 Welcome to a Lowy Institute virtual event today on the centenary, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1921. In China, this is a big deal, a moment that's marked by and celebrated, I should say, with grand parades, TV shows, books, study sessions, wall-to-wall media coverage and so forth. They've also been in the lead up to this event, multiple pronouncements on history from Xi Jinping. You might call the whole event a teachable moment with Chinese characteristics. Now joining me today to try to make sense of this event is a stellar cast of genuine China experts. Melinda Liu in Beijing where she heads the Newsweek Bureau. Steve Tsang in London where he heads the China Institute at SOAS University. And finally Chris Buckley, the New York Times China correspondent who is working out of Sydney at the moment as a result of US-China tensions over the media. Now Melinda, let's start with you. You've lived in Beijing on and off for decades. You've witnessed many a big day. I think the last big one was the 70th anniversary, the founding of the PRC in 2019. Give us a sense of the mood of the city and your sense of the preparations for the July 1 event. Well, it's sort of a combination of the 2008 Olympics. Combined with, if you can imagine it, the actual founding of the People's Republic in 1949, there is great pomp and circumstance and intense security presence. There are so many volunteers and security people and traffic cops and everyone around. It's hard to miss that something really special is going to happen. However, I do think that it's going to be largely a made for TV moment because this also happens to be following a global pandemic where for a year and a half various concerns, lockdowns, jitters and anxiety have been besieging China on and off in various places. So it's like a lockdown within a crypto lockdown. I mean, there's lots of going on, people who hadn't been checking your health apps for your vaccines and signs of and your negative COVID tests are checking them now. And of course, everyone who takes part in person in the festivities will all have had COVID tests, which have to show negative and ideally, that's proof of vaccination. So it's a, it's, it's a pretty major event here. And you can you can feel it. So you're not only being screened for political viruses, but real viruses as well. Yeah. And of course, everyone expects that, you know, the real, the real party will be will be the viral part that social media, television, everything you can see, unlike past national days and military parades, there will be no, no military parade. We're not going to see tanks in the streets. How I knew that actually 10, 10 days ago, why? Because when they do put out the tanks, they tell everyone who lives along the parade route, you've got to close your windows, draw your curtain, stay inside and don't peek out. They didn't tell us that this year. And indeed, there is no parade, but they will have fly pasts. 10 days ago, there was a, you know, the sound of very loud helicopters, very close to Tiananmen Square, which has got to be among the world's most controlled bits of airspace in the world. And they had like migs with colored smoke trails flying down the main drag. So those we can see those are happening hype in the air. But I think there'll be lots of fireworks, lots of TV coverage. But not as much sort of ordinary people on the street as during some past anniversaries. Okay, Steve, now it's important to watch not just what Beijing celebrates, but how they celebrate different events. Is anything stuck out to you and the lead up to July 1, any themes, any particular emphasis on policy and the like? Well, what strikes me is that this is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PL, of the CCP. The impression I get is that they are probably more looking forward, looking ahead, rather than looking back to celebrate. This is, I think, something which carries a strong political message, which is that Xi Jinping is ushering in a new era for the Communist Party, and therefore for China. I think what we need to bear in mind is that when the Chinese socialism under Xi Jinping in the new era was being introduced in the 19th Party Congress in 2017, it's meant to be preparing for this date and next year, when we will see a real confirmation that this is not a rhetoric, that Xi Jinping's new era, that Xi Jinping thought is not like the like of the three percents or the scientific outlook. They are not for the personal gratification of the leader himself. It is for real. Xi Jinping thought is meant to be the new guiding ideology for China in the foreseeable future. Xi Jinping is going to be the leader for China, shaping its future in so far as we can see. If we don't recognize that we may well be missing what it is really about for China today and moving forward. So it sounds like to you a dividing line is at work. Can you explain very briefly for general lay people watching this. What do you mean by Xi Jinping thought? Well, Xi Jinping thought I think is now being presented as the most up to date, modern and totally Chinese interpretation of Marxism, Leninism. There is no more need to talk about the further signification of Marxism, Leninism, but Marxism, Leninism, it is just under the interpretation of Xi Jinping, which will now tie it completely to China's history and tradition and civilization. Marxism, Leninism and the Communist Party are the organic development of China's culture and civilization. It is the ultimate manifestation of the merging of Marxism, Leninism with Chinese culture in perhaps the way that Buddhism in China was not seen as an import from India any longer, but a Chinese religion. I think Xi Jinping has embraced that. And this is something which people in China will have to learn to embrace. The ideology is back. That sounds very much like an ideological apex if you like. Chris, I want to come to you. I mean that brings us to this point outwardly at the moment China seems to be in a