 Good morning and welcome to the US Institute of Peace. My name is Tina Hagedorn and I manage the conflict prevention and resolution forum for USIP along with our partners Alliance for Peace Building and Search for Common Ground and a list of others. This is our first CPRF of 2018 with an event titled Bringing Arm Groups to the Peace Process in Afghanistan. Since 1999, the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum has provided a monthly platform in Washington for highlighting innovative and constructive methods of conflict resolution. CPRF's goals are to provide information from a wide variety of perspectives, explore possible solutions to complex conflicts and provide a secure venue for stakeholders from various disciplines to engage in cross-sector and multi-track problem solving. The CPRF is hosted at USIP and SICE. We do consecutive months, so we hope you will follow us and see what our topics are and come back. Some of our partners, as I said, are Search for Common Ground, Alliance for Peace Building, George Mason University, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins and USIP. I will hand over the stage to Johnny Walsh, who will introduce the topic and the speakers, and we are waiting. Laurel Miller is coming. She is stuck in traffic, so we will begin without her. Thank you for coming. Thank you very much. Thanks to CPRF for organizing an event on a subject extremely dear to my heart. I'll just introduce our panelists quickly. First, Laurel Miller, who you'll see sitting next to me shortly. Senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation at this moment. Prior to that, she led the US government's efforts on the peace process during four years at the State Department, first as a deputy SRAP, and later as the acting SRAP for an extended period in past lives. She was an adjunct professor at Georgetown, senior advisor to the US Special Envoy for the Balkans, director of the National Security Council, perhaps most illustriously a senior expert at USIP. And we'll see her shortly. Javid, to my right, is a non-resident fellow at both the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center and the Modern War Institute at West Point, if I have that right. In his own past lives, he's been a manager at the risk management firm, IJET, a senior advisor to the Afghan Minister of Finance, program coordinator for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, and a member of DOD's Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, and on our screen, we will have live from London, Alexander Rams-Bottom, who I, there we go, that's a technological victory already. Hi, Alexander. He works for Conciliation Resources. He's the head of their Accord publication series on peace processes and peace building. I'd be remiss if I don't note that Accord has an issue coming out, I believe in May, with a specific focus on the Afghan peace process. This is very exciting for a nerd like me. I think we'll all want to take a look at that. Alexander has also been a specialist advisor to the House of Lords EU Committee and an associate fellow at Chatham House, among many other things. He'll be offering comparative thoughts from other peace processes that are relevant to the Afghan case today. And last and very much least, I'm Johnny Walsh. I'm a senior expert on Afghanistan at US Institute of Peace, leading our efforts on the Afghan peace process. Prior to this, I worked on the same peace process in various capacities around the US government, including for State Departments, South and Central Asia Bureau, for SRAP, for the US mission to the UN. And without further ado, the format, we will hear roughly 10 minute presentations from each of our panelists to start things and then turn it over for Q&A. I think we'll start with Java, if that's all right. Absolutely. Thank you so much, Johnny, for having me and the USIP and the CPRF team. So as we wait for Laura, I thought she was going to go first. I'll go ahead and talk about and focus on two overarching questions that I thought are important just to set the debate about our topic today. And those would be what a political sentiment might look like from a stakeholder perspective and what level in terms of investment might we need to achieve this end state. And so let me begin with a very basic question, which I'm not quite sure has been fully established yet as we debate the Afghan peace issue. There are only talks. It's not been fully turned into a process yet, but this question is important, which is who are we really negotiating with? And I think I'm asking this because answering this is significant for numerous reasons, not only because of the varieties of actors involved, but also because of the diversity of opinions, the conflicting interests and divergent views among different actors that are a party to the Afghan conflict. And each of these actors are expecting some say in the Afghan peace negotiation and definitely some say in the Afghan any sort of peace settlements that may come after it. So from how I see it is that there are at least four categories of concentric circles of actors that involve the Afghan peace process. The core group are obviously going to be the Afghan government in the Taliban. The second category of actors would involve Pakistan and the United States both hold significant influence on developments in Afghanistan. The third circle would definitely be the regional government such as India, Russia, China and possibly Saudi Arabia that too has significant influence over any outcomes of any peace negotiation. And then finally the Europeans, the Japanese and maybe some international organizations such as the United Nations or the EU would be the other set of actors that could be expected to play some role. Now before any formal talks begin, I think it's crucial to clarify the long-standing ambiguity about the Afghan conflict itself as well, especially between the different players that are party to the conflict. This should include who is fighting whom, who is the common enemy, who is a friend, and what does each side want and is there an interlocutor that could serve as a neutral mediator or an intermediary. For example, and I'm asking this because this is important to settle this ambiguities because Washington views the Afghan conflict largely as an internal struggle between the Afghan government and the Taliban. For Afghanistan the conflict is an undeclared war between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Taliban are merely a proxy that are used by Pakistan to support its insidious agenda in the region. For Pakistan the war is a part of a historic enmity with India and Afghanistan is but the competing ground. And as far as the Taliban, which consider the Kabul government as a popular regime, the fight is between Islam and the West. And then on top of this you have a confluence of criminal actors and patronage networks that as well as the Afghan booming drug enterprise that adds to this growing puzzle. Now naturally these ambiguities as we look at it more closely poses challenges for the Afghan peace talks. But in the end one thing has remained clear for the last 21 or so years since 96 is that the Taliban has been at the center of any fight the United States and the Afghan force have had so far. In the last five or six years the Afghan government has pursued its own fight, fracture and talk strategy that was aimed to fracture the Afghan Taliban but to a little success so far. But the Taliban has been fragmented but not to the extent that the Kabul government had hoped for. Now in recent years there have also been a variety of both official and unofficial contacts between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Representative these talks have been meaningless in nature as I see it and it has also not yielded any tangible results or outcome. And one reason is that the talks are almost exclusively top down. It lacks a solid roadmap and it's narrowly focused on the terms under which the Taliban might agree or might not agree to lay down their arms. Now any future peace talks assuming it starts should and must begin by considering the views and perspective of all sides. Now that should include what do each side want and what are their major fears. How is each actor's internal policy decision making processes structured, who negotiates, who agrees to, who vetoes in any peace deal or serious peace talks. What pressures including political or military will likely shape each party's decision making in the processes and do they believe that the time is on their side and what are also the likely must-haves of each negotiating party and what are the general wishless or merely want-to-haves of each party involved in the Afghan conflict. Now there's a considerable degree of overlap in the priorities of actors that are involved in the Afghan conflict but their interests and objectives also vary greatly. For all parties especially the Afghan government and the Taliban the main topic at the core of any future talks are likely to involve a ceasefire in acceptance of the Taliban as a legitimate political movement. The Taliban renouncing ties with al-Qaeda and other terrorist platforms and outfits the distribution of power as well as the patronage network, constitutional revision, the role of Islam in Asharia and the Afghan government also in the Afghan law and eventual withdrawal of foreign forces as well as a release of prisoners on both sides. Further concessions on both sides will also include the removal of Taliban leaders from the United Nations blacklist, providing security and financial arrangements for the Taliban fighters and their leaders immunity for the