 century, Balkan national deconism resulted in new waves of immigration. During the summer of 1906 extended pogroms against the Greeks were carried on by the garrians who regarded them as a main national enemy. As a result, over 20,000 Greeks were urged to leave Eastern Romania during that turbulent summer. Immigration waves started after the Lutinov plot in the summer of 1906 and were not nationally destined towards Greeks, but towards neighboring Greek communities, Romania and the Ottoman Empire. Neither did they involve all the population, but mainly the African individuals. Nevertheless, immigration became generalized after the fire of Vankielos. At that point, Greeks were fleeing Eastern Romania not only because of the fear of their lives, but because of economic destructions of their cities and because of cultural oppression as well. But even this program could not compare to the extended population movements that took place since the Balkan Wars continued throughout the Great War and reached their neath with the Greek-Turkish exchange of population in 1922 and 1924. The Balkan Wars were part of the new condition of nationalizing the territory in the sense that there was the continuation of the Erdanconism between the states rather than within the states. Atrocities and massacres that took place in the Balkans between 1912 and 1913 systematically appeared as headlines in the major European newspapers. Population movements were a crucial part of the Balkan Wars as populations followed the constant change of the borders at the region. The Armenian population suffered most during the First War by Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian troops and the regulars, while their villages were in many cases burned down by the crisis neighbors. Thousands of refugees sought shelter in the city like Salonikis and Istanbul. In the period between 1878 and 1913, about 1.7 to 2 million Muslims were displaced from the Balkans from Anatolia and Niferan Thrace. In the Second War, it was mainly Greek civilians that suffered the Bulgarian violence. Greeks in the same way as Muslims were forced to leave their villages in Macedonian Thrace, while many were forced to convert to Bulgarian nationality. From Eleni Kostramnitsa alone, 5,000 Greeks fled the Bulgarian control towards Greece. In the region of Edirne, 1,000 of Greek civilians were killed during July 1913. Accordingly, 15,000 Bulgarians escaped the Greek administration in Salonika. After the Bucharest Treaty, Bulgarians from the Greek part of Macedonia resulted in the Bulgarian Western Thrace, while almost 40,000 Greeks fled from the Western Thrace during that period, following the opposite route. According to the Carnegie Commission Report, some 156,000 people took refuge in Greece, 104,000 in Bulgaria, and more than 200,000 Turks fled to Anatolia. The situation had become so tense that there were initial agreements for a mutual, reciprocal and voluntary limited population exchange between Bulgaria and the Ottoman government in 1913. The plan was to form a mixed commission that would assess and liquidate the property left behind by the refugees. The agreement was left in the plenary phase because of the great war that broke out, but it was indicative of the climate that was growing in the region. Defeat at the Balkan Wars stroked the Ottoman Empire to its core as it shook the heart of the state and the unity of the civilians. Part of the blame for the defeat was put on the Christian recruits of the Ottoman army, while additionally economic help from the Christian Communities to the Balkan state was suspected. Moreover, refugees' waves of the Muslim migrants from the Balkans that were reached in Anatolia only intensified the distrust and anger against the other militias. As a result, the Ottomanism project was validated and the new project, that of the Turkification of the Anatolia, emerged. The emergence of the Turkish Nationalistic Project in 1913, according to which Anatolia was to become homeland to ethnic Turks exclusively, set in motion a series of ethnic cleansing programs. Attempting to avoid such fate, many members of the Turkidic communities chose to migration either to Greece or to Europe or to Egypt. Reportedly, in 1914 alone, over 1.15 million Greeks left their homelands in Asia Minor, either from the coast toward the East Aegean Islands or from the islands toward bigger cities in the coast. As a result of this extended violence and agreement of mutual voluntary population exchange, on the pattern of the Ottoman-Mulgarian one, was pursued between the Ottoman Empire and Greece in 1914. During the previous period, during what was described as a campaign of threats and intimidation, over 200,000 Orthodox had been forced to leave the Asia Minor coast, especially from the area of Izmir. The exchange, primarily concerned the Greeks of Izmir region and the Muslims of Macedonia, would be overseen by a specifically established committee that would guarantee the just disposal of properties. As was the case with the agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, though, none of this agreement had time to materialize because of the war. Now, Pontus Region experienced such a widespread violence in an excessive way because it was a battlefront with the Russians and therefore considered sensitive. Though many Pontian Greeks lost their lives in the marches, many took the weapons and fled to the mountains fighting a partisan war against the Muslim troops. The situation changed in 1916 when the Russian troops entered the region during the period of 1916-1918. If the Pontus Regions had been raided, you've got about four minutes or so left. Okay, so I'll skip Pontus because anyway it was presented in the previous presentation and I'll go towards the closing. So before closing, a small reference to the period of the Greek-Turkish war. This presentation was mainly about what preceded the war, but in the public memory it is like we jump from the episode that from this point to the episode of the burning of the caverns, men and the refugees trying to get on the boat to flee to Greece. But this was not the case from the beginning of the Greek-Turkish war in 1922. There was population movement all around Asia Minor. Either it was Muslims trying to avoid the violence of the Greek army entering the region, or it was after the defeat it was the Greek population, orthodox Christian population, trying to flee the Turkish violence. But this was a route that took months or years, wandering around the Anatolia inland until they go to Greece. And even when they got there, they had wandering taking place in the country until they finally settled settled. So why is this important? Well in the century of 1922, we still tend to discuss about the refugee movements implicated in the long First World War in a way that is national-intended and top-down all-intended. As far as national approach is concerned, we other discuss about the trap of the nation and its heroic efforts to commandite the refugees, or we discuss in terms of treaties, conventions and diplomatic history. We fell to contextualize 1922 to the long series of wars that outbroke after the end of the First World War. The Russian Infinite Civil War, the Irish War, was between Poland and Lithuania, and so forth and so forth. About 13 million people were deported during the wars of the second decade of the 20th century. Many lost their lives along the way. Others never managed to return to their homes, paying the price of dismantling Europe's historical empires and organizing the world in the nation states. During the persecution of the refugee, the refugee and minor from this perspective does not detract from the drama of the uprooting. On the contrary, it helps to understand it in its historical context as a process that accompanied the end of the historical era and through which were formed the political entities, identities and institutions with which we were more or less lived today. It helps, for example, think about what the condition of being a refugee meant in the modern world and at the same time how it became a building block of the nation state by calling for the creation of institutions and governmental practices. It also helps to understand how, in many ways, modern refugeedom was at the same time the outcome of national ideology and the constitutive element of the modern nation state. It also helps to think interconnection between the notion of the modern refugees and the minorities over migrants and the exclusion lines produced. As far the top-down approach in concert and enclosing here turned to the clear-cut top-down narrative to fragments of the grassroots perceptions, help us understand the complexity of the situation of the population movements during this period. It also sets lights to the way that identities were not prefixed but were shaped during the process. Who was to become a refugee on what grounds and what was at stake each time at their accounts with the locals is another important chapter of the story. In which situations, for example, did the refugees become another class? And in which were they mobilized for the politics of national homogeneity? Issues like this are important in understanding the complexity of the picture. They presuppose, though, a shift from the exoticization of the particular and specific to their correlation in an answer to a broader question of the nationalizing process during the interwar period. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. We'll save questions, which I think has been informed, and we'll go straight to our second speaker, who is Antonio Ferrara, who is an independent scholar with research interests in the history of forced migrations and genocides. Antonio, you also have 15 minutes. So I think your paper, the one you submitted, is slightly longer. And present us with your main arguments, that would be very helpful. Thank you. I'll mute yourself. Antonio, you're muted. Antonio, we can't hear you. You're muted, if you could. Yes, I think... OK, can you hear? So can you hear me now? Great. So first of all, I want to thank the organizers of this event and for inviting me and also for accepting my paper quite late in the hour. I want to thank all of you for your attention. My paper is a part of a larger project dealing with the history of forced migrations in lands belonging to the Hasburg and Zoller, Ottoman and Romanov and Pies and their successor states on a time span, which goes from the Crimean War to since that. And I am presenting here a chunk of this project examining on one hand the massive resettlement of Anatolian refugees in the northern borderland of the Greek state and seeing it as the most extreme example of the nationalist agrarian reforms that were taking place in the same period as they were in the other successful states, namely Baltic states and Poland and so on. Such states were striving to redistribute what was still the main economic resource, Arab land, to the advantage of members of the populations, identified on religious or linguistic grounds, that they put ported to represent. Sometimes to the detriment of foreign speaking landowners. And I argue that this is in fact what also took place in the areas of Greece from which Muslims were removed with similar motives, analogous motives, even if there were significant difference regarding the scale of the phenomenon and the justification provided for this possessing what we can consider aliens. On the other hand, practices of planned and strategic refugee resettlement predicated on the refugees belonging or not to specific linguistic and religious groups were enacted most clearly by Greece and Turkey in the context of the population exchange but also by other actors such as, again, the newly established successful states of central Europe. And indeed, the political rationale between the central European agrarian reforms was clearly articulated by none other than Eleuterios Venizelos, who was thinking about completely what I was thinking about, so it was not about the central European agrarian reforms. But still, I mean, he announced that land would be distributed to landless cultivators and malholders with following words. This is not simply an act of justice. In the new provinces, we have populations of questionable and malleable national consciousness who would ultimately side with that state which would solve the agrarian problem which for them is of such vital importance. And one can argue that Lausanne Treaty and the exchange population brought this line of extreme consequences. The Greek state endeavoured to solve the agrarian problems of the Anatolian refugees. Also in order to ensure their allegiance to the political community it purported to represent and in which refugees were expected to integrate. And to do so, it dispossessed and displaced the Muslim inhabitants of Macedonia, not just Macedonia, seen as outsiders to a Greek national community demarcated on religious and linguistic grounds. To establish in a linkage between the enjoyment of property rights, especially landed property rights on one hand, and citizenship restricted on religious and linguistic grounds. More religious grounds, I was saying, case of Greece, because since exchangeable Anatolian Greek Orthodox could not speak Greek, whereas exchangeable Muslims sometimes spoke Greek. So it was much more religion than language contrary to other contexts. Nothing remotely as radical was attempted by the newly established successor states of Central Europe, but they too found it expedient to dispossess and exclude foreign landowners, especially if they belonged to groups seen as privileged under the imperial order. On another and perhaps more obvious note, the relocation of incoming Anatolian refugees on the northern borderland of the Greek state was an example of what I've defined elsewhere as the use of refugee resentment as a tool of demographic surgery. That these incoming refugees were channeled towards areas that seemed as strategic, used to supplant unwanted the Muslim-Australian-speaking population, parts in order to bolster Greek claims to recently acquired border areas, seen as vulnerable to the territorial expansionism of neighboring states, which had cross-border ties of language and religion with the non-Greek inhabitants of these regions. I stated in the papers how there were other instances, especially in Eastern Europe, in which incoming refugees were resettled or were prevented from returning to their homelands according to similar reasoning. For example, not all those who went or left the territory of would be post-war Lithuania and Estonia were allowed back, and a number of those who came back were resettled not where they came from, but where it was the more proper for purposes of national security to settle population seen as trustworthy. And this establishment of a close link between landed property rights and restricted and sending of citizenship on one hand, as well as the political exploitation of refugee resentment on the other were defining features of the Greek-Tarquish exchange of population of 1922. They had substantial lands and dissidents in the 19th century. They had been indeed adopted to some extent by newly established Balkan states and by the Ottoman Empire, as I tried to detail in my paper. This is, however, less important in the fact of such practice were not peculiarly Greek or Tarquish or Near Eastern one, but would rather spread northern-west not in the immediate aftermath of World War One, but one generation later during World War Two. Because linking the enjoyment of property rights and restricted understanding of citizenship would become a feature of wartime rule by both Nazi Germany and seven but by a nationalist regime ruling over its central Europe, both allies and adversaries of Nazi Germany. And political exploitation of refugee resentment would be right in central Europe and beyond it, as shown by examples from Nazi Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Israel, Punjab, for examples which I mentioned at some point in my paper. So I will not dwell on it unless you ask me to do in the Q&A. And such a settlement often took place in the aftermath of population displacement which were often justified by referencing the Greek or Tarquish exchange of population as a model conflict resolution practice which I think was interesting. So to conclude, because I tried to be very concise and with space for question and answer, the cross-agency exchange of population was a crucial link in the chain of events by which the kind of mass violence that ravaged the whole area of the Blyck Sea littoral already in the second half of the 19th century would come to devastate in even worse ways most of the lines between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Caspian cities in the 1930s and 1940s. So 1912 was an hinge moment not just because it foreshadowed of course did not foreordain the calamitous events of the following decades but it was also the atrocious code of a decades-long era in which forced migrations and mass murders were resulting from inter-impeal rivalry and warfare even more than from the establishment of success of states with the streaking of Ottoman Empire had been commonplace occurrence all over the Blyck Sea littoral and its Balkan and Anatolian interlands. At that place of time practised such as the establishment of link between property rights and city industry on one hand and political exploitation of refugee settlement on the other started and by 1922 were being endorsed by the international community admittedly as a region specific exception to the existing general rules of minority protection but in the 1940s the exception became the rules and 1912 Lausanne settlement was seen as more durable than the one settlement of 1919 until its features came to appear undesirable only if only because they were more effective in guaranteeing the peace and in turn this contributed to legitimize policies which were more than a passing resemblance with those perfected in Ottoman territories and legalized if only exposed and comprehensively enforced in 1922. So this particular moment of 1922 is in my opinion best seen as the hinge between the Ottoman and post-Ottoman history of violence started with the Crimean War of 1853 and a larger and perhaps better now one involving the shutter zone of the dynastic empires that had ruled the East Central Europe until 1917 and this is I think a widely valid connection which I only been able to explore in some of its dimensions. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for keeping on time. So thank you to both because we now have I think 45 minutes just a good amount of time to start asking some questions. I want to start off by just asking sort of three very broad questions really just as an invitation to the two speakers and others to start making wider connections I suppose. So first of all the aim of the conference as I understand it is to think about the Greek-Turkish developments in the context of wider connected or wider connected picture and I think both papers have the potential to contribute to that but actually both could be more explicit on that so both papers primarily focus on the Greek-Turkish context and sort of some of the immediate neighbors both let's talk a little bit about Bulgaria but both speakers have touched on ways of looking beyond that and on how the violence radiated out for example. So right at the end of her talk Amelia made a connection of the Greek-Turkish case with the wider wars in the region and with the subsequent refugee movements and Antonio said a little bit about how the Greek-Turkish events kind of been emulated by European political leaders elsewhere but I was wondering actually both of you could be more explicit about how you see this geographically or causally or politically or ideologically or practically related to kind of the wider set of developments that so many papers have already touched on. Secondly I was going to I would like to push you both a little bit on the chronologies and timelines within you which makes this 19 19 to 1922 set of developments. In his introduction the conference explicitly in terms of kind of centennials and bicentennials not just as opportune moments to rethink old history but also to think about different timelines that 1922 can be a part of. So I'd like to ask you what longer timelines do you think the subject of forced migration and population exchange do you think this needs to be written into? Emilia I think has talked a little bit about the construction of the nation building in the Balkan regions and in her long paper has touched on the kind of 19th century roots which seem relevant to her story and Antonio as we heard just now talks about the 1929 to 1922 as a English moment and longer Ottoman history that brought it to the 1940s developments but so potentially you actually disagree on the timelines that you draw which might have actual practical roots of that and I'd like to put you in the conversation of that actually to what extent do you accept each other's timelines or suggestions of timelines and then my third broad point is one of I came up a bit yesterday but I'd like to put that squarely into this panel which is the question of agency who has the agency in these movements and these nationalization processes that you both talk about Antonio talks about practices that comes up on your paper that spread from the Greek and Turkish context to Central Europe and Antonio talks about the use of refugee settlement as a tool of I think demographic surgery and the Hellenization of the regions and so on Emilia talks about waves of civilians being forced to leave and about how for example Christian recruits of the Ottoman army where you suspect those and Emilia in fact you also mentioned the special committee that's being tasked to oversee the fair distribution of property and so also sometimes both of you see the newly established states as agents in themselves but then we've heard about Venezuelans but on the whole there's an absence of actors here these are anonymous broad processes and I think I just kept wondering who is doing this, who is enforcing international agreements and practice on the ground you couldn't know so much more for example about the local regional officials who had to interpret instructions as they came down had to push against them, had to ignore them had to do something with them had to enact them on the basis of their judgment so there's a lot of these in this in both your papers and I'd like to know just much more who did the encouraging, the welcoming of the returnies, the granting of citizenship, the exploiting of the general political process and so on and also what about the agency of international organizations, both of you have very little about the League of Nations and also other groups in there, which may be a deliberate choice maybe you tell me we know from Matthew Franks a thick, excellent volume a little bit about the internationalization of the minorities problem via the League of Nations with all its flaws the League had been involved in the Greek-Bulgarian exchange and on the basis that kind of claimed the expertise to be the leading agency that was of course disputed in practice but yeah, I'd like to know much more about what you think and also about the displacements themselves to the extent to which they had agency about micro and not about micro decisions. I think Emilia gives us more of a sense of their perspectives than Antoine does and of course Laura yesterday made the argument about refugees as crucial components in this production of territorial integrity so that those voices as agents actually are potentially really relevant but anyway, these are three broad questions about wider connections, about chronology and about the agency that I hope we can touch on I'd like to invite the two speakers just to come back briefly and then we'll open them up. I'm sure there's lots of questions in the room as well. Emilia, would you like, do you have any comments immediately? Yes, thank you. I think I will start from the last question about international institutions. I did not touch upon the issue because I was more focused on showing that the population and refugee movements was not something that could be limited in 1929 and 1922 but has a longer story but I just hinted it when I spoke about how the modern refugees got the birth of new institutions and new governmental practices so the international committees was part of this modern conception of what the refugee is because as a matter of fact people fled violence long before the 20th century but they fled violence because they were immediately threatened as persons or because of war but not because they were threatened as a community with small exceptions but now you have people fleeing their homelands because they were in many cases projected with an identity that do not really subscribe to I mean and this moves me to your other comment about agency of course when we speak about in the Greek case, 1922 case of course when we speak about big urban cities Kosovo, Poland, Izmir, Izmir