 Welcome everyone to Bogle Heads On Investing episode number 44. Today our special guest is Eric Balchunis, senior ETF analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence. Eric recently wrote a book, The Bogle Effect. How John Bogle and Vanguard turned Wall Street inside out and saved investors' trillion. Hi everyone, my name is Rick Ferri and I'm the host of Bogle Heads On Investing. This episode, as with all episodes, is brought to you by the John C. Bogle Center for Financial Literacy, a 501C3 non-profit organization. Please visit BogleCenter.net. Your tax-deductible dollars are greatly appreciated. Today our special guest is Eric Balchunis, senior ETF analyst for Bloomberg Intelligence. Eric was my guest on episode number 15, where we talked about his former book, The Institutional ETF Toolbox. This time we're talking about a new book, The Bogle Effect. And what exactly is the Bogle Effect? It's not just Jack Bogle's life, it's not just Vanguard, but it's the influence that he had on an entire industry, in fact, the entire world. You can pre-order today and it will be published on April 26th. So with no further ado, let me introduce Eric Balchunis. Welcome again to The Bogle Heads On Investing podcast, Eric. Oh, it's great to be here, Rick. I'm a big fan of the podcast and all the work you do. Well, last time you were here was episode number 15. So it was a couple of years ago. Back then we were talking about your previous book, The Institutional ETF Handbook. And this time we're going to be talking about your new book, The Bogle Effect. How Jack Bogle and Vanguard turned Wall Street inside out and saved investors trillions. And I have to say, you've done a wonderful job with this book. But before we jump into that, I mean, your job at Bloomberg is the senior ETF analyst. And as we both know, Jack Bogle thought that ETFs were a product of the devil. So what is an ETF analyst doing writing a book about Jack Bogle? Well, it's a good question, Rick, because Bogle was very animated and colorful in his critique of ETFs over the years. I know because I went to interview him multiple times and challenged him on this and asked him questions about ETFs. But my first time really sitting down interviewing him came in about 2013-ish. And I was writing a book on ETFs, which you mentioned. And I wanted to get his take on them, some of the trends going on like Smart Beta. I wanted to include him in the book. I write my books like some of my documentaries. And I like a lot of voices in there to give the topics more angles and color. And I thought Bogle on ETFs would be a way to get the green vegetables, you know, so I don't get too carried away with ETFs. Let's get, let's get the grandfather Puritan voice in here to maybe give the other side of the ETF story. And he was critical and I put some of his criticisms in my first book, but I kept pushing back. And at the end of the day, I think his problem was trading and marketing. That said, there's plenty of ETFs that aren't really full of gimmicky marketing and that are not traded that much. And so he did admit that and acknowledge that over the years, but that was ultimately his issue. And I have a chapter in the book called Bogle and ETFs, It's Complicated. One of the reasons I wrote this book as an ETF analyst is that I was shocked and it always stuck with me. When I interviewed Steve Bloom, who created the first ETF with Nate Most that the American Stock Exchange, he told me the story of going to Bogle's office, talking to him about ETFs, Bogle giving him some advice, but saying, you're never going to use the Vanguard fund for this. But he was nice. And one thing he said was, well, we priced the first ETF spy at 20 basis points of a fee. And just for clarification, spy is the spider S&P 500 ETF. The first ETF launched in the US. It's the biggest to this day. It's basically king of the ETF world. And it was the first one launched and it had a price point of 20 basis points. And why did they do that? And he said, because Vanguard's 500 index mutual fund was 20 basis points at the time, which is pretty cheap, especially in the 90s. This is absolutely major. And it really dawned on me that the ETF industry would be a tiny fraction of itself had Vanguard and the mutual ownership structure not gotten to 20 basis points at that point. These are guys from the American Stock Exchange. They weren't exactly like retail people. We know Wall Street. They probably would have priced it at 80 or 90 because that's just what you can get away with back then until Vanguard hit the scene. And that is huge because if you start to think about that, you realize that the ETF industry is almost largely built off of retail and advisors at this point. And there's no way they're buying a ETF at 80, 90 basis points, maybe a couple, maybe at the fringes it would have some assets. But I just think that was an interesting link and something where I thought, wow, Vogel had this profound effect on something that he hated. And then as I researched this book, I realized over and over this was the case. I get what you're saying exactly. And I really love the title of the book, the Vogel effect, because what you just described was part of the Vogel effect, which was that even though Vanguard didn't create ETFs and Jack hated ETFs, that he had such a profound influence right at the beginning in the ETF marketplace. And this perpetuates through many, many things that we're going to talk about here on this podcast. It's not just index investing, it's the whole entire industry and not only in the US, but now around the world. And so the Vogel effect is just growing in many different directions. So I think it's a great title. The book, which I found fascinating, of course, I'm a Vogel head and I read all this stuff, kind of a geek if you will. And thanks for mentioning me a few times in the book as well. I appreciate that. You've done a great job describing who Jack Vogel really was. People used to call him Saint Jack, right? I mean, he was like this side, as soon as he had this idea about indexing, you know, his world changed and he was all about indexing and so forth. But that's not really true. And I think that you brought that out of the book and I think it's interesting. So this is sort of the true story of Jack Vogel and Vanguard and the rise of Vogelism, if you will. You know, Vogel was an investor, activist, most of the time during his life, although not all of the time. And so let's start with Jack Vogel, the beginning, and the fact is he was an active investor. Yeah. So he ran Wellington, which was a balanced fund. It was the big Wellington fund was balanced and it was active. And I think, you know, had had some, I'll go into the, but had a crisis not emerged at Wellington, I believe he would have stayed there. He was happy there, but fate intervened. And what was interesting is he had this balance fund and everybody can identify with it because it's just like this era. The last 10 years, you know how growth stocks have gone wild. They've sold off a little this year, but for the last 10 years, if you're a value investor or doing anything conservative, you probably had a tough time in the past decade. And so it was