Taliban leaders and possibly some administrative decentralization in the Afghan government. But the challenge here is agreeing on the prioritization of all these issues on the timing of it and then sequencing it as well. Now moving on to the Taliban itself within the larger movement there are many groups that have divergent views and interests that are party to the conflict especially about a political settlement with the Afghan government. Since the death of Mullah Omar we have seen the Taliban have become increasingly decentralized both horizontally and vertically. They've also become relatively incoherent. They've also splintered across different factions in groups that are now operating under different flags and different leaders. They're also internally divided across ideological and tribal lines. It's also no longer a homogeneous group. It started off as a push through movement largely at the top but it's as you sort of trickle down more to the fighter level. We've seen more and more Tajiks, Punjabis, Hazaras, Uzbek, Arab institutions, even the times Al Qaeda fighters fighting along their side. At the same time in recent years the Taliban have become increasingly more extremist as a unit. Now for example today when the Taliban commander gets killed he's often replaced by another one oftentimes from the same family member who is more extreme, more radical, more cruel and much more uncompromising and meanwhile many of the reconcilable Taliban have and are gradually becoming more and more irreconcilable. But for the last 21 years since 96 the group's main objectives has not changed and that is to take over Afghanistan's political system and fundamentally change it. And one important challenge is that despite frictions today in the Taliban movement and within the insurgency the Taliban have no single peace voice or a messenger that would speak tortitively for the group to negotiate peace. Now neither does the group have a leader who could bring all these different fractured Taliban groups into one deal and then actually deliver on it. Now as it currently says the Taliban are unlikely to sue for peace nor have they publicly sought a political, politically negotiated deal. Past peace efforts have also been fruitless either from bad faith, miscalculation or bad timing. Now reconciliation also does not appear ideal option for many Taliban leaders because they loathe, not because they loathe accepting the Afghan constitution but because their fighters will be disarmed. Now the problem is that the Taliban as you see right now they're increasingly becoming less and less about Islam itself and then more about Islam about. Now this takes me back to my original question which is who are we really negotiating with. So if you ask the Afghan government they believe that there's a need for a two tire approach to the Afghan peace talks. One a state-to-state negotiation between Afghanistan and Pakistan and then a second would be a talk, a direct talk between Afghanistan and the Taliban. But in principle both of these approaches revolve around Islamabad or Pakistan itself. More crucially there's a multiplicity views within Pakistan's military on its own Afghan policy. So it would be fundamentally know the views of all the different actors that involve in Pakistan on its Afghan policy on what reasonable accommodation they expect in any peace deals and what they're willing to trade for it. That's important because no Taliban leader would freely engage with the Afghan government or with the United States in any peace negotiation whether Pakistan consent largely because of the fear of reprisal. Now a cursory look into past instances of these peace talks would show that when Taliban have freely engaged with the Afghan government or the United States they've been marginalized, detained, killed, or isolated by Pakistan or elements within Pakistani military establishment unless they sought their blessing. Attempts Pakistan have also torpedoed entire peace efforts when their needs were unmet. In the latest report about Taliban's five-member team visiting Islamabad from their Qatar office just so they could seek Pakistan's consent about talks is another example of why the Taliban as a group as a unit is not a free independent movement to negotiate on the group's behalf. Now add to this puzzle the recent unhelpful machinations by Russia and the Iranians who are reportedly providing material support to the Taliban to counter this whole perceived so-called Islamic State threat in Afghanistan. Now as long as weapons from Iran especially Russia flows into the Taliban fighters, Taliban heartliners are going to stand again and they are likely to become even bigger, gain bigger advantage on the battlefield. Now in those gains could easily be translated into the negotiating table and potentially affecting the outcome of any power sharing arrangement with Kabul. Now in the bigger picture they could also further shift the balance of power away from the United States to Russia. Now the challenge here isn't to bring the Taliban into negotiating table but how to make sure that they remain on the table. The Pakistan knows well that it must maintain a toehold in any peace talks as a key interlocutor. Now all while having the necessary tools and willingness to disrupt any peace efforts if negotiations or the talks does not go as they want it to be. Now just quickly on what level of or type of investment is needed to achieve this end state. With respect to the settlement going forward I think one practical strategy that how I see it is impossible one likely to have more success than the other is to pursue a what I call a Salami slicing approach and what I mean by a slicing approach is to peel away the splinter Taliban groups from and lower level commanders from the main movement which would be the Afghan Taliban or the Quarishora and from the battlefield and slowly integrate them into the Afghan government and this would bring or pressure the Taliban top leadership to negotiate more seriously as well while it still has leverage and this has for the Afghan government in the past have been fruitful that they have reconciled some Taliban commanders in the north where the group maintains a modest presence. Now the important question is how would one exert that pressure on the Taliban one way to is to go with a conventional wisdom in Washington which is to pursue a strategy that simultaneously engages the Taliban on the battlefield but also on the negotiating table on the battlefield the United States has already authorized its commanders on the ground to increase the drone strikes and precision strikes and slowly taking it into their safe havens in Pakistan as Quetta in north-western areas and the idea here is to make make their safe haven or the Taliban's safe havens unsafe for them and this could also potentially strain their relationship with the Pakistani establishment as well. One other thing I want to highlight is that unlike in the past the Taliban has become increasingly a important group today they leverage for example a variety of mobile special forces units the red unit as we have heard recently and they have access to and they use a variety of sophisticated weapons sometimes even better than the Afghan forces have this includes heat gears, sniper weapons, drones, night vision goggles, laser made laser guided M4 rifles, they have bulky telescope excites that are made in Iran or Pakistan they have humwees that they use some acquired some provided by the Iranians and the Russians. Now the only thing that they don't have at this point is the air power but imagine if they also get their hands on anti-aircraft missiles that are probably potentially supplied in the future by Iran or Russia what might that mean for US Afghanistan mission and what might it portend for the survivability of the Afghan government itself. The last thing I want to mention is that on the Afghan context is that which needs to be taken into account is that they're also internal obstacle in Afghanistan with respect to pursuing reconciliation the main challenge is that there's no internal consensus when it comes to Afghan elites seeking a political reconciliation. Many Afghan political leaders review a settlement with the Taliban as a threat to their own vested interest and they actively work to undermine it. The position of individual Afghan elites also differ on where they sit in their personal relationship with regional states and countries. Now what might it take for the Afghan leaders to start trying to build a consensus vision for a power sharing agreement with the Taliban? I don't know. The second thing is that the Afghan leaders have yet to also outline a more coordinated and coherent strategy for a political settlement and then publicly articulate that to the Afghan people and then plan for how they are going to implement that strategy. That has not worked so far so they have done I would say a quite poor job on what needs to be done to convince key constituencies about the benefit of a political settlement. Now is it feasible to develop a local peace and reconciliation initiatives at the ground level and then build it towards a national settlement? That's a question and now what are the different avenues for establishing a dialogue and how can that be sustained? Can we also agree on a mediator or a mediating team perhaps led by the United Nations? That is also a question. Now this question needs to be answered before any serious peace talks could begin and I'll stop here. Thank you. Thank you that is an extremely thoughtful rundown. I present Laurel and perhaps you'd like to speak next. Thank you. My apologies for the late arrival. I'm