 Greetings from the Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. I'm Commander Michael Petta, and I am the Associate Director for Maritime Operations here at the Stockton Center. We welcome you to the third annual Alexander C. Cushing International Law Conference. I, along with Major Heather Traigle of the U.S. Army and Lieutenant Commander Cynthia Parmily of the U.S. Navy will be your emcees for this three-day event. Exploring international law has been a focus of the U.S. Naval War College since its inception, and the Cushing Conference continues this long-standing tradition. This year we will primarily look at the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region, but we will also explore matters not unique to that part of the world, such as illegal fishing and global developments associated with the opening of the Arctic. We are honored and grateful to the 32 officials, scholars, and practitioners who will present over the next three days from locations across the globe. For those interested in learning more about our 32 exceptional speakers, you can find their biographical information in the online conference program. A link is available in the chat feature. Before turning to opening remarks, I offer four quick housekeeping notes. First, the conference will run from 11 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. Eastern Daylight Saving Time each day. We respect your time and we aim to keep that schedule. Second, the chat feature is disabled. You must use the Q&A feature to submit questions to our experts. Third, Zoom has a closed caption option for those who would like to read a live transcript of the conference. You can activate the live transcript feature at the bottom right of your Zoom Zoom application. Finally, the entire conference is being recorded. It will be available on the Naval War College YouTube channel shortly after the conference ends, and we will share a link also in the chat feature in time. Now I turn it over to Professor James Kraska, Chair of the Stockton Center. Professor Kraska. Thank you, Commander Pettah, and welcome everyone from the Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College to the third annual Alexander C. Cushing International Law Conference. This year we will explore the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The conference is made possible by the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation and gifts by Mrs. Nancy Cushing Evans in remembrance of Alexander C. Cushing. The Cushing Conference is the world's foremost event on international maritime law and international security. It continues a long legacy at the Naval War College dating to the foundation of the institution. General Order Number One of the Naval War College on September 2, 1885 established two areas of instruction. International law would be taught at 10 a.m. and military science at 1130 a.m. Because the founders of the War College understood that international law reflects the rules of the game of international security. Of course these rules are even more important today as we address maritime boundary disputes, gray zone conflict, the emergence of autonomous ships, illegal and unregulated and unreported fishing, climate change, and the Arctic Ocean with special emphasis on the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and Navy and Coast Guard operations in the region. International law is the language of diplomacy and great power competition. The Stockton Center has three major lines of effort. We focus first on the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law with associate director for land operations, Lieutenant Colonel Elton Johnson, U.S. Army judge advocate. Our second line of effort focuses on airspace, outer space, and cyberspace law under associate director, Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Davis, U.S. Air Force judge advocate. And finally our third line of effort focuses on the law of the sea, the law of naval warfare, and maritime security law. Here Commander Michael Pettah, U.S. Coast Guard with Lieutenant Commander Cynthia Parmily, JAG Corps from the United States Navy. These two planned and lead the Cushing Conference. Thank you to them. Selected contributions from this conference will appear as articles in volume 98 of international law studies, or also called ILS. In the Naval War College blue bullet, ILS is the oldest journal of international law in the United States, and the oldest publication at the Naval War College. Now it's my pleasure to introduce our president of the Naval War College, rare Admiral Shoshana Chatfield us Navy. She is a quintessential warrior scholar, a naval aviator with operational and command experience in the Indo Pacific region, service in the Pentagon and around the world, and also had. She's earned a doctorate in leadership and she was a former professor at the US Air Force Academy. And she has a full biography and others in the agenda, and on the website. So without further delay, Admiral Chatfield, thank you for opening the conference. Thank you so much, Professor Kraska, your sub generous in my introduction. I really appreciate that to all who are on today and to all who may be viewing this remotely asynchronously later. Welcome and good morning and thank you for joining us at the US Naval War College. Before getting too far into my remarks, I'd like to express gratitude to a few individuals specifically who have made this conference possible. First and foremost, I'd like to thank Mrs Nancy Cushing and the entire Cushing family for their commitment to advancing critical discussions on international law and naval operations. This is possible only because of the Cushing family and the Naval War College is honored to name this annual conference after the late Alexander C. Cushing, who so honorably served his country. I'd also like to thank Vice Admiral John Haneck, Judge Advocate General of the United States Navy and Rear Admiral Peter Goetje, US Coast Guard Deputy Pacific Area Commander, and Rear Admiral Melissa Burt, Judge Advocate General of the US Coast Guard for taking time from your busy schedules to provide keynote remarks at this week's conference. Your participation and insights underscore the US Navy's and the US Coast Guard's commitment to promoting the rule of law across the globe, a commitment of all conference participants undoubtedly share. And as an aside, I'd like to also thank Rear Admiral Burt for sending Commander Michael Pettit to the Stockton Center as the Associate Director of Maritime Operations. It's because of Commander Pettit's diligence as the director of this week's conference that we were able to assemble such an exceptional group of scholars, practitioners and government officials. And lastly, I would like to thank Professor James Kraska, the Chair of the Stockton Center of International Law, and team for their original and ardent legal research, writing and engagement, all of which have proven instrumental for national decision makers, military leaders, and legal practitioners around the globe. Welcome to this third annual Alexander C. Cushing International Law Conference. I'm so glad you could join us and hope everyone is well despite the challenges we have all faced and addressed in this COVID-19 pandemic. Hopefully, this conference is a respite and presents a rich opportunity to learn and contribute. This year, you will be exploring the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond to include discussions on contemporary and crucial topics such as ongoing tensions in the East China Sea, climate change and resiliency, maritime security in the Indian Ocean, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, the growth of maritime militias, and Arctic governance. The rule of law is the bedrock to security and stability both domestically and internationally across the maritime domain. Whether one's focus is military operations, the maritime transportation system, food security, climate change, or marine resource conservation, the development of and compliance with international law is paramount for the safety and security of the world's oceans. I'm here today to kick off this very important conference because of the dedication and work of the Naval War College to understand and answer questions of international law and key issues in maritime and international affairs. The more we prepare and understand each other, the more effectively our forces can operate together or individually. Our role here at the Naval War College is to inform today's decision makers and to educate tomorrow's leaders. In today's dynamic security environment, supremacy in strength and size of force and technological superiority are no longer enough. Our chairman has informed us that we need to concentrate on out thinking and outpacing any potential adversary. At the Naval War College, we inform, influence and challenge the thinking of naval joint interagency and international leaders to achieve that cognitive advantage. The objective here in Newport Rhode Island and around the globe is to deliver excellence in education, research and outreach, and to build enduring relationships with our maritime partners. The Naval War College is committed not only to conducting research simulations and academic courses in the field of international law, but when appropriate, we also want to be a leading voice within the US Department of Defense, and among international militaries in working to improve our understanding of and development of international law. Some of the contributions you will hear during this conference will be published in International Law Studies, the Naval War College Blue Book, which is the oldest publication at Naval War College and the oldest journal of international law in the United States. We're grateful to the entire Stockton Center team for continuing to make that so. My charge to all of you throughout this week's program is to foster a greater understanding of the rule of law, providing practical advice to decision makers and shaping and influencing scholarly debate. My team and I are glad to have this opportunity to further develop relationships throughout the international law community and amplify conversations between commanders, operators and lawyers. Have a productive and successful discussion throughout this conference. And again, welcome virtually to the United States Naval War College. Admiral Chatfield thank you so much ma'am for joining us and we are optimistic we will live up to that charge. Today we have a unique opportunity to hear from seven senior staff judge advocates from across the United States military services. And that discussion will be moderated by Colonel Thomas McCann, who is the staff judge advocate for US and opaque home. These seven the seven military attorneys presenting today provide legal advice to senior US operational commanders across the Indo Pacific region. So to start today's dialogue, we will first turn to one of those operational commanders where Admiral Peter Godier, who is the deputy commander of US Coast Guard specific area command. Admiral Godier will highlight how important the rule of law is to operations. Admiral Godier the floor is yours. Good morning everyone. Thanks very much Professor Kraska chair of the Stockton Center. We were Admiral Chatfield President of the Naval War College. Thanks so much for inviting me to speak today at the Alexander Cushing International Law Conference. You know I know that out there in the audience is an August group of attorneys. And as a career Coast Guard officer, it feels like I've been practicing law all my life without actually passing the bar. So admittedly, I have not been to law school. I am not a lawyer, but I think as a career coastie, I feel like I'm a practitioner of the law. And I understand that I may be the only non-attorney speaker at this conference, which makes your invitation for me to speak here that much more of an honor. So thank you again. This year's theme on the rule of law and great strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic region. As well as climate change and illegal fishing is completely relevant with our priorities and efforts out here in Coast Guard Pacific area. So today I hope I can provide value to your conversations this week by speaking from the perspective of an operational commander. Someone whose work is underpinned by the legal frameworks that have allowed not just myself, but all operational commanders across the services to get our mission done. So let me start with a brief overview of our Coast Guard Pacific area area responsibility to provide as much context as possible to understand our world of work. The Pacific area span of responsibility encompasses six of the seven continents, 71 countries and more than 74 million square miles of ocean, a vast space that extends from the west of the Rockies in the U.S. all the way to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic down to Antarctica. Syria includes the west coast of the United States, the high latitudes, the eastern Pacific, Oceania and the Indo-Pacific. As you all know, all of these regions are in a historic period of man-made environmental threats. You know that the geo-strategic landscape in these regions is dynamic to say the least. So naturally, such a vast and diverse swath of oceans presents an opportunity for illicit activities and behaviors that do not benefit the family of nations that surround and operate in the Pacific. Although the operating area is diverse, it is interconnected and the behavior of nations in a particular geographic region impact regions far across the globe. The Coast Guard is governed by legal frameworks ranging from our domestic laws to international conventions, regulations in a network of multilateral and bilateral agreements that underpin everything we do while we carry out our missions. Particular to our area of responsibility, Coast Guard's unique authorities allow us to support and complement the Department of Defense operations in the region, as well as all of our U.S. government partners, and it enables us to establish enduring international domestic partnerships, and I'll talk about that more in a minute. But everything that we do, again, is underpinned by a framework that gives our actions legality, whether that be from domestic law, regulation, international convention, or our vast network of agreements. And our collective goal to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region. And in a region where everybody can have security and prosperity, the U.S. Coast Guard is uniquely positioned as an organization to work towards this objective. In the Coast Guard we bring a capability of law enforcement agency, a regulatory authority, a facilitator of the maritime transportation system, a steward of the environment, and it's all underpinned by our fundamental natures and military service. And it's in this space where the Coast Guard's unique range of authorities, our reputation, and our relationships enable us to help achieve our U.S. national security objectives and the objectives of all of our partners across the Indo-Pacific region. They also enable us to have access to places and make partnerships that might not be as easily attainable by the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense partners. Specific to the Coast Guard operations across the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere, the rule of law is critical to our operational success, and so to help illustrate that, let me give you a walk around the Pacific and talk about some of our more recent operations out of Coast Guard Pacific area, some of the partnerships that we have, and some of our ways of advancing our national security goals. So let's start first with the Eastern Pacific. In the Eastern Pacific, we've had an enduring counter-drug mission together with U.S. government and our international partners. Our comprehensive approach to combating the illicit flow of narcotics at sea is one of the best examples I can think of the power of a whole-of-government approach to security issues. In that region, Coast Guard legal authorities enable us to interdict smugglers at sea where contraband is smuggled in bulk quantities before they land and they're broken up and into smaller parcels and then smuggled across into the United States. We work with the Joint Interagency Task Force South, JADF South, that coordinates the detection and monitoring for these interdictions. But being a DOD capability, it's a complementary relationship that we have that enables the Coast Guard to use the targeting and detection and monitoring of JADF South and then the Coast Guard can do the interdiction and the seizures because we have the law enforcement authorities to do that. It's a great example of our unity of effort because JADF South under Southcom integrates capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations and a whole host of other federal agencies, but then also representatives from all of our partner nations in their regions are representative in JADF South. These efforts depend on Coast Guard cutters, Navy destroyers and literal combat ships to deliver Coast Guard law enforcement teams onto smuggling vessels. JADF South laid interdictions account for almost four times the cocaine seized by all domestic and border enforcement efforts in the U.S. combined. So it really is an incredible success story. And then many of the interdictions are further investigated and prosecuted by the Department of Justice that then enables intelligence that then informs our cycle of detection and monitoring and seizures. So it really is a cycle of justice that gets after the cycle of crime that we face with drug smuggling. In fiscal year 20, the Coast Guard interdicted 195 tons of cocaine and other dangerous drugs in this fight. That translates to more than $5.6 billion in lost profits for transnational criminal organizations including the disruption and the dismantlement of those networks. And that shows you what we can do to impact the bad guys when we have a really strong joint effort. The fight against criminal organizations that traffic narcotics at sea is also multinational. We have a comprehensive network of partner nations in this effort that cooperate and assist. And that's solidified by a network of multilateral and bilateral agreements that we have with those nations. Coast Guard has standing agreements with countries in the eastern Pacific from Mexico to Peru. And they cover 10 different countries and allow nations to seamlessly work together to accomplish common goals. And with the help of other U.S. government agencies in capacity building, I'm pleased to say that our partner nations in Central and South America sees a record amount of narcotics in 2020. This work is about dismantling the transnational criminal organizations and incite crime and instability that drive migration and cause all manner of harm across the western hemisphere. So shifting gears and moving on to Oceania and the Indo-Pacific region, this area is home to global fish stocks, strategic trade routes, and maritime nations in a region that's increasingly contested, especially in the maritime environment. It's an area where nations, namely China, are employing economic coercion and overarching territorial claims to threaten the sovereignty of independent states and by extension regional and international security. Illegal unreported and unregulated fishing, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, piracy and encroachment on maritime boundaries threaten the maritime domain there. Economic security is national security. This is an area where strengthening a rules-based system that promotes peace, security, prosperity and sovereignty of all Pacific Island and Indo-Pacific nations is imperative. The Coast Guard is deeply committed to leveraging our capabilities and authorities to be a preferred partner to all who share a commitment to a rules-based order and strong behaviors and values. Bilateral, multilateral agreements, joint operations and a collaborative commitment to share values are our most effective tools to combating coercive and provocative behaviors at sea. A specific area of focus I'd like to touch on there and elsewhere in the region is illegal unreported and unregulated fisheries or IUUF. IUUF has replaced piracy as a leading global maritime security threat. It can destabilize the fragile economies of developing coastal states and it erodes competitiveness in global markets. Distant water fishing fleets are expanding at an unprecedented levels and one of the largest and most prolific fleets is owned by China. Their fleet often targets developing coastal countries without extensive maritime enforcement capabilities. So in response, nations must uphold the international conventions designed to protect global fish stocks. Regional fisheries management organizations hold enforcement agreements but they need legal support and cooperation from everyone to have the ability to enforce meaningful penalties for non-compliance of the rules. Last September, the Coast Guard released an IUU fishing