 Good afternoon, everybody. My name is Scott Smith and I'm a senior advisor USIP on the Afghanistan team. And I'm delighted to welcome you all here for a timely discussion on ending the war in Afghanistan. I'd also like to welcome those who are joining by live stream. You can engage with us and with each other on Twitter with today's hashtag Afghan peace, and that's just one word. As many of you know USIP was founded by the US Congress 35 years ago as an independent nonpartisan national institute charged with the vital mission of preventing, mitigating and resolving violent conflicts under the premise that peace is possible. USIP has been involved in Afghanistan in particular since 2002 and supporting a sustainable peace in Afghanistan is a core priority for us. Our team is engaged at all levels of the process, including convening meetings like this. Here in Washington are meetings with key stakeholders for the discussions on how to bring about an end to America's longest war. In addition, we publish a great deal of details on substantive topics related to the peace. We work in Afghanistan through our office there at the grassroots level, hosting provincial peace dialogues, for example, that bring together women, youth and elders to help provide them with the skills and tools to participate in the peace process and have a say in the future of their country. These are just a few examples of how USIP is trying to implement its mission in Afghanistan. A year and a half ago, the Trump administration took what could be called the bold but risky decision to begin direct and open discussions with the Taliban on how to end the insurgency and allow our troops to come back home. This was prompted by the recognition that by all sides that there was no viable military solution to the war. Since December 2018, Ambassador Zalma El-Zaid and his team, including Ambassador Mali Fih, who we have here today, have been engaging with the Taliban negotiating team in Doha to agree on conditions for a reduction in violence and a lasting political solution to the conflict. That team has made frequent visits to Kabul as well to inform the Afghan government on progress made during these talks and to urge them to prepare themselves for negotiations with the Taliban on a final political settlement. And the team has also been making a concerted diplomatic effort traveling through the region to secure cooperation and support from countries in the region and from the international community writ more large. It now appears, according to news reports, that these efforts have achieved their attended result, at least in terms of a preliminary agreement between the U.S. and Taliban to reduce violence and an agreement by the Taliban to begin negotiations with the Afghan government, which they previously have refused to recognize. Naturally, such an agreement raises all sorts of questions. What are the implications for our national security? Can the Taliban even be trusted to negotiate? What will remain of Afghanistan's constitution and especially its protections of women's rights? And based on news we just heard this morning, what are the implications of the re-election of President Ghani on this process? Our panel today will discuss these issues and several others. The discussion will be moderated by Ambassador Richard Olson. Over the past year, Rick has been a senior advisor to our team at USIP. He was previously the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan in Pakistan and prior to that Ambassador to Pakistan. He will be joined by Stephen Hadley, former National Security Advisor and, of course, the chairman of USIP's board, as well as Michelle Flournoy, former Under Secretary of Defense for policy. Unfortunately, we'd expected to have Douglas Lute with us today, but at the last minute he was forced to cancel. Before we invite our panel to come up to the stage, it's my pleasure to introduce Ambassador Mali Fee. Ambassador Fee was appointed Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation in September of 2018. She's also served as a U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of South Sudan as part of a long and distinguished Foreign Service career. We're very fortunate she could join us here. She's just back from Doha and she'll give a few remarks that will set the scene for the discussion that follows. Thank you and Ambassador. Hi, good afternoon. Thanks very much. It's always an honor and a delight to be here at USIP. We're very grateful for your leadership and expertise and your support to our efforts. You're a valuable partner in everything that we do and I'm happy to be here and join all of you today. So, like a good deputy, probably many of you have never heard of me and that's fine, but I'm part of a great team that is proud to support Ambassador Khalilzad and his effort to try and finally bring an end to this war and pursue a political settlement. So, we're all proud to work with him and I thank you for the opportunity for letting me update you here today on what we've been up to. First, I want to say when this event was arranged, my understanding it was envisioned as a discussion of the latest developments out of Doha, including the understanding we reached with the Taliban on a reduction in violence and the next steps in the political process. I still intend to walk through these developments with you. This morning, however, the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan announced that President Ghani received over 50% of the vote, thereby precluding a runoff. We understand that Chief Executive Abdullah and others feel the process was flawed and are challenging the announcement. Our Embassy in Kabul, now led by Charjet de Ferre, Ambassador Ross Wilson and Ambassador Khalilzad, who fortuitously arrived in Kabul this morning, are currently speaking with Afghan political leaders. So, I don't have much more for you at this time, given that these are very recent developments. It is likely, of course, that these developments could add to the many challenges Afghanistan faces, including the challenges associated with the peace process. While it is up for Afghans or up to Afghans to decide the election outcome, our priority, and what we believe to be the priority of most Afghans, remains peace and the peace process. We believe we are close to executing a period of a significant and lasting reduction in violence. If this test period is implemented successfully, it should lead to the signing of a U.S. Taliban agreement. At that time, we will also publicly reaffirm our strong commitment to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, including our Afghan security partners. Importantly, the U.S. Taliban agreement will open the door to negotiations among the Afghan government, the Taliban, and other key Afghan leaders. And in those talks, Afghans will tackle the future political arrangements for their country. As Secretary Pompeo has said, finding a true reconciliation path forward will involve a difficult set of conversations, but one that's long overdue. We will not prejudge the outcome of intra-Afghan negotiations, but we are prepared to support whatever consensus the Afghans are able to reach about their future political and governing arrangements. It's taken a lot of work, honestly, to get to this point. We believe we have established the conditions that can transform the trajectory of the conflict. It is high time for the parties to begin moving off the battlefield into a political process. This work, as