlet or air induction system on this engine was designed to provide a peak aerodynamic performance and to stable and steady flow of air into the engine over a range of supersonic speeds. But flight testing between Mach 2.4 and 2.8 uncovered severe inlet duct roughness, basically an improper air flow match between the inlet and the engine. And improper aerodynamic contouring in the inlet duct was making that rough flow of air worse. The issue came down to the control system that activated the inlet spike. The inlet spike played a crucial role in managing the incoming supersonic air. It mitigated the challenge of the compressor not being able to handle supersonic air flow. The inlet spike's job was to slow the air to subsonic speeds before it hit the engine. The challenge was that subsonic and supersonic air behaved very differently. An aircraft flying subsonically pushes through the air molecules ahead of it. Nearing Mach 1, the air molecules can't get out of the way fast enough and form shockwaves, bands of air that are hotter and denser than other subsonic air. The shockwave is the problem, and the inlet's job is to manage the shockwave so it can't harm the engine. The inlet spike creates an oblique angled cone-shaped shockwave at the engine's inlet, as well as a normal shockwave further back. And as the plane's speed changes, the inlet adjusts to maintain these waves' balance. The first slows the air coming through the inlet. The second slows the air entering the compressor. This reduces the speed of the incoming air without a dramatic pressure change, ensuring the engine continues to work as designed. The spike had two working controls, one hydromechanical and a backup electric system. Resolving the issue was vital and complicated. It was another lengthy and costly fix that pushed the schedule back. Again. The A-12 was making strides, but it was almost a two-steps-forward, one-step-back situation with all the ongoing issues. But the Air Force's interest in the cutting-edge plane only grew. In October of 1960, nearly two years before the A-12 flew, the service decided to purchase three long-range interceptor versions of the A-12 that it could arm. Called the AF-12, this new plane fell under project Kedlock and came with an estimated price tag of $111 million, half of which was earmarked for the weapon system contracted to Hughes Aircraft. In January of 1962, the Air Force added another five A-12s to its order, a development that fell under project Wedlock. In both instances, the CIA acted as procurement agent, securing the planes from Lockheed to transfer to the Air Force to hide the trail. Coincident with the second procurement program, the DOD pitched another reconnaissance concept, a Mach 3 ramjet drone launched from an A-12 mothership. Project Tagboard, also called the D-21 drone program, became a version of the A-12 and one of the first programs to use unmanned aerial vehicles that weren't orbiting satellites. The CIA initiated the program before it was transferred to the National Reconnaissance Office in 1963, but it was still partially an Air Force exploration of the A-12 as a launch plane. Two of the five Wedlock A-12s were soon scheduled for conversion to Tagboard launch vehicles, with another three following suit months later. On January 29, 1963, the Secretary of Defense approved six additional A-12s for the Air Force's general purpose reconnaissance vehicle, and in August, the service got approval for 25 more. The military version of the A-12 was shaping up to be a significantly larger program than the CIA's. At this early stage, it was also renamed the R-12. As the military program grew, there was some discussion of whether or not to surface some version of the program via the White House. The program was growing at such a rate, it was increasingly likely that people would find out about ox cart in the process. Releasing the story of the Air Force's plane was effectively a way to hide the CIA's program in plain sight. There was talk of announcing it was the X-21, but some were concerned that it's closeness to the B-70, an experimental Delta-wing aircraft designed to fly Mach 3 and 70,000 feet, would peel back the curtain shrouding the R-12's true purpose. No public statement was made, but as the delivery date for the R-12 approached, it was clear there would need to be some public disclosure of Lockheed's work in Mach 3 research. People were going to find out this technology existed sooner or later. The CIA's primary concern in all this was to protect the anti-radar aspects and capabilities of the A-12, elements that were also present in the military version. The Department of Defense was keen on a cover story for the increasing cost of the A-12. Not only was the price tag rising, it was having trouble concealing the amount of money going to the Strategic Air Command for the R-12. There was also a practical reason for surfacing at least some of the plane's design. More activity at Area 51 met a better chance of someone accidentally seeing the plane that wasn't supposed to exist. The CIA also wanted the supersonic flight characteristics and research openly available to the industry for the inevitable spin-offs. A week after assuming the presidency following Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon Johnson was apprised of the situation and decided surfacing some kind of story was the best option. On February 29, 1964, Johnson held a press conference wherein he announced that a plane called the A-11 was being disclosed today to permit the orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our military and commercial program. Arrangements are being made to make this and other important technical developments available under appropriate safeguards. The reference in this speech to the A-12 was deliberate. Calling it an ex-plane would have been both wrong and problematic since it was expected to be in regular service eventually. The A-11, Lockheed's former version of this plane, wasn't an untruthful title and it successfully hid the plane's real purpose and intention. The surfaced A-11 was redesignated the YF-12A and though there was speculation about the CIA's role in the program, nothing was ever formally acknowledged by the government. Timed to the president's announcement, all A-11s were flown from Area 51 to Edwards