 Okay, so we're a change of program, so Ica Fernandes, who's works on urban planning. Just being at Cambridge as a evening scholar, we'll be talking to us about the Mount Dutter Peace Award. I think that's right now. More or less. Among other things. I missed already other changes. Yeah, so good morning everybody. My name is Ica Fernandes. Before I start this talk, I want to set a few caveats before I begin. I'm not reading an academic today. I'm not an academic. I'm also not a Cordillera specialist. I'm a, as my signatories, I'm a Tagalog, Ilonga working in Mindanao, and I'm very significant, but I don't belong to that culture. So I'm a special planner by training and a conflict specialist by practice. And I, although I started engaging in the Cordillera in 2011, after the signing of the the school agreement between the government of the Philippines and the CPLA, the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, most of my work has been in Mindanao, working on land conflicts, urban violence, and post-contact reconstruction, particularly the implementation of socio-economic peace agreements. So it's mostly MNLF, Moro National Liberation Front, MILF, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and then partially on CASER, which is the Comprehensive Agreement on Social Economic Reforms with the Communist Party of the Philippines. So in the last few years have there have been exchanges north and south between the Cordillera and ARMM, mostly on the autonomy issue. And I was asked in by both parties, both by the Philippine government and the non-state actors themselves, the CPLA and the MILF, to come in as an outsider looking in to help people think things through. So that's, I just wanted to make that positionality clear before I start talking. So I'm very aware of that outsider's perspective, and that's partially why I'm here in front of you, to gather feedback and ideas amongst my betters. Many of the conversations held back home in the Philippines are under Chatham House rules, and I find it unacceptable that the parties still feel uncomfortable dealing with academia, to talk about this in a very public manner. So I'm using the SOAS platform to go around it a bit. All I've had one-on-ones with other academics, and I feel it's a shame that June Pryl Brett couldn't be here because she and Finian have written extensively on the Bodong, and I'm really happy that Sir Tommy is here because the book that you are launching this evening already illustrates really well the Ili, the community that we're talking about in the next 20 minutes, without me having to show my crappy camphor and photographs here. So if you want to see how these places look like by the book outside. Okay, and while I completely agree with the parting shot from Villa yesterday from Lloyd, that the master's tools cannot bring down the master's house, nevertheless it's all we've got as a starting point, and the rules of the game are rigged, so that's where we have to begin. Okay, so my talk, I'm sorry, I talk really fast, I only have 20 minutes, so I'll go very broadly across this, and then I look forward to speaking to you in the tearoom if possible. So my talk is roughly on Spaces of Resistance, question mark, exploring the socioeconomic dimension of the amount of data seeped through the Koydelya-Ras-Winodnyan communities. Okay, so all the constructionist political practice my interest is in developing how these political agreements manifest in material conditions in space and place. And we all know as we'll be discussed later that issues of land, property, and socioeconomic development are fundamental to the struggle in the Koydelya-Ras both in the last 100 years and long before. But there's a clear mismatch between the negotiating rhetoric in the peace agreements and both the police asks from the non-state actors in the region and what this time should be delivered by government, so at least two-three levels of disconnect and mismatches. And the renewed push for autonomy right now under the State Administration and including the current draft for federal government highlights the need to discuss these issues in a more rigorous fashion, and that's partially why I hope this can be brought to this group of academics who have been thinking about the region in more serious and the one space and I have. And right now my entry point is the ongoing review of the CDAC-KVAT agreement and the drafting of a development strategy for the region which begs the question how this one approach these communities. Okay, so my project has three parts. The first aspect is going through the elements of the 2011 closure MOA. I'm not sure if people are aware of these peace agreements. Some of them, some people here I assume know about it, but others might feel a bit of refreshing. The second part is the more technical spatial aspect of it since I work as a land use planner. I work across the region down to urban scale. We won't have time for all of that but I'll show you a few maps and then try to talk through perhaps the political, cultural implications of those choices. And then third, try to discuss the possible implications between these kinds of technical choices being made and what happens in the months and years to come. Okay, all right, so just a bit of a refresher on this. You will recall that in 1970s the struggle in the Cordillera was centered with the Communist Party of the Philippines. I believe the entry point of the CDP and PNDF was through Ifugao in 1970s, but towards the end of the 80s there was a split within the Cordillera amongst factions for both tactical and ideological reasons. So by 1986, I believe the Cordillera People's Liberation Army decided to, starting from the faction in Abra, decided to leave the Communist Party of the Philippines and highlighted Cordillera autonomy as a clear ask, which they thought was not being addressed by the NPA rhetoric of addressing basically against localization and other things. Okay, so by 1986, they