moment of great confidence the economy relatively speaking is bounced back. There was a slogan earlier this year which was very prevalent about the the East is rising the West is declining. But you might have noticed noticed in Canberra last week the outgoing head of the Foreign Affairs Department in Australia Francis Adamson talked about the party state the government being insecure. So, can you be very confident and insecure at the both at the same time. The Chinese Communist Party leadership repeats these messages of both confidence and insecurity so often and with so much firmness that in a sense they must be true for party leaders. I think the way in which we can square the circle of making sense of how they fit together is to go back to what Steve is partly saying here which is about this theme of China entering a new era, a new era of strength and also implicit of consolidation as well. So this idea that China is entering a time when there's great opportunity to consolidate its prosperity it's standing in the world. Consolidate the standing of the Communist Party, but also this underlying conviction that this process of rising consolidation faces dangers and sometimes outright enemies from all sides. So that's where I think the two come together this idea that China is sort of, I think she has said it quite vividly himself sometimes it is the higher it rises the greater the dangers are overfall. And so I expect part of the theme on July one is going to be this theme. There's come through repeatedly in Xi Jinping speeches about requiring vigilance and also sacrifice to ensure this time of opportunity and also danger that people, the party the nation remains unified. So in that respect is a sense of insecurity a kind of strengthening mechanism. Yes, I think that's a very good way of putting it and it's certainly a way of rallying people around this idea that one of the reasons why the party should remain in power is that is this argument that it provides security and unity for China at a time when the world is looking increasingly insecure and disunified if that's still a word in English. But at a time when the world is looking increasing uncertain part of the message here is that is the party that can rally people around that can provide that unit in also that security which as, as Linda said is on abundant display in the streets of Beijing in the past few days. Now, earlier this last week I wrote something for the observer in London London part of the Guardian group about sort of 10 points in the hundred year history of the party. And I was criticized which is fair enough for ignoring various moments of the push for democracy. Like charter await the petition which was set around before the Olympics so I might get you to all comment on this starting with you Melinda. What is the state of alternative political movements to the party at the moment and is there any ability inside China to express themselves. Well, first of all, I think that one of the very iconic facts about Xi Jinping's administration is that if we thought it was opaque before think again it's even more opaque now, I have to confess that there's not a whole lot of transparency into what what's going on inside even even just ordinary bureaucracy, people don't talk the way they used to talk. I mean, we thought they were already closed mouth before but but this is really deafening silence people are afraid to talk to foreigners in some cases, or they just, they just don't want to don't want to. Of course and there's been a pandemic so they're not, you know, there's also a kind of a feeling of being sort of more self contained, you know, there's been psychological isolation as well as real isolation. We don't really know, but there are definitely signs of people yearning with with some nostalgia for a time of greater openness and especially a time of greater, shall we say, market oriented reform greater interaction with expats maybe you know, these are all topics that are okay to talk about so what do I mean. I mean, you know, there might be officials at a very low level say district level officials in Beijing and Chaoyang district where I live, who talked to business people and say, Oh, we've a lot of expats have left and there are a lot of empty offices in the district. So now let's have a project to build wait for this one low income housing that it's expats can actually afford in Beijing so that they'll come back and take part in building our economy. Okay, first of all, it's true. A lot of people can't afford to live in Beijing both Chinese and expats, but the idea that somehow let's get expats back I've heard I've heard that for more than one direction also in Shanghai. There are local level people saying there used to be our population used to be 7% foreigners and now because of the pandemic and other reasons, it's down to 1% but but our most innovative moment was when we had sent 7% and now we'd like to get back to 7% These things are okay to say there are many other things that are not okay to say, but some analysts have talked about the politics of funerals there have been a couple of milderly and prominent somewhat relatively liberal people who passed away at an advanced age, and the sorts of commentaries that have been aired about them, people go who have gone to their funerals or sent wreaths to their funerals and they say on those wreaths, there seems to be some kind of slight feeling of a bit of nostalgia for a more open sort of market oriented era of the past. Steve do you have any thoughts on that I guess from your first answer about the firmness of Xi Jinping thought do you see any avenues for expression of alternative views of China's future. Well, I think alternative views for China's future exist in China is an enormous country with huge amount of diversities among people. The truth is whether they're articulated and how they're articulated. Here I think we have to get back into a reality that after the Tiananmen, Mexico of 1989, the