 Grant returned to the battlefield around Fort Donaldson after spending the morning talking with Captain Foote about the gunboat failure, and he found a defeated Union army. He didn't even expect there to be any real fighting while he was gone, and he comes back to find that in his absence, the Confederates had broken through his entire line. The situation was grim, and the most obvious course of action was to fall back and give the army time to recover and regroup. Doing this would look almost like a surrender. It would certainly be an admission of defeat, at least for the time, and this was a nauseating idea for the aggressive General Grant, but he was considering it. But when he spoke to two of his subordinate officers, they gave Grant some information that would immediately change his strategy. Some of the Confederates, they told him, had carried their knapsacks and blankets with them into battle. These would be the men under the command of General Simon Bolivar Buckner, if you remember from the previous episode. The other Confederate brigades were under the impression that they would quickly return to Fort Donaldson to gather their things after driving back the Yankees, but Buckner thought the plan was to make their escape as soon as the door was open, so his men brought their belongings with them to the fight. Grant immediately recognized the significance of this. The only reason the Confederates would have their knapsacks with them in battle would be if they were trying to escape, and since they had not yet made any attempt to escape, this could only mean that they were feeling the same sense of defeat that the Union army was currently facing. With this information in hand, Grant abandoned any thought of falling back and instead ordered an immediate offensive. Grant told his officers, quote, the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets out of me, end quote. By the end of the day, Grant would be proven right, and it would make him famous. I'm Chris Calton, and this is the Mises Institute Podcast Historical Controversies. In the previous three episodes, we've told the story of Grant's assault along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, his initial capture of Fort Henry, and the battle of Fort Donaldson up to the point we begin with today, which is the afternoon of February 15th. In today's episode, we will finish the story and see how Ulysses S. Grant first earned the reputation that would eventually make him the preeminent Union general in the war. Grant proceeded to order a Union offensive in which, for the first time since the day began, the Union army would be acting in concert with each other. Unfortunately, his river navy was still out of commission from their defeat the day before, but Grant still believed they could be an asset. He sent word to Captain Foote, quote, if all the gunboats that can will immediately make their appearance to the enemy, it may secure us a victory. Otherwise all may be defeated, a terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command, and I think the enemy is much more so. I do not expect the gunboats to go into action, but to make appearance and throw a few shells at long range, end quote. So Grant's idea was that the South wouldn't be fully aware of how defeated the gunboats were, and as long as they could see them lobbing a few long range shells at them, the threatening presence of the gunboats would occupy the attention of the Fort's defense so they couldn't turn their cannons on the assaulting Union infantry, as well as the demoralizing effect it would have on the Confederates in general. Grant's focus in his attack was the Union right, which is exactly where the Confederates were planning to attempt their escape. The Confederate plan had been to open the door on the right, and they had succeeded in doing that. Grant recognized this, and he intended to close the door before they could get past him. Grant was deliberately sending the stronger portion of his available forces on the Union right, knowing he had to close the Confederate door to escape, but he also sent troops on the Union left to tie up part of the southern line. Grant's thinking here was that the Confederate right, being in line with the Union left obviously, was weakly defended. In this, he was actually underestimating how weakly defended the Confederate right actually was at this point. The forces under Brigadier General Charles Smith pushed against the Confederate right, which was where Simon Buckner Bolivar was in command. Now the Union left wasn't exactly in the best condition to wage an assault, so they were very much depending on Grant's assumption that the Confederate right was weakly defended at the moment. General Smith ordered his men to fix their bayonets on their muskets and hold their fire until they had broken through the enemy line. They had no artillery covering them, so the plan was to charge the Confederates, break their line quickly, and regain the ground they had lost during the morning. The troops conducting the bayonet charge would be supported by another group to their immediate right that were instructed to feign an attack and draw the attention away from the charging infantry. Tactically, the Union men were at a severe disadvantage. The ground they had to cover was covered with foliage and fallen logs and all manner of obstacles. One soldier said, quote, it appeared incredible that troops could go up that hill and keep any kind of lines of organization. It looked as if a rabbit could scarcely get through the brush and logs and fallen timber, but broken as the lines were by such obstructions and the storm of lead poured from the enemy, the regiment faltered not, but what was left of it pressed on over the earthworks, end quote. The Union men took heavy casualties with roughly 