Nair Istanbul you have people having national identities but when we speak about villages in Anatolia then people have mainly a religious identity or a community but they are expelled and you have for this you have reports from Proxen consulates sent there from the Greek state saying that why did you send us here they do not even believe they are Greeks, they believe they are Christians or they are parts of the communities so when they are expelled because they are perceived as Greeks then they are forced by states or by treaties so by big plane agents but the way that they flee their countries is organized by their communities but they live communities the way they experience their subjectivities and then they become they develop their national identity at the same time that they become refugees it's an inter-connected process because they become refugees they develop a national identity that corresponds to this refugee hood thank you, thank you very much we'll come back with more questions, Antonia do you want to get back to this first round of comments, pick up anything that you I try to answer all three questions or comments as well connections beyond Greece and Turkey well the Greek-Turkish population exchange is referenced several times well for example it's referenced by Italian diplomats when they try to arrange for an exchange of population between Italian and Germans in 1939 it is referenced by Croatian nationalists in 1941 when they want to expel Serbs it is referenced by President Roosevelt when he advocates for the expulsion of Germans from East Russia Zionists praise the Greek resettlement when they think about resettling the Jewish refugee they expect from Central Europe after the war which do not materialize because they are killed in the Holocaust so yes there are many connections and we also know that Nazi admired were other chemists and but I don't know honestly if other Eastern European nationalists had how cognizant they were of the Turkish example or Greek-Turkish this I don't know there is clearly a need for more research on that I mean we have Stefan Heerig's research on how Germany how Kemal was seen in Germany but we don't have my knowledge anything similar for I don't know Poland or Romania or other Eastern European countries regarding timelines well it seems that Emilia's timeline of 1912 1922 if I understand well it's clearly an important subset of my larger one which goes from the Crimean War to Stalin's death I think she is more concerned with just the Greece and post-Ottoman lands and I agree that post-Ottoman lands most starts in with Crimean War even if there is important president of Greek Revolution in 1820 so I think our timelines are broadly compatible international organization well mine was a deliberate choice in the sense that international organizations are resetting refugees but they don't get to choose where those refugees are resettled so they just help they mostly help in where the refugees are it is interesting here that the League of Nations well Nansen was commissioner for refugees of the League of Nations so it starts working on the exchange of population in this capacity as a way out to solve a refugee problem and he's I mean while he was selling this exchange of population as a way to how to say adapt for the influx of refugees in Greece by making room for them by removing the but in fact he also he was not the one the only one it was also taught as a solution to a minority problem even if minority problems were just being started in well properly speaking in Europe because minority treaties are all 1919 even if there are many antecedents in 19th century of their closes at least so in my opinion in the end it was not international organization who got they are not so much implied nor in the where refugees are resettled because it states decisions nor and even less in agrarian reforms which was entirely a domestic well not just a domestic they may become matter of international concern but international organizations were not in any interested in the implicated in the agrarian reforms well and regarding this place the well this place that agency of course they always have some I would argue that sometimes they even became perpetrators they even started to move in order to resettle I mean there are examples for example in I think there were Greece Greek refugees in Macedonia who attacked Bulgarian speaking residents and prompted exodus of Bulgarians towards I mean that's an interesting thing because there was this Greek or Bulgarian voluntary exchange as long as it was voluntary there was no exchange and then when Greece in fact started to force Bulgarians out and Bulgaria started forcing Greek out then it was there was the exchange in 1924-25 so I mean also this is to say that also the discussion about how important is that the exchange is compulsory in practice it's not so important if it's timid compulsory it's more a thing for the history of international law and for legal history I think which is important because of course where I'd say first migrations were internationally seen as legal from the central international just for well 3-4 decades between 1912 and 1950 because already in 1940 they were being outloaded by one of the subsequent Nuremberg tribunals but I mean this was of course the most important in the world so I hope I thank you that's a great question yes please let's collect some questions you all have a chance to come back again let's collect some questions are there any in the room Jay? let's collect some thank you thanks for these migrations were really interesting it is partly about this collection of papers but also about our collection yesterday especially some others Erika, where you struck in the conversation about the exchange that we've heard so very much more about the refugees who come to Greece than those who are going to Turkey and I think you know there are lots of structural reasons for that that have to do with the sources and the kind of actors and the numbers as well which is worth acknowledging but I'm curious to know for those of you who are working on this moment I know that when we look at the records of this particular moment in places like Salonica there are these and arrivals actually overlap we have these moments even people living in the same spaces negotiating over these properties that there is a consciousness of the other side and I'm curious to know the extent to which your actors both the refugees themselves the aid workers the local officials how do they understand their role as expellers of the Muslim population as well as receivers of the Christian I think that this is something I have not heard about and it seems important to me to at least ask that question in what way does the expulsion from Greece come up that's given the sources as well and then for Antonia I'm curious about I was struck with this idea of the connections with land reforms and the kind of the message that expulsions which connects with a bunch of more contemporary conversations about what constitutes refugee camps there was a very recent conversation about the application of the term refugee to people who were displaced in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina for instance so I'm wondering what you think this might have to say about our understanding of the term refugee both historically and the contemporary category of analysis thank you make notes of those I want to ask both speakers to consider a slightly different framework one that we've used the framework is what I would call population turbulence in armies and in civilian populations all in Department of War studies here about armies there were 70 million people who put on uniforms who are I would say superficially forced migrants, they don't have the choice of where they go and indeed are considered as such in some demographic work the number of soldiers who were killed in the First World War in France for example in the French demographic sources are known as out-vibrants because they never come home again they're under the ground all of that is secondary the primary issue is that there are millions of prisoners of war created 9 million prisoners of war in the period 1918 to 1922 who aren't settled they don't get home they can't get home frequently they can't feed themselves they can't get involved in the fighting the check there are many examples what we've left out in the story so far I think is what I would call demobilization problem which is enormous in demographic in terms of what I'd like to ask you is what do you think that the problem of refugees was harder to solve because the problem of demobilization was happening at the same time but the leaders knew that they had to get those from that uniform so that they could lower the costs of upstate mass which was prickling it it was really prickling at the time I'd be very interesting to hear about how this looks in the from Austrian Empire because it is a very heavy issue population turbulence is not something that we've talked about as a photographic phenomenon within which refugees are far but by no means the only players in this matter there is as well the economic upheavals of war-torn regions in which farmers can't go back to their farms and which farmers are completely disrupted the borders change what do you think is the problem of demographic turbulence and framing the years 1919 to 1922 as a part of the history of refugees Thank you, great question Can I just be slightly picking up on one of your points Jessica about the timeline so again just to reiterate one point if we are to think of the question of population transfers refugees that we'll be talking about and we will construct a bigger picture I made a mistake we always make a question but I would like the speakers to say explicitly how will we account for that moment and what is the game changer you know is it the national organizations is it the up in the level of electrification so you know just to kind of try and see how much we can broaden the picture and create that moment and you know I'd just like to kind of hear the speakers on which place Thank you I think that's quite a lot for you to get stuck into for now hopefully we'll have another round of happy masks for the online questions yet but Emilia do you want to pick up on a couple of these points and questions for you and your views so we can hear you I had a bad rather bad reception I got the one about the Muslims what what do we know about the Muslims that left Greece and then the one about the soldiers unfortunately I didn't get the last one so I'll just respond to these two for the beginning so the question about the Muslims is what I was implying in my closing of the presentation that we have to turn to grassroots narratives and to soft sources you don't actually find much about Turks living Greece in official statements you find though in official sources data that referred to the camps built for Muslim refugees before the left so from the moment they're uprooted to the moment they actually live the country and you find though many data in the oral sources the testimonies from the refugees taken from the center of Asia Minor studies that they actually say that while they were wandering around Greece they were waiting for the Muslims to live in order to go to their houses and stay so you have that the most known case is that of the a Turk the Muslims of Crete and this is narrated in literature very much and novels and that kind of sources now about the questions of population of movements and soldiers and how do they connect with the refugees well I was thinking that well ok we have here the Mithas Kamuzis that has just finished a program about soldiers in the Asia Minor war but just to comment about how they connect with refugees I think that they are two sides of the same coin modernity I mean the first world war is the first one we have so big numbers of compulsory conscriptions and then demobilizing their forces and we have population move because they are perceived as national subjects and for the same reason we have people expelled from the house from their home lands because they are perceived as national subjects of another country so yes I think that the two phenomena soldiers coming back to the home lands in big numbers because they were conscripted in big numbers and the refugees coming to the home lands are forces that created and exploded situations that's why we have associations of veterans in even Greece that it's not so well known there is such a thing as veterans associations so yes I think that both sides of the modernity you almost I didn't get your question about timeline so sorry or even you want to repeat thank you very much Ikelya that's Antonio do you want to come back to those three oh well okay regarding soldiers and prisoners of war and refugees I think I can give just a single answer where because of Nansen who was the commissioner of League of Nations for refugees so he was kind of ancestor to the current UN UN commission for refugees and he was in charge both of exchanging populations also and exchanging prisoners so how did the mobilization connect with population exchange well I am not sure but it's some extent it was part of it I mean or at least the actual work in all the population exchange included the exchange of prisoners of war so I'm not sure that this answer the question but well regarding refugees yes I think it's an important moment also because this bureaucratic structure created by Nansen it's the antecedent to the refugee commission mission of the UN UN nation which is in turn subsequent to the League of Nations refugees commission too and regarding the that's for the mobilization and for refugees and I'm regarding well I would add about refugees that indeed there was a refugee as commission already in the Ottoman empire in the 19th century so I think if we are looking for the historical roots of this of the current refugee protection system a refugee settlement system we can very well go back to this to 1912 to 1922 but also later in the Ottoman empire I mean there are important antecedents at least and these are the main things I think I can contribute but if there are first I hope I answer the question if not please what do you think about the questions about soldiers mobilization in the context of the exchange it was closely connected because they were exchanging prisoner of war together with well regarding demography well of course demography was very important but demography meant to have the right persons in the right places and so well population exchange was exactly aiming to this to have in some actually Greek speaking and Greek Orthodox relations near to the Greece border and not to have Slavic speakers or Muslims so I mean to some extent where the the mobilization is going together with the exchange and the exchange is also very concerned with demographic with demography with demography for sure are there any more questions in the room then with someone please Antonio he stopped the time trainer shop in the 5th century but made me curious how between key element of your argument is how citizenship and property rights were linked but actually if I look at this period this is for me more the period is kind of period when states and society are struggling to redefine that's a new state constitution from the mid 19th 19th century and modern property rights so with the property rights according to the city so for me it's not just a potential argument this is rather a parallel process and society and states are struggling with this kind of challenge how to define how to transition to that kind of modernity of the world and I'm really curious when you think if you collect these two questions whether it's a long period of negotiation whether you can even push the argument to the point that claiming that it's something so close to this it comes about the inheritable termic of the top of the category of regimes because you can put this a long process of negotiation that will investigate this case and sometimes it also could be interesting here that a very closer collection of citizenship I would say that in central european context what happens in the world period is stronger connection and also deconnecting of the perpetorized from citizenship because if you include the social assistance of other elements of the citizenship concept then you will find that many of the restriction goes on ethnic aliens or Jews have the right to to to practically to that's for you, Antonio but we'll share with you now those questions to the audience please please this was a question primarily for Antonio Antonio you wanted to come back to Gabo's suggestion What do you argue with that? Well, OK, so regarding property and citizenship, I see that what's going on after World War I is something as a continuation of what was going on during World War I, when there were a lot of confiscation of goods and so restricting property rights of those who were not nationals of the warring states, but were nationals of the enemy states. So for example, especially German property was very, there were, there was often confiscated. I mean, that there was the hunt for German properties a bit like there is today one for those of Russian oligarchs if you allow me the comparison, which is not, of course, it's not meant to be a scientific one. So my point is that with the agrarian reforms in Central Europe, there are some steps towards linking the citizenship and property rights because they are often, there are some times don't, to the detriment of foreign speaking landowners. For example, in the Baltic states, they basically gave to Baltic peasants what was land over German speaking owners who often emigrated. And this is the more evident in the Greco-Turkish exchange because that's exactly what they do. They confiscate lands to Greek Muslims, though they deprive them of citizenship too because they are deemed exchangeables and they give this property to the incoming refugees. So in this sense, I argue that there is a connection between property rights and citizenship, which is strengthened in this hinge moment as I speak of. So that's basically, I mean, I think it's mostly, that's what I was mostly arguing. Maybe you can turn this also into a question to Emilia. In your understanding or description of this process of nation-building, what role of arguments about defining citizenship? What roles do they play and to what extent are they connected with property rights in your sources? They overlap to some extent, but you can focus on quite a few things. Emilia, please go on if you want. Yes, it sounds as proper motivation. Yeah. Well, I think that is where, if you... What I can add is that after World War I, there is also a push towards creating also not just national states, but also national economies. So the idea was that a state should... Well, I mean, this was already the young... Well, the atheists, because already in 1914, they were arguing, and it's interesting because it's a hybrid ideology with left-wing and right-wing components. I mean, at some point, what the young talks, if we are atheists, they're arguing that you need them usually in bourgeoisie and you need to take the economies out of the non-Muslim hands. So it's already, in my opinion, something that foreshadows, prefigures the connection between citizenship, because you're arguing basically that Muslims are, well, the main core citizenship is that of Ottoman Muslims, and which is the one in whose name and you will establish the Turkish Republic later on, same constituency. And this core citizenship is also the one which is entitled to entirely protected property rights while Christians' property rights are not protected during World War I. They are confiscated. They are dispossessed several times. Thank you. Thank you. You're welcome. To pick up on Jay's point about the prisoners of war, that there's a considerable overlap between the architecture of refugee camps and prisoners of war camps. And actually, Michelle, to some, she's written an article recently about, which tells something, I want you to talk about it, but concentration camps in which she has traced the overlap actually mapped the overlap between military encampments and the architecture of refugee concept across the outside of the country. So it's a critical question of whether that one is spatial. That's it. That's it. That's it. That's it. That's it. That's it. That's it. That's it. So I think it's really useful work for the refugees to be in the refugee camps. Again, that's it. Thank you. Justin, we want to talk about land reform with the mobilization. There is a first phase of self-service land reform. And turning our grid in the land and nature, it's quite customary in Central Europe to settle on veterans. The Czechoslovak threat is on the north side and the other is that they directed their dozens of veteran supplements from the missionaries. And they even imagined that it would strengthen the military. And several of the land reform taking the great case that I think she was in the, at least at some point, it's out for the young people. The book about that, essentially, the GV settlement of increased becomes a means to resolve a pending question which is the land question increased from a long time. So here we have, if you will, a settler-coronial element. If you think about it imperial, we also have a kind of pending social question or rather within a state that is in the process of integrating in one way or another. So we see, in the great case, we see these both then act back up, if you give us a little bit. So lots to say about, Jay. I have one thought of any transmissible issue with that project. I'm not sure that the term hinge moment in Antonio's paper is established. I know it's very interesting. And I think I'd like to know more. From what I've heard yesterday today, my sense, and I'd be interested to know other people, I think, is that the period 1922 is an almost unstoppable extension of the First World War. So it is a continuation of the viciousness of what George Mossy called the civilization of war. And without the state authority to control some of the criminality and viciousness that goes along with it. The hinge moment, if I'm right, is before 1919. Now, of course, the Greek presence in Turkey or in Anatolia is legitimated by the three of the four. So it's a special case of what I would call an imperial special military operation as Putin calls it for the purposes of protecting Greek people of Greek origin and Orthodox religion in a defeated power. So what I feel so far and this is important for the book as a whole, but out of this is that there's enormous momentum of prior violence, which is the core of our discussion as something really unusual. I don't know if the brothers agree with me, but I think this is a very important choice that editors have to make in terms of the theme or themes, plural themes of publication of economics. No, indeed. And this was precisely what I was trying to get at, the timeline question kind of where in the long narrative is the 1922? May I ask you, Jessica, on that point? That it's more of a legacy of the war rather than something that this is not, I'm the outside this is not my real right, but I think this is certainly my understanding of the interwar period, so that is a more persuasive way of doing it, but you know, all these local case studies it's interesting if they're pushing against that and that you can mobilize that tension for the book and say to what he said, you can come up with a plan that fits, or everyone, or whether there's actually there are multiple timelines running amongst each other, so the idea of tracing certain connections from the late Ottomans, this is certainly a place of hope overall in some cases, but I think as far as kind of century European violence is concerned, I think this is about never ending the first one. I see the ghost of Oslo. Is the Russian revolution what makes the difference? Is it the elephant in the room or a sickle of the world? We haven't talked about the Iraqi community how this is for isn't it? Do you justify and keep the term hinge moments in your title of view or paper? So indeed, thank you to the speakers actually for triggering this minor discussion, but I want to give the last word, first of all, Paul Iwile, have you heard any of our questions or propositions? I think we want to continue this. Antonio, I hope you have been able to follow and you have very specific questions to us, which is do you think the hinge moment and where you placed it is justified? Well, I think it's a hinge moment in terms of the history of forced migrations. I'm not claiming it's a hinge moment more generally. I think that in terms of the history of forced migration it's a hinge, or maybe hinge is not the most correct word, so I want to rethink this choice of words in the sense that up until 1922 up until the Greco-Tax exchange this history of violence and forced migration is mostly a history of the post-Ottoman Europe. Then of course during World War I you have it also outside the post-Ottoman lands. My sense is that it's a hinge in the sense that this model for conflict resolution through forced migrations of the Greco-Tax exchange is then imported back to Central Europe in the following decades. In this sense it's the hinge moment. It's a hinge moment in the context of the wider chronology which starts with the Crimean war in 1853 and goes on up until Stalin's death in 1953. In this sense I consider it a hinge moment a, well, that's maybe not a hinge but maybe hinge is not the right word. I have, I want to think the choice of word but my argument is that there is something it's just the code of something which had started decades ago but only in Anatolian Balkans and the precedent for something which is even larger but will not longer so much involve Anatolia at least in the 1930s and 40s and which instead will especially involve Central Europe and Eastern Europe. Thank you Thank you very much, Antonio and thank you Emilia for these talk provoking papers and the discussion no doubt was to be continued at some point but thank you very much. Good afternoon Hi, good afternoon Feyz-Hallen-Remzi good afternoon. Can you, sorry I thought I was amused by the music myself. Can you hear me now? Yes, very well. Is the sound good? It is. I messed up. I switched off my sound while I was boiling a cup of coffees. How about mine? Do you hear me well? Yes, that's perfect. Thanks. And I usually don't do the PowerPoint presentation through Zoom. Normally I don't like it. Can I just do a quick check if you will whether it works the way which it's supposed to? Sure, yeah, absolutely. I think we're facilitated for screen sharing. Okay, so I do this? Yeah. What do we see? I wonder, now I lost the, what is being seen actually by the colleagues and the panelists? I can see the first slides. Do you want to scroll through? I'll let you know. Second slides. Oh, okay. Yeah, so it seems to be. This one, the maps, the table, okay. Yeah. Okay. I think if I go full screen, I won't be able to read my paper or, you know, my notes. It's very clear as it is, Paiso. Okay, sorry for this, you know, let's say rather a little bit unsavory, you know, like this instead of the full screen, but great. I hear a live stream is still running. So are the people are looking under the bonnet and able to see the organization, the conference. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Great. Okay, well, it's just turned 3pm here in Dublin, same time as Greenwich meantime. So welcome back to the seventh panel. My name is William Mulligan. I'm an historian at University College Dublin, and it's a pleasure to introduce our two speakers today. Paiso Shimsek, who is based at McGill University, and he'll give the first paper on arms, sons and men, Turkish mobilization for war 1919 to 1922. And then the second paper is given by Ramsey Chattay Charkelar from Leiden University and from the Ecole d'etude in Paris. And he will talk about the anchor of Paris must go access strategic prospects and cooperation in the liminal phase of the post great war. So without any further ado, I'll pass the metaphorical floor to Paiso. Thank you. And thank you, William. And thank you. I just want to thank the organizers for this wonderful conference. Actually, I also know, as we all became the veterans, so to speak, of this, you know, zoom things. It's such a feat actually to run, you know, multi participants event like this. So my appreciation to them. So arms funds and men Turkish mobilization for war 1919 to 1922. Yorgo asked us to, you know, basically not to read the papers again but you know give like a summary of what we have to say. What I tried to do also, you know, while preparing for this short talk of 15 minutes right was that, you know, re altering my notes so that I can address to some of the points raised yesterday, which was a terrific day. So, I won't be I think I won't be having too much time to talk about the funds part, and maybe the arms, except maybe for the technological aspects of the war a little bit. So, you know, my talk now will be more about men, and a little bit about the ideology and that's that I mean more ideology that is that push the Turkish side, or, you know, how the Turkish men were pushed I mean with whatever they were forced given to them today so just go back to all right. It is hard, hard to fully characterize the nature of violence in Asia Minor during these years solely as a conventional war between two nation states standing armies. It varied in scope and scale, depending on geography and time involving a myriad of local and foreign participants. The constant fighting between the regular as well as irregular forces, active clashes and alliances between ideologies, military and financial intervention of the outside powers. The mutual and intra communal fighting between various ethnic and religious groups, continuous unrest and maltreatment of civilians make the era between 1919 and 1922 resemble what I think actually as Russian Civil War in many ways. The altered nature of all these events, during which violence and warfare were constants and created the Turkish public, Turkish public, and fundamentally altered the borders and face of people's living in those borders across the Balkans and Middle East so just to illustrate, you know, this point I mean, these are the major and minor actually rebellions against the Ankara government all perpetuated by essentially Muslims, not Greeks, not Armenians and so on. So, from the spring of 1920 onwards, the newly formed Ankara government under Mustafa Kemal's leadership fought against internal rebellions staged by Antonio Muslim populations, as well as regular forces fielded by Christian nations. In Western Anatolia, the Greek army which aimed to unify the ethnic Greeks living in the Asia Minor and trace under one nation state, initially fought against irregular bands and under strength divisions and inherited from the Ottoman army in 1919 and 1920. However, in 1921 and 22 it faced a mass conscript army, officer by it I mean the Greeks face the mass conscript army, officer by battle hardened survivors of the First World War, which used wireless radios and aeroplanes purchased from Europe. Anatolian populace, which had already suffered severely during the First World War, heavily taxed and conscripted to raise and then maintain this force. The numbers are shaky, but probably about 120th of the Muslim population, living in east of Sakarya River, Sangarias, was pressed into the army, which was predominantly composed of ethnic Turks, but had significant Kurdish, Circassian, Albanian, Bosnian, consultation with the Bosnian, Lazian, Arab elements. On this note, I don't know exactly and it's hard to detect for the you know, common soldiers, but in the battle fields of Western Anatolia, we see for instance tens of, well I mean black officers coming from Benghazi and provinces of the former Ottoman Empire fighting under the Turkish banner against the Greek army. Many of these also stayed afterwards actually, continued to serve in the New Republic's officer corps. Just to illustrate the let's say the messy nature of the war here and also very interesting. So even though the Turkish Nationalist historiography overlooked the subject, desertion from the Ankara government's army was rampant and one of the main tasks of the infamous independence tribunals, Istiklal mahkemeleri, was to catch and punish deserters and draft the raiders so that they could be sent back to the war. One comprehensive work actually estimate that at least 100,000 men, which was about one third of the whole Turkish army in August 1922, deserted at some point in these three years. The Greek army itself conscripted about 60,000 men from the Greek communities from Asia Minor and Thrace, which have been under the Ottoman rule until very recently. This figure amounted to almost one in every four troops in the Greek army's ranks. And I'm not talking about the Hellenic army in Asia Minor, but the whole Greek army, there were also garrison troops in the mainland Greece. So this whole picture in a way, everything combined, you know, whatever I said, turns Turkish-Greek war into some sort of civil war of Anatolian peoples perhaps. And I don't know whether if we have the time, the term civil war came out a couple of times yesterday. I would love to probe the term and, you know, maybe discuss the usefulness or unusefulness of the term in describing the events of 1919-1922 in Anatolia and Thrace. So, furthermore, when these individuals, you know, the Greeks from Thrace and Anatolia who were conscripted, were, if they were captured in battle, the sad Turkish tribunals, the independence tribunals, treated them as traitors and not foreign POWs. And in some cases, outright executed them. So it's not uncommon that many Anatolian Greeks and Thrace and Greeks, I assume, were issued with Greek passports just to give them some sense of assurance in case, I mean, for the possibility that they were captured by the Turkish enemy. So I guess after this quick and very broad picture, I just want to talk about, as I said, I guess the time will permit that mainly, the mobilization, the manpower mobilization of the Ankara government's army. In order to talk about that, of course, we have to talk about the Ottoman mobilization in the First World War. So this is a table that I came up with by crunching whatever available and most up-to-date material. So out of a population of 20 to 23 million in the Ottoman state mobilized close to and probably more than 3 million men during the First World War. Okay, why is this important? Well, many became casualties. And this left actually with a very, very shrunk manpower pool for whatever the Ankara government leadership wants to implement in the military sphere. And there's also another very important aspect of this whole manpower mobilization thing. It's the demobilization after 1918, which was dictated by the treaty. So what we end up is, and I'm giving you the rough numbers, there were about three million men mobilized. We still have actually more comprehensive works to understand what happened in terms of mobilization, the First World War in the Ottoman Empire. So out of these three million men, we only have about like 400,000 remaining under arms by 1918, October. And then there was a huge demobilization actually, which I think deserves a song story from October to all the way to May 1919. And there were about like 50, 60, 50,000 men remaining under arms. So this is the army actually, also the Mudros Treaty sort of stipulated. And this is how I think the mobilization links with the war making of the Ankara government. So from the very beginning, I talked a little bit about this yesterday and the question has appeared, so I don't want to repeat myself, but from the very beginning, the Ottoman leadership is very, very suspicious, but leadership, I mean, the many army commanders on the field, such as Mustafa Kemal Ali, about the treatise, the, the, the displations of the Mudros Treaty, especially the Seventh Article, you know, which gave the right, the right to the allies to occupy anywhere they see of, you know, strategic importance and the threat to them. So from the very beginning, actually, the Ottoman leadership stalled the mobilization, demobilization. So how did they do this? They discharged the older men, they kept the younger men. Sometimes they sent back men to their villages with their rifles, actually. They also wanted to keep the whole structure of the units, so that, I mean, even though the numbers were shrinking, so that when the mobilization comes in later on, and this probably wasn't their mind and which happened in the Greek-Turkish war, so that they can flesh out, you know, full divisions or more, let's say stronger divisions from the skeletal formations. So as I mentioned, okay, so was it all about, you know, mobilizing men? There's also the aspect of, of course, how people responded to this. So we, even though the Turkish nationalist, nationalist historiography is silent about this, we know, we know that many, many thousands of Turkish men actually deserted from war. So to put them in, in the ranks, the independence tribunals were used, actually. And when we look at the, at the local level, we end up with very interesting, I would say, not only political and military, but also social and cultural history of the era, actually. So, and how these men were called, again, I tried to explain it a little bit in the paper, but under the ideology subtitle, well, religion was one of the main things, and this is for the rank and file. For officers, religion is still there. Of course, it's the Muslim army, predominantly, but also the sense of the ideals of nationalism and defending the fatherland was there. I think I don't have too much time left, right? I have about like a couple of minutes, one minute, two minutes. Okay, so, but at the end, with policies of carrot and stick, the leadership from Ankara maintained a very large army after the devastating losses of the First World War. So that's a fact, but maybe what we don't know is the suffering or the wheezes of the conscripts. We hear officers here and there. Well, one main reason is that Ottoman conscripts and Turkish as well are, we're mostly illiterate. So that's one thing, being one problem with the sources, but we have a lot of memoirs from lower ranking and higher ranking officers. So there's that. Just maybe one or two words about the arms and the funds. Ankara governments used direct taxation in its war, actually, unlike the Greek government, which used and had the access to foreign borrowing. Okay, this, of course, put more strain on the probably on the Anatolian population. We still don't know the full story. And the other thing, other important thing is, of course, the Russian gold, which is important as hard cash coming in while Russian is Bolshevik gold, I would say. It came quick. It is hard cash. These are important. Unlike Greece, Anatolian lands probably didn't see much inflation actually partly, you know, thanks to this gold. But when we combine the whole expenditure of the Ankara government, which is, again, really hard and unwieldy, Russian gold amounts to about nine, 10% of the whole expenditure of the Ankara government during this time. And finally, about the arms. Well, I mean, I'm happy to answer questions about, you know, more conventional, well, I guess, planes and signal cord are also conventional warfare. But let's say the more traditional inventory of the Ankara government such as rifles, guns and machine guns, etc. I can talk about it and the question and answer if there are any questions. But basically, Ankara government pillaged or well retook, recaptured the Ottoman stockpile from the Great War, which had been kept under custody by the victorious allies. But what is also interesting during the war, I mean, Greek-Turkish war is that Ankara government made conscious efforts, especially towards the end of the war, by obtaining airplanes, like machine guns, like Chauchat, French Chauchat, trained, I mean, and also spent a lot of attention, as it seems, on the signal core using wireless radios. And we see the impact of these weapons. And in a way, like a kind of primitive combined arms doctrine, if you will, they employed, especially in the August of 1922, which also included stormtrooper tactics, actually, some of the units were trained and stormtrooper tactics that we know from the First World War. So which, in many ways, I think, affected, I mean, there are no war-winning weapons, I guess, but, you know, this approach and this new inventory helped the Ankara government, Mustafa Kemal, to win the war. So I stopped there. I hope I didn't go over my... It's perfect. Thanks very much, Faisal. You timed it just perfectly. We'll pass the microphone over to Remzi. Thanks. Thanks, Faisal. Remzi, you're on mute at the moment. Yeah. Well, thank you very much for giving this opportunity. And I'm sorry that I'm not there with you. Can you still hear me? Yes. Okay. Because I have a 10-year-old computer that's kind of struggling, but I will get there. Okay. Do you see the PowerPoint? No. So just it's beginning to come up now. Yeah, we've... Oh, thanks. Okay, great. And great to see Faisal after three years after the corona pandemic. So in this paper, I will present a short-lived and mostly forgotten triangular strategic solidarity that started to emerge in 1922 onwards. So wait for it to grow until 1922, and I will take from there onwards against the British imperialism in the Middle Eastern Europe. As often stated, the final years of the Great War in 1917 and 18 brought lifetime of large continental empires to an end in Europe. Romanos in Russia, Hohenzollern in Germany, Austria, Habsburg in Austria and Hungary were joined into oblivion by the Ottoman counterparts in 1930 and 1922. This watershed also resulted with the emergence of new regimes within the international system of nation-state on the lands of former empires, although in Russia by a union of theoretically independent nation-states the Soviet Union. Among the defeated Romanos and Ottoman empires, Bolsheviks and Kemalists replaced the old political order respectively after a series of conflict with allied powers, their proxies, and the counter-revolutionaries within. Although there had been certain tension between Moscow and Ankara as the Bolsheviks aimed to expand their ideological sphere of influence to Anatolia while the Kemalists aspired to receive Soviet financial and material support without exposing Bolshevik ideas, Moscow and Ankara lines were quite efficient. Nevertheless, towards the end of the national struggle movement, we see other actors joining to this anti-British camp. One of the less known actors that I want to bring into life is the Radical Party in French Partie d'Edicale or officially the Republican Radical and Socialist Radical Party in France, leading center-left political party. So, one second. Founded in 1901, to unite all sides of the French Revolution under a single coup de roux against the counter-revolution at the heydays of the rising coups that maintained Catholicism and Draper's affair, the Radical Party was the champion of the late anti-Clerical Radical Republican, pacifist, and secular soldiers' ideas in the Third Republic. The party claimed to be the genuine heir to revolution in France and pioneering the separation of church and state in 1905 and espousing the ideas of French socialism of 1848 as opposed to Marxist socialism. In 1919, we see a young and energetic leader taking the charge of Radical Party, Édouard Erio, who has the simultaneous titles of Mayor of Lyon, Senator of Rome, and the former Ministry of Public Works, now was elected to Radical Party leadership. But we see that the first task of Édouard was to organize the party and invigorate it in the face of rising French politics. So, although the Radical Party claimed the heritage of Patriotic tradition of the 1789 and 1792, this Patriotism was more of a civic one, putting great emphasis on large disarmament in France and Europe, international arbitration solidarity between the nations under an international organization which now found its embodiment in the League of Nations. In fact, Radical Party's founder, Leon Bourgeois himself was elected to the presidency of the League of Nations, SMV 1920, the one who we see in the picture. However, at the heydays of post-1918 nationalism and cries of revenge from Germany, such patriotism was not the most appealing one in France, as you may judge. So, at the result series of center-right coalitions called Blogue Nationale came to power in 1919, led by Clamenceau and later by Raymond Poincaré, until June 1924. So, in post-war years, we see that Radical Party announced its willingness to substantially modify, even if not necessarily, to reverse European and Middle Eastern policy of the previous governments of Clamenceau and Poincaré. Jacques Caïsar, lawyer and future vice president of the Radical Party, and also the nephew of famous al-Faith Gréput, accused Clamenceau in 1922 for being concessionist and obedient to the demands of Britain. According to Caïsar, Britain threatened France to leave her alone in the face of Germany during the peace negotiations in Paris, so the former could take quote-unquote lion's share in the Middle East. Caïsar claimed that Britain who occupied Constantinople in 1920 not only secured the roots to Egypt and India, but also became the sole ruler of Mediterranean, Aegean, Marmar, Aglesi, Caspian, Red Sea and Indian Ocean, while holding Jerusalem, Cairo back then in Istanbul, thus becoming the master of Zionism, Calabate and Eastern Catholicism at the same time, not to mention the oil, of course. Therefore, Caïsar proposed that France that lost its way on the tracks of Anglo-Saxon imperialism in 1914-1918 should return to the Amicron relations with the Muslim world. Caïsar also said that Bolsheviks in Russia and the Turkish nationals in Anatolia are the two most efficient movements against the British imperialism in the world. Anyways, besides, there were two possible calls of anchors future policy that is aligned with Russians, the Soviet Union and the agreement with France. Meanwhile, another radical, Henri Franklin Bouillon, visited Turkey in October 1922, drinking Modania armistice after the Kemalist victory over the Greek army. So we see Mustafa Kemal and Bouillon here. It's almost three weeks after a Turkish retake of Izmir. In the following 19th radical party congress, annual congress in Marseille, the month after his visit, Bouillon declared, look now at the Orient. Two years ago, the great powers had agreed to raise Turkey from the map of Europe. A man stood up alone to appeal. A man as has not appeared greater by the energy and the character since our revolution, without money, without support, without anything other than his faith in the destinies of his race, both in Turkey by all the traditional forces. Mustafa Kemal tried and realized the impossible. In three years of effort, he has organized the parliament and administration and army, delivered 10 battles and crashed the Greeks back by England. In short, by his action alone, he recreated the nation of 5 million men and became the moral leader of 200 million Muslims. That's what a man does when he wants. So, meanwhile, we have Erio, also in October 1922, visited Moscow, yielding fruitful results. Erio, after his visit, the Soviet leaders announced that radical party wants, radical party comes to power, and we recognize and start the official relations with the Soviet Union. Erio and Soviet leaders confirmed that French and Russian interests were identical, as both were against the British policy in the Near East and in Turkey. Attribute between Ankara and Paris, Moscow was on formation, for short. So, just like Bouillon's mention of the 30th week tree, Erio repeated the importance of the Soviet alliance in the radical party annual congress, so it takes the floor after Bouillon. So, an official relation with the Soviets was a necessity, as Soviets could become prey of German propaganda if they were to be neglected. Erio mocked the policy of indifference for being way too intelligent towards Soviets that was led by Clemenceau. His proposal instead was that France accept the fact and recognition and official relations, start of the official relations with the Soviet Union. Erio also repeated that French-Soviet collaboration passes through Turkey. So, in his view, this policy could counterbalance Germany and Britain in Europe and in the Middle East respectively. In Turkey, meanwhile, Muldanya armistice in 1922 opened the way to long-feet negotiations, culminating in the Treaty of Lausanne. Having abolished the sultanate in November 1922, Grand National Assembly of Turkey finally proclaimed the republic in Turkey, two months after the Lausanne. On top of that, the young republic in March 1924 abolished the caliphate, hence removing very symbolic remnants of the old regime. Thus, Turkey specified its intention to secularize itself. So, we see that anti-clerical, laïk and republican radical party wholeheartedly welcomed the development in Turkey. Erio called Turkish republicans, the brave republicans, who exiled Clemence following the example of old French and recent Soviet revolutions, moreover professing his will to collaborate with Turkey that was the moral child of French republics. And announcing that once the radical party comes to power, it will strengthen the bond with, quote-unquote, young Turks of Ankara. May 1924, elections in France made a dream come true. When the left cartel that was composed of radical party, SFIO, French section of the Socialist International and Socialist republicans defeated Poincaré and its bloc nationale. So, we see Erio becoming the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in the new French cabinet. So, left cartel government immediately declared to abandon predecessors foreign policy, which was largely based on rigid enforcement of the post-war peace treaties, first being the Versailles Treaty. Thus, a new politics started to dominate French diplomacy, rather than build bilateral