 Individualism, a Reader, edited by George H. Smith and Marilyn Moore, narrated by James Foster. 18. From the Religion of Nature Delineated, William Walliston. The Religion of Nature Delineated, Seventh Edition. London, J. and P. Napton, 1750. Pages 234 to 269. Spelling and punctuation have been modernized and most italics have been omitted. Walliston's footnotes, which cite various classical sources, are not included. Educated at Cambridge, William Walliston, 1660 to 1724, took holy orders in the Anglican Church and, after attaining financial security through an inheritance, devoted his life to scholarly pursuits. Although Walliston wrote a fair amount, he published very little. The Religion of Nature Delineated being his only major work. This book sold well going through eight editions by 1750 and selling more than 10,000 copies. The last edition appeared in 1759 and the work was not reprinted until 1974. During this gap of more than 200 years, Walliston's moral theory, as one commentator noted, was soon relegated to the Curiosity section of the Philosophical Museum. Most philosophers who did not ignore Walliston ridiculed him instead. David Hume made him the butt of a joke and Walliston fared little better at the hands of Jeremy Bentham. The English historian Leslie Stephen, after misrepresenting Walliston, concluded that he inevitably fails to extract any intelligible result from his fanciful form of an illusory theory. Some commentators have been kinder to Walliston. The great free-thought scholar J.M. Robertson characterized him as a vivid, interesting, thoughtful, and very learned writer. Ernest Mossner, a biographer of David Hume, called him a man of vast erudition. More recently, 1977, Stanley Twainman claimed that the available literature has not offered effective criticisms against his views, nor has it been shown that Walliston's book is without lasting significance. And philosopher Joel Feinberg corrected some common distortions of Walliston's ideas. Friend and foe alike, however, have focused on Walliston's ethical theory while neglecting his theory of property, which is based on the unique individuality of each human being. The following excerpt deals with that topic. 1. Every man has in himself a principle of individuation which distinguishes and separates him from all other men in such a manner as may render him and them capable of distinct properties and things, or distinct subjects of property. That is, B and C are so distinguished, or exist so distinctly, that if there be anything which B can call his, it will be for that reason not C's. And what is C's will for that reason not be B's. 2. There are some things to which, at least before the case is altered by voluntary subjection, compact or the like, every individual man has or may have such a natural and immediate relation that he only of all mankind can call them his. The life, limbs, etc. of B are as much his as B is himself. It is impossible for C or any other to see with the eyes of B. Therefore, they are eyes only to B, and when they cease to be his eyes, they cease to be eyes at all. He then has the sole property in them, it being impossible in nature that the eyes of B should ever be the eyes of C. Further, the labor of B cannot be the labor of C because it is the application of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of something, and therefore the labor is as much B's as the limb and faculties made use of are his. Again, the effect or produce of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C, and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's, as much B's as the labor was B's and not C's. Because what the labor of B causes or produces, B produces by his labor, or it is the product of B by his labor. That is, it is B's product, not C's or any other, and if C should pretend to any property in that which B can only truly call his, he would act contrary to truth. Four. Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with respect to C would be just the same in C with respect to B if the case was inverted. Because reason is universal and respects cases, not persons, hence it follows that a good way to know what is right or wrong in relation to other men is to consider what we should take things to be were we in their circumstances. Five. In a state of nature men are equal in respect of dominion. I accept for the present the case of parents and their children and perhaps of some few other near relations. Here let me be understood to mean only those between whom there is no family relation or between whom all family relation is vanished. In a state where no laws of society make any subordination or distinction, men can only be considered as men or only as individuals of the same species and equally sharing in one common definition. And since by virtue of this same definition B is the same to C that C is to B, B has no more dominion over C than C reciprocally has over B, that is they are in this regard equal. Personal excellence or defects can make no difference here because one, who must judge on which side the advantage lies? To say B or D or anybody else has a right to judge to the disadvantage of C is to suppose what is in question, a dominion over him not to prove it. Two. Great natural or acquired endowments may be privileges to them who have them, but this does not deprive those who have less of their title to what they have or which is the same give anyone who has greater abilities a right to take it or the use of it from them. If B has better eyes than C it is well for him but it does not follow from this that C should not therefore see for himself and use his eyes as freely as B may his. C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his use and so are B's to his and each has the sole property in his own so their respective properties are equal. The case would be parallel to this if B should happen to have better intellectual faculties than C and further if B should be stronger than C he would not yet for that reason have any right to be his lord. For C's less degree of strength is as much his as B's greater is his. Therefore C has as much right to his and which is the natural consequence to use his as B has to use his that is C has as much right to resist as B has to impose or command by virtue of strength and where the right though not the power of resisting is equal to the right of commanding the right of commanding or dominion is nothing. Three, since strength and power are most apt to pretend a title to dominion it may be added further that power and right or a power of doing anything and a right to do it are quite different ideas and therefore they may be separated nor does one imply the other. Lastly if power quaw power gives a right to dominion it gives a right to everything that is obnoxious to it and then nothing can be done that is wrong for nobody can do anything which he has not the power to do but to assert this would be to advance a plain absurdity or contradiction rather for then to oppose the man who has this power as far as one can or which is the same as far as one has the power to do it would not be wrong and yet so it must be if he has a right to dominion or to be not opposed moreover that a man should have a right to anything merely because he has the power to take it is a doctrine indeed which may serve a few tyrants or some benditi and rogues but directly opposite to the peace and general good of mankind it is also what the powerful themselves could not allow if they would but imagine themselves to be in a state of the weak and more defenseless. Six, no man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happiness of another because in the first place this supposes a dominion over him and the most absolute two that can be in the next for B to begin to disturb the peace and happiness of C is what B would think unreasonable if he was in C's case in the last since it is supposed that C has never invaded the happiness of B nor taken anything from him nor at all meddled with him but the whole transaction begins originally from B for all this is couched in the word begin C can have nothing that is B's and therefore nothing to which C has not at