going to start by disagreeing slightly but importantly with Javid on the question of what the constellation of parties to the conflict is and what the necessary constellation of parties to a peace process would have to be. There are very clearly three parties to the conflict in Afghanistan, three principal parties actively involved. Obviously there are other dynamics at play. There's the Taliban and Afghan government but there's also the United States and it's important to acknowledge it's important for the U.S. but also for others to acknowledge that the United States is a party to the conflict and necessarily has to be a party to a peace process if there's going to be a successful negotiated settlement. Now all three of these parties in various ways have said that they want a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. The United States and all of the countries of the region as well as all of the principal international stakeholders in Afghanistan have said repeatedly that only a negotiated political settlement can end the conflict in Afghanistan and bring some hope of durable stability in the country and yet despite these repeated statements and despite the fact that the administration's current policy in Afghanistan it's newly announced a South Asia strategy puts achieving a negotiated settlement at the center of its objectives. Despite all of that there are no substantive talks underway. There is no peace process. There are many reported contacts of various sorts and there have been over a period of many years but there is no peace process and so the question is why given that this is nominally at least the objective of all of the parties to the conflict and acknowledged widely as the only road forward the only possible end game if you will why is it that there's no peace process underway yet. Looking at this from the perspective of the three parties to the conflict I would say first of all from the Taliban's perspective the conflict is all about the United States it's a conflict between the Taliban and the United States and therefore the focus must be on what the United States will bring to the table and what it will what the Taliban can negotiate with the United States. The Taliban is focusing on a process a format for a process that fits their theory of the case their theory being that the United States illegitimately overthrew their legitimate government and therefore they want a format for the process that reinforces their position as to what the nature of the conflict was the legitimacy of their position and the illegitimacy of the Afghan government and they're quite rigid about that for the Afghan government unfortunately they have a fairly weak hand in trying to initiate a peace process or be the the primary mover in generating a peace process. One reason is and Javed alluded to this a lack of political cohesion within Afghanistan within the political elite on what a peace process should look like and what the plan should be and what exactly the objectives should be and importantly you know a peace process will be a very difficult initiative to sustain and will likely be a if it ever occurs if it ever materializes it will be something that could further fracture politics in Afghanistan rather than unite it and therefore it's it's a a significant deficiency that there is already a lack of cohesion. The second way in which the Afghan government has a fairly relatively weak hand in trying to be the prime initiator of a peace process is lack of leverage over the Taliban and that's not just because of battlefield dynamics it's because what the Taliban most wants out of a peace process is the departure of international forces from Afghanistan and that's not something that is in the the hands of the Afghan government to determine though obviously they ultimately would have influence over that but that's primarily a decision for the United States. A third way in which the Afghan government has a relatively weak hand is that obviously there is a high degree of dependence by Afghanistan on the United States and international community for financial support, for military support and so the decision-making dynamic there is from an Afghan government perspective negatively affected by that disparity in the the power balance. Now for the United States I would say the U.S. has been over time perhaps the most complicating factor of the three parties to the conflict in trying to generate a peace process. One reason is that U.S. interest in or enthusiasm for negotiating peace in Afghanistan has waxed and waned pretty considerably beginning with a stretch of time up until about 2009 so a pretty considerable stretch of time where there was no interest in negotiating with the Taliban and a policy that was in opposition to the idea of reconciliation and since that time as I said a sort of waxing and waning of interest. I think it's also problematic in terms of the U.S. perspective and ability to push forward with a peace process that the U.S. has lacked a fully coherent view of what the Taliban is. Is it an insurgent group? Is it a terrorist group? Is it defeatable? Is it not defeatable? Is it unified? Is it fractured? You know is it is it an irreconcilable enemy or is it a group that has at least in some respects a political character that one could envision bringing into the Afghan polity and it's not just that views have varied at different points in time views have varied across the different American government agencies that would have to play a role in in developing a policy and backing up a policy of genuinely seeking a peace process. I think another problematic factor in terms of the U.S. position in this is not fully accepting its role as a party to the conflict and as a necessary party to a peace process and so at at times and in certain ways that is acknowledged but at others particularly when enthusiasm about a peace process wanes there's more emphasis on this being an Afghan issue and and a negotiation that predominantly if not exclusively needs to occur between Afghan parties. A further reason why I think the U.S. view and this is is problematic is that it's been a long time since the United States negotiated peace agreement to which it was a party. It's one thing to be involved in peace processes in other people's countries where you are just trying to make peace among other parties and as a facilitator negotiator guarantor interested stakeholder but not directly a party and so for the United States to now be in the position of actually negotiating a peace agreement to which it is a party that would require it to resolve a conflict in a way that is at odds with often stated objectives of defeating the enemy and winning the war is is a difficult creates I don't want to be overly psychological about it but I think there's both a policy and a psychological element of this for the United States it creates a different kind of hurdle than than trying to support peace processes as I said from from arms length where you're not a party to it and a final reason why I think it's been problematic for the U.S. to really be committed to a peace process is because there isn't a clear vision in Washington as to what the outcome would look like what is it in part I think because the U.S. is not fully acknowledged and accepted its role as a party to the conflict and a necessary party at the peace table it hasn't fully envisioned what it would want out of a peace process what's the outcome that the U.S. would seek if if peace talks broke out tomorrow I'm highly confident that the U.S. would not have a well-developed position as to what it was seeking as as the end of those as the conclusion of those peace talks so what to do to get out of this impasse that is the current state of affairs first and foremost in my view the United States needs to really make up its mind is it committed to a peace process or is it not committed to a peace process it's one thing to continue you know modest diplomatic efforts and interactions with the Afghan government and the regional countries and others to sort of try to nudge this along it's another thing altogether to put vigorous diplomatic and political muscle behind seeking a negotiated settlement and the latter is not something that I currently see happening and and frankly I don't think is likely in the near term while the the current escalation of the conflict plays out and we see what the effect of that is another element of what could be done but again this depends on the United States really committing itself in a in a much more robust way would be for the U.S. to to articulate at least to some extent what its vision of an end state could be and more to the point for the United States to make clear either publicly or at least privately that it is willing to put on the table the issue of the troop presence in Afghanistan a not an abrupt withdrawal not anything that would destabilize the situation in Afghanistan but for the United States to articulate more clearly than it has in the past and in particular for the current administration to articulate that it envisions that a negotiated settlement would entail a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan as part of the negotiation would I think be highly consequential just a couple other quick comments I would say regarding the the recent reports of Russian interests or offers to be supportive of a peace process to host a peace process initiatives like that are are really not particularly relevant for the reasons that I just expressed as to what the obstacles are to a peace process the United States is the key here to a peace process getting underway or at least a genuine