agreements, traditional alliances, and armaments. New French government was committed to pursue foreign policy based on legal nations, international arbitration, international and collective security, control, and large disarmament in Europe. In brief, Erio's foreign policy was a policy of reconciliation between the old enemies. On June 17th, Erio announced new government's program. First, the new government came to solve issues standing between France and Germany, since the French and Belgian troops occupied the industrial rule area in January 1923, after Germany declared that she cannot pay the war operations. The second priority of Erio government was to establish the official relation with the Soviet Union. In Turkey, left cartel had been welcomed wholeheartedly. Press immediately uploaded the beginning of a new era in French-Turkish relations, claiming that contrary to Poincaré, Erio was free from bigotry and came to collaborate with Turkey because he understood the French interests better. For the Turkish press, French parliament was going to soon ratify the Lausanne Treaty, which was shelved almost for a year by Poincaré for various pretexts. More spectacular was that Turkish press, or more importantly, was that Turkish press would openly talk about Paris-Moscow and Paris-Anchor alliances that would complete Moscow and Anchor alliance, paving the way to a triangle of alliance in the region. So famous Turkish journalist Ahmet Emin, later Yalman, would write that, once the French and Russian friendships were opposite poles to one another, becoming friend with France used to mean becoming foe with Russia. Today, the situation has tremendously changed. Soon the French government will recognize Russia. The concept of French and Russian alliances with Turkey will complete one another. Such alliance would be more fruitful than meeting with London on Germany and rule question. The correspondence between Soviet leaders and Erio that started in July 1924, yielded the official recognition of the Soviet Union on the land of former Russian Empire. In August, we see at the end of two days meeting, French parliament ratified the treaty that overhandling majority led by radicals against the opposition. In a long and impassioned speech, Erio said, It is not only for France to encourage a republic which, by some of its institutions and tendencies, resembled ours. This new republic, which tends to be instituted after so many convulsions, difficulties and numerous efforts, this republic is the spiritual daughter of ours. If the Turks arrive among the complicated circumstances and instill obscure conditions that we will have to clarify and specify, constitute the new regime, is because the greater part of the man, more over-remarkable, who were at the head of this movement, were trained to the French influence to the School of French Politics. Perhaps even terrible events like Turkey's entry into the war among our enemies in 1914 would have been avoided if, two years earlier, when Turkey made efforts towards its independence, it had received support that at the moment this is either one to give to him. The treaty that the parliament is going to rectify marks not only the end of the number of difficulties, but also an end of a very long evolution which, in the course of the 19th century, led the Turks towards independence. If I say that, it is because in the same way that France is going to be happy to help Turkey confirm its new regime, she hopes that despite the difficulties and complications I've just mentioned, the Turkish statesmen will not forget what they call the France, who is the spiritual mother of the regime they just used to be. Four days after this speech, Ariel appointed Louis Mujan as the French representative in Ankara. Mujan was a self-appointed friccafile who already worked in Turkey between 1919 and 1924, first in Istanbul then in Ankara. During his mission, Mujan developed personal and amic relations with the Republic's leadership of Turkey, including Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Mujan was critical to Ankara's policy and defended the immediate ratification of Lausanne Treaty in the French parliament and even the recognition of National Pact with Takimi Li. In his logic, such action would grant Ankara's friendship to France as blockading the expansion of British imperialism and bullshit spread of bullshit within the region. However, his open criticism to Ankara in Turkish newspapers meant the end of his office, so he was invited to Paris. But after the change of cabinet, so we see that with a stronger government behind him, he was sent back to Ankara. Mujan would arrive to Turkey in October 1924 and during the peak meetings on Mosul between Britain and Turkey that taken place in the United Nations. In his first interview with the Turkish journalist upon arrival, Mujan would say, if I was third, I would play Mosul. This would lead to a diplomatic crisis, whereas Britain would send a diplomatic note to France, asking his dismissal. Nevertheless, France would continue to keep him in Ankara. As you may guess, the Aryan Radical Party became the new accessory of press in Turkey. Supinuri, a journalist from Sontagreb and a brother of a deputy in the People's Party, wrote that the relations with Soviets were always dead of allies. As for France, Ankara government was trying to corner Turkey in order to stay on the inside of Britain. However, the election of radicals changed the situation. France and Turkey became friends, Britain on the other side was insisting to be an enemy, first and foremost, in the middle of the mission. Remzi, would you mind wrapping up? Thank you. Yeah, so we see later that Petty Bey, who is the personal friend of Kerio since the Yanktuk period, is appointed as the new Prime Minister. And yeah, so when the government collapsed, and there was also, which I will maybe mention later, there's the Minister of Foreign Affairs report on a triangular strategic solidarity in the region between France and Soviet Union and Turkey. Thank you, and sorry for long phone. Okay, floor is yours. Many thanks, Remzi. Many thanks, Faisal. They're terrific papers. And on behalf of the audience, I'll say thank you very much. And yeah, I'll just say, I thank both speakers. Remzi, I think your paper, the way it unpicked the domestic political debate in France, was fascinating. Obviously, figures like Poincaré and Clemel, so loom so large over the foreign policy of this period. And yet, Kerio and other figures like Leon Bourgeois play a critical role in the internal debate. And it's one of the things that you show is its external effects. And Faisal, I was fascinated in the ways that your paper showed how a state could remake itself out of the shatter zones of empire. It's, you know, a lot of the historiography about the Ottoman Empire has shown what a resilient, powerful actor it remained, sometimes brutally and murderously a powerful actor it remained during the First World War. But in the context of the shattering of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, and your paper depicts very clearly the way in which demobilization stripped the new Turkish state of its military forces, then your paper begins to sketch out, resolve this puzzle of how a Turkish national state could re-emerge. So what I wanted to do very briefly was raise a few issues about how international politics worked in this period, because I think your papers raised questions for me and three areas, really. One is the logics of international order after the First World War and in the early 1920s. So what were the rules of the game? Are there any rules of the game? A second issue that I wanted to raise is about hierarchies and identities in the international order as it emerges from the First World War. And the third issue is power relations, how power relations were both conceptualized and how they operated during this period. So the first question is really about rules of the game and Renzi, it's perhaps primarily for you because a proclaimed aim of leaders such as Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference is to move away from a world of power politics, to move towards a away from an anarchical international system, towards an international order in which international politics will be determined by rules, institutions, and norms. Sorry, Antonio, could you mute yourself please? So in that context, and perhaps here I'm influenced by Peter Jackson's work on French foreign policy after the First World War, he shows the figures like Leon Bourgeois, like Eduardo Heriot, play an important role in rethinking not just French political interests, but almost conceptualizing how security could be achieved and arguing that security could be best achieved through international norms and institutions and that the election of Heriot, as you point out in 1924, marks an important staging post away from the logic of power politics towards multilateral relations epitomized in Western Europe by Lucarno. So what I was struck about in reading your paper was the persistent way in which figures like Erio and Jacques Kaiser and others articulated what struck me as a kind of a classic balance of power politics that France continues to operate in a world that is shaped by the logic of balance of power that Britain's gain in the Middle East is a blow not just for France's position in the Middle East, but also for France's position vis-à-vis Germany because as Britain becomes more and more powerful then it has less and less need of French solidarity and so what France is trying to do with this as uniquely described triangular strategic solidarity is to weaken Britain or to challenge Britain in the Middle East in order perhaps to bring Britain back into play in Western Europe. So I'm wondering there whether a reading of Erio's and radical party politics that centres on Western Europe kind of overstates perhaps the value of norms and institutions and underestimates the persistence of balance of power thinking in French foreign policy after in the 1920s and Faisal I think that's something that your paper also speaks to is the persistence of balance of power thinking obviously in terms of Turkish nationalist politics since that was one issue. Second issue that I wanted to raise was about hierarchies and identities and how the international order is conceived and here I was thinking of Len Smith's work about sovereignty at the Versailles peace settlement and the way in which he argued that the ability for the great powers, the Council of Four in Paris in 1919 to constitute order, to constitute states became an important part of constructing order and created hierarchies in order and here I was very struck Ramsey in your paper did the quotes from Erio about the new Turkish state as being the spiritual daughter and the moral child of the French republican and French revolution yeah French revolutionary republicanism. I have a very particular question about this actually that really comes from a PhD student here at UCD Florence Prevo Gregoire and she works in French internationalism and one of the things she's very interested in I should say is the use of family metaphors or the metaphor of the family by French internationalists and she sees or part of her argument is that the employment of the family metaphor is a way for internationalists, French internationalists to simultaneously describe affinities and affections with other societies but also to portray hierarchies within that effective relationship so France can portray itself as being a more senior figure to its Italian little sister or its Latin little sister are in this case the Turkish the moral child so I was interested in that part of it and then secondly in the end of your paper you also mentioned the Turkish response to this you mentioned Fethi Bey the prime minister and so it was what kind of languages did Turkish politicians use to play with these family metaphors to play with this language did they exploit that to build languages of affinity that could allow them to assert a Turkish membership of this new international order and perhaps push back against much more exclusionary language employed by British Liberals obviously George senior amongst them so are these and I think this is something that will come up in George's paper about language you know the employment of language as a strategy and identities and what affects the employment of that language and the availability of language has on shaping outcomes or a counterpoint perhaps to go back to Fazel's paper is that is that at the end of the day a power matters a military a force matters and that it's victories on battlefields that allow the Turkish Republic to enter the international community in various peace treaties in the mid 1920s and that perhaps in that sense then the identities and these hierarchies might be less important than what actually happens on the with material power and then the final issue that I wanted to raise centers on power and how power itself operates in international politics after the First World War particularly in this period of the reconstitution of international order in the 1920s you know one level I Fazel I think you make a very strong case through the persistent importance of military force in shaping power politics that despite the claims of Wilson and others at Versailles power politics remained red and tooth and claw but I also think one of the things your paper showed was the importance of economic interdependence and here a slight puzzle for me was that Turkey was able or Turkish nationalists were able to use these interdependent relationships so to get money from Soviet Russia to have French armaments indeed French factories I think you pointed out were set up in Anatolia and that this these this economic interdependent relations was an important source of power for the nascent Turkish Republic and so I was interested in in that and then to go back to Remzi's paper Remzi you just have a a line or two in it at the end where you pointed out how the devaluation of the Frank leads to the collapse of the aerial government that reminded me of kind of Adam twos this point about how American but you could make the same point about British dominance and centrality in post-war economic and financial relationships was an important source of power so because they could exploit that to achieve goals without having to employ military force overtly so I was just curious about how you both thought Turkish that Turkish nationalists and the radical party in France negotiated the complexities of an interdependent power system in the 1920s so thanks again for the papers I don't know if you want to respond to those questions now or if you want to take some more I can answer go so yeah there are hierarchies and yeah there is something about this infant idolizing attitude about like the small child spiritual daughter and that's not only towards actually the Turkey but also for instance when the radical party compares like the Soviet revolution because they are the pacifists yet they accept that the the Bolshevik revolution was bloody and they say well it's bloody because it's a delayed revolution it happened a hundred years after it was supposed to so a hundred years after the French revolution and the same a similar sort of infant idolizing I can say attitude towards Turkey is present so in terms of power relations I think Turkish Republicans at the time tries to exploit the situation as much as possible but also bringing trying to bring that the France and Turkey or Ankara government is the same level so one side in terms of international politics they might be benefiting from this sympathy but also trying to for instance when it comes to the situation of the Catholic or French schools in Turkey for instance the Republicans say well how can we tolerate the to keeping the crucifixes in the classrooms while we ourselves are trying to secularize our education so always trying to rule the game that was actually brought by this French license back against to the France so but it goes back to actually pre pre-war years when the young Turks were in Paris too they say that this anti-clericalism is not for expert it's not the the proper anti-clerical politics it has to be exported the other thing that I want to emphasize is the the financial aspect that each you mentioned I think radicals are quite explicit when it comes to the relations with Soviet and the Turkish Republic that they have the economic concerns so they don't hide it they they they are quite vocal about it for instance with the Soviet Union if we cannot start the official relations how are we going to extract the the French debts that were granted to Russia and there are similar concerns with Turkey because it's still the the the largest foreign investor is the poor creditor is still with France and they don't hide it for the the League of Nations and rules of the game I also would like to add that although from an idea point of view they the radicals push forward that Leon Bourgeois was the the first delegate to the 8th conference in 1899 and since then he was building an international arbitration policy by 1922 they say that well now the League of Nations exists but only by name for instance the the the the fact that US withdrew from European politics from the the League of Nations is seen as a big gap in this idealized international system I think that also gives why they insist so much to have a quick reconciliation normalization also in Turkey and bringing Turkey as part of like more stabilized Europe one last thing maybe I can say is that when it comes to this you know all these praisings of Mustafa Kemal or other leaders in 1922 it again falls back to this attitude well do we have to look back to these figures because we have the French revolution we have all the sources of inspiration from that last source so yeah there's some sort of hierarchy that's quite clear so yeah thanks very much thanks for the thoughtful response and I turn the floor over to Faisal thank you very much for this great point actually that you raised so I'll I guess try to address to the point you raised about the the importance of military power power itself I mean it's sort of a tragedy I guess and really really really old school sort of approach to history perhaps you know like the primacy of war in deciding the you know fates of millions like I don't want to echo with that sort of classic kind of passe attitude but I mean as things show and perhaps we have to get back to the minds of the Turkish leadership during this time and the Turkish leadership were just exclusively army officers veterans combat officers who essentially created this movement in Ankara and they were the survivors of not only the first world war but even the wars before that so there's that human element let's say I don't want to paint them as like really like monolithic in this in in in terms of their attitude to nationalism or you know what the new Turkish state will be or you know in their own lives I mean we look closer to them there's really some some really interesting individuals Faiz Chakmuk is actually for instance the chief of one of the chief well eventually the chief of staff of the army here is a what we can call as some sort of military intellectual for instance Mustafa Kemal is a different kind of man the reason I'm bringing this up is this I guess so in 1918 we have this incredibly ravaged empire with depleted ranks and all and in the minds of a maybe the most important of all in the sense in the minds of these army commanders on the field like there's an armistice which is signed it's very ambiguous and things that followed kind of kind of affirmed their suspicions about the fairness of the British this is something Ralph Bay actually mentions when he signs Moudros III in October 1918 British will be fair well they may may not have been as such perhaps so you know but at the same time these are very realist brutal realists as in a sense to allude the points that you made they're the sons of enlightenment in many ways actually in terms of mentality you know with their readings sometimes crude readings but the readings of Walter Montesquieu etc so you know they're very rational people and like they are also coming from their practitioners they're coming from the battlefields and battlegrounds so and regarding the sony moment I mean these guys were also in touch with the diplomats and politicians okay we saw this in the communique they have sometimes in personal contact too that you know whatever argument Ottomans use there's an Ottoman Wilsonism as well I mean something rarely at rest perhaps right whatever arguments the Ottomans or eventually Turks I mean it's kind of ambiguous interesting thing going on there too as the Arab provinces are gone this is established they truly on the ground as well as in the minds of the Turkish leadership too okay but what to do with race and Anatolia right so whenever the for instance in Paris talks Ottomans gave memorandum like saying okay here are the population numbers we are majority here and so on okay and they put the blame on the CUP combative you know progress they accept that Armenian massacres happened but it was because the CUP you know don't don't put us in this racial category of well not suited not suited to rule other people or their own people for that matter so we see laser yeah sorry sorry for interrupting and being very rude I'm afraid I've let the time run away from us and so and I'll open it up to the floor there's one question in the chat but might go to the to the room there this school of so school of security studies to take some questions as well so gather a few questions well I haven't quite a few but I don't know if you can hear me but I just begin with a comment on this use of passports but the use of passports being issued to I mean it's kind of connects you don't see territories of this you know ground but territory of the body even it's kind of a fix in of of of what Greek bodies or any Greek bodies for a Greek ancient state but I don't know I apologize I didn't read your paper yet but you you you have this writing phrase civil war of the Anatolian peoples they elaborate on that a bit it's interesting particularly that map where you're showing the rebellions against the emerging new regime and I'm just curious what's motivating the Muslim populations that are opposing the emergence of the republics the the other I mean I've got other questions about but I think they were ultimately revolved around when we're talking about the military mobilization what kind of war are they kind of is it a long war a short war or is it a short war because they have no choice is it that kind of long war because there's sensitive to problems sustaining of a manpower mobilization and I guess this connects with the final issue of economic mobilization you mentioned that there are sources of weapons and finance abroad but to what extent do they appreciate do they mean a domestic arms industry to sustain a war thanks very much and I see a hand up from Michelle to son she'll do you want to come in sure excuse me good morning and thank you for these great papers I have a question for Visel very specific one that term of madros always always it's striking we have the right to occupy wherever we want right and I always wondered where the resistance to it came from so on the British side you see well they're not demobilizing why won't they demobilize why is the pace so slow and call for those and tries to find out you know what's what's the deal right and it keeps going from nineteen nineteen to twenty two and you suggested that this was a self-conscious this was a policy of sort of stalling the demobilization because there was one theory that well it's just logistically difficult right after war demobilizing all of these men but you said there was a strategy and my question is where does that come from is it is it the nationalist and anchor or is it the Ottoman government in Constantinople under the occupation so who who is who's stalling out the demobilization and and resisting madros in nineteen eighteen nineteen and there's one question on the chat from alexander's macros which asks whether chemist army established veterans associations and if so whether those veterans associations played a significant role in the construction of war memory in the Turkish republic and back to the back to the room uh in security studies are there any other questions that you want to add in at this point thank you william so very welcome apologies for uh i want to do two things here the first is to see for the purpose of the discussion of the gozhan moment uh whether remse you might go back because your paper is not about gozhan it's about after this the gozhan period is poincare and everything the opposite of what you say no very socialist international tradition is poincare and tough nails and it's a it's a story of restoring french business uh in anatolia and nothing to do with the revolutionary tradition poincare is the last person i would put in the revolutionary tradition uh and in fact the