 Question 13 of Summa Theologica, Parse Prima Initial Questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Parse Prima Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 13, The Names of God. After the consideration of those things which belong to the Divine Knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the Divine Names, for everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it. Under this head there are 12 points of inquiry. First, whether God can be named by us. Second, whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially. Third, whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally or are all to be taken metaphorically. Fourth, whether any names applied to God are synonymous. Fifth, whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally. Sixth, whether supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures. Seventh, whether any names are applicable to God from time. Eighth, whether this name God is a name of nature or of the operation. Ninth, whether this name God is a communicable name. Tenth, whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God by nature, by participation and by opinion. Eleventh, whether this name who is is the supremely appropriate name of God. And twelve, whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God. First article, whether a name can be given to God. Objection one, it seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says that of him there is neither name nor can one be found of him. And it is written, what is his name and what is the name of his son if thou knowest? Objection two, further every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God since he is simple. Nor do abstract names belong to him for as much as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God. Objection three, further nouns are taken to signify substance with quality. Verbs and participle signify substance with time. Pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God for he has no quality nor accident nor time. Moreover he cannot be felt so as to be pointed out. Nor can he be described by relation in as much as relations served to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us. On the contrary it is written, the Lord is a man of war, almighty is his name. I answer that since according to the philosopher words are signs of ideas and ideas the similitude of things. It is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything insofar as we can understand it. Now it was shown above that in this life we cannot see the essence of God, but we know God from creatures as their principle and also by way of excellence and emotion. In this way therefore he can be named by us from creatures. You're not so that the name which signifies him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name man expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence, for the idea expressed by the name is the definition. Reply to Objection 1, the reason why God has no name or is said to be above being named is because his essence is above all that we understand about God and signify in word. Reply to Objection 2, because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound, whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing but rather is that whereby a thing is, hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things, whereas names given to signify simple forms signify a thing not as subsisting but as that whereby a thing is, as for instance whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple and subsisting we attribute to him abstract names to signify his simplicity and concrete names to signify his substance and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express his mode of being for as much as our intellect does not know him in this life as he is. Reply to Objection 3, to signify substance with quality is to signify this opositum with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence as some things are set of God in a concrete sense to signify his subsistence and perfection so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further verbs and participles which signify time are applied to him because his eternity includes all time for as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood not what is sensed for we can only describe him as far as we understand him thus according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God so far can he be signified by relative pronouns. Second article whether any name can be applied to God substantially. Objection 1, it seems that no name can be applied to God substantially for Damascene says everything said of God signifies not his substance but rather shows forth what he is not or expresses some relation or something following from his nature or operation. Objection 2, further Dionysius says you will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God thus the names applied by the holy doctors and praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves but what expresses the procession of anything does not signify its essence therefore the names applied to God are not said of him substantially. Objection 3, further a thing is named by us according as we understand it but God is not understood by us in this life in his substance therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God. On the contrary Augustine says the being of God is the being strong or the being wise or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby his substance is signified therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance. I answer that negative names applied to God or signifying his relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify his substance but rather express the distance of the creature from him or his relation to something else or rather the relation of creatures to himself but as regards absolute and affirmative names of God as good, wise and the like various and many opinions have been given for some have said that all such names although they are applied to God affirmatively nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some emotion from God rather than to express anything that exists positively in him hence they assert that when we say that God lives we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing and the same in like manner applies to other names and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify his relationship towards creatures thus in the words God is good we mean God is the cause of goodness and things and the same rule applies to other names. Both of these opinions however seem to be untrue for three reasons first because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God for he is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as he is the cause of good things therefore if the words God is good signified no more than God is the cause of good things it might in like manner be said that God is a body and as much as he is the cause of bodies so also to say that he is a body implies that he is not a mere potentiality as his primary matter secondly because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of him by way of being taken in a secondary sense as healthy is secondarily said of medicine for as much as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy thirdly because this is against the intention of those who speak of God for in speaking that God lives they assuredly mean more than to say that he is the cause of our life or that he differs from inanimate bodies therefore we must hold a different doctrine namely that these names signify the divine substance and are predicated substantially of God although they fall short of a full representation of him which is proved thus for these names express God so far as our intellects know him now since our intellect knows God from creatures it knows him as far as creatures represent him now it is shown above that God pre-possesses in himself all the perfections of creatures being himself simply and universally perfect hence every creature represents him and is like him so far as it possesses some perfection yet it represents him not as something of the same species or genus but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short although they derive some kind of likeness there too even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun this was explained above in treating of the divine perfection therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance but in an imperfect manner even as creatures represented imperfectly so when we say God is good the meaning is not God is the cause of goodness or God is not evil but the meaning is whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God and in a more excellent and higher way hence it does not follow that God is good because he causes goodness but rather on the contrary he causes goodness in things because he is good according to what Augustine says because he is good we are replied to objection one Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is for as much as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what he is but each one signifies him in an imperfect manner even as creatures represent him imperfectly replied to objection two in the significance of names that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify as for instance this name stone is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot but rather to signify a certain kind of body otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone so we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections creatures are the representations of God although in an imperfect manner so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves as if when we say God lives the sense where life proceeds from him but rather to signify the principle itself of things and so far as life pre-exists in him although it pre-exists in him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified replied to objection three we cannot know the essence of God in this life as he really is in himself but we know him accordingly as he is represented in the perfections of creatures and thus the names imposed by us signify him in that manner only third article whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense objection one it seems that no name is applied literally to God for all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures as was explained above but the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically as when we say God is a stone or a lion or the like therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense objection two further no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it but all such names as good wise and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to him as appears from Dionysius therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense three further corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only since he is incorporeal but