 Thank you very much. I have a couple of questions on the last presentation. First of all, you made a point that private ownership, the outcome of private ownership could be inferior to that of community-owned management. And I think this is quite untrue because if you grant assets to a private company or private individual to own the fishery, they will balance the marginal cost of extraction with a marginal benefit. And the extraction path will be optimal, unless of course we talk about some extra externalities that are not internalized by the private individual, which the community will account for. If that is the case, that could be true. Perhaps if also there are, okay, first we have externality and then the cost of securing maybe the fishery. If for example a private individual owns the fishery and that private individual has to incur some extra cost to protect the fishery, which is not a case for the community, then we can also say that that of the community could be a better way to manage the fishery than the private individual. But if all these conditions are not there, then it is always the case that if you grant assets to a social planner or an individual to manage your private entity to manage the fishery, the outcome will be much better or be superior to if you grant assets to a community. The second issue I have is about the use of, I mean the dependent variable you use, which is consumption of fresh fish. So this is not quite surprising because if initially the resources manage an open assets, let's say unregulated open assets, and then now you restrict assets by granting the communities some rights to exclude people or to limit the extraction of the resource, it's always the case that harvest levels or harvest per boats or per trip will be higher. And for that matter we will see consumption per member of the household increase it. So what is surprising about the results? Okay, so you have two questions. So let me take both of them one at a time. First of all, from a theoretical perspective, there's no reason to assume that the community work operating as a unit will not realize the same efficiency gains as a private individual in terms of internalizing all costs and benefits, right? So you said that a private ownership will always be more efficient and actually that's the core of what's interesting here is that if you grant a community rights, strong property rights over their resource, they are also able to put in place resource use rules that then lead to optimal resource use and investment over the long term and the internalization of those costs and benefits. So we're not talking, that's why I was really clear in the beginning, that we're not talking about open access, right? We're talking about collective ownership rights in which case the community is actually able, if they have effective internal governance mechanisms, to realize the same efficiency gains as a private individual would be and over the same kind of time horizon. So that's actually a theoretical question that's important to understand the study here. The second question regarding the outcome, whether or not we would see improvements and should we be surprised to see improvements in fresh fish consumption? Well, we are only going to see improvements in fresh fish consumption if indeed these, they are able with the support of the state to do exactly what you said, which is more effectively exclude outsiders and realize those benefits of the fishery internally. So theoretically, there's nothing surprising, but we have never had any empirical evidence that it actually happens, right? That there's lots of theory, but we've never seen whether or not that's true. So I don't think the results are surprising. I think they are what we would expect, but I think it's obviously quite important to make sure that what you expect is indeed what's happening. That was the welfare question. I'm quite familiar with the literature on ILAC and many institutional learning and change and many institutions like for example the CGIR has tried very hard to internalize the theory of so-called ILAC, call it OLAC, in your case organizational learning and change. And they are sort of well established analytical categories. How does an organization or institution learns and then how does such an institution changes internalizing the lessons from the learning, right? Well, the examples you give would fit relatively well into this literature, but the words, the terminology, the discourse is not the same. And I'm wondering and maybe that rejoins the question that was asked before here is this a parallel effort? Is that a subsequent effort? How do you relate what you are proposing here to this kind of body of thought about institutional learning and change? And it would be helpful at least to me if you could place your effort relative to what we already find in the literature. Again, I hope it's a parallel effort because I'm right and you're right so we must be moving in parallel directions. I think, I mean coming back to this first very hard question, so we may be right and moving in parallel directions but in fact you have yet to have a lot of impact on a lot of mainstream development organizations. CGIR, what's bracket for a second? But like if you look at what has just happened at the World Bank, it's the paradigm opposite of what we're saying. They have just undertaken a major organizational reform to do exactly the opposite of this, right? So now that's just maybe even stronger agreeing with you that even though your report from seven years ago and other things have identified the potentiality of this, it has yet to make a dent in the conventional paradigm. That said, I think a lot of the work on innovation has focused rightly on technological innovations that are at least technological innovations and a lot of technological innovations are in fact capable of logistical scaling, right? So the kind of organization I would build, so we've seen lots of innovation in the world, Facebook and Google and all of this and a lot of it has the nature that there really is a core technical problem that once better solved essentially self-scales. Now again, I would be stupid to say anything about the CGIR in agriculture with you guys sitting there, but my vague impression was the first generation of efforts thought that the problem was exclusively technologically. If we had a better seed, people will build a path to it and then realize that