critical issue um in in this matter um is that um immediately after the uh breakdown of conversation we'll talk about this very briefly uh most of the kamal is in uh his mirror to show that he's not involved today that he's going to run a very good capitalist economy and the french latinians and everybody else who wants to be there so i'd like to ask you again for the purpose maybe of coordinating with all of the papers in this uh in this conference uh to move back before your aerial radical republicans get there and to talk about whether this argument actually stands when when the other side is in office and then the second point on arms isn't isn't it simply that the the reason why was the kamal won is because his men were defending their land it was a defensive war it was it was a war for the homeland and and indeed it was a near miss in the the levels of inflation hunger serious archer among the messy population it was a not a not an easy matter for the for the turkish side to win and and victory i would i would say wasn't overwhelming until rik's made it made a total mess of their own economic and financial support for the for for their military operations in one way we can say the greeks lost were more than the turks won would you do you accept the fact that there are alternative interpretations to consider great thanks very much i'll return to the floor to the speakers phasel do you want to uh come in there there's quite a few questions there yeah i counted five i think my apologies if i miss any but thank you for all these wonderful points actually well just to be clear i mean and totally frankly i'm saying this i mean i brought in the term civil war to maybe arouse a discussion i don't have frankly like a clear cut clear cut and kind of final thought on that but i think that may be a that may be a framework that scholars historians should be talking more about while dealing with what's happening in an otolia and trace in 1919 1922 so then this comes okay what is a civil war right i mean how is your war of roses different from american civil war than this right uh i'm not a scholar of it but uh i think that may be an interesting way to look at it well i mean from coming from turkey like as you can imagine this is a raw raw subject like you know all the nation rolls up together fought against the enemy defending the homeland uh i mean this is a way less nuanced attitude or approach to what professor winter described as totally different this is you know nationless discourse and very little factual so you know maybe bringing this you know the centers of the nation if you will or you know the elen forest wonderful book title right the nation and its deserters when he deals with the french conscripts so we have a lot of i mean there is a maybe turkish nation informing but also you know they're the deserters of it there may be one third of it right so that's maybe why i wanted to bring in this and also in turkish historiography you know the involvement of the greek localism which was considerable it's not one regiment it's not one division probably amounting to like six divisions okay and the helenic army had about 18 infantry divisions in an otolius this is huge now there's more research coming up here and there like but i think you know we can maybe consider this this whole you know fact into our narrative and you know think about how we can integrate it so i'm afraid i don't have a straight answer for that but you know i'm happy to be in touch if there's there's a discussion following this you know this whole you know conceptualizing the war in an otolius civil war um so about the demobilization the the domestic industries okay when we like between 1921-22 ankara government ruled over about 5.5 million pardon me 6.5 million muslims and about a million christians and the greeks ruled over about like 5 million 5.5 million greeks and two and a half million very sizable recently conquered muslim populations and ankara government had lost actually the most one of the most populous dense provinces to the greeks by 1921 which includes the ottoman empire's nascent industries including the armaments armaments factories which you can imagine really you know spotted around istanbul well it's the greeks and the allied occupation we can say but eventually towards 1922 we see some smaller manufacturers established the ankara central otolia but i would say like from what i saw from the sources ankara government Mustafa Kemal fought mostly with recaptured weapons of first world war foreign aid direct foreign aid or foreign purchases so it's a war fought on uh kind of captured them bought weapons mostly so that's what i can see eventually they have emission factories etc so regarding professor Tussan about demobilization that's something i mean the question you ask is something that drove this article to uh okay is this a you know consistent policy that you know stalling them demobilization i mean i didn't see any evidence like direct evidence that you know communicates between the commander saying things like this but i think as professionals as military practitioners this was their gut feeling and most of them were as i said like suspicious of mudras armistice and and the fate of whatever they consider as turkish nation in the days to come and when and that's a very important thing this is this starts way before formation of ankara government at all like we see the suspicions raised by the turkish army commanders and you know when you look at the memoirs from the lower ranking officers too like saying well uh treaty is suspicious uh they can you know in weight anyone they can capture anyone the fate of the nation isn't trouble and so on so forth and this these questions their roles like almost a week after the signing of the mudras treaty and we see these things in writing it's not he he said we said i i can't link this to the installing the demobilization and and we can see implicit implicit let's say easing happening between like war ministry i mean easing of stalling the demobilization kind of orchestrated sometimes by war ministry and the commanders on the ground i'm gonna have to yeah because i think the next session is due to start in three minutes and i just want to get frenzy a chance to come in perhaps frenzy you could particularly focus on uh the question about kwan kare in 1922 that's okay and i'm not sure if i i captured the first half of the question but for the second i can say that uh the the it's it's quite uh known to radicals that uh post apache mal is not a bolshevik uh i mean jack kaiser already writes that uh he held the olive branch uh extended by chicharid but he he basically didn't allow any bolshevik propaganda in Anatolia so um but i'm not sure if i got the first half of the question because of the sound i think it is to bring your story back to 1922 and kwan kare's attitude and his kwan kare working within a different logic one which which he wants to protect french investments in uh turkey uh yeah and yeah uh yeah numerous issues that uh that causes uh that poses a problem or the border uh issues that um the turkish government is still suspicious that france is although the the the um the the border is set with the syria uh that the french government is still pursuing uh ambitions in the southern borders um and there is the issue of the payment of the debts uh they are uh basically installments uh they are um um uh the way to pay uh in how many years um and the the catholic schools and their situation because turks um would like to um basically um bring them under their own um uh rule but the the and the area that uh he constantly emphasizes that um you know that's a legitimate claim that's a nation state it's it's sovereignty um so it's basically debts and the also the the um the the representation of france and kankara so the first uh because um the the it's a big question uh and that also takes place with uh diplomatic uh traffic uh between london and paris and i think rome as well uh we know that from uh mojans um um exchanges that uh it is attributed uh great importance to uh have an embassy in ankara um so and the first ambassador is also a radical politician who's a friend of erio al-basarou from the southwest of consulate deputy um thanks thanks very much i think we're uh we're pretty much out of time uh so with uh all the smoothness of the 1996 british relay team i'll pass the button on to uh our friends and colleagues uh uh or robson and the next panel in uh the school of security studies but renzi faisal thanks very much i really enjoyed both reading the papers and the discussions this afternoon well then thank you well uh we will we will resume in one day to solve some technical issues right well thanks very very much to you and we're waiting for arie oh arie's there okay just just yeah i would like to thank you very much both so i'm okay We're emcee and phasal, there's some questions in the Q&A, so I think you're free to, if you could type answers, quick answers, those are get in touch with the people who ask the questions, that'd be great. I was, I was precisely doing that, actually, for, Oh, you were? Sorry. No, no, no worries. That's, that's excellent. Actually, can I talk now or no? I think the next session is, I think, Yes. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, absolutely, absolutely. Thank you. Thank you for your comments. No, really enjoyed it. Thanks everyone. Okay. Okay. Everyone's ready. I think we'll get started on our, our last one on this channel. I am very pleased to be chair of this last panel that looks at British history, and we can gather from remarkably, I'll hear a pair of papers that we have here. So I will go ahead and introduce our panelists and then we will get started. All right. So it's always a special pleasure to be able to introduce a little friend. So I'm very pleased to be introducing Ari Abdel, who is Max Tickton chair of Israel studies at George Washington University in Washington, DC. He is a historian of 20th century Jewish and Israeli history and he is especially interested in histories of political thought, of internationalism, and especially the effects of decolonization. He has many publications. I will mention just here is books, which include Isaiah Berlin, The Journey of a Jewish Liberal, which was published in 2012, and the volume of Partitions in the Alps 5 from 2010. And then most recently, the edited volume of Partitions, 20th century histories of transnational separatism, which I had the privilege of co-editing with him and came out with Stanford in 2019. And we will hear from our fearless leader who really needs no introduction and I'll do it anyway. He is a historian of modern Britain and Southeast Europe, who focuses on international and intellectual history from the late 19th century. He is currently affiliated with the City University of London and is also a visiting research fellow here at the Center for Hellenic Studies at KCL. He holds a PhD in modern history from the Queen Mary University and has been published in a number of leading scholarly journals and he is currently finishing out a book on the history of interventions in modern Greece. So with that, Ari, I will turn the floor over to you. Thank you. Thank you so much, Laura and dear friends and colleagues. I'm awfully sorry that I could not attend this really simulating conference in person. I learned a lot throughout the last two days. I'm taking copious notes and I'm only sorry that I could not, you know, add to that the mingling and the coffee breaks and saying people face to face or at least mask to mask. I will share my screen and I know that it has been kind of long a couple of days so I tried to make my arguments likely more accessible through visuals. And since my talk will zoom in on a historian, please allow me to introduce the short reflections on the historian's craft. And while Clio is the muse that associated with the historian's craft, no less important is the Roman mythological deity named as Janus, the god of beginnings and gates. Janus is the one that lent his name to the month of January, the beginning of a new year. But Janus was also the gods of transitions, passages and time. And he was depicted as having, of course, famously two faces, one looking forward, the other backwards from which the adjective Janus faced is derived, referring to an entity or a phenomena as having two sharply contradicting aspects or characteristics, often implying insincerity or deceit. Our conference, as it often happens in scholarly discussions that are prompted by anniversaries or centauries, invites us to travel in time a century backwards and to revisit 1922 and ask whether it was a moment of birth, dawn of a new beginning. And we are drawn to such question, but we're often forgetting the warning posed by Marc Bloch in his famous Apology Polysoil, where he castigates what he calls as the obsessions of origins with origins and Bloch's words in English translation, it will never be a myth to begin with an acknowledgement of our faults, the explanation of the very recent in terms of the remotest past, naturally attractive to the men, and I would add also women who have made this past their chief subject of research has sometimes dominated our studies to the point of hypnosis. In its most characteristic aspect, this idol of the historian tribe may be called the obsession with origins. And indeed so historians suffer from the tendency to idolize notions like origins and beginnings, and so on. And I opened with this short metahistorical reflection because in a sense I can be accused of being an idolizer of beginnings. I argued elsewhere in the book I was in that Laura was generous enough to help me bring to fruition that in searching for the genesis of partition politics, for instance, there's good reasons to claim that the Lausanne Treaty, inaugurated an age of internationally recognized and legitimized population transfer, dubbed euphemistically, as we were reminded yesterday, as the age of unmixing of populations. And partitions of these kinds that we will witness in India, Pakistan and Palestine in 1947 and eight combined elements from both the Irish partition of 1922 as well as the Lausanne Treaty. Partition politics I claim does emerge as a set of proposals wrapped together alongside territorial integration achieved through the elimination of new borders. It did not separate merely between districts or regions or cantons, but between nation states. And third, it also implied the re-engineering of spaces to fit that demography. So partition in that reading is a conglomeration of ideas. It did not begin in 1922 in Greek and Turkey. However, the 1930s and 40s planners or partition plans openly discussed the Greek and Turkish precedent of unmixing and separation as successful experiment or surgery that they could learn from. But 1922 is also a moment of birth in a different sense. According to his own autobiographical account in 1922, the young Arnold Joseph Toynbee, aged 33, drafted on a half a sheet of paper the main outline of his ambitious and controversial 12 volume long, a study of history. It will be published only later on from 1934 to 61. The draft was composed during a train ride as it was returning back home to England after covering the Greco-Turkish War for the Manchester Guardian. The journalistic assignment he took on himself. And this experience also led into resignation from the Korea's chair for modern Greek and Byzantine history established just a few years earlier in 1918 with generous support of the Greek business community and occupied today by our esteemed colleague and one of the driving forces behind this marvelous conference, Professor Godavansky. But more importantly, for the sake of our discussion today, there is the way in which the bloody Greco-Turkish encounter served for the young English historian, a classic product of Oxford's literary, human risk education as a moment of epiphany. In Toynbee's words, 1922 was he understood was where when he understood that the contact of civilization in his words has always been and will always continue to be a ruling factor in human progress and failure. So the global moment in World Affair was thus also the beginning of the branch of world historical writing. It may, in what may seem as an impossible paradox if we're English historians or a dialectic process, for those of us who require a more continental taste for historicism, at the very same time, the post-World War I was being consolidated, Europe of the post-World War I was consolidated into separate and distinct nation-state, replacing the pre-1914 multi-ethnic and multilingual empires. Toynbee was boldly resisting what we were described today as certain methodological nationalism, that is the tendency to assume that nation-state is the basic building block in the natural social and political form of the modern world and was offering the term civilization in the plural, of course, instead. And civilization, Toynbee wrote in 1922, is discerning beneath the new phenomena and the old omnipresent and indefatigable in the creation and destruction like some gigantic force of nature. And someone who dirtied his own hands in transnational history, highly sympathetic towards contemporary criticisms of methodological nationalism, I should have been drawn with admiration to Toynbee and his world historical system. Indeed, in an irony occupying a chair in Israel studies, my title carries with it the same problem as if there is no question worth asking in history that does not revolve around the study of a specific nation-state. And I find myself thinking time and again about the disputes surrounding the Korea's chairs a century ago as some contemporary disputes in my own field become increasingly toxic, fueled by anger and feeling of so-called betrayal expressed by philanthropist community members and lobby groups who dislike scholars of Israel studies who dare challenging the combination of political apologetics for a nation-state combined with methodological naval gazing. And yet my paper resisted the temptation of idolizing Toynbee and using the photographic metaphor of zooming in before it was hijacked by the video conferencing software amusing. When writing this paper, I was wearing again my old intellectual historians had looking at the evolution of his meta historical system. And I'm not wishing to do here is simply to contribute to a somewhat isolated historiographical discussion about trends, methods and approaches in the study of history. But to try to the broader conversations we are having in this conference regarding the way this historical imagination is tied to interwar internationalism and it's ambivalent yet undeniable ties to British imperial thought in general. And as I argue in the paper, the British tradition of thinking about classic classicism in particular. So to return to the Janus, to Janus and his double faces, I suggested in my paper that as much as 1922 is a date of birth of the sub branch of historical research we know today as world history, it is rooted firmly in late Victorian Edwardian anxieties of empire and imperial domination that was developed in tandem with post 1918 notions of internationalism and supranational British Commonwealth of Nations that was reimagined after the war as a big tent and the basis of a liberal global order. So I will just highlight few of the main moves that I made in the paper and I will leave there for more room for discussion. So the first part of the paper going back and tracing the genesis of Toenby's intellectual route back to Oxford. I focus on the people he studied with and became close friends with, especially the university leading classicist including Alfred Eckert Zimmern on the right side in the slide fellow tutor of New College at the time, Gilbert Murray. On the left, Regius professor of Greek and of course through Toenby's marriage became his father-in-law. Crucially these classicists and particularly the study of the Hellenic world of the fifth century BC provided I argued the lens through which these men thought about the stage craft and the future of the British empire and the nascent field of international relations. And Athens was admired by them as achieving something unique in history and civilization not only thanks to the cultural achievements art, theater and philosophy but also due to the Athenian League that was viewed from by them as sort of this brilliant political mechanism that would be analogous to the British empire emphasizing the maritime empire this image of the Thalacracy network of almost entirely independent city states competing with each other in peacetime but united by a common culture and resisting other civilizations with a strong economic ties and shared enemies and those of you are familiar with Zimmerin's writing would know that the term Commonwealth that would then be used to describe the British Commonwealth of Nations originates in his textbooks about the Athenian League and this model I'm not the only one to argue it appealed to these classicists because it was seen as a wonderful alternative to the Roman empire that ever since Edward Gibbon wrote his famous book was always seen as something that was inevitably would over stretch and decline and collapse and definitely we have numerous articles and papers by Tombi that it would not go into that show us how he thinks about the Commonwealth in these kind of Zimmermanian terms as something that is both in this kind of a network of independent city states that because they're part of this bigger network they can transcend their parochialism and create this common civilization and so on and so forth. Next I looked at Tombi during World War I and how we initially thought to address the twin challenges that was posed by the collapse of the Habsburgs and the Ottomans during the war that he'd seen and what we see was not only challenges as much as bolstered this mode of thinking here I am in close dialogue with my co-panelist George Yogos and they learned much from his article because Tombi's were trying collaborations with people like Robert Seaton Watson but also I will add to that equation Thomas Mussolik that was exiled in London at that time by Louis B. Namier and a group of writers affiliated with the New Europe Journal was predicated on these notions that continental so to speak nationalism was the major source of instability threatening to fragment Europe and yet it was permitted to persist and culminate if it would form a lead to the formation of some sort of middle European Union that would continue relying on Britain for protection and support there was a big emphasis on the world on the word small when these new states were described as small states which echoed Victorian orations that was introducing the differences between small and great nations as part of a bit of a global order and this is I would argue also what allowed figures like Massolik and Seaton Watson to be seen very sympathetically and to present to the British audience a vision of post-war Europe that continued relying on the liberty loving British Commonwealth and it's not a coincidence in King's College where Tombi was teaching also had appointed Massolik that when he was exiled in London to chair the establishment of Slavonic and East European studies in 1915 I will just add that this is not the only source of thinking about Commonwealth and federalism we have also sections in Toinby that show us that he was also thinking about the American model a good white settler experiment that was seen to him as sort of also another kind of a template to be used but as we are going in from 1915 to the early 20s we see Toinby also starting to read more books that are trying to help him to start thinking about those civilizations also as if you would like to use a tectonic imagery the places between civilizations as prone to extreme violence and so on I would not go into details but I argue that his reading of Frederick John Tigger was one of those elements in thinking about how cultural differences and groups distinguish themselves and that would map on to the way Toinby is thinking about civilizations in the general and what is is fascinating to see about this historical imagination is the way in which Britain still was able to translate it very clearly to state making and foreign policy making knowledge production ecosystem is sort of a way perhaps to think about it there are close ties between the Oksonian on the left hand you see the Balliol College emblem which is an important policy a think tank sort of a Chatton House which is a short term name for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the way it was relying on men like Toinby is crucial I conclude the paper by arguing in a way that part of what we see in Toinby is what might sound very familiar to contemporary years it's sort of a early Samuel Huntingtonian actually vision of differences and that in a way his new world historical vision was based on sort of this reinvention of differences and here I will conclude by saying that part of my attempt is kind of to take the discussions about Toinby as only something