all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense on the contrary Ambrose says some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense but there are some which are said of him in their literal sense I answer that according to the preceding article our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from him to creatures which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names therefore as to the names applied to God namely the perfections which they signify such as goodness, life and the like and their mode of signification as regards what is signified by these names they belong properly to God and more properly than they belong to creatures and are applied primarily to him but as regards their mode of signification they do not properly and strictly apply to God for their mode of signification applies to creatures replied to objection one there are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as stone signifies a material being and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense other names however express these perfections absolutely without any such mode of participation being part of their signification as the words being, good, living and the like and such names can be literally applied to God replied to objection two such names as these as Dionysius shows are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to him in the ordinary sense of his signification but in a more eminent way hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life replied to objection three these names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified in regards to their mode of signification whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified fourth article whether names applied to God are synonymous objection one it seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names for synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same but these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God in the sense of God is his essence and likewise it is his wisdom therefore these names are entirely synonymous objection two further if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality but differ in idea it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion therefore if these ideas are many and the thing is one it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions objection three further a thing which is one in reality and in idea is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea but God is supremely one therefore it seems that he is not one in reality and many in idea and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas and thus they are synonymous on the contrary all synonyms united with each other are redundant as when we say vestiture clothing therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous we cannot properly say good God or the like and yet it is written oh most mighty great and powerful the Lord of hosts is thy name I answer that these names spoken of God are not synonymous this would be easy to understand if we said that these names are used to remove or to express the relation of cause to creatures for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards to diverse things denied of God or as regards diverse effects connoted but even according to what was said above that these names signify the divine substance although in an imperfect way it is also clear from what has been said that they have diverse meanings for the idea signified by the name is the conception and the intellect of the thing signified by the name but our intellect since it knows God from creatures in order to understand God forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied as therefore to the different perfections of creatures there corresponds one simple principle represented and perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect that corresponds one altogether simple principle according to these conceptions imperfectly understood therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing still because they signify that under many and different aspects they are not synonymous thus appears the solution the synonymous term signify one thing under one aspect for words which signify different aspects of one thing do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception as was said above replied to objection to the many aspects of these names are not empty in vain for their corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner replied to objection three the perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in him simply and unitedly thus it comes about that he is one in reality and yet multiple an idea because our intellect apprehends him in a manifold manner as things represent him fifth article whether what is said of God one of creatures is univocally predicated of them objection one it seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal for every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal as many are reduced to one for if the name dog be said equivocally of the barking dog and of the dog fish it must be said of some univocally namely of all barking dogs we proceed to infinitude now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition as man generates man and there are some agents which are equivocal as the sun which causes heat although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced is a univocal agent and thus what is said of God and creatures is predicated univocally objection two further there is no similitude among equivocal things therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God according to the word of Genesis let us make man to our image and likeness it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally objection three further measure is homogeneous with the thing measured but God is the first measure of all beings therefore God is homogeneous with creatures and thus the word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures on the contrary whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense is predicated equivocally but no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures for instance wisdom in creatures is equality but not in God now a different genus changes in essence since the genus is part of the definition and the same applies to other things therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally further God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other but the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible as is the case of those things which are not in the same genus therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures so only equivocal predication can be applied to them I answer that univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures the reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree but in a measure that falls short so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply and in the same manner as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold in various forms and all inferior things in the same way as said in the preceding article all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied pre-exist in God unitedly thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature or perfection distinct in idea from other perfections as for instance by the term wise applied to man we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence and distinct from his power and existence and from all similar things whereas when we apply to it God we do not mean to signify anything distinct from his essence or power or existence thus also this term wise describes and comprehends the thing signified whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended and as exceeding the signification of the name and this is evident that this term wise is not applied in the same way to God and to man the same rule applies to other terms since no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures neither on the other hand names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense as some have said because if that were so it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation such a view is against the philosophers who proved many things about God and also against what the apostle says the invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense that is according to proportion now names are thus used in two ways either according as many things are proportionate to one thus for example healthy is predicated of medicine and urine in relation and proportion to health of a body which the former is the sign and the latter the cause or according as one thing is proportionate to another thus healthy is said of medicine and animal since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body and in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univical sense for we can name God only from creatures thus whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause wherein all perfections of things are presently now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple unification for in analogies the idea is not as it is in univicals one and the same yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing thus healthy applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health replied to objection one although equivocal predications must be reduced to univical still in actions the nonunivical agent must proceed the univical agent for the nonunivical agent is the universal cause of the whole species as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men whereas the univical agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species otherwise it would be the cause of itself since it is contained in the species but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not a univical agent and the universal cause comes before the particular cause but this universal agent whilst it is not univical nevertheless is not together equivocal otherwise it could not produce its own likeness but rather it is to be called an analogical agent as all univical predications are reduced to one first nonunivical analogical predication which is being replied to objection two the likeness of the creature to God is imperfect for it does not represent one in the same generic thing replied to objection three God is not the measure proportion to things measured hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus the arguments deduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univically of God and creatures yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally sixth article whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures objection one it seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God for we name anything according as we know it since names as the philosopher said are signs of ideas but we know creatures before we know God therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God objection two further Dainese says we name God from creatures but