similar situation where there were funds like ARC just going wild and basically capturing and riding this wave and his Wellington fund was conservative and it wasn't going well. They were losing customers and assets and clients and his boss Walter Morgan said, okay, look, I'm going to hand the firm over to you at age 35. I need you to fix it. So he said, look, I was selling bagels and everybody wanted donuts across the street. So I thought we should start selling donuts. And it's a great metaphor because donuts are sweet and just like, you know, high performing funds are in a similar way, sweet, but maybe not good for you. And so he looked to try to team up with an equity company that was good at equities and he went through like four or five people and actually think he brought this up on your podcast. I think he was on the first one, I'm sure, right? Yeah, he was my first guest. He said he went to Capital Group. They didn't want to, they weren't interested. He goes to Franklin, they weren't interested. And ultimately, he lands at Thorndike, which had this iVest fund and it was a real popular fund. And so it wasn't his first choice. These were like his fourth or fifth choice. And they were really polar opposites and for a while it worked. It was like they had gotten chocolate to match with the peanut butter. It seemed good. But then the market basically dropped after the 60s were over in the early 70s. I feel like I believe it was 35% in two years. And basically they had changed the Wellington fund to be almost all equities. And so the Wellington fund went down as much as the market. Just rewinding the story a little bit. So during this period of time, the go-go years of the late 1960s, you had companies like Xerox and Polaroid, IBM, Avon, Extron. I remember all the Tron stocks actually. These are the Facebooks and the Googles of the day, if you will. These were the Teslas of their day. And they were not in it at Wellington. And so they were trailing far behind the rest of the market and losing assets. But then when they brought in these other managers and they did load up the Wellington with these stocks, unfortunately, you got, if you were a Wellington investor, you not only did not keep up with the market during the 60s, but now you had all these other stocks. It's like buying ARC at the peak and then boom, down it comes. And you lost 40% when these stocks dropped. So you didn't get any of the upside. You got very little of the upside. And you got all the down. He must have been in some really deep trouble. Yeah. I imagine he felt he betrayed his boss, his mentor, and himself. And he was pissed off. And apparently he was no picnic to deal with either. I can't say. In his books, he sort of writes himself as the victim. And I guess there's some of that, although he admits I made a mistake hiring these guys or emerging with them. And he gave them effective operating control of the board or voting control of the board. He gave away too much in the deal. Anyway, they had voting control of the board and they were not into him and they fired him. But then he realized that he was actually chairman of the funds themselves. Yeah. And to explain that, explain that a little bit. Yeah. It's a quirk in the system. Like Wellington's the investment advisor. And the funds are like shell companies themselves. So they hire an administrator, an advisor. And so there's the board of the company, Wellington, and there's the board of each fund. And so Jack was chairman of the funds. And so he had some power. They didn't realize this. And so he decided to basically dig in and as chairman of the funds, sort of fight to keep control of something versus Wellington, the company. And it was actually a pretty brilliant move. He's basically starting a young family at this point. The pressure's on. So he had a lot going on, but he's a fighter. I mean, this guy is, he's not going to like just go away. You tell the story in the book, he used to play squash. And he had a heart condition. And so he used to bring a defibrillator to the court. And he would tell his opponent that if he passed out, you know, run and get the defibrillator and, you know, shock him back, which I assume he would continue to play at that point. I mean, this is the kind of person he was. Yeah. I mean, this guy was hardcore. And especially the issue with his heart, he was supposed to die like 10 times. He was told he wasn't going to live past 35, 40. I think being that close to death all the time probably gave him a jolt of life in a fight that maybe, you know, other people don't have. And it may be a sense of purpose. So back to the bifurcation period, you have Bogle on one side and the Thorn Dyke guys on the other. Bogle and the board and they all say, look, we have a mess in our hands. Bogle, why don't you come up with a way to basically come up with a solution in which your funds can live in harmony with Wellington the company. So Bogle and his two assistants, Jen Twardowski in particular, it seems like a scene from Jerry Maguire. They crammed and wrote this 250 page report with a couple solutions. They needed some kind of a solution where they could just work together without, you know, even though they hated each other. And so the board of the funds, which actually had, I think, three people from the Thorn Dyke crew, and I think seven or eight from the Philadelphia Wellington side that were more friendly to Jack, but still there were three on there from the Thorn Dyke side. So they needed something and the board wanted it to be unanimous. So basically Jack had to propose something that would make it seem like he wasn't trying to make out like a bandit or impose too much control and also mess with Wellington or Thorn Dyke's desire to run money. So the solution was you become a back office administrator for the funds and you can mutual and will mutualize. Therefore it doesn't look like I'm in this for money or anything. And so that's sort of how he was able to get the unanimous approval of the board and keep his job. And then he took about 25, 30 people with him and that he decided to call that company Vanguard. And just to clarify, you say back office administration, I mean what does that cover? Basically all the funds have holdings and you have to calculate what the value is every day. Basically all the operational details that go into sending out the NAV, the numbers, keeping track of it. We're probably working with the custodian. Basically all the not fun stuff, Wellington, the company that Thorn Dyke was now running, they would still be the investment advisor. So they would run the money and do the investments, which is what they liked anyway. So the back office is an unsung job. It's necessary for any fund to operate, but I think most people would find accounting and administrative tasks pretty boring. So they went ahead and went with that. So Vanguard got started. It was kind of a non-event, if you will. The media didn't really even pick it up. It was not a big deal. It was just, okay, Wellington is going to offload this back office administrative stuff to this new entity that they formed. That's not a profit center, if you will. It's just at cost and it's called Vanguard. I