strategic outlook. The outlook is a 10-year plan and includes three lines of effort to counter IUU fishing. First, promote targeted, effective, intelligence-driven enforcement operations. Next, counter-predatory and irresponsible state behavior and lastly, expand multilateral fisheries enforcement cooperation. Surface presence is one of the most effective tools to protect U.S. and global interests including freedom of navigation, respect for maritime boundaries and responsible fisheries practices. So to illustrate this point, the Coast Guard recently completed a patrol in Oceania with our most capable cutter, the National Security Cutter. That operation and patrol included operations in the Salmon Islands, Papua New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia's exclusive economic zones. As we speak, U.S. Navy literal combat ships with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments are coordinating fisheries boardings in the Pacific. That's a symbiotic relationship because these law enforcement detachments carry within the Coast Guard law enforcement authority, put on very capable Navy platforms in order to get after this problem. Last year, the Coast Guard launched an innovative surface action group concept with the Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter and one of our 225-foot buoy tenders, the Coast Guard Cutter Walnut. This surface action group supported fisheries enforcement and bilateral ship-rider operations in Samoa exclusive economic zone as well in the U.S. EEZ surrounding American Samoa. This SAG also engaged with Australia and New Zealand forces. So that just gives you a few examples of what Coast Guard Pacific area is doing with our partner nations and the U.S. Navy in that region in order to get after some of the issues that I described. And this innovative type of force packaging in these partnerships are absolutely the way of the future. So let's shift now to the high latitudes. As America's lead maritime surface force in the polar regions, the Coast Guard's objectives are to uphold American sovereignty, secure national security interests and promote economic prosperity. Access to the Arctic's vast energy, mineral fisheries and other commercial resources is growing while global interests in these resources intensifies. The Antarctic is also strategically important. Approximately 20 countries of at least one station in Antarctica, which has a wealth of natural resources. The high latitudes are unique. The environments are the harshest in the world and the tyranny of distance complicates the ability to operate there. But what is clear is that presence equals influence. The contrast in the fleet capacity among Arctic nations in order to provide presence is stark. Russia has 55 icebreakers right now with 10 more coming online in the near future. The United States has two. But I'm happy to say as a nation we're investing in our polar security fleet. The shipyard VT Halter Marine down in Mississippi will begin construction of the first polar security cutter since the construction of our one heavy icebreaker, which was built in 1976. And we expect the delivery of this polar security cutter in the mid-2020s. And the Coast Guard fortunately has appropriations from Congress to construct the second polar security cutter too. Looking to the future, effective high-latitude capability requires not only heavy icebreakers, but also reliable logistics, high-latitude communications and comprehensive maritime domain awareness. That one heavy icebreaker I told you about is called the Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star. And this winter it deployed to the Pacific Arctic through the Bering Strait up into the Cheshire Sea. And that was the first time we had a polar security cutter during the winter in that Arctic region since 1982. And it was an interesting patrol for the Polar Star and it illustrates the value of our Coast Guard presence in the region. Because we hadn't been up there in a while. Russia from all of our measures was curious to see that we were there that far north during that time of year. But fortunately the Coast Guard has a strong existing relationship with the Russian border guard regionally and that helped enable clear communications that prevented any kind of surprises there. And some of the things that we did experience were that we had some outreach from the Russian border guard asking about the presence of the Polar Star, what it was doing there. They communicated with us prior to flying a Russian border guard aircraft over the Polar Star. And then when the Polar Star is returning through the Bering Strait from the Cheshire Sea down south, it entered into a recently forged international maritime organization Traffic Separation Scheme. Part of that is in Russian waters and there had been some confusion on the presence of that particular Polar Security Cutter in Russian waters but that was all resolved with clear communications with our intent to follow the IMO Sanction Traffic Separation Scheme and through those communications any kind of surprise or conflicts were resolved. So this is an example of where the Coast Guard has a relationship with the nation that can be viewed as an adversary and other channels of our relationship. So let me shift now to cyber security. We would be remiss if we didn't talk in terms of governance to move beyond the physical realm into the cyber realm. The last real important domain that really is demanding governance. Do the rapidly changing and evolving nature of this sphere, the ungoverned nature of it, the frequency and the impact of cyber attacks on a daily basis. It's an urgent call to establish global norms that are underpinned with consequences so we can drive the kind of behaviors that we want to see in that sphere. The Coast Guard is rapidly building and expanding cyber protection teams that are going to be expert in cyber security. They're going to follow DOD, US Cybercom Standards and capabilities but the unique nature of the Coast Guard enables us to use those cyber protection teams not only to protect and to defend Coast Guard data systems but also enables us to apply our authorities for the protection of the maritime transportation system, the majority of which is in the private sector. So this will enable us to help the private sector detect and thwart adversarial missions in their networks. With approximately 360C in river ports that handle more than $1.2 trillion in annual cargo, the US is critically dependent on safe, secure and efficient maritime transportation for our economy and for our well-being and for our prosperity. And the Coast Guard, again because of our unique statutory authorities our regulatory authorities and international agreements put us front and center in the protection and the response to cyber threats in the maritime domain. And this helps us ensure we're most effective in protecting our infrastructure both on the ground and virtually. So I want to leave you in closing with a couple of thoughts and a challenge as you kick off your conference and proceed today in the next couple of days. First I want to reinforce the value of Coast Guards. As I mentioned earlier, Coast Guards bring that unique set of military capability that also has law enforcement capability. We help facilitate commerce. We're an environmental agency and we have a full suite of authorities that provide a toolkit beyond mere use of force and defense that help enable us to get after our goals of free and open into Pacific and security and prosperity for all where every country has an opportunity to prosper. Coast Guards provide the right combination of all these authorities underpinned by law international agreements and bilateral multilateral relationships to get after these problems. The second thought I want to leave you with is the need in the region for predictability. Now I grew up through the Coast Guard as an emergency responder and that's a specialty that succeeds by being prepared for all sorts of unforeseen events and to plan for them. To avoid conflict and escalation in the Pacific region, we need to avoid misunderstandings that can then escalate. An example of how we've done that recently is we've had a recent Coast Guard engagement through the State Department with China to advance the code for unplanned encounters at sea for Coast Guards. So this is one example where you can gain different scenarios, predict certain encounters and think about things that can happen in the maritime environment and through that enables attorneys to rehearse the sorts of things that might come out of those and be creative in considering based on these scenarios our responses to those beforehand. So everything is predictable. We don't have to think during a crisis about what our next steps might be that's all going to be figured out in advance. On the operational commander side of things, we're counting on you as attorneys to help rehearse these things and develop the different courses of action based in legal authorities that we can pursue in order to achieve our goals and de-escalate. Lastly and most importantly, I charge you to help strengthen our regimes. To reap the full benefit from our operational resources, our Coast Guard cutters, our Navy ships, aircraft sensors, our people to float ashore, I ask for your efforts as you have opportunities in your current and future roles to strengthen the legal bases on which we operate. Whether that be strengthening systems that bring transnational criminals to justice or bringing stronger boarding and inspection regimes through our regional fisheries management organizations or addressing fishing vessels that turn off their automated identification systems and go dark or establishing healthy norms in cyberspace reinforced by agreements that provide enforceable authorities or in the resolution of conflicting territorial claims by the rule of law and not through coercion or use of force, our operations on and above the high seas only achieve their goals, our goals when underpinned by a strong legal basis. We've done a lot, there's still a lot to do. Our personnel operating are counting on you to help us do that. So, I'd like to thank you, the Stockton Center, for paving the way and creating research that educates and informs military leaders national decision makers, international law practitioners and scholars. What you do makes a difference to people who operate like myself and our staff here at Coast Guard Pacific Area. So, thanks very much and I wish deeply that we could have all been in person this week but Elastis is the next best thing, but I do wish you all an insightful and productive conference. Thank you. Admiral Gaudier, thank you for joining us today. I know you have a demanding schedule in Pacific Area. We were lucky to hear from you. Next up is Colonel McCann, who is the staff judge advocate in New Pekin, but it should come to no surprise to those in the audience and sometimes we have technical difficulties and we have some right now getting Colonel McCann online. So, to give us an opportunity to connect with him, we're going to take a short break. We will reconvene at minute 50 and hear from Colonel McCann at that time. Thank you for your patience. Again, we will see you at minute 50. Well, good morning or good afternoon wherever you are in the world. It's truly an honor to be speaking with you and hosting the staff judge advocate or SJA as we say, panels later today. Whatever's drawn you to this conference today, whether you're an academic, a government lawyer, a private practitioner, a policymaker, a non-lawyer, a student or a military professional, the conference is going to highlight how important the Indo-Pacific region is and the legal complexities and challenges that we face out here. In preparing my remarks, I learned the late Admiral Cushing, this conference's namesake was a practicing lawyer when Pearl Harbor was attacked in 1941 and he, like so many others, was motivated to sign up for military service after the attack. As it was in 1941, the Indo-Pacific remains a critical region in the world. Back then it was ravaged by war, but since then the region's been grounded in a modern international system but kind of a common rural view, so to speak, held by many nations based on shared values and the rule of law. In this modern system that's helped shape and maintain the peace and stability that this region's enjoyed for over 75 years, but that is now under threat from the so-called great power competition which we're going to talk a lot more about today. It's got a lot of different names and a lot of different connotations to it and I'll put my twist on it toward the end, but that's the terms we're using right now in this great power competition. I'll talk about that competition in a moment, but at the outset I must note that my comments here today are strictly my own and do not necessarily represent those of Indo-Pacific Command, the Department of Defense, or any other element of U.S. government. And that same goes for our SJA panels today. Those are their own remarks, their own personal comments on how they see things and don't reflect DoD, their service component, or Indo-Pacific Command's position. The Naval War College Stocking Center is a hallmark of interdisciplinary interaction and scholarly discussion on international law and public policy issues. And I and my SJA colleagues are hoping to contribute to that today by sharing our personal perspectives and experiences. The start-off, of course, is as many of you know, I am an SJA as staff, judge, advocate, or a lawyer to the combatant commander here in the Indo-Pacific. So before I get into global competition in my perspectives, I thought it would first be helpful to give you a quick overview of where COCOM's fit in the picture for those of you in the audience who may not fully know and understand how it works. So the Department of Defense has 11 combatant commands. Each has either a geographic or a functional mission. It provides command and control over military forces during peace and in war. A functional combatant command, like United States Special Operations Command or United States Space Command, operate worldwide across geographic boundaries. It provides unique capabilities. Whereas geographic combatant commands like Indo-Pacific Command or Central Command or Africa Command, AFRICOM, operate in delineated areas and have distinctive regional military focus. But those regional focuses sometimes blend over into global areas and we will find that that's very true on a lot of the topics we want to talk about today. Indo-Paccom, like other COCOMs, exercises control over a variety of subordinate units and commands. In fact, the panels that follow, you'll hear from SJA's of these subordinate commandments from the U.S. Army Pacific, Air Force's Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Air Forces, as well as SJA's from other commands to include the Coast Guard Pacific Area SJA and the Space Operations Command. Each brings their own set of perspectives and experiences for all mutually supporting what we do out here. That leads me to my next point about combatant commands and SJA's. Great power competition is ultimately a whole government endeavor. But the military is one element of that. I think it's important to recognize this so when you hear from the SJA today, you understand that we support our military commanders who there support broader military and DOD strategies, which are in turn nested under the national level strategies. We also work closely with our legal counterparts, both military and civilian, across the U.S. Government Interagency. And I'll explain in a moment, there's a shared vision for the Indo-Pacific, so there's a critical international element with our allies and partners, all of us too. So it's broad spectrum what we do out here and not just one focus of how we handle it as SJA's. Okay, so moving into the theme of this year's conference, which is the rule of law and great power competition in the Indo-Pacific region. You might be asking, really, what does that mean and how do lawyers specifically fit into that? And I think this is a very important topic because I don't find lawyers to be collateral in what we're doing out here. I find them to be central, pivotal in what we need to do in the Indo-Pacific. And I'll talk more about that as we go along. A good starting point is, of course, the strategic concept of shared vision for the Indo-Pacific. For many nations, not just the United States, but many of our allies and partners, that vision is what we call a free and open Indo-Pacific. Indeed, in our recent statement in the joint leader statement that President Biden and Prime Minister Suga reiterated a shared vision for free and open Indo-Pacific based on our commitment to universal values and common principles and the promotion of inclusive economic prosperity in the rule of law. This includes, among other things, shared norms in the maritime domain, including freedom of navigation and overflight as enshrined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. What jumps out to me in all of this? Words like shared, common, universal, and inclusive. There's a tendency to think of competition as an us-versus-them sense and looking at a battle like that, mano e mano. But if these words shared, universal, common, and inclusive mean great power of competition in the Indo-Pacific is anything, I think, but about us-versus-them. We're about two competing systems, and we hear about that sometimes, or about just a U.S.-centric view. In my mind, as those words can note, competition is really about preserving the existing rules-based order that benefits all nations, not just China. It's not about competing systems, but preserving the system and a shared worldview based on the rule of law. The international community is endorsed for almost three-quarters of a century, and I think that's pivotal in what we do out here. I don't think we talk about what type of thinking we need out here from a legal perspective. I don't believe we need a new level of thinking on how things ought to be done. It's not about that. It's about reinforcing what we do have in place right now, and I'll talk a little bit more about that. But let's contrast this a little bit with China's vision to the Indo-Pacific. By its words and its gray-zone actions, China seeks to gradually change the status quo in China's favor. Some have described China's strategy there as salami slicing or incrementalism, gradual exclusion, and things like that. As one expert aptly described it, China employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a cassus belly or an act provoking or justifying war. To gradually change the status quo in China's favor, not shared, not universal, not common, not inclusive interest, only China's interest. And as I said, it's done in a way that is short of the use of force, short of an active war, it's hard to deal with. I'm going to talk more about that, but I believe that our thinking, especially in the United States, about how we deal with conflict, we've got to reset our mindset on how we do that from the way we've done things over the last 20 years to truly get at this. Simply put, as this thing creeps forward, and as we look at it, describing how we need to meet that challenge I think is where we as lawyers can really help out in this area. China's actions in the East and South China Sea make this apparent, and you will hear more about the East and South China Sea from other speakers, including tomorrow, so I won't survey all those actions. But to highlight just a few, island building, base construction to gain effective control of disputed features and surrounding waters, intimidation and coercion to exclude other claimants, blatant disregard for the 2016 Philippine China of South China Sea, Orbital Tribunals Award, and advancing dubious maritime claims on legal basis, which I think is very important. The opportunity they're trying to take to change the legal narrative. All these actions are designed to incrementally change the status quo in China's favor, very slowly, very incrementally, to where I guess that's the way it's always been, is the way I think some people might look at it. One day we look at this and don't realize that they didn't occupy these features. They didn't have air bases there. They didn't have military structures and operations going on. It's the way it's always been. And does that make it a norm? I think that's where they're going. I think we've got to address. So in this essence, what the competition is about is preserving a shared worldview. One of the benefits all from being gradually supplanted by one that favors China and exclusively China. So then how do lawyers and more specifically SJAs fit into that? In other words, how do we help in this competition? And as I said, I don't believe we're collateral to this issue and solving it. I believe we can be pivotal because I think the rule of law and what it means and what it stands for and how we espouse that and how our commanders understand it and how we as SJAs help them