 It's a really big honor for me to present my work for this audience and also with all the other presenters, especially my former teacher, Dr. Sony. I wanna thank Yale University and my supervisors there, Phyllis Granov and Koichi Shinohara. And thanks a lot, Professor Flugal, for inviting me to come here. I also wanna thank the sponsors, especially I wanna thank Jiv Daya Foundation. I'm working part-time now for Jiv Daya on their Kivalayan website, which will be a repository for Jain art in museums throughout the world and at sacred sites in India. I'll be happy to talk after the conference with anyone about my involvement with that project. For now, I will present this paper, The Logic of Legitimation of Jain Lay Life in Surya Garamba, 2.2 and the Uva Vaya. In this paper, I will argue that there is an inconsistency in the presentation of the legitimation of lay life in Surya Garamba 2.2 and further, that the second part of the Uva Vaya is compiled specifically in response to this inconsistency. I'll begin by talking generally about the text that I'm dealing with. The Surya Garamba and Uva Vaya, these are early Svetambara texts. Uva Vaya is the first of the Uvanga class of text. In the first part of this text, King Kunika travels to hear a sermon delivered by Mahavira. The second part of the text mainly consists of a hierarchy of beings who will attain good rebirths. In this paper, I focus on the second part of the text. Surya Garamba is the second of the Angas. The text is divided into two books and each of these is divided into lectures. In this paper, I focus on the second lecture in the second book, Surya Garamba 2.2. Both of these texts are made up of sections dating from a number of different periods that have been compiled at some point. There may have been several stages in the process of compilation. The date for the compilation seems to be different for each text. The fact that the texts are compilations is one reason why it is difficult to date these texts. The texts are made up of material from a number of different periods. As with other material in the Svetambara canon, the best that one can do is to argue for the relative date of a particular passage as it occurs in this or that text. In this paper, I will argue about the relative date of one passage as it occurs in two different texts. I argue that the compiler of the second part of the Uwabaya has copied the passage from Surya Garamba 2.2. The date of the passage as it occurs in Surya Garamba 2.2 is unknown. One might safely say that it dates from the last few centuries before the common era or else the first few centuries of the common era. On the basis of my own study of early Svetambara texts, I think the passage examined here is one of the earliest statements about the lay Jain community in the Svetambara canon. I have talked about the text that I will discuss in the paper. Now I want to explain the phrase legitimation of Jain lay life occurring in the title. What do I mean by this phrase? The earliest extant passages in the Svetambara canon, such as the first books of the Ayuranga and Surya Garanga present Jain mendicant life as a necessity. They contain no significant discussion of the lay community. Dixit and Johnson have drawn attention to this phenomenon. This is not to say that there was no Jain lay community at the time when the texts were composed or that Jain lay life was somehow illegitimate at this time. As Dundas points out in his review of Johnson's work, there must have always been at least semi-regular contact between Jain ascetics and some householders. The mendicants needed to beg for alms and also if there was no contact with householders, how would anyone be convinced to join the Jain mendicant order? So lay Jainism was never illegitimate. Nonetheless, there must have come a time when the early Jain monks realized, it would be good if we had some positive statements in our texts about these householders who are supporting us and who are indeed an important part of the Jain tradition. So in later parts of the canon, we find extensive discussion of the Jain lay community. The phrase legitimation of Jain lay life in the title of the paper refers to the process of writing positive statements about the Jain lay community and incorporating such statements into the canonical texts. These positive statements about Jain householders in the Shvetambara canon are the subject of mydoctoral thesis. As I have mentioned in this paper, I will focus on one such passage occurring in both Suyukadanga 2.2 and the Upabaya. In the paper, I will do four things and then I will present a conclusion. First, I will present the passage that I'm talking about as it occurs in Suyukadanga 2.2. We can see how the author of the passage has made a place of respect for the Jain householders where there was none before and we can observe the logic associated with this. Second, I will explain that the logic of legitimation of lay life seen in this passage appears to be inconsistent with the absolute condemnation of non-Jain mendicants found at an earlier point in Suyukadanga 2.2. Third, I will explain why I think that the compiler of the second part of the Upabaya has copied the passage relating to the lay community from Suyukadanga 2.2. Finally, I will argue that the second part of the Upabaya was compiled specifically in response to the logical inconsistency evident in Suyukadanga 2.2. It is clear that Suyukadanga 2.2 is made up of at least three separate treatises. Yakobi points this out in his translation of the text. This is obvious because the text treats the same subjects over and over in various ways. The subjects are dhamma and adhamma, here meaning something like the religious life and the irreligious life. The legitimation of lay life occurs in the third treatise. The first treatise deals with 12 kinds of dhamda or sin corresponding to adhamma and then it deals with Jain monastic life corresponding to dhamma. In this treatise, dhamma means Jain monasticism and adhamma is all other types of life. This is reminiscent of the earliest Jain writings. In the second treatise, we have again a list of bad actions called adhamma and then a section on Jain mendicant life