mean it probably didn't even make the last page of the Wall Street Journal at the time. That's right. And that was a way to sell it to the Thorn Dyke side because they thought, okay, fine, you do the back office. We'll run money. That's what we're good at anyway. That's what we want to do. And we can now move forward together, even though we're not friends. And that was the deal they made. But then something happened, right? How did they end up starting the S&P 500 fund if they can't run money? Yeah, again. And the serendipity in that story is ridiculous, right? The amount of things that had to happen just for Vanguard, the mutual to be born, were crazy. Then for Vanguard to launch an index fund, it was also a crazy serendipitous situation because you read an article by Paul Samuelson right after he started Vanguard. So good timing. And Paul Samuelson was saying, so much has just set up an index fund just so we can benchmark all these gun-slinging active managers and see how they're what they're really worth. Also Burton Malkiel, who was talking about if there isn't an S&P 500 index fund, there should be. And that was quoted in his random walk down Wall Street book, which was published in 1973. And there were some other people as well, like Charles Ellis and other folks who were alluding to the fact that they should be index funds. And Bogle just like, you know what? I'll do it. And that I won't be running money. We can actually try to sell it to our board by saying this isn't running money because it's passive. So he actually got it through, as he says later in the interview, they actually bought it. Because even I think he thought, well, this is a real, this is a big technicality I'm trying to drive a truck through, but he got it through. And that was a way for him to sort of follow up. He liked the idea. He saw the returns were pretty good versus the group of active funds. The data was there. Paul Samuelson buying in helped him a lot because he has academic credentials like I work for Kennedy. And so Bogle was able to get that idea through the board. And then they filed for the first, I think it was called the first investment trust that was in Vanguard at first. And then that was in, I believe, 75. In fact, there were attempts at doing index funds in the early 70s before Vanguard through Wells Fargo and Battery March Financial and American National Bank in Chicago. So there were other attempts at this. This is, if you will, not Jack Bogle's idea, correct? No, I don't think it was. And I think anybody would debate that. And in the book, I have a small section called the origins of indexing. And I go back to MIT, Chicago, John Mack McWown, who worked at Wells Fargo. It kind of reminded me of the PC and Steve Jobs. Steve Jobs did not invent the PC or personal computing. But in every business, there's usually somebody who's able to bring it to the masses. And that's a whole different ballgame. The other thing is, even though people could have an ideal idea of this and think about it and buying the S&P, it's a different story when you have to sell it to your big boss at the bank or whatever. Well, I'm not going to sell a fund for three basis points or whatever, 20. They want to make money. And so to me, again, this brought me back to why I really focused on Bogle, because none of this really happens to any extent like it has happened without it, the mutual structure. And that structure is why indexing is popular. It's because it's cheap. The index just happened to be the perfect vehicle for the mutual ownership structure and an idea whose time was ready. So Bogle was in the right place, right time, and the index fund was. Honestly, I actually have this statement in the book, which is that indexing and index funds needed Vanguard, more than Vanguard needed index funds, if that makes any sense. Yeah, it was the structure of Vanguard and the nonprofit nature of it, which allowed this to eventually grow. Although it didn't at first, right? I mean, the mistake that was made was they tried to raise their initial capital through the brokerage industry and that did not go well. No, there were stories about them going out and pitch they used those, well, what if I could tell you could go out into golf course and shoot par? Would you lock into par? And they said that played okay. But basically they wouldn't pay brokers. That was problem number one. And number two is it really is a hard concept to understand. It's counterintuitive to think that just buying all the stocks in a market cap weight would actually be good. So I spend a good chunk of the chapter on the index fund, not essentially on why indexing makes sense or doesn't, but just how Bogle sold it. And he had to sell it outside of the system, which makes it even harder. It's like making a movie and no cable channel will carry you. No movie theater will carry you. You basically have to sell it outside of the entire system. And it took a long time because of that. And it took a long time because of the counterintuitive nature of it. So he was very creative. I think some of the ways he did it was to show the growth of $10,000 if you get 5% versus 7%. But he had to take that direct to the public. And so the idea of going through the brokerage industry to raise capital, according to Jack Bogle, they were trying to raise $150 million. That's what he said in my interview before they launched this fund, which ultimately did launch in 1976. But they ended up only raising through the brokerage industry $11 million. In fact, in my interview with Jack, you should not even launch the fund if all you have is $11 million. I mean, it should never have existed. Yeah. It gives the story some drama because here you have this flop. Everybody knows it's a big deal today, but it flopped. But you have to put yourself in the time and place and wonder, would you have kept it going? Plus keep in mind they launched it when Wellington, again, those funds were within an 80-month streak of outflows. It was just a brutal time, but they hung in there. I think he just believed in the idea. It took Vanguard 25 years to even get 10% market share. That is a long time. And if you look at a chart of all the people who ran Vanguard, Jack's time is the line of assets is all the way at the bottom for his whole tenor. It only starts to go up after he passed it off. But that groundwork was so major and the blood, sweat, and tears of hanging in there. And if you read his book, Character Counts, it's all his speeches from speech in 81, 82. It's like the Christmas party speeches. And each one is like, hey, we got to $3 billion. Can you believe it? And every billion is this huge victory. Now they've taken over a billion a day. It's wild. Interesting. You say that because the Vanguard S&P 500 was going back to the the story of the Vanguard S&P 500, the first investor trust being launched in 1976 and with only 11 million, they couldn't even buy 500 stocks. They could only buy about 275 stocks. And now the thing was, and I had asked him this on my podcast and I really was mind blowing is that the first fund manager, the one who did the trading in that account was one of his assistants who was run part-time, this is his quote, by a young