200 men dropping during the advance. Many of the casualties were officers. One soldier remembers his regimental officer taking a hit before he went down himself, he later wrote, quote, just as I saw my captain fall, I sank down and for the first time realized that the balls were flying pretty thick. I heard one or two strike the log I fell on and only remember crawling down on the lower side of it when all consciousness passed from me. When I recovered, I found myself a half mile to the rear, the surgeon cutting a ball out of my right hip, end quote. The cost of the attack was high for the regiments that took part in it, particularly for the second Iowa, which had more than half its men either killed or wounded. The devastation makes it clear that had the Confederate forces actually been well-entrenched in the area, as they had been a few hours earlier, they easily would have driven the Northerners back. But Grant's assumption was right. There were basically only some token defenders on the Confederate right. The rough terrain gave them enough of a defending advantage to wreak havoc on the Yankees, but it wasn't enough to stop them. They even had a small battery lobbing shells at the union forces, but this wasn't enough to break the line that was charging them. And when the group conducting the bayonet charge got within range, they were ordered to rush the artillery. Now all of this that I've mentioned took place over the course of a few hours, so by the time the order was given to charge the artillery, the sun was already setting, as it was winter and the days were short. The person who ordered the charge was a regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Babcock, and General Smith actually disagreed with him. Seeing the sun going down, he thought it was too late in the day to capture the battery before it got dark, and he countermanded the order. But it was too late to stop it, as the men had already started rushing toward the Confederate artillerists. At close range, the canister shot from the cannons was devastating to the infantry. Remember that canister operated kind of like a shotgun. It sent a number of small projectiles and a wide spread, so it was designed to be used against infantry. But this was the only defense the Confederates had when the Northerners closed in on them. They were otherwise completely exposed, and once the infantry got around the cannons, there was little else they could do but take off. The bayonet charge worked, and the cannons were captured. The assault from the Union left was successful. Grant was right in assuming the defenses were weak. But the terrain advantage that the Southerners enjoyed was enough to make this a costly victory. The Union troops that participated in this attack suffered nearly 400 casualties. The attack from the Union right was led by Brigadier General Lou Wallace. In this case, the Confederate defenses were stronger, but so were the Union attackers. As they advanced, they didn't just face the obstacles of the terrain, but they also faced the fresh bodies of the dead and wounded from the morning fighting, where the combat had been the most intense. In one account, as the Union men pushed forward, General Wallace found a Confederate soldier sitting against a tree stump. The Confederate was wearing a coon skin cap. The soldier's eyes were open, and he was grinning directly at General Wallace. Wallace turned to one of his aides and said, quote, find out what that fellow means by grinning that way, end quote. The aide did as he was told, going up to the Confederate and shaking him. Why, he's dead, sir, the aide told Wallace. When he removed the soldier's coon skin cap, he found that most of his skull underneath had been shattered. As the Union troops advanced on this side, each regiment faced an onslaught from the Confederate defenders. The advance took place slowly over the course of three hours. Unlike their counterparts on the Union left, they did not flush out the Confederates, but they weren't driven back either. Seeing the Union continue their slow advance, by the time the sun started to set, Confederate Commander John Floyd later admitted, quote, we had to submit to the mortification of seeing the ground which we had won by such a severe conflict in the morning, reoccupied by the enemy before midnight, end quote. With the sun set, combat would come to a halt for the time. But the Confederates had to figure out their plan now that the door they had opened for escape in the morning had been closed once again in the afternoon. Before calling a council of war, though, John Floyd took the time to send an update to the department commander, Albert Sidney Johnston. In his telegram, he gave good news, quote, the enemy having invested our lines, it was determined to attack them. The enemy maintained a successful struggle, which continued for nine hours and resulted in driving him from the field with a loss on his part of 1,240 killed and wounded of who 1,000 were killed. About 300 prisoners, six pieces of artillery, and 1,000 stand of arms were captured. Our own loss amounted to about 500 killed and wounded. They have a force of 42 regiments, end quote. This telegram puts a positive spin on the day's events. It does not detail the morning success followed by the afternoon setback as it just gives a general overview of the entire day. For Johnston, it must have been welcome information as the telegram seems to imply that Confederates were holding Fort Donaldson quite well. But after Floyd sent this telegram, he called his officers into a meeting to discuss their new plan. Now, it's important to understand that the Confederate soldiers felt pretty good about everything at this point. Overall, the day had been largely successful, and they were under the impression that they were still expected