no, it's not just a technical problem, there's at least some ways in which we have to have adequate positive models of the scaler of pharma practices and then people built around how do we combine our technological improvements with scaled pharma practices and there I think that's where you've had much more mixed success even in the agriculture domain, meaning there's been more technological progress in some domains that has been capable of having particularly governmental organizations carry that out into practice. Is that? Is that? Yeah. Yeah. No, no. You're saying kind of new language reminds me of French sociology where we have wave after wave. One of the things we have in some of the papers we've written is like a concordance, right? So I think one of the small ways in which I think what we're trying to do has value added is pointing out that this is a coherent approach and these elements have to fit together and then like I say we have a concordance of like here is what for each step in terms of identification of problems in terms of how learning scales, we then often say here are the nine other people and how they talk about it. So it's not like we're ignorant of Ostrom and the other efforts that have gone before. It's just we're trying to build a coherent story that goes from start to finish, whereas I think lots of the other efforts have sliced off one or more of the elements and there are some that have gone top to bottom but we're you know to some extent you know lots of parallel efforts pushing in similar ways will be helpful as long as we all recognize that we're not competing over whether it's this word versus that word. It's like here's a conceptual approach and we're trying to we're trying to get that. But I think one of the reasons why it's been less successful is there has to be a certain coherence to the overall approach. You know if you just say to you know if you go to somebody in the World Bank and say oh by the way here's a log frame and this log frame allows you to introduce multiple possibilities into your project but everything else about the way the organization treats the project demands uniformity there's incoherence between the reform element and what needs to change. So one of the things about overall changes is that they've got to be coherent right you've got to pull the organization in a coherent direction. Why don't we take yeah I'm going to say in the interest of time I'm going to get three of you to ask questions. The rules are they have to be short they have to be one question not two half questions and we'll start with you sir yes yep. Okay thank you for your very interesting presentation and I'm William MacPai from CIM and my question goes to Tara. Just one question to save time and you talk about there are two communities I can say all ethnic groups there Indian vision and also the ethnic vision and and just the only the ethnic vision can have the collective ownership rights on the fishing area in some small fishing area. So my question is the is there any protest or fighting of Indian vision over the ownership of the fishing areas because the fishing areas from this thing is we can consider as the natural resources of this state of the nation. So what do you think about that thank you. Rachel. Hi I'm Rachel Gislequist from UNU wider. So I thank you both for really interesting presentations. I guess one thing that continues to puzzle me with the PDIA project or at least I think it's a it's an issue that I keep coming back to is what what exactly is the how exactly do we think about locally identified problems because obviously there are multiple local groups with competing interests and I think Tara's study underscores this especially well you know the different interests between ethnic Fijians and Indo Fijians. So I wonder if you could talk about that a bit more Lent and maybe Tara has insights as well. Yeah great question good one more. Yep. Thank you very much. Francie Lent from the University of Cozillunatel. I quite agree with some of your critique of what you were saying. I think the one particular thing I want to to pick out is that I think in trying to go forward in one respect you go backwards for me in terms of my understanding of sort of organization development and that was where you talk about organizational capability and I think a lot of the breakthroughs of the last 15 years part of which have come to to in contestation of this logical framework stuff is is to say there isn't an organization that out there that is separate from people. I can't say that my organization should do this it's I am my organization and what am I going to do so it is that sense of personal agency which I think has really been important and I was surprised given your overall intent to see you talk again about organizational capability you talked about inducing agents to do things so it was it was a surprising phrase for me to see in the whole context of your over what I think understand your overall intent is and I just wanted to put that on the table. Okay so I'm let Tara respond first and she's got one and then we'll let Lent have the last two. Okay great so first of all yes this is clearly political issue am I echoing I think of a lot going on here okay better perfect so I mean like I said there was a coup so there was a coup because there was an attempt to move from collective ownership rights that were recognized to a much stronger framework in which the resources were entirely given to the community to the community groups them so yes there's a coup however first of all the ethnic Fajians are significantly more powerful than the Indo Fajians and second of all the structure of the economy the Indo Fajians don't really rely on the the fisheries in the same way that the ethnic Fajians do so the I think Fajians most of them are subsistence the Indo Fajians never had resources in the first place because they came over they were brought to work the sugar plantations by the British in the 1800s so they were always in the cities to the extent that they use the fisheries it's sort of very margin it's much more the lowest cast I mean they use them but the poorest of the poor Indo Fajians with the least political power use the fisheries for subsistence fishing because they don't have jobs so the Indo Fajians with power don't care as much about the fisheries because they're in the cities working in manufacturing but yes it's still I mean clearly there's a