Air Force Base. And all program activity followed. On July 25, 1964, the president revealed an improved version of the A-11 called the SR-71 which was the true military version of the A-12. It was the moment that gave birth to one of the infamous stories about this plane. At the time, the military A-12 was called the RS-71 but Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay preferred calling it the SR for strategic reconnaissance. The designation was changed before Johnson's announcement but the press materials couldn't be updated in time. When LBJ called it the SR-71, the media speculated he'd misread the name, forcing the service to rename the plane after its commander-in-chief. With the SR-71 openly under development as a long-range supersonic interceptor, the agency's A-12 had cover for its reconnaissance missions. In November of 1962, the military program not yet announced, the first group of A-12 pilots separated from the Air Force pool and moved over to Oxcart under the auspices of independent contractors to the Hughes Aircraft Company. Their training began in the new year, working within altitude and speed restrictions designed to keep the desert site hidden. These pilots started with basic proficiency on key mission events like aerial refueling, navigation training, and camera systems operations. Training pilots while the plane was still going through its final checks was a way to shorten the time frame in which the A-12 would be operational. But the program's forward momentum continued to be marked by setbacks, this time with the loss of aircraft. The first crash came on May 24th, 1963, a little over a week after NASA launched Gordon Cooper on its final Mercury mission. From the first flight in April of 1962 through the end of 1963, the A-12 program had seen 573 flights totaling 765 hours in the air. There were by then nine planes in the CIA's inventory with three more scheduled for delivery. And the year had seen some major milestones. On July 20th, an A-12 reached Mach 3 for the first time. In November, it hit Mach 3.2 at near operational altitudes of 78,000 feet. The inlet duct roughness problem was less problematic, though it was still operating below design requirements. Nevertheless, it was upwards momentum all around. By the middle of 1964, the A-12 was sufficiently close to operational readiness that planners started working on a program to gather performance data in the field. That program was Operation Skylark, and its field was the skies over Cuba. On August 11th, Skylark took on a more important role than just data gathering, real missions. The new goal was for the plane to be operationally ready by November and capable of sustained Mach 2.8 flight at 80,000 feet. Planners felt confident that at that height and speed, the A-12 could safely fly without a full defense system. Skylark was ready with limited emergency capabilities on November 5th. With two weeks' notice, it could manage a Cuban overflight. The plane may have been operationally ready, but the goal of sustained Mach 3.2 flight remained elusive. Only test planes had reached the high Mach numbers. Skylark planes had a peak performance of Mach 2.9, an altitude of just 76,000 feet. The Skylark aircraft went through a series of improvements for speed, range, reliability, and duration, and on March 25th, 1965, a detachment pilot flew a detachment plane at Mach 3.0 for the first time. By the middle of 1965, all Skylark pilots were qualified to fly above Mach 3, marking the detachment's true readiness for missions. Operational readiness was so appealing, project headquarters and the Skylark detachment began planning for possible A-12 overflights in the Far East. On March 18th, 1965, DCI McCone and secretaries MacNamara and Vance met to discuss the U-2 flights over Communist China. The plane was gathering valuable intelligence, but it was extremely vulnerable. Oxcart, they agreed, was ready to take over with Okinawa-based missions. Almost a decade after its inception, the A-12 was finally proceeding through authorization for deployment. When it was found that the Soviets were deploying surface-to-air missiles around Hanoi midway through 1965, the A-12 was given another reason to start proving itself. Even with missions on the horizon, there were still development problems, and making everything worse was evidence of careless maintenance. Program supervisors saw an overall lessening interest from Lockheed employees. Black Shield was in jeopardy because workers were sick of the program. Kelly Johnson ended up moving out to Area 51 full-time to oversee his staff, and the situation did improve. By the end of 1965, Black Shield's validation program was complete, and the plane was finally scheduled for deployment at Kadena on January 16, 1966. But higher-ups were starting to push back against Oxcart. On November 10, Bureau of the Budget officials raised concerns at the joint cost of the A-12 and SR-71 programs, $2.5 billion through fiscal year 1966, with an additional $2.1 billion projected to maintain both programs through 1971. Looking purely at numbers, the BOB questioned the need, first for the total number of aircraft, and then for having an Oxcart fleet distinct from the SR-71. Its recommendation was that the A-12 be phased out by September 1966 to save money, but the suggestion was vetoed by the Secretary of Defense. The SR-71 wouldn't be operational by that date, and the country needed the plane's capabilities. 