to make their escape. This is exactly what the generals told their regimental commanders to have the men prepare for, in fact. The regimental officers left the meeting and gave orders to have their men prepare their knapsacks and four days rations so that they could take off as soon as day broke the next day. But once all the subordinate officers were out of the room, generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner were left discussing their situation further. Floyd asked for counsel from Pillow and Buckner. Well, gentlemen, what is best now to be done? With this, Buckner and Pillow started to argue over the details of their original plan. Buckner thought the plan had been to escape as soon as the door was open, which is why his men carried the knapsacks with them. Pillow responded by saying that the plan was to return to the fort just as they had done now before gathering their things and taking off. Pillow said that they should go ahead and retreat during the night while they still had the opportunity. But Buckner and Floyd were reluctant. The Cumberland River was rising from the rainfall, and the winter cold made it impossible to cross without boats. On land, the officers believed that Grant was receiving a large number of reinforcements. Floyd was reluctant to make an escape that way without more information. So he summoned Nathan Bedford Forrest to the meeting to see if his cavalry could scout out the situation. But by the time Forrest showed up to the meeting, he couldn't believe what the generals were discussing. The topic of escape had apparently shifted to discussing the possibility of surrender. Between the time that Floyd sent for Forrest and Forrest's actual arrival, the three generals concluded that the road to Dover had already been blocked by Union troops, according to reports that were apparently coming in. When Forrest arrived, he gave an entirely different assessment. He argued that his scouts had seen the fires that led to people concluding the road was blocked, but they were fires built by wounded soldiers, not combat-capable ones. Thus, the road was still open, and escape was still possible. Forrest himself had checked out the situation and had seen nothing but dead and wounded soldiers. But Floyd was skeptical, and he chose to believe the reports claiming that the road was defended. Pillow was a bit more on Forrest's side, opposed to surrender. He offered another option. Two steamboats had been sent to carry wounded Confederates downriver to the town of Clarksville. They were expected to be back by morning. Pillow suggested that some troops be used to hold the fort while other soldiers were ferried to safety. It's unlikely that everybody would escape with this plan, as they might if they went over land. But this plan could potentially keep a large portion of the Confederate army from being taken captive. But Buckner couldn't agree with either plan. He decided that the only thing they could do at this point was surrender. He was convinced that General Smith, who had driven his men back that afternoon, was going to attack as soon as the sun came up, and he couldn't hold his position for more than 30 minutes. Pillow asked to why Buckner couldn't hold his ground. Apparently, Buckner had in mind an inflated number of Union troops than Smith actually had access to. And he more accurately pointed out that his own men were utterly drained from the day's combat, lack of sleep, and shortage of food. And they were also short on ammunition. At this point, Buckner was entirely convinced that the battle had already been lost. Floyd was convinced by Buckner's argument. And apparently, even Gideon Pillow started to accept that their position was untenable and escape was impossible. The only person who disagreed was Forrest, who maintained that they could still escape through the road, but nobody else believed his reports that it was only held by wounded soldiers. So here's where I'm going to offer a little bit of commentary. If you're a regular listener to this show, you know I tend to criticize historians who accuse soldiers or officers of cowardice for battlefield decisions. Cowardice is an easy thing to claim when you have the benefit of hindsight and are dealing with books instead of bullets. So I try to interpret battlefield decisions as charitably as possible. That doesn't mean my interpretation is correct. We're all just making educated guesses about intentions and chains of reasoning. I just do my best to consider the most generous possible logic behind a given decision since it's difficult for me to imagine the pressures that these men faced during battle in the Civil War. But here's something that I am willing to call cowardice and it's not the decision to surrender itself. Although evidence that historians have access to does seem to suggest that Forrest's report was correct and the door to escape was actually still open, the generals couldn't know which of their competing reports was actually accurate. So it was by no means certain that an escape would have been possible. So their decision to surrender may have been tactically wrong in hindsight but it was somewhat understandable given the unknowns they had to consider where a failed escape attempt could lead to a defeat with more dead soldiers instead of just prisoners. But what I will consider cowardice is the unwillingness particularly on the part of General Floyd to take responsibility for the decision. After Buckner made his arguments that the battle was already lost, Gideon Pillows spoke up and said, well, gentlemen, what do you intend to do? I am in favor of fighting out but if we cannot cut our way out nor fight on there is no alternative left us but capitulation and I am determined that I will never surrender the command nor will I ever surrender myself as