Communist Party did steadily increase the scope for internal policy at the top echelon of the party. And that was largely closed down after the 19 Party Congress of 2017. And now we are not really seeing much scope of internal policy debates at the upper echelon of the Communist Party. So if the top leaders within the party. There's no knowledge that you don't rise to the top of the Communist Party for being incompetent with by and large you're talking about very, very able people who have enormous experience and ideas of how to steer China to the best destination. It can be, and they are being. Intermediated to stay silent. That means that in the wider society in civil societies and elsewhere, people are no longer able to articulate their alternative models for China, because if you try to do that, you will almost certainly commit the historical nihilism. Because if you say anything about the party's history, if you go back to the party's history and say that the 1980s was a wonderful time when people were able to talk about all kinds of alternatives. Even under leadership of Dong Xiaoping, we were talking about whether the party and the state should be separated. Now that's no longer acceptable. It's something which, if you go back 10 years, people will speak very freely about and would debate whether that was the right approach or the wrong approach. Now there is only one right approach. You follow the leader, you follow the narrative, or you take very serious personal risk of what may then happens to you. Yes, what is your sense, you of course would remember clearly the charter await and various democracy movements in China. Is there any outlet for them at the moment. Well, just as Steve and Melinda were talking, I was just thinking, you know, July 1 Thursday is another anniversary, which has a great bearing on this which is the imposition, the introduction of a national security law into Hong Kong. So in so far as Hong as China's had an alternative future open to it. An example of what that alternative future might be it's always been there in Hong Kong. And the fact that over the past year, the Chinese government and its ancillary government in Hong Kong have acted so swiftly, so aggressively to use the national security law to bring in this fundamental transformation of politics in Hong Kong with the eradication of opposition voices. I think that does speak to know the other side of this argument Richard, which is at the same time is that there's been the silencing of these, what you could call liberal voices. There's been this growing sense of confidence of expansiveness of these voices within the party encouraged by Xi Jinping emboldened by Xi Jinping's era, who are pushing for a much more confidently authoritarian view of China's future. And that's a view of future that I think many people outside of China find difficult to understand and even find repugnant. But I think it's also a future that does have at least some constituency in China some some basis of support and the basis of that support. It's partly an appeal to nationalism but it's also partly appeal to that sense of security that we were talking about before about this firm paternalistic authoritarian government, which can bring the country together, but also withstand domestic and external differences. So, you know, in a sense those, at the same time those liberal voices as those alternative views have been still I think we've seen these more authoritarian voices become emboldened and more influential as well. So one area where there has been debate of course that has surfaced slightly into public is about Chinese diplomacy and the so called wolf warriors, and whether in fact they help China or hurt China. You know, within China they seem to be very popular outside of China people think it's a disaster. Melinda what's your sense of the debate inside China about the wolf, about wolf warrior diplomacy. Yeah, that's that's that's fascinating it's a sort of Jacqueline Hyde on a state level. I think part of the problem is that Chinese officialdom. Especially the communist regime, they're accustomed to being the underdog they've actually waged that battle very successfully otherwise they wouldn't have survived for for a century. The underdog they do, they can do and they know how to do it. They don't know how to do top dog they don't, it's not too clear how you're supposed to act if you are number one, you know, and of course now we're getting to the point where people see China as aspiring to number one but they don't know their models for how you act as number one is, you know, written 100 years 100 200 years ago, or the United States they seem to see them as very aggressive and very assertive and very exploitative or colonialist. So, underdog top dog equals, that's, that's why we have wolf warrior, the wolf warrior tone and diplomacy. It's a, it's a, it's a sort of a sort of mistaken equation between an aggressive tone and an actual strength, you know, like if I talk strong and talk big that means I am strong and I am big. Well, no it doesn't it actually often means quite the opposite or, or at least reveals a deep insecurity. And I think there's actually some experimentation with this because some of these officials who are today's wolf warriors and they were not always wolf warriors not by any means. And it just, I think some of them see it as a, you know, a means to fast promotion a way to gain attention. Just like sometimes diplomats in Western countries do but it's not of course it's, it's much different when you're, when you're in China, and it's all very new. I don't, I think there is discussion. I think. And also the other thing we have to keep in mind is, we place a lot of weight on what the diplomatic tone is but in the broader picture of the Chinese government, the foreign ministry in particular is a rather weak player when you compare it to other ministries. So we might be putting a lot of weight on the wolf warrior rhetorical tone, when in fact