do that is pivotal to pushing forward in this and pushing back on what's happening or attempting to happen out here in the South China Sea and in the Indo-Pacific region. You'll hear specific examples from SJA panelists later today, but I'll offer a few general thoughts at the stage. First, SJAs help commanders understand the full range of operational authorities so they can leverage those. Now, this can be challenging in grey zone competition where competitors like China use non-military means, but often incrementally to achieve their objectives. As I quoted above, none of the competitors' activities may be clear caches belly. A military response to those activities then may not always be appropriate. So that brings the nuance of how do we address that given the way we normally address things and we've done that over the last 20 years. Our military brings a range of capabilities and authorities to the competition space whether we're out in front or in support of other US government agencies or allies and partners and we've got to look at that and how we do things. Second and related, SJAs help ensure competition activities are conducted in accordance with domestic and international law. We uphold the rule of law, including international law. Indeed, as I noted, this is a cornerstone of the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. International law is made, as we all know, among other ways, through state practice. And I would argue that US practice being one of the primary shapers of state practice, we are the ones who do it. We are the ones who are out there conducting these things, exercising our authorities and our abilities and our rights under international law more so than anyone else. And we should be the ones and we are the ones that define, I don't want to say exclusively, but I think set the pace and set the example for what international norms ought to be. And Indo-Pacom, as a combatant command, is looked to as an embodiment of state practice. We have to be. We have to do that. So it's therefore imperative that our actions and our activities follow the rule of law and SJAs help ensure this through our advice and guidance on international norms and law. Third, not only do we help ensure compliance, but SJAs also help commanders and operators develop a solid understanding of international laws, norms, and principles applicable to their operations. Take freedom of navigation or phonops, for example. Operations that challenge excessive maritime claims. Claims to maritime zones or jurisdiction inconsistent with international law of the sea. SJAs help ensure commanders and operators understand the precise excessive claims to be challenged so a phonop can be developed and executed with equal precision for that purpose. We also help to ensure that public affairs teams share the same foundational understanding so they can accurately explain a given phonop and the precise claims challenged to external audiences, which I believe is key, to say that we will fly, sail, and operate anywhere international law allows. We also help ensure completed phonops are accurately recorded. Of note, these phonops are not directed at any one country in particular, but challenge excessive maritime claims agnostic. Recall what I said earlier about rate power competition. It's not for us versus them, rather preserving the rules-based order that already exists and is prevailed for so long in this region. These phonops do just that. It's exactly what they're designed to do. They preserve freedoms of the sea and navigation that benefit all nations, not just powerful or coastal states. And SJAs play a key role, I believe, in ensuring that we do these effectively. Fourth, SJAs help develop, inform, and promote common legal understandings and interpretations, clearly articulated legal positions, and, the transparency in law and policy, and I think that's very important, that transparency piece in both law and policy and what we did. As an example, INDO PAYCOM recently published a series of blue papers in the Naval War Colleges International Law Studies Journal. Those papers articulate US views on the rules-based international legal order on a range of topics, ranging from more general topics, such as the principles of the law of the sea and navigation regimes, to more specific topics, such as military activities in the EEZ, regional straits, and the South China Sea Arbitration War. The blue papers help counter flawed narratives that we see espoused by some states, like China. On important maritime issues that we believe we need to be full and open and transparent about what the law is and how we operate under. Back again to what I said earlier about great power competition, not us versus them, rather preserving the rules-based order that's prevailed for over 75 years. The blue papers are a way SJAs help to do that. They promote a shared, transparent understanding of the rules-based international legal order. We can share with our allies and partners in the world to espouse not the US position, what that international law says, those rules and norms and what they are, what the foundational concrete positions are, not just the United States takes, but have been established long down and that all nations follow and push that out so that people understand that's where we're coming from and that's how we want to do business. And fifth, I would say SJAs advise on international agreements whether they're existing and are drafting, negotiating, implementing new ones. Could those international agreements help solidify our relationships with our allies and partners and contribute to the broader cooperative framework we need for maintaining and operating in a free and open Indo-Pacific and challenging those who want to compete to erode it? And finally, our SJAs also help our forces posture and prepare for when necessary, fighting and winning across the spectrum of conflict. Provide just a few examples, our Legal Advice supports exercises that help our forces prepare for the spectrum of conflict. Our advice also helps identify fiscal and operational authorities that enable us to exercise with partners and to enhance cooperation and interoperability. We also help commanders plan for a range of conflict scenarios and we help commanders develop and implement rules of engagement and compliance with international law and domestic law and policy so we can lawfully wield a range of combat power when necessary. These SJAs rules are tremendously important, especially in the event of a modern day high end conflict transpiring in and across all domains. And these are just a few of the ways SJAs help in great power competition. You're going to hear a lot more from the SJAs that have talked to you today. In many ways, since the central element of this competition is the rule of law, preserving the rules based order that has prevailed and benefited all nations for so many decades here, it is inevitable that lawyers including SJAs will play a key role. And I would add as we look at this and we look at the way things operate in the Pacific and as I've said, the competition space that we're in, the way China, the PRC are doing business, I often, there are a lot of ways it's been described but I look at it really as a super tanker, not moving very fast at about five to ten knots, a very difficult to turn and almost impossible to stop on short notice. You have to plan for these things. You've got to think it through in advance if you're going to shape it, if you're going to do it. Moving along, you know, across the horizon a super tanker doesn't like it moving very far, moving very fast. When it's coming at you and coming over the horizon toward the shore. But eventually it will get there before you know it. If you don't take action, if you don't do something about it to stop it or turn it. And I believe that's why it's so important for us to address these things now. As we look at the different phases and I would say of operations in a military context, you know, I've often thought phase zero is not the absence of conflict. And we talk about this as competition. And I think one of the things we have to get our heads around is over the last 20 years, and I don't mean to be blunt, coarse or callous when I say this, but we've been able to solve a lot of problems with the JDAM or Special Operations Strike Force. It's been the solution to many of the problems we've faced in the military issues that we've addressed over the last 20 years. Our way of thinking about things is fundamentally shaped by that and it's understandable. But we can't fight the next war, as they say, using what we learned exactly from trying to prepare for the last one. And I think looking at how we do this, we can't wait until we're at war, until we're on the brink of war with China to take the actions we need to. And I think the space we're in right now, they were truly in a battle for the legal narrative. When I came into this job, that was the first thing I noticed, and I used to talk to Pete Pedrozo about it, that we look at what the Chinese say, the PRC say, and how they want to change that legal narrative. And it's quite smart, actually, their actions and their deeds, when they operate, they create norms. They create state, they engage, I should say, in state practice. And if that's the only state practice that's being engaged in over a while, you might argue, that might become a norm. If no one else engages in a state practice, contrary to that, it is effective. So I think it's very important for the United States, we can't do it alone. And I don't think we can expect a lot of our allies and partners to exercise those rights to the extent we do. And there are a lot of different reasons for that, understandable on the risks that they face in doing so economically, politically, and other ways. Their neighbor, the PRC, is half a road away from the United States, but it's right next door to many of our allies and partners. And so the way they deal with that and address that may be different than the way we do it. The way their calculus works may be different. But I believe we have a responsibility to set the example, to be out there as the example of what is right up holding international law, not just a U.S. position, but the international norms and rules that we've all become accustomed to that we operate on, that the body of nations has signed up to, that China is actively contesting. Because I think if we do that, we'll be able to bring our allies and partners in to some extent, to lean into not the U.S. position, but into international law, the international norms that we are supporting, the ones that we are promoting, and those things we're doing. And so I don't believe we need a new regime or a different way of thinking, a level of thinking, a new law, a new paradigm. I think we need to exercise those rights, those freedoms, use those laws, uphold those principles that are already established in the face of those that would challenge them. And I think that's where it's key for SJAs to be involved, to make sure that commanders understand that, that we teach our staff, that we support our staff, that they understand those concepts. And many do. Many commanders you talk to around here, they understand a lot of these things very well and what it means. But I believe it's key to our position out here to uphold those, and to constantly engage in state practice that supports those things and push back because I think in this competition space, that's one of the key ways we've got to push back against the PRC and against China to make the world understand, to make them understand that they can't supplant world order. And the rules that have been there for so long that work for all nations that are for the benefit of all nations. So I think we've got a big task ahead of us out here. But I don't think it's insurmountable. But I do think it's going to take not a change in the law or a change in any paradigm or anything like that, but just a change in the way we think about things compared to the way we've done it over the last 20 years. I'll stop there. I know I was late coming in and I want to keep us on track here. But the SJ panels will kick off here very shortly. They're going to provide you more specificity on what I've just discussed. And I look forward to moderating those. I look forward to the questions that we'll have and the dialogues that we may have today. I'm very much interested in other perspectives of what we need to do and how you see this and where you see the problems and where you see the solutions. So I encourage you to chime in wherever you can. We'll talk more about that later. But thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this. I greatly appreciate that. And I apologize again for the technical delay this morning. But I hope I can get us back on track. I will turn it back over to our moderators to move the panels along. Thank you. Sir, due to the extended break earlier, we're just going to go ahead and push and go right into the first panel. OK, great. What I'll do is I'll kind of introduce that first. And each one, I will do that. I'll kind of give a general overview of how I see this going to work. Just so the audience understands, each panel we're going to have has two panelists. And they've got approximately 50 minutes to talk to you. So they'll deliver their operating marks. Each one will give you about 10, 12, 10, 15 minutes. And give us about 30 minutes at the end for questions. So we'll kick that off at the end. I'll start off with a few questions to the panel to kind of get things warmed up and allow them to address it. And then I'll open it to the audience for questions. You can ask those by typing into the Zoom chat panel or any way, other way that the crew back in Newport wants you to. But I think through the Zoom chat panel, we can take a look at those. We'll try to get as many as possible and select a variety of them. And I apologize in advance if we can't get to all of them. But we'll certainly try to answer every question we can if you want to put those in there. As I said before, as a reminder, the views of the panelists don't reflect Indo-Pacific command, their specific component, or the Department of Defense. They're their personal views. And they have an opportunity to speak to you about those today. But with that, let's turn it over to our first panel, which will consist of Colonel Marie Anderson from U.S. Army Pacific as the SJA and Colonel Chris Tolar from U.S. Marine Corps for Pacific. We're going to address a few issues for you right now. So I'll turn it over to open remarks, or you, Marie, and I will first. Okay, Marie, I'm going to turn it over to you to get your remarks started. Thank you very much for participating, and I'll be back up on shortly. Thank you. Okay. Good morning, afternoon, or evening, depending on the location from which you're joining us here today. My name is Colonel Marie Anderson, and I'm honored to represent U.S. Army Pacific, also known as USERPAC, and provide some thoughts from the Land Force perspective. As you know, the Indo-Pacific region covers a vast expanse of ocean, which may lead many to believe that this is an air and maritime-dominant region for our sister services in the Air Force and Navy. However, it is also a region consisting of 36 countries with more than 4 billion people, comprising more than 60% of the world's current population, and it is expected to exceed 70% of the global population by 2050. It is home to 24 of the 36 global megacities. It has seven of the 10 largest militaries and 22 of 30 chiefs of defense forces are Army officers. In short, people live on the land, and this region presents a host of opportunities and challenges for each service to bring their unique capabilities to bear in support of the Joint Force and the Combatant Commander. When the Naval War College asked that I discuss international issues relevant to Land Force operations, activities, and investments, I spent some time thinking about it and understand this request to be a bit challenging. Army operations, activities, and investments rely on a combination of international and domestic law. So if you're looking for a robust discussion focused solely and exclusively on international law, please tune in to a later presentation. However, if you're interested in some real world legal issues that I encountered over the last two years, I'll get to those shortly. Before diving into the legal issues, I thought it might be helpful to frame my presentation with a broad overview of USERPAC. The mission of the 106,000 soldiers and civilians assigned to USERPAC is to train, ready, and posture army forces, sustain and protect those forces, set the theater, operationally prepare the environment for competition, crisis, and conflict, support the development of an integrated multi-domain Joint Force, and most importantly, build military relationships and strengthen alliances and partnerships in order to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. Military forces are consistently present west of the international dateline. They constitute a credible deterrence and help implement the army concept of how the army fights in 2035 multi-domain operations. This concept is built on a theory of victory based on deterrence by denial in which multinational and joint forces are able to bring an overmatch of capabilities across multiple domains to a non-linear battlefield and deny our adversaries the ability to achieve their strategic objectives. The army thinks about multi-domain operations with four general rules see first, sense first, shoot first, and sustain to purpose. USERPAC is the first army unit to field a multi-domain task force which we believe has significant potential to disintegrate the adversaries anti-access area denial denial capabilities and create temporal windows of opportunities for air and maritime assets to penetrate and ultimately allow the joint force to exploit. The MDTF must be able to converge its effects with the joint force and our partners. It has participated in a number of exercises to experiment with its ability to link any joint or multinational sensor with any joint or multinational shooter enhanced by artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities as well as its robust intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. The MDTF facilitates our ability to see first, sense first and shoot first across the multiple domains of land sea, air, space and cyber. While the concept paper does not have a legal annex it's easy to see that this concept will provide job security for the USERPAC office of the staff judge advocate to 2035. In addition to having forces that are forward station USERPAC also employs forces forward temporarily on an episodic basis. Although USERPAC was not the first Army service component command to field a Security Force Assistance Brigade or SBAB we are leading the Army in employment of this relatively new capability. Its mission is to advise assist, liaise and enable allies and partners. Initially unemployed in Afghanistan this capability relied on both the Exord for Operation Freedom Sentinel and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. Without these authorities, employment in the Indo-Pacific region required some significant legal work. Ultimately we use a combination of authorities such as subject matter expert exchanges exercises, little training and 10 USC 321 allowing the employment of the 5th SBAB now in 10 countries. The 5th SBAB will join a number of other Army units during our major operation Indo-Pacific Pathways of which Defender Pacific is a major strategic readiness exercise. The key distinguishing feature between these two efforts is the strategic development deployment of conus based Army units and joint operational maneuver in Defender Pacific. Indo-Pacific Pathways is our operational path to building trust and interoperability with allies and partners. This year Defender Pacific is the decisive operation that enables Indo-Pacific Pathways. We are currently in its final planning stages with an execution expected this summer. It will involve use of Army watercraft, rapid deployment of high mobility artillery rocket system or high Mars, experimentation with the MDTF employment of the SBAB command post exercises and a joint forceful entry operation or an airborne operation conducted by the 82nd Airborne Division. For the land forces described above to conduct operations activities investments I suspect we face different issues than those who operate in the air and at sea. While we all need both fiscal and operational authority issues which seem specific to land forces that I will discuss are legal mechanisms to support forward posture, entry in the midst of COVID and the Army's recently released Arctic strategy. In the last year user pack used different legal mechanisms to support updates to our forward posture. The choice of legal mechanism was driven in part by whether the U.S. Army's investment was in land owned by host nation military or owned by some other host nation entity. In one case user