entered, well, there was the CPAT, the preliminary decision to start the ceasefire from a very, very short period of time between the actual creation of the entity, of the Danse entity, and the beginnings of a peace negotiation between the Philippine government and this group. So it started off like from 150 combatants from the CPLA, breaking off from the NPA, and into something that was striving towards a more pan-Cordillera identity. So we're looking at two particular organizations, the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, which is the Army being trying to defend autonomy and identity using armed means, and you have the CBA, the Cordillera Bodong Administration, which had its roots in the tribal organizations in the region. There were at least two, I believe, the UCC, the United Communities with Cordillera, and the Kalinga-Bond-Docti-Spakholis Association, the KBPPHA, which started in around 1979, long before the CPLA formally split from the NPA. The trigger, I think, will be discussed later if you'll recall the Cedophil logging issue in NABRA, and people, and of course, Chico-Dama as well, where people were trying to consolidate the tribes for the protection and defense of their homelands, which they felt was being threatened by outsider economic interests. So during that CPAT, which was not just a peace agreement, but a very significant act, the CBCPLA and the MNS, La Montanosa National Solidarity Group, presented a paper called Towards the Solution of the Cordillera Problem, a Safe End of Position, and that paper presented 26 demands, which was promised to be tabled for negotiation between the Philippine government and the CBCPLA. So it outlined the roots of the Cordillera problem as defined by these groups, and touched on a number of demands in political, social, economic, cultural, military, and even foreign relations. So they said that these demands, if addressed, would end the armed struggle and usher in peace in the Cordillera, as the first demand had to do with Cordillera autonomy. Second, one of the few demands also had to do with the creation of a federal system of government in the Philippines. A number of twists and turns which happened, but this led to the creation of the car through EO 220. Okay, so fast forward. So we all know that the two plebiscites failed in the Cordillera for various reasons. There was a massive factionization between these groups. They were never disarmed, and some members of the group turned to illegal activities, which significantly diminished their positioning in the region, and the agreements promised by government were never substantially completed as usual. So this led to a second agreement signed in 2011, which they were calling the, towards the CPLA's final disposition of arms and forces. It's transformation into a potent socioeconomic unarmed force. It had potent, so it will unpack these elements later and what it means, because it has really beautiful language. And then, but of course, the outcomes are significantly different. And part of the agreements included the final disposition of arms and forces of the people who thought themselves as CPLA, economic reintegration, and then the programming of a number of community development projects, mostly roads and water systems in the area. And of course, documentation of the struggle in the Cordillera. Okay. So just quickly, for those who have never seen this, and then when I go around asking Cordillera, and see if they've seen the 26 demands, they usually haven't. But as far as we're concerned for this particular talk, this is the language. So being able to recognize the primary ownership of the peoples of the land's resources and other patrimonies, recognizing traditional systems of ownership over the Torrin's title system, respecting the economy of the Cordillera autonomous social state, and allow its consolidation, pay reparations of funds and development assistance to the Cordillera nation, and then respecting the right of the Cordillera nation to conserve its forest stands and mineral resources, its lands from harvesting and usage, and to maintain the national ecosystem in the CASS against the act of outsiders who present a different life philosophy, moral values, and attitudes towards their environment. So just before IPRA, very fascinating ways of formulation. But as we all know, reality is very different, and it sprinters upon sprinters. So after Father Balweg died, there was a bit of a mess as well in 2003. There was an attempt at unification, which between the Balweg group and then the Morina group. I'm sure there's familiar names, perhaps, to some people here. Not really, no? For the old ones, maybe, no? I'm sure you have a lot of cheese myths about these people. But this led to GMA's Gora Mocabal Arroyo signing of the 2001 AO, which allowed for the integration of around 264 combatants into the AFP, the armed forces, and then around 500 combatants into the CAFGU, the armed auxiliaries, and then seed capital. But of course, this was incomplete, and they also had a number of projects called the Kalayansabalangay programs, run by the AFP's Nadescom in the past. Most erodes, school buildings, water systems, but then even Nadescom was dissolved in 2010 because of corruption issues. So most, I try to track down many of these projects. Many of them exist on paper, but were never implemented. In 2010, again, another split. Any familiar names? Morina Kumiding and Suggyao from the armed wing, and then in the CBA side, you have Ngaui, and then Mammar Sibahata. And in 2011, one particular side signed the MOA with government, only for the same parties to split amongst themselves in around 2013. And then again, with now in 2018, there's new dynamics. The groups who split have come together and split. There's another new group called the Balawastham, a father and son group. And so it's interesting, because one does wonder if entering peace agreements with groups like this is just a form of negative