Scott outlines, began in earnest in January 2019 when we met the Taliban in Doha and agreed that a military solution was not possible and a political settlement was the best way forward. We then conducted nine rounds of intensive negotiations to work out a formula in support of that objective. As you all know, President Trump suspended our negotiations with the Taliban on September 7th of this past year, judging that no peace process could survive the high levels of violence afflicting Afghanistan. Since that time, we have been working to meet the President's challenge to the Taliban. He said, if you want me to move forward with a U.S. Taliban deal, show me you are willing and capable of implementing a lasting and significant reduction in violence, or RIV, as we are calling it. The President then authorized us to restart negotiations in November. In December, the Taliban conducted a series of thorough consultations with their military, religious, and political leadership. In January, as a result of that engagement, they provided us with a serious RIV proposal that has the backing of their leadership. After additional discussions, consultations, and negotiations these past few weeks, we recently finalized this understanding with the Taliban to reduce violence in Afghanistan for a period of seven days. This RIV will serve as a test period of the Taliban's intent and control of their forces, and as, if you will, a proof of concept of their commitment to the peace process. If the Taliban abide by their RIV commitments, it is our expectation that violence will drop significantly across Afghanistan. The RIV is very specific, and it includes Afghan forces. To support implementation of the RIV, a communications channel will be established in Doha to resolve any issues. And I think it's important to note that General Scott Miller, the commander of Resolute Support, will retain all of his authorities and the capability to respond to any threat. If implemented successfully, the RIV will set the stage to conclude the U.S. Taliban agreement, which in turn should lead to further reductions in violence, inter-Afghan negotiations, a political settlement, and a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire. We expect Afghans to endorse their vision of human rights, women's rights, and minority rights with a strong support and advocacy of the United States and our like-minded partners during inter-Afghan negotiations. As Secretary Esper underscored last week in Munich, our approach to this process, including implementation of the agreement, will be conditions-based. We are proud that our approach enjoys the broad support of our NATO allies, the European Union, Russia, China, and our partners in South and Central Asia and the Middle East. A big facet of our regional diplomacy has been outreach to Pakistan. Second only to the Afghans themselves, Pakistan has the most to gain from a stabilized Afghanistan. Pakistani support has been positive and real. The Pakistanis assisted in opening an important channel to the Taliban leadership for our negotiations and have been clear on the importance of reducing violence to allow negotiations to move ahead. They supported our efforts to secure the release of hostages held by the Taliban. Pakistan's support of this process has allowed for some positive momentum in our bilateral relationship. But we have been clear that further steps to build the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will remain directly tied to Pakistan's responsiveness on our core regional security concerns, particularly in Afghanistan. In this regard, we will need to continue to work with the Pakistanis as the process moves forward, in both securing a negotiated end to the war in Afghanistan and ensuring successful implementation of any deal. I want to close by stressing that we have before us a massive opportunity. I expect your discussion will encompass the many associated risks and challenges, including the threat from spoilers who do not want this effort to succeed. But I urge you and challenge you also to identify what steps can be taken to take advantage of this opportunity, as we are likewise urging all our Afghan partners to seize this moment. We should all do everything we possibly can not to let this opportunity pass. And as I close, I just want to say, especially to Steve, I often joke, but I mean this seriously, that it's diplomatic malpractice to think that when you step off the plane in the country of your assignment, that history starts. So as in this process, we are building on the work and experience of many colleagues in this room and others who have worked so hard to bring this conflict to the end. So it's an honor to see all of you and I don't want to be convicted of diplomatic malpractice. I want to honor all of you for all the work that you have done on behalf of Afghanistan and the Americans who have invested there. Thank you very much and have a great discussion. Okay, so Ambassador Fee talked about transforming the nature of the conflict and what a major step this is and I think those of us who have worked on the Afghan peace process certainly would recognize that and applaud this step. The question I want to ask to our panelists to start is as we move from transforming the Taliban from an enemy on the battlefield to a partner in a peace process, can we rely on them? Are they going to be, can we make them reliable peace partners? Well, first of all, thanks to USIP for convening this chance to talk about what is a really, really significant and important development. You know, I think trust has to be earned and I was pleased to hear that the approach that's been negotiated is a phased conditions-based approach because we will have an opportunity to see whether the Taliban actually produces the reduction in violence that they've promised. We will see whether they actually show up and meet with the Afghan government and members of civil society and really begin the intra-Afghan negotiations that are essential to get to an actual political settlement and a true end to the war. And we will see if there are spoilers and there almost certainly will be. We have to prepare ourselves. I've never seen an implementation of any kind of peace process that is in a rocky road. So there are going to be steps forward, there are going to be steps back. But one of the key questions is when there are spoilers inside the Taliban ranks, what do they do to discipline those folks and to stay on the path? So there will be lots of opportunities. Prisoner release is another one. There will be lots of opportunities for them to demonstrate whether or not they're serious and to build confidence and trust in the process over time. I don't have anything to add. You know, in a war that's been going on, not really 19 years but really 40 years in Afghanistan, there's an enormous amount of distrust on both sides. And one of the tricks, of course, as you know well in these kinds of negotiations, is can you structure something that assumes distrust on both sides but is structured in such a way that give an opportunity to build confidence and trust over time? Michelle, you mentioned spoilers. And one of the things we learn from various peace processes around the world is that there's an incentive, especially when you're on the cusp of a negotiation and a cusp of a process, there's an incentive for those who are opposed to come out and attempt to prevent the start of the process. And I think that's probably true for all of the camps and