there's a lot of other stuff going on that we don't see and we don't hear. So in your sense of this debate, is it important. And what does it tell you about China at the moment. Well the event of the wolf warriors I think is important, because I think any objective observer would see that as hugely damaging to Chinese efforts to build soft power, and to gain international respect and admiration, which is what he wants to do. But the event of I think wolf warriors is perhaps very difficult to avoid if not inevitable, given the way House Xi Jinping is running China, he's put in the incentive system. He focused much more than his predecessor who already did it on what I would call party centric nationalism, and in this focus on the party centric nationalism in this construction or reconstruction of history. What I would say is changing the day facto social contract that existed between people and the party stage in China since 1989. The day facto social contract was always previously about the party monopolizing its power in the return for each delivering a better tomorrow to people in China, better living standards and better living conditions. To modify it upgraded the social contract to one that is going to make China powerful and strong. So it is necessary for the party state to present to people that China is strong and powerful, and can go out and command respect. And that is the conditions where diplomats are being incentivize to go out and behave like wolf warriors, because their five primary objective is no longer to work with the host country, but to be assessed by domestic opinions, both country at large, and in the party upper echelon. And for all the Xi Jinping said about we need to modify it a bit to make China's diplomacy credible and lovable. No wolf warrior has ever been demoted or punished. So the incentive is clearly in place that if you want to move upwards and forward in your career as a diplomat, be a strong wolf warrior. So we get into this track of China coming out in his diplomacy in his diplomacy, which is counterproductive to his diplomacy, even though is very professional diplomats understand and know that. Chris, I remember about 1015 years ago a professor whose name I've forgotten from Sun Yat-sen University in Guangdong complained about aggressive nationalistic language and he said young people were being brought up and being fed wolf milk. This is the wolf warriors have grown up after being fed wolf milk and the like. I mean, what is your sense of this is that, you know, popular at home, unpopular aboard or just unpopular amongst Western countries, Southeast Asian countries might have a different view of it. And what do you see it as reflective of. I think Steve hit the nail on the head about many of the motivations within the Chinese system for this much more of them and rhetoric when it comes to foreign criticisms, this fusing of party and government. Party and government means that, you know, the party's propaganda and ideological imperative so felt much more directly on the diplomatic system. And throughout the foreign ministry than perhaps they used to be. I would I would just point out another element here which comes into play. And I think it's important for understanding what is happening which is, you know, the fact is over the past four or five years, four or five years, certainly over the past couple of years, some of the most contentious issues in Chinese foreign policy and in Chinese railings with foreign journalists have been about the these these human rights issues in Xinjiang, to some extent in Tibet, in Hong Kong as well, that have a slightly different cast or somewhat different cast from those tensions of the past so you know when when China is presented with criticism or critical reporting of its policies across an entire region and entire territory with that's Hong Kong or Xinjiang. That touches on these nerves that are very important within the party about territorial sovereignty about the integrity of the Chinese nation state in a way that individual human rights cases and more localized human rights abuses in the part didn't touch on. You know, often in so far as you see that Wolf Warrior rhetoric coming into the for its on these very sensitive and intense issues about China's periphery. And also on this big issue of course about covert as well. So I think that is one issue and your other question Richard was about how this is playing in China. I think Melinda can probably best speak to that. I suspect inside the Chinese system, perhaps even quite high up in the Chinese system. There would be people who would wish that, you know, some of the loudest voices in the Chinese Foreign Ministry in global times and so on, would just tone it down a bit. And I think what you do see from time to time is that the, you know, sometimes that message gets through. It gets through the calibrations when the rhetoric dies down a bit. But then the incentives for being, let's call them Wolf Warriors Wolf Warrior is so baked in as Steve says that they're back roaring pretty quickly. I'm going to move on to ask you a separate question each now starting with you Melinda that we've seen a crackdown on China's tech titans they're almost entirely private businessmen entrepreneurs. That's on top of the jailing of a number of other private or and also disciplining of a number of other private entrepreneurs in recent years. Is there a concerted effort to actually transform the private sector and make it much more a political base for the party or is this just, you know, a sort of cyclical disciplining of the sector to make sure that they behave. I think it's a somewhat of a combination of both. But I think you pointed out a very important fact also which is that we might have once upon a time thought of the Chinese Communist Party as you know dominated by the proletariat workers and peasants and the downtrodden in society who who brought down a capitalist and bourgeois ruling system. But today, those