pack looked to store military equipment in a foreign country on host nation owned land which reduced security and logistics concerns. However the U.S. did not have a status of forces agreement or similar type document with the country. The lack of a SOFA raised a number of concerns ranging from customs and tax issues for replacement parts as well as status protections for the employees required to ensure stability and maintenance of the property. Further we faced the fundamental question of what type of legal instrument would be sufficient to allow 24-7 365 days storage of military equipment in a foreign country. Ultimately with the help of the office of the secretary of defense and the U.S. Indo-Pacific command we settled on a non-binding memorandum of understanding. Key provisions of this document included acknowledgement that the United States would store military equipment, have access to designated facilities, retain ownership of its property, need military, civilian or contractor personnel to support the storage and acquire some degree of operational control of the designated facilities. As you might expect one of the most challenging provisions was the terminology used to obtain the degree of operational control over designated facilities. The U.S. interest grounded in domestic law was to have sufficient control to allow potential future construction. The host nation's concern was to prevent the appearance of U.S. ownership of its sovereign territory. One of the reasons that both parties wanted to use a non-binding legal instrument was to streamline the process for negotiating and concluding it at the Army level. The non-binding nature alleviated U.S. Department of State review however the content triggered the need for a review by our allies ministry of foreign affairs. Despite the level of host nation review required we were able to negotiate and conclude the terms of this MOU at the USERPAC level. Although some provisions required multiple terms at the negotiating table we had the necessary agreement in place just in time to meet by commander's suspense. Contrast the proceeding effort with an ongoing initiative to store military equipment on sovereign land not owned by its ministry of defenses in the previous case but in a nation where the U.S. does have a similar SOFA or similar agreement. The agreement was signed to a public private venture with a company that will enter into a lease with the host nation entity that owns the land. USERPAC will then use a service contract to acquire access from the corporation holding the lease. Having a SOFA like agreement mitigates potential concerns over status protections customs and taxes however using a service contract for a quasi real estate transaction raised other legal and policy concerns. Negotiations remain ongoing for this issue that you may have seen in your real estate transactions. Excuse me, like how you can use the property who pays for what costs to include utility services repairs as well as who ensures the land buildings and fixtures. These challenging property law issues are ongoing and how they will be resolved is yet to be known. Being west of the international date line on land allows USERPAC to increase its interoperability with our partners. It should come as no surprise that COVID-19 had an impact on our ability to operate in a foreign country. Nonetheless, we've been relatively successful in creating training bubbles that enable our forward presence while protecting both our forces and those of our allies and partners. From our point of view, interacting with our partners at the squad, platoon, company or higher level is critical to assuring our allies and partners as well as creating the opportunity to work together. Traveling to engage our allies and partners during a pandemic presented multiple operational legal issues. To me, the issues all seem to stem from policies our allies or partners in place to protect their own population. As the COVID-19 environment continues to evolve, we anticipate that these issues will also continue to change. To date, the issues we face include requirements to conduct a restriction on movement or ROM upon arrival to be subject to host nation testing and to be fully vaccinated prior to arrival. The first new entry related issue we saw was the ROM requirement upon arrival. Interestingly, only one SOFA in the region had the foresight to contemplate how to handle a potential pandemic. So for the most part, either the SOFA was silent or the US did not have a SOFA with the country. As you know, most SOFAs will allow military forces to enter with orders and military identification that COVID caused some countries to add additional entry requirements. Some may read these new requirements as an infringement on US sovereignty. However, OSD policy was clear from the outset. US forces would comply with either our own restriction on movement or that of the host nation, whichever was more restrictive in nature. To me, OSD's acceptance of an entry requirement to ROM appears to be a recognition that we're in the midst of a global pandemic. We are not establishing customary international law by accepting these new conditions. Rather, these are unusual circumstances where it seems appropriate to accept an entry requirement designed to protect our forces and our partners and slow the spread of a disease that is killing millions around the globe. After working through the challenges of whether or not we would conduct a ROM upon arrival, the next issue we faced was a requirement to take a COVID test administered by the host nation. Again, an argument exists that this impacts US sovereignty. However, this new requirement also appears to raise additional policy concerns related to individual privacy, collection of DNA and medical information. To mitigate these concerns, we used our Security Cooperation Division to engage with the host nation to understand how they would handle, process and dispose of the test sample. Given our understanding that the host nation will anonymize the samples and not retain them, our commander has generally accepted the risk and authorized host nation testing of user-packed personnel. Now, we are facing the issue of countries that require soldiers to be vaccinated before entry. We all understand that until the vaccine transitions from its current emergency use authorization to full FDA approval, it's voluntary for service members to take. While we believe that soldiers are deployable without the vaccine, we will respect the host nation sovereignty and not deploy forces to a country requiring vaccination for entry. That means that our non-vaccinated soldiers will not participate in certain upcoming events. We anticipate that this may raise some collateral issues, but we'll deal with them as they arise. Finally, I know that you have a panel later in the week on the Arctic. The U.S. Army recently released its Arctic strategy entitled Regaining Arctic Dominance. This strategy starts by observing that the United States is one of eight countries that order the Arctic region making the U.S. an Arctic nation. Using the definition of the Arctic in 15 U.S.C. 41-11, the Arctic spans areas of responsibilities of three different geographic combat commands. It is an area of potential future strategic competition that represents a need for the ability to operate in a harsh Arctic environment that has extreme temperatures, long periods of darkness, and extended daylight. High latitudes, seasonal challenging and changing terrain, and rapidly changing weather and patterns. Currently, there are about 11,600 soldiers assigned to U.S. Army Alaska. Their missions include readiness for operations and competition, crisis and conflict, homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities, support to search and rescue and strengthening relationships. These forces must be manned, trained, equipped, and organized to win in the Arctic. Looking forward, this means reorganizing our forces in U.S. Army Alaska. The Army plans to field a multi-domain task force and adjust the currently assigned Alaska base brigades to regain the Arctic dominance. I want to conclude by saying thank you for the opportunity to discuss some perspectives from the land component. I did not have any experience in the region before this assignment. The last two years have been an exciting experience for me to realize the depth and breadth of opportunities and challenges that exist in our region. There is much work for each of the components as we ensure the joint force achieves advantage and competition effectively responds in crisis and wins in conflict. Thank you. We will hear from Colonel Toler now. Good morning or good afternoon. I'm Colonel Chris Toler and I'm the Statue of Advocate for U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific. I join you today from our headquarters in the space of the special mission. I learned from my colleague, Jim Smith White, and am pleased to be able to talk about Malcour pack and some of the issues we face in the Indo-Pacific. My colleagues and I are asked to share service perspectives on issues in the Indo-Pacific so I thought I would give you a flavor of Marine Corps posture and the AOR, some of our ongoing operations, activities, investments, and a bit about the legal issues that we address. Like U.S. you may have expected to hear about at this conference. Colonel Anderson mentioned that the Indo-Pacific region consists of 36 countries. But throughout repeating everything she discussed, I like to reiterate that the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility is vast, spanning over 105 million square miles or roughly 52% of the Earth's surface. And while the Indo-Pacific is defined by water, it's 4.3 billion people, approximately 60% of the world's population, live on the land. Of this 60% of the world's population, 80% live within 200 miles of the littorals. This region includes not only the world's most populous countries, China and India, but also some of the smallest population on the planet, especially the small island developing states in the Pacific. Finally, the Indo-Pacific is the center of gravity of economic growth in the world. The three largest economies, the United States, China and Japan are all located in the Indo-Pacific. G3 countries alone account for more than 42% of the world's gross domestic products. With that as a background, let me talk about the Marine Corps and Marfor pack. I'll start with the Marine Corps' role as codified like US code. Title X, section 8063 prescribes, in part, a Marine Corps focus primarily on the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. As a Marine Corps service component to US-Indo-Pacon, Marfor pack comprises two thirds of the Marine Corps' combat power. Commander Marfor pack commands two of the Marine Corps' three Marine expeditionary forces or MAPS. You can think of a MAP as roughly equivalent to an Army Corps. One map is based in California and Arizona, and three map is based in Japan and Hawaii. Each of these maps is comprised of a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing and a Marine logistics crew. One map also has three Marine expeditionary units or MEWS that regularly deploy aboard US Navy amphibious shipping to the Indo-Pacon and Tent-Com areas of responsibility. And three map has one MEWS that deploys in the Pacific. These mission tailored forces are qualified and posture to create, penetrate and exploit gout and singe and adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities, effectively maneuvering in and around the literals and leveraging the advantages of modern and sophisticated sensor, shooter and command and control systems. To effectively accomplish our mission, more for pack forces have to be appropriately posture in the Indo-Pacific. We have forces permanently base at various locations stretching from Arizona to Japan with deployed forces providing persistent presence in various locations throughout the theater. By providing an overview of various places where we operate, I'll be able to highlight the various bodies of law that impact our four packs operations, activities and investments in the Pacific. I mentioned one map forces are based in the Continent United States. Some three map forces are based in Hawaii, but the bulk of three map forces are west of the international data line in Japan. These forces provide the Marine Corps permanent presence inside the first island chain. Guam, a US territory is also west of the international data line. For several years, the Marine Corps has been using US and Japanese funding to construct facilities on Guam, which provides another permanent location inside the second island chain from which project power into the Western Pacific. The showcase project in Guam is Camp Blas. Named after Brigadier General Vicente Blas, a Marine Corps general from Guam, is the first new Marine Corps base in 56 years. In addition to base infrastructure, such as office spaces, warehouses, weapons ranges and housing, there are ongoing projects to build a new ramp and hangers aboard an ancient Air Force base to support Marine Corps aircraft and a project to expand the waterfront and Afro Harbor to better support amphibious shipping. This ongoing effort is a result of a 2009 international agreement between the United States and Japan to relocate approximately 17,000 Marines and dependents from Okinawa to Guam. Since that time, one of the most important and time consuming legal issues with the buildup in Guam was a requirement to ensure compliance with U.S. environmental law, particularly the requirement for appropriate environmental assessments. I also wanted to take a minute to give you a flavor of more four-packed interactions with our partners and allies throughout the Pacific. Even during the COVID pandemic, we have Marines from both one map and three map over deployed and operating throughout the Western Pacific, developing interoperability and capabilities with our partners and allies. In Japan, we're currently exercising with the Japanese self-defense forces at Camp Fuji. We have the French Marines and Navy coming to Sasebo, Japan later this month, where we'll conduct trilateral training with those two countries. In South Korea, we have Marines training on the ground with the Republic of Korea Marine Corps. Marine Corps forces routinely deployed to the Korean Peninsula from Japan to maintain readiness. We just completed a major exercise on the peninsula. In the Philippines, we just completed an exercise at Balikatan and have operating forces in the South. In Australia, we have a large number of Marines for the 10th iteration of Marine Rotational Force doorway. Even with COVID, we've worked with the Australians on protocols that allow us to have up to 2,000 Marines there for the next six months. Next month, we'll conduct trilateral exercise with Australia and Indonesia. And later this summer, we'll participate in exercise Talisman Saber, with some of the Marines from the rotational force embarking on the Australian Amphibious Ship HMAS Canberra. As we speak, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked on the three ships of the USS Macon Island Amphibious Ready Group, returning from an extended deployment to the US Indo-Paycom, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM areas of responsibility. They just completed high-end training as part of exercise in exercise Northern Edge in Alaska. And mainly prior to that, they conducted an exercise at sea with the Indian, French, Japanese, and Australian navies, as well as an F-35 exchange with Singapore. On the island of Tinian in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marian Islands, we currently have Marines working on alongside Navy CVs. And then additionally, I want to highlight the freely associated states, the federated states of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. In accordance with the compacts of free association, the United States is obligated to defend these states from attack or threat of attack, can deny access to these states by militaries of third countries, and has the option of establishing defense sites. We currently have a small group of Marines in Palau working on engineering projects and researching sites for future exercises and projects. I highlight our posture and activities to give you a feel for the various bodies of law we work with on a regular basis. Model or packs, operations, activities, and investments are governed by both international law and domestic law and policy. In every case, we work through issues associated with access and sometimes with basing, with the status of US forces and with authorities to fund and conduct operations and exercises with our allies and partners. We have status of forces agreements or visiting forces agreements with some partners and allies and no agreements with others, but we continually work to build and maintain our relationships and interoperability with all. In my time at model or pack, we've developed and deployed various sides Marine units aboard foreign Navy vessels. This is a fairly new concept for us and requires us to work through a variety of issues. In 2019, and again, in the not too distant future, model or pack deployed Marines aboard Royal Australian Navy vessels for exercise in the Pacific endeavor. One of the many issues that arose in 2019 centered on the provision of crew lists and shore party lists to host nations during foreign port visits. Under international law, all state-owned non-commercial aircraft and ships are entitled to sovereign immunity. And the Indopecom AOR, this is implemented by Indopecom and US Navy policy. Under this policy, neither a crew list, a list of all personnel aboard, nor a shore party list, a list of personnel going ashore, may be provided by commanders of US Navy ships unless separately agreed upon in an international agreement between the US and the host nation. Generally speaking, the US Navy makes separate arrangements with each country regarding port entry and shore liberty, but typically does not ever provide a shore party list. During the 2019 deployment, we discovered the Australian Navy did not invoke sovereign immunity when it came to the matter of providing crew lists and shore party lists during visits to third countries. Although the United States does not have a sovereignty interest in the names of US personnel embarked on a foreign vessel and the names could have been legally provided, there was a policy concern of the provision of such lists, risk erosion of the US position on sovereign immunity. There were different interpretations and concerns amongst US personnel, depending on the third country to be visited. Some saw no issue with the Australian Navy, including the names of US personnel on crew and shore party lists, while others took the opposite approach and felt the provision of such a list would erode US sovereignty. This ultimately resulted in the Marines remaining aboard the Australian vessel during the port call if the host nation required a shore party list or flying them off beforehand to conduct exercises in a different country, the host nation required a list of the entire crew regardless of whether they disembarked. At the end of the day, it was a policy decision that required the commander to weigh on a country by country basis, the risk of eroding US sovereign immunity with the importance of multilateral engagements alongside our Australian partners. We're currently planning ahead to avoid similar issues during the next iteration of this exercise. Along those lines earlier this month, a Marine Corps F-35 squadron embarked aboard the United Kingdom aircraft carrier, Queen Elizabeth, for an extended operational deployment that will span the UCOM, SINCOM and INDO-PACOM areas of responsibility. There was a much more dedicated and detailed planning effort at the headquarters level for this deployment resulting in an implementing arrangement between the US Department of Defense and the UK Ministry of Defense. This effort was several years in the making as a party has worked through issues regarding responsibilities of each participant, operational policy and authorities, rules of engagement, status of forces, responsibilities for investigating mishaps involving US aircraft on a UK vessel, and procedures for addressing emergent operational tasking from either the US or UK governments. This process should serve as a template for future deployments of US forces aboard foreign vessels. I also wanted to take a few minutes to talk about some big changes in the Marine Corps. We're currently in the process of redesigning the force for naval extraditionary warfare and actively contested spaces, fully aligning the service with the direction of the national defense strategy. The Commandos vision is a Marine Corps trained and equipped as a naval extraditionary force in readiness and prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations. To achieve this end result, the Marine Corps is creating Marine Latoral Regiments or MLRs. The MLR will be uniquely designed to maneuver and persist inside a contested maritime