 Good morning everybody. Good morning. We're going to go ahead and get started. My name is Nancy Lindborg. I'm the president here at US Institute of Peace, and I'm delighted to welcome you here this morning for a conversation on UN peacekeeping reform. As many of you know, USIP was founded by Congress in 1984 as a federal, nonpartisan, independent institute dedicated to the proposition that peace is very practical, it's very possible, and that it is essential for US and international security. And so we work with partners around the world to equip them with the resources, tools, education that enables them to more effectively manage, prevent, and resolve violent conflict. Today, around the world, and in many of the places where USIP works, there are 15 UN peacekeeping operations, playing an essential role in helping many countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. These operations are absolutely vital. They're vital to global security, and they're increasingly relied upon as the go-to tool. But they're also increasingly challenged, challenged by the changing nature of conflict, by complex mandates, by bureaucratic inefficiencies, and also allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. So we know that the UN leadership is actively pursuing these reforms. They've been sought by previous administrations and members of Congress, and for those of you who are at the US Global Leadership Campaign dinner last night, you heard Ambassador Haley pledge both support for the reforms and clearly a close productive relationship working with Secretary Guterres. So today's conversation is an opportunity to look at how far these reform efforts can go to achieve more effective peace operations for the millions of people they serve. This event is convened together with our partners at the United Nations Association of the National Capital Area and the United Nations Foundation. And this is part three of a series on UN peacekeeping reform. It follows two expert roundtables that we held over the summer in partnership with UNA. And those roundtables were looking at what are the actionable recommendations based on past reform efforts and current priorities. So I'd like to recognize both the current and the past leadership of UNA who are here today, and thank you for that long partnership. And we're delighted to also be joined in partnership today with the UN Foundation as we continue this conversation and we'll hear a little bit later from Peter Yeoh, who's the president of the Better World Campaign. For almost a decade, USIP has partnered with the State Department's Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, one of those great acronyms, COTA, to deliver training for nearly 6,000 peacekeepers in 200 African-contributing countries, trainings on conflict analysis, communication, negotiation, mediation and protection of civilians. And we recently released a special report on conflict management training for peacekeepers, which really looks at the relevance and effectiveness of training programs. We have also been looking at how to integrate gender more effectively, gender perspectives into peacekeeping. I know this is an issue that DPKO has seized with and one that also requires member states to deploy more women peacekeepers. So it's an all-of-UN conversation. And also the need for more women peacekeepers, as well as the need to understand why SEA happens and how to factor that into training as well. Last month we released a special report on sexual violence exploitation and abuse, which looks at ways to improve prevention across conflicts and crises. And you can pick up copies of both of these special reports on the publications table just outside. So this is an issue of great importance and long-time interest to us. And we really welcome this morning's opportunity to hear from the Under Secretary General about the work underway on UN reform and how can the U.S. support significant progress in our shared goals. And I want to just take a moment to acknowledge somebody who's really driven the work here at USIP and been a catalyst for this effort and Ambassador George Moose, who's the member of our board, he's the vice chair of our board, and he's really spent a lifetime on these issues. And you'll hear from Ambassador Moose later. Please join the conversation by writing down any questions on the note cards that have been provided. Please engage online and you can tweet your comments using hashtag peacekeeping reform. And now it's my great pleasure to welcome to the podium Ambassador Don Bliss, who will help us to introduce the Secretary General. Ambassador Bliss has a lifetime of service. He was the president of the UN Association of the National Capital Area from 2013 to 2017 and a board member since 2009. He previously served in Montreal as the U.S. Ambassador to the International Civil Aviation Organization. He has a long career, including a Department of Transportation, USAID, and a legal career. Thank you for joining us, Ambassador Bliss. Please join me in welcoming him. Thank you Nancy and thank you for hosting this wonderful event in this terrific venue of USIP and for our partnership on this very important work to improve and strengthen UN peace operations. And welcome to our distinguished honored guest, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, who I will introduce in a moment. It's my pleasure on behalf of the United Nations Association of the National Capital Area, which we affectionately know by the acronym UNA-NCA, to welcome you to this symposium. How can the United Nations meet the need for better peace operations? For those of you unfamiliar with UNA-NCA, we are the largest chapter of UNA-USAID when covering the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Northern Virginia. Our mission is to inform and educate the American public, policymakers, and the next generation of leaders about the values and work of the United Nations. And we do this through dozens of programs each year, including, for example, our Global Classrooms and Model UN at the U.S. State Department, our Young Professionals Career Development Initiatives, and our upcoming, indeed, tomorrow evening, our upcoming Human Rights Awards reception, which will be held at the National Education Association, where we will be honoring, among others, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Honorable Zahid Al Hussein. Now, check out our website, unanca.org. We still have opportunities to come tomorrow night and congratulate the wonderful work being done by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, so I hope to see many of you there. I often say that UNANCA, that we are not cheerleaders. An important part of our mission is to advocate vigorously for constructive U.S. leadership in working for a stronger, more efficient United Nations. We firmly believe that an effective United Nations serves U.S. national interests and is critical to successful U.S. foreign policy. With that in mind, I approached President Lindbergh over almost a year ago, suggesting a partnership to explore ways in which the United States could help to strengthen the UN's peace and security mandate. And we decided to focus initially on UN peace operations and to start, more specifically, with UN peacekeeping, which U.S. Ambassador Haley has described as, quote, the UN's most powerful tool to promote international peace and security, end quote. We initiated a series of roundtable discussions, as Nancy has already told you, from government, academia, think tanks, and civil society, to consider ways to address the challenges facing and the potential of UN peacekeeping missions. When we initiated this partnership, we could not have predicted that Secretary General Antonio Guitars would initiate bold restructuring reforms to UN peace operations, that the Security Council would pass a resolution affirming the responsibilities of member states and calling for peacekeeping reform, that President Trump would, and I quote, pledge to be partners in this work, predicting that with such reforms, the United Nations will emerge as a stronger, more effective, more just and greater force for peace and security and harmony in the world. End quote. Yes, President Trump actually said this, and we at UNN ANCA want to prove him right on this point. Nor could we have predicted that Ambassador Haley would make peacekeeping reform the top priority when the United States assumed that the chair of the Security Council last April. And the U.S. Congress, as it debates U.S. funding for peacekeeping, has made reform an important issue as well. Now, we recognize that other nations such as China can step up and lend more financial support to UN peacekeeping operations, and we certainly urge the United States government to enhance its support in advising, training, and equipping UN peacekeepers. Under the leadership of the Secretary General and our honored guests this morning, Under Secretary General LeCroix, reforms are well underway. At the UN peacekeeping defense ministerial conference in Vancouver last month, some 46 new pledges of military equipment and expertise were made that will make peacekeeping missions around the world more efficient, effective, and proactive. Among other accomplishments, 55 countries pledged to work to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers. Now, we recognize that U.S. foreign policy is in a state of flux, with different voices competing for attention. However, the converging objectives of the U.S. administration, the Secretary General, and the U.S. Congress in seeking reforms to peace operations presents a timely opportunity