names transferred from creatures to God are said primarily of creatures rather than of God as lion stone and the like therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God objection three further all names equally applied to God and creatures are applied to God as the cause of all creatures as Dainese says but what is applied to anything through its cause is applied to it secondarily for healthy is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine which is the cause of health therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God on the contrary it is written I bow my knees to the father of our Lord Jesus Christ of whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than creatures I answer that in names predicated of many in an analogical sense all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all and since that expressed by the name is the definition as the philosopher says such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things and secondarily to these others according as the approach more or less to that first thus for instance healthy applied to animals comes into the definition of healthy applied to medicine which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal and also into the definition of healthy which is applied to urine which is called healthy and so far as it is the sign of the animals health thus all names applied metaphorically to God are applied to creatures not necessarily rather than to God because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures for a smiling applied to a field means only that the field is in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness so the name of lion applied to God means only that God manifests strength in his works as a lion in his thus it is clear that applied to God names can be defined only from what is said of creatures but to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only as some have supposed for when it is said God is good it would then only mean God is the cause of the creature's goodness thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness hence good would apply primarily to God rather than to God but as was shown above these names are applied to God not as the cause only but also essentially for the words God is good or wise signify not only that he is the cause of wisdom or goodness but that these exist in him in a more excellent way hence as regards what the name signifies these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures because these perfections flow from God to creatures but as regards the imposition of the names they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures as said above reply to objection one this objection refers to the imposition of the name reply to objection two the same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names as said above reply to objection three this objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause and not also essentially for instance as healthy is applied to medicine seventh article whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporarily objection one it seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporarily for all such names signify the divine substance as is universally question 14 part one of summa theologica pars prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy question 14 of God's knowledge having considered what belongs to the divine substance we have now to treat of God's operation and since one kind of operation is imminent and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect we treat first of knowledge and of will for understanding abides in the intelligent agent and will and afterwards of the power of God the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect now because to understand as a kind of life after treating of the divine knowledge we consider the divine life and as knowledge concerns truth we consider truth and falsehood further as everything known as in the knower and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas concerning knowledge there are 16 points for inquiry whether there is knowledge in God whether God understands himself whether he comprehends himself whether his understanding is his substance whether he understands other things besides himself whether he has a proper knowledge of them whether the knowledge of God is discursive whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things whether God has knowledge of non-existing things whether he has knowledge of evil whether he has knowledge of individual things whether he knows the infinite whether he knows future contingent things whether he knows annuncible things whether the knowledge of God is variable and whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things first article whether there is knowledge in God Objection 1 it seems that in God there is not knowledge in habit and habit does not belong to God since it is the mean between potentiality and act therefore knowledge is not in God Objection 2 further since science is about conclusions it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles but nothing is caused in God therefore science is not in God Objection 3 further all knowledge is universal but in God there is no universal or particular therefore in God there is no knowledge on the contrary the apostle says oh the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God I answer that in God there exists most perfect knowledge to prove this we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing for the idea of the thing known is in the knower hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited whereas the nature of an intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension therefore the philosopher says that the soul is in a sense all things now the contraction of the form comes from the matter hence as we have said above forms according as they are the more immaterial approach more nearly to a kind of infinity therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge hence it is said in Deonima that plants do not know because they are whole immaterial but sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter and the intellect is still further cognitive because it is more separated from matter and unmixed as said in Deonima since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above it follows that he occupies the highest place in knowledge because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God himself whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures hence knowledge is not a quality of God nor habit but substance and pure act reply to objection to whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly now man has different kinds of knowledge according to the different objects of his knowledge he has intelligence as regards the knowledge of principles he has science as regards knowledge of conclusions he has wisdom according as he knows the highest cause he has counsel or prudence according as he knows what is but God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge as will be shown hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names in such a way however that there must be removed from each of them so far as they enter into divine predication everything that savers of imperfection and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them hence it is said with him is wisdom and strength he has counsel and understanding reply to objection 3 knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge so as to be universal or particular or habitual or potential or existing according to any such mode second article whether God understands himself objection 1 it seems that God does not understand himself for it is said by the philosopher every knower who knows his own essence returns completely to his own essence but God does not go out from his own essence nor is he moved at all thus he cannot return to his own essence therefore he does not know his own essence objection 2 further to understand is a kind of passion and movement as the philosopher says and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known and the thing known is in the perfection of the knower but nothing is moved or suffers or is made perfect by itself nor as Hilary says is a thing its own likeness therefore God does not understand himself objection 3 further to God chiefly in our intellect because we are the image of God in our mind as Augustine says but our intellect understands itself only as it understands other things as is said in De Anima therefore God understands himself only so far as perchance he understands other things on the contrary it is written the things that are of God no man knoweth but the spirit of God I answer that God understands himself through himself and proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect the object of the operation which is taken as the term exists outside the operator nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator the object signified as the term of the operation resides in the operator and accordingly as it is in the operator the operation is actual that the sensible in act is sense in act and the intelligible in act is intellect in act for the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species and because of this only it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object since both are in potentiality since therefore God has nothing but potentiality but his pure act his intellect and his object are altogether the same so that he neither is without the intelligible species as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself and thus God understands himself replied to objection one returned to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself in as much as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence it is in a certain way diffused in it and it returns to itself in as much as it has existence in itself therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting but are acts of organs do not know themselves as is the case of each of the senses whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting know themselves hence it is said and it causes that whoever knows his essence returns to it now it supremely belongs to God to be self subsisting hence according to this motive speaking he supremely returns to his own essence and knows himself replied to objection two movement and passion are taken equivocally according as to understand as described as a kind of passion as stated in Deonima for to understand is not a movement that is an act of something in perfect passing from one to another but it is an act existing in the agent itself of something perfect likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object that is is assimilated to it this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it there to through the intelligible species which is in the likeness of the thing understood and makes it to be perfected thereby as