woman whose full-time job was to work with her husband at her husband's furniture store in Wilmington, Delaware. I mean, you can't make this stuff up. Yeah, I remember my second time I interviewed Jack and when he told me that story, I almost fell over. I was like, really? It speaks to the sort of small business upstart kind of atmosphere that was happening at the time and how, again, big ideas or sometimes seem so not a big idea at the time. You make a good point by not having all the stocks and having a high fee. I think it launched in the like 45, 50 basis points. The tracking was pretty bad. I think it might have missed the index by 60, 70 basis points, which today would be like a horror show. If you look at a chart over time, the fee came down and the tracking got better. They brought in Gus Souter to really sort of bring his math skills and his ability to trade and he really, really tightened up the tracking. Again, today, it's not just that the total market fund has three basis points, but it's actually zero because they're able to use securities lending and some passive management acumen to make up a couple bits. Again, that's a modern miracle that you can get free exposure even beyond the fee. It's funny that when they first tried to pass the idea of an index fund to the board, they couldn't call the person running in a portfolio manager. They called J. N. Twardowski a portfolio administrator. They didn't have any money in the fund. They couldn't buy all 500 stocks until, I believe it was 1977 when Wellington merged one of their funds, one of their large cap funds into the S&P 500, which brought the assets up enough to be able to buy all 500 stocks. Then this was now the true replication of the S&P 500. They also fired all the brokers. They went to no-load direct to the consumer product with this fund. Even then, though, it took years, I think, till they first got a billion dollars. It was something like at least 10 more years before that fund actually took in a billion dollars in assets. Yeah. The amount of time it took was another thing that drew me to the story. The other thing that I found interesting was not only everything you just said, but as it did get a little traction, they would turn down money regularly. I was shocked by that. Gus Souter told me that on multiple occasions, they'd have a big institution wanting to come in for a month, but they were like, get out of here. We don't want your money. Turning down money is something that a private equity manager would do where perhaps you're in an area of the market that isn't liquid, like small caps. For a young large cap fund to turn down money is really shocking. I think it speaks to the walk the walk. This guy was all in and was able to really discipline himself in a way that's so difficult in this industry. People lose their minds. They want money. They want to get rich. I get it. It's what draws people to Wall Street. This guy just seemed to not have any of that bug or any of those sort of tendencies, which enabled him, I think, to walk this really straight line, even if it meant slowing their growth rate. He just seemed to be somebody who almost was miscast in the whole industry. There's so many stories like that, which are just the opposite of what the natural tendency is for people in asset management to do. I think what it took to last all that time, I think also the pain of working with the Thorn Dyke guys and the idea of selling your soul during a bull market only to lose out, I think that lesson allowed him to walk that straight line through many cycles and through many opportunities where he could have taken a faster route to higher assets. It was purposely taking the slower, more prudent route. That core of investors that is long-term and his absolute protection of them is really, in my opinion, why today when there's a sell-off, you still see money going into Vanguard funds. People are like, how come Vanguard can take in all this money when everybody else is losing money because the market's down? I'm like, you have to go to the core and how it was built and how people found it and the trust gained. That's why I wanted to tell the story, it explained so much today. I want to circle back a minute to mid 1970s when the first index fund was formed. There was this whole academia thing going on called efficient market hypothesis. People sometimes link indexing to the efficient market hypothesis, saying, well, you can't beat the market. The market is the most efficient way to invest. That's what Bogo believed and that's why index funds were formed. But none of that is true. He didn't even know that the efficient market hypothesis was going on, even what it was, until long after he created the first index fund. This whole idea of you can't beat the market because the markets are efficient. Jack Bogo never said that. He was not anti-active. No, not at all. Vanguard is the third biggest active manager today. Bogo took almost more pride in the Wellington fund in his books than any other fund and that's active. He loved the prime cap fund. I will say that the way he talks about why those funds are successful, it reminds me of the book Moneyball and Saber Metrics, whereas most active managers are like, I found this perfect formula. I found this premium and they're highly educated and they are able to sell that. Bogo basically gave credit for why his active funds outperformed because of the costs. He was able to keep eliminating basis points from their costs. He also had in some cases multiple managers. He wanted them to be more conservative, not trade a lot. I call them Bogo Metrics. Those data points, he attributed to why his active funds were so good. He was okay with active, but he thought that costs really brought down most of the managers. In his book, he says a lot of them are highly educated. They're nice. They're honorable people, but they have math working against them. They have cost working against them and the efficient market hypothesis. I put in here that I get it and I think you could argue that like, okay, there's all these people covering Amazon stock. What could you possibly know? For some big stocks, I think it does pass the sniff test. Of course, Amazon is properly priced because there's all this information. Everybody knows everything, but the sniff test in a holistic sense doesn't work. People probably would argue Tesla's overvalued. It doesn't seem efficient right now. Meme stocks. The market never seems perfectly efficient. What Bogo came up with, he riffed off of that and said, I'm going to do something called the cost matters hypothesis. He wrote a journal of indexing article on it. That does pass the sniff test. I think when people think about how much cost eat up, especially in a compounding way, and they see charts of dollars and cents, I think that passes their sniff test. I think Bogo was actually good, smart to avoid attaching himself with EMH and way better to focus on the cost, which are, it's not as sexy, it's not as interesting, probably not going to get any Nobel prizes, but it really, that's where the trillions of savings has come from, is just the costs. That's what he honed in on. And that was probably his number one