incentive that brings out the worst in freedom fighters that, and some people were saying, in Tagalog, in Tagalog, in Tagalog, we can't do anything. These groups after the late 80s no longer had any sway over the region. And by just entertaining their demands, we're opening a kind of worms. So it's a current quandary, but the reality is these agreements have been signed by the Philippine government, and they, as other friends and people are working in the various provinces, say, we can't do anything. These are outstanding commitments, and the least we can do is to implement them and implement them as best we can with as less damage as possible. Anyway, so another discussion for another day. So a really quick discussion of the elements done so far since 2011. I'm not sure if you're interested in this, but then you, combatants profiled were profiled, firearms were inventoried and turned in and sold. There were issues ranging from corruption to, from both ends, no, both from the locals, local governments and the actors themselves, even a rumor of sex for integration, the theme about, where female combatants were coerced into sexual arrangements in order to be entered into the master list. But that was never addressed. Interestingly, a lot of members were made as forest guards, Bantagubat, addressing working with the DNR to work on the national viewing program. So they were very proud of this. When I asked the combatants, they said that at least because we are fighters, the illegal loggers cannot scare us away. That's something that at least we have dignity because at this point, these are a large group of people whose only ways of survival is through the gun. A number of people's organizations were formed and trained, but only one of them is operational. Okay. Other issues being there was a documentation attempt to write the history of the Cordillera through the lens of this group. It has been drafted by Mr. Bahatan, but it's still in legal limbo because they wish, well, government and UNDP funded it wants to have it open source, but certain members of the group wish to have royalties from the book. So it's interesting. I understand that life is hard and people don't have to make money, but then you do have these tensions between political moors and reality. And as we discussed, people have agency and choice. But I'm wondering how to read this. So again, language. So you have this, and then we do have these commitments to transform this group of people ranging from maybe a thousand and their families into a potent economic and armed force within the next two years. But the two years started in 2011. It's 2018. Not happening. They're trying to legalize shifting from the armed group to something like a cooperative system. But that's not worked so far yet. And then again, there is a five year partnership strategy. It's trying to be drafted right now, which would be spelling out not a plan, but a document that would try to pin down projects and activities that would be economic in nature. It could be funded by government and donors, but still have the spirit of the Cordelia Rens as far as development is concerned. And that's the tension again. Okay. So challenges, right? For one, big words, but they're only focused on the non-state actors, not the place, not the communities. There's unclear intersections with the regular development planning process done by NEDA and the ADIS DPP formulation process under EEPRA. So even we know EEPRA is flawed, but it has tried to do certain things. It's not clear yet. And then you do have these new political scenarios on the horizon, a new bid for autonomy, a push for a federal shift, and a pending proposal for localized peace talks in the Philippines. So and the autonomy right now only being yet in the whole Cordelia is able to sustain itself technically. Everywhere else in the Cordelia Rens is not able to be physically autonomous, as defined strictly speaking. Okay. And which brings us to the term the NAN communities, which is now being popularized or attempted to be popularized by CPLA members. Has anyone heard of this term by any chance? No. So they're trying to popularize the term in the context of Tabodong, no, areas of practice of the Tabodong or the Pechen system. We're trying to shift it now from the old nuance, which is the bilateral peace talks between tribes into something that is shortened for Pan Cordelia Rens, Indigenous Covenant System that affiliates the Philippine nation state, similar to the Sultanates perhaps in the South, where you have the ator as the space for consensus building for the IBI. And now they're trying to translate it from the old concept of Bodong to a modern Bodong, where you have original values such as collective decision making, leadership, and democracy that might be acceptable for formulating a new Cordelia Autonomous Region. So it's now being negotiated as a basis for targeting for further socioeconomic programming under the peace process, but I feel that this still needs to be interrogated not only from a political sense, but also technical and economic sense. And this is a rough map of a short list that was given still under negotiation, but then it includes Corba Rangays under the Moa. But so for discussion, because while they are geographically isolated and deprived, they do hold a political purpose where they're trying, it could be used as a carrot to persuade people to galvanize around this idea. And so of course, have the ongoing issues between the NPA and the CPLA in these areas, where they're still picking off each other when they can. So I won't go into this, but in this rough map, comparing land cover and resources available, the current economic clustering where you have two major conurbations in terms of economic activity in the Cordelia, and the spread of proposed elies for programming and targeting. And again, my current issue is that how are we able to now negotiate between aspirations and the language and technical issues