rich people are the party. You know what it came home to me when I saw a lot of this, you know, the armies of street sweepers who are out there on the street with you know the bus drivers all the policemen all the security, you know, they're quite happy to do everything they can do to make this party for the party be a big one. Um, but more and more the party people are themselves. Well to do. They use the party for networking. They see it as a fast track to a good career and a good life. And I, I, I think it's, I think it, I think there is a an idea that you can't let private entrepreneurs get too far ahead of things because once you have economic power then maybe you'll want a bigger political say. And, you know, I think it's kind of fascinating that Jack Ma, you know, of course, who is now invisible, having a lot of issues in his once former corporate empire. For a long time he didn't want to say that he was a party member and then eventually it came out that he was you know not that he was a typical one, but I think now we're seeing you know, I think we're seeing tech titans encountering regulatory and other kinds of obstacles and setbacks, but the ones who will survive are the ones who find the way to be both entrepreneurially successful and to work with the party or even to be a staunch party member. I mean, yeah. It's a new ball game in that in that respect to me and in the West of course we complain about the cancel culture but the cancel culture in China is quite something when you look at what's happened to Jack Ma. Steve, I want to go to another topic now for you. You've done a lot of work over the years on Taiwan has been a lot of discussion about Beijing increasingly willing to gamble with military action on Taiwan if not today then maybe about by 2025. Do you think there's there's been a change of tone on Taiwan and in what and and what does it mean. What we have to bear in mind with Xi Jinping is that when he is finally finished. He expect China to be one united country. One strong powerful united country respected by all for which he will have to bring Hong Kong tightly into his phone and to bring Taiwan into China's phone. I don't think he is in a desperate hurry to get this done in the next five years or so, but he will not leave it unaccomplished before he is ready to hand over to somebody else. The reality with Xi Jinping is of course that when he hand over, it will be a result of a biological clock ticking and not his personal choice of funding and a knowledge successor and handing over power that way. So I think we are looking at something more like perhaps like 20 years, the man is 68. Past the 10 year mark from today, I think the risk that the PLA maybe orders to do something would increase significantly year by year. Xi Jinping is a risk taker. Particularly in contrast to his two immediate predecessors, but he is not reckless. He is not somebody who is likely to want to embark on an operation over Taiwan. Because he knows if that operation should fail, it could fundamentally destabilize his hold to power within the party and therefore in China. So he wouldn't want to take a risk like that. He will only do so when he feels that China has the capability to take Taiwan and to deter the Americans from interfering so that he can actually get Taiwan or force Taiwan to accept unification with the mainland. Very interesting. Chris, I wanted to ask you about the Uighurs. This has been, I think we're about three, four years now into the construction of the reeducation camps. So long in fact that China says many Uighurs have graduated from these camps and have gone into work in various factories or gone home and the like. Can you give us a sense of where we are on the Uighur issue right now? Is there any sense of all at all? Obviously, outwardly China has been absolutely firm in rejecting any criticism and the like, even as pressure and criticism from the west has been ratcheted up. Where are we at on that issue? Are the camps still there? Are they being wound down? Is there any sense of a debate inside China on this issue? Unfortunately, I haven't, I'm not in China now, of course, but I haven't been able to visit Xinjiang since 2018. So that direct sense about what is happening on the ground now is very indirect for me. And only from what I hear from other people who have visited more recently, it does sound like over the past couple of years a couple of changes have been taking place in Xinjiang. First of all, it does seem that the leadership of the region and the leaders in Beijing feel confident enough about their control over Xinjiang that they've taken away some of the most egregious aspects of security that really stood out for you when you visited Xinjiang, certainly up until later in 2018. So, you know, the, the, the, the nests of barbed wire that were around every public building and schools and so on. The checkpoints that were everywhere, especially for Uighurs and other national minorities there are the constant surveillance and the police patrols everywhere. All of that certainly hasn't receded, but it sounds like, at least in a good many areas, it's been calibrated a bit so the region doesn't feel under that oppressive state of near martial law that it felt like for a couple of years there. At the same time is big question about how many people remain in confinement. Just how many people remain in reeducation camps and other other forms of detention I think is is one that experts and observers are still puzzling through. It's difficult to say just how many people have been released from the camps. I think we can say with much greater confidence so that the population, which has been put under into prisons after conviction is, is extraordinarily high, certainly compared to other areas of China, and it's likely to remain high for some time to come. So it is plausible that while, you know, while a number of the people who were in indoctrination camps have been released, if not into back to their