potentiality is perfected by act on the other hand the divine intellect which is in no way in potentiality is not perfected by the intelligible object nor is it assimilated there too but is its own perfection and its own intelligible object replied to Objection 3 existence in nature does not belong to primary matter which is a potentiality unless it is reduced to act by a form now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects just as primary matter is to natural things hence our passive intellect it only exercise concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species as it understands other things for it is manifested by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding and by this act knows the intellectual faculty but God is pure act in the order of existence as also in the order of intelligible objects therefore he understands himself through himself third article whether God comprehends himself Objection 1 it seems that God does not comprehend himself where Augustine says that whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself but God is always infinite therefore he does not comprehend himself Objection 2 if it is said that God is infinite to us and finite to himself it can be urged on the contrary that everything in God is truer than it is in us if therefore God is finite to himself but infinite to us then God is more truly finite than infinite which is against what was laid down above therefore God does not comprehend himself on the contrary Augustine says that everything that understands itself comprehends itself but God understands himself therefore he comprehends himself I answer that God perfectly comprehends himself as can be thus proved a thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable as for instance a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration not however when it is known by some probable reason now it is manifest that God knows himself as perfectly as he is perfectly knowable according to the mode of it's own actuality since the thing is not known according as it is in potentiality but in so far as it is in actuality as said in metaphysics now the power of God in knowing is as great as his actuality in existing because it is from the fact that he is in act and free from all matter and potentiality that God is cognitive as shown above once it is manifest that he knows himself as much as he is knowable and for that reason he perfectly comprehends himself replied to objection one the strict meaning of comprehension signifies that one thing holds and includes another and in this sense everything comprehended is finite as also is everything included in another but God is not said to be comprehended by himself in this sense as if his intellect were a faculty apart from himself and as if it held and included himself for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation but as God is said to be in himself for as much as he is not contained by anything outside of himself so he is said to be comprehended by himself for as much as nothing in himself is hidden from himself for Augustine says the whole is comprehended when seen if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer replied to objection two when it is said God is finite to himself this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion because he has the same relation and not excluding his intellect as anything finite has and not excluding finite intellect but God is not to be called finite to himself in this sense as if he understood himself to be something finite fourth article whether the act of God's intellect is not his substance objection one it seems that the act of God's intellect is not his substance for to understand is an operation but an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator therefore the act of God's intellect is not his substance objection two further to understand one's act of understanding is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood but the act of understanding is act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great objection three further every act of understanding means understanding something when therefore God understands himself if he himself is not distinct from this act of understanding he understands that he understands himself and so on to infinity therefore the act of God's intellect On the contrary, Augustine says, in God to be is the same as to be wise. But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is his substance as shown above. Therefore the act of God's intellect is his substance. I answer that it must be said that the act of God's intellect is his substance. For if his act of understanding were other than his substance, then something else, as the philosopher says, would be the act and perfection of the divine substance to which the divine substance would be related as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible, because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down above, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic, for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection, as existence is the perfection of the one existing. Just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than his existence, as shown above, hence as his essence itself is also his intelligible species, it necessarily follows that his act of understanding must be his essence and his existence. Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God intellect and the object understood and the intelligible species and his act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to his substance. Reply to objection one, to understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator but remaining in him. Reply to objection two, when that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood as when we understand our act of understanding, and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent. Thus appears the reply to the third objection for the act of divine understanding subsists in itself and belongs to its very self and is not another's. Hence it need not proceed to infinity. Fifth article, whether God knows things other than himself. Objection one, it seems that God does not know things besides himself for all other things but God are outside of God but Augustine says that God does not behold anything out of himself. Therefore he does not know things other than himself. Objection two, further the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands if therefore God understands other things besides himself, something else will be the perfection of God and will be nobler than he which is impossible. Objection three, further the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much nobler than nobler the object understood but God is his own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than himself then God himself is specified by something else than himself which cannot be. Therefore he does not understand things other than himself. On the contrary it is written all things are naked and open to his eyes. I answer that God necessarily knows things other than himself for it is manifest that he perfectly understands himself otherwise his existence would not be perfect since his existence is his act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known but the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things as is clear from the aforesaid God must necessarily know things other than himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the very existence of the first effective cause namely God is his own act of understanding. And so whatever effects pre-exist in God as in the first cause must be in his act of understanding and all things must be in him according to an intelligible mode for everything which is in another is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. Now in order to know how God knows things other than himself we must consider that a thing is known in two ways in itself and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another. So we say that God sees himself in himself because he sees himself through his essence and he sees other things not in themselves but in himself in as much as his essence contains the similitude of things other than himself. Reply to objection one the passage of Augustine in which it is said that God sees nothing outside himself is not to be taken in such a way as if God saw nothing outside himself but in the sense that what is outside himself he does not see except in himself as above explained. Reply to objection two the object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance but by its image according to which it is in the intellect as its form and perfection as said in the Deonima for a stone is not in the soul but its image. Now those things which are other than God are understood by God in as much as the essence of God contains their images as above explained and so does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence. Reply to objection three the intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another but by the principle object understood in which other things are understood for the intellectual act is specified by its object in as much as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation. Since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect enact and this is the image of the principle thing understood which in God is nothing but his own essence in which all images of things are comprehended and so does not follow that the divine intellectual act or rather God himself is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself. Sixth article whether God knows things other than himself by proper knowledge. Objection one it seems that God does not know things other than himself by proper knowledge for as was shown God knows things other than himself according as they are in himself but other things are in him as in their common and universal cause and are known to God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things beside himself by general and not by proper knowledge. Objection two further the created essence is as distinct from the divine essence as the divine essence is distinct from the created essence but the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence as said above therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by his essence it follows that he does not know what the creature is in its essence so as to know what it is which is have proper knowledge of it. Objection three further proper knowledge of the thing can come only through its proper ratio that is concept but as God knows all things by his essence it seems that he does not know each thing by its proper ratio for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things but a general knowledge were to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them. On the contrary to have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general but as they are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in that manner and so it is written that he reaches even to the division of the soul and the spirit of the joints also and the marrow and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart neither is there any creature invisible in his sight. My answer that some have erred on this point saying that God knows things other than himself only in general that is only as beings for as fire if it knew itself as the principle of heat would know the nature of heat and all things else and so far as they are hot so God through knowing himself as the principle of being knows the nature of being and all other things so far as they are beings but this cannot be were to know a thing in general and not in particular is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect when it is reduced from potentiality to act acquires first to universal and confused knowledge of things before it knows them in particular as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect as is clear from the physics. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than himself is only universal and not special would follow that his understanding would not be absolutely perfect therefore neither with his being be perfect and this is against what was said above. We must therefore hold that God knows things other than himself with a proper knowledge not only in so far as being is common to them but in so far as one is distinguished from the other and proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one bring forward some examples as for instance that if the center knew itself it would know all lines that proceed from the center or if light knew itself it would know all colors. Now these examples although they are similar in part namely as regards universal causality nevertheless fail in this respect that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle not as regards that which is the principle of distinction but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only but by the different dispositions of the diaphanous medium which receives it and likewise the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge but only in a general way. In God however it is otherwise for it was shown above that whatever perfection exists in any creature wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures namely being belongs to their perfection but also what makes them distinguished from each other as living and understanding and the like whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species is a perfection and thus all things pre-exist in God not only as regards what is common to all but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in himself the essence of God is compared to all other essences of things not as the common to the proper as unity to numbers or as the center of a circle to the radiating lines but as perfect acts to imperfect as if I were to compare man to animal or six a perfect number to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general but also by proper knowledge thus for example whoever knows a man knows an animal by proper knowledge and whoever knows the number six knows the number three also by proper knowledge. As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being and far more God can know in himself all of them with proper knowledge for the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know himself perfectly unless he knew all the ways in which his own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could he know the very nature of being perfectly unless he knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge in their distinctness from each other replied to objection one. So to know a thing as it is in the knower may be understood in two ways in one way this adverb so imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known and in that sense it is false for the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye but by the image of the stone which is in the eye the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside the eye and if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the mode of existence it has in the knower the knower nevertheless knows it according to its mode of existence outside the knower thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect in as much as it knows that it understands while nevertheless it knows what a stone is of its own nature if however the adverb so be understood to import the mode of knowledge on the part of the knower in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower the more perfect is the mode of knowledge we must therefore say that God not only knows that all things are in himself but by the fact that they are in him he knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly the more perfectly each one is in him replied to objection to the created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence but rather the converse replied to objection three the same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things but the divine essence excels all creatures hence it can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in and imitate it seventh article whether the knowledge of God is discursive objection one it seems that the knowledge of God is discursive for the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge but actual knowledge now the philosopher says the habit of knowledge may regard many things at once but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time therefore as God knows many things himself and others as shown above it seems that he does not understand all at once but discourses from one to the other objection two further discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause but God knows things through himself as an effect is known through its cause therefore his knowledge is discursive objection three further God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it but we know the effects and their created causes and thus we go discursively from causes to things cause therefore it seems that the same applies to God on the contrary Augustine says God does not see all things in their particularity or separately as if he saw alternately here and there but he sees all things together at once I answer that in the divine knowledge there is no discretion the proof of which is as follows in our knowledge there is a twofold discretion one is according to succession only as when we have actually understood anything we turn ourselves to understand something else while the other mode of discretion is according to causality is when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions the first kind of discretion cannot belong to God for many things which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing if for instance we understand the parts in the whole or see different things in a mirror now God sees all things in one thing which is himself therefore God sees all things together and not successively likewise the second mode of discretion cannot be applied to God first because this second mode of discretion presupposes the first mode for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once secondly because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown hence it is manifest that when the first is known the second is still unknown and thus the second is known not in the first but from the first now the turn of discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first by resolving the effects into their causes and then the discursant ceases hence as God sees effects in himself as their cause his knowledge is not discursive replied to objection one although there is only one act of understanding in itself nevertheless many things may be understood in one medium as shown above replied to objection two God does not know by their cause known as it were previously effects unknown but he knows the effects in the cause and hence his knowledge is not discursive as it was shown above replied to objection three God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves much better than we can but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in him by the knowledge of the created causes as is the case with us and hence his knowledge is not discursive eighth article whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things objection one it seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things where origin says on Romans whom he called then he also justified a thing will happen not because God knows it as future but because it is future it is on that account known by God before it exists objection two further given the cause the effect follows but the knowledge of God is eternal therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created it seems that creatures are eternal objection three further the thing known as prior to knowledge and as its measure as the philosopher says but what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things on the contrary Augustine says not because they are does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal but because he knows them therefore they are I answer that the knowledge of God is the cause of things for the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to the things made by his art now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action as heat is the principle of heating nevertheless we must observe that a natural form being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect and likewise the intelligible form is the principle of action insofar as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect which inclination is through the will for since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things and as much as the same knowledge relates to opposites it would not produce a determinant effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite as the philosopher says now it is manifest that God causes things by his intellect and his understanding is his act of understanding and hence his knowledge must be the cause of things insofar as his will is joined to it hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the knowledge of approbation replied to objection one origins speak in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it as is said above the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future this must be understood according to the cause of consequence and not according to the cause of essence where things are in the future it follows that God knows them but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them replied to objection two the knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in his knowledge now that thing should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God hence although the knowledge of God is eternal it does not follow that creatures are eternal replied to objection three natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge for we receive knowledge from natural things of which God is the cause by his knowledge hence as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge and are its measure the knowledge of God is prior to natural things and is the measure of them as for instance a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built the end of question 14 part one question 14 part two of summa theologica pars prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy ninth article whether God has knowledge of things that are not objection one it seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not for the knowledge of God is of true things but truth and being are convertible terms therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not objection two further knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known but those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God who is very being therefore what is not cannot be known by God objection three further the knowledge of God is a cause of what is known by him but it is not the cause of things that are not because the thing that is not has no cause on the contrary the apostle says who calleth those things that are not as those that are I answer that God knows all things whosoever that in any way are now it is possible that things that are not absolutely should be in a certain sense for things absolutely are which are actual whereas things which are not actual are in the power either of God himself or of a creature whether in active power or passive whether in power of thought or of imagination or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever whatever therefore can be made or thought or said by the creature as also whatever he himself can do all are known to God although they are not actual and insofar as it can be said that he has knowledge even of things that are not but the difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual although some of them may not be in act now still they were or they will be and God has said to know all these with the knowledge of vision for since God's act of understanding which is his being is measured by eternity and since eternity is without succession comprehending all time the present glance of God extends in any time as to objects present to him but there are things in God's power or the creatures which nevertheless are not nor will be nor were and as regards these he has said to have knowledge not of vision but of simple intelligence this is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside this year reply to objection one those things that are not actual are true and so far as they are for it is true that they are in potentiality and as such they are known by God reply to objection two since God is very being everything is and so far as it participates in the likeness of God as everything is hot and so far as it participates in heat so things in potentiality are known by God although they are not in act reply to objection three the knowledge of God joined to his will is the cause of things and so it is not necessary that whatever God knows is or was or will be but only is this necessary as regards what he wills to be or permits to be further it is in the knowledge of God not that they be but that they be possible tenth article whether God knows evil things objection one it seems that God does not know evil things for the philosopher that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation but evil is the privation of good as Augustine says therefore as the intellect of God is never in potentiality but is always in act as is clear from the foregoing it seems that God does not know evil things objection two further all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known or is caused by it but the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil nor is it caused by evil therefore God does not know evil things objection three further everything known is known either by its likeness or by its opposite but whatever God knows he knows through his essence as is clear from the foregoing now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil nor is evil contrary to it for to the divine essence there is no contrary as Augustine says therefore God does not know evil things objection four further what is known through another and not through itself is imperfectly known but evil is not known by God for the thing known must be in the knower therefore if evil is known through another namely through good it would be known by him imperfectly which cannot be for the knowledge of God is not imperfect therefore God does not know evil things on the contrary it is written hell and destruction are before God I answer whatever knows a thing perfectly must know all that can be accidental to it now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental and God would not know good things perfectly unless he knows evil things now a thing is knowable and the degree in which it is and since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good by the fact that God knows good things he knows evil things also as by light is known darkness Dionysius says God through himself receives the vision of darkness not otherwise seeing darkness except through light replied to objection one the saying of the philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation by privation existing in it and this agrees with what he said previously that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually but only potentially for were they actually in our intellect they would not be known by privation it is thus that simple things are known by separate substances God therefore knows evil not by privation existing in himself by the opposite good replied to objection two the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known replied to objection three although evil is not opposed to the divine essence which is not corruptible by evil it is opposed to the effects of God which he knows by his essence and knowing them he knows the opposite evils replied to objection four to know a thing by something else only belongs to imperfect knowledge if that thing is of itself knowable but evil is not of itself knowable which is the very nature of evil means the privation of good therefore evil can either be defined nor known except by good 11th article whether God knows singular things objection one it seems that God does not know singular things for the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things but as the philosopher says reason has to do with universal sense with singular things therefore God does not know singular things objection two further in us those faculties alone know the singular which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions but in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality therefore God does not know singular things objection three further all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness but the likeness of singular things and so far as they are singular does not seem to be in God for the principle of singularity is matter which since it is in potentiality only is altogether unlike God who is pure act therefore God cannot know singular things on the contrary it is written all the ways of a man are open to his eyes I answer that God knows singular things for all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way as is clear from the foregoing now to know singular things is part of our perfection hence God must know singular things even the philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God and thus against him pedicles he argues that God would be most ignorant if he did not know discord now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings exist simply and unitedly in God hence although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial and by another we know singular and material things nevertheless God knows both by his simple intellect now some wishing to show how this can be said that God knows singular things by universal causes for nothing exists in any singular thing that does not arise from some universal cause they give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens and can then foretell all eclipses that are to come this however is not enough for singular things from universal causes to certain forms and powers which however they may be joined together are not individualized except by individual matter hence he who knows Socrates because he is white or because he is the son of Sophroniskus or because of something of that kind would not know him insofar as he is this particular man hence according to the aforesaid mode God would not know singular things in their singularity on the other hand others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects but this will not hold for as much as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things therefore it must be said otherwise that since God is the cause of things by his knowledge as stated above his knowledge extends as far as his causality extends hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms which are the source of universality but also to matter as we shall prove further on the knowledge of God must extend to singular things which are individualized by matter for since he knows things other than himself by his essence as being the likeness of things or as their active principle his essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by him not only in the universal but also in the singular the same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer if it were productive of the whole thing and not only of the form reply to objection one our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles and on that account our intellect does not know the singular but the intelligible species in the divine intellect which is the essence of God is immaterial not by abstraction but of itself being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things whether principles of the species or principles of the individual hence by it God knows not only universal but also singular things reply to objection two although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination in sense yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things reply to objection three although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God yet even in so far as it has being in this wise it retains a certain likeness to the divine being twelfth article whether God can know infinite things objection one it seems that God cannot know infinite things for the infinite as such is unknown since the infinite is that to those who measure it leaves always something more to be measured as the philosopher says moreover Augustine says that whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the knower now infinite things have no boundary therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God objection two further if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untreversible