environment whereas primary mission will be to conduct sea denial operations as part of a larger naval expeditionary force. We're experimenting with the first MLR in Hawaii or the next three years. As per its built naval combined arms units, MLRs consists of four components. The Latoral Combat Team will be employed as a task organized maritime Latoral unit. The LCT consists of a smaller, more mobile infantry battalion that's capable of commanding and controlling distributed expeditionary advanced bases and will have other capabilities that support sea denial missions, including the Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary ship interdiction system or Nemesis, which is built around ground launch, long range and anti-ship missiles. The Latoral Anti-Air Battalion will provide an aviation command and control communications, aviation support operations, including support arming and reviewing points and ground based air defense. The Latoral Logistics Battalion will be a multi-functional task organization designed to support the MLR and other units at forward austere operating sites. And finally, the MLR command element will be capable of employing information and cyber capabilities, long range surveillance capabilities and long range unmanned surface vessels will be able to integrate fires from various platforms. This is a new concept with new capabilities, including the MEP weapons, which required a legal review to ensure compliance with the law of war. The employment of cyber and information related capabilities at the tactical level will also require a sense of review and coordination in the legal chain of command. Finally, in my time at Marfor Pack, one of the issues that has taken an unexpectedly large amount of time to address is cases in which a foreign country seeks to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a U.S. service member. DoD policy requires that for personnel, present in areas outside the United States in connection with official duties, we maximize the exercise of jurisdiction to the extent possible under applicable status enforcement agreements or other jurisdiction arrangements that would protect to the maximum extent possible the rights of DoD personnel who may be subjected to criminal trial by foreign courts or imprisonment and foreign prisons and that where possible, we secure the release of DoD personnel in the custody of foreign governments pending completion of all foreign judicial proceedings. In the past several years, we've had several cases involving relatively minor criminal conduct and a handful of cases involving serious misconduct, including sexual assault and death. This has required us to become familiar not just with U.S. law and international agreements with the nation exercising jurisdiction over a U.S. service member, but also with the criminal procedures and laws of that nation. Excuse me, we routinely work closely not just with embassy personnel, but also at times with host nation officials as we were to ensure a fair process in which each country complies with its obligations under international law. So that's all I have for you today. I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to talk about the Montcourt PAC and what we're doing in the Indo-Pacific. Now, happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. Thanks very much to both our panelists out there. Now, I think we've still got time for some questions. I know we're just about back on schedule. Okay, thanks very much to both our panelists for your comments, very thoughtful. We greatly appreciate them. I think we're just about back on schedule. We've got time for some questions and I'll start the panel off with a couple of questions and I'll pose this one to either one of you. Major Colonel Tolor is right here with me since I'm in his office until mine gets fixed. But the first question I have is, both of you talked about forced posture and the importance of it. Could you elaborate on why that's so critical and how the SJA plays a role in forced posture as we see out here in the Pacific? Chris, I'll turn it over to you if you'd like to speak that further. Sure, I can take that one to start. Posture is important, obviously, because we can't do this alone. That's why we train so extensively with our allies and partners. We need to ensure that we're in the Pacific, that we have a warm start. If something were to happen, we can't be caught flat-footed at our bases and stations in the continental US or in Hawaii. We extensively operate with our allies and that gets us out there forward inside a second and first island chains from which to build relationships and take it from there. Thanks, Marie. Any thoughts on the role of the SJA plays as far as in forced posture and the importance of it? Yes, Tom, thank you for the question. So forced posture has been really an interesting and challenging problem for us with respect to are you there consistently? So I talked about a couple of different international agreements or agreements that we entered into for a more permanent presence. And thanks to you and your team for kind of shaping the MOU that we use to get military equipment permanently forward so that we can use them and draw that equipment out for exercises with our partners. And then we also wanna be forward for exercises which may range from a week to two to three to four weeks. We wanna be forward for subject matter expert exchanges for short periods of time. And as you know, you can do that with your own inherent authorities or sometimes we submit a con off with Indo pay comm as the approval authority for under 10 USE 321 so we can do training with our partners in a friendly country if the Secretary of Defense delegated Indo pay comm determines it's in the national security interest to do so. And that authority allows us to play some of the incremental costs of our expenses of our partner forces. All of these authorities are important to us to create assurance and to build interoperability. I think we've all learned over our military careers you don't build friendships in time of need. You wanna rely on and know the people that you might have to go into crisis or conflict with earlier when you're just at the point of need over. Hey, that's great. Great comments, Marie. And I think you bring out a very good point that, you know, when we talk about this theater posture very important. And to consider the fact that it's an 11 hour flight from Washington DC to Honolulu. It's another eight to nine hours from here to Tokyo or here to Guam. And from Guam it's another four hours onto the Philippines. So the tyranny of distances we say a lot times out here is really big. So force posturing, there's a different way of thinking about it that we have to have out here to get where we need to be. But not just getting there, the distance is one thing but having access, basing and overflight as we always talk about in my mind is so important. Things like sofas, VFA's, access, all of those things are critical to our ability to get in and get in quickly and not deal with those things if we need to posture. Part of it is our own internal problem getting our forces there. The other is can we get there? Do we have the rights and the access that we need to operate the way we want to? And I think that's where the SJ comes in very critically and ensuring that we have that access at basing, the overflight, looking at the laws, the rules that apply in that country, how we work out agreements with those countries, formal and informal, sofas that will protect our forces or VFA's that may do the same thing, access which allow us to do certain things, other types of agreements to make sure those are in place because it's too late after the fact. And like you said, we're continually trying to work and develop those and do that through exercises as well because as you said, are we there intermittently? Are we there consistently? What do we do? So I think the SJ plays a key role in that. I've got a question here from Andrew Norris. It says, Colonel Tolar, you mentioned weapons review necessary for the MLRs under development. What types of systems are you intending to use that require that review? Turn it over to you. So right now there's just one that I'd be prepared to talk about the Navy and Marine Corps Exhibitionary Ship Interdiction System, also known as Nemesis. What I did mention in my earlier comments was the RL. There's another aspect to that, that that's a preexisting weapon. Navy uses it from naval service platforms. The Marine Corps would take that and modify it, use it from ground-based positions and there's a separate launching system that goes with that. And so when you add those things together, when you talk about the ability to target and to preferably target that weapons system, that's where the legal review would come in. So it's, like I said, existing system but we're doing some different things with it, using it from the land and so that's where that requirement comes from. Thanks Chris, very much. Any other questions? I've only got that one in the Q&A but if there are other questions out there, Major Trigl if you've got some you want to pass to me verbally, we can also do it that way but I want to make sure if there are any but we can certainly get an answer during this period. I know we're a couple of minutes, we're still right on schedule, we've got about three or four minutes but if there are any more we can entertain them right now. I'll pause for a moment. Okay, I don't see any other questions coming in right now so at this point I will turn it back over to Major Trigl to take us into the break. I believe we've got one coming up here for a few minutes before we start our next panel. Major Trigl I'll turn it over to you. Thank you very much. Thank you sir. Yes, we will take a 30 minute break and we will be back at 1330. Thanks very much Major Trigl. Okay, so our next panel you'll hear about the maritime perspective from two SJAs in our region. The first one, Captain Dom Flat who is the SJA or the Fleet Judge Advocate for US Pacific Fleet Forces or Fleet Pacific Command or the US Pacific Fleet, excuse me, sorry Dom, tongue tied here if you're running across the street. So then you'll hear from Captain Angela Cook, the SJA for Coast Guard Pacific Area. I'm gonna turn it over to them right now to start their remarks. Thank you. Hey, good morning everyone. Can you hear me okay? All right, thanks Tom. Hey, good morning from historic Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the home of the US Navy's Pacific Fleet. My name is Dom Flat. I'm a captain in the Navy Jaguar and the principal legal advisor to the commander of the US Pacific Fleet. Very grateful to be included in this year's conference among my colleagues of course and other esteemed practitioners in this area who in many of cases I'm seeing are also old friends. Thank you to the Stockton Center for all the work that goes into hosting an event like the Cushing Conference and specifically to Major Heather Trago who graciously and patiently helped us execute in this method. Not all of us are used to this interface so I appreciate her patience. For those in the audience who are unaware, the US Pacific Fleet is the maritime component of US Indo-Pacific Command and to execute the missions assigned to us in this role PAC Fleet administers a budget of an annual budget of approximately $16 million with which we plan, man, train and equip the 200 ships and submarines, the 1200 aircraft and approximately 150,000 Navy personnel located in this region which we'll define as anywhere from the US West Coast to the Indian Ocean. The commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Sam Paparo sees his roles first as the Navy's operational commander in this vast maritime area of responsibility as a readiness enabler who's focused on people, platforms, places but importantly, a reliable and responsive partner to the nations in the region who share our values. Now, in support of these roles, a lot of our effort as a staff is spent building interoperability with the many allies and partners we enjoy in the region. You heard mentioned earlier of our combined naval exercise with Japan, India, Australia and the United States and of course some of the current operations with the French and UK Navy's operating in this area and those larger scale event driven or scenario driven exercises are vital but nothing really compares to the daily operation, interaction and engagement we have with our long time allies in the region, the Japanese Maritime Defense Force, the Republic of Korea Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the navies of the Philippines and Thailand. That in addition to our other partners in the area I think are a real focus of what we do at Pacific Fleet every day. Now as the legal advisor to the commander, I'm responsible ultimately for providing the legal reviews to these and other operations and exercises but I think importantly, we also perform an oversight role of our operating forces in the area to ensure compliance. Compliance with our commitments under international law as well as adherence to our own domestic laws and policies on a range of issues that include everything from safety of navigation and overflight, respect for the sovereignty of coastal nations in the region, environmental stewardship and other commitments that we make in regional for us such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. To do that, there are 10 lawyers on the PAC Fleet staff and 81 additional attorneys assigned to operating forces subordinate to Compact Fleet. Perhaps some are in the audience today or you're bound for some of the PAC Fleet units and to USA, thank you for that commitment and please be kind to me in the Q&A portion. Now I highlight the number of attorneys assigned to build on a point Colonel McCann made earlier about the importance of judge advocates in the region. I'd say the volume alone of legal support here is an indicator of the importance our commanders assigned to adhering to rule of law. Now the team here at PAC Fleet reviews new legislation from countries in the region as a predictor of any potential changes to the operating environment. And that analysis review and highlighting of these key legal developments is shared with our planners, our operators, our fleet leaders. The recently enacted Chinese Coast Guard law is an example. And I along with Captain Angela Cook, my Coast Guard counterpart on this panel will offer our time to do some more focused analysis and sharing of our views on this matter. I note this more focused look comes at the expense of the broader account of the legal activity we have in the region, which I actually appreciated hearing from my army and Marine Corps counterparts on. So I'll say we'll reserve time if you like for any conversation there in the Q&A portion. Before launching into the views on the Chinese Coast Guard law seems particularly useful to restate the disclaimer. My views here are my own and not attributable to the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, the Navy, the Department of Defense or any agency of the US government. So with that, the Chinese Coast Guard law. Colonel McCann led with a description of great power competition, one that I aligned to as not as a us versus them, so much as a competition of ideas, right? One which is committed to an international rules-based order that favors all nations, large and small, versus another view which adopts a more authoritarian perspective, more of the all for one or might makes right approach that seeks to displace that more established order. I think Colonel McCann was also clear in stating that it's the People's Republic of China seeking to displace this established order through this incremental approach to changing norms or small steps with the long view in mind. And those long, those small steps as the state began with foresight many years ago with among other things, the development and then the militarization of features in the South China Sea. This is important context to understanding the Chinese Coast Guard law and the objections that many nations in the region have had with the law. So on February 1st of this year, China enacted this new Coast Guard law which among other things authorized their Coast Guard to use force against foreign vessels in order to enforce quote unquote China's claims sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction. Now this law as I mentioned provides insight into how China is working to displace the established rules-based order with its own approach. Specifically the law when viewed in the context of their other activities and claims of the region appears designed to intimidate its maritime neighbors and to advance their own interests at the expense of both international law and regional security. Even prior to passage of this new law, the text of it was viewed by our allies and partners as yet another effort to support China's maritime claims which had been rejected by the international community to include in the arbitral tribunal in the 2016 South China Sea case. To get to some specifics, Vietnam has described the law as quote very dangerous and noted that it prevents claimant states from exercising legitimate economic activity in their maritime zones. The Philippines called it a verbal threat of war and Indonesian leaders have warned that the law heightened the risk of spillover conflict around the Natuna Islands. Japanese commenters have noted that it contradicts unclossed or the UN conventional law to see a treaty to which China is a signatory. Why do they have these views? Specifically the new Chinese Coast Guard law in article three of it directs the Chinese Coast Guard to and I'll quote again, conduct law enforcement operations in the waters under the jurisdiction of China and in the airspace above those waters under the jurisdiction of China. So what are jurisdictional waters? Not defined in this particular law. If you look to unclossed or international law for the definition, you'll note it's defined as internal waters or territorial sea, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and waters that come in the show. China however has claimed indisputable sovereignty over the area inside their nine-dash line which includes the entirety of the South China Sea. This was not based on any of the characteristics defined by unclossed but as quote unquote historical rights. Now in the 2016 award by the tribunal constituted under unclossed in the arbitration initiated by the Philippines against the PRC, this position was rejected. The tribunal determined that although Chinese fishermen as well as those of other states had historically made use of the features in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China historically exercised exclusive control over these waters. And there was no legal basis for the Chinese to claim historic rights. Further, any historic rights would have been extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the definitions provided in uncloss. Finally, the tribunal concluded that any feature in the South China Sea claimed by China was not capable of generating any easy and certainly could not view the entire South China Sea as its internal waters. The tribunal, I think most of us recall also found that China violated not just its treaty obligations but the sovereign rights of the Philippines by interfering with the Philippines fishing and petroleum exploration by constructing artificial islands and by failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the Filipino EEZ. China did reject this award and noted in its public comments that it will instead, and I'll quote again, continue to work with states directly to resolve relevant disputes through negotiation and consultation. And now with a fully armed Chinese Coast Guard which is also fully empowered under Chinese domestic law to enforce its claims in these disputed areas. So what does their law empower their Coast Guard to do in these jurisdictional waters? Well, in Article 20, it allows the Chinese Coast Guard to destroy structures and suspend illegal activities. And by the text of the law, again, assuming they implement a definition of jurisdictional waters that's consistent with their past positions, this would give the Chinese Coast Guard authority to use force against other countries on occupied features like those occupied by the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia as well as to enforce what the international community would regard as lawful fishing activities of any nation in international waters. Now in Article 21 and 22 of the new Coast Guard law the Chinese Coast Guard's given authority to take necessary security and control measures to include the use of force to restrain foreign military vessels in waters under China's jurisdiction from violating the domestic laws of China. Now, leaving aside yet another repudiation of international law that prohibits exercising coastal state jurisdiction against sovereign immune vessels, the activity by China's legislature alone raised the temperature