thing overall, beyond indexing, even beyond trading, I think, and his son told me this. He said, he was preaching low costs from the day I was born until the day he died. Vanguard was able to launch the S&P 500 because it wasn't managed, they were just administering it. But when they did get permission to manage money, some of the first funds that they launched were actively managed funds. They experimented with quant funds and they experimented with thematic funds and they experimented with style funds, correct? They had the first value in growth funds. I mean, this was not an indexing shop, per se. Yeah, this is one of the most fascinating things about Bogo is he spearheaded all of these things. He innovated all over the place. Those growth value funds were innovative at the time. He had a quantitative fund in 87 that sounds normal today, but it was not normal back then. Bond funds, he innovated there, international, and even themes. Vanguard did have a couple of theme funds. What I found interesting is he would later in life come to trash all of it. He would trash things he innovated and launched over and over and over. I think over his life, he just came to the conclusion that if you just can't do better than buying the total market, that was his true love. I think the total market, even beyond the S&P, buy the total market and just wait 50 years. I think anything outside of that, he came to just say it's just not worth it. It's going to mess you up. It's not necessary. I have a big theme in my book where I talk about this concept of addition by subtraction. To me, that was almost the name of the book because if you took Bogo's life work, I think it was taking this industry and just subtracting and subtracting and subtracting all the stuff you don't need to your left with basically frictionless exposure that's the most efficient way to grow wealth over 40, 50 years. For him, that was the total market fund. Once you block into that, you start to look at your past innovations and funds and you're like, why did I even launch this? There was a lot of conflict at the end, especially between Bogo trashing stuff at Vanguard that was actually doing quite well and taking in money. It's kind of weird. Studying Bogo and listening to him over 25 years and dedicating my professional life towards that idea, I came to this four-step process that people go through. The first step is called darkness, where you don't know what's going on or you're trying to beat the market and you're out chasing dreams, if you will. That's darkness. Then you have enlightenment. Enlightenment is when you discover indexing. For Jack Bogle, that happened in 1975 and they launched the first fund in 1976. He discovered the basic concept of indexing as a better solution, low fee. This is the way to do it. Then you get into the next phase, which is complexity. As I look at John Bogle's life in Vanguard and what they did, they took indexing to a different level with many of these quant funds, a type of an index fund, because all they were doing was eliminating what they thought were the high cost stocks in one of their quant funds. It's complexity. You take something that's very simple and you just make it more complex, value investing, growth investing, factor investing, all of this. Then finally, if you've done that enough, you get to the last stage, which is simplicity. What you just described, what I noticed in watching Jack Bogle's evolution over the 35-year period in my own evolution in this industry was you do eventually get to simplicity. Total stock market is the place to be. Total bond market, total international. This is all you need. Once you get to that phase, you're at the fourth and final Nirvana stage, if you will. That's what I learned from Bogle in at least his final year. It finally occurred to me that this is what he was doing. In fact, by the time Jack Bogle retired in 1996, he had the four funds, if you will, that when necessary for this, he had developed a total stock market index fund. He had developed a total international stock index fund. He had developed a total bond market index fund. Then he had another one for real estate. I throw that in because real estate is a big part of the economy, but not a very big part of the stock market. We had the essentials to do a simple investing using just a few three-fund or perhaps four-fund portfolio. A lot of people I interviewed are fans of international. He would actually say almost half of the stuff you just named, you don't need. Again, he actually started to cut away stuff that would, I think, traditionally be looked at as a main core holding for most people. International is probably the biggest area. I found three things that he thought that almost everybody who loves and disagreed with. ETFs, international, and the idea that the asset management industry will ultimately all go or mutualize. Almost everybody I spoke with basically said, I love them, but I disagree with them on those issues. But you have to take them all seriously and at least consider them. I talked to Dan Egan of Betterment about the international. I think he put it best when he said, well, Rome fell. You can't argue with that. And I think that's one area where I agree with Dan and not Bogle. I think international is good to own just in case for that diversification purposes. But Bogle would probably argue, well, 40% of US stocks get the revenue from overseas. Therefore, you're already exposed. But anyway, that's, again, if simplification is those four things you named, he's beyond Nirvana, I guess, because he got it down to just basically the total market. And I think he did own some bonds on the side. I think he had some munis and stuff for tax purposes though. But beyond that, that was mainly, and once he locked into that utter, utter simplicity of one holding, it was just hard for him. It's not Bogle's nature to not speak his mind. So that had him, again, at the end of his career, kind of bashing and dumping on a lot of stuff that was taking in money at Vanguard. So I used to have this chart back in the day when I would go around to presentations and I'm like, Vanguard is so in the zone right now that they're taking in cash and stuff that Bogle trashes regularly. Smart beta, international. And I'm like, that's how powerful Vanguard has gotten is that the founder is dumping on these areas and they're crushing. So let's get into the Bogle effect. So we've talked just about Vanguard and what Vanguard did and how they grew and the different things that Jack Bogle tried and ultimately getting to the total market portfolios. But it's just not Vanguard. I mean, the Bogle effect is throughout the entire industry, I would say throughout and much of the economy. And globally, this effect that he created through low fee or cost matter hypothesis just grabbed hold. I wrote a book about ETFs back a few years ago and the bottom line is it all has Bogle in it. The whole ETF industry has Bogle in it, even though he hated ETFs. Yeah. So this was fascinating. And I remember when Vanguard cut their commissions on their trading platform, maybe five years ago, they had a commission free ETFs. They were really the first major one to go to commission