conflict and that's actually why strengthening the intervention to strengthen police support for the community's efforts to police their own waters is was was such an a significant intervention because what had before been essentially a battle between community groups saying get off our fishery and Indo Fajians the poor ones who just came along and fish now the police weighed in and actually the community could arrest Indo Fajians and hand them off to the police so I think the question of problem construction is precisely about there are multiple problems out there facing multiple competing stakeholders and framing problem you know framing problems in certain ways is going to be conducive to generating an authorizing environment in which you can make change versus others and this is better I think served by examples so you know when the examples we use is you know many bureaucracies have a process compliance mentality as their definite as their problem definition versus a performance mentality which puts them in conflict rather than cooperation so in Brazil there was a labor agency responsible for enforcing you know labor safety law and their modality was they would visit a plant they would inspect the plant and they would write up the plants that were in violation of the law and that kind of neither really had any impact on firm behavior because a they would hide b they would bribe so there was an effort within the organization to say we're going to visit the plants and focus on workplace safety so rather than focus on compliance with the workforce regulation we're going to look at output data on number of agents issued and we're going to take it as our goal as the organization to help the firm avoid accidents independently of whether they push them into compliance so again you've just changed the problem formulation I mean another example is you know in South Africa there's all kinds of problems of crime all kinds of problems with police corruption all kinds of problems with violence but you know at one point there was a coalition of forces around how women got treated after rape because women even after having been raped if they reported that the police often got you know further abuse if not you know from disrespectful to abusive treatment by the police so again there was a problem where you could slice off you know you weren't attacking police corruption which is a necessarily conflictual view between the population the politicians and maybe the bureaucracy we sliced off something where the politicians could support it the bureaucracy could say this is the kind of problem that you know reformers within the bureaucracy could say this is the kind of problem where I can motivate support from within the organization because it's not existential to our organization and you could get a you could get a coalition around that problem framed as problem so again I don't think there's anything magical about this and and it's impossible to you know your question was how exactly would we do this Jesus I don't know I mean how exactly we would do it I'm far from knowing but it's easier to look at examples and say here are some really good examples of problem formulation and then here are really bad examples of formulation where for instance our colleague Matt Andrews who works on public finance management you know went out to work with the Department of Justice in Mozambique that had spent you know I don't know four years and 50 million dollars of dough and money to create some MIS system for tracking court cases and basically it was completely dysfunctional and you know the employees of the court like all they really needed was a spreadsheet but no one had ever like said what do you need to know to really make this work better and let's start from where you are and work to where you want to be so again it's easy to come out with still again years and decades and decades and egregious sort of examples in which the world is still operating on your lack of the solution is your problem your lack of my solution is your problem and and better formulations of problems again does that speak to your question if not answer it okay on the last thing I just disagree so this would have to be a longer conversation I mean organizations ontologically are something and they ontologically are something independent of the aggregation of the people in them they just are something and and I think pretending that they're not something is a problem problems in a way that you're doing I think quite rightly right then you've got to say it is the people of course I know ontologically they they are there right you and you wider is there but you can't say that you and you wider will fix something or change it's absolutely absolutely and you know in our in our framework we have sort of tiers of agents and how they're engaged but the point is is that uh you know the but but you do come back to organizations are something and agents interact with that something um such that you can't add up the individual capacities and get the organizational capability so the the aggregate of the knowledge of the doctors in the public sector in India isn't the aggregate of what they do in their organizational practices and organizational practices interact interact with agents that said obviously the only active agents are agents um and part of our whole theory is is that you need to mobilize a sufficient a sufficient I mean part of our theory again is that the way unsuccessful organizations survive is that the leadership of the organization kind of pursues isomorphic mimicry and frustrates and prevents the agents from the organization from forming more effective coalitions and you need to break that down in order to re break it up so again I'm not pretending that organizations are in some sense the driving agents without human beings involved but on the other hand the donors have this really nasty tendency to want to train individuals right and without asking is the lack of training of individuals really the the the constraint on a more effective organization right uh and so you know uh training is often like the most sacrosanct and yet the most completely worthless part of donor activities on that note thank you very much to to Lance and to Tara thank you for giving up your afternoon when you could have been somewhere else to come and join us thank you and enjoy a coffee break and we'll resume I guess at 3 30 for the next session thank you