to address the very real challenges facing UN peacekeeping missions, to enforce zero tolerance on sexual exploitation and abuse, to hold troop contributing countries accountable, to establish conditions for the settlement of disputes through political dialogue, and to enhance the UN's capacity to support vital U.S. interests. With the death of four American soldiers in Niger, the American people are learning about the extent of U.S. military activity throughout the world, as with the collapse of the Caliphate, ISIS, and its affiliates metastasize. The American people will not support U.S. intervention in every conflict situation, which can result in prolonged and even counterproductive wars. And what we have learned from our supportive role, such as that with the Iraqi army, is that we can be successful much more cost-effectively. We strongly believe that a well-trained and equipped UN peacekeepers are vital to U.S. national security interests, if they operate under achievable, realistic, and adequately resourced UN Security Council mandates that serve clearly defined political strategies. With conflict situations, since the year 2000 tripling around the globe, peacekeepers are an essential tool in the negotiation of peaceful solutions and the building of stable, inclusive societies in failing or failed states. At one-eighth the cost of U.S. boots on the ground and with the support of U.S., France, NATO, the African Union, and other nations, peacekeepers can be the most efficient response to internal or cross-border situations that would otherwise lead to regional instability, breed terrorist activity, initiate migration flows, or create humanitarian catastrophes. We in the U.S. need to make this case now when these issues are being vigorously debated. That the strong U.S. investment and leadership at the United Nations is the most effective way to mobilize the global community to build a more peaceful world. Peacekeeping is an integral part of a broader range of UN peacebuilding, sustainable development, humanitarian, human rights, and conflict resolution strategies that support goal 16 of agenda 30. That is why drawing upon the many ideas proposed by our expert roundtables here at USIP and the excellent UN studies on peace operations, UNA NCA's Peace and Security Committee co-chaired by Richard Pupman-Ciel here from Stimpson issued a report entitled, Reform and Strengthening of the United Nations Peacekeeping Would Serve Important U.S. National Security Interests. The report is available on unanca.org and includes 26 specific recommendations that would advance U.S. national security interests. We accept full and sole responsibility for these recommendations and are delighted that some of them already are being implemented. We welcome you to join us at UNA NCA in our advocacy work in support of strong U.S. leadership at the United Nations. And it's now my pleasure and honor to introduce our keynote speaker this morning. Jean-Pierre Lacroix-France was appointed by the Secretary General as Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations in February of this year. He previously served as Director of the United Nations and International Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France and brings to this position over 25 years of political and diplomatic experience mostly handling multilateral organizations, United Nations activities and programs. Among his many previous posts, he served as France's Ambassador to Sweden, Chief of Protocol for France and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. Following Under-Secretary General's remarks, Career Ambassador George Moose, Will, who is Vice-Chair, as Nancy has told you, of USIP and also as Distinguished Member of UNA NCA's Advisory Council, will introduce and moderate a panel discussion on Peace Operations Reform. So let's give a warm welcome to Under-Secretary General Jean-Pierre Lacroix. Thank you very much, Ambassador Blis. Madam President Nancy Lindborg, I would like to thank the US Institute for Peace for this invitation and also the partners UNA NCA. That's an acronym I was not familiar with, but at the UN we love acronyms and the UN Foundation as well. And I will try to very briefly suggest what the key challenges are to peacekeeping and how we're trying to address that. But before I say that, I would like to thank you for your engagement. I would like to thank you for your commitment to the UN and for the special way in which you support us, because as you rightly said, Ambassador, we don't need cheerleaders. We need demanding support, and I think this is really what you are providing to us, all of you, and I'm very grateful for that. We have today roughly 120,000 colleagues deployed around the world in 15 peace missions. It's not the highest number we've reached, but it's still very significant. And the budget of peacekeeping this year will be 7.3 billion. Again, not the highest figures, but still very, very significant. I think the sheer size, the magnitude of the human resources that are committed to peacekeeping and financial resources is, per se, something that has highlighted both the role of peacekeeping but also the challenges, and I think the fact that we have had to deploy a very large mission in a number of areas was indicative of the kind of challenges and also their magnitude of these challenges that we're facing. But before I speak about the key challenges we're facing, I think it's important to highlight the achievements of peacekeeping as well because they're not often spoken of and they're very real. Then I would mention four of them. Some of them may be debatable, other less so, I think. The first category of achievement lies with the many countries which have returned to peace, not exclusively thanks to peacekeeping but largely thanks to the contribution of a peace mission. And the examples are many. More recently we terminated the operation in Ivory Coast. I'm not saying that all the challenges in this country have disappeared, but the kind of challenges that the Ivory Coast is facing now have to be dealt differently and certainly not with peacekeeping. And if you compare the situation of that country today with what it was 10 years ago, the difference is huge. And I think Haiti as well, which still has a UN operation but of a different nature and size, also has made a lot of progress and again largely thanks to the presence of a UN peace mission. And if you go back in time, there are other examples. The Cambodia in the 90s, Angola, Mozambique and Timor-Leste and many others. So that would be the first category of achievement. The second category lies has to be found in the fact that peacekeeping saves lives and not by the dozens, by the thousands, probably by the hundreds of thousands. And our colleagues are doing this every day as we speak. They're protecting refugee IDPs. They're helping in the provision of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons. Huge numbers of civilian population in need of all kind of assistance. And I think it's fair to say that if it were not for the presence of UN peacekeepers in many places, again, thousands, probably tens of thousands of lives if not more would be lost. The third kind of achievement, as I said, maybe more debatable but I still think it's a form of achievement. And I'm thinking about the places where peacekeeping has been there for quite some time that a durable political solution has been found but peacekeeping helped appeasing. And I think that's the case for Cyprus. Some could say, well, this is an operation that has been around for almost 50 years. It's a failure. Well, maybe yes, but the reality in Cyprus is that the two communities are coexisting in a much more peaceful way than they were in the 60s, not to mention the 70s. So you could also think of that as a form of achievement. And maybe an even more debatable kind of achievement that I would put to you is the fact that it's a negative argument that in some places, with all the challenges, if UN peace operation were not there, these countries, the countries concerned would probably fall from an already difficult situation to utter chaos. And I can think of at least three or four countries, particularly in Africa, that are in this situation. Now, these are the achievements. At the same time, the challenges are very real. And again, I can think of four of them, key challenges. The first one is that peacekeeping and the rationale behind peacekeeping is to support a political solution or to support the efforts towards political solution. And when political processes are moving too slowly or when they're not moving at all, which is the case in some of our situation, I can think of South Sudan where the political efforts are there, but the progress is very slow if at all existent. Then we have a major challenge because we don't see a prospect for exit if efforts towards a political solution are not yielding results. And that creates the... Our peace operation have a limited shelf life. We cannot stay forever in a particular country, particularly with big and diversified and complex operation because the expectations are very high. And at the same time, if there are no progress towards a political solution, then by definition whatever we do, then we cannot meet the expectations. So that's the first challenge. The second challenge is that many of our missions are operating in a much more dangerous and difficult security environment. Today our peacekeepers are targeted by armed groups. They're subject to asymmetric attacks with the IED and other types of indirect or direct fires against our camps and so on and so