all of the parties to this conflict. And so I wonder if you can maybe say a few more thoughts on how this has to be dealt with and what we should expect in terms of spoilers, both in this interim period where we're talking about a temporary reduction in violence and then a more permanent reduction of violence. Right. I think, and there's spoilers at different levels. I think at one level, at the sort of tactical level, there may be individuals within the Taliban, for example, who don't support the peace process, don't want to lay down their arms, don't want to go along with this process. And I think there we have to, you know, the Taliban has to be held accountable to manage their own and to impose discipline and accountability inside their own ranks. And the Afghans and us on our side, but I don't anticipate us having a comparable problem. And then there are spoilers at the strategic level. You know, there may be a country that's on the periphery of Afghanistan or two that have not been a direct party to the talks that may say, well, you know, I'm not sure this is in my interest. So what can I do to make things hard for the United States or to undermine the process or to reset the table so that my concerns have to be more immediately addressed? You know, I actually think that the Ambassador Khaledzada and the broader team has actually done a reasonable job of engaging in literally all of, you know, in either direct or indirect more track 1.5 kind of talks with all of the different countries around the periphery. And in many cases, their interests in seeing this war end are actually rather aligned with ours. They may still do some unhelpful things. I think it's up to not only the U.S. but the coalition and the international community that's been investing in Afghanistan and trying to support getting to an end to the war to engage and deal with those spoilers as appropriate. If you think about it, in order to bring a sustainable piece in Afghanistan, we've talked about it, it's sort of you have to work for concentric circles simultaneously. You have the issue between the United States and the Taliban, which has been addressed immediately. That then needs to be nested inside an intra-Afghan negotiation but where all elements of Afghan society agree on a political way forward, which in turn has to be nested inside regional players who have to decide that it is in their interest to support what the Afghans come up with and who have to use their influence with those potential spoilers in Afghanistan to get aligned with what the Afghan dialogue produced. And then finally, there's the international community. There's going to have to help build the regional economic integration that is going to produce job growth and economic growth that will sustain the piece that comes out of this process and, in fact, knit the region together in a way that will be sustainable over time. So one of the things Zal has had to do and his team have had to do really is work all four circles at the same time. And as Michelle says, I think they've made a lot of progress on the neighbors. I thought it was interesting that Mali talked about how the Pakistani support has been positive and real. That's really one of the big potential spoilers and I thought that was a good sign of what she said. I'm sure there's more that they need to do. One of the questions we can talk about and others may have a more expert than I and you may want to say a word about this, Rick, yourself. But Iran, what about Iran as a potential spoiler? And part of it is going to be that's a decision Iran is going to have to make and they may see it in the context of U.S.-Iranian relations and think if there's a way I can frustrate the United States here, so much the better. On the other hand, we are not the only player here. Iran as a neighbor of Afghanistan is threatened by the drug problem that comes out of Afghanistan potentially about terror and Iran is going to be Afghanistan's neighbor long after this conflict is over. So I would argue that it is in Iran's interest to be supportive of whatever the Afghans can come up with in terms of a sustainable peace that can provide a safe and secure border on Iran's border in the form of Afghanistan and not be a source of problems either economically in terms of terror in terms of narcotics. Iran will have to decide but there are a lot of reasons why Iran in its own interest ought to decide that being a spoiler of an Afghan peace is not really in their long-term interest of their people. I would agree with you on that. The question is, is Iran going to be completely unified internally on this question because I think that the policy statements from Iranian leaders and from the foreign policy establishment in Iran certainly recognizes the alignment in some ways of interest that they have with peace in Afghanistan and indeed with what the United States is doing. But there's the whole question of the Quds Force and under its new leadership the new leader has actually got a lot of experience in Afghanistan. He had the Afghan file whereas Soleimani had the western file and will the desire to get back at us after the Soleimani strike override the objective calculation of interest. I mean, I think actually Iran is pretty good at calculating its long-term interest but there may be a temptation for a short-term spoiling role and I think we have to be alert to that. So, Mali described for us a very, and Secretary Esper described in Munich a very conditions-based approach that the U.S. as long as the U.S. keeps troops in Afghanistan we will have leverage. But the question I think that we need to think about is over time as the intra-Afghan negotiations begin and I think in the estimation of most experts likely to take some time will there be pressure on the U.S. to draw down further and perhaps to weaken some of this conditionality and lessen American leverage over time? Yeah, I think we have two real sources of leverage. One is our continued troop presence and I would hope that we wouldn't make any unilateral decisions until we have a peace deal actually in hand and concluded by the Afghans. Although, you know, in a political season that's going to be a temptation for this president. He's shown that he's been tempted in that direction before. I would hope that if we actually get serious negotiations underway between the Afghans that he will resist that temptation and not undercut them or our own leverage. The other point of leverage is our long-term assistance and that of the international community. Any Afghan government that comes out of this political settlement is going to need continued support from the international community and that gives some leverage to helping to shape that outcome and to ensure that certain things like respect for human rights, respect for women's rights, inclusivity and so forth, that those elements are ultimately part of whatever government emerges. So I think we do have leverage. We just have to be careful not to actually undercut ourselves by throwing any of that away prematurely. I'm not so worried about that. Actually, I think the administration has spent a lot of time developing its strategy with respect to Afghanistan, had the South Asia initiative, now initiated this negotiations. I think what has to be in the background of people is we want a sustainable peace. We've had pieces that turned out to be not sustainable. We left Afghanistan in the 1990s, having helped get the Soviets out of Afghanistan and had to come