families then into other forms of confinement or labor. It's also quite probably true that at least a segment of that that camp population has now been put through the judicial system and is serving prison terms. Not the rethink is on their own policy. I think we're still trying to puzzle that out. Quite recently the party did hold a work conference on Xinjiang policy that did begin to offer some signs about not necessarily the moderation of policy but an extension of policies there. I think what we're waiting to see now is how those policies unfold in the next few years, especially if it seems likely there's a change in the regional in the leadership of of Xinjiang in in in the coming period. So I think for the party secretary who presided over the enormous wave of detentions there is getting pretty due for replacement fairly soon. So I think that will be something else we'll be looking at. Thank you now I'm going to ask some of the low Institute members and the like questions which were emailed in. I'm going to try and keep this related to the party itself. But Linda, starting with you from Andrew Bain. Any chance of a woman standing committee member, I think there's one woman Politburo member and to my memory there's not been a member of the standing committee that is the inner circle of the Chinese leadership ever since 1949. Of course, if you look at people coming up through what is a hierarchical system there are very few coming up through the system as well it's really amazing if you think about it. Have you looked at that issue recently do you see any women who are likely to be promoted. I haven't actually looked at the issue in terms of the, the Politburo standing committee, but overall over the past few years. I haven't been looking at it much because it's all bad news for women in politics, particularly at that that high level. One could not have thought this would be possible but things have actually gone backwards. In other words, as we, as we became more modern they became fewer women in those higher levels of course in the past, many of them were probably what we would call token token women or women placed in high positions due to family or other connections in a sort of princely type connections. Nonetheless, it's been very disappointing I think that the current the current regime has has has gone so far backwards. You know this whole thing is kind of unusual. I would never in my life have thought there would be nostalgia for Jung's a man, but there is some of that in some circles. It just just never occurred to me that things would go backwards like this. I've got a question from Michael Wadley for you Steve as an unparry phrasing this is lots of talk in recent years about China exporting its system, I guess, or aspects of it is very hard to export the system. I don't think China is flawless because it's quite unique, but but certainly the conversation about this has changed within China. What do you think China wants to do in promoting its system overseas and does that mean exporting it. I think China is planning to export is particular system to any part of the world. It is not the same as the Cold War era when they were trying to export revolution. What they are trying to do, and I think they do to get very seriously is to make the world save for authoritarianism. Democracy is not the only narrative that democracy is not the only direction of trouble for governments to develop and making the world save for authoritarianism is ultimately to serve the best interests of the Communist Party in China itself. A world safe for authoritarianism is a world that cannot have a color revolution that's spread to China and undermine the authority of the Communist Party. So that is pretty basic. A world that is safe for authoritarianism is also a world that is more welcoming to China playing a more assertive and stronger and influential road in global affairs. It will be a world that will counter the dominance of the Western powers led by the United States. And I think this is really what we are seeing in terms of the Chinese government's objective by his foreign policy, rather than exporting his particular political model for other countries to copy China. After all, from their perspective, the Communist Party and Xi Jinping are pretty extraordinary. Yes, I always. Yeah, when people talk about exporting the Chinese system I often ask them, I mean, could you have an organization department in the Democratic Republic of Congo and obviously the answer is you couldn't and so I don't think it is really exportable as a single unit. Now Chris for you from Nicola Sabadini. She's asked about the serious points of tension within the party we've sort of talked about this but in asking you that I'd like you to think not just about, you know, the sort of binary often gets stuck in about you know Democratic impulse versus the strong party what about within the ruling group within those sorts of people who you know are making the case for the need for a strong party to rule China. What are the points of difference there. That's a very good question Richard I'm not sure I have an easy answer to that so within the ruling elite what are the different points of perhaps debate or difference that that that we may see emerging in some for or more another. You know what they are I do think one point of I wouldn't sort of call it a debate but I think a point of pressure that the party leadership and party elite is going to feel more acutely going into next year and beyond. Is this question of political succession and transformation under Xi Jinping. Assuming that he remains in power for at least another five years, I think almost inevitably within the party elite, even within levels, you know parts of the leadership. There's going to be questions that arise about what is the game plan for China's process of succession and transition going forward. So what we're going to see is those points of pressure. If Xi Jinping doesn't offer a clear roadmap