least as good a title as B has or in other words nothing which C has not as much right to keep as B to claim these two rights being then at least equal and counter-poising each other no alteration in the present state of things can follow from any superiority of right in B and therefore it must of right remain as it is and what C has must for any right that B has to oppose this settlement remain with C in his undisturbed possession but the argument is still stronger on the side of C because he seems to have such a property in his own happiness that no other can have inserted from a previous section men's respective happiness or pleasures ought to be valued as they are to the persons themselves or according to the thoughts and sense which they have of them not according to the estimate put upon them by other people who have no authority to judge of them nor can know what they are may compute by different rules have less sense be in different circumstances or such as guilt has rendered partial to themselves every man's happiness is his happiness what it is to him and the loss of it is answerable to the degrees of his perception to his manner of taking things to his wants and circumstances though no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happiness or to hurt him yet every man has a right to defend himself and his against violence to recover what is taken by force from him and even to make reprisals by all the means that truth and prudence permit great part of the general happiness of mankind depends upon those means by which the innocent may be saved from their cruel invaders among which the opportunities they have of defending themselves may be reckoned the chief therefore to debar men of the use of these opportunities and the right of defending themselves against injurious treatment and violence must be inconsistent with the laws of nature for if a man has no right to defend himself and what is his he can have no right to anything since that cannot be his right which he may not maintain to be his right he who begins is the true cause of all that follows and whatever falls upon him from the opposition made by the defending party is but the effect of his own act it is the violence of which he is the author reflected back upon himself it is as when a man spits at heaven and the spittle falls back upon his own face lastly since every man is obliged to consult his own happiness there can be no doubt but that he not only may but even ought to defend it in such a manner I mean as does not interfere with truth or his own design of being happy he ought indeed not to act rashly or do more than the end proposed requires that is he ought by a prudent carriage and wise forecast to shut up if he can the avenues by which he may be invaded and when that cannot be done to use arguments and persuasion or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm but when these measures are ineffectual or impracticable he must take such other as he can and confront force with force by that same means that a man may defend what is his he may certainly endeavor to recover what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him for it has been shown already that the power to take anything from another gives no right to it the right then to that which has been taken from its owner against his will remains still where it was he may still truly call it his and if it be his he may use it as his which if he who took it away or any other shall hinder him from doing that man is even here the aggressor and the owner does but defend himself and what is his then further if a man hath still a right to what is forcibly or without his consent taken from him he must have a right to the value of it for the thing is to him what it is in value to him and the right he has to it may be considered as a right to a thing of such value so that if the very thing which was taken be destroyed or cannot be retrieved the proprietor nevertheless retains his right to a thing of such a value to him and something must be had in lieu of it that is he has a right to make reprisals since everything is to every man what it is in value to him things of the same value to anyone may be reckoned as to him the same and to recover the equivalent is the same as to recover the thing itself for otherwise it is not an equivalent if the thing taken by way of reprisal should be to the man from whom it is taken of greater value than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer he must charge himself with that loss if injustice be done him it is done by himself to which add that as a man has a right to recover what is his or the equivalent from an invader so he seems for the same reasons to have a right to an equivalent for the expense he is at in recovering his own for the loss of time and quiet and for the trouble hazards and dangers undergone because all these are the effects of the invasion and therefore to be added to the invaders account 9. A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation if B has the soul right in lands or goods nobody has any right to the disposal of them besides B and he has a right for disposing of them is but using them as his therefore the act of B in exchanging them for something else or bestowing them upon C interferes not with truth and so B does nothing that is wrong nor does C do anything against truth or what is wrong in taking them because he treats them as being what they are as things which come to him by the act of that person in whom is lodged the soul power of disposing them thus C gets the title innocently but in the case of compact the reason on which this transaction stands is more evident still for the contractors are supposed to receive each from the other the equivalent of that which they part with or at least what is equivalent to them respectively or perhaps by each party preferable thus neither of them is hurt perhaps both advantaged and so each of them treats the thing which he receives upon the innocent exchange as being what it is better for him and promoting his convenience and happiness indeed he who receives the value of anything and what he likes as well in effect has it still his property is not diminished the situation and matter of it is only altered mankind could not well subsist without bartering one thing for another therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourse is inconsistent with the general good of mankind if a man could find the necessaries of life without it and by himself he must at least want many of the comforts of it 10 there is then such a thing as property founded in nature and truth or there are things which one man only can consistently with nature and truth call his 11 those things which only one man can truly and properly call his must remain his until he agrees to part with them if they are such as he may part with by compact or donation or which must be understood till they fail or death extinguishes him and his title together and he delivers the lamp to his next man 12 to have the property of anything and to have the soul right of using and disposing of it are the same thing they are equivalent expressions for when it is said that P has the property or that such a thing is proper to P it is not said that P and Q or P and others have the property proprim limits the thing to P only and when anything is said to be his it is not said that part of it is only his P has therefore the all or all hood of it and consequently all the use of it and then since the all of it to him or all that P can have of it is but the use and disposal of it he who has this has the thing itself and it is his 14 to usurp or invade the property of another man is injustice or more fully to take, detain, use, destroy, hurt or meddle with anything that is his without his allowance either by force or fraud or any other way or even to attempt any of these or assist them who do are acts of injustice the contrary to render and permit quietly to everyone what is his is justice this has been individualism a reader edited by George H. Smith and Marilyn Moore narrated by James Foster copyright 2015 by the Cato Institute production copyright 2015 by the Cato Institute