 Good morning everyone. Thank you so much for joining us early on a Monday and welcome to the Center for strategic and international studies for today's Panel discussion an assessment of Russian defense capabilities and security strategy I'm Sam Brannon a senior fellow with the CSIS international security program And I'm privileged to be joined with you today to hear the thoughts of my CSIS colleagues and deep subject matter experts on this topic Dr. Andy Cushans, Dr. Clark Murdoch, Dr. Paul Schwartz, sorry before Clark Murdoch and Dr. Jeff Mankoff You can consider today's panel a behind-the-scenes look at how a think tank works Today's public event is the more formal continuation of a series of Conversations that we've had over recent months as we sought to figure out in elevators and hallways and on the sidewalk To make sense of what exactly happened in late February and early March of this year in Crimea and what's happening in Moscow Today's event is really thanks also to Oliver Bacchus the research assistant in the Russia and Eurasia program who pulled everything together for today In the checkout line at the National Geographic cafeteria just around the corner I was complaining to Oliver about Tom Friedman's op-ed that argued that Putin had blinked in the Ukraine crisis And that the United States