forth. And that is a very challenging situation for us. In addition to that, the people who are after us, these armed groups are very elusive. Their agenda can be either political or ideological or simply purely aiming at exploitation of natural resources. And sometimes they can have one agenda at night and another agenda during the day. So it creates a very difficult situation for us. And this is really key challenges to which we have to find adequate responses. The third challenge is the fact that many of our missions are operating in a situation where and in an environment where we have huge numbers of population in distress in need. In South Sudan we have half of the population, 6 million people who are in need of a dire need of humanitarian assistance are almost 2 million IDP and in the neighbouring countries in South Sudan we have another 2 million refugees. And this space is a particular burden but also this represents a very particular challenge to us. The result of that is that the role for protection of civilians in our mission has become even greater and it's really now one of the key priorities in our mandate. I think the first challenge has to do with the pressure on our resources. And to be fair it's not a new thing and it's not coming only from one country, it's not coming only from the United States. It's been a case for quite some time that many member states have been taking a harder look at how we're using financial resources dedicated to peacekeeping and it's been quite some time that member states have been demanding that we really pay attention to how these resources are used and that we put an emphasis on cost efficiency as well as effectiveness. It's fair to say that this pressure has increased lately but again this is not something totally new. And I think to a certain extent the degree of pressure on our resources is healthy because it helps us think creatively and look for new solutions, innovative solutions that make us both more effective but also more cost efficient. But of course there is a limit to that and we also need to ensure that we have the right amount of resources to fully implement the mandates that are given to us by the Security Council. Now how do we try to address these challenges? I think the first thing that has to be emphasized is it has to be a collective responsibility because we are trying to do certain number of things but our mandates are being given by the Security Council and we need support from the Security Council both political and in terms of our resources. We need support from member states beyond the Security Council. We need support from our true contributing countries, our financial contributors. We need to act with partners. So working to improve peacekeeping is really a collective responsibility. But then I would turn to the main areas in which we are working. First is working on the political dimension. I mean this was one of the key features of the so-called HIPAA reports which I think is really the basis for many of the things that we are doing to improve peacekeeping. But ultimately wherever we are deployed the durable solution will be a political solution. It won't be anything else and certainly not a military solution. So whatever the challenges we are facing however slow and painful and cumbersome these political processes are we need to really dedicate our best efforts to make them move forward. And of course we, and it's a responsibility for the Secretary General who is very much involved in a number of situations. He has demonstrated that one example is Cyprus where he really committed himself personally to try to help reach a solution. But it's also our role. I mean the whole team at the UN has to really engage as much as possible on helping these political processes. But it's definitely a collective game as well where we have to interact and work together with the regional, sub-regional organization like the AU and African sub-regional organization and influential member states. And of course we need the support of the Security Council as well because the directive, the guidelines, the pronouncement of the Security Council are also very important. But definitely this is a key priority. And again however painful and cumbersome and sometimes really disappointing these processes are we have to continue making all possible efforts to advance these processes. Number two is, and I think Ambassador Blis, you referred to that issue in a very relevant manner. We need to refocus our mandates because we can't do everything. If we try to do everything probably we won't do these things well. And when we are particularly challenged on the ground which is the case in many of our situations then we really need to focus on the key priorities and think of what could be done by others. And maybe there are a number of things that cannot be done at this moment because of the specifics of the situation. I think the key priorities are most often both the support to political efforts and this is what most of our missions are mandated for. I'm not talking about the more sort of traditional peace operation that are still around like Unifil or Cyprus or the observer mission in Western Sahara. But our biggest operation which represent close to 90% of our colleagues in our budget have this mandate to support the search for a political solution. That's one priority. The other one is the security dimension and particularly the protection of civilians. So we're trying to, you know, with the help of member states and Security Council to refocus our mandate on these two priorities. And when we have the political space that is needed for, that is required, then we do more. And usually more is support to state institution building, particularly in the area of rule of law, which are the key sort of core state institution, justice, police and correction. But in order to do that, in order to support institution building, we need to have the political space. We need to work with legitimate institutions, with elected presidents, elected parliaments. And I would say it's better if they have been recently elected. Otherwise, you know, we don't necessarily have the space to do that. I mean, in South Sudan today, the priorities are really on both the political dimension and protection of civilians. There's not much we can do really by way of supporting state institution. There would have to be a couple of preconditions or necessary steps to be taken before we really engage in that. The third very important element is about performance. We, you know, with this difficult environment, this dangerous environment, this huge number of civilian population to protect, the unpredictability of these situations where you have, like in the case of DR Congo, you know, new points of violence that are emerging in places that were up to then rather calm. We need to be more reactive. We need to be more flexible. We need to move from being a static or a bit too static to being able to move and deploy wherever needed and to do that rapidly. And we also need to be better informed and aware of our environment. So in other words, we will, we're thinking less in terms of numbers, you know, whether we have, you know, given operation five or six or seven or eight or 10,000 military personnel and two or three or four thousand police officers, we need to think in terms of what are the missions that we have to fulfill and how, what are the needed capacities to achieve that as best as we can. But that has a number of implications. The first implication is we have to have better trained units, contingents, and, you know, in quite a number of cases, particularly when in the cases of so-called re-hatted operation in Central Africa and Republic and Mali, we essentially composed our UNP operation building on previous African mission. We've had special problems with the level of equipment and training of some units. We also have these problems in other missions, but maybe to a lesser extent. So a lot of efforts have to be put on training and not only necessarily on peacekeeping training, but sometimes we see that there are important shortages, you know, in what we call the green training, the military training, the one-on-one, you know, needed training for our units to be performing. I'm not saying this is across the system, but we encountered these problems here and there and also as we're trying to improve, again, the reactivity, the flexibility, the ability to rapidly respond to a situation that requires a different kind of training as well. We also need different kind of equipments and even though the so-called summit process, the so-called peacekeeping readiness system that is now in place since the 2015 summit, even though as a result of that we have more pledges, we still have deficits as far as a number of critical capacities are concerned. Helicopters, tactical transportation, intelligence, counter-ID, counter-improvised explosive device units. We need qualified staff officers. We never have enough of them because we need to have a chain of command that are more effective, especially if we want to be more reactive and nimble and flexible and so on and so forth. And we also need more women and I definitely and categorically put it in the category of effectiveness because having more women in peacekeeping means having a more effective peacekeeping. Yes, it's about gender parity, but it's mostly an above all about effectiveness because first of all we need the having more women in peacekeeping means that we have a working environment that is more reflective of the society in which we are and I think it's important for