say at the next party Congress, either a particular successor or cohort of potential successors, or at least an idea of where the country is headed in terms of the next transition. I think we're going to see some uncertainty there. And that's why it's a pressure about, you know, what is Xi Jinping going to offer us, you know, what does happen if, you know, if Xi Jinping's health runs into trouble, or there's a need to for considering who the next leadership will be. I think that's one broader issue that's going to come up. I think possibly the other issue that becomes a point of contention, even among among officials who are not necessarily self described liberals. So what is this question about the future of the economy as well. No, it's, it's, it's an enormous country of course 1.4 billion people, each province is is the size of a very large European country. And so each province has its own motivations, its own interests its own demands when it comes to know the priorities for economic development resources to be allocated from the central government. So some of those points of difference also for example between say officials on the Eastern seaboard who are still in some ways very much more wedded to an export oriented form of growth. And those officials from inland provinces of China, you're quite happy to see the central leadership signaling that it's much more focused on domestically driven forms of growth. So that may be another source of potential debate that we see, at least continuing in China in the next few years. Yes, well Linda on that point about the succession issue which I think is a big issue. You know somebody asked me the other day on a webinar to, you know, if I, for me to look into the black box of Chinese politics and say what was going to happen with succession. The problem is when you open the black box it's still dark inside and you can't really see, but but Chris makes an interesting point for people who are critics of she for people who are supporters of she. Do they necessarily want him to stay on in perpetuity and is that a potential source of tension in the years ahead. I think Chris made really good points there I think the question of succession, it has to be watched because even if you love everything that Xi Jinping did, he's he's mortal, and he will not be here forever. There is no plan for when he's no longer here that itself is destabilizing and of course, you know, not not many political parties last as long as a century or dynasties for that matter and succession has always been a really tricky wicket and for those who care about lasting beyond the lifetime of one person. Yes, it is, and it's going to be a big, a big focus, particularly if things remain opaque and unclear for longer than what people find comfortable. And then the other I also agree that in the economy there's some there's some potential fissures, and one of them which cuts in very unusual ways, non traditional ways is the question of okay we're now supposed to be green we're supposed to be green we supposed to use clean energy get away from fossil fuel, save the world climate change you know only China can do it, or, you know during the Trump era it looked like only China could, could make that commitment and not now Biden is back. However, there are some very very serious issues like how, how deeply can the ruling, the ruling team cut into its own power base by telling the coal bosses, hey look you guys, you know, you got to clean up your act, we're going to shut you down. We've actually seen some major coal mines being shut down. And people were wondering oh you know as this is, is this green thing for real, but I went when you start weighing the cost in terms of political support. That's going to be a very very difficult situation, particularly because the rhetoric has been pretty green you know pro green or at least. Aspects of it at this at the top level, it's the implementation that will be a really big problem. And then you know I, I, I, I just worry that the, the lesson learned during the Olympic period is going to have is deeply imprinted and is going to still be there for many many years, which is that nationalism trumps everything. I recall that when the before the summer Olympics Beijing summer Olympics there was a very controversial torch relay that went all over the world and there were protests and against China in many countries. Some of them were for you to bet, you know, Tibetan independence protesters or other kinds of protesters. And I think the Chinese organizers felt almost betrayed in a way they were like, hey wait this, you know, we're trying to be part of the world here and have a good games and why are you beating up on us. But the thing that they learned is that when these protests took place overseas at home public opinion was very united behind the government. And the lesson was, hmm, you know, if there was ever any question about how we want to keep people behind us at home. Nationalism will do it. And I just worry that that will become a very reflexive thing as we go further into this key transitional period. Yes, you make good points I think especially on coal everybody says that even with the 2060 target for carbon neutrality in China that is extremely difficult and we've seen some big public fights in China recently over how to get to that target and how to sort of get coal out of the system. Steve, on the you mentioned on the issue of the Xi Jinping succession you talked about it in passing there, and you seem pretty convinced that he's going to stay for as long as he can which means you really don't expect to see any nod for a successor at the party Congress at the end of next year. You're correct. I don't see a successor being named in the 20th Party Congress. If you were in the in the political and about to be promoted to the political standing committee at the 20th Party Congress, would you like to be named as the successor to Xi Jinping. It's probably just most vulnerable