 Well, one of our great problems is that when you waste half a decade, and we nearly have, we've done the same thing in Afghanistan. You give up tremendous opportunities that you have if you go in with a balanced approach to dealing with ideology, politics, culture, and economics, as well as security problems. So you can't recover a lot of the things we might have done in Iraq now. That is a very important point because the fact we have had these problems in Iraq is not a model for the future. If we have to do this again, and we do it correctly, we could produce very different results. But if we look back, what we see is, to put it mildly, a pattern. Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and now Iraq. And in each case, the problem is we dealt with a state which, if not failed, was clearly broken, which was going to take immense efforts after defeating an enemy we could easily defeat with conventional forces. Now we have already totally revised our doctrine on counterinsurgency. We have issued a DOD directive which directly contradicts the entire administration thesis that you could fight this without stability operations in nation building. You have a counterinsurgency manual which is 180 degree reversal of the way we went to war. And in Baghdad we are attempting to create a security model which would, if it's successful, at least provide some degree of stability for government if it chooses to move forward. But what is the best we can hope for? The fact is now we can't produce a national government. We removed the Ba'ath Party, and the Ba'ath Party unfortunately had virtually all of the secular elements in Iraqi society in it. We installed a group of exiles, most of them dominated by religious figures. People who had ties to Iran who were part of Shiite religious parties that had opposed the secular structure of Iraq since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war. That is the government. That is the dominant majority. It's possible we can persuade it to be flexible in dealing with the Sunnis. They have a vested, very strong interest in reaching some kind of accommodation with the Kurds, although that's not clearly possible. But what we're going to end up with, I am afraid, is an unstable Shiite-dominated state. A real question about the future of the Kurds, whether they can coexist effectively with the Shiites. Serious problems indefinitely into the future with the Sunnis. Without the support to sustain high levels of economic aid with serious problems about being in Iraq long enough to create effective Iraqi security forces, which may be impossible because of the sectarian and ethnic divisions. So where can we go? We can get the most stable Shiite-dominated Iraq possible. We can understand our security interests in this region require us to try at least to use economic aid and Iraqi force development as tools in stabilizing the country. We have to have a very clear plan to deal with Iraq's neighbors and to maintain our presence in the Gulf, regardless of the outcome in Iraq. We are searching for the least bad alternative. And while in Washington we focus on plan A and plan B, the reality is plan I has already taken over. It's the Iraqis who will determine the outcome, not the United States.