and the finite that it is traversable as said in physics but the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite as is proved in physics therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite or even by the infinite and so the infinite cannot be finite in God's knowledge which is infinite objection three further the knowledge of God is a measure of what is known but it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured therefore infinite things cannot be known by God on the contrary Augustine says although we cannot number the infinite nevertheless it can be comprehended by him whose knowledge has no bounds I answer that since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to himself or to created things as shown above and as these must be infinite it must be held that he knows infinite things although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are or will be or were is not of infinite things as some say we cannot say that the world is eternal nor that generation and movement will go on forever so that individuals be infinitely multiplied yet if we consider more attentively we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision for God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on forever the reason of this we found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge for the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing and can give the knowledge of only one individual but the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature which is participatable by infinite particulars and so our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men not however as distinguished from each other but as communicating in the nature of the species and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles but as to the principles of the species on the other hand the divine essence whereby the divine intellect understands is a sufficing likeness of all things that are or can be not only as regards the universal principles but also as regards the principles proper to each one as shown above hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things even as distinct from each other replied to objection one the idea of the infinite pertains to quantity as the philosopher says but the idea of quantity implies the order of parts therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part and in this way the infinite cannot be known for whatever quantity of parts be taken there will always remain something else outside but God does not know the infinite or infinite things as if he enumerated part after part since he knows all things simultaneously and not successively as said above hence there is nothing to prevent him from knowing infinite things replied to objection transition imports a certain succession of parts and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite nor by the infinite but equality suffices for comprehension because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite and so what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended if it were traversable replied to objection 3 the knowledge of God is the measure of things not quantitatively for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things for everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God as the thing made by art agrees with the art granted however an actually infinite number of things for instance an infinitude of men or an infinitude in continuous quantity as an infinitude of air as some of the ancients held yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being because their being would be limited to some determinate nature hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God 13th article whether the knowledge of God is a future contingent things objection 1 it seems that the knowledge of God is not a future contingent things for from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect but the knowledge of God is the cause of things known as said above since therefore that knowledge is necessary what he knows must also be necessary therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things objection 2 further every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent for the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow as is proved in the posterior analytics but this is a true conditional proposition if God knew that this thing will be it will be for the knowledge of God is only of true things now the antecedent conditional is absolutely necessary because it is eternal and because it is signified as past therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary therefore whatever God knows is necessary and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things objection 3 further everything known by God must necessarily be because even what we ourselves know must necessarily be and of course the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours must necessarily be therefore no contingent future thing is known by God on the contrary it is written he who has made the hearts of every one of them who understandeth all their works that is of men now the works of men are contingent being subject to free will therefore God knows future contingent things I answer that since as was shown above God knows all things not only things actual but also things possible to him and creature and since some of these are future contingent to us it follows that God knows future contingent things in evidence of this we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways first in itself and so far as it is now in act and in this sense it is not considered as future but as present neither it is it considered as contingent as having reference to one in certain terms but as determined to one and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge for instance to the sense of sight as when I see that Socrates is sitting down in another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause and in this way it is considered as future and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one for as much as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things subject to any certain knowledge and so ever knows a contingent effect in its cause only has merely a conjectural knowledge of it now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes but also as each one of them is actually in itself and although contingent things become actual successively nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively as they are in their own being as we do but simultaneously the reason is because his knowledge is measured by eternity as is also his being and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time as said above hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity not only because he has the types of things present within him as some say but because his glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their present presentiality hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God in as much as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes replied to objection one although the supreme cause is necessary the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the contingent cause although the movement of the sun which is the first cause is necessary so likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes while the knowledge of God which is the first cause is necessary replied to objection two some say that this antecedent God knew this contingent to be future is not necessary but contingent because although it is past till it imports relation to the future this however does not remove necessity from it for whatever has had relation to the future must have had it although the future sometimes does not follow on the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent because it is compound of necessary and contingent as this saying is contingent Socrates is a white man this is also to no purpose for when we say God knew this contingent to be future contingent is used here only as the matter of the word and not as the chief part of the proposition hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition or to its being true or false for it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass as that I said Socrates runs or God is and the same applies to necessary and contingent as it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary nor does it follow that the consequence is absolutely necessary because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequence which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause but this is to no purpose where the conditional would be false where its antecedent the remote necessary cause and the consequent a contingent effect as for example if I said if the sun moves the grass will grow therefore we must reply otherwise that when the antecedent gains anything belonging to an act of the soul the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself but as it is in the soul for the existence of the thing in itself is different from the existence of the thing in the soul for example when I say what the soul understands is immaterial this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect not as it is in itself if God knew anything it will be the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge that is as it is in its presensiality and thus it is necessary as also is the antecedent for everything that is while it is must be necessarily as the philosopher says in the parahiminias reply to objection 3 things reduced to act in time as known by us successively in time but by God are known in eternity which is above time once to us they cannot be certain for as much as we know future contingent things as such but they are certain to God alone whose understanding is in eternity above time just as he who goes along the road does not see those who come after him whereas he who sees the whole road from a height sees at once all traveling by the way hence what is known by us must be necessary even as it is in itself for what is future contingent in itself cannot be known by us whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge as already stated but not absolutely as considered in their own causes and also this proposition everything known by God must necessarily be is usually distinguished for this may refer to the thing or to the saying if it refers to the thing it is divided and false for the sense is everything which God knows is necessary if it is understood of the saying it is composite and true for the sense is this proposition that which is known by God is is necessary now some urgent objection say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject thus if I said it is possible for a white thing to be black it is false as applied to the saying and true as applied to the thing for a thing which is white can become black whereas this saying a white thing is black can never be true but in