opportunity for a peace process being created and Russia simply cannot convene the United States to any table it's not a plausible arrangement that the United States sits as a party to a negotiation at a table that is chaired by Russia or frankly that is chaired by any other government though there could be the prospect of some kind of neutral mediator and finally just one quick comment and in reaction to java's suggestion of appealing away strategy there is a logic to that if it's something that could be done it should be done I have skepticism about the capability of of any entities or or individuals in Afghanistan currently to really implement such a strategy there's no there's no downside to trying but this is something and there's a potential upside if it if it worked but this is something that's been discussed over a fairly long period of time and if it if it could be done in a much more in a much more systematic and comprehensive way than it's been done in the bits and pieces so far I think it it would have been done but I I don't see any evidence of real capability to to effectuate that kind of strategy unfortunately and I'll leave it there thank you very much Laurel assuming we are still properly connected to London perhaps we could go out to Alexander there we are hi yeah can you hear me okay absolutely great thanks and thanks those two really really fascinating presentations as as was introduced earlier on I'll I'll bring in some some broader perspectives on the peace process including reflecting on comparatively from other contexts particularly some thoughts from the process in Nepal and the Marist's engagement in a peace process there and yeah to pick up on a couple of points that have been raised already first the point that there is lots of talk and speculation about how in the sort of conflict resolution terminology how right the situation is in Afghanistan for a political process um is there a mutually hurting stalemate as people talk about Laurel was referring I think to the there's a growing consensus that there is no military solution to this the problem in Afghanistan so a political process is the is the only game in terms of there does seem to be consensus that that's that's the direct direction of travel for it at least amongst the international community but um equally as Jarvid we think was pointing out very persuasively a lot of pessimism that um the conditions are really there's conditions aren't really there for any progress in that direction in the in the near future um and lots of challenges to getting a peace process off the ground that have been discussed um at quite length already proliferation of armed actors internal coherence of the of the insurgency but also of the Afghan state um and the willingness and capacity of leaderships of various parties to bring their constituencies with them into a political process what are the capacities to do that um one material blockage to progress and that's something that um um we've been thinking a bit about here at um conciliation resources and we'll be um presenting some some thoughts about in the um a court publication that Joly mentioned would be will be out later this year is um to think about really well what does the mechanics of a peace process look like is there any detail about how the what how it might unfold and what the various various sort of components of it are um and can that help us to identify some appropriate models or entry points for talks and peace initiatives and try and anticipate some of the demands risks and compromises that are involved and I think as I'll explain a little bit um having a clearer idea clearer idea of of direction of travel for a peace process but also how it might unfold can I think help and has in other situations help to build and also sustain momentum for a peace process in Afghanistan and one challenge that is related to this I think is the tendency to forget about the process part of the peace process and that it does evolve over time it has um has components and stages to it and fundamentally it involves change and often incremental change that happens um over time and parties aren't groups but also state parties need to compromise but also adapt as they go through it and the tendency to to compress the process and forget about the process part I think at times accentuates accentuates blockages first off relating to before talk starts so we lots of red lines are set up before you'll even get into talks for example related to um the removal of foreign or of foreign troops or whether the Taliban um will endorse the current constitution and so it tends to to think well are those things that we have to agree upon before we get into talks or are those the things that can be negotiated in the talks and that's one sort of blockage that can come from from um concertinering the the um peace process at least conceptually but also I think they tend to look towards the end of at least the negotiation process as well and um to look at the outcome of the of the peace process and in terms of project the political discourse of the discord of the battlefield onto the eventual settlement and missing out in bargaining between the different parties in between and in Afghanistan for example concerns over the what the implications are of integrating the Taliban into the formal political sphere um acquire a um affects people's willingness to go into a negotiation process in the first place um this is obviously as I think has been alluded to already this is this is a disincentive both for conservative conservative elites reluctant to concede power by letting another power player um into the political sphere but also looking to broader society constituencies that are looking to hang on to progressive gains that have been made since 2001 and these are very significant and important reservations um but to anticipate them too much in advance and not think about how they will evolve over the the process of a peace negotiation I think is significant and one key part of that that transition process through a through a peace dialogue is the transition of an armed group itself and how it progresses through a peace process from the battlefield through talks and then into nonviolent politics um notwithstanding the idiosyncrasies of each context and and um that you can't transfer lessons from one place to another um wholeheartedly like that wholesale like that rather I think it is worth looking um at what happened in Nepal and some of the comparable challenges from there especially if you think back to before they even um agreed a piece of the back in 2006 where um things seemed equally stuck and equally um challenging and they managed to find some ways through that um and so yeah back in 2005 clearly there was a political stalemate between the marriage and surgeons in Nepal and the states and so there was similarly as I think that um I think there is today in Afghanistan a building consensus that there has to be some sort of political deal to move this this forward it's a political settlement there's a solution not not a battlefield solution still there was plenty of distance to travel to get from there into a viable um political process um and one of the blockages and one of the worries I think about lots of people in Nepal and both internationally would be that was how the Marist would transition from a revolutionary force to one committed to a system that recognizes democratic pluralism and that was not something that was at all guaranteed and was a genuine worry and a blockage to progress um this was a challenge also to the Marist to become a convincing incredible partner in a viable process and to manage the change that was required to move from one state into the into another internally within the movement and the Marists have had to go through or have chosen to go through continuous internal political transition from coming above ground in order to engage in talks through over dialogue and peace peace talks and into the post-conflict transition and I think it's interesting that um that political transition transformation for the Marists um accelerated both as prospects for a peace process intensified and as as as engagement with um international partners but also with um the state itself as those prospects intensified so did conversations within the Marist about how they would adapt themselves and how they would prepare themselves to engage um engage in a non-violent political process and lots of other partners helped them in that process in that converse in a source of conversations as well um within Nepal individual politicians civil society but also internationally international civil society partners as well as states neighboring states and donors as well um and so lots of people supported dialogue informal dialogue and more formal dialogue as momentum builds up for a more formal peace process along the way um the final quid pro quo of the actual peace deal itself in 2006 reflected both the high point of the insurgents um the Marist insurgent power rather so there was um there was a real sort of battlefield stalemate but an understanding that it had got to as far as it had got it could go militarily and some sort of political process was needed but also a um a trade off between the promotion of their their socio-economic gender in return for an acceptance of political liberalism and their agenda I think is important um notwithstanding all the different components of the Taliban and the complexities of it still they represent some grievances and they represent some constituencies um and some of those are important to bring into the process too since um since the 2000 2006 deal the