that should interest historians of history of the historical craft to think about them in dialogue with books such as the ones you can see here and I will conclude as thus it was the famous book on provincializing Europe who argued that historicism enabled European domination of the world in the 19th century so I would like to expand this question into the 20th century and to use 1922 on one hand and Toinby on the other hand as test cases to allow us to do so I actually approached this what I call the Toinby affair from several angles and the central claims of my paper were producing dialogue with these type of books and questions above all is this angle of power knowledge interdependency because besides offering us a unique case of a classicist that was turned into a journalist and a witness turned into a historian Toinby stories also exemplifies arguments that were advanced by Robert Vitalis that was thinking about the origins of international relations pre-Assetia and others regarding the close connection between history, writing, power international politics and anxieties of western declines because chronicles of past events were not fables or allegories instead Toinby's approach to classics and history always fell under the category of a usable past informing statementship and the fact that Toinby's history prided itself as a bold attempt to transcend nationalism in favor larger units of analysis does not make any sense to Toinby's views extreme international relations on the country it gave a long established traditions and cultures a constitutive role and explanatory force in the better understanding is contemporaneous history event of mental history and the moral guide to foreign affairs but above all the principle category of analysis that introduced civilizations in the plural this seemingly subtle change provided the Archimedean point for his magisterial history and yet it rested on a deep suspicion of any kind of liminal hybridity or cultural mestizo blurring the need division between those distinct civilizations so the Toinby Affair does offers us a case which we can recognize to bore terminology of the French sociologist Jean-François Baillard and his work cultural imaginative the reinvention of differences in action and the ways in which he continued shaping our world of the West supposed borders and we are still living with the consequences of this method and of thought and historical imagination. Thank you so much. Thanks, I will take a chair. I spent meeting the current father of the Christ who is leaving the roof. I am kidding. I have an invitation. Don't be a person. Why are you not taking a chair? Just give me a phone. I think we are able to see me. Is there a sign? Should I move this? I think you are. You can get it again. That way you maybe will pick up my voice or it won't. Thank you very much. Thank you. I wasn't meant to present today but I couldn't resist the invitation seeing the paper. I will try to present a version of what I would like my paper to be. I hope you cannot hear it. I will pick up a version of what I would like my paper to be when they are fitting. What I thought I wanted to do or still thinking I want to do with this paper is essentially to zoom back in the early 1920s and try to see and understand the language of westernization that it used to think of from the Greek actors and from imperial actors like British. I would like to do that in my story. Before that, I should say he connects more with the first book I am trying to finish. One thing I picked up when I look at British sources is the story of Balkanization. I am sure Marietto D'Orva might come up but an interesting version of the Balkanization argument that comes in is a version of the problem we have discussed is the story of national fragmentation across Eastern Europe most predominantly and there is a discussion of some types of federations and that is why I brought these two quotes here connected one another and then Edward Benes came up with that language and offering the argument that to speak of Balkanization is a distortion of facts. Why? Central Europe is not the scene of disorder or in a different way. That is something I want to flag and that takes me here and that takes me to think about this moment early 1920s is it a moment of Balkanization is it a moment of the unfortunate distribution of greater bigger empires and economic problems come up? Here what is interesting and I will pick on a quote from Alpen Zimmer who mentions Putz in Ireland in his story that story of economic dependence that has been broken after the break-up of the ocean can carry it. He says it has raised a war between birth and doubly and what is the answer to this? It is that which British liberals co-operate to implement demands in Canada etc. What I want to flag here is an interesting debate that we find imperialist positions someone like Leo Emery agreeing on the diagnosis with anti-imperialist positions someone like praise for the radical you may think of him as and what is the problem is how the economy is to pick up in a fragmented world of East Central Europe and this is a very interesting debate that connects with action that allows us to think of different national contexts together and it brings up a discussion of federation on the table a second element I am very much interested in and that brings me to more to the local dimensions of my story is what I call the bridge enter Thomas Massory who was previously mentioned from the character of a patriarchal statesman the church constitutes the westernmost wedge driven into the German body quite military but he writes in 1915 or 1918 they constitute the furthest west in the zone of the small nations they are the western outposts of the non-German nations he is building he is seeing the task of Czechoslovakia and the world does some kind of language between a west enemy the way he understands that I am not going to get into details well a person of his actually someone very close to him that historiographers tend not to see the connections is Venizelius in this period that is slightly early in 1815 this is how Venizelius understands the task of kind of the Greek expansionist project to be again a version I am not going to read it, you can see a version of a bridge argument essentially Greece again becoming some kind of a vehicle for progress for western values in an east Venizelius's east is not quite the same as Massory's east but there is a very interesting bridging metaphor going on and actually that leads to as well remember Marcos paper yesterday where he talked about Mussolini fashioning Italy again as that kind of bridge I am fast to speak a little bit reduce the screen size I think maybe just get out of the full screen like that? So I continue and that takes us to the final bridge that I want to mention to the end of the story and that Mustafa Kemal's fashioning Turkey as the new Turkey, the successor state Turkey as again a land bridge so the story of westernization to me is interesting the metaphors of bridges and here there are two comments I have before I move on to what I mean and how long I have and the two comments I have is this for this paper to evolve what I want to focus on and what I want to juxtapose is actually what I would call the complicated but also interlocking natures of Greek and Turkish nationalism in the sense that we have here a blend in this moment of imperial projects we have a blend of versions of Wilsonianism that measure people that kind of try to find arguments for which element is kind of greater in this area and I just want to flag in the Turkish case, Jamil Aydin's work this is really influential in why because it shows how Turkish nationalism in this particular moment is quite contradictory with regards to self-determination there is pan-Islamist ideas that connect the language with self-determination and there are also more westernized regions and I would argue that in the Greek case we do have different varieties and sometimes contradictory varieties of imperial nationalism of Wilsonianism kind of converging in what is the Greek sort of expansionist project so in the context of the broader paper I'd like to explore these angles better now that takes me you may think that as I connect I just want to take you back to Smyrna I guess we spoke about the Smyrna fire yesterday and I want to bring in Toinbi in some way because what's interesting to me Ari laid the groundwork about Toinbi he's a very interesting imperial in some ways commentator who's a historian and journalist but he's also because he has worked with his imperial administration as an advisor he's really into the practical nature of trying to solve questions conceptualizing them first and trying to solve them secondly and Toinbi as Ari mentioned is in the region in 1921 when it's fairly clear that Turkish nationalism would not be eradicated by the Greeks and I'm not going to talk about the humanitarian side what I want to flag is a very interesting way he comes up as a means to solve the Smyrna question and why is his proposal he's in Smyrna 1921 he thinks of Lebanon 1860 why because that is the frame of mind and how do you solve national questions when you have to go back to the broader Turkey he thinks that well if Smyrna is to acquire a broader geographical length have an autonomous status by the autonomous status he means in 1921 now and some kind of millet system that's the one option and he writes that as Ari mentioned but then that's the interesting bit and this is the moment of transition in one way he admits at the same time that that's a difficult thing to happen practically and what would be the alternative well to place Smyrna under Ottoman territory and exchange populations it would inevitably entail a vast amount of suffering and economic loss and it's only a last resort that's how many progressives live present 20 is one of them, it's not a conservative how to put it Ari I think we agree a Victorian progressive complicated you know historian I'll skip that slide because it actually links to the Armenian question but actually I might bring that in because Toynbi writes to a wider public but also writes to his connections and people he knows in the foreign office and this is the foreign office, Kersen surely Lloyd George's government is not one thing I don't want to go into the details of what's going on at the time but this is the kind of mindset of the time that Kersen had he's being asked by the Armenians in Britain to help them out and here is how Kersen replies to that you can't expect this country to arbitrarily select a portion of Turkey and check all the other races will concentrate within the ring and so to organize an Armenian national existence at the immense expense of the Greek taxpayer this idea is Khmerida I just put this into to kind of give you a sense of what's the other end of the line which is you know that kind of imperial bureaucracy state you know that takes me so I would argue something following that why is Toynbi interesting because the question would be again why it may appear a figure but the book is interesting because it actually marks the end of a whole tradition of thinking about the question in a Gladstonean way and with it a big portion of what Wilson understands as a self-determination but also it doesn't quite reject self-determination it kind of uses self-determination as a tool to speak about a broader western context but a context that nonetheless would have nation states and here is the interesting for me fascinating point where Toynbi embraces Turkey's nationality and this is when after the exchange population during Lausanne he goes around the new Turkey and he offers a number of pieces in this journal which will then known as Asia I think now it's known as National Geographic and these are some quotes from what he writes today which links to broader patterns of the thinking that Ari knows we will speak to what Victoria's National History does today the rest of the Muslim world is going to do tomorrow I mean the bottom here is that story of diffusion of self-determination across western eastern boundaries the other interesting bit is obviously something he flags and I really the full version of the paper will engage with premise sources Turkey by all means is attracted by the French model of government, French connections and there is also a very interesting bit and also what makes Toynbi interesting that he co-authors the first piece in English after the war that actually of modern Turkey, the book of modern Turkey and there he makes an argument I don't have it here how Turkey could also follow British lines of national development more organic evolution rather than the rigid centralized French foundations upon which it's built and my final point and why Toynbi would be interesting is the point that's been that has been reverberated here which is the point about the embrace of population transfer as essentially a tolerant a way to protect minorities that's the paradox we kind of segregate people in order to protect them and what's interesting with Toynbi is that the books are in paper as early as 1925 so in where in the Royal Institute of International Affairs and that's the quote from there although the possible transfer of population was essentially inhumane, the mutual anti-pathy inflicted by nationalist religion made segregation that's the quote segregation that uses as a more tolerant alternative so international politics is a messy thing but as a last resort it's not that bad to resort to these measures now I'm kind of the conclusions of this kind of quite disparate paper that more wants to, from discussion rather than makes a specific point of that point and with two questions that would probably foreshadow my attempt to actually properly write the paper one would be you know how is the language of westernization mobilized as I said earlier by Greek and Spanish political elites to justify their country's place in the new shifting order and again how the western figures and commentators one of them is Toynbi there others which well employed the language of liberty and westernization to make sense of the imperial transformations in Southern Europe and the Middle East so that's kind of the broad range of where I want to go with this paper I hope I've said enough to cover this discussion so thanks well thank you so much for two fabulous presentations I'm just going to offer just a very very brief at the interest of time a very brief response on the whole I got to the floor I'm very you know I'm struck in reading this and also in hearing this that it's not just two visions of Toynbi here but multiple visions these things to say that are often contradictory perhaps perhaps actually incompatible and so I want to start with a question about kind of reception and timeframe and this is this is lowly made through whatever we're thinking about as the actual industry but I think it is worth reminding ourselves of it that we I think it's worth both of you are kind of pointing out ways that Toynbi's commentary is influencing two separate but related spheres one is public policy and international affairs and the other is the writing of history the intellectual history in particular and Ari is pointing to world history as a kind of you know ancestor or sorry descendant of Toynbi's thought so I think it might be worth articulating the reception in those two related arenas across his career not least because it's such a long time right it's such a long frame he has so many different positions you know what are the avenues through which his ideas are disseminated where are they found convincing where are they found wanting right and I want to just throw out with particular respect to Ari's presentation and I think it's important to remember that one of the things that came up for me in reading this was in thinking about the distinction between world history which are kind of as a field that comes out of the spot and international history which is really quite different right and so we might think about whether perhaps Toynbi is creating a field that is quite antithetical to another view and diplomacy even as he is quite specifically addressing issues of diplomatic approach and the making of nation states and the making of a global a new global political order in Georgia's paper I I'm very very struck actually this comes up a bit in Ari's as well I'm very struck by the prevalence the continuing prevalence of Ottoman laws of thought right that this is something Toynbi himself doesn't really acknowledge except in passing but it's something that other scholars have pointed out more recently that there are ways in which we can understand the post-war order and not just in the ex-Ottoman territories but across Europe as well as having progenitors in Ottoman political thought and thinking here particularly Lerna Ekmenulou's work on the way that minority rights reflects Ottoman practice which is something that Toynbi is in fact explicitly recognizing and is a millet idea for Lerna and also Amy Jeanelle's more recent work on the Ottoman origins of the mandate system that we have in fact kind of Ottoman friends in the way that these essentially European imperial interwar frames begin to emerge so despite his kind of active disdain and moments for Ottoman and not only his but the kind of British imperial practices active disdain that we do in fact see things that are a lot of it in what's being made to eat here so finally I think that both of these are tied together by an interest in the economics which is something that has come up in a number of instances across the last couple of days and it might be worth thinking about what precisely these federal systems have an economic justification that is not always terribly clearly laid out but clearly does have important ramifications for one of the major issues that comes up at all of the peace treaty negotiations and that is the rights of small nations so it might be worth kind of articulating that a bit more clearly and specifically and in greater detail since it's clearly very central to the thought that is being kind of constructed in the context of all of these treaties and their aftermath particularly for Greece and Turkey but often represents a kind of unsaid level unspoken set of assumptions about what a post-war global order might be so I'm going to close there and maybe we'll have just very very brief responses and then we can open it up to the floor so that's right yeah, but I'll go first then we'll see how it will turn my way but okay I hope you can hear me right lots of stuff I just want to okay let me start with the latter first because what I and I'm struggling with my other work now is like to make sense of these kind of you know the coming back of the discussion of federation especially from the great imperial world for their view and it seems to me that this is a throwback again in 19th century region for federation that the Nubian federation gave you one idea that God would know more about the Nubian these sort of structures and discussions about federation from the mid 19th century that that kind of essentially I was speaking the language of free trade I was speaking the language of of of how to essentially create order by allowing greater units to trade with one another going into these discussions I mean even during the first during the Balkan wars he's one of them who thinks the Balkan federation is a good idea I mean obviously the Balkan war and then he comes back to that again so you know the problem here is if we look at Central Europe and people like Massary the language of federation there is really meddled up there are instances where one reads these and then thinks it's just like small state nationalism he's talking about here where's the federation then he speaks about co-federation which makes it even weirder so there's a very complicated I think in this political elites at least understanding and very contradictory of you know what exactly are federation that we're talking about here I know it's not kind of a full answer but that's where I would be gesturing at very quickly I do agree on the point of the Ottoman political thought well on time he starts letting Turkish during the First World War and so I don't think he's fully conversed into Ottoman on Turkish but what's interesting is that at least in Britain after the Yankturt Revolution for two or three years for us for Balkan small state nationalist actually are taming making a U-turn and they're thinking that the moment of federation the moment of opening has come the westernization moment has come into the Ottoman Empire 1908, 1909, 1910 well that window closes by 1911 so he has these debates in mind which and obviously the kind of imperial practice that is around him I suppose because he's someone who's advising who's at the bias peace conference as a junior diplomat so that would be a final point something that's quite interesting and it has been the elephant in the room here I think it's Russia I think even for the time being it's interesting that the transformation that happens with the October Revolution going with regards that as a big turning point that also fits in the story of westernization in some way but it's not the westernization that you have in more than 30 years in Japan it's another kind of development but and the reason I'm mentioning this is that well that's a side note but it's a very interesting thing to think about in Britain the researches of the Ottoman Empire sorry of the Russian socialist experiment were quite surprising in some way or another and the final point that I'll stop and I might disagree here that it's slightly on this point I think with someone like Torbini did he creates this or starts a genre of world history I think I would agree that there are Victorian versions of universal history that Torbini picks up on Freeman it's an interesting case example Edward Freeman and yeah I'll stop here thank you I want to be able to touch on all the points you made but you were right that again we stuck on the term world history definitely for us thinking about how to do a history that acknowledges how ideas and practices do not recognize borders but at the same time not be divorced from the local specific conditions and so on Torbini is kind of a very interesting case that allows us I think that's sort of my point of entry here that might sound for someone from the outside as nuances of minor differences narcissism of minor differences but really for me there's a huge difference between transnational history and the world history the way he thinks about them and the world history that you asked about influences and so on it was valorized I mean it's not a coincidence that his most important biographer William McNeil that would later become the president of the American Historical Association and it was and I agree with the image I don't think it's had the image of something progressive beyond nationalism beyond this kind of a petty narrow mindset and it also allowed people to you know add things like you know ecological dimensions to history and so on and so forth so I'm not here to say world history is a branch that should be canceled out it moved in a different direction it says its own trajectory but it definitely has its own and I think that there's something to be said about we are for very good reasons are very suspicious of in a small nation nationalism especially when it our histories are predicated on that so the appeal is there but with our with our attacks it's amazing to see how our criticisms of the nation state project actually echo old imperial attacks against the nation the nation state so we're kind of a cut between rock in the hard place and so on and so forth so you write that international history developed differently but international relations do have a common origin so the so-called discipline is really rooted in that same moment with the same people yes and very very briefly on economics you write it's kind of a it's it's hidden there I think this is where also geography comes in especially is the new I mean access to a what you know to a port to water to a notion is is a major thing that is always discussed in these kind of questions about what makes a small nation say you know a little bit in state that is it's not only the size it's over what would make it viable and so that's definitely part of it but yes I will I will stop I will stop there and I'll open up for other questions as well thank you very much and I just wanted to to say something about a point to Laura made and area just replied to it I firmly persuaded that time it would have been a perfect to a perfect contributor to the journal of race development foreign affairs and this is where he belongs and this is exactly where I do see him not as a precursor of international history of world history but as one of the known acknowledged fathers of international relations as a racist discipline this is what we have to say this is my own take on that and I say it very bluntly and openly the second point has to do always with him and with Lebanon and it's more