prisoner. I will die first, end quote. After Pillows said this, General Floyd who is the commanding officer said that he also didn't intend to stick around for a surrender. Buckner responded by saying that if he were in command he would share the fate with his soldiers as officers were expected to do. Floyd apparently took this to be an offer on Buckner's part to take responsibility for the decision. Floyd asked to General Buckner quote, if the command should devolve on you would you permit me to take out my little brigade? End quote. Buckner replied quote, yes, if you leave before the terms of capitulation are agreed on, end quote. Floyd then turned to Gideon Pillow, the next in command and said, General Pillow, I turn the command over, sir. And General Pillow responded, I pass it, to which Buckner replied, I assume it. Pillow then asked if it would be improper for him to make an escape as well and Floyd said that he thought it best to let as many people escape as possible. Now it seems understandable that Floyd would want to let as many people escape as possible. But what was cowardly in my view was his unwillingness to take the surrender upon himself as commanding officer to let his subordinate's escape. And his reasoning was not based on the concern for his men. Because he had been the US Secretary of War during the Buchanan administration just prior to Lincoln taking office, his loyalty to the Confederacy was doubted by many people. Floyd was worried that if he took responsibility for the surrender, despite believing it to be the only option at this point, it would confirm the doubts about his loyalty. He basically admitted as much to Buckner, saying quote, you know my position with the Federals, it wouldn't do, it wouldn't do, end quote. In other words, he was worried about his reputation and personal pride. He would be embarrassed if he surrendered. So instead of standing by the decision that he believed was correct as the commanding officer, he passed the buck to his subordinate. Pillow also refused to accept surrender, which may demonstrate similar cowardice, but unlike Floyd, he didn't think surrender was the best option and he was simply ceding to Floyd's decision. In fact, Floyd's plan to escape, which Pillow followed along with, was exactly what Pillow advocated earlier. They decided to take the two steamers returning from Clarkson and escape down river while Buckner surrendered the fort. Essentially, Floyd wasn't rejecting Pillow's plan, he just wanted to be part of the escape. The preparations for their own escape were largely kept quiet as well. So the subordinate officers who were left to be taken prisoners had no idea that the decision to surrender had been made. And of course, neither had their men, who at this point were still enjoying their sense of victory and were making their own preparations to escape as they had been ordered too earlier in the night. And just to pile on to Floyd's treachery here, when the steamboats did return the next day, they actually carried reinforcements of 400 fresh troops with them. Floyd had them disembarked from the boat and he ordered the majority of the cargo that the boats were also carrying to be dumped to make more room for his men. As he loaded his own men onto the boat to escape, he ordered the 20th Mississippi Regiment to form a semi-circle around the boat to block any of the other soldiers from trying to board. Once all of Floyd's other men were safely on board, the Mississippians would board last and join the escape. But as the surrender was taking place, Buckner got word that Floyd's men were still within the perimeter of the fort and he said that if they didn't take off before the surrender was underway, because escaping after the surrender was complete would violate the rules of surrender, he'd turned the fort's artillery on them. So Floyd took off early, leaving the Mississippians behind to be taken as prisoner as well as the 400 fresh reinforcements who had essentially shown up to immediately be handed over as prisoners of war. Now again, for people who listen to this show regularly, I don't pull my punches about despicable behavior on either side. And I've pointed out some pretty indefensible decisions of union officers in the past several episodes. So let it not be said that despicable decisions were only made by one side in the war. Floyd was willing to throw to the wolves any soldier he had to in order to save his own skin. And this was at a time when officers taken prisoner were still treated rather well. So it was out of concern for his reputation more than for his well-being, not that I think it makes much of a difference. So while I am very slow to accuse somebody of cowardice for any battlefield decision, I am willing to call a man a coward for refusing to take responsibility for his leadership decisions out of concern for his personal reputation. That is unequivocal cowardice as far as I'm concerned. Forrest was mortified by the decision. Floyd and Pillow had already resolved to make their own escape while Buckner surrendered. And Forrest intended to do the same, taking the road that he maintained was completely open. He told the generals that he would rather the bones of his men bleach the nearby hills than have his men locked up in a Yankee prison during the winter. He asked permission to leave as well and it was granted. When Forrest did make his escape, he encountered no union resistance and historians generally agree that his report was correct and the Confederates could have made their escape over land just as Forrest had claimed. And in fact, the door for their escape remained open until as late as one in the afternoon the next day. But hindsight is always 2020. Floyd left to send a new message to General Johnston. In his telegram, he sang a very different tune from