peacekeeping. And the second very important element is that peacekeepers interact with the population, with the civilian population and we're being more effective, much more effective with that if we have more female both in the police and in the military. The fourth, yes, it's a fourth element is about conduct and discipline. And it covers a wide range of issues. The most visible and prominent one is about sexual expectation abuses. And there, you know, I think we have a much stronger policy now. The Secretary General Antonio Guterres is very much engaged in fighting sexual exploitation abuses. We have also engaged with member states, troop contributing countries because it's a shared responsibility. I think it's important to say that this is not a phenomenon that is limited to peacekeeping. And in fact, the numbers show that peacekeeping is not particularly more effective than the UN system at large, but certainly there's something probably even more perverse in having peacekeepers engaging in these kind of actions. So, in these kind of acts. So, what we're doing today is, you know, we have better instruments in place. We also have a much greater awareness from member states, particularly from troop contributing countries, that this is a very, very serious issue. And also we have demonstrated in some cases that we can take action. We have removed an entire contingent from one mission because the country concern was not forthcoming enough in responding to a number of cases. And as a result of that, we're seeing some results now. I think, you know, we have a much better policy. We are there. I think we should be much more to the right in terms of implementation. We have to make sure that we fully implement that policy. And that fully implementing that policy means that we should be aware of the allegation. The system should be made aware of allegation. And there, you know, we have developed system whereby cases can be reported anonymously, even from people that are not within our operation, that are outside of them. We need to make sure that preventive measures are being taken by contingent. And it's about a lot of things that has to be done by every level of the contingent. The hierarchy, beginning with the lowest level, has to do with the way we organize and install our camps and so on and so forth. It has to do with how reactive the system should be and how reactive our member states should be. And there we've seen quite significant improvement. One figure that I have in mind is that it used to take three months for a country, for a true contributing country to react to an allegation and to send an investigative team to our mission. And now the average length is only seven days. And we have seen cases of individuals that have been prosecuted and sentenced quite in a manner that is quite adequate with the gravity of these cases. So we're seeing improvement. I think another thing that's important to say is our policy also focuses very much on the victims. And in order to achieve that, we have deployed the victim rights advocate in the missions that are most affected. There's also a victim rights advocate at the global level, at the system level. And we have a fund that supports the basically that help support the victims at the local level. Now, SEA is, as I say, one important and very visible element of the conduct and discipline issue. But there's also something that is very important to us in a maybe slightly of a different nature, is it's the need for the right mindset from our colleagues, particularly from our police and military contingent, because we have mandates that are in many cases robust, that include the use of robust force when needed. It's not war, it's peacekeeping, because when we use force, it's to help and support the achievement of a political and peaceful solution. But it's still a robust force and we need contingent that are willing to able, of course, train and equip, but also willing to go and fully implement these kind of mandates. And we are really insisting to our true contributing countries that mindset is equally important as our training and equipment. A fourth, no, rather fifth element which I would like to underline briefly is partnership. I mentioned the importance of partnership as far as the political efforts are concerned, but partnership is equally important when it comes to improving the level of effectiveness of peacekeeping operation. First of all, because we need to have more options, we need to broaden the scope of options. Peacekeeping operations can be the adequate response, or at least part of the adequate response to some situation, but in other cases, they are not adequate, especially when we talk about peace enforcement. And there, we must help others to improve their capacity to put in place and conduct peace enforcement operation, and hence the importance of working with, particularly with the African unions and with African countries, to improve their capacity. The CODA program that was mentioned is a very important part of that. We at the UN are very committed to help and support the AU in its effort to further strengthen the African peace and security architecture and the African capabilities as far as peace operations are concerned. And I think by doing this, we not only help the AU and other organizations to establish, to organize these kind of operation we needed, but we also help African countries become more effective and better troop contributing countries for our own operation. So we hit two birds with one stone, and I think this is why we really want to continue these efforts. But we can do that alone. We also need bilateral partnership between those countries that have the capacity and the experience to help to work with other countries that are willing to engage in, or that are already engaged in peacekeeping, but who need extra support to raise the level of their units and their contingents. I think maybe to conclude two words on reforms. When we think of reforms currently at DPKO, there are a number of lights that, you know, it's not only about peace and security architecture reform that's one important reform stream, but equally important for us is the management reform that has been undertaken by the Secretary General, because we all know that we are penalized by procedures that are cumbersome and long and not decentralized enough. And if we achieve management reform, it can really be a game changer for our field mission. And the goal there is really to make things more simple and to decentralize as much as possible. And of course, decentralized responsibility has to come with accountability. That's something that also we want to emphasize. The peace and security architecture to me, which essentially aims at bringing closer together the, let's say, the more political side of the peace and security architecture of the UN to the operation side of it. I think to me it's about adjusting the UN structures to the reality of our work, because we don't have any situation where peacekeeping operation is the only tool, is the only game in town. Usually the peacekeeping operation is one tool and one player among many other. You know, you take the Sahel, we have a peace operation in Mali, Minusma. We have other forces that are there as well, the French force Bakhan, the G5 force. Now we have the Malian armed forces. We have political players, the African Union, the ECOWAS, the regional organization. We have the regional office of the Secretary General, UNOWAS, who's also helping in the political process. We have the EU, of course, and a number of areas. And some of the problem that we're facing in Minusma in Mali are Malian, are essentially national, but others are regional in their nature. So we cannot only address the issue of Minusma looking only at Mali and our operation. We need to have the right approach, the broad angle. And in order to achieve that, we can't run around and keep saying, you know, this is DPA or DPKO. We need to have an integrated approach. And I think that's really the aim of the reform and the mechanism that will be put in place to make sure that the future department, the department of peace building and political affairs and the department of operation will work hand in hand in handling these complex situations. The last thing that I wanted to say is at our level, we have undertaken strategic reviews for almost all of our peace operation. We've started with the Minusco in DRC. We completed Cyprus, but the mandate that was given to us by the Security Council was specific and didn't touch the mandate of the mission of UNFICI. We will be continuing and conducting these reviews with a very ambitious agenda. We want to look at everything from the political situation, the broad political objectives down to the mandate and whether the mandate is really adequate to these political objectives down to how we implement the mandates and all the way down to issues of effectiveness and cost efficiency. And these review teams will be led by individuals that are experienced but that are outside the UN. And we are inviting them to come up with bold proposal to be innovative. Their report will not be filtered by, neither by Atul Kare, my colleague, the head of the department of field support, neither by me. We will just add to the brief note to the Secretary General with our comments saying about the political and practical feasibility of the recommendation, but the report of these missions will come unfiltered to the Secretary General. And we look forward really to have innovative, as I said, bold proposals in order to make these operations more effective and, as I said, more