politically vulnerable positions you could get in the current political setup in China, the name successor will be the number one target for problems is the whole thing's been changed previously to be named successor you have been given a five year apprenticeship to become the next top leader. So you are going to be named as the person who potentially is going to be taken down by Xi Jinping because you pose a threat to him. I don't think there's going to be a huge amount of lobbying amongst the seven or so people six or so people who will be named to the political standing committee at the 20th Party Congress to be identified as Xi Jinping's successor. People get that in the 19 party Congress, which was smart enough to make it clear that he was quite happy staying way, where he was in the bullet Bureau, and we'd rather not be promoted to the political standing committee, knowing perfectly if he were given his background and his age and topic expectation if he were in the political standing committee, he would be seen as a potential successor that would make him extremely vulnerable for personal political survival he didn't do that. I think most of your people who will be promoted will be smart enough to learn that lesson. I love that comment on the poison chalice the most dangerous position in China is to be number two to Xi Jinping. So a final question, which is a little bit theoretical but I kind of like this from one of the low Institute members Graham Shaw. He talks about the Minsky moment as applied to Chinese politics. Does stability inevitably breed instability now this is a financial markets theory he's trying to apply it to Chinese politics. I'll ask you first Chris once again I've given you absolutely no notice one minute each from both from all of you on this starting with you Chris does stability breed instability. Luckily Steve has already given half of the answer which is this conundrum which is going to get different Chinese politics of an extraordinary strong incumbent leader Xi Jinping, who is so powerful that it's almost it's going to be very difficult for any potential successor, not merely to emerge but also to amass the authority and influence to become a confident successor. When the day come when Xi Jinping passes on the on the baton. So, you know, I'm not quite sure whether we'd call it a minsky moment I'm not an economist. But there is a kind of a structural issue here that has nothing to do with the horse race about who the particular leader is, but about this contradiction between the power that Xi Jinping is has amassed and institutionalized through the positions of the primary general secretary ship through the Central Military Commission chairmanship, and even in the sense through the presidency. How he's institutionalized all of that power and himself, and the difficulty that creates for them passing on to a successor in some form. I do think it's going to be an extraordinarily difficult navigation effort to smoothly crossover into a smooth into a new leadership. Melinda, do you have any comment as in stability breed instability. In my mind. I think it depends on the toolkit for stability. I think that in general, an obsession with stability is about the most deep destabilizing thing you can have, but I've been, I've been. It's not a simple paradigm and I've been wrong. And I've been wrong regarding a Chinese society and that was Taiwan where I lived in the 1970s, which were dark, dark martial law days. I mean you talk about repression. That was bad. I was a journalist. I was followed at one point I was banned. Lots of things were happening. I was banned. I'll just say one word I won't talk about the mince key moment because I don't know, you know, I'm not very familiar with that but the thing I am familiar with is the jumping wall conundrum and solution. We all thought that here he was the son of John Kasek, you know, of course he's going to be just like his father, iron fist, Leninist type party. It's been a few years of heavy hand, quiet, but you know tension under the surface. And then to his credit mid 80s, he said okay, we're lifting martial law, we're democratizing and lo and behold it actually happened. I would never have thought that that could happen. So he had tools that are and a scale that are not today's China, but it's not impossible for this to happen, even in a even in a Chinese society that started out as a very by the book Leninist style party, which was the guamidong party in the 70s. Stay final word to you very quickly on that point. I would just like to remind us that for all his scenes. Put your towel in his decade of in China was moving the communist party into a very unusual way. He was beginning to accept some element of mothering. And under Xi Jinping, completely reversed that everything has to be done right, and the party will see to it that everything are being done right at his race public expectation. So under Xi Jinping, everything has to get it right. The party must get it right every time, all the time. And the moment comes, when the party state stops to be able to do that, either because of the leadership change or whatever. I think it will be very, very difficult for the party state to try to muddle through and survive that way, it will have to get things right again. Unless China is extraordinarily lucky to suddenly have a successor to Xi Jinping, who will be able to deliver the same kind of strong leadership and making sure the party is getting it right. That may be the moment we have to be watched as a very difficult moment, we won't get much money from that point. Thank you very much and we'll finish on that note. Steve sang from London. Thank you by the way for wearing red I don't know whether you did that deliberately Chris Buckley in Sydney. Thank you so much for being in Beijing and thanks to Andrea Pollard and just got in for getting this event together at short notice. Thank you very much I'm Richard McGregor and I hope you've enjoyed the broadcast.