back. We left Iraq in 2011 and had to come back. I think the administration reels that. We want to bring our men and women in uniform home with honor and keep them home and not have them send them back to do the job over. I think the administration understands that and I think they recognize this is really the best opportunity we've had in 19 years to achieve that kind of result. It's uphill. It's always uphill. There are going to be lots of unforeseen problems. But I will say that two things really, and I think you will agree, one, I would not have predicted a year ago that they would have gotten as far as they've gotten. And second of all, I think what they've come up with is better than what was talked about in September. In two respects, really. One, this needing and the emphasis on a substantial reduction in violence up front I think was a real innovation and very welcome. And then secondly, tying what has come up out in the U.S. Taliban negotiations more closely to the start of the inter-Afghan negotiations, which in the end of the day is the form where a sustainable piece is going to have to come up with. So it's a tough slog, but I've been surprised at the progress. A lot more to do, a lot of loose ends, a lot of things that I think are going to have to be worked out. There's a chance of a chance, and that's something we haven't had before. On the question of a sustainable piece, I think here at USIP we tend to believe that to get a sustainable piece you have to have an inclusive peace process, and that would require bringing together people who can address women, who can address the question of women's rights, especially on the Islamic Republic side, as well as civil society, perhaps members of the opposition. As we seem to be on the cusp of inter-Afghan negotiations, do we feel that the steps have been taken on the Republic side that are necessary to build an inclusive team and to actually be prepared to engage with the Taliban that could be a relatively short period of time? I think it's a real, this is going to be one of the most difficult issues to solve. Let's see if Michelle and I see it the same way. One, we're always talking about the inclusivity on the Afghan side, and I'll come back to that. There's also a question of inclusivity on the Taliban side, because you've got to have not only the political folks in Doha, but you've got to have people who have contact with the fighters on the ground in Afghanistan so that you know the peace is actually going to be embraced by and enforceable against all of the parties. So there's an inclusivity question really on both delegations. On the Afghanistan side, I think the dilemma is this. The Taliban had tried from the very beginning to discredit the state institutions of Afghanistan that arose after 2001 and in some sense to fragment their authority as part of a strategy for enhancing their influence and waging their war. And that is something that is not lost on the Afghan government. And it is important that those state institutions be preserved and supported and that the achievements in the Afghan constitution not be lost. So on the one hand, this is why we've insisted that in the end of the day the Taliban need to sit down with the Afghan government, and it's important that they do so. The problem is it can't be just the Afghan government in this sense that it has to be inclusive of all elements of Afghan society. And that's the tension. How do you have a leadership role for the government where the Taliban actually has to deal and acknowledge the legitimacy of those state institutions but in the same time be inclusive of all Afghan elements of Afghan society so it's sustainable politically over time. I would hope that the way that tension gets resolved is that the government appoints a delegation to meet in Oslo or whoever for the negotiations that is inclusive, not just government representatives, opposition, civil society, women and youth. That seems to me that's the way you get out of this dilemma of not wanting to undermine the Afghan government but at the same time getting an inclusive delegation. And that's, I think, an issue that Zal has been struggling with and will continue to have to struggle with in the end of the day, I hope. And I'm pretty confident that President Ghani will see that that's where he's got to end up. I absolutely agree with that. I would say that in the current political, very polarized environment in Afghanistan politically, it's going to be difficult. But I think it is going to be very important that the opposition be represented on the delegation and that when we talk about members of civil society and women and youth that it's not just a token sort of participation, but it's a real empowered participation. All of the literature, all of the historical case studies on when have you had police, sorry, peace settlements, peace accords that have actually stuck? I mean they've actually been implemented, they've been sustainable, they've been enduring. It's when those additional voices, particularly the voices of women have been at the table and heard and represented in the negotiation, in the execution, and in the sustained implementation. So I think that that will be very, very important as kind of a design criteria going forward. And as we're talking about inclusivity, we have to mention at least that the election results were announced today. And interestingly, Mali suggested that this might present some challenges. I think there might also be a view that this actually simplifies things in the sense that there is now an elected government and is in a position to negotiate perhaps from a position of strength, but I think it could be seen in a variety of ways. I wonder how you see it. Maybe Steve, do you want to? It's tough. It's in some sense too soon to say. On the one hand, people will say, well, Ghani only got just over 50 percent and raised questions about that outcome. It should have gone to second round. On the other hand, I think Ghani had 50 plus percent and I think Abdullah had 39 percent. So in some sense, it was close as to whether President Ghani would get over the 50 percent threshold in order to avoid a second election, but it wasn't particularly close between Abdullah and Ghani. And I don't think too many people think that actually if there had been a runoff election that Abdullah would have been able to win. So it's a tricky issue. So it will depend on a lot of things. One, what is the opposition? What do the Abdullah people decide to do? How far do they want to push their complaints? And that's a conversation that's going on now. Secondly, I think it will depend a little bit on what President Ghani does. If he were to come out strongly now and make clear that he was going to lead this country into the negotiations with the Taliban and he was going to lead all the country and embrace the opposition, civil society, women and youth. I think it's a terrific opportunity for him to show leadership to lead his country and if he does that, I think a lot of these concerns will fall away over time. So I think a lot of it is actually in President Ghani's hands and I think it's a terrific opportunity for him and I hope he will seize it. So I think we'll do just a couple more questions for me and then move on to the audience so if you could start thinking about your questions. The Taliban, of course, is only one actor on the battlefield, unfortunately, in Afghanistan. We do have the phenomenon of ISIS, Daesh, and of course there are other groups and presumably Al-Qaeda will be dealt with in the context of the assurances from the Taliban. But since Daesh is not a party to this agreement and I don't think any of us expected it would be, how do we see that particular dynamic playing out with regard both to the peace process and more importantly the future stability of Afghanistan and security interests? Certainly ISIS and other terrorist organizations in Afghanistan that are not party to the talks they can be spoilers in their own right. My understanding, though I haven't read any of the text, is that the Taliban has made a commitment to fight Daesh, Al-Qaeda, any of these groups that are in the territories it controls and it also has acknowledged that the U.S.