nimble and also more cost effective. Now, the last word that I wanted to say is in order to achieve that we, as I said, it's a collective game. We need the support of our member states. I think we particularly need the support of the United States. And I can see a great deal of engagement from the U.S. And frankly, we had two occasions at the Security Council where peacekeeping was discussed, both in April and in September. The good thing was that these debates were relatively consensual. And I think it's important to note that there seem to be an emerging consensus, not full consensus, but emerging consensus as to what the main challenges to peacekeeping are and what the responses to these challenges should be. And as I said, I mean, what we need is support, but we need demanding support. And, you know, it's perfectly fine. It's normally fine. It's actually helpful to us when our member states and particularly the influential member states expect from us and say that very clearly to work in order to make peacekeeping more effective and, in the end, more beneficial to the population that we're serving and the countries we're serving and ultimately beneficial to peace, the cause of peace in the world. Thank you for your attention. Secretary General, if you wouldn't mind joining us as well. Tori, I'm going to put you in the middle. Eric, right here, our colleague, Bill Durge. Well, Mr. and Secretary General, you've given us a very full, rich menu agenda to follow up on. And I'm pleased and privileged that we are joined by three very noted experts in the field who will help us perhaps delve more deeply into some of the issues that you've highlighted for us in your presentation. First, Eric Gaudiosi is the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, International Organization Affairs at the State Department with responsibility for UN Security Council, peace operations and UN political affairs. He's had an extensive career around the world and he's actually returning to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which is great to see. Victoria Holt, Tori, was Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs from 2009 to 2016 overseeing the offices that address UN political affairs, the Security Council, peace operations, sanctions and regional organizations. She is currently a distinguished fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center to which she has recently returned, where she previously served as co-director of the future of peace operations program. At last, but certainly not least, we are pleased to be joined by William Durge, Bill Durge, distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. Bill has a long and deep experience in the areas of arms control and international security affairs, notably for the purposes of today's discussion. He served as project director of the landmark panel on the United Nations peace operations, what we all know affectionately as the Brahimi Report back in 2000. He currently serves as a consultant to the UN's international forum on challenges of peace operations, which focuses on improving the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. But before I turn to our panelists, I wonder, under Secretary General LeCouf, I might follow up just a little bit on your earlier comments. And you anticipated, I think, a lot of the things that we were implying to want to ask you. But one of the things I wanted to ask you is this very ambitious agenda that Secretary General Guterres is outlined and that you have reviewed for us, summarized here for us today. One of the challenges we face is how do we judge and how do we measure the progress against those various goals? What are our metrics here and how will we know when in fact we are achieving important progress, for example, with respect to this issue of sexual exploitation and abuse with regard to things like protection of civilians? And what have we learned, for example, from our experiences in South Sudan and Haiti and the crisis there? So you mentioned one metric, which was the response time on the part of countries to allegations of sexual abuse. Are there other things that we should be looking at focusing on as we are judging the way in which progress is being made? Well, thank you. I think it's a key question. I would like to say that in the end we have to be judged by others. We have to be judged by our member states. We have to be judged by the populations and the countries we're helping. And that's the ultimate proof for the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of what we're undertaking. That's one thing. So one or two years from now when reforms have, hopefully, advanced and also our efforts to improve some of our missions, then we expect to be judged by our constituency. But that's one level. But we have to also work on the indicators and the instrument that we're giving ourselves to measure progress. And I think it's important to go scientific. I would take one example. We are working a lot on performance, performance of our contingent. But up to recently, we all agreed within DPKO that the way we were assessing performance was a bit... They're good. They're not so good. And we had to be more sort of systematic than that. And as a result of that, we have put together a program, a series of key indicators that would help us determine in a way that is more scientific and also more coherent from one mission to the other to determine the level of performance of contingent. And also, by having these kind of more rigorous instruments, we can also reach out to our true contributing countries in that case and tell them, here's what we would like you to improve as opposed to just telling them we're happy or not too happy. So these instruments are helpful because they put us in a different situation of being more constructive, more constructive interaction with others. And I think even though sexual abuse is of course of a different nature, but we are also building, I think, a strong set of indicators in terms of the number of allegations, the length of response, the way... An assessment of how the judicial systems of our true contributing countries are performing and so on and so forth. And this is how we can at least make the case that we're either improving or not improving, and also revising our policies moving forward. And we know in this House how challenging it is to come up with metrics to measure. But I think, again, here in this situation it's going to be particularly important, because otherwise the UN itself is going to be subject to arbitrary judgments about whether or not it's improving or not improving. Eric, if I might, President Trump presided over, I think one would describe it, a historic meeting in September at the UN headquarters where 129 countries signed on to a statement lending their support to Secretary General Guterres' efforts to reform and strengthen the UN. From the perspective of the administration, how and where does peacekeeping reform fit into this larger reform agenda? And what are the administration's key priorities for peacekeeping reform? I think, are you Mike? We'll have to find out. Go ahead. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Secretary General Delay, to see you as always and my colleagues on the panel as well. President Trump's hosting of the event was, in many ways, the signal event of High Level Week at the General Assembly. And we hope it is recognized as eloquent testimony to our commitment to the United Nations and to the reform thereof. We are historically a leading supporter of peacekeeping. And we think that we have a strong partnership with DPKO and with the Secretary General in efforts to reform the system. And I would note, as you will doubtless recall from the department, that the process of reform is ongoing. It is a healthy vital sign of an institution, the efforts to approach the horizon, if you will, to make the good better. That is a sign of strength, it is a sign of confidence, it is a sign of responsibility. And I would also recall from that event, Ambassador Haley's words, that the goal is a better United Nations. That is not necessarily defined as a cheaper United Nations or a smaller United Nations, and that the United States remains prepared to make investments in success, as we've recently seen in our decision to not only join but to drive consensus towards a temporary increase in the Minoos Commission in the Central African Republic. The reason we did this, I would note, is because the facts argued compellingly for that. Facts must be the basis for these decisions, and that's why we credit the hard work undertaken and underway by DPKO to ensure a rigorous process of analysis. So that we do not have an absence of evidence, but rather evidence of absence. It's not only with respect to performance, but so that we can make these very, very difficult decisions across a spectrum of missions which face a spectrum of threats. So I would say that we credit the ambition of the Secretary General for his reform. We want to see that it is widely supported. We believe that it does not lack for vision. We want to help ensure that it does not lack for support. But within that spectrum, we believe that peacekeeping is an integral element of the foundation. The UN is a force, and the US is a forum. We want to ensure that it is the best possible one that it can be. At the same time, the administration has announced its intention to cap its contribution, assess contribution to peacekeeping at 25%. Now, obviously, that can compare it with the current rate of 28.4%, I believe it is, which creates a gap and a challenge. And