free trading ETFs. Everybody followed. And it was that point I said, wait, Vanguard is actually leading in that. And then I really started to unpack where their impact is coming from. So you have the trading platforms largely followed Vanguard going commission free. Then you've got other people launching index funds and ETFs at the same price points as Vanguard funds because Vanguard has 50% of the passive market share. But the other 50% are people who basically copied them. And a lot of people in the book would say something like they did it kicking and screaming Vanguard did it because they wanted to and that mattered to them. But they all acknowledged that Vanguard was probably the reason those other firms came in at those low price points. And then you look at something like the advisor world and behavior. And I know this is a great topic you love, but I would also argue that the bogal effect is huge in behavior, not just because bogal railed against trading. We know that trading was right up there on his deadly sins, but that the index fund gave people something worth holding. A cheap index fund was such an innovation and such a value proposition was so high. And people who lock into an index fund, I think if you ask them, they would say, well, even if the market's down, what am I going to do? Jump on some fund that might have had a good year. I'm in a good spot. That makes behavior so much easier. So I know people preach behavior and they give credit to some of these studies, but honestly, behavior has gotten way easier because of the cheap index fund. So that tool has really allowed for this whole birth of this new generation of advisors who are very behaviorally focused. And it's helped their clients save and build their wealth over the years. There's been a lot of sell-offs over the past 12 years. And if you basically dumped everything, you have lost out on a lot of future gains. So behavior is something I think Vanguard had a role in two parts, just the preaching of don't trade. And it's the idea that you now have something worth holding. And I think there's a resignation, a positive resignation by a lot of people who own the cheap index fund that I'm done. I'm just not going to run around trying to find something better. And that's why you see them taking flows even during sell-offs. Well, it's interesting because I've been an advisor for almost 35 years now. And so I've lived through this evolution. And the advisors didn't want to do the indexing thing at first. Back in the 1990s, when I converted over to indexing, they didn't want to do it. They were the masters, if you will. They would take these mutual funds and mix them and match them and try to outperform the market and find the active managers that were going to outperform and so forth. But as they began to see flows going out and as more and more studies were published showing that indexing was in fact outperforming, they finally came into it. And then you had the evolution of ETFs, which made it easier to trade these index funds. It was hard being at, let's say, a Charles Schwab or someplace and trying to trade Vanguard index funds, because sometimes they didn't allow you to trade certain class shares. And they were high commissioned to buy them. So when ETFs came along, it just, for advisors who weren't custodian at Vanguard, it just made indexing so much easier. And even the brokerage industry now, when I was a broker where I started out, the only thing I could buy was SPY, the S&P 500 and MDY, the S&P 400 mid cap. And that was in the, let's say 1996, 1997, when I started using those, that was it. That was the only thing that was available. But by the early 2000s, you had a much more variety of ETFs that advisors could use both in the brokerage industry and independent advisors. And I think this then helped them move their business models more to a core and satellite. They weren't ready to give up on active management just yet. They went to a core indexing and then satellite of, okay, now we're going to pick a few areas where we think we're going to outperform. That didn't really work, but that's where the first phase was for the advisors. It's also interesting, and I explore this a little. I have your story and some other people's stories in there. In terms of the other side of the mountain, as Michael Kitts has put it in the 80s and 90s, I think advisors deserve a lot of credit in really helping to build Vanguard. Because once they went from the, I'm getting paid by the mutual fund to I'm going to get a percentage of assets, all of a sudden they're now shoulder to shoulder with the client. And they're going to obviously pick things they think are good and that are cheap and will benefit them too. Because now they're going to draw from that same pool of money. And that really was major. If you were to chart the growth of Vanguard's assets and that moved to the fee-based fiduciary advisor, I think there's a strong correlation there. And the amount of money, and it's growing, certainly has great stats showing that I believe 71% of the assets now in the brokerage advisor worlds are fee-based fiduciary type assets. But it was interesting, and I tried to see if maybe Bogel actually by actually building Vanguard and putting Vanguard on the other side of the mountain where most brokers couldn't get to it unless they left where they were. Remember, you're outside of the system, so you got to get people to leave the system. Right. That's what he wanted to do. That's exactly what he wanted. That's correct. And they did. And I asked a few people whether Bogel should get credit for actually getting people to leave the system and become RIAs. And some people were like, definitely. And some people were like, no, there was all these other things going on. And I tried to be nuanced, but I have to think that the idea of not being able to get this amazing vehicle for your clients where you were, might be one of the reasons you were inspired to leave. Maybe also the weighing on the conscious that I'm putting my clients and stuff that I would never invest in. And maybe over time, that rate of the weight on them. But I try to think, let's say there was no index fund, cheap index fund, or something on the other side of the mountain. Would brokers have left the droves and become RIAs? And I don't know. I'd ask you that. No, I probably personally, personally, I probably would have become an airline pilot because I was a pilot in the military. And I was really just couldn't stand the brokerage industry anymore. Once I once I learned about, well, as long as the indexing didn't exist, I probably wouldn't be in the investment industry anymore because I was so disgusted without what was passing for investment advice in the brokerage world that I was ready to leave it anyway. But then I discovered Jack Bogle and discovered indexing and realized that if I left and started my own company that I could have access to all these things for my clients. And yet that was the reason I left. And then I also, I think, helped start driving down advisor costs because as soon as I left, I realized advisors were charging too much money for this too. So, you know, I started a low fee advisory company