1966 saw everyone involved in Black Shield go through familiarization exercises. Pilots and support crews were trained on procedures, electronic countermeasure systems usage, day and night flying, instrument flying and landing, suit operations, camera operations, film handling, and emergency procedures. Actual mission planning was made easier by the number of graphs, charts, and operational benchmarks that had been gathered during testing. So much data had been gathered that engineers built a computer program to generate flight plans. Coupled with weather data and worldwide inertial navigation system data, a flight plan could be customized with just a 24-hour countdown. The missions began to take shape, but planners struggled to lock in firm government commitment. Vance and McNamara opposed deploying the A-12, but the Air Force representatives were in favor of the flights. Many expressed deep concern over the lack of adequate photography to detect possible communist installations in South China. Satellites couldn't return immediate images, and the U-2 was under constant threat. The matter remained unresolved with the CIA arguing for immediate deployment, the State Department arguing against it, and the DOD's split. The divergent positions were presented to Johnson on August 12th of 1966, who decided against deploying Oxcart. Issues around the cost also resurfaced at this time. Options on the table were co-locating programs, the SR-71 and A-12, to cut down on base operations, or the more radical option of outright transferring all existing Oxcart missions to the Air Force, making them Air Force missions. This raised the question of what effects cancelling Oxcart might have on foreign affairs and covert reconnaissance operations as a whole. There was more at stake than just finances. In September, a new proposal for Oxcart flights over Cuba was dismissed. The plane was considered too risky an element to introduce into the fragile political ecosystem around the island. The need for the plane was slowly diminishing. Three months later, on December 12th of 1966, another meeting at the Bureau of the Budget voted to cancel Oxcart altogether, but there was one vote in favor of sharing the SR-71 fleet between the CIA and the Air Force's strategic air command. Again, the undecided issue was sent to the president who decided on December 28th to phase out Oxcart. The whole program would be shut down by January 1st of 1968. The phase out was called Operation Scope Cotton. The plan was to move for A-12s into storage in July of 1967. Two more would follow in December and the remaining four by the end of January, 1968. Only the A-12s ready for deployment would escape mothballing for the time being. In the meantime, there would be no further updates to the A-12, only changes from engineering proposals and necessary retrofits. There would be no new construction area 51, just improvements as needed. Hardware would be redistributed to other programs, largely to the SR-71 program. Contracting and funding for the J-58 engine would be transferred to the Air Force for its program, with other contractors following suit. Research and development would be completely suspended. In May of 1967, there was such growing concern over missile activity in Vietnam that Johnson finally approved OXCART reconnaissance missions. This slowed down the phase out, but the end date remained on the horizon as Black Shield's preparedness was put into action. By May 29, three A-12s, three pilots, and 260 personnel were ready. On May 30th, the cadena detachment got one day's notice for a mission over North Vietnam and one over the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Through the end of 1967, Black Shield saw 29 missions, 24 over North Vietnam, two over Cambodia, and three over North Korea. Each launched from and landed at cadena, except one that made a precautionary landing in Bontuck Lee, Thailand. Enemy radar tracing was reported on all but four missions. Three missions drew SA-2 missiles, but no aircraft were damaged. And smack in the middle of its deployment, on September 12th, an order came to withdraw OXCART from cadena by mid-November to make way for a fleet of SR-71s. The order drew pushback from managers stressing the importance of retaining the A-12 that was thought to be between two and four times less vulnerable than the SR-71. The compromise was to keep three A-12s at cadena through February 1st of 1968, at which point the Strategic Air Command would take over all Black Shield missions. The Air Force was scheduled to replace all CIA planes by March 31st. In March of 1968, the military SR-71s arrived at cadena to take over from the CIA's A-12s. The CIA's cadena operation was officially terminated on June 30th. Of the 13 airplanes that the CIA had procured from Lockheed, just eight remained after crashes. Though OXCART was finished, there were still some who wanted covert civilian capability. Like with the U-2, it was in a way safer to fly risky missions without ties to the military. If anything happened, a civilian pilot captured was less likely to be read as an act of war. But in the end, the deciding factor was money. The budget for fiscal year 1969 had been set with the assumption that OXCART would be canceled. So although the program had proved useful flying reconnaissance flights over the Far East, there was no money left to keep it alive. The president confirmed OXCART's cancellation during his weekly luncheon with advisors on May 21st of 1968. OXCART lasted nine years and cost about $950 million. Though it flew less than 30 missions, those missions did mark a response to priority intelligence requirements of maintaining surveillance in North Vietnam, earning its pilots the Star of Valor. And the plane's contribution to aviation was significant, notably in pioneering sustained Mach 3.2 flight. The SR-71 lasted far longer. The military version flew until 1998, and NASA's own research version flew until 1999. This is going to wrap up our Cold War aerial espionage series, and lest I find something I want to dig into more, or you guys have something else you want to know more about, let me know what you all think in the comments. Up next, we'll be looking at some unflown mission concepts before getting into X planes. In the meantime, I want to remind you guys that my new book, Fighting for Space, is available however you like to consume books, and is also now in paperback, which is very exciting. My first book, Breaking the Chains of Gravity, is also widely available still if you have the need for either. I have links to both in the description below. A very special shout out to all of my Patreon supporters and YouTube members. You guys truly make these videos possible, so thank you so much for your ongoing support. I honestly could not do this without each and every one of you guys. If you would like to help keep the vintage space up and running, and also get access to my Space Center Discord, I've got the link you need in the description, and of course links to connect across all of my social media as well. That's going to do it for me. Thank you guys so much for hanging out with me today, and I'll see you next time.