of the same and I bring it back to the point that the audience made on a Lebanese solutions for Spirnia but that's precisely the solution for the uncivilized and this is what and this is why we go back to geography and mental imaginaries and that's exactly why Lebanon comes to the mind of toying immediately and this is the perfect solution and by the way since we have been talking about Mark block and the obsessions with origin there is in the consular archive French archives there is so much to be said about un-mixing populations Lebanese populations in 1960 precisely because the French idea was to segregate and move the Maronites in Algeria where they could have become perfect producers of wine I stop here Are you going to respond to that? No I mean it's fascinating disturbing it's sort of my only response would be and to think about the way they were used in the area from that date and of course we can take it to 1982 and the Israeli invasion to Lebanon and where the Maronites are playing there so it's I agree with you I think that if I need to go back to my research notes I think that it's not only there was a conference on racial relations that Toynbee did contribute an article to so we tend to think about him as thinking about differences in a different way which is not racial we talked about it the entire mandatory system is based on racial hierarchy and ranking even class A, class B, class C so it's the language so the fact that he's not using it as explicitly tended to create this image of him as progressive that doesn't go there but not so much so I would say it's sort of in later years he's becoming really religious he's becoming very a pious religious Christian and it doubles down it adds elements that the young Toynbee in his 30s are not so prominent would really come up so some of his critics actually are arguing we deal here with a mix of theology and a Christian way of thinking about differences that's later on the criticisms that he will receive from British colleagues in the 50s and 60s I think we're running short on time so what I'm going to do is take Jay's question and then I'll come back to you is that reasonable? I want to raise the possibility that there's a strain of pessimism in Toynbee that you can see in not just regarding artists all of them in the library which you've gone through as well but if you will wasn't he anticipating Benjamin there is no monument to westernization which is not at the same moment a monument to barbarism this barbarism is what he saw and it was against the reign of his political outlook with respect to Greece and Turkey so that maybe this is a narrow thing to use in the discussion is this not a moment of what might be called the need to temper empire to measure the value and weight of different approaches to westernization and a moment of crisis and a moment of immense difficulty not indeed a moment of exuberance and a moment of what we learned is that we're mortal but I wonder if this is an appropriate annex to that and that occurred to me already when you're talking about the conversations with other classes including his father a lot to what extent is his conversation with Spain also with Spain though so that was about the second question answered so absolutely pessimism so I think not only that there is pessimism there are two type of pessimism one is the Oswald Spenglerian pessimism of the decline of the west it's very there's a very he talks about it very explicitly there's an irony to it because the person that introduced him to Oswald Spengler was his classmate a roommate in Oxford Louis Namier gave him here's the latest book that came out around I have the date in the article I can't remember it exactly when so that's one type of pessimism but you're absolutely right that he witnesses awful things and it's both the war between Greece and Turkey but also his work with Lord Bryce composing I linked the blue book and the Armenian genocide so the pessimism is absolutely there it doesn't contradict the fact that it really leads him to see the unmixing of population he won't use perhaps this exact language I used the kind of the tectonic plates kind of metaphor when two tectonic plates meet this is where the friction this is where you have earthquakes or volcanoes appearing I think that when he saw you know genocidal violence he would interpret it okay this is an indication that what we see here is kind of this collapse meeting point between civilizations so try to separate them and not mix one into the other otherwise you will have these awful atrocities so I think that you're absolutely right the pessimism that is driving the system of thought but it ended up in essentializing each civilization and so on and creating very distinct separation lines between the civilizations but in the early 20s to pick up from here this pessimism absolutely the only thing at that just to enrich the conversation Toinby as someone who's really thinking comparatively a vanilla letter is really that's what drives me what makes this case fascinating is also really much alert about what's going on in Ireland same timeline and then he speaks about moral organization in Ireland so the pessimism also comes from this angle it comes from the intellectual angle the you know the Spengler stuff it comes from the great the war angle it's some of those documents you know like atrocities not only the Armenians but also what the Germans to Belgium right so it comes from the greater war angle it comes from the angle of someone who sees nationalist violence genocidal violence and finds records to some form civilization discourse but that also has a promise westernization is a promise and that's modern Turkey here and that's what I find interesting to highlight that is an experiment for him it may have a promise on the geopolitical end to stabilize the Middle East but also it may has a promise as a new state that seems to embrace nationalism's discrimination in a way and don't be so open to this and that's what I want kind of bring to the table on this it's quite a confused relationship with religion I think this is one of the things that strikes me is that in the early part of his career he discusses you know when this federalist frame is strong right when he's really thinking that this might be a functional kind of path forward and he's not the only one it's confused because he is thinking about classical models for that represent the West and then you know Islam and Judaism right but then later on as he moves to the civilizational frame the classical frame is replaced by this Christian frame and that's actually when nationalism is as bold as a kind of solution right and Turkey is a very peculiar example of this regard right because it is an actively secularizing state in this period so that's not a question so much it's just the same as there are many kind of there's a great deal of kind of incoherence in terms of the role of religion and how it fits into the concept of civilization the concepts of federalism the concepts of the nation state so is that a thing 100% and you know just to bring the broader point he speaks about the abolition of the caliphate comparing me to the papal states in Italy which was amendment in the 19th century again you know that idea so that is a constant feature of the thinking and that's also we need to how that might understand the complicated that he has with nationalism and also the population transfer kind of being sanitized in some way you know being liberalized being seen as something that could potentially have a progressive thing which of course also is essentially drawn up religious rather than nationalized are there any further questions from the Sumer I'm seeing me further perhaps I'll just add Georgia mentioned briefly Jamila Den's excellent book which I agree is a phenomenal book and perhaps part of what is so confusing about Donby is the type of reception and admiration you received in the context of post World War II decolonization efforts and then he was valorized in what we would call today the national south and especially in the Muslim world and Jamila Den writes very persuasively about the way his subtly language was then appropriated as kind of a using civilization as if it's mapped on to sort of a Muslim concept of Ooma or a pan Muslim but that's a later development of course that's post World War II so a lot of what you know he becomes kind of later on and his symbol is kind of sort of a herald of either post colonialism or or maybe even a better description would be a sort of a British imperialist that is written by guilt feelings after the empire collapsed so that's a lot of this is the kind of the 1950s, 60s reception of Toin B that we shouldn't map on back on to 1922 well I think we have just a couple minutes left so maybe I'll take my take my prerogative as chair to just ask one last question which comes from dinner last night whereas someone said well no one reads Toin B anymore and I'm interested whether you both think that's true I think in the room we have a PhD working in Toin B I mean he damaged himself by writing 12 volumes who will read 12 volumes right but this said I think that I mean it's hard to say if we have like again because World History as a sub branch developed and evolved and I guess I don't know Val Noah Harari is probably the Toin B of our age or something like that and it's a different it's a different place and he's thinking about a global order based on Elon Musk but I think that in popular history I think that you will find sort of a weird take spin-offs on Toin B in sort of a history channels right sort of a very popular versions that still permeates there in the back of people's minds Can I just add something sorry I'm turning it but I like it so the way he comes in my story is as an astute commentator of national questions or rather the observer of national questions and offering solutions and what's interesting is how this the book he writes in Greece and Turkey it has totally different afterlives and you know that's something quite interesting which is not the story of what we're discussing now the Toin B thinker, the national thinker the broad range but it's the distant observer well the Brits have this fascination to think that they are distant observers so the distant observer who offers an interpretation and then these books have different reputations and they read differently and obviously they vindicate different national plays the Greeks read them in one way but they're similar All right well thank you all for this really fascinating conversation and I hope we'll all take away our warning not to make our back our focus while you respond and I'll close and say goodbye thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you I've never once sat in the way he put up a coffee or anything hi thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you Okay. Hey, I think. I think. That's okay. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Okay. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Yeah, who's the ass. I don't think anyone. Yeah. Oh, I forgot. Yeah. Right. So we should have. So we can. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Good. Yeah. I think the rest of this is pretty simple. Exactly. It's an appropriate illustration. Is that something that we can do? I think it's a really good idea. I think it's a really good idea. I think it's a really good idea. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I'm happy to be here. I'm happy to be here. Chair. Yeah. Yeah. You know this story, are you going to the army? Yeah. Okay. Do you know it? But before we end, so I hope people online can hear me, just give us a wave so we know you can hear us. Okay. Great. I can hear you. Terrific. So my name is Dr. Hilary Berfa, I'm a lecturer in National Security Studies here at Keynes. As part of my research, I've done a lot of work on MOLTA, World War I, and I'm writing a global visitor in 1919, connecting the uprisings in MOLTA, India, Trinidad, Egypt, Belize, basically everywhere that wasn't an imperial power together. And so I've joined very kindly, especially in my role, by the means of coming on to this conference. Perhaps if you love listening to your talks. Although I wasn't in the room for all of them, I was online all day listening to a few. And it's been absolutely brilliant, even though you might not have seen my face, I've been listening to all of you very closely. It's my extra privilege to have the opportunity to share this slide with Anna, which is essentially an overview of our main takeaways or bring all of the strands of what we talked about for two full days together and hearing from senior participants in the conference that they think 1932 needs to dance. So we'll have a bit of a discussion. So we've lost each of our five panelists to speak for a maximum of 10 minutes. If they go for under even better because I'm going to get a chance to have a bit more of a discussion. I won't give them long introductions because you've actually heard from all of them already. So I'll just pass to each of them in their order. I just let you know their name and affiliation. And if that sounds good to everybody and the people online have told me they can hear me. I'll pass straight over to Dr. Nina Venturas from the University of Peloponnes. So straight over to Nina. Good afternoon from the University of Pandion, not the Peloponnes. I would like to comment mainly on a point that hasn't come up so much in our discussions these days, which is in my view is the much deeper entanglement of domestic and international governance that followed the First World War, especially in eastern and southeastern Europe and in mandate territories. Here I will only focus on the example of peripheral European regions where asymmetric political and economic power, long-term tutelage transnational European institutions and ideas and catch up modernization strategies developed by local westernized elites had a very long history and of course informed and facilitated international intervention during and after the First World War. This history, I think, weighed upon both the great powers and the newly formed League of Nations civilizational hierarys and decisions as well as on the peripheral states policies. During the war, moreover, both western European states and intergovernmental administrative capacities had been further enhanced. Two groups of bureaucrats and experts with a strong dive drive for efficiency and modern management techniques worked closely with policymakers in developing novel patterns of state intervention and transnational networks concerning issues of reform in which elites from the peripheral European countries often participated. The ideas and practices spread through their networks were still founded on the belief of the supremacy of the western civilization and of its civilizing mission, but the concept of civilization was now more closely associated to economic development and modernization or with the ethics of self-sufficiency. Infused with liberal internationalism, they also contributed to the establishment of international institutions such as the League of Nations to promote their ideas and interests. The League in turn became an important conduit for the expansion of practices of so-called modern rule of ideas concerning the best methods of governance and for the implementation of modernization projects. The League and the agencies it founded assisted certain countries of the region to stabilize their economies to raise funds to enhance their health care systems to implement policies for refugee resettlement and et cetera, thereby increasing the interpenetration of national and international government. But while the great powers and the League of Nations gave impetus to state and institution building, they simultaneously conscripted sovereignty with various means. In certain countries, the League and the agencies it created, even temporarily assumed many of the functions, a sovereign state was expected to be in a position to carry out according to western standards of the era, for example, the registration and allocation of resources and workforce development of infrastructure, undertaking of census, et cetera. By temporarily replenishing the often deficient and insolvent local and central government mechanisms and expanding their incomplete knowledge, the League enhanced these states' ability to penetrate territories and to control populations. And I will give an example from interwar Greece where the territorialization of state power that is mainly its institutional and infrastructural consolidation in the northern territories and refugee rehabilitation came to involve multiple foreign state, non-state and private business agents, the League of Nations and the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission established under its auspices alongside multiple domestic actors. By combining older and contemporary templates of land distribution, well-established practices of refugee rehabilitation which had been tried both in the Ottoman Empire and in Balkan states and of course in Greece before 1922, as well as the modern administrative methods introduced by sections of the Greek elites and the commission, the efforts of all these actors succeeded relatively well in redistributing a massive amount of resources in an extremely short period of time, thus removing the imminent threat of famine, social unrest and state collapse. This rapid redistribution of rural land would not have been possible to reach if the state had undertaken it alone or if the commission had not been so closely linked to the disbursement of the refugee loans and had not been accorded so many rights, privileges and exemptions. In Greece, therefore, the commission enhanced the state sovereignty by enlarging its ability to control and intervene in its northern territories, but this enhancement, of course, came at a cost as the commission took over large decision-making powers, economic management and various other state functions. Of course, the local political elites used foreign and international intervention to justify their own priorities. They both called upon and resisted foreign and international interventions. They both before overwhelming power balances, but also manipulated to leverage to their own advantage. They adopted ideas and practices and used them to promote their own interests. And finally, local actors, either by taking advantage of the gap between international and local authorities' ambitions and their capacities, or by other means, also managed to intervene in shaping their circumstances and future. So what I'm trying to say is that the intertwinning of the heterogeneous disarticulate and unevenly empowered domestic and international spheres, both public and private, with their multi-level and multi-actor components, all interacted in state design and consolidation in institutional organization, land reform and refugee settlement simultaneously strengthening and conscripting sovereignty. And I think this is one of the aspects that we should add in our discussion of this very short period of time, that after 1918 and up to 1922. Thank you very much. Thank you so much, Dr. Venturas. And perhaps it's our own. Myopia is the scholars of international relations, and sometimes we actually overlook this relationship between domestic and international. So thank you for introducing it into the discussion. Hopefully we'll have a chance to discuss a little bit further as well. And so my second speaker comes online as well, Dr. Davider Rodonio from the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Davider, are you still with us? Yes, I am. For you. So I have the floor for you please. Thank you. Thank you very much. I would be way less eloquent than the Lina and would make some impressionistic points on a few words that have been said. I'm wondering whether 1922 was particularly global or more or less global than 1921 or 1923 or 1924. This afternoon, one of our participant Aria referred to Janus, and I think that since we shouldn't be obsessed with origins, I think that this idea of continuities and raptures in 1922 and 1922 becomes really an excuse to study something else is fruitful, at least as far as I'm concerned. So this is my first point, how global 1922 really was. The second has to do with something that Jay Winter said yesterday on chaos. I think that the way we historians study it would deserve more attention. And I think that in the minds of so many protagonists of 1922, whether we talk about people that were forcefully displaced or policymakers or peacemakers, the idea of chaos and references to the Soviet Revolution, et cetera, et cetera, that bring us far away from the Near East or the Middle East or the Eastern Mediterranean Balkans is important and this would deserve more attention, which brings me to a third point, which is related to mental geographies and imaginaries, yet another word that was used in the last two days. We've been thinking and reflecting on zooming in. It seems to me that the vast majority of Western policymakers were utterly unable to zoom in and I connect with what Lena said on the domestic and so the idea of going to the more granular was something that they were either unable to do or unwilling to do. Because in these mental geographies and mental geopolitical landscapes, the future that they imagined for this region of the world was based and I here connect with Georgios with Victorian imaginaries. This seems striking to me. It was eventually the moment for show to the world that the Near East and Ottoman lands could eventually be civilized, Greece included had come through the Mondays and many different ways or through the refugee settlement commission in Greece. So this is important to me and the last point that I would like to make or mention very briefly, which I mentioned yesterday and this is also my way of connecting with Laura's paper yesterday has to do with sovereignty and the manipulations, instrumentalizations of sovereignty, which eventually led to immobility, which in my view is absolutely connected to these deliberate attempts to deprive communities of their agency and so force them somewhere after they've been displaced. And so this idea of a non-return and the three ingredients of sovereignty as we know our territory, people and government, and there was no such determination very often because these three elements were engineered and they were manipulated in so many ways. So that's a geopolitical design was forced on to people and communities of this large area that we have referred to as the Middle East and Near East, the Ottoman lands and post-Ottoman lands. I would stop here. Thank you very much. Okay, thank you so much. And so we're doing very well for time. So I think we will have time for discussion on all these points that are being raised. So I'll just move swiftly on. Dr. Jerry Winter from Yale University is going to share his views on what 1922 means to you where they can get to that discussion. Thank you. And again, thank the organizers for spending time. I want to be very modest in trying to see to what extent we can imagine the title of the book. And it may sound a little bit high-flung, but I'm sure we can whittle it down. I take it from Heusica and I would call it 1922 colon, the winding of the imperial world order. Heusica's way of being the Middle Ages is one of the classics and it also has its own historiography. The story about the contemporary meaning to the view of blood and roses. And I do believe that the imperial world order enables us to grasp Laura's essential contribution of economic difficulty. The restoration of the economic order of the world is unclear and unsolvable. Now, if that doesn't appeal, in other words, I have the imperial impasse, 1922 imperial moment, crises of empire, but they're all the same thing, which is that meetings like this have many different pieces. I don't know if you can tell, but I think the role of the array is where we can find a theme that can bring us success together between the covers of the book. And 1922 is a good title, it has its own cache, but we actually need a subtitle that describes the book should be all about it. So I leave you with the idea that inspiration, I put to you the best that I can think of is the wedding of the imperial order. So much. Are you offering to add in? I do have a word to... Let's sign off the graphs. More to the material side. There is a publisher, the thing I've been working for some decades that might indeed be the place to put this. I want to continue the discussion over there. But it speaks to the idea of just saying, you know, crisis. I want to think of the interwar period. Well, it's called the interwar period. I don't care what we talked about for two days. I think it needs more words to be said to your point. It was our first speaker. He's our last speaker for Kennedy. Thank you so much. Thank you so much. Thanks to the organizers. It's been a splendid conversation. I'm just going to highlight a couple of things. The first and I think probably the most central builds on Jay's point