 Cyber Conflict, Module 7, Purocracy, and the Cyber Domain. Once you have completed the readings, lecture, activity, and assessment, you will be able to articulate why Richard Clark's FIDNET proposal met such fierce opposition. Welcome to Cyber Conflict, Module 7. This module focuses on how the bureaucracy of the U.S. government has evolved to accommodate new cyber technologies and capabilities in the face of potential and actual cyber attacks. In November 1988, an estimated one of every six computers in the United States crashed due to the Morris Worm. Robert T. Morris, the Worm's engineer and a Cornell University graduate student, later stated that his aim was not to damage but rather only to determine how many computer systems were connected to the Internet. Instead, a glitch added the Worm to many computers multiple times, causing them to crash. Although the Worm is estimated to have caused hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars of damage, the event was, to some degree, positive. The crash motivated the U.S. government to fund the first computer emergency response team to better coordinate efforts for future computer intrusions. And the event was a wake-up call for corporations and organizations that had become increasingly reliant on computer technology for business operations. Evolution of the U.S. government in facing the future of cyber technologies has been a slow, painful process. This is due in part to the fact that, at least initially, few senior decision makers understood the rapidly developing technologies. Also at fault, however, was the bureaucratic infighting within the government over who would control the new cyber infrastructure. The saying, if you are not growing, you are dying, is taken seriously by many governmental agencies, and grabbing a piece of the growing cyber mission would make such growth, including growth in their budgets, possible. The readings for this module introduced several bureaucratic intrigues surrounding how the government should organize in the cyber domain. Many of these involved Richard Clark, who had worked for both presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, and was named by President Clinton as National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure, Protection, and Counterterrorism. Clark pushed for the creation of a Federal Intrusion Detection Network, or FIDNET, to protect the government agencies and private corporations involved in critical infrastructure from unauthorized computer intrusions. The FIDNET initiative eventually failed, partly due to privacy concerns from stakeholders, which highlights yet another influence on evolving bureaucracies. Though not successful in that initiative, Clark was instrumental in creating a series of information sharing analysis center, or ISACS. Such ISACS continued to exist today, serving as public private clearinghouses by which government and corporate sector organizations may share information to better mitigate threats. The organizational backbone of the cyber domain was formed in the 1990s, and that decade also saw an evolution in how cyber weapons could be used. This module's readings discussed several efforts by the U.S. military to use computer technologies to disrupt enemy operations. One example is the disruption of the Serbian Integrated Air Defensive Systems, or IADS, by the U.S. military in the late 1990s. The Serbian IADS system apparently used civilian phone networks for command and control of its missiles. U.S. planes flying in Serbia were able to feed false information into the Serbian radar systems via these phone networks, blinding the enemy to the locations of the U.S. aircraft. These information operations helped to end the U.S. war in Serbia quickly, but a few senior generals recognized that the efforts were sporadic and not well coordinated. Soon after the war's end, the U.S. military formed the Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations, or JTF-CNO, to better coordinate the types of offensive computer operations the U.S. had conducted against Serbia. Agency infighting, which we have already noted as slowing progress by the government in the cyber domain, occurred here as well. Eventually, the JTF-CNO morphed into the Joint Task Force Global Network Operations. The Task Force was eventually co-located with the National Security Agency campus in Maryland and became the precursor to today's U.S. cyber command. Quiz question one, true or false. The Federal Intrusion Detection Network, or FIDNET, was intended to protect government agencies and private corporations involved in critical infrastructure from unauthorized computer intrusions. The answer is true. Quiz question two, which of the following was not an operation planned by the U.S.-European commands UCOM's J39 directorate during the late 1990 war with Serbia? A. UCOM spoofed the Serbian phone network, which also controlled Serbia's integrated air defenses. B. UCOM obtained phone and fax numbers of Serbian military officers, which allowed J39 operatives to send the Serbs propaganda. C. UCOM sabotaged Serbian jet fuel with sugar water. D. UCOM obtained intercepted communications between Serbian leaders and their military commanders, which enabled J39 operatives to identify Serbian financial holdings to freeze. Answer C is correct. UCOM sabotaged Serbian jet fuel with sugar water. The activity for this module asks that you consider the bureaucracy of an organization with which you are affiliated and answer the following. Who is in charge of the information technology infrastructure? Is the organization optimal? How might it be better? Do you think the average worker in your organization understands common cyber vulnerabilities? Do employees practice good cybersecurity hygiene? What kinds of cybersecurity training would you recommend to the information technology manager to better protect the organization?