-led coalition and the Afghans in partnership will continue to prosecute counter-terrorism operations against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and others in the territories that are under Afghan government control. And that, again, this is an area where we will need to see the Taliban actually step up to its commitments. The fact that General Miller has expressed that he's comfortable with this goes a long way with me. He's a very strong commander and someone who's got a lot of many, many, many years of experience and he's very clear-eyed and realistic in his assessments of what's happening. But I think it's also important to have that communication channel established, as Ambassador Fee noted, so that if there are unclear situations of there are issues that need to be addressed, that aren't being addressed with the urgency and attention that's required, we can communicate that. Because I think, remember why we are there. We are there because a terrorist attack came to the United States from Afghanistan on 9-11. And so we, that's our primary interest in ensuring that doesn't happen again. And I think the United States has to keep our eye, we have to keep our eye on that ball. And I was, again, pleased to hear that General Miller will have all the authorities he needs to ensure that stays the case in the interim. As I understand the agreement that has emerged, the Taliban agree that they will not support in any way whether it's arms, training, financing or anything, al-Qaeda and ISIS in the territory in which they have control and operate. And that's probably all you could expect from a U.S. Taliban agreement at this point. But I would hope in the inter-Afghan negotiations, as they move to a political solution, one element I am sure of that conversation will be that the Taliban, if they are going to enter into a political process in some way, have to agree that all of us, all of them, if you way, all Afghans including the Taliban are going to go after terrorists everywhere. It's not just, as Michelle said, it's not just al-Qaeda and ISIS. I think the mission there has identified 18 terrorist groups in Afghanistan. And really, if there is going to be a sustainable piece benefiting all of Afghans, all of that terrorism has got to go. So part of it, I think, in the inter-Afghan negotiation is going to be a commitment that all of society is going to unite in going after all the terrorists everywhere and getting them out of that country so it can finally have some real sustainable peace. So final question. Both of you have considerable experience with Afghanistan over time at the top levels of the U.S. government. As you reflect on your experience and what you've heard today, how transformative do you think this is? Is this potentially the beginning of the end of America's longest war? I think it's, as I said, I think that it is certainly the best chance that I've seen in all the years I've been either working on or watching Afghanistan. That said, I think it's going to be a rocky road. It's not going to be easy. It's going to take time. It's going to take vigilance. It's going to take continued investment in trying to keep this train on track. But when you look at the study of how civil wars end, they end in one of three ways. Either somebody wins on the battlefield. That's not possible in Afghanistan at this point or at any point. Or an outside power intervenes decisively. That's not going to happen. I don't think any of the potential neighboring states is going to do that. Or the parties to the conflict finally reach a point of exhaustion and negotiate a political settlement. I think that's where we are. And I think we're closer to that point than we've ever been. And I think it's incumbent upon all of us to try to support the seizing of this chance. And here, I'll just say, we have to deal with our own political polarization. This is a very difficult time here in the United States. But I think if there's a chance for peace and we're pursuing a responsible, clear-eyed approach to that, we should be doing everything in our power to muster bipartisan support for that. I would just interject one note before I give it to you, Steve. The last time I heard someone lay out those three options, I completely agreed with it, as I agree with your analysis. It was a Taliban. We laid out those three options and said that the Taliban had concluded that they had to pursue peace for precisely that reason. So I think the logic is good. I think one of the things we have to say when people talk about America's endless war in Afghanistan, I think we have to recognize that America's role in that war is dramatically reduced. We still have troops there. We still lose troops in Afghanistan to enemy engagements, which is a tragedy. But the war is overwhelmingly being fought by the Afghans now with a lot of support from us in terms of intelligence, air power, and all the rest. So it has become Afghan's war. And I think that, in some sense, is the key to a sustainable peace and the work that USIP does and all the work we do in the districts and the like. What we have heard is there seems to be a desire for peace and for the end of the war in Afghanistan, this 40-year war, in a way there has not been before. And I also think that's going to be one of the critical elements if we are going to get a sustainable peace, is Afghan society has got to really mobilize and demand the peace and demand of the Taliban that they participate in this peace process but in a way that reflects the rights and achievements that Afghan society has achieved in these last 19 years. And so I think there is a crucial role, really, for all of Afghan society in this process and that's why the inter-Afghan negotiations need to be inclusive. I'll just add one more thought. Another important lesson from history. If we are fortunate enough to see a political settlement reached, it doesn't mean that the US role or the role of the international community is over. This country is going to need continued support, investment in its security forces, whatever form they may take. Maybe there's some disarmament, demobilization, reintegration effort. And here I'd commend a recent RAND paper that's just come out on what that might look like, which everybody should take a look at. But also the international community in terms of financial assistance and investment. Afghanistan without outside investment is not a society that is going to survive and thrive. And so in no case are we going to be able to wash our hands of Afghanistan and walk away, nor should we want to. This is something where we're going to have to continue to be engaged. Just the form of that engagement may change. I think it's worth bearing in mind that Afghanistan has always been very, in its