so what I ask you is how does the administration intend to approach the negotiation at the UN? Is there a strategy here that would allow for the alignment of our assess contribution with what the administration has indicated it intends to pay? And if we fail to do that, is there a risk that we would undermine our own ability to help lead and influence this process of reform that's underway right now at the UN? Well, sir, as I said, and as I hope everyone knows, we have historically been the leading funder, for example, not only through our assessed contributions, but also since the year 2005 in our bilateral contributions of over $1 billion in capacity building with individual contributing countries. And I would certainly note that we would welcome some healthy competition for our title in that regard. And the question is how do we? And I think we are pursuing this through a variety of channels. First, we are trying to ensure that we recognize the success that under Secretary-General Lacroix rightly pointed out. There are instances where missions have successfully fulfilled their mandate, and it is not a question of a termination, but rather of evolution. There are other appropriate tools that the UN can bring to bear, whether those are in mediation or rule of law. We want to make sure that every tool in the toolbox works. We want to make sure that investments in individual missions are appropriate, but not excessive. That is our fiduciary responsibility, just as we ask of ourselves. And of course, there are negotiations regarding rules of assessment. There is a historical precedent that some will doubtless recall for this as well. Certainly, our influence within the United Nations is something that we want to use to best effect. We regard it as an investment, and I think that we want to make sure that we are not alone, that we are lending our voice to this chorus. But I do think that we regard the present situation, the present trajectory as extremely positive, and we look forward to working both with the UN and with capitals to ensure that we recognize success, that we invest in it, and that we invite others to join us in what we are confident will remain a continuing relationship where we will be a vital part and a vital voice. I certainly think I heard in there an intention to try to work in that direction, but I did not quite. Here was a strategy, but we will come back to that in a subsequent round. Torrey, you have deep, long experience in this area. And notably, you played an important, I would say, pivotal role in initiating the first UN member state ministerial conferences at the UN on UN peacekeeping hosted by Vice President Biden, and then subsequently the summit that was held and hosted by President Obama in 2015. Since then, we have had two other summits, one in London, most recently in Vancouver. What has been accomplished through this process? Why is this important? What remains to be accomplished? And what role can the U.S. in particular play in ensuring that this process not only continues but actually achieves the goals which you all envisaged for it when you set out in 2014? Well, thank you very much, and it's a real pleasure to be on the panel. Welcome to Washington, and thank you for your remarks to the audience. I will talk exactly about what we wanted and what we got out of those summits in the way forward, but briefly let me say what led to it. Because if you know the origins of something, it helps understand why policymakers would in the end have a president host discussion on capabilities of UN peacekeeping. Frankly, I think the Obama administration, many people came in sympathetic to peacekeeping, but perhaps taking it for granted. And we quickly saw with an earthquake in Haiti that it was the UN that led the relief despite losing honor people in the crisis. Near civil war in Cote d'Ivoire held together when two people wake up and declare themselves president. It took months, but the peacekeeping mission was front and center along with French troops to keep that country on the right path. We saw an effort to deter the worst of violence in Syria with unarmed observers. It did not work, but it was a very brave try. And the UN was on the front lines of South Sudan's independence. So these were all things that we just watched happen in real time, and none of those were actually in the mandate, nor was dealing with Ebola in Liberia. But as the U.S. looked to take on some of the tougher political security challenges, particularly in the second half, Mali were extremely threatened in the state collapse in the North and the whole region. The Central African Republic, where ethnic cleansing and divisions were a real challenge. South Sudan after 2013, when the crisis broke out, and civilians fled to UN compounds. Kidnapping of peacekeepers and other missions, civilians being kicked out of the mission in Western Sahara. We recognized that a good Security Council resolution was just a start, not the end of what you do. So with the authorization, for example, in South Sudan of 5,000 more troops, we were hauled to meetings at the White House daily. Weekly, and the clock kept ticking. And we're like, why aren't they available? Why isn't there rapid reaction? It wasn't bad intent. It was a wake-up call to us that the capabilities available to the UN were not what they needed. And sometimes it was basic engineers. It was rapid reaction and aviation. It was capable personnel to go into the field. It was French speakers, female police officers, as well as combat-ready contingents for some of the tougher environments, where the peacekeeping mission itself might get attacked. So I lay that out because the summit focused on filling those gaps. And so the series of summits started with asking the UN, what are your gaps? Not something governments make up. And we asked governments to come. And in the end, we had nearly 50 heads of state at the Obama Summit in 2015. And we asked them to pledge. This also had a secondary effect. It meant that every government who came to that summit had to review their own policy, including the United States. You can't write a pretty speech just from the State Department. You have to talk to your military colleagues if you're pledging something. So I think also it contributed integration of policymaking and some of the key countries and partners that the UN needs to work with across civilian police, military, and humanitarian sides. I'm very proud that the British continued the tradition. And I understand Vancouver was a success. So what did it result in? It resulted in over 50,000 pledges of new enablers, military, and police, and capabilities. It expanded the pool for the UN to draw on, which is absolutely vital so the UN can be picky about who goes where. And it started having a conversation. Now, this also helped the whole hippo process. Simultaneously, some of the key themes that have already been touched on, you have to have an underlying political strategy for a peacekeeping mission to work were really important. So we tried to marry that with capacity. So I think as a result, the summit process kicked off a much larger capital-based engagement. It enabled the UN to come clean and candid with many of the challenges it faced, which otherwise they often felt didn't have access to reforms. And it also put on the table a number of quick things I'll mention. They need for better planning and assessment. I think that's still unfortunately a real challenge for the UN. Better understanding of who might threaten the peace, both politically and then physical violence against civilians. I need to sequence mandates so you don't do all of it at once, but you take your time and lay it out. And a better integration with the political strategy is just to name a few things. Let's come back to them. Perhaps later we'll give a chance for Mr. Quad a comment on that. But Bill, you have a very extraordinary perspective on this, having been an integral part of the panel, the Prohimi Report, the Produce the Prohimi Report. If you look back, what strikes you or impresses you about this current effort in reforming peacekeeping? And I guess the related question is, do you think we are focusing now on the right priorities? Are there things that you think we might be overlooking or missing or under-emphasizing that you would like to see more squarely addressed in this opportunity that we have at the moment to advance this reform agenda? Thank you, George. It's a pleasure to be here on the panel with the Under Secretary General and with my colleagues. I really applaud the concerted effort at management reform and other reforms that the new Secretary General has undertaken. And it's taking up the challenge to reduce the fragmentation of the UN system in peace and security. But it's also trying to do so without altering established mandates and functions, which might limit some of the scope of the changes that can be done in a cost-neutral fashion, so neither more nor less. But if the reforms result in greater accountability, and especially, I think, greater ability of the system to evaluate how well it's doing in the field, which has had very meager resources, two or three people to do that, then that's a great leap forward. On the reorganization, I have maybe some more critiques. Other than folding the Peace Building Support Office into a new Department of Political and Peace Building Affairs, I'm not quite sure I get the Organizational Division of Labor. There's a combined set of regional divisions from DPA, the Political Affairs Department and DPKO, that will be suspended between two Under Secretary General, reporting