in the region, increases risk, and of course, further signals China's disregard for established international rules based norms that all nations in the region, large and small, derive a benefit from. This gives short shrift to many of the issues our allies and partners have with this law, but aggravating these concerns are Chinese efforts to undermine past agreements and commitments when it comes to communication at sea and establishing methods to resolve issues of mutual concern. For better insights into these issues, I'll yield now to my colleague from the U.S. Coast Guard, Captain Angela Cook, over to you Angela. Good morning from Alameda, California. As Colonel McCann said, I'm a staff judge advocate and principal legal advisor to the commander for Coast Guard Pacific Area. Admiral Gaudier, who you heard from this morning is the deputy commander for Coast Guard Pacific Area. So I say I am done in whatever he said goes. But actually following Admiral Gaudier on the agenda is perfect. Instead of hitting all of the things that the Coast Guard is doing in this past region, all of which the Coast Guard lawyers are very, very carefully involved in, it allows me and my co-panelists to focus in on one or two interesting updates in the region that we wanted to do a little bit more of a deep dive on. And if there are other questions during the Q and A, we're certainly available for that. So I thought I'd talk first about rules of behavior intended to reduce the chance of incident. I'll start with the disclaimer as well that these are my views alone and are not attributable to the Coast Guard. So as Admiral Gaudier said this morning to achieve our national security goals in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States Coast Guard has increased our presence throughout the region. As Colonel McCann said, we will operate anywhere and everywhere that international law allows. And we're sending our national security cutters to areas like the East and South China seas. Again, we had had a little bit of a gap in that but we're picking up the pace. And of course we're not alone out there. Certainly my co-panelists will attest to the US Navy's global presence. And we are all out there with other nations, Coast Guards and Navy's. So with the increased presence comes an increased risk of miscalculation. More than ever, the need for agreed upon established regimes to prevent Coast Guard incidents at sea has become apparent. In fact, critical in my view. So in this region, of course there are cues, the code for unplanned encounters at sea. Cues was adopted by the 21 member states of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014. And it provides for basic safety, maneuvering and communication procedures, drawing from the 1972 convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions and the related regulations, otherwise known as coal regs. Well, definitely a positive step toward ensuring stability in the region. Cues is not without its criticisms. First, it's non-binding. But second, and this is more relevant to my discussion, is that it's designed to apply to naval forces and the WPNS nations largely CQs as inapplicable to their Coast Guards. Although the United States Coast Guard is an armed force and we do apply cues as a matter of course, many countries in the region do not consider their Coast Guards to be part of their armed forces. And a lot of the troubling encounters that you read about in this region are not so much between navies, but between the respective Coast Guards of the surrounding countries. So soon after cues was adopted, the US Navy and Chinese Navy PLAN announced a bilateral memorandum of understanding on the roles of behavior for safety of air and maritime sea encounters. These rules of behavior are largely based on cues and they apply to quote military vessels further defined by the words warship or naval auxiliary. So customary international law as reflected in a law of the sea convention defines warship as a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state marked in accordance with the nation's distinguishing characteristics commanded by an officer commissioned by that state who appears on the appropriate service list and manned by a crew under, which is under armed force discipline. So as I said before, the United States Coast Guard vessels meet that criteria. We are considered warships and as such they are considered military vessels in accordance with this rules of behavior agreement that we have with China. So like I said, we operate consistently with the roles of behavior and cues. So now I'll shift to China Coast Guard. The US had been attempting to enter into a Coast Guard to Coast Guard rules of behavior with China starting in 2015. And despite everyone's stated commitment to that endeavor there was no joy on executing that. But fast forward to 2018, my opinion is that maybe that effort isn't so critical anymore because in 2018 the China Coast Guard was placed under the people's armed police which was in turn placed under the direct control of the Central Military Commission. And their 2020 legislation then codified that. So they report directly to the Central Military Commission under the relevant theater command in times of crisis or war. Their members are subject to an equivalent of a uniform code of military justice. They're entitled to military disability. So in other words, the China Coast Guard shares a lot more similarities with the US Coast Guard than just a similar looking racing stripe. And this reorganization suggests that the Chinese Coast Guard should also be considered warships under customary international law and therefore the terms of the rules of behavior and cues should apply to the China Coast Guard. And we told China so as much this year through a Dimarsh where we stated that the United States both Navy and Coast Guard intend to apply the rules of behavior and cues when encountering both China Coast Guard and PLAN vessels. And we've asked the same courtesy in reply. So I guess we'll have to wait till next year's conference for an update on how that goes. But here's the skinny of it. A random analyst noted that in between 2010 and 2016, China increased the size of its Coast Guard in tonnage by 73%, Japan by 50%, Vietnam 73%, and in that same six year period, the Philippine government increased the size of its Coast Guard by 100%. So with more Coast Guards operating in close proximity to each other, in and around contested waters with dangerous incidents at sea on the rise, we need agreements like cues in place that will ensure safe and professional encounters at sea. And they need to apply to Coast Guards. The way I see it, if the Navy's can get together and adopt cues, maybe it's time our Coast Guard's stepped up. It's definitely a topic that I think is worthy of deliberation at the various regional forums specifically designed to foster multilateral coordination and cooperation. As examples of those are the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative, and I will just one note on North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. In 2005, they did publish a combined operations manual, which has a lot of similar provisions to cues and the roles of behavior, but it applies to planned or ad hoc operations, not unplanned encounters. So good step, but not the level that we need. And while these forums are good models that are formed to foster cooperation and responsible maritime activity, they don't include all of the relevant parties. So like the WPNS, 21 Nations, I think something more comprehensive needs to be considered. That's all I have. Hey Angela, thanks very much to you and Dom, both. Great comments. We really appreciate your thoughtful insights into what we've, into this area. I'd like to start off with a couple of questions from my end and Dom, I'll push this one directly to you and Angela, please feel free to chime in. When you look at the new Chinese law, would you say that new law in and of itself is a violation of unclossed? Why or why not? Or what do you think? Give me your thoughts on that in terms of how it marries up against underclass. Yeah, thank you, Tom. That I'll note from the outset that I'm leaving unclassed aside for just a moment. The provisions on the authorities the Chinese Coast Guard has with respect to sovereign immune vessels from other countries raises concern, right? The law itself in its own text, places I think authorities that you'd say would violate customary international law if nothing else. With respect to unclassed, I'll note. Yes, like many commenters from around the world have noted that the very passage of the law would be inconsistent with China's treaty obligations. They are in fact a signatory under-unclossed. And I share that perspective, but I do think a lot of it hinges on what do they mean by jurisdictional waters? And will they continue to define that term as they have historically done? I'll note too that every year, China imposes a fishing ban throughout a large portion of the region. This fishing ban usually extends from May through August. So I believe as we speak, the Chinese fishing ban is underway. This would be the first one since they passed the new Coast Guard law. And I think their national media has said they will use their Coast Guard to enforce the law. The question I think all of us are mindful of and attentive to is how are they gonna implement that? What does that look like? And certainly the Philippines and Vietnam have both come out publicly noting their concern and encouraging their fishing fleet to ignore the ban. We'll see what enforcement comes this year. Back over to you or to Angela if you have a comment. I do actually have a comment and I'm gonna tie it back to the United States Coast Guard's authority, which is incredibly broad. It, I'll read it here. The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable federal laws on, under and over the high seas and water subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. So that doesn't sound too dissimilar. And of course, the title 14 continues too dissimilar to what China Coast Guard, the China Coast Guard law. I think what's troubling for me about the law is not so much the words, but the expected interpretation of those words when we say jurisdiction in United States Coast Guard we're quite clear about what waters are subject to our jurisdiction in accordance with customary international law as reflected and unclosed. But we worry that China maybe does not interpret it the same way, that word jurisdiction the same way. And we're also, I would say my concern is more in the implementation of this power. Like I said, the United States Coast Guard has huge amount of power, which is what authority is. But we are guided by very, very strong policies starting from 1790 with Alexander Hamilton when he, I'll quote, said that while I recommend in the strongest terms to the respective officers activity, vigilance and firmness, I feel no less solicitude that their deportment may be marked with prudence, moderation and good temper. And our use of force policy states that only that force reasonably necessary under the circumstances may be used. These are our guiding principles in the United States Coast Guard. And I think that we've seen through example that those are not necessarily the guiding principles of the China Coast Guard over. Thanks Angela, great comments, great comments indeed. Now I'm back to what you said, I share your concern about China and the PRC's definition of jurisdictional waters and what that means. And I think you bring up an interesting point that this is the first fishing ban season, if you will, under this new law. And I'd be very interested to see how they implement it to what extent they really push these provisions and how they're executed. But I think from a legal perspective, we've got to understand what our narrative's gonna be, make sure our commanders understand that that we can push that from here, not only in the information space but in the operational space as well. Because I think it's critical right now as they move forward with this, as I said, they're attempting to establish new norms. If they're the only actor acting, they're the only person pushing out these things. At some point, the comfort level with them is gonna grow and it's gonna be harder to displace them much as it would be harder to displace them from some of the disputed features and how hard that's got. And I think that's a great example, when you think about it, how hard it would be to get them off, missed you free right now. I don't think there's a diplomatic solution to that one. And I certainly think the longer we allow these kinds of things to go on, the greater the risk is that we will be facing conflict with them over them. Let me take a look quickly. We've got a couple of questions that have come in. The first one from Andrew Norris and I'll pose it the same order Dom first in Angela. What is your thinking regarding the impetus for the new Coast Guard law? Why they see they need to adopt it at all? Over to you. Hey Andrew Norris, great to see your name in the chat. I'll tell you just my two cents on that. I think it's as Colonel McCann mentioned at the outset. And this is consistent I think with the progressive phased approach that China's had at changing norms, right? Norms that benefit them at the expense of other nations in the region. But I also think a lot of Chinese activities, again, this is me speaking for myself, a lot of their activities recently, I think are designed to appeal to their own domestic audience. And their activities recently have had the effect of, I would say, encouraging other nations who haven't historically participated with us in partnership building or interoperability, pushing them our direction. So while I think it's a mix of a part of their phased approach at changing norms and appealing to their own domestic audience, whatever their motivation, the effect I think it's having on the ground or on the water, so to speak, is one that is encouraging nations in this region to align with kind of our perspectives on a free and open Indo-Pacific. And I'll pass over to Angela. I have nothing to add, great, great, great answer, John. Okay, I'll go into the next question and Angela, I'll start with you on this one because I think it's kind of directed more at you. It says from Cornell Overfield, on the topic of interactions on at least two occasions recently, U.S. fishermen have been surprised in the U.S. EEZ off Alaska, a Russian vessel's lawfully exercising their right to conduct military activities. Media coverage including in the New York Times has at times gone so far to frame this as an invasion. What is producing these misunderstandings both at sea and in the media and how can the U.S. Coast Guard better manage such instances in the future? It's a great question and I think framed perfectly when I got the notification of the Russian Navy intimidating our fishing fleets and they have no right to do that. When you dig down, it's the Russian Navy doing what the U.S. Navy does is operates lawfully on waters around the globe. Certainly they had no authority to order our ships lawfully fishing in the region to move, but I could see the U.S. Navy putting out a broadcast to say, hey, we're gonna be firing our guns, stay clear. So I think tempering the language that we use was the first step in that. And our 17th Coast Guard district actually has incredibly great communications that's up in Alaska with their Russian counterparts. So communication is key, but yeah, it's a good question, but I think it's important how it was framed is that they not necessarily were doing anything wrong and certainly not necessarily doing anything that our U.S. Navy wouldn't also do. So just that's all I have. If I could chime in on that one too, Tom, it wasn't long ago, I was just looking up the date, I wanna say it's about five years ago, that China sent a SAG of about five warships into our territorial waters up there in the Bering Sea and getting to the role of judge advocates on the staff, right? Our advice then is consistent with our perspective now that military warships can engage in innocent passage through our territorial seas. This was not viewed as us necessarily as the big deal that I think China wanted people to see it. Being consistent in applying the rules and the obligations is a big part of, I think what we as lawyers at least are trying to help our operators understand. That's why we help our public affairs teams with the words to use, but also why we're doing things, for instance, such as monitoring the transcripts of our bridge, our own bridge to bridge interactions to ensure that everyone is operating consistently with our rules and norms. Oh. Yeah, thanks, Dom. I think that's a great, great comment. I think we may have some other comments from out in the field. So I'm gonna turn it over right now to anyone who else who'd like to comment on this question over. Then we'll move on to the next question and I'll open it back up to Dom and Angela. This is from Lieutenant Commander Noyes who says, it's been said that operations drive authorities. The operational outcome drives the appropriate authority under domestic and international law for the decision. Protecting authorities and legal norms is in the operation. What is the judge advocate's role in advocating for the operation? Dom, if you wanna start off with that, we'll let you. As usual, Travis Noyes is engaged in deep thinking far beyond my capacity at this hour of day, Travis. But hey, thanks for your post and thanks for chiming in. Obviously everything we do as a judge advocate is caged by the authorities. And when the, I guess as you put it, when the operation is really all about protecting our authorities, I mean, I've been surprised, pleasantly I should add about how familiar our operators are with, for instance, the rules associated with our FON ops. It wasn't long ago where you talked to some of our operators and they had an assessment that FON, your only transit regime in a FON was innocent passage. Now we have, in some cases, the operators correcting young lawyers' understanding. It's like, no, a FON can also be in normal mode. It really all depends on what you're challenging. And so I don't wanna say that Judge Advocate's role has been replaced by more experienced operators, but increasingly in this part of the world, our operators understand the rules. They've been conditioned over time and certainly the frequency with which we're doing things like FON, those types of operations which are about protecting authorities has become more and more commonplace. Our operators more and more familiar and our work as Judge Advocates has become one more of oversight than advising the planning phase. So thanks for the opportunity to comment on that, Travis. Yeah, Travis, I think I would say that, well, you well know, right? The Coast Guard attorney's job is to help the operator get where they need to go in the lawful, in the right lawful path, right? So we guide the operators and facilitate their end game in literally everything we do. And I guess I'll bring it back to the concept of competition in the way I see competition is that competition doesn't have to mean conflict. And I would argue that when done right, competition can actually make us all better. So my role, I see my role as an attorney to not just put steel on target, but to send that demarch to China, to message what our ships are doing there and that we expect you to abide by rules-based norms and safe and prudent mariner ship. So it's not just guiding the operation, but it's thinking how else to have a complete and comprehensive operation that's just not steel on target, but is the communication behind that. Some people say the US Coast Guard is the bridge between DOD lethality and State Department diplomacy. And if we need to do more than just get our operators in the right place, but we need to follow it up with the right messaging before, during, and after at all channels so that we can push the rules-based norms that are really at the end game of all of our operations over. Yeah, thanks, Angela. That's a great comment. You know, and to kind of dovetail on that, Travis, when I think about this question, you know, advising commanders, you know, we go back to that idea of, you know, advising what can we do and what should we do? And I'm a big fan of my commander's idea of loud and proud, going loud and proud. A lot of the times I'm one of those type attorneys, but I think it's important that we, as attorneys, we frame the box and the perimeter and the limits of what we can do under domestic law and international law to first understand that, what we can do so we can explain that to a commander. But then comes the real question of what we should do. And I think that's always important and what I'm going toward is credibility of our actions, credibility in the international community and with our allies and partners of what we're doing. Are we poking the bear, so to speak, or the panda in this case? Or are we doing something