back then. But yeah, I completely agree with you. I think a lot of advisors left the brokerage industry so that they could put their clients, they're being fiduciaries and put their clients into the things that they thought that their clients would benefit from when indexing was one of them. And ETFs were another one. And I told Jack this before he died. I said, you know, I know you don't like ETFs, but I think that this is nothing that has happened in the last 25 years have advanced your beliefs more than ETFs have. And he goes, eh, you know, he didn't want to believe that. But I think it's true, don't you? Yes, ETFs have done a lot to get people low costs than indexing. And not all ETFs trade a lot. The Vanguard ETFs in particular are basically bottom held. I mean, they're not really trading tools. And he did acknowledge that I also had a revelation in the book that I did not know. And I interviewed Gus Souter, who was probably one of the best interviews of the book because he was there. And he said that the reason he pushed to launch the ETF was because he was trying to figure out a way that if the next crash came, he could protect the index fund investors from people who want to trade or go in and out. And so he didn't do it to increase distribution, which is what Bogle seemed to insinuate when I met with him. It was more to protect the investor, which is right up Bogle's alley. Now it did increase distribution, but Souter said he caught up with Bogle in 2014-ish, 14 years after he launched the first ETF and told him this. And he said, Bogle didn't quite know that. And so I think that's why towards the end of his life, he did soften. And in my last, very last interview with him, we asked him about the ETF again. And he said, you know, if I was running the place, I probably would have done it too. And I know he wouldn't have, but the fact that he threw that line out, I thought he'd come to some general piece with it. But after he says that, there's a dot dot dot. But look at all these people chasing returns and trading. We still don't know. And all the fruit cases and nut jobs and marketing. So he's talking about the other side of ETFs, the dark side of ETFs. I think the ETF industry is a big 10. And I think there's a section in that 10 for Puritan index investors that are up Bogle's alley. But then there's maybe 50% of the 10th that wild and crazy and the opposite people and doing things that he wants no part of. And so that's why I call that chapter. It's complicated. The metaphor I use is that it's like Bogle's firstborn daughter, like the index fund marrying the tatted up bad boy. And Bogle, there's nothing he can do about it. He's got to learn to deal with this guy and his family. Yeah. And that was how he spent 20 years of his life. And that's why him in Vanguard had this really interesting relationship where Bogle sitting over here in his research center on campus, only 100 yards from where upper management is. And he's sort of constantly dropping bombs on them, on their products. Yeah. And I have found that very interesting, sometimes funny. I think when the ETF came out, Jim Wyatt told me, and I didn't know this, that Vanguard put a press release out, then Bogle put another one out. This sucks. So he's a character. Interesting that Warren Buffett is one of his biggest fans. Yeah. I wanted to interview Warren Buffett for the book. I interviewed about 50 people and I asked our people on TV if I get his email and they're like, okay, here's his assistant's email, but look, he's not going to reply. If you really want to bother, go ahead, try it. Just be nice. But don't expect anything. I sent him an email. I got a reply, I don't know, within about six, seven hours from Warren who said, look, I'm swamped, but I'm going to help on a couple items about Jack. And he answered every question I had. Warren Buffett is interesting one because he's the most popular active manager who's ever lived. And yet he has this interesting kinship with Bogle. And I think what they really do share is the great depression World War II generation attitude. They're both very frugal. They don't need a lot. Bogle's son was saying you wore the same khakis for 46 years. That's something you might read about Warren Buffett doing. And it was almost like they were cut from the same cloth where ironically one is the king of active and one's the king of passive, but they're very similar in every other way, I thought, when reading about him. I think that's what Warren Buffett was responding to. And I think, as Jason's wife said, Buffett and Bogle also fought against some of the same forces of like overcharging for under-value. And I think Buffett was famous for betting against hedge fund performance. And in some of his letters, he's pretty adamant against how little value some active can actually produce. And so they were aligned on that issue, I think. And Buffett, again, was really, I guess, generous to respond, but I definitely was happy he did. I'm just going to go into one more section and then we're going to wrap it up. And that has to do with takeoffs on indexing and things that aren't really indexing, but are being called indexing to try to jump on the coattails here. Thank you for mentioning spin-dexing. In your book, a phrase I came up with, it stands for special purpose indexing or spin-dexing, which is everything's an index now. Because Bogle made indexing and Vanguard made indexing so popular, why not just call whatever it is you're doing indexing, even if it isn't indexing, call it that anyway, because then you might get assets. For example, smart beta, right, and direct indexing and ESG and all these things are now indexing. Could you speak to sort of people jumping on the coattails of Bogle, even though it really isn't what he was all about? Absolutely. There's two points I want to make here. One is you're right, Bogle was not into this. There's one quote where he said, no wonder I wake up some mornings feeling like Dr. Frankenstein, what have I created? And so he definitely battled against that, again, that 50% of the ETF tent that's pretty wild and crazy. That said, this is another interesting part of the book, which is that he kind of created it in a way that's not really, I think, appreciated or understood yet, which is that by taking over the core of portfolios, a lot of people have now sold out of their legacy active mutual fund and now have a cheap index fund or cheap ETF in the core. By being so successful with that concept, he then pushed active and ways to be active to a complete extreme. So now people who have a boring vanilla core, which is highly effective, not all people, I think you're maybe in that Nirvana stage that you can actually not take the bait on some of that. Some people look for things to decorate with. And that's why spindexing and themes are no joke. They seem like they're crazy and who cares, but you have crypto arc, ESG, thematic investing, some smart beta. A lot of this, honestly, is to compliment that core now. And that's why you see the number of holdings in new ETFs come down and down. Portfolios are getting more concentrated. It's again, it's really, again, part of the bogal effect. By confiscating the