to both of them under different circumstances. But I think DPPA needs to be the analytical and early warning shop that the UN has really never had on a strategic and operational basis. DPO, the Department of Peace Operations, needs to be the show-running shop on a regional and country basis, providing its base knowledge and its updates from DPPA. Integrated planning, backstopping, and support to the field, which is what the regional divisions under DPPA are supposed to do, really shouldn't be coming, in my view, from the same offices and the same people who are supposed to be watching and analyzing and projecting in many places the world over. They tend to trip one another up a bit. The historical problem, in fact, has been that the DPA has never had the resources or really the culture to be the information and analytic hub that it has needed to be to lift that burden from DPKO's office of operations. And I think there's still going to be an ongoing problem with regional versus functional expertise and responsibility in planning and executing missions. A regional or a country analyst may very well understand the nuances of everything in their region and country, but not have expertise in policing or courts development or mine action or demobilization or border management, these sorts of things, and the functional experts in those areas need coaching on how to apply their expertise in a particular country and setting. So they are complementary. And the system has been struggling with this over time and how to bring these sets of expertise together in both planning and responsibility for action. And it really is not clear how that works in the new system. George, in terms of something I'd like to see a little more emphasis on, something that we at Stimson had worked on and the Albright-Gambari Commission also recommended was a much larger standing capacity for UN police. There's currently 40 to 50 people. It's being better integrated into how police division and the missions do their work. Our recommendation was closer to 300 to 500 people on a full-time basis. Sounds like a lot, but when you have 12 to 15,000 police in the field at any one time, and those people are, the personnel are rotating in and out on six months to one year appointments and need to be retrained and reculturated and so forth, you need a much more extensive system for police. It's the second most numerous element of UN peacekeeping. Compared to the military, they have much more specialized duties. The military don't train their counterparts locally, the police do, in other areas of rule of law, training courts and other parts of law enforcement, and they interact much more intimately and closely, intimately is maybe a bad word, with the local population, whereas the military is supposed to be more aloof with the exception perhaps of some protection of civilian mandates. So this is something I think the whole system needs to take seriously and in the work that we did on this a few years ago, there's a minor cost increment to maintaining this kind of capacity, but it really saves you money over the longer term by enabling you to get with training and security and public safety much faster in a more coherent fashion and in handing off in a more coherent fashion as you build these critical law enforcement and control of law capacities in disturbed states. Thanks very much. And building on that, I want to give under Secretary General Laquan an opportunity before we open it up to questions here to comment a bit, but it goes to the point you were talked about at the very end and this is the peace and security architecture and the changes that have been suggested or proposed, and I think we're looking forward to a report from the Secretary General sometime early next year, which lays out more of the intention here, but it goes to the point Tori made earlier about how do we ensure that the mandates and the design of our operations, of peacekeeping operations, how are these informed by a better political analysis, a better understanding of conflict analysis, a better appreciation for what the political goals and objectives are, and how do you see these reforms of the security and peace architecture improving your ability to perform your mission in your office? What do you hope will come out of this organizational reform? Thank you. I think that what we need is to make the best use of the human resources that we have. We know that we won't have much more by way of manpower, so to speak, at the secretariat, but we have a great number of colleagues who are really experienced and it is true that up to now there has been a tendency to... I mean, I wouldn't like to exaggerate or to overemphasize, but to work each of us in our silos, depending on whether there's a peace mission or not. And as I was trying to suggest, peace operation is never the only tool and the issues that it's addressing are not necessarily the only issues that have to be addressed. It's part of a broader set of issues and challenges as a player. And I think the peace and security architecture reform is trying to address that and trying to help us better work together and also emphasize the prevention and mediation dimension in the role of the UN. I think structures are one thing but equally important, maybe more important. We're trying to bring about a change of culture and I'm a very strong believer in task forces. I'm a very strong believer in people working together. We have what we call integrated operational teams, so-called IOTs. They're backstopping, supporting our peace mission and essentially a bunch of colleagues sitting around the table and one of them is a political specialist in that particular region. The other one is a specialist in support, political support or police. We have a military colleague from the OMA. We want to make that work better and I think in order to make that work better we need two things. One will hopefully be brought by the structures, the new structure. We need to have a better coordination at the top and the new architecture will include the so-called standing principle group essentially the USG, the Under Secretary General making strategic decisions together with the Secretary General so that we provide better guidance and at the working level these task forces, these IOTs however we call them that are very useful but I think if we want to make the best of these task forces the change of culture is important in the sense that people sitting in these formats in this setting have to feel empowered. They have to feel that there's a strong sense of respect for your direct hierarchy at the UN but if you want to be efficient in that kind of collective setting you need to feel that you have some leeway, you have some margin of maneuver and that will come I think hopefully moving forward when we implement the reform and the Secretary General himself has been emphasizing time and again that it's not mainly about changing structures, it's about changing the culture in which we're working. Thank you very much. Does anybody else want to comment? No. We do have a couple of questions from the audience which I will try to decipher here and pass on. One relates to one of the greatest challenges we face in many of these environments in which we operate which is the problem of spoilers and as you pointed out the environments in which we expect UN Peacekeepers operator are highly volatile, complex with actors whose agendas are varied some criminal, some ideological and the question of how do we deal with spoilers we have a situation for example in the DRC where the UN Security Council mandated that there be a component to deal specifically with those who were seeking to undermine the fundamental accord here and one of the questions has to do with this is there consideration of using hybrid systems of justice for example in order to deal with these in which in many cases are largely criminal activities is this a realistic option or is this more than the system will bear given all the other complexities that you're dealing with and let me put that to you first Mr. Laquan that let me open it up to the other panel as well. Well thank you very much. Yes the so-called spoilers are the not so new but still relatively new keys are on the block when in terms of people were dealing with that in the field and I think there are a number of things that take one example the Central African Republic. We have all kind of groups again and some of them have more political agenda, some of them have less political agenda and some of them are in between or a combination thereof and I think all instruments have to be used there in order to help a political process, a reconciliation process, a dialogue process move forward then we need to have the right balance of power because otherwise there will be no incentive for any of these groups to join a political process so hence the need for and in addition to that if we don't have the right capacity they will be harassing the population and we will not and this is you know we have a key priority in protecting civilians so we have to have the security, the capacities both to show muscle to these groups and at the same time protect civilians from their activities but then the other challenge is political and I think it's important to keep in mind that you know we have these processes, the political process should be aiming at turning as much as we can spoilers into non-spoilers because you're not born a spoiler to remain so for the rest of your life I mean neither as an individual nor as a group so these negotiations and engaging even in a situation like the