that the messaging and it's perceived as upholding international law as opposed to just doing something for the sake of doing it? I think that's very important to our credibility of doing things that just because we can doesn't always mean we should. So I think in advising and making sure we don't lose our authorities or we don't erode them, I think we have to use them prudently. And sometimes that takes thinking through with the commander and with the command on how we do things and how we're thinking about doing things because we don't want our own government or our allies and partners to see us as the bully or as someone who is reckless and does things just because they can have the might to do so because that's not really the message in my opinion we want to send. But we've got to go back to the idea that we need to be the leader in state practice and we need to do those things that the international community sees as legitimate, valid, credible and pushback. Because one thing I've learned is the PRC doesn't like is a unified front opposing what they want to do. A unified invoice and action and everything else that isolates them is the individual actor. So I think it's very important if we want our allies and partners to get on board we've got to do things that they will support. They may not go as far as we do but we certainly don't want them to see us as the bully. See us as just doing things that they think are not appropriate at that time that might the harm, the risk analysis that goes into that very important. And what we do when there's a lot of policy considerations here and those can sometimes be frustrating or for an operator who wants to achieve a certain effect that may not be looking at things holistically. So I think it's very important as a lawyer you want to push your authorities to the limit. I think if we don't exercise our authorities we will lose them. But at the same time we have to be prudent in how we do that so that they are taken from us or abridged because it looks like we're being reckless to answer your question. I'll turn it over to any other questions out there. I don't see any in the bottom no open questions right now but I'll hold for a moment in case there are over. Okay, seeing none. Thank you very much to our two panelists very thoughtful insightful comments. I greatly appreciate your help and your work on this today which you've had to offer to the group. Thank you very much for that. At this point I'll turn it back over to the Cushing host to take us into the break and then we'll move on from there. Thank you very much. Thank you very much Colonel McCann. We will take a 13 minute break and we will see you back here at 1420. The Undersea Cushing International Law Conference we are now going to begin our third panel and final panel of the day. This one is from the Air Force and Space Force perspective. Colonel McCann over to you. Hey, thanks very much. Right now we're going to hear from Colonel Suzette Sewell from US Pacific Air Forces and then Colonel Todd Pennington the SGA for Space Operations Command. I'll turn it over to Colonel Sewell for her remarks. Good morning Colonel McCann. Chairman at Stockton Professor of International Mayor Tim Land Mr. Kraska, United States Naval War College professors, staff, distinguished panelists and viewers from around the world. Thank you for that opportunity with you today. And first I got to start out with a little bit of an apology. Actually it was my boss, Colonel Ira Perkins who was supposed to speak with you today. He called me about 6.30 this morning and then started texting me because he has lost his voices and is sitting over in the emergency room right now probably has bronchitis. So he asked me if I could fill in for him this morning so obviously I'm not in the right uniform. And I have just looked over the material that he was gonna provide. So hopefully I don't do him a disservice and am able to provide some interesting background from Air Force perspective on some of our maritime and air plot issues that we're dealing with here out in the Indo-Pacific. So one of the things I wanna start off with I listened to some of the earlier speakers really talking about what we're seeing with a revisionist and aggressive China out here in this area of the world. And so I'm really not gonna cover that new ground. What I'm really gonna say is yes, they are forced to see in some of those same challenges as well. And we're adapting with some of our new concepts out here to meet that challenge like joint all-demain command and control, dynamic force employment missions, agile combat employment, among others. All of those particular new concepts of operations require robust legal support and that can come from the form of fiscal law, authorities contracting that we see out there, of course, international law, rule of law, a lot of particular issues out there. But the issue that I'm gonna talk about, it's kind of unique and one that we don't really think about all the time as being a huge player in our operations in this particular area of the world. But which in fact is one of our most challenging areas of environmental law and area that can really slow us down. And that's environmental law, right? Surprise, surprise. It's not something we really think about upfront when we're thinking about operations. But I kind of wanna point out three areas where environmental law is a huge impact to us or where this issue plays out. The first, as you can imagine, environmental law is pretty important to a lot of host nations that we operate in this particular area of the world, whether that's Oceania nations really concerned with climate change, rising sea levels, protecting their fishing industries or the very small land territories that those have out here. It plays out in Japan, it plays out in Rio, right? All these nations that we operate. So host nations, places that we wanna go. The second, Indo-Pacific is one of the few, well, the only combatant command out there that incorporates both US territories, states and other countries out there. And so environmental law obviously is a huge part of US law. It's a factor that we have to consider whether we're operating in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, or any one of those other US territories, for example, Wake Island, which is particularly important to us out there as well. And then the third area that we really see environmental law is not so much what we're doing, but what do we see China or other countries doing vis-a-vis the environment out there. So really I got kind of three examples in each of those areas. I'm gonna start with China. In 2016, the permanent court of arbitration basically heard claims brought by the Philippines against China, concerning their island building activities in the South China Sea. They ruled in favor of the Philippines, China and rejecting China's historic nine-dash line, giving them sovereignty over that particular airspace, basically concluding that under the United Nations Convention on the law of the sea, the allocation of maritime rights for the exclusive economic zone, basically that under unclothes that those previous rights that they may have had under the nine-dash line were no longer valid and without international legal basis. Of course, China's continued to ignore that and went ahead and as we know, continues to conduct activities from those islands. What you may not know is in that ruling, several pages, large part of it was dedicated to talking about China's environmental violations in those particular areas, talking about the severe harm they've caused to the marine environment by their land reclamation and some of the artificial island building projects. We see that play out pretty much anywhere where we see China conducting operations in around the world whether they're building something, dredging a port, is they're not particularly concerned about the environmental concerns in those particular countries and that can be very off-putting for those partners or potential countries that are working with China. So in that sense that when we flip it around on the United States side and we're out there doing the same activities but we're being better environmental stewards, we could peak better and we make ourselves a more favorable partner of choice. So how do we do that? On the US side out there, very little international law usually required when it deals with operations in a foreign country at least from the military's perspective. We've negotiated agreements, these HOFAs and different underlying environmental agreements whether that's with Australia, Japan, Korea, that basically sets some baseline for an environmental requirements out there. I will say they're pretty minimal for the most part. And so what it really comes down to is how good of a stewards do we wanna be when we're operating from those particular countries out there? I could say environmentalist type ideas, being good stewards of the environment are being very key to many of our allies out there. And for example, PFAS, which is the firefighting phone that we're using in many countries out there, pretty routinely when I was the stock judge advocate in Missawa we would have spills. And at the time we weren't too concerned about PFAS and now we're particularly concerned and we get a lot of pushback from those local communities on how we're taking care of what is the particular threat for those issues. And of course that affects their ability to trust. In fact, I was listening to Colonel McCann saying something earlier when it came to other countries out there being the country of preference, and that is other nations don't want us to see us being bullies or reckless that we in fact are conforming to state practice, being good stewards of the environment when we take action that it's legitimate, valid, incredible. And so environmental law, obviously when we're being good stewards of these countries see us as legitimate, valid, and credible out there. So how do we do that? Basically on the legal side, it takes a pretty long time when you're talking about baking in environmental considerations. In the US territories and states we'll use NEPA. Basically as a baseline, but that can take anywhere from 18 to 24 months to kind of put that together. Believe it or not, in a lot of our host nations out there, particularly some of these small oceanic countries, one of the first things they wanna know is how we're protecting the environment. So it also may take that same 18 to 24 months to negotiate some sort of agreement with them and demonstrate how we're gonna protect that environment out there. So I don't wanna run long and I also wanna give Todd a chance to talk about space, which is always maybe one of the more interesting aspects of what we used to do in the Air Force, but of course, which is now the space force. So I'm gonna stop there on the environmental side and just give an opportunity for Todd to talk and then answer any questions folks may have after. Thank you. Good afternoon, I'm Colonel Todd Pennington and Professor Kraska Naval War College staff and team. It's my pleasure to speak to you today as the space force staff judge advocate representative. I'm the staff judge advocate for space operations command. That's one of the US space forces field commands and your conference focus on the rule of law and great power competition in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions really speaks to some of the principal issues we wrestle with daily in the space force. The re-establishment of US space command and the establishment of the US space force both in 2019 were really driven by the realities of great power competition. Many of the capabilities that US and allied forces rely on are provided from or through the space domain, things like missile warning, GPS, satellite communication and of course all disciplines of intelligence derived from unorbit sensors. Until recently the space domain that these assets and habit had essentially been an uncontested sanctuary that is not the case today. There's every possibility that the next major conflict will extend to space or frankly could begin in space. And so I wanna talk today about some of the legal issues that we encounter as the legal advisors to the space force. I'll start with the very first time that the US had to address a novel legal issue arising from outer space, October 4th, 1957 when the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite into orbit Sputnik. At that time, there was no controlling position on the vertical limits of a nation sovereign airspace that was recognized as customary international law. There was real deliberations about what to do about Sputnik. Within the air force, there was an argument advanced that there was no limit, there was no upper limit to a nation's sovereign airspace. There was a proposal for a formal protest or to march to the Soviets for an unlawful overflight of US territory. Others however felt this position was unwise or unsustainable. Kind of a Machiavellian explanation for that position is that some could see the potential advantages of the legal regime that would permit our own access to the ultimate high ground of outer space over the territory of our adversaries. In my own way of thinking, a little more pragmatic explanation of that view is that the physics of orbital mechanics mean that the ground track of an object in orbit necessarily traverses many nations sovereign territory. That's true in every orbital regime except geostationary orbit and it gotta do a lot of flyover to get to that orbital position. Insisting on no vertical limit to national airspace would effectively have precluded our access to orbital regimes and to the use of outer space. And ultimately, of course, no protest was filed. And this really was the earliest example of a development of state practice in the law of operations in outer space. It quickly became the customary international law principle of free access to the domain. Of course, that principle was later codified as treaty law with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Incidentally, the question that I've started this whole kind of bunny trail of Sputnik with, what is the vertical limit of state sovereignty? Where does outer space begin remains unsettled. There's no controlling answer to that. The US opposes a binding rule of international law that would define the limits of outer space. Our position that was expressed before the UN committee on the peaceful uses of outer space is that such a definition would be, in the words of the paper, arbitrary at best and constrained, excuse me, arbitrary at worst or at best constrained by the current state of technology. Now there are of course administrative policies that have definitions that are sometimes pointed to for purposes of defining where space begins. For example, NASA and the Air Force for their internal purposes of accrediting an individual as an astronaut, define the limit of outer space as 12 miles below the Carmen line. Similarly, the US space command geographic area of responsibility is defined to begin at 100 kilometers above mean sea level, which is the altitude commonly referred to as the Carmen line. The Carmen line is the altitude at which conventional aircraft can't stay aloft through normal principles of flight with Bernoulli's principle and the like. They've either got an inter orbit or descend. Neither of these administrative policies that I gave you as an example that were controlling as international law and frankly, even the exact demarcation of the Carmen line is disputed. It's a theoretical question of physics and frankly, it somewhat depends on the state of current technology. So now that I've established, I can't even tell you exactly where outer space begins. Where can I take these remarks today? Well, I'll start with a few sort of, I'll phrase them provocatively and then discuss what they mean questions. What provision of international law did China violate with their 2007 anti-satellite test? They left a constellation of debris in orbit. Thousands of pieces of that test debris remain in orbit polluting the low or the low earth orbit regime still a decade later or consider this. What provision of law did Russia violate when their Cosmos 2542 satellite discharged another satellite like a little Russian nesting doll? Cosmos, we numbered it Cosmos 2543. What about when Cosmos 2543 aligned its orbit regime to closely approach one of our sensitive US satellites? Or what about when Cosmos 2543 discharged a high velocity projectile that had the characteristics of a weapon out into space? Well, all these activities raise concerns, obviously, and interesting questions about things like the conventional registration of space objects. Things like the principle of due regard in the context of the outer space treaty. That is the requirement to operate with due regard for the corresponding interests of other state parties to the outer space treaty. Ultimately, the US has never denounced any of these actions as unlawful, only irresponsible or concerning. And we tend to talk about our interest in space in terms of responsibility and norms rather than strictly framing everything as a legal issue. General Raymond, the chief of space operations has spoken of the shared interest and responsibility of all space-faring nations to create safe, stable and operationally sustainable conditions for space activities, including commercial, civil and national security activities. However, the reality is these activities by China and Russia demonstrate the capability to hold US assets at risk, physical risk. But that's in addition to the capabilities that are non-kinetic in nature. How do we compete with these actors to ensure that our nation and our armed forces retain the advantages of space-based capabilities? Well, one, we do it with our own presence in the domain, much like we do with protecting our access to the high seas with different freedom of navigation activities. We do it by hardening our assets. Many of our legacy systems were built at a time when we assumed unrestricted and uncontested access to the domain. We don't build systems with that assumption today because it's no longer factually valid. And we do it by improving our access to the domain with assured and responsive launch capability and the cost of getting into orbit just decreases all the time for millions of dollars per ounce to thousands of dollars per pound. Another way we compete is by attributing irresponsible behavior. The chief space operations remarks about Russia's nesting doll satellites, that reflected a significant departure from past practice. In the not too distant past, the fact that we could detect and attribute activities like that would have been highly classified. Our national leaders have recognized that a lot of information about space operations and space capabilities is simply over classified. And breaking through those self-imposed barriers is a key thing to do if we're gonna deliver messages like this in support of developing responsible norms of behavior in space. Or even just downgrading the classification to where we can talk about it and talk about these capabilities and this information at a more accessible level. For lawyers, for example, who may not have SAP access but may have collateral clearances. For lawyers, the ability of US and allied systems to detect and attribute adversary activities in the space domain is critical to a legal analysis that we think a lot about in exercises and war games. It's an analysis this audience will be very familiar with. Just thinking about hostile act and hostile intent. These concepts from terrestrial conflict apply equally in space. They define, they're really the backbone of the US thinking about when it's lawful to act in self-defense and to some extent inform how we think about use of force for mission accomplishment. But how do you know if a particular adversary satellites orbital profile indicates hostile intent? How do we think about hostile intent with respect to unmanned satellites? Does it matter if the satellite that's at risk is a missile warning sensor? Or what if it's part of the nuclear command and control system of protected communications? What if it's part of the GPS constellation, providing navigation data for precision targeting? Or it's part of the GPS constellation providing precise timing data that's the backbone for a lot of US electronic financial transactions. What if the US desired in the context of a hypothetical future international armed conflict? What if we wanted to deliver an electronic warfare effect to an adversary space system? Does it matter if that adversary system is a dual use capability with perhaps military and civilian payloads on board? Does it matter if we're targeting the spacecraft itself or the link between the spacecraft and a ground station? Does it matter if the effect is temporary or reversible? Like does it matter if it's permanent or destructive? The answer is yes, all these things matter. They matter in space just like they would on earth. And