transition itself has been a real balancing act for the Marists to insimulate into the Nepal's political mainstream at the same time and defending their revolutionary principles to some of their core constituency who obviously have some of many of whom have fought for them and lost lives and loved ones over that over the tenure period but also their ideology that had been a main um driving force of their of their whole campaign and this required difficult trade-offs within the party and including internal splits and bargaining over power sharing um so coming back then to Afghanistan um I think the trajectory of the Taliban from insurgency into formal politics uh is important for the functioning um of a viable peace process and and people have I think our speakers already have referred to understanding better the um political dynamics of the Taliban and what some of their um desires and um and objectives are and this requires hard choices and uncomfortable uncomfortable compromises but I think it's important to remember that a peace process does involve change and involves change for the the parties to it and that change happens over time um one thing that I think is important is um in going forward is building momentum but for dialogue um and how different actors can facilitate this um I was very interested to hear what Laurel was saying about would the US um make a more solid commitment to supporting and negotiated for this core settlement um it's interesting I think that um the the sort of latest US policy towards Afghanistan has put the a conditionality on on military withdrawal framed within the terms of an objective of um increasing leverage for a political solution so that would affect the calculus of the um parties on the ground to protect propensity for a political process um still conditionality um requires addressing some of the accompanying circumstances to facilitate that withdrawal and I think the pressure for for a political process and making and for players like important players like the US to make a strategic sustained and public commitment to that um is important consideration and is something to think about um just as a corollary to that um how much sort of political appetite there is in the US um to make that sort of move another for some for the current administration that is something that would be politically desirable for them um consideration resources along with the Alliance for Peacebuilding in the States actually recently did a public survey of um survey of public opinion about engaging in peacebuilding the government's engaging with peacebuilding but also engaging with armed groups and the findings were remarkably positive actually in in the US survey 76 percent of US respondents both from democratic and republican persuasion supported the US government talking even to prescribed terrorist groups in order to further peace so it seems like there is some public appetite for this kind of um this kind of activity and so maybe some leverage within the United States but also countries like the UK who are engaged in Afghanistan this is something that donor governments could push and could um could push for and looking within Afghanistan there are sort of periodic moves to make progress I was interested recently to to read at the High Peace Council's proposal in December um offering um that the Taliban could suggest a mechanism for negotiations for example through religious ones or jihad please um and so so these periodics of offers of of ways forward um are interesting it's not very clear to me exactly where that proposal would go but I think it was is also telling that um the HPA the the peace council's statement about this offer stressed that the peace process um did not represent surrender for the government so um these public sort of commitments like that to show constituencies that dialogue can deliver positive outcomes for those political constituencies I think are important to progress for into a political process and of course this also applies to to armed groups and maybe some of the terms of negotiation processes that has been presented to armed groups in Afghanistan including the Taliban of course need to be able to suggest that there is space for accommodation um there is room for negotiation and reform and it's not just co-opting a co-opting the insurgency into an existing set up but there is there is room for things to change um I think there's also the there's also the question of the wider public I mean we've been talking very much in terms of the battlefield protagonists in terms of a peace process in um Afghanistan but there's also the the interests and the desires of the wider community I've referred earlier on to um major constituencies in in Afghanistan not what we're wishing to lose gains already made since since the fall of the the Taliban in in 2001 um and so it's a complicated issue I think in in the Afghanistan Afghan situation particularly but what are the prospects for broadening inclusion beyond in any peace negotiation beyond just the battlefield protagonists to bring in other players and other players interests and how would that whole process move forward um so I think I'll stop there and then we can open up um to the wider discussion great thank you so much Alexander uh to all our panelists I'll just say for those who care deeply about the long-standing quest to help to bring peace to Afghanistan um it's fantastic to hear people thinking so deeply about this issue and for that matter it's great to see such a large turnout for an event to think through some of these issues um maybe I'll start by taking my dictatorial moderators prerogative and uh ask first sort of from javid and laurel I feel like I heard two different visions of the Taliban right now from javid you pointed out this is a group that has become more decentralized less cohesive uh since the death of mullah omar or at least since the revelation of the death of mullah omar um to where there are different grievances in different places there are different things motivating factions of the group to fight and that that leads to what you called the salami slicing uh prescription where the the crux of a peace strategy is to peel off fighters units factions within the group um and over time create peace that way laurel you didn't speak directly to the nature of the Taliban but I think implicitly you were talking about a more cohesive group with consistent policy positions on in what order will they talk to the united states what do they seek from such a negotiation that's a picture of a of a group with a command and control structure that predominates and so first of all I'd just be curious how how you two would respond to each other's uh view and second over recent years of the peace process I think the effort has shifted from having both a top down and bottom up component you know we're in years past there was a lot of money and manpower put into reintegration efforts as they were called and now there is less of the latter and most of the focus is on trying to negotiate with the top of the group set it with the top of the Taliban is it time for a reevaluation of that approach uh and then for alexander maybe after we are from java and laurel this is hardly the only case for an insurgency is chaotic uh where it's it's hard to read the relationship of the top leadership to the fighters on the ground and I'd be curious if there are comparative examples of other peace processes that worked through this issue in in some kind of emulatable way uh so we can take that in whatever order you like for maybe java do you could go first sure um so I'll start off with uh with the point about the the slimy slicing with the peeling off some of the splinter afghan taliban or any Taliban groups and integrating with the afghan government I mean I disagree with Laura on this one because the afghan government has done a fairly good job at peeling away some of these splinter taliban groups in in in integrating the afghan government mostly in the north um in reasons for that may be that taliban often assigned or commissioned their low-level commanders to some of those northern provinces um that the afghan government then targeted and then slowly or gradually but steadily integrating the afghan um government and that may have been because um those commanders receive little reinforcement or cash compared to other commanders in east or in the southern provinces um the second point I want to make is that the afghan force the afghan government authorities as well as the afghan intelligence agency has done um a fairly good job as well they have been successful in reaching these um sort of village-level district provincial-level peace agreements with the taliban with different sort of these fragment or splinter uh fracture taliban groups at those local level including ceasefire agreements for example um so it has worked for them in the past and it seems like it could potentially work if some of those initiatives local level initiatives are nationalized now how could you exploit the role of some of these local actors in that one particularly the local leaders or the maliks or the khans for example in um in using them because they command greater legitimacy across afghanistan even though their roles have been successfully undermined uh in in different regimes but they they still serve as a de facto interlocutors between the afghan government and their local communities they know their ins and outs so how could you uh exploit the roles of those because in the past the afghan government have used some of those local leaders to reach some of these local level village district potential level peace