that he's just named, which is that I think this is the fundamental question about 1922 is the extent in nature of continuity with the older empires, right? And I think that one thing that I would stress in thinking about that, that theme is that we're not just talking about the active reformulation of the British and French empires, which is really happening in the form of nations and all the, you know, the very apparatus and all of the rest of it, but also about continuity is from the defeated empires, right? And I think that's one of the things that I would stress is that we're not just talking about the British from the Ottoman sphere, from the Russian sphere, even in a different way, you know, from the Austro-Hungarian sphere, but these are imperial presences that continue to exist in the political leader over the next at least a couple of decades that are going to be longer than that, right? I think that I think we're thinking about and then perhaps also something we have mentioned not at all, which is the emerging American empire, right? Which is in fact building itself up during this period before is the important moment of establishment for their imperial presence in the 20th century in certain ways. We might think about that as a theme that's necessary for at least as a presence as well. The second thing I want to talk about is something I've been hammering on about since the beginning and that is the role of economics and the vision for an economic world order. I think this is a more active conversation in the moment that we sometimes acknowledge and that the abstraction set out that ethnicities and nation states and borders can sometimes serve to obscure the essential material interests that underpin everybody's actions to every one of these multiple histories that I see. So I think I would just encourage a kind of consciousness in that messaging actively engaging forward with the forces that suggest the specifics of these visions and how they might work out, how they might work out, which is equally important. And last but not least, I want to pick up on this point of agency that has been brought up a couple of times, the local actors to meet these new demands to make this new geopolitical reality to gap between what is being said in the negotiable negotiations at the top and how those visions can be implemented. And I think this is a trickier question than we might sometimes think. We'd all like to believe in an agency, right? And there are clearly important moments where local actors and local settings and local contexts are changing and making and shaping the expression of these visions on the ground. But I think we also need to consider the question of agency in the context of the very real effects of violence and the real impact of violence, right? And the way that the kinds of realities of the war, this war era, this war opposition do in fact limit people's choices in very real ways. So I'm suggesting a kind of balanced approach to the question of agency, but simultaneously acknowledges the contributions and actions of local actors, regional actors, and also acknowledges the brutality of this period, right? We talked about the chaos, but we haven't. We also need to emphasize the violence, which is something that goes through 1922, past 1922, and as a feature of the interwar period that leads directly into the next major global population. So I'll close by our entrance, please. Thank you so much. And so we'll move forward. You know, let's say the best for us. I thought about, is somebody else joining in or is it just like, you're the only one who can speak to this. So we can move in your back to King's College, home team, over to Professor Milo to give you a final views on this topic. I'm not trying to get my final views on the topic. Yeah, look how nice. I just want to share. It's the last one. Okay. Some more thing, Ward. Thank you. And it's been a great two days. And I've certainly learned a lot and enjoyed it. So, you know, we, as organizers, all panelists take the time to thank us, but just take this opportunity to thank all the participants. I just want to, things in a different order here. One thing I do want to begin with this, particularly as one of the hosts, and in a sense we are in the Sir Michael Howard Center, the history of war, because this is, you know, it. I just want to say, of course, that I think Sir Michael Howard would definitely approve of this event at this center, because this was his conception of war. It was never narrow. It was never about, you know, guns and cannons and muskets, you know, all that kind of great military operations stuff. He had a very broad vision of the history of war, and this conference certainly hit that spot. Then I have a few other comments that are related, I think to how we might conceive of an edit collection emerging from this. And I have said, it's interesting you brought it to the title and the title you proposed, and Jay's conversation with Laura. And I think having listened to that, I think I would want to just modify your title, your subtitle a bit, with, you know, 1922, or global 1922, I would call it the reinvention of the imperial world order, because I'm not sure it ever disappeared. It just keeps getting reinvented. And if there is something, and you know, I don't know if you're still there, there's something particular about 1922. This is perhaps precisely it. This is the moment when a different kind of global imperial order is beginning to coalesce. Perhaps I'll have a bit more to say about that. Again, I'm just focusing on a potential text. One of the things that's striking, particularly looking at some of the PowerPoints, is just the potential in a book like this and how useful it is these days if we could do this, is to have some of the original photographs, for example, that Michelle Tuzan has in her collection, their other striking photographs, and particularly maps. I mean, I was fascinated to see just some of you pull maps out of the archives, whether it's the Anatolian Civil War or Trieste's sphere of economic reach, whatever. But they're a really fantastic illustration. And of course, the political cartoons that if we could draw parallels across that would be great. This lack of certain Soviet perspective and Soviet barclays has been mentioned by several times. I'll just underscore that. And I think we would have to look and recruit somebody specifically for that particular role. But I have sort of Terry Martin's work on the Soviet Union as a, I think it was supposed to be equal opportunity in the Empire or something. The sort of recreating the nation in form like socialist and substance. And that in relation to the Armenian questions, the foundation of the Armenian Republic, that all strikes as a potential line or avenue of research. I kind of assumed that that had been done, but I've been told by others it hasn't. Structure, agency, the Vienna order, the Paris order. I just, Eric writes, sadly we could never, can't have him join us now. But I think he would have obviously found a lot of interest here. His name has come up many times. But I just want to go back to that article for a moment because when he wrote that, if you look at sort of trace the intellectual lineage, thinking, I won't go down the pot hole of looking for origins, but there's one thing that stands out. It's Paul Schroeder's transformation here in politics as the inspiration for that Weitz's article. And the argument in both Weitz's article, as in Schroeder's work, is that there seems to be sort of one moment that could be sort of a global transformation can take place. And it's normative, and it's about what the emote can call the rules of the game. And what are the rules of the game? And I mentioned this, my own remarks on the opening papers. Putting populations, managing peoples or eliminating peoples at the center of international work from the background of periphery, but right square center. And thinking about organizing space and economic life in relation to populations. And a lot of the, what that would mean in terms of behaviors and behaviors across ideologies, religions, what's always struggling to meet our similarities of behaviors and responses to particular normative changes. And I think I will go into examples as lots from the conference today, and yesterday. What I would say though is, of course, and again, back to this question is, what's special about 1922? I'm not sure if 22 is special, except perhaps as a culmination of a particular range of peacemaking that might connect Treaty of China 1921, the Washington Conference, and the reimagining of China and relations in China. And I'm thinking about the nine-power treaty and the four-power security pact, but also, and of course, Lausanne, but then also bringing the story into China and thinking about how war and nationalism or the idea of the nation is created in the way that Waldron's book on the civil wars in China made, you know, his argument is what makes Chinese nationalism if the civil war is in. So 1922, 23 is deeply important, but part of that rethinking the nation, people, and space. And certainly Chiang Kai-shek thought about it that way. If there were two figures who tended to think about one of the civil suits and then it was Autotürk and the idea of visiting this screened out of all the discussions about Camel and I have that book and I thought somebody else will mention the author's name. I think it's called something like Autotürk and the German Imaginations and they said, do you know the title? It's a wonderful book. And just how the right and the left and the liberals all appropriate the image of Autotürk for their own purposes. He's a successful revolutionary against the Paris settlement but at the same time it's also a liberal modernizer. So anyway, again, thanks everyone for watching. Thank you so much. Thank you so much. So anyway, again, thanks everyone for a wonderful, fascinating two days and plenty to think about. Thanks so much, Joe. So with everybody being extra efficient we're actually left with about 25 minutes maybe we'll finish five minutes before because it's a Friday night but I think we should get, we will go as we did in response to some of these comments and I don't know if anyone wants to raise anything more online but if I can use chairs for a week if I get a question. Well, two questions I wanted to raise and so perhaps I could direct them at people but anybody can come in who would want to respond. So my first one is I was really struck over the last couple of days thinking about the themes of the conference. So in the first presentation we talked about the Travias faced by refugees and then today we'll talk about problems with citizenship and migration movement. I couldn't see that I miss in the newspaper today in the headlines today and we also had a number of themes that I could see to do with nationalism, to do with tensions in communities. So I suppose my first question that might be best directed at perhaps Laura and David there but anybody who wants to come in on this is, you know, is there anything that we can take from this that I know there is value of course as a historian is studying history for the sake of it or is there anything that we can apply which we can take from this? Is there anything you turn to policy makers and say, have you studied this and you know, we're a century on is there anything that we can apply the lessons for policymaking today? And then my second question which I suppose I'll put towards Mark, Joe and Jane and anyone who wants to come in is thinking about our students today on what they are studying in the world, essentially from 9-11 only they think about the impact of the Ukraine crisis today all of these kinds of things 1922 might seem very far far off in their imagination and we were thinking about it partly because of the centenary but also because we think there is value in understanding this moment and how it's shaped the international environment. So I suppose my question is what would be your pitch and I think this might help you to start thinking about a forward or an editorial for the book, why do we we've done two days, okay we've thought a lot about 1922 why do we need to keep thinking about why should we not just be thinking about what's happening in Ukraine today so those are my two questions on pitch to the panel and whoever wants to go first give us a wave and I'll go with whoever waves at me first I do think 1922 is about Ukraine I'm impressed with my presentation something happened to the institutions of war and of course in the first year we weren't crowded before of course with which we are struggling today it's easy to be moralistic and say evil matters to us but there's something we've learned that is making a modern army kill children and others all these are criminal acts the criminal acts come out of history in history I believe it's present, visible achingly visible, viscerally visible not to change you raise the applied history question and you direct it to Laura and then they don't mind, just jump in what I would say is the absolute lesser of everything we've heard is that when you dehumanize the person on the boat whether it's a refugee or displaced person or whatever terms you want to use you create a dispersive space to murder them or abuse them in some way and that is actually the lesson and to make it very specific shift them off to somewhere else even this is the lesson can I jump in? yes please go for it well first of all yesterday Jay began as he just said making several plans to the situation in Ukraine which I think was a great thing to do and very necessary for all of us and probably the wider audience I would also to add that there is a similarity there is a difference between 1922 precisely when it comes to comparing and contrasting Ukraine with the events of late 1922 and Greece and Turkey and all the rest it has to do with international organizations and the League of Nations and the UN we had the visit in Kiev of the Secretary General and the United Nations have been quite absent from this crisis just for very different reasons just like the League of Nations was absent or it was decorative I mean it was an ornament they didn't decide much and here there is something that we could think of because at that time that kind of international organization was brand new underfunded its human resources were extremely limited etc etc and its political leverage was what it was very little or insignificant when you look at the United Nations today you have plenty of questions and since I live in Geneva I have an awful lot of question marks when it comes to the role that the United Nations have not played so far in this conflict so it speaks to the current crisis of multilateralism as well precisely I think that I hesitate to answer your question because I am very skeptical about the idea of usable history I have been spending the year in DC the Wilson Center one of their fundamental models is actionable ideas I think it is not a functional thing because there is no universal agreement on what an optimal policy outcome is and so I think that my takeaway largely has been building on the excellent work that humanitarianism is essentially fraudulent and that in fact I think we could make the argument that much of the 21st century internationalism has also been essentially fraudulent and the hunger out of where national interests and so as a historian I think the best thing we can do is expose the actual interests that lie behind these kinds of decisions that lay behind the depressed that lie behind the present so that they are visible for action by others and that I am not sure that lends itself easily to a kind of practice of making policy recommendations from a different perspective I think that is not what we should be making doing here as historians in general but rather kind of laying there the impulses the practices the developments of these systems and acknowledging for whom we were built and what interests they served actually is an important forward act and so I think that this is a project that could contribute to that if not necessarily pointing the way towards some sort of better future absolutely and I think by saying I think there is also you know something moment for the sake of it but I think what we were speaking about in fact too was that there was a presentation of continuities and fractures so we can see what things were creating and serving those interests and perhaps where we might cause a lot of trouble where it is staying the same today where at least it is posing it might land us a bit weight that balance of humanitarianism a bit more the way is ideal yes George just like to be passing to black history here he is calling to not really so there is a centre for a grand strategy which I am part of which is what got me thinking about is where we work on a life history so we try to we all talk to each other yeah and I think just a footnote and I kind of work through what Laura said would be think think carefully of the vocabulary one uses to conceptualise problems as questions and then try to flash solutions because I think one take away from at least some time to speak from that you know the easiness the unthoughtfulness the kind of reliance that are really coming up in thought group of thought that commentators whatever it is you use to conceptualise something as a problem be it naturally for you and then come up with a fitting solution for that problem but partly in that solving the problem and that is I would find a partner in being able to think and conceptualising problems of international problems today and of being able to think and conceptualise things such as for instance the Ukrainian question I'm pretty sure if I ask all of you here we may come up with different finishes about the Ukrainian question maybe we're not in that kind of question I'm sure you're right but this year language is part of the history of 1922 the specificity of the language but I do think we actually have to break out of English you know the whole concept the word civilization itself is not the same in civilization having a range of linguistic categories I think is part of the essential place of the work that you're doing in understanding this particular matter so I see it as a broad based multidisciplinary matter with the necessity of having a focus around particular moments how do you define the moment is the class that I want to raise is the year really what would you call it icon civilising a bigger period it's catchy it's good or it is a collection of essays from the European university and there are good essays too there's room for more what about the idea of using one year as a what would you call it is anyone a Jagdman maybe it's worth raising it's a conceit well I think the first lecture I put this a while ago was when does world war II really begin so it gives you everything we're talking about does it begin in 1915 but certainly as a discursive point to think about I think what Davide said about continuities and lectures what's new about this moment there was somebody with hands raised on the chat Michelle are you with us did you want to contribute something well this is really interesting 1922 is a moment but I want to get back to what Lena started us with Professor Venturis we have to pay attention to the domestic and the local and this idea that humanitarianism is something imposed from above is something I think we as historians should be really skeptical about because humanitarianism takes place in a local context and we risk really reproducing the hubris of Anglo-American imperialism by saying it's not just the ones who get soup from the soup kitchen but the governments and the local actors and the intermediaries who are actually administering aid and I think that was the point of Professor Venturis idea here is that it isn't something that goes one direction it's not perfect and it's not like a government can just say yes to certain aid and no to other aid but to say that the project based on a set of premises that has no no counter in the local and the regional I think is too dangerously reproduced that American Euro Anglo-European hubris and I think one of the things that I think it's important about 1922 is it allows us to tell different stories about the war that have been outside of the narrative so when we ask questions about an event that really has been part of someone else's national history the Armenian genocide, Smyrna and we actually say this is part of a narrative of the war I think we are disrupting that narrative that privileges particular kinds of events in a context that have given us really the boundaries of how this war has existed and began and ended and I do think 1922 is a good moment for us to be disruptive with a narrative of the war that has been incredibly Eurocentric in its sensibilities and to allow us by talking about what's happening on the edges, what was once considered the edges and to center them and it allows us to get back to what this local regional context that there are other things happening and people are paying attention to them persons unmixing a population's idea does not come out of thin air it comes out of the context of engagement with these kinds of tragedies and Smyrna is not just one of many tragedies but I think we can really think of it as a sort of hallmark that is emblematic of the difficulties of thinking about a war that just won't and so I would really encourage us to not replicate this idea that the war narrative must fit within particular boundaries and privilege certain kinds of events and certain moments because we always have done it but what if we went from the perspective of national histories and said why do the Greeks care so much about Smyrna why do the Armenians care so much about the Armenian genocide what does that actually mean when we think about it in the larger narrative of the war and I think in that way we can in some ways disrupt which is I guess the language of the day disrupt, decolonize whatever it is our understanding of the war World War I as a European war and I think until we do that we're not really being honest with how we periodize this position so I would just encourage that kind of disruption and I love the idea of 1922 as a disruptive moment but I think that's absolutely valid, it speaks to you I think that's been the emerging theme which shows that even after two days new knowledge and new perspectives and this is definitely coming out but certainly even as a group I definitely concur with what you're saying about our own positionality in relation to the research we're doing because something comes from multiple which is a British colony whenever I study these topics I already automatically come at it either from a different perspective than perhaps some of my peers there and we try to see where do our biases and preconceptions and where are we finding those intersections so definitely agree with that so we've only got about five minutes and I want to leave you a chance to perhaps judge the space and find a word so what I would just do is last time and I had a great pleasure of saying the big thank you to you really and to the organizing team for putting together such a professional conference and such a rich program especially spread over two days it's been an absolute pleasure to participate and especially the doing it hybrid is extra challenging but it gave I took a lot of people the opportunity to participate and wouldn't have been able to otherwise so I hope this is only the start of many of these conversations certainly this side of the room are talking books already so there's a lot a lot of the air but you should you know all of us you should be thankful for everything you've done to put this together so one last slide and I was serious about the conference everything about the Greek Turkish where I too have got me thinking was from 1824 with a fire I was writing about the alternatives of the Greeks and he said history with all of our last knowledge has only plus one page so I hope we're going to be writing a new page on this topic and not just the same thing that's been said before so thank you for bringing us together for the chats to do this thank you so I think so okay well thanks everyone I just really want to thank any people for her magnificent help making this format work I really thank the 17 of you and those contributing it's been a challenge today technologically wise but I think we've made it work so this is great thank also to all of you for helping us out with the social media and I just really don't want any of course Anna thanks Anna is a writer and a student here at the Center for Hellenic Status for Hepinus II I'll just I'll say that our conversation will continue and you know we'll email you shortly about the next steps but you know the words we've expressed I mean in an island that actually bears the branch of the historical memory of this equation and kind of of these waves that's the island of Samus we'll be in touch with you shortly and thank you very much all for for this that's wonderful thank you