frankly, most of the law that applies to terrestrial conflict applies equally in space. The challenge for legal advisors in this business isn't really learning a whole new body of law. Rather it's just understanding how the law of war and how international law applies in a completely different domain. The space domain is characterized by objects continually in motion. Every object in orbit is continually in motion at enormous speeds faster than bullets travel in terrestrial warfare. And of course it's a domain where a handful of humans may be temporarily present but a multitude of human interests reside. Space is a domain in which our adversaries are very open about their intent to compete. As I watched China's space program and particularly their lunar exploration activities, I think back to the time that I spent serving in the Pacific and the times that we all spent focused on China's activities in the South China Sea. I think about China's unsafe and unprofessional intercepts of US aircraft that were operating in international airspace. I think about the dangerous and harassing activities of China's maritime militias. All this kind of thing is the competition below the threshold of armed conflict that our adversaries are extending into space. It presents the same legal issues in orbit around the lunar surface for that matter or further beyond that it presents in the South China Sea or the Black Sea for that matter. It is an exciting time to be serving with the nation's newest military service. It really is. I'm very thankful and feel very blessed to be able to work at SPOC right now. In addition to protecting our on orbit assets and delivering space effects for combatant commanders in the nation today, we're working to develop the systems and concepts and people that will protect our access to and our benefits from the domain both today and for the future. So thank you for your time. I look forward to answering your questions. Todd, Sue, thank you very much for your comments. Very helpful, very insightful. And Todd, as the newest force as part of the military, introducing us to some of those concepts, not new concepts, but how we think about them. I think very fascinating, very interesting perspective on things. And I think I'd like to start off with a question for you. You kind of dovetails off something you said. I guess the CSO Chief of Space Operations, General Raymond, recently stated that space needs new rules because it's the Wild West up there. My question to you is, you talked about how we, it's just a different domain. We're the same rules in the law of war apply, but in your mind, do we need new rules and in what areas and where do you think that'd be helpful if we had those rules and addressing things? Over to you. Thanks, Tom, that's a great question. Before I answer that for the admins, it looks like my camera's disabled. So if y'all can enable it, I'll turn that on from my end so everybody can, here we go. Thank you very much. Yeah, thanks, Tom. Great, that's a great question. You know, when I heard the CSO say that, I thought back to what the Wild West was like and thought, you know, the Wild West wasn't really crazy and wild because of a lack of law. It was crazy and wild because of a lack of enforcement. They had laws, you know, the laws, the common law of crimes was not that different in that day than it is today. What's different is the body of law enforcement, the resourcing we've done for law enforcement and the courts to enforce that. There is law in space. There's the Outer Space Treaty. There's some more conventions that implement more particular bits of guidance, such as liability for space activities and rescue and return of astronauts and the like. And apart from that, many of the principles of international law, you know, concepts of sovereignty and activities in area where there can be no claim of national sovereignty all pertain. When I look at space, I honestly see a lot of parallels to the South China Sea. That's why I mentioned it in my remarks. When I got to the space community a couple of years ago, I came directly from my time serving in Curl Sewell's position out at the PAC AF. And I talked to the commander about, you know, y'all are trying to wrap your head around how are you gonna compete with China? Have you looked at the South China Sea and thought about the parallels with what China is doing there and how they're behaving in space? And they hadn't because this way of thinking, much like, you know, many other parts of the service are thinking about space in a new way. The space community is thinking about military operations in a new way. And I guess the bottom line is there's obviously room to develop the law in outer space, but I think I would maybe disagree with my boss a bit that it's the wild, wild West because of a lack of rules. Now, in terms of there is a lot of irresponsible behavior that goes on orbit, can't be denied. And the question my teenage daughter used to ask me when she would see the news about things in the, in South China Sea and I was serving in the Pacific, she asks me now, what are we gonna do about that? And that's a good question that, of course, that's why we're here and it's what we think about every day at work. Over. Hey, thanks, Todd. Great comment. I think about enforcement. And I think what you said about the comparison between space in the South China Sea, very relevant here when you think about it because there is a body of law that can be applied in the space domain. And we have an opportunity right now. And as I said, state practice, a lot of times defines what's going on. And if you don't push back against it, that becomes the norm. Or if you don't exercise those rights that you have an international law and make those norms, exercise those norms the way they were intended to be, I think they can be supplanted. And I think space is one of those areas where much like the South China Sea, we're not looking at it as hard as we need to because it's more subtle. I guess, you know, we think about the Chinese incremental salami slicing and the subtlety of it and acting against it. Very similar situation I think in space that we've got to use those rules and enforce them by the international rules and norms the way they were intended to be. Otherwise they could be supplanted. They could be become state practice of how we do business. And I think that can be very unhelpful in space just like it is in the South China Sea, you know, in the maritime domain the way certain countries look at it, especially the PRC. So yeah, I think that's extraordinarily helpful. And it goes back to exactly what I said. I don't think we need a new body of law. I think we need to utilize the rules we have vigorously and robustly guard them and enforce them. Colonel Sewell, I'd like to come back to you for a minute on a question I have and to talk about just briefly the ideas and the idea of the ideas and the importance of that of what it is and what it isn't and what its significance out here and how you see that playing in especially the way other state actors are interpreting that. If you could spend a moment on that for us, please. I can, again, start my video. Thank you. All right, so ADIZ, our Air Defense Identification Zones also there called ADIZ's. Pretty much every country out there that borders international airspace will have an ADIZ. And ADIZ is simply designed for that if an aircraft is flying into your national airspace at a certain point when they enter an ADIZ that's basically a boundary as they're coming into your airspace, if they're flying into your airspace, they're gonna identify their intentions, they're gonna identify what aircraft where they're from. Most countries out there when they're flying into an ADIZ that's going into a nation's territorial airspace you're gonna file a flight plan out there. What an ADIZ is is not until you get to 12 nautical miles out from a nation's border, it is not sovereign airspace, it's international airspace, anything beyond that 12 nautical mile out there. And as international airspace, the rules for international airspace apply. Basically you're free to fly in that international airspace and if you're a state aircraft under the rules under IKO, you're allowed to fly with due regard. That means I'm basically safe operation of your particular aircraft out there. What often happens, and I'll just give an example of the United States. For example, off of Alaska, we have ADIZs that operate out there and we may have Russian aircraft that fly into those ADIZs and just as a matter of state practice watching those aircraft, we may go out and intercept those aircraft but those Russian aircraft are not required to file a flight plan. They're free to be out there and as long as both nations operate with due regard with one another, we can be in proximity to each other and we just need to do safe intercepts. I think what you're referring to is about 10 years ago, China extended their ADIZ outside of China pretty extensively off of their coast to cover in particular some islands, the Sonakas that have historically been claimed by Japan and just a lot of other additional territory into the international airspace into the South China Sea. What they were requiring was that aircraft injuring those that ADIZ, which is not required by international law, they file a flight plan if they're gonna fly into the ADIZ regardless of whether that particular aircraft was gonna fly into the territorial airspace of China. They were requiring that they contact the Chinese airspace authorities. They would maintain contact with those authorities and basically follow any directions out there, none of which are required by international law in particular for aircraft that are never entering into that state's territory. And as a matter of speaking, it's a same sort of area that we're seeing with the Chinese whether it's in the South China Sea and the Maritime Domain with the Coast Guard, whether we're seeing with space a grace of action. It's a gray zone in international law where they're exerting some level of control and by pushing it out there, they're essentially trying to claim more territory, more rights, more legal responsibilities, authorities than they actually have. Of course, the United States declined to follow that. Many other countries did as well, but sometimes you have nations out there that are flying commercial aircraft that are going ADIZ. And if those commercial aircraft, whether they're US, they're Canadian, they're Philippine, whether the country they are out there, to the extent that they start complying with those requirements in the ADIZ, China has an incremental victory. And again, it's just an aggressive and it's abuse of an area international law. And really the only way to challenge it is to push back and you need allies and partners to push back too, because to the extent that other countries comply, even if the United States doesn't comply, that's one of those gray zone victories for China. Yeah, thanks, Sue. I totally agree with that. I think very, very relevant, especially those gray zone activities and just another example of how we see the rule of law being eroded by the state practice, the PRC and how they do things. And I think our response to that across the spectrum of information, operational, diplomatic realms, is very important to push back in that area of things. Todd, I wanna shift back to you just for one second. We had a question, let me see in the chat, or excuse me, question and answer. It says, when will Space Force get its own JAG capability? And I guess I would define that as, hey, we have the Space Force and Space Command. And could you give us just a brief insight to how they plan to structure their legal support? Would it be like the Air Force did theirs? What were familiar with the other services and how the tiers will work, et cetera, et cetera, and how you see that supporting the mission of Space Command and Space Force? Sure, that's a great question. Well, Space Command is the easier situation to explain. It's a combatant command like all others. It's jointly manned. They've got JAGs there from Army, Navy, and Air Force today. And I think they're gonna look very much like that for the foreseeable future. On the service side, the Space Force only has three career fields, Space Operations, Intelligence, and Cyber. That's it. That's the only jobs there are in the Space Force. Every other capability that the Space Force has assigned to it is provided by the Air Force, including Judge Advocate. Now, it is actually assigned to the Space Force. So like me and my team, I am assigned to Space Operations Command. My Raider is Lieutenant General Whiting, who's the spot commander. And so it feels like day to day, the Space Force does have a JAG capability because they've got embedded and assigned Judge Advocates who are in that chain of command and working for that commander. It's just that my next assignment might be back in the Air Force. I think that's gonna be the situation we have for the foreseeable future, both for some practical realities of keeping the service very lean, which is part of its organizing design and for some legal reasons. By law, the Judge Advocate General is the legal advisor to the secretary and to all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. And so if we were resourced and inclined to change that, we need to go back and revisit the law as well. And I don't see some appetite that for quite a while. Now, in 20 years, people coming into the Air Force JAG Corps today, they may well live to see a time when there's Space Force officers who are Judge Advocates doing this same duty. But I think that might be the horizon that the service may evolve. Hey, thanks very much, Todd. That's very helpful. And honestly, I didn't really realize that to the extent you were telling me about the MOSes. You know, within the command, I think that's very, yeah, a lot to think about about how a structure, kind of a Marine Corps idea of, you know, underneath how things are done. Let me take a look. I don't see any other questions in the question and answer box, but I will hold for a moment in case anyone wants to type one in, you know, or make a trigger if you know of any out there that we could want to depose before I go into my final comments. Okay, well, I first like to thank our last two panelists to Todd and to Sue and Todd. It's great to see you again. Great to see you out there. Thank you very much for both of your comments. I think very insightful into what we're doing here. I think, you know, to everyone out there, I think when you listen to the SJs and what they had to say, a lot of common themes out there, a lot of common problems we're getting our head around and how we deal with things in this region. And it's very different. Like I said, the way the United States has been posed for war has been looking a different direction, cardinal direction, as well as thought direction and how we do business. And what we've had to do over the last 20 years and the way we look at warfare, where we are on the spectrum of conflict and what constitutes a conflict, you know, and even though we're not in a use of force type conflict right now, we call it a competition, that doesn't mean the absence of conflict. You know, phase zero, as I've said, is not the absence. And so how we think about these things, extraordinarily important. I once heard someone say, you know, that the law is that which can be plausibly asserted and boldly maintained. And I often think about that in terms of how we look at things out here and what we need to do before, you know, below the threshold of war, how we win without fighting. And as I've said earlier on the legal narrative, I think we're in a battle for that. We're in a struggle over the legal narrative. And you know, in international laws, I've said before, state practice drives so much of what goes on. And I think it's incumbent on the United States and our allies and partners as we can empower them and support them to not create a new body of law. It may require a new way of thinking, but not, I don't think we have to go that far away from what we have, we have that. The long established international norms and rules that countries have come up with and forms they've come up with them in that we need to embrace because the idea that China may be trying to supplant that or erode that or go against that doesn't just play into the South China Sea of disputed features. I think it plays into the international order and how businesses conduct it and the impact that can have on the international framework of laws and what that could lead to the precedent of attacking those things in favor of states that have certain powers or abilities or authorities over others, very important. If you think about the way the international community works everyone gets a voice, not just those with missiles and tanks but the way things may go in the precedent could be said here, could definitely erode that. Like I said, not just in the Indo-Pacific but I think that's the way we've got to look at it is this has implications not just in our region but around the world and how the world may look at things and is the world changing and where does this fit into it? And I believe we have to take a pause and realize we've got to use those things we have those tools, those laws and I believe as the United States it's McCann's opinion we've got to push, we've got to push we've got to do those things we can do that fit within our law and our policy what can we do and what should we do and do those things robustly so that our allies and partners will look at us. I think we're also in a competition for their favor. Oh, when you think about it a lot of allies it's not just us or them with a lot of our allies and partners it may be us and them to some extent. So how do we affect that? How do we understand that? And how do we create an environment that makes them want to lean into what we're doing to embrace how we look at the world as opposed to just succumbing to what they may have to deal with you know, with China and the devil they know it's a complex problem but I think some of the basic fundamental blocking and tackling still applies here. We've got to do those things we know to uphold the law because if we don't if this country doesn't, if our nation doesn't no one will. And it's more that's never it's not as clear anywhere else I think that in this region or other countries do look at what we're doing. And so that it barts on us I think that responsibility to do it right do it well so that we can push back on this and build a wall if you will around you know of allies and partners that quell this idea not necessarily this country because it is not versus them but this idea that the rule of law can be supplanted and replaced by the desires of one country seeking to increase their own influence with their own good and only their own good. So I will leave it at that. If there are any other questions or comments I'll give it a moment, the question and answer box and if not I'll just move into my final comments. Okay, seeing none. Thank you all very much. And I'd like to thank our hosts at the Naval War College I greatly appreciate the opportunity to participate today. Thank you so much for asking me and for asking all of us the SJA's out here to give you our opinion it's great that we had this opportunity and I welcome the opportunity to share these type of experiences in a dialogue that comes from this here and in the future. I think it's critically important to what we're doing and I greatly appreciate it. And I made you trade, thank you for setting this up. I apologize in the beginning for the administrative trying to get technical problems ironed out here. I hope it didn't impact things too much but I greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak to everyone today. And I think this is a wonderful idea and I hope you will continue to press on this topic in this forum and other forums because I think people out here are listening to what you're doing on that end. I think it informs what we do. We work hand in hand on these things. And I think it's critical that the big minds and the big thinkers on this are putting out those ideas and feeding this because we're reading it, we're using it, we're embracing it and we need you on that end doing what you're doing. So thank you for everything you do. And again, thank you for the opportunity to speak today. And I'll turn it back over to you, Major Trigl at this point. Thanks again. Thank you, Kurtle LeCann. Thank you to the outstanding practitioners who presented today on the staff judge advocate perspectives, the rich viewpoints from across the fleet and department of fifth defense enterprise fostered great dialogue on international law and military operations. Thank you as well to those in the audience for joining us today. We hope to see you tomorrow for day two of the conference beginning promptly at 1100 Eastern daylight savings time. This ends day one. Have a great rest of your day and thank you.