the one he sent only a short time ago. He said, quote, last evening, they arrived in the river near Fort Donaldson, 11 transports laden with troops. We are completely invested with an army many times our own numbers. I regret to say the unanimous opinion of the officers seems to be that we cannot maintain ourselves against these forces, end quote. While this message was being sent to Johnston, Johnston himself was already in the process of sending the previous good news to Richmond, basically saying that Donaldson was well defended and had enjoyed a victory over the Union troops. Naturally, Floyd's 180 would be the source of great embarrassment to Johnston when he eventually had to deliver the news of surrender to the Confederate high command. As the day started to break, Bushrod Johnson, the lowest ranking brigadier general at Fort Donaldson, and the only one who was not included in the decision to surrender, was ready to renew the Confederate attack and carry out the original escape plan. He got word that General Buckner was looking for him, and when he went to see Buckner, Johnson learned that Floyd and Pillow had left him in command and that the men would be escaping. To say that this was an unexpected development for Bushrod Johnson would be a gigantic understatement. But Buckner was now the commanding officer and orders were orders. The Confederate troops were spread out, so the information of the surrender was slow to make it to everybody involved. But Buckner started the process of surrender without waiting to make sure that everybody knew what was going on. He sent a courier to send a message to General Grant. The message read quote, "'Sir, in consideration of all the circumstances "'governing the present situation of affairs "'at this station, I propose to the commanding officers "'of the federal forces the appointment of commissioners "'to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces "'and post under my command. "'And in that view, suggest an armistice "'until 12 o'clock today. "'I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant.' "'S.B. Buckner, Brigadier General, C.S. Army.'" When Grant received the message from Buckner, he was with General Smith, his former teacher from West Point. Grant and Smith read the message together and Grant asked quote, "'What answer shall I send to this general?' Smith immediately spat out quote, "'No terms with traitors.'" Grant laughed and started to write his response, which is probably one of the most famous messages delivered during the entire Civil War. He wrote quote, "'Sir, yours this date, proposing armistice "'and appointment of commissioners to settle terms "'of capitulation is just received. "'No terms except unconditional "'and immediate surrender can be accepted. "'I propose to move immediately upon your works. "'I am very respectfully, your obedient servant, U.S. Grant, "'Brigadier General commanding.'" This message would make it to Northern Press and by signing his initials U.S., he would earn his nickname. Instead of Ulysses S. Grant, his initials came to stand for unconditional surrender Grant. When Buckner received Grant's reply, he was shocked. He and Grant had been friends since the Mexican War and Buckner had even helped him out of a tight spot at one point by loaning him money. He expected generous terms of surrender, but defeated, Buckner responded quote, "'Sir, the distribution of the forces under my command, "'incident to an unexpected change of commanders "'and the overwhelming force under your command compel me, "'notwithstanding the brilliant success "'of the Confederate arms yesterday, "'to accept the ungenerous and unshivalrous terms "'which you propose.'" End quote. So with that, General Grant had officially captured Fort Donaldson. Even though their history of friendship did not compel Grant to offer charitable terms of surrender to Buckner, once Buckner was in Union custody, Grant showed that their friendship had not been forgotten. He said he remembered the kindness Buckner had showed him years earlier and he offered to cover any expenses Buckner had to deal with now if he needed any provisions. Buckner declined, saying he had everything he needed, but he asked Grant to take care of his men. Grant replied that his staff was too occupied at the moment to do anything. So Buckner actually asked if he could take command of his own staff to see to his men. Grant replied quote, I know you well enough to realize that you will not take advantage of this and will therefore give instructions that any orders which you issue on that subject will be obeyed by my troops as though I had issued them myself. End quote. So Buckner was actually given permission by Grant to have his own staff issue orders to some of Grant's men in order to attend to the Confederate prisoners. This is a pretty remarkable display of trust on Grant's part and one that serves as a stark reminder of the friendships that so many opposing officers had prior to Southern secession. Before I close this episode, it's worth offering a little bit of analysis of the significance of the capture of Fort Henry and Donaldson and the aftermath of the battle. In one respect, as the title of these four episodes indicates, these battles were important in establishing General Grant as a winning general in the war. With Lincoln's endorsement, the Senate approved the promotion of Grant to Major General on February 19th. General Halleck was still wary of Grant even after these victories, but this was the start of Grant's rise to prominence that would ultimately end in his taking overall command of the Union Army. Strategically, the capture of Fort Henry and Donaldson gave significant advantages to the Union Army. Typically they're grouped together, but historian Timothy Smith makes the argument, which I find convincing, that