core of the portfolio, it's then made active, have to get more creative and more active. So a barbell type of a thing. Yes. And I have a whole chapter that looks at that. And so while he would have hated it, again, I think he had a hand in creating it by being so successful in the core. He would say just use the core and be a monk and basically have the total index, but some of us are human. And I also think there's arguably a behavioral hack. If you have a cheap core and it's vanilla and you're just the kind of person whose mind's buzzing all the time, maybe you want 10% in the crazy stuff, stuff that has a basically possible asymmetric return down the road. It's exciting. It's entertaining. That's a narrative driven just to keep your hands off the core. If it keeps your hands busy, it's actually potentially bogally in that it's helping you behaviorally to do that. I'm not sure he would buy that. I wrote about this in my very first book called Serious Money. It's like you do your core indexing and then you could have what I call bingo money on the side, which is your fund money is small, maybe up to 10% of your portfolio. But that's it. But I have to tell you, working with individual investors and myself, now that I'm in my mid-60s, it just doesn't appeal to me anymore. In other words, it's, yeah, okay, I was interested in it in the past and all that now. And I could see this with Bogle. I mean, it's just something that as you kind of get on to pre-retirement and retirement, that stuff just doesn't interest you anymore. So you end up going to this pure core, pure core. Yeah, I think you're right. I think that there's probably going to be some correlation with age, crypto arc. I bet their investors are on the younger side. And maybe as you get older, you get over that stuff. I will say on the flip side, there were people like Michael Lewis, who I interviewed for the book. And he said something that I thought was really, again, another amazing byproduct of the Bogle effect. He said, once I got my portfolio into index funds, I had way more time on my hands. I had to think about this stuff. And that really helped me as a writer, because I could just go into my writing head all the time. And I guess because he was in the financial world, he would think about where to put money. But once he got the index fund, it freed up time. Dan Egan said the same thing. He now is an advisor, doesn't have to worry about portfolio. He can worry about the other stuff, planning, taxes, behavior. And that that time freedom, I think for really evolved investors is big. I just think there are probably some maybe who like the cheap index fund, but do want to dabble. And they actually like following the market and stuff. And for them, I think spin dexing is sort of that's why it exists, because, you know, you do have some people buying it. And perhaps there's some people who are all in on the crazy stuff. And they'll learn the hard way of a chapter called the art of doing nothing. And I talk about the Robin Hood and the trading and my thesis there is that this is just a generational thing. The 90s had the same thing. You're young, you don't know, you go through this. The Robin Hood Army is Vanguard investors waiting to happen. That is absolutely correct. The people who are trading dot com companies in the early mid 1990s and late 1990s are the Vanguard investors of today. Yes. And I think there's a line in war games, which I think about a lot as myself, which was the only winning move is to not play. To close, you wrote that Bogle realized that making money was rewarding. And he realized that making money is rewarding. But the thanks and admiration that he received from investors was much more rewarding to him. And it was actually, in my view, intoxicating to him. I've knew Jack for probably, oh, I don't know, 20 years. I saw him a lot at the Bogle has conferences. And we're starting that up again, by the way, in October. But he felt that it was much more important to him personally, professionally, spiritually, to be appreciated for what he did helping people than any amount of money that he could have made as the CEO of a mutual fund company. We say around the Bogle, Jack Bogle knew he could make a lot of money, but he chose to make a difference. And that was Jack Bogle. He wrote a book called Enough. And he clearly had some gene in him that wasn't attracted to the sort of thirst for more that a lot of people who go to Wall Street are having them. And it's just a natural gene. It's like firing your belly stuff. He just didn't have that. He was immune to it. But what he could never get enough of was appreciation and adulation. And his son was saying that his whole family never quite understood that part of him. He could never get enough of hearing the guy on the street saying, you saved me money, whatever. He saved almost every letter. Aaron Arbelin from the Philadelphia Inquirer said he would read letters to her in his office from doorman who put the other kid through college. And that's why I say that, in a weird way, he might have been miscast. It's almost like somebody who wants adulation and appreciation would go into the arts or acting or something or be a physician. Bogle, it's a good myth. Sometimes it's good to have somebody miscast in an industry. And it's also interesting, back to Princeton to go full circle with this, that I found it just crazy that the whole reason he did all this is he's in the Princeton Library looking for a thesis, something to write his thesis on. And he's just flipping through magazines and he happens to find fortune. And in the magazine, there's this article on mutual funds in Boston when he decides, okay, I'll do this. Well, I looked and the cover of Time, which is probably laying right next to it, was Conrad Hilton. This is December 1949 and had the hotel business. And I thought, you know, it's just as easy, could have picked that up and been like the hotel guy. And it's interesting. It's almost like fate nudged him to this because between that and the crazy Wellington story that had like four things that had to go exactly perfectly. And then the index fund isn't managed. You realize the amount of serendipity, you almost feel like there was some kind of fate nudging this to happen. It's really crazy. And I didn't realize it all until I dove into it, just how serendipitous the whole thing was. Well, the name of the book is called The Bogle Effect by Eric Balchunis, coming out April 26. Eric, thank you so much for coming on the Bogle Heads on Investing podcast. Thank you, Rick, for having me. And as you know, I am a big fan of the podcast. And it's quoted several times in the book. You really, through your interviews, you've got some gems that came in handy in my writing there. So thank you for that. This concludes this edition of Bogle Heads on Investing. Join us each month as we interview a new guest. In the meantime, visit bogelcenter.net, bogelheads.org, the Bogle Heads Wiki, Bogle Heads Twitter. Listen live each week to Bogle Heads Live on Twitter Spaces, the Bogle Heads YouTube channel, Bogle Heads Facebook, Bogle Heads Reddit. Join one of your local Bogle Heads chapters and get others to join. Thanks for listening.