called dhamma. But in the second treatise, we also find a third category, a mixed state, misaga. In this category are the non-Jain ascetics. This mixed category in the second treatise is absolutely condemned. It is not holy and does not lead to moksha. In the third treatise, we have again adhamma, various types of bad action. Then a section on dhamma, again meaning Jain mendicant life and then another mixed state. This time the mixed state is the lay Jain whose life is described in absolutely positive terms. This is the passage legitimating lay life. Now I want to discuss this passage but one cannot discuss the legitimation of lay life in the mixed section of the third treatise without also discussing passages occurring in the section on dhamma and adhamma in the same treatise. The mixed passage is created out of the other passages. Each section of the third treatise in Surya Ganga 2.2, dhamma, adhamma and mixed begins with a variation of the same passage. The subject in each case is some people, samtigaya manusa. According to this treatise, there are three categories of people. Let's look at the passage in the section on adhamma. This is not the whole passage but I have selected some parts to show what the author has done. Now the explanation of the first subject, adhamma. Here in the east, west, north and south live some men. Men having many possessions, unrighteous men, they are of bad character and morals. As long as they live, they do not abstain from killing living beings and so on, nor from bathing or anointing themselves, from wreaths and ornaments, from cars, carriages, vehicles, bed seats, from buying, selling, from silver, gold, riches, et cetera, from working and making others work, from cooking and making others cook and so on. So this is the adhamma section. Now the section on dhamma is entirely opposite of this. It describes the life of Jain mendicans. Instead of many possessions, the Jain monks have no possessions. They are not of bad character and morals, they are of good character and morals. As long as they live, they do abstain from killing living beings and so on. Everything is opposite the adhamma section. Now in the mixed section, the author makes an innovation. Instead of many possessions or no possessions, these people have few possessions. These people, for as long as they live, they abstain from one kind of killing living beings, but not from another kind. For as long as they live, these men partly abstain from bad actions and partly do not. In some other cases, the mixed section is identical to the dhamma section. For example, in the section on adhamma, we have unrighteous men, while in both of the other sections, we have righteous men. In this way, the author has created a positive statement about some householders. So what is the logic here? First of all, Jain monastic life is ideal. This is a premise carried over from the earliest texts. Now, the logic of the legitimation of lay life is that this mixed state, the life of the Jain householder, is respectable because it lines up to some extent with the life of the Jain mendicant, described in the section on dhamma. The logic is not well developed here. Nonetheless, it is clear. As presented in the passage examined here, lay Jains are people who behave like Jain mendicants at least some of the time and in some respects. Now, as far as I can see, this logic is perfectly coherent. There is no problem with the basic logic of the legitimation of lay life as presented in Surya Gidanga 2.2. But there is a problem in relating this logic to statements about non-Jain ascetics. This is part two of the paper where I point out the logical inconsistency in Surya Gidanga 2.2. I have already noted that the mixed category is absolutely condemned in the second treatise when it refers to non-Jain ascetics. This contradicts the logic of legitimation of lay life in the mixed section of the third treatise. The fact that non-Jain asceticism is described as a mixed state suggests that it corresponds to Jain monastic life at least sometimes and in some respects. Given the logic of legitimation of lay life in the third treatise, the absolute condemnation of non-Jain ascetics in the second treatise would seem to be illogical. This problem is left unresolved in Surya Gidanga 2.2. Now I come to part three of the paper. Here I show that the compiler of the second part of the Uba Bayeha has copied the passage relating to the Jain laity from Surya Gidanga 2.2. The reason to believe this is first of all, the same passage occurs in both texts. Furthermore, there is another passage relating to the Jain laity in Surya Gidanga 2.2 directly following the passage discussed here. This other passage was initially separate from the introductory passage but was inserted into the text at some point. Now we see the same sequence of passages in the Uba Bayeha and the two passages occur consecutively only in Surya Gidanga 2.2 and the Uba Bayeha. So it is clear that there is a relationship between the two texts. We know that the compiler of the Uba Bayeha has copied from Surya Gidanga 2.2 and not the other way around because as I have just explained, the first statement about the layman in Surya Gidanga 2.2 is one of three similar passages. There is the Adama version, the Dama version and the mixed version. In the Uba Bayeha, we find only the mixed version and the Dama version. The Adama version is not found. This situation seems to prove the direction of borrowing since it is the versions found in the sections on Dama and Adama that are natural opposites. We are thus able to establish a relative chronology for these passages as they occur in the two texts. The compiler of the Uba Bayeha has copied from Surya Gidanga 2.2. Knowing this, we can speculate about the motives of the compiler of the second part of the Uba Bayeha. Why has he copied this passage? This is now part four of the paper. I have shown that there is an inconsistency in Surya Gidanga 2.2 in that the legitimation of lay life occurs beside the absolute condemnation of non-Jane ascetics. I have also shown that the compiler of the Uba Bayeha has copied the legitimation of lay life from Surya Gidanga 2.2. When one considers this and one