Fort Henry was actually the more strategically important victory. Fort Donaldson had value, of course, in that the Cumberland River that it protected led to Nashville, which the Union military promptly occupied, taking control of an important Confederate city, including its valuable supply of iron, which was already in short supply in the South. But Fort Henry protected the Tennessee River, which ran south all the way to Alabama. This was a gateway to the Confederate heartland and was crucial in Grant's follow-up campaign, leading ultimately to the capture of Vicksburg in 1863. Even if they never captured Fort Donaldson, as long as the Union held Fort Henry, and therefore access to the Tennessee River, the incredibly important Union successes in the West likely would not have been achieved. In terms of morale, the victory was valuable as well. In February of 1862, the Union really only had a couple of naval victories, but the significance of these were less apparent at the time, and they hardly received the attention that land battles received. So this was the first real Union win for the Army. In the North, this was a huge morale boost, and it also helped in the Union diplomatic issues where France and England were concerned about the Union's trend of losing the war and were considering recognizing the Confederacy. The capture of Fort Henry and Donaldson helped to restrain the foreign powers from hastily abandoning their neutrality. Additionally, on the morale side, was the negative effect it had on the Southerners who now had to face their first major loss. And I already detailed the Tennessee River Raid that struck fear throughout the Deep South, which no longer felt secure that they were protected by the barrier of Upper South States. The capture of Confederate prisoners was nothing to sneer at either. A lot of estimates claim that Grant took 12,000 prisoners, but the listing of rations issued in Cairo, I was mispronouncing that before apparently, but a listener corrected me. The listing of rations issued in Cairo, where the prisoners were held, accounts for 14,623 Confederates. This was a huge bounty of prisoners, which of course could be exchanged for the many Union prisoners taken in previous battles. But the prisoners were the lucky ones. The battle also meant leaving a mountain of dead and wounded soldiers behind. Some of the wounded were left to suffer in the cold, immobilized from their injuries for days after the battle. One heartbreaking account told of a Confederate soldier found as late as February 22nd. The Union man who found him wrote, quote, some of our men, while strolling about the entrenchments yesterday, found a secessionist in a brush heap with both legs shattered by a cannonball. His hands both froze off. His face frozen until it was black. He was in his shirt sleeves and had been lying there ever since last Friday, a week on the cold ground, and was still able to faintly ask for a drink of water, end quote. The dead bodies were also, as with any major battle, a burden to deal with. In one case, 76 soldiers from the 11th Illinois Regiment were buried in a single mass grave made out of one of the trenches. Ultimately, as with any battle, we don't know the exact casualty counts, particularly for the Confederates where records are more sparse. But general estimates would place the Union losses at 500 killed and nearly 3,000 wounded and a couple hundred missing out of maybe 27,000 total participants. The Confederates had maybe 18,000 men who participated in the battle and they suffered far fewer killed and wounded, probably less than 300 killed and less than 1,000 wounded. But of course they had somewhere between 12 and 15,000 taken prisoner given the competing evidence. Naturally, the numbers on both side will vary in given sources but the proportion should give a good idea of the cost of battle for both sides. With large battles like the battles of Shiloh and Antietam that would take place in the same year overshadowing the victory at forts Henry and Donaldson, it wasn't really until the 1980s that historians started to acknowledge the military significance of the capture of these forts in the ultimate outcome of the war. Many historians accept at this point that this is where the Union won the war. I think that's an overstatement. But for reasoning that holds true for any battle that somebody claims was the battle that won the war. Military victories can never confidently be said to decide the outcome of a war as they don't account for important factors that are harder to identify such as logistical difficulties, economics, war fatigue and whatever else can affect a war without necessarily relating to any given battle. But military victories do dictate how a war actually plays out on the ground. So maybe the Union would have won the war even if Grant had failed at Donaldson due to whatever other advantages the North had over the South. But any of these claims are speculative and counterfactual. What we can say, however, is that without Grant's victory over these forts, the campaign in the West would have played out entirely differently. And in that sense, forts Henry and Donaldson proved undeniably to be among the most important battles of the war. The battle of Shiloh, Grant's next major fight would immediately overshadow forts Henry and Donaldson as it would prove to be the bloodiest battle of the war up to that point. But before we move on to talk about Shiloh, I want to make sure we cover the battle of Peeridge, which took place in March and fits into our story of Union victories in the West in 1862. So the battle of Peeridge will be the subject of the next episode. Historical controversies is a production of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. 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