modern state, has always been very reliant on assistance and the one time it wasn't was during the Taliban era and I think we should all draw, you know, the appropriate conclusions from that. So I'd like to open up the panel for questions from the audience. So we have speakers, microphones set up on the sides. So if you would step up and please identify yourself or we can pass mics. Yeah, we can pass mics. Okay. So if you could identify yourselves and please keep your questions brief. You're in the center. Hello, sir. My name is Nisar Hawaii. I'm a student of politics and my question is specifically, I think, I'll try to shorten it. What assurance that are there that peace process will not imitate the results of 1990s? And two, REEV has a plan B, C, or plan A must work. I'll take the last question. I think, you know, if this falls apart, the first option is to go back to the negotiating table and try to get it back on track. But if it doesn't, then we are sort of, we are in the status quo. You know, I don't think, I would certainly not advocate a US or NATO departure short of a political settlement being in place. I think that would be, you know, a disaster for everyone. So I think, you know, plan B is revert to where we are now and try to convince the Taliban and their supporters who can hopefully put some pressure on them to be more serious about moving forward. So we will see. I would agree with that. I think the country learned a lesson from the 1990s and it was brought home to us on 9-11. I think there's a consensus. We don't want to make that mistake and I think Michelle made that point. You already, I think there is international assistance committed to Afghanistan through 2024. I think that's right. And they were already to talk about what Afghanistan will need if a peace agreement is achieved. So I don't think you're going to see the international community or the United States, you know, saying we're done, we're out. Even if a peace agreement is achieved. I always used to say that plan B is always make plan A work. And I would sometimes say that's plan C, too. But you do need a plan D. And I think we have had a plan D, which is to strengthen Afghan institutions, both their security institutions, their political institutions, and their economic institutions, so that if the Taliban is not ready to make a peace agreement now, the society can continue to function and to continue to try to provide security and prosperity and a positive prospect for their people. Most people overwhelmingly in Afghanistan do not want to fall under Taliban rule. They don't want to give up and let the Taliban come in. And I think what our plan C or plan D is to do all we can to help Afghan society do what it has been doing over these last 19 years, to put itself in a position that even in the face of an ongoing Taliban presence that is unwilling to make peace, they can continue to survive as a state and not let the Taliban to be a strategic challenge or a strategic threat to the future of the Afghan state. I would also just add on the lessons of the 1990s or maybe more precisely the lessons of 1989, 1988, 1989. This peace process fundamentally recognizes there has to be an intra-Afghan political discussion, which was, I think, a widely perceived failing of the Geneva Accords, which did not have a clear political path forward. And as Steve mentioned, there's an external dimension to this as well and the four circles and the fact that all of the regional players as well as the larger powers need to buy in. And I would say that there actually is a very strong international consensus now on not repeating the errors of the past. So, the gentleman in the front here, please. Jeff Stacey, I've worked with UNDP in recent years on regional economic issues and more recently some of the peace issues and just two questions today in light of your remarks already. First to Michelle Flournoy, is it time that we Democrats really sort of step forward and give this administration credit for what we all held out on for a long time, which was negotiating with the Taliban the wisdom of that and crediting this team for this against the odds sort of progress and what kind of consensus is there? How will this help the administration to stick to the game plan here? And then a second question for both of you, really. If I were sitting in Kabul and thinking how on earth is all this going to work now, because as an Afghan in front of my mind is sitting right back here said last night, there's way more to go on this than you Americans seem to realize. So, keeping in mind, way more to go than you Americans seem to realize, she said, and acknowledging the catalytic impact of the Eid ceasefire and what have you, how does the government now sort of get the camel through the eye of the needle simultaneously not give away the store while releasing a certain amount of prisoners, getting a ceasefire, and in particular, what does this have to do with officer positions and potential military forces for the other side? My own view in terms of our, I'll address the question of our politics is that, you know, this has been an imperfect process. There have been lots of complaints about lack of consultation or lack of, you know, various criticisms. I think at this point, though, if we have a chance to actually, if this agreement actually goes forward and we get reduction in violence, you have intra-aftran negotiations started, you have all of the, you actually have these steps going forward, that is something that we started working for. I'm sure it was worked for in the Bush Administration. We were certainly working forward in the Obama Administration and if it can happen and make progress now, absolutely we should support that. But I think we should also hold the Administration to giving it the time and support that it deserves and to not allow our own election politics to rush any decisions like, you know, let's just throw up our hands and go to zero in terms of our troops by, you know, November because it's, you know, an election, it's a campaign promise or something. So I would like to see more bipartisan support but also, you know, sort of a stiffening of the backbone to hang in there and as you say, let the process work because the U.S. Taliban agreement is just a first step. The really hard part now is the intra-Afghan negotiations and navigating our way to those and through those to a viable and sustainable agreement. That's going to take time and we're going to have to stick to it and not make any, you know, decisive big unilateral moves ourselves in that time. Yeah, I don't really think people don't appreciate how far there is to go. I think there's a lot of appreciated. This is just a first step. It's been an enormously difficult first step as first steps usually are given the history here. Second of all, we have to recognize in the end of the day, the Afghans are going to have to make the peace in Afghanistan. We can't make it for them. We can help them, we can support. But in the end of the day, it is a test for the Afghan nation as to whether it can come up with a plan for reconciliation and peace and it's theirs to win and it's theirs to lose. In terms of the violence, I'm not sure I understood your question. I keep thinking, I think if there were a Taliban here, I would say, you know, the ending of the violence is in your own hands. If you will ratchet down the violence, the coalition in the United States will follow suit. So the key to the reduction of violence is in