Central African Republic where the frustration, the resentment is enormous has to be promoted and has to be supported and that's why in the case of the Central African Republic we really encourage the president where they have the legitimately elected president of the Central African Republic to engage which is what they're doing to induce reconciliation process with the different groups but I think there are a number of other elements that justice is very important impunity is central to durable peace I think it's a university recognized and there are a number of different instruments I think all of them are relevant international justice, ICC, hybrid justice and in the case of Central African Republic there is a hybrid court of justice that is being put in place it's an important component my only concern is that sometimes these instruments are very expensive and the voluntary contributions are not necessarily forthcoming equally important, probably even more important is to strengthen the judicial capacity of the host countries however challenging it is but that has to be the ultimate goal and then just a few words to say in addition to what a peace keeping mission with the help of other protagonists can do in the areas that I've mentioned I think that we as an organization and an international community we will probably have to do more to address conflict drivers like radicalization and illegal activities I think the international system is already doing a lot on illegal activities and trafficking but I think it will have to do much more because in some of our situation which are probably in the Sahel in Central African Republic and to a certain extent in other situations like DRC and maybe South Sudan to a certain extent these illegal activities are becoming the number one conflict driver did you have others? I absolutely agree and I think this all speaks to the imperative of ensuring that the United Nations has both broad and deep experience so that it has the flexibility to address these challenges but when we look at spoilers I think we also look at host governments not to be among them and when we look at missions I think we look to the cooperative attitude of the host governments to ensure that whatever the missions contend with it is not the hostility or the obstructionism of the host government itself and Tori? In a way the spoilers have different types and this gets to your point earlier about situational awareness so I would maybe if you go into a mission to your point of knowing who the actors are a spoiler could be a small group that's out of power briefly and just wants in or it could be a very committed group of individuals who wish to undermine the peace or at times it could even be government forces so I think I will just come back to an earlier point which is more the mission is designed eyes open about who potential and actual perpetrators are and who your allies are that builds a better bond with the political side of the Security Council I'm mindful that we have already gone over our time but this is a topic of such importance that I felt I hope the audience will be tolerant and forgiving of us I'm mindful though we just had the release of the most recent Fund for Peace fragility index and on that list of countries one could easily imagine five or six of them which within the next year could be in desperate and dire need of assistance and support and transition Mr. Lacroix you said it's about quality and not quantity on the other hand we were already in a situation where many of our missions your missions are understaffed we know we have a situation in which a number of countries that used to be habitual or traditional supporters of peacekeeping are no longer at the table how do we and the whole process that Tori talked about in terms of bringing more countries to the table with concrete and specific commitments and contributions but how do we continue that how do we in fact expand the available pool of contributors so that in fact when we do have these situations which we know are going to arise in the next months and years that we are in a position to respond that's a tough one Bill do you have any thoughts on that certainly well one thing that has made me a little uneasy about the summit process in the last few years is that all the countries hosting the summits have been contributing relatively few people to UN peacekeeping and I would love it if those who hosted the summits the first thing they did was to contribute 10,000 people to the new rosters and then have them shell up the US used to have contributed 1,000 police to UN peacekeeping albeit mostly in the Balkans at the turn of the century and shortly thereafter and that has fallen way off so there is a divide between those who pay and those who end up deploying in the field and that shows up especially in the lack of enabling capacities that the Under Secretary General was talking about and we train a lot of folks to go and do these things but we don't do them ourselves because we've been busy doing other things and I suppose as those draw down I think we ought to be thinking about contributing some more to UN peacekeeping if only to encourage others especially in the developed and middle-developed areas who used to contribute thousands of folks to UN operations and one could enter that list, Canada, I guess Scandinavians others who were traditional contributors I would just add that yes quantity does have a quality all its own at a certain point what I took as a very positive sign was that much of the conversation on the margins at Vancouver was between and among nations so that missions do not fail for want of the nail we have invested a great deal in training in what we like to think of as smart pledges to focus on the sinews if you will aviation in cooperation with Rwanda for example on engineering so that we are in fact acting not only as an enabler but as a multiplier as we look forward to countries making their own successful transitions to become contributors and net exporters of stability yes please let's comment I'm literally between the two I think the US could do more in particular high quality capabilities I mean some of the gaps are its mobility, its engineers, its medical care those are the ones that are really tough to find and the benefit for US military officers and I know served in missions is a whole new world and their understanding of working within a multilateral context with officers and spillings from all over the world their situation awareness themselves goes up dramatically about what the issues are and 80% of them come out of it saying if only we could do this, this and this put me in coach I want to address it and I think that's some human capital that we then the United States could do better at keeping in touch with the Americans who serve helping them get promoted for it and actually creating a career track not just for the military but also for police and civilians because it is a skill that can be used repeatedly in operations around the world that relates to what was a question but I think it was really more a comment that came from the audience and had to do the fact that where are the folks who have been on the ground here on the panel well and not in that sense but I think the references that how do we take advantage of the experience of the folks who have served on the ground to make sure that as we're thinking through these reforms of peacekeeping operations we are taking getting the benefit of their experience and what they understand and the challenges that they have faced on the ground so I'll take that not as a question mainly as an observation which we all should take into account as much as I would like to extend this conversation I will try to be respectful of your time and I would invite you all to thank our speaker under Secretary General Lacroix and our panelists for helping us better understand both the challenges that the UN is facing in terms of improving, enhancing, strengthening its operations as well as the opportunity that exists I think in this moment so thank you all very much and I would like to invite our other co-sponsor Peter Yeo of the UN Foundation and the Better World Campaign Peter and Foundation have been strong and very effective partners with us over many years and trying to help understand these challenges and let me invite him to say some closing remarks please I just thank you Ambassador Moose thank you all of our panelists I won't hold you up but this has been a very important dialogue and I think it's important to remember that this dialogue today is posited in a series of briefings and other types of outreach on the important issue of peacekeeping that is happening here in Washington and New York so the more that we can stay engaged and informed we collectively can try to feed into this process and be supportive of this process I think the only second point I want to mention is that that we at the UN Foundation Better World Campaign released polling in October which showed that American support for peacekeeping is at record highs so when you ask Americans whether they want to support paying our UN peacekeeping dues on time and in full we have 65% of Americans wanting us to do that the majority of Republicans Democrats and independents all support us paying our dues to the United Nations on time and this is a record high that I think in large part reflects a feeling that the United States needs to work constructively with other countries to solve the world's challenges so again thank you all for coming thank you to the panelists and we look forward to a continued dialogue