agreements ceasefire agreements uh at times even they they engage with the taliban directly you know if there's a marriage in a local village or in a district they or funeral they will reach out to them uh times uh taliban have come to some of these local leaders they've they've told them not to stay away from a particular area because there would be a landmine or or or an ied so so how could you we exploit some of those local actors in in creating some of these peace agreements and then slowly peeling away those local taliban groups and integrating the government um is is a question uh i i i agree with laura the the united's role is key here but the problem was that in the past the focus was on um not losing the war uh instead of winning it and and those are two different things now our solutions are quite utopian in in nature in that that we um um that uh everyone wants in other words and everyone wants the united states to own the afghan problem but yet nobody wants uh uh the united states to stay in the region now that's a that's that's a problem the other point i want to make is is that i think it'll be completely meaningless to talk about the afghan peace talks unless we focus on building at least four or five building blocks or building those peace blocks but without it i think any talks where the taliban would be essentially fruitless and um what i mean by those uh peace blocks is that one you have to build and professionalize the afghan security and defense forces as a national apolitical institution um two is that you have to bring a positive change into afghanistan's relationship with pakistan um and it needs uh to be based on a mutual trust and not just asking the pakistanis to or or pushing them or nudging them to bring the taliban to the negotiating table but convincing them that afghanistan and pakistan could coexist and they could live together and peacefully um the third would be finding the right kind of governance formula uh for uh the governance issues in afghanistan unfortunately it seems like the national unity government is in the right kind of governance formula for the country neither was president carzai's kleptocratic regime that created a very sort of predatory mafia state which has become part of the problem and then the fourth one it would be focusing on the current national unity government's anti-corruption anti-predation reforms which has yielded important results with national unity government going after and prosecuting senior level afghan government security civilian officials who engage in inclusive practices and this has reinstated a sense of optimism among afghan people in the afghan state but it's it's still insufficient so a lot more needs to be done and then finally it's the talks with the taliban but but before engaging in talks it's important to work on the broader sort of building blocks of peace including changing the environment itself reducing violence um hemming in the power of warlordism for example who have become part of the insurgency or part of the problem in in fueling the insurgency and not just talking uh uh uh with the arm groups i'm afraid if you're going to do all of that before you talk to the taliban then it's going to be uh not any of our lifetime so that that actually happens i mean look in terms of a view of of the nature of the taliban i think we all have to have a fair amount of humility uh about our assessments and understandings of the taliban this is a group whose uh leader was dead for two years before we knew it uh so you know how insightful are we at times we have to check our own uh a sense of assurance that we understand what is a fundamentally pretty opaque organization i think it's also important that everyone be very careful and i include myself in that and other analysts not to uh not to get fixated on a characterization of the taliban that fits your own view of what you need to do so if you if you are advocating a strategy of splintering and peeling away you're going to naturally look for fishers in the organization and lack of cohesion in the organization uh if you're focused on top-down negotiations you're going to see the most prominently the characteristics of the organization that support the idea that it does have command and control and cohesion um you know i think it's probably the case that there are a variety of different characteristics along both dimensions and it depends on whether you're looking you know where you're looking geographically whether you're looking at the leadership whether you're looking at the rank and file at what exactly uh point in time um my my view is um first of all i would say i don't think you you need to follow just one approach either a splintering peeling strategy or a top down strategy um there's no reason why multiple different approaches can't be pursued simultaneously so long as you have the capability and they're not inconsistent and as i said i think it's a worthy effort to try the peeling away and certainly um some of what javid described uh has has most certainly occurred at uh at local levels and is something that could be built on one thing that i um wonder uh and maybe alex can speak to this is whether if there were a a broader peace process underway a more top down peace process where the leadership of the organization was engaged um uh as well as the other parties would that perhaps create some opportunity for the lower level local um deal making and accommodations um because you've changed the environment in a way that might make that look seem more feasible and more acceptable to to the rank and file um but i don't think or at least i don't see any evidence that pursuing a bottom up peeling away kind of strategy uh alone or as your predominant effort is is going to be a sufficient approach in terms of whether the top down negotiate with the leadership strategy and can they deliver uh that angle of it you know ultimately i think what you have to do is test and probe the possibility that it can work no one is certain that it will work um but you will determine whether it works by trying and by determining whether uh whether the organization is able to deliver most importantly at some stage if there's a process underway um would they be able to deliver on a ceasefire that would be a very significant test of their command and control uh and at some stage i think that's in a necessary and appropriate test to put uh to put forward um i'll leave it there alexander anything to add before we turn it over to the crowd um yeah just a couple of things on the sort of top down bottom up front um my understanding of and i'm very far from being a afghan specialist but my understanding of of some of the peacemaking history of afghanistan is um at at some of the more regional levels and sub-state levels um where there have been some progress in reaching various accommodations particularly in place in some some of the areas down in the south um those have remained very vulnerable to lack of progress at the top level and resistance from the top level both from the state side but also from the taliban leadership side and and vice versa too with you're trying to do um national level um in a very um as was described with the taliban that has some centralized structure is also very fractured as well and um if you're trying to do just top level stuff without dealing with some of the idiosyncrasies in some of the regions it remains vulnerable in the other direction as well so um certainly in afghanistan and since happened in other places um i think that top down and bottom up at the same time seems to be essential in the sort of multi-track approach um seems to be something that would be an important way to take that forward the ceasefire question um is interesting about where that comes in the in the process of course in it's it was rather different i think in columbia but ceasefire was deliberately left um out of the equation knowing that the vulnerabilities of a break in the ceasefire can make to the more political track i suspect it's a bit different in afghanistan but it's important to think about the timing of that and then more broadly on the on the sort of splintering of of armed groups and how to deal with that kind of thing um i do think it's important and and there are possibilities and options of some intra group dialogue and and how those sorts of things happen certainly in northern ireland that was a big part of the process of the ira getting to the table was how they managed the inter process i think it took some leadership from within the armed group to make that happen but certainly lots of different acts has facilitated that process and there were conversations with um people from the ira in different areas in order to bring some cohesion and bring some momentum to the process i think it was kind of different in nipol because there were splits within the party but there was a they had instilled a very strong sense of leadership including at various points in particular leader um nevertheless it was the possibilities of a peace process and the possibilities of a peace process that would respond to some of the grievances that they had been fighting for for a long time and they knew they had some traction um in various quite big constituencies in the population it was a progress towards some sort of political outcome held them to maintain some sort of cohesion as well so i think um what the prospects for the for their political future is like is is helpful that process too great thank you uh i welcome questions here um we will pass a microphone so that uh alexander can hear us and perhaps uh anyone speaking could just briefly introduce themselves could