considers the contents of the second part of the Uba Bayeha, then I think it is quite obvious that the second part of the Uba Bayeha was compiled in response to the logical inconsistency evident in Surya Gidanga 2.2. The second part of the Uba Bayeha consists primarily of a hierarchy of 16 classes of beings, Jivas. The 16th category includes those Jain mendicants that have already obtained or are guaranteed to obtain the ultimate soteriological goal. The 15th category consists of the remaining pious Jain mendicants who will achieve the highest form of divine rebirth if not released from the cycle of rebirth. In the 14th category are the Jain householders who may attain rebirth in the Achuta Kalpa, which is the highest of the 12 Kalpa heavens. It is in this 14th category that we see the passages relating to the Jain laity from Surya Gidanga 2.2. The remaining categories are made up of non-Jain ascetics and perhaps some Jain ascetics who do not behave properly, as well as various types of householders. All of these categories will attain some form of divine rebirth. This situation is clearly different than Surya Gidanga 2.2 where in the second treatise we see the absolute condemnation of non-Jain ascetics. Though the compiler provides no clear explanation of why one group is higher than another, it seems that he has developed the hierarchy relative to the basic logic of the legitimation of lay life seen in Surya Gidanga 2.2. This is seen especially in the lowest category in the hierarchy. The lowest of the 16 categories may obtain rebirth in the heavens occupied by the Vana Vyantaras, one of the lowest categories of deities. The reason that they obtain this type of rebirth is that they experience involuntary hardship. Here the logic of the legitimation of lay life from Surya Gidanga 2.2 is pushed to its extreme. These people may obtain a divine rebirth because they behave just a little bit like Jain monks. It doesn't even matter that the hardship that they undergo is involuntary. There is only a very loose parallel with the life of the Jain ascetic, but this is enough to lead to a divine rebirth. As an aside I would note that this situation is similar to the Jain view on violent action. It doesn't matter if a violent action is accidental. What matters is that the action is committed. In the written version of my paper I discuss a few of the other categories in detail, but I will omit that discussion here. I do want to point out, however, that the Ajivika ascetics in the 11th category may obtain the same type of rebirth as the Jain householders. This is a long way from the absolute condemnation of non-Jain ascetics seen in Surya Gidanga 2.2. In stating that the Ajivika ascetics may obtain the same type of rebirth as the Jain householders, the compiler seems to acknowledge that Ajivika ascetics behave much like Jain ascetics. Now, even though non-Jain ascetics are not absolutely condemned, there is still a problem. The compiler of the Uwaya would like to say that lay Jainism is the best alternative to Jain monasticism. This is a problem because it is tricky to have a monastic ideal, but then to explain why lay Jainism, a domestic mode of life, is superior to non-Jain forms of monasticism. This, so the tension seen in Surya Gidanga 2.2 thus remains in the second part of the Uwaya, but the tension is less apparent here since there is no absolute condemnation of the non-asetic groups. Now, my conclusion. This paper examines the activities of a few monks in response to specific historical circumstances. The earliest extant passages in the Shfitambara Canon present Jain mendicant life as a necessity and contain no significant discussion of the lay community. In the context of competition with other ascetic groups for the support of non-asetics, the Jain monks composed scripture legitimating the lives of the non-asetics who supported them. In the third treatise of Surya Gidanga 2.2, we find one of the earliest extensive positive statements about non-monastics. The author of this passage has created a place of respect for Jain householders in a manner that minimizes inconsistency with the earliest Jain writings. The basic logic he employs is to present Jain asceticism as ideal and to legitimate non-asetic life insofar as it corresponds to the ideal. This is not the only logic of legitimation of lay life in the Shfitambara Canon, but it is influential. This logic is fine in itself, but the manner in which Surya Gidanga 2.2 has been compiled draws attention to a potential inconsistency between this logic and the absolute condemnation of non-Jain asceticism occurring in the same lecture. The compiler of the second part of the Uwabaya has copied the passages relating to lay Jainism from Surya Gidanga 2.2. He has recognized the potential inconsistency in Surya Gidanga 2.2 and he responds to it. Rather than condemning non-Jain ascetic groups as in Surya Gidanga 2.2, the compiler of the second part of the Uwabaya legitimates these modes of life to some extent by suggesting that the type of rebirth one obtains depends on the degree of correspondence with the ideal life of the Jain mendicant. This is not the only response to the problem seen in Surya Gidanga 2.2. In the Vyaha Paninati, we also see attempts to deal with the tension between the logic of legitimation of lay life seen in Surya Gidanga 2.2 and the absolute condemnation of non-Jain ascetics. As in Surya Gidanga 2.2, in the first two lessons of Vyaha Paninati 7.2, we have first the absolute condemnation of non-Jain asceticism, followed by the legitimation of lay life insofar as it corresponds to the ideal of Jain asceticism. Here, however, the inconsistency seen in Surya Gidanga 2.2 is not as apparent, because the condemnation of non-Jain ascetics is made through an appeal to doctrine and proper understanding rather than behavior. The appeal to doctrine and proper understanding provides a way to condemn non-Jain ascetics even though they may appear to be similar to Jain ascetics. The appeal to doctrine and belief is a prominent feature in some of the other early passages relating to the Jain laity that I discuss elsewhere in my thesis. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.