the Taliban's own hands and that may be why, as Mali Fee described, the Taliban were willing to respond to President Trump's challenge and actually go through a process and put forward a reduction in violence plan, which I must say I found astonishing. I found astonishing. So maybe they understand that, that that is the key to be ratcheting down the violence and if so, that would be a good news for Afghanistan. No question. Hi, I'm Monica Sager. I'm a student from Clark University and I'm currently at American University's Washington Semester program. I work with women's education in impoverished areas. So I was wondering if you could speak to how this will help Afghan women, especially but education in general, knowing that education helps empower the people in the state, but also the state in general. Thank you. Well again, I think my hope would be that whatever representative, inclusive Afghanistan negotiating team together that you'd have strong voices, certainly women but also others, who would make strong, strongly assert the need to protect the progress that's been made on women's health, women's access to education, women's ability to work, women's rights more generally. That is I think part of not only ensuring that we get a sustainable piece, but also that Afghan society is ultimately able to thrive. They bring a tremendous amount to the table in terms of the economy, in terms of the society and the peace process itself. So I think that's widely understood, certainly in the non-Taliban parts of society or many of them, particularly in urban areas, but I think protecting that progress is one of the most, in my personal view, is one of the most important things I hope the Afghans will do in their negotiations. One of the things USIP has been doing and Scott Smith can talk about it in more detail and correct me if I get it wrong, but we had a training session here some months ago of Afghan women to try to help them understand the skills and tactics and the way to handle themselves in a negotiation so they can be more effective in putting forward the perspective of Afghan women in a context which is probably still going to be male dominated. And secondly, I would hope in that process precisely because it will be male dominated, I would hope the Afghan men would adopt as an operational principle that in matters that affect the status and livelihood and life of women, men ought to defer to the Afghan women negotiators even if they are in a minority because it will be very important for the gains that Afghan society has made in terms of education and in terms of health, in terms of role of women, in terms of entrepreneurship and all these other things to be retained, not just because we like them as Americans, but because those are, and what we need to get the Taliban to understand that those are critical enablers of a prosperous, peaceful, sustainable Afghan society. That's why you want to preserve those things. And that's an argument that I think Afghan women, but I hope Afghans more generally are making in the room to the Taliban when we get into these intra-Afghan negotiations. The lady in white in the back. Thanks. Deirdre Scheskrain with USA Today. The Trump administration has come under criticism for not really having a strong counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan. I was hoping you could talk about that policy gap in this context. I mean, if the U.S. is withdrawing significant numbers of troops and minimizing its presence there, what are the implications of that? So I'll take that. No administration, not the Bush administration, not the Obama administration, has had an effective counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan. The last people who did was one year when the Taliban were in control and seemed to have been able, through their own inevitable methods, to reduce poppy production to zero. It has been a problem that has defied us for all the time we've been engaged in Afghanistan. And I think in the end of the day, the Afghans are going to have to decide what is the right kind of counter-narcotics strategy for themselves. And it is important that they do so because it is one of the reasons why the regional states will support a sustainable peace in Afghanistan if they can be insured of two things. Because this is something that China is worried about. The Central Asian states are worried about. Pakistan is worried about. The Russians are worried about. They're worried about two things. Terrorism coming out of Afghanistan and they're worried about narcotics coming out of Afghanistan. And that's why those issues need to be addressed in the inter-Afghan negotiations, not just because they're important to Afghans, because of course they are, but they are important to the neighbors and they're important if Afghanistan is going to have a sustainable peace and good relations with their neighbors in the region. I would just add to that that the substantial revenue stream from narcotics production, which mostly flows to the Taliban right now, is actually one of the main drivers of the conflict in certain parts of the country. And so it is absolutely an issue that will have to be addressed in the intra-Afghan negotiations and hopefully will be something that there can be a new compact that can result in a more effective approach than what has been attempted over by the United States over the past 20 years. Thanks. I'm Alex Theer. It's great to see you all. Many people are concerned that the Taliban believe that they are negotiating first the U.S. withdrawal and then appearing at the table to negotiate their takeover of Afghan government. And I'm interested if you are confident that the Taliban are coming, actually all three of you, that the Taliban are actually coming to the table for intra-Afghan negotiations as a good faith effort to think about how to share power with others and moderate some of their views or do you think that they are coming because they believe that this is now that they will receive power. And if you believe that they are coming to moderate their views, I'm curious what evidence you have. You think that suggests that. And if you don't think that they're coming to moderate your views, what is it that's going to cause them to change their views at this point that could actually lead to a successful Afghan dialogue? No, I certainly think the picture you paint is probably a fantasy of many in the movement, in the Taliban movement. But I think if it would be hard to hold that view over the mid-last, given how the conditions-based and phased approach of this agreement has come out, I mean, they would have had to stop listening altogether. I mean, it's very clear that the U.S. has agreed that if there's a reduction in violence, if they actually begin the Afghan negotiations, then in a certain period of time there will be a first reduction to 8,600 troops, which General Miller's been very clear is adequate to do his current mission set. But from between there and zero, there's nothing that is automatically going to happen unless other conditions are achieved. So unless the Taliban, this is my understanding, again, having not read the agreement just going on newspaper reports and what we've heard just now, but unless there's actual progress towards an Afghan agreement and the getting to zero on the U.S. withdrawal side is not going to happen by itself. It has to be, it's conditions-based. It's tied to the other outcomes that have to be reached. And so, you know, I think the