forms that are inseparable from the subject this distinction does not hold for instance if I said a black crow can be white for both senses it is false now to be known by God from the thing for what is known by God cannot be known this objection however would hold if these words that which is known implied any disposition inherent to the subject but since they import an act of the knower something can be attributed to the thing known in itself even if it always be known which is not attributed to it insofar as it stands under actual knowledge thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself which is not attributed to it insofar as it is known 14th article whether God knows annunciable things objection one it seems that God does not know annunciable things for to know annunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides but in the divine intellect there is no composition therefore God does not know annunciable things objection two further every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness but in God there is no likeness of annunciable things since he is altogether simple therefore God does not know annunciable things on the contrary it is written the Lord knoweth the thoughts of men but annunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men therefore God knows annunciable things I answer that since it is in the power of our intellect to form annunciations and since God knows whatever is in his own power or in that of creatures as said above it follows of necessity that God knows all annunciations that can be formed now just as he knows material things immaterially and composite things simply so likewise he knows annunciable things not after the manner of annunciable things as if in his intellect there were composition or division of annunciations for he knows each thing by simple intelligence by understanding the essence of each thing as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is were to understand all that can be predicated of man this however does not happen in our intellect which discourses from one thing to another for as much as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another hence when we understand what man is we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him but we understand them one by one according to a certain succession on this account the things we understand as separated we must reduce to one by way of composition or division by forming an annunciation now the species of the divine intellect which is God's essence suffices to represent all things hence by understanding his essence God knows the essences of all things and also whatever can be accidental to them reply to objection one this objection would avail if God knew annunciable things after the manner of annunciable reply to objection two annunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing and thus God by his existence which is his essence is the similitude of all those things which are signified by annunciation fifteenth article whether the knowledge of God is variable objection one it seems that the knowledge of God is variable for knowledge is related to what is knowable but whatever imports relation to creatures is applied to God from time and varies according to the variation of creatures therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures objection two further whatever God can make he can know but God can make more things than he does therefore he can know more than he knows the definition objection three further God knew that Christ would be born but he does not know now that Christ will be born because Christ is not to be born in the future therefore God does not know everything he once knew and thus the knowledge of God is variable I answer on the contrary it is said that in God there is no change since the knowledge of God is his substance as is clear from the foregoing just as his substance is altogether immutable as shown above so his knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable reply to objection one Lord creator and the like import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves but the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands now created things are in God in an invariable manner while they exist variably in themselves we may also say that Lord creator and the like import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves as they are in themselves and thus these relations are attributed to God variously according to the variation of creatures but knowledge and love and the like import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable way reply to objection two God knows also what he can make and does not make hence from the fact that he can know more than he makes it does not follow that he can know more than he knows unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision according to which he is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time but from the fact that he knows some things might be which are not or that some things might not be which are does not follow that his knowledge is variable but rather that he knows the knowledge that we know and afterwards knew that his knowledge would be variable but this could not be for whatever is or can be in any period of time is known by God in his eternity therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time it follows that it is known by God from eternity therefore cannot be granted that God can know more than he knows because such a proposition replied to objection 3 the ancient nominalists said that it was the same thing to say Christ is born and will be born and was born because the same thing is signified by these three namely the nativity of Christ therefore it follows they said that whatever God knew he knows because now he knows that Christ is born which means the same thing as that Christ will be born and this opinion however is false both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of annunciations because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would always be true which is contrary to what the philosopher lays down when he says that this sentence Socrates sits is true when he is sitting and false when he rises up therefore it must be conceded that God knew he knows it referred to annunciable propositions but because of this it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable for as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing some time to be and some time not to be so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an annunciable proposition is sometimes true and sometimes false the knowledge of God however would be variable if he knew annunciable things by way of annunciation by composition and division as occurs in our intellect hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity for example if when either as regards truth or falsity if when a thing suffers change we retain the same opinion about it or as regards diverse opinions as if we first thought that anyone was sitting and afterwards thought that he was not sitting neither of which can be in God 16th article whether God has a speculative knowledge of things Objection 1 it seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things for the knowledge of God is the cause of things as shown above but speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative Objection 2 further speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things which does not belong to the divine knowledge therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative on the contrary whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God but speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge as the philosopher says in the beginning of the metaphysics therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things and the answer that some knowledge is speculative only some is practical only and some is partly speculative and partly practical in proof where it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways first on the part of the things known which are not operable by the knower such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine things secondly as regards the manner of knowing as for instance of a builder consider a house by defining and dividing and considering what belongs to it in general for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner and not as practically operable for operable means the application of form to matter and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles thirdly as regards the end for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative as the philosopher says for the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of the truth hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made not ordering this to the end of operation but only to know how to do it this would be only a speculative consideration as regards the end although it concerns an operable thing therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known is merely speculative but that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical in accordance with this therefore it must be said that God has of himself a speculative knowledge only for he himself is not operable but of all other things he has both speculative and practical knowledge he has speculative knowledge as regards the mode for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing God knows all this much more perfectly now of things which he can make but does not make it any time he has not a practical knowledge according to which is called practical from the end but he has a practical knowledge of what he makes in some period of time and as regards evil things although they are not operable by him yet they fall under his practical knowledge like good things in as much as he permits or impedes or directs them as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the position in as much as he cures them by his art reply to objection one the knowledge of God is the cause not indeed of himself but of other things he is actually the cause of some that is of things that come to be in some period of time and he is virtually the cause of others that is of things which he can make but which nevertheless are never made reply to objection two the fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge but only accidentally in so far as it is human in answer to what is objected on the contrary we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable therefore since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect he must know what is operable by him formally as such and not only in so far as they are speculative nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of speculative knowledge for as much as he sees all things other than himself in himself and he knows himself speculative and so in the speculative knowledge of himself he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things the end of question 14 part 2