we start here and then go to scott marvin weinbach in the middle east institute uh couldn't you help notice the fact that jabid put pakistan at the center of things and laura if i'm not wrong you never even mentioned pakistan another another observation uh uh what's the well let me go on to just a question jabid uh you've made a good case for well how pakistan can be a spoiler is there an equally good case or any case at all at this point to be made on how they can dictate to the taliban that is what influence they have with the taliban um uh the other and for laurel uh well for both really uh where was islamic state in all this uh you could make the case that any movement toward negotiations could very well strengthen islamic state which is we all agree uh made up of groups that largely have turned their back on a peace process um i could talk about pakistan at great length too i just didn't uh i think what i would say is um in my view it is backward to suggest that you get peace with the taliban through peace with pakistan i think you get peace with pakistan through peace with the taliban and that doesn't mean that pakistan doesn't have influence on whether you can achieve you being afghanistan and the united states um can achieve uh a negotiated settlement with taliban i do think that they have influence to exert i do think that they certainly can exert negative influence if they don't see a negotiating solution going in a direction that satisfies their interests um but i don't think that uh that there is a deal to be had between afghanistan and pakistan state-to-state basis um that brings that a deal to be had um that is feasible and that two parties i could imagine making uh that would then resolve the the conflict with the taliban in afghanistan i think if um a route towards a peace process can be found and it proceeds towards a negotiated solution um that that will remove um many of the though certainly not all of the but it will remove many of the obstacles that are in the way of an improved afghanistan pakistan relationship and indeed an improved us pakistan relationship it is and certainly i would agree it is a necessity that there be an improved relationship between afghanistan and pakistan if there's ever going to be some kind of durable stability in the region and and durable stability for afghanistan in particular um but i don't think that's something that is going to be negotiated in the in the abstract um on islamic state i don't see any prospect of any kind of negotiation of with islamic state there's no indication that that would be feasible i do think that the uh that that factor is one that gives me reason to think that there actually could at the end of a negotiating process be a prospect of the taliban being willing to accept a continued security relationship with the united states now that's not to say that the us should go into a negotiation assuming it will get that as an outcome but it is plausible to me that that could be an outcome of a negotiating process because islamic state is a threat to the taliban as well uh and the us obviously could bring a lot to the table in terms of uh in terms of being a security provider in afghanistan over a longer period of time in a counterterrorism posture different than what it is doing today thank you i would argue we we that we still don't know which group pakistan really or which taliban group pakistan really has influence over in which it doesn't but i would assume that the pakistani still have influence over the taliban's leadership but that influence then fades away as we go down more to the tactical and commander's level across afghanistan um but as as the group itself the taliban as a group as one unit has been fractured um it's still we we we still don't know which group um which group pakistan carries that kind of influence over to bring them into negotiating table um which it doesn't but i would i would argue that um that there's a need for you know with respect to pakistan's role in this whole thing that there's a need for even though we have the uh this this china um pakistan us and afghanistan um quadrilateral but but there's still a need for establishing a afghanistan pakistan and um us trilateral with with their focus on the afghan peace talks but with one important caveat and that would be enlisting the united nations as a third party mediator as a third party interlocutor now why i say that is that when we speak of the talks with the taliban it's increasingly shrouded in secrecy we still don't know even though the group is fractured we still don't know who's who in the in the new movement which which which which taliban group are we really talking about the afghan taliban is no longer just one coherent one cohesive afghan taliban movement so this is fractured it's splintered now into multiple groups each operating under a different leader and under a different flag maybe they're in states the same maybe they're ideology the same but at times not so much some of them have even worked together with daish in the islamic state there so the the creating this trilateral would would be important because other than the men taliban leader we don't know much about them now who are the other taliban leaders now who are the other taliban movements which groups are reconcilable which are not which are hardliners which are moderates in which particular leader carry that kind of influence to coalesce the entire movement around one one deal and then actually deliver on it now so engaging the united nation could give that kind of transparency to to the talks as well as legitimacy which i i assume the taliban wants as well and it would also make clear the hedges and the spoilers in in in the process i might also just editorialize with one point on the taliban pakistan relationship there's a years-long disagreement on how much control pakistan has over the taliban there are strong views on both sides of that debate it's not resolvable i do think that over the last several years pakistan's leverage over the taliban by most objective measures has decreased and the reason for that there are a few reasons for that the taliban have other international partners who may or may not be substitutes for pakistan but who the taliban attempts to use as a hedge for example it's sort of nascent relationships with iran and russia second and i would say more importantly as the taliban controls more of the afghan countryside they're less dependent on the fundamental safety that their leadership gets by being on the pakistan side of the border and indeed there are far more taliban leaders living relatively safely in afghanistan than there were let's say six years ago and number two controlling a larger percentage of population in the afghan countryside varies somewhat directly with resources that's much more to tax it is much more possible to run opium rackets out of afghanistan and i would say all that means there's less of an existential dependency on a pakistani safe haven still very important but less of a dependency than there was shall we say five years ago but this is not about me scott thanks scott warden from here at usip i want to ask about what some are calling the intra afghan process so the political basically political elite leadership within afghanistan and their orientation or collective use sort of peace process i think that's you know among the many daunting obstacles maybe maybe one of the biggest when you look at an ultimate peace agreement certainly it's the least discussed so for javid and maybe others you know what are you a comment and i want your reaction basically that's the form of my question which is you know it's easy for the political elites in afghanistan also they support a peace process they want a political settlement um but i think that behind that you know there's there's a bit of a kind of maximalist maybe even fantasy about what that looks like for them so for northerners it's great you know the pashtuns have a certain amount of power and the taliban are largely pashtun and so a peace process involves you know keeping the pashtun part of the pie the same and pashtuns give up some of that politically economically to the taliban you know as the price for peace i think on you know this is obviously over generalization but to illustrate the point on the on the pashtun side it's well where our influence and power within afghanistan is largely constrained by this civil war that until recently has been fought largely in pashtun areas and so you know with peace we should have more power and influence those are kind of irreconcilable goals if i've if i've gotten the assumptions at all correct and i guess then the you know the question basically is what do you see um as ways that you know the afghan elites can deal with the ultimate power sharing equation that would be present in any peace deal what are the steps to you know discuss that and what are some possible options to say you know classic expand the pie in a peace negotiation so that you know people don't look at this as we're losing power to the taliban uh and therefore they would ultimately try to scuttle the deal yeah i wish i knew about the steps but i could certainly um comment on on the different characters um that collectively constitute the afghan or cabal elites these days are their characters that relish as chaos yes in in cabal their characters that seize destructionist power and actively perpetuate that just because their own vested interest interests are the stake yes of course and it's largely because you know they are uh in the end the 9-11 profiteers i mean like why would they like why would they give that up uh by bringing in