Taliban have got to understand that if they've read the agreement they're going to sign. I would hope that the majority would not be coming to the table with the view you described, but with the expectation that they actually have to be part of getting to a political settlement that's not a Taliban takeover, but a mutually negotiated settlement with their Afghan counterparts. I would just add to that that the indications of perhaps moderation in the Taliban position largely come from interactions that a lot of people have had with the Taliban in Doha, the political commission. And I think everyone is aware that the political commission will probably be predisposed towards a more internationally acceptable view than perhaps the hardliners who are out in the field. So, you know, as Michelle said, this whole structure of the peace process has to be based on testing premises and some of the premises that are going to be tested is whether the view that we have gotten of the Taliban out of Doha is the accurate one or whether there's another view. I would just add, though, that I think one of the reasons that Zal was so insistent on having an authoritative Taliban delegation and why it was important that Mullah Baradar was released by Pakistan and headed the delegation to be Zal's counterpart was precisely to address this question of whether we were dealing. Mullah Baradar is one of the co-founders of the Taliban. So we think we, you know, I think it's safe to conclude that we have perhaps a more authoritative view of the Taliban as reflected in this understanding than we have had in previous encounters with them. Yeah, I want to try to head off one problem I think we may see in the way the media looks at this agreement once it's finally announced. I don't think anybody has a a Pollyanna's view about the Taliban. They're only going to accept an acceptable peace if they're forced into it. What is likely to force them into it? A recognition that we won't leave unless there is such a a sensible, sustainable agreement acceptable to all of the Afghan people. Secondly, that the Afghan people won't accept them. This is where the Afghan people have to stand up and make it very clear what they are demanding of the Taliban as a condition for a political settlement. And thirdly, I think the Taliban, as Michelle said, know that this country cannot survive without international support and they won't get international support unless there is a political settlement that all Afghans embrace and that reflects and maintains these international norms that the Afghans themselves have built into their constitution and built into their society. That's what's going to bring the Taliban around. Now, when this agreement finally becomes public I'm sure there are going to be a lot of people who are going to say, well, what is the withdrawal conditioned on? Is it conditioned on continued reduction of violence? How much reduction in violence? Is it conditioned upon continuation of cooperation against terror? Is it conditioned on just the start of the inter-Afghan negotiations or the conclusion of the negotiations? Is it conditioned on a particular outcome? There's going to be a lot of people reading the fine print of the agreement. I think the reality is is if we get past the 135 days and after this initial drawdown to 8600 that people have talked about, if violence is not down, if there is not cooperation against terror, if the Taliban are not in good faith really making progress with the rest of the Afghan society towards the political settlement, those other troops won't come home. I think it's going to be that simple. I think that is the reality, whatever the sort of legal niceties of what conditionality looks like in the agreement. Because once that agreement is announced the real venue becomes the inter-Afghan negotiations and what they are going to insist on is the price of peace with the Taliban. I think we're out of time, but can we do one more question? Would that be okay? Analysts? Okay. Kate. Thank you. Kate Bateman of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Thank you so much for a stimulating discussion. If there is a significant reduction in violence and inter-Afghan negotiations open presumably there will be perhaps quite long and murky period when political structures and security structures and who has security control on the ground in the provinces in Afghanistan that may continue for months if not more than a year. At the same time there will still be U.S. forces on the ground perhaps in the thousands. Right now their role is a train, advise and assist role. I wonder if you could comment on what do you think the role of U.S. forces will be in that uncertain interim period or maybe what should their role be and more specifically do you think DOD and ministries in Afghanistan are at all thinking about transforming going from a psychology of the Taliban is the enemy to one in which there's a DDR process under negotiation and we may have integration of security forces. Thank you. Yeah, no I think it will be a very important as you said the negotiations will take time and I think it will be very important as they get underway to clarify what are the expectations in terms of continued reduction of violence if not a permanent ceasefire. How are each, how are the Taliban going to moderate their operations? What will the role of the coalition be in support of the Afghans? If we go down to 8600 I certainly can't imagine a major expansion of the U.S. role in beyond kind of train, advise, assist providing some of the key enablers like Medevac and so forth for the Afghans but so I don't see it expanding. I think as you suggest there's going to have to be some greater clarity about what is acceptable what's not acceptable in terms of activities on both sides and I do think the very hard work of imagining what kind of whole of Afghan force comes out of this. What are their security institutions look like as part of a political settlement? Is there a DDR process, a disarmament demobilization reintegration process? What does that look like? And again there's lots of historical cases lots of different models to draw on but all of that is to be worked out. I have not seen any kind of definitive work on that so far other than some of the good work of places like USIP and RAND and others who've laid out the historical models and best practices as input to the governmental kind of analytic and planning work that's going to have to happen. You rightly because of the job you have and the responsibilities you have start out with the US forces. Really what we have to start with is in the inter-Afghan negotiations if they come up with a ceasefire what kind of ceasefire is it? There are all kinds of models and they're going to have to decide what is the one that will work in the context of Afghanistan. Similarly they'll have to talk about what happens then in terms of demobilization of forces. Are Taliban forces integrated into Afghan forces? That's initially a decision that the Afghans are going to have to make. Once they do it the issue will then become what can US forces and what should US forces do to facilitate those things and I'm pretty confident that the US military can change its mindset to play whatever the role is required in order to sustain those decisions that indeed the Afghans are going to have to come to first and foremost. Alright well thank you all very much for joining us this afternoon and for joining me in thanking our excellent panel.