where you do have a Philippine government who's now reopening, has reopened the Chico Dam irrigation project this time under the Chinese. And it's not your World Bank projects which now have safeguards. These are not even soft loans, very high 12% loans to be dealt with by future generations. So given my discipline, and these are areas where you'll have to be able to start thinking about these areas not only in terms of patchy-patchy projects, but when you start investing in these areas, they should serve both a political and a practical purpose. And again, I won't have time to go through this, but I want to post questions not only to people like me who work as technocrats, which is like a bad word in the Cordillera, but also for people who work about identity and other issues. How can you manifest aspirations for EV-driven development in space and place that goes beyond political experience, beyond factions, across scales? Because the EV, as I understand it, is standalone, whereas your normal economic activity will require agglomeration and you right now have issues reading value over excessive urbanization, you're over your carrying capacity. So how do you expand a notion of development, bridging the languages of both worlds? And how do you ensure it is participatory and acceptable to everyone in the region? Hard questions, but I hope this is the start of a conversation that we can have. Okay, so I'll end with this, one of my favorite quotes from Father Baalbeg, I think they found this in his quarters before he was killed. So it's long past, the way now is peaceful means, but how will the people know if we don't go there? Thank you for your time. So a hundred years ago, Dean Wooster, the Secretary of Interior, sought legislative control over the Cordillera and Mindanao. His purpose was to prevent the just forming Philippine Assembly from getting control of those areas so that a sense of nationhood could not be developed. So now a hundred years later, are we looking at the rewosterization of the Philippines so that these people are thinking, well, we're not really part of a country, we're our own little area. There's no sense of capo a Filipino and there'll be no sense of common problems. Okay, it's fascinating you're asking this now because I do have fights with my friends who talk about nationalism. So the communists in my friendship group say about there are two governments they say in the Philippines. I beg to differ, there are more than two governments, there are a lot of governments in the Philippines and I think this debate cannot be addressed until we're able to expand the notion of nationhood to something more plural and real. We're an archipelago for crying out loud, we cannot be unitary. So but I do agree because they are pitting the Cordillera and the people in Mindanao against a particular narrative. Right now the BBL and ERMM is being decided, debated on. It's been butchered. The same is happening in the Cordillera with the CAR, RDC debates are on the next federalism. So yes, it's the same story, same sad story happening again. Yes. I guess my question for you is how my mapping of what I saw here in London articulates with your stuff because where is the space for the diaspora in that? These are people who largely are not on a federal impact. They've not moved out of the Philippines, they've been not out of the Cordillera. They're still in that thing there. They see their future as a return to place, as a life that will be lived out in the Philippines and they spend all their time working around home in various ways. Where do they find, you know, are their family networks going to be significant enough to represent them? Or do you need to open up a diaspora space? Because I can, I mean, when I see the landscapes on the Cordillera, they are remittance landscapes. These are remittance led development. If you're looking at the micro projects, the extensions of houses, the paving of private roads, all sorts of improvements that make people's lives viable in that way. You know, if they've got broadband, if they've got smartphones, those phones are coming in boxes from abroad. You know, this is a landscape that's being sustained in many ways by its diaspora. They don't really have a representation of those interests, which might be different. So, I mean, to complexify it, how do you work that in? I completely agree with what you said and it's, well, I guess there's members of the diaspora here, so they can talk about this more. But from my observation as an economic actor, at least a planner, and the projects I've seen that have lived on that don't fall apart within a year or two are the ones self-funded by communities. They care of their projects more significantly. They know what they want. And that's why ideally you'd have a more participatory process of planning and programming, particularly funneling in diaspora money, not only relying on government or external funds. Let's worry about the money than I am about people who are abroad having a say over what kind of community they're building to return to. So, I'm actually interested in diaspora political representation, because it can be problematic for people in diaspora to accept that their families are fully and completely representing their future interests, because very often the families are like, just keep the money coming, go worry, we'll take care of it, and the individual interest is there. That's quite true. They're treated as cash cow. I know people who've joined the NPA when they return to the Philippines for that very reason. It's like, oh, I don't like what my family's done. I'm going to take up arms. I think it's a great response, but also, you know, you're really angry. But if you spend five years doing domestic work in Singapore, yeah, there's no improvement, right. Yeah, the diaspora has sent me in another direction. Maybe I'll just rest my question. Think about it again during the break. All right, great. Okay, so that's, thank you.