another actor into the pie and you already have a heck material there and then they're not very happy with that one now assuming that the talks with the taliban does begin and then eventually turn into a process and then into a negotiated uh a peace deal that negotiation among afghans irrespective of their ethnic groups or ethnicity will focus on the nature of any power sharing arrangement itself they haven't fully uh publicly articulated or even privately articulated that yet but i would say it would also include possible modification to the constitution some changes to social norms as well on the role of the sharia sharia law but given the centralized nature of the current afghan government it's also not impossible to to to assume that negotiation might actually lead to some kind of a decentralization of the subnational governance level as well although this would require both the taliban and also the the afghan or the leadership to alter their historical preference uh to a more centralized unitary uh cobble centric system but this is likely going to happen um more more organically rather than imposed just a quick comment because i think it'd be helpful to hear from alex on this for any comparative experiences but i would agree this is a a huge obstacle not an obstacle to i mean looking at the taliban versus the afghan government and leaving the us out of it for the moment i think for the taliban the greater hurdle is getting into talks i think for the afghan government there's a there's a lower hurdle for getting into talks but a much higher hurdle for getting through them and all the way to the end because of the the uh cohesion issues and the the the points that you made scott um um uh i uh i would be interested to hear from uh alex whether there are any lessons to be learned from other cases as to how to go about managing those um disparate views on one side of the equation i think you're muted alex can you hear me okay now yes um um yeah well that's that's the sort of core of the of the deal isn't it there's got to be made and i agree it's the um it's one of those sort of very complicated and very sort of thought over bits and i guess it's it's it's thinking about where you can make those types of concession and make that kind of arrangement and um for example in in napal some of those sort of power conversations were put put off from the actual peace deal itself and put into a constitutional process through a transitional constitutional arrangement which gave them some a period of time in which to negotiate that not to say that those constitutional negotiations weren't very complicated and took a lot of time uh and are still being debated but the whole idea of how the power was shared and how it was divided um in a federal structure um and in other kinds of ways they gave gave themselves a bit of leeway to to separate out a little bit the deal to sort of end the violence and then the longer conversation about okay well how does the pie get then divided up um of course i think it's important to remember that um the political elites are elites are representing constituencies and behold into those constituencies and just returning back to napal that was a real big part of the equation and a big problem for the elites to convince the constituencies for example for the um for the marists for whom these constituencies had been fighting over a long period of time that they were still they were still guaranteeing their rights and and their interests um and a lot of people who felt or had looked to the marists to be representing those actually felt quite left out of the peace process once it moved um and the constitutional process in the federal conversation once it moved beyond the peace deal still that the peace held and the constitutional process was a vehicle in order to take that power sharing conversation forward um i'm not sure that's the same exactly the same of course for for afghanistan but some ways to to land the initial deal and find a way to take that power conversation forward in a different kind of process it might be something to be considered great thank you uh so we have hit our 11 o'clock stop time it's certainly all right if anyone needs to excuse themselves i've inclined to take another question or two if our panelists are amenable uh maybe we could go to awesome down front thank you very interesting discussion my name is fardaus rahmani i have two questions one for joey one for lauren lauren you mentioned that there are three parties in peace negotiation to bring around the table to taliban the afghan government and the us while when you talk about the taliban you talk about an umbrella my understanding is that the taliban is give protection to tens of different terrorist units in afghanistan today including shuraikuita shuraipi shawar ashkar taiba isis and the list goes on so when you talk about these it means the leadership is not in afghanistan and there are parties including pakistan iran russia and some other countries so the arabia who are involved with this so how do you see that is just an internal issue not a regional or international issue and you also mentioned that the the russia is trying to bring them around the table which is not welcomed because the us is involved can you can you give us your thoughts in more details how is there any issues or tension or conflict of interest between these countries still in afghanistan peace negotiations and my question for joey you mentioned about the pulling off strategy well there were some some efforts by the afghan government to bring them around the table and provide them job opportunities including job for peace but i'm curious if the if the afghan government has the capability to provide them safety and jobs for those who return to afghan government or or those who join to the peace process it means you mentioned that they are were talban leader who came to the government but they were not safe or they were targeted by pakistan or other groups they were called so how do you see this can be flexible and sustainable thank you those are all good questions um first of all uh it's you know there are different views as to what the talabans relationships are with all of these different groups but i do think it's important to recognize that it's hard to envision any peace process and peace agreement that is going to comprehensively eliminate all violence and all militant groups in afghanistan i think it has to be recognized that there will be spoilers or there will be groups that are disconnected from the negotiators that will have to be dealt with and in other means and in the in the aftermath of a peace process on the issue of the other governments and entities that may have a role in the peace process i would say you know there's a distinction to be drawn between um who are the actual parties to the the the core substance of the negotiations and um what are governments and entities that will need to be brought along as either actively supporting or at least acquiescing in whatever solution is ultimately arrived at and some of the governments that you mentioned are important factors in this regard in order to truly have a stable and durable outcome you would want to attract the support of governments like russia and iran and obviously pakistan um but others in the region as well as a broader set of international supporters and so there would have to be um elements of a a peace process that would draw the support of those governments for the final conclusion of a peace process but that's different than being the negotiators who sit at the table who actually have a vote over what the text of the agreement is um in terms of russia you know the reason that i say russia isn't really in a position to host a peace process it's it's partly because of what the current environment is in us russian relations but it's not uh it's not predominantly for that reason it's just um you know the united states is just not a government that is going to subject itself to being um mediated in that fashion by another government i think it will be hard enough to get the u.s. government to agree to there being some kind of neutral facilitator who can help manage a peace process and maintain its momentum and in my view if there is ever a peace process that would be very valuable to have an international mediator a facilitator of the process to keep it going but the idea of another government much less a sort of competitor government being the uh the host of a peace process at which the u.s. is at the table it's just it's too far outside the realm of what the u.s. system and politics would tolerate yeah no i i completely agree on that one the i think ultimately they would want security guarantees they would want financial guarantees they would want and i'm talking about Taliban fighters peeled away or coming in as a in a more sort of elaborate negotiated deal so financial guarantees security guarantees blanket immunity employment preferably through uh you know a share in the government and then being part of an elaborate afghan government paid transition network um and then eventually having some kind of a say in the afghan political scene as well and i i i would presume that if all of these uh happens it would automatically create a safety zone uh for themselves as well and i would also presume that it will be done in the same manner that uh that the his big slummy hikmachi deal was done although the the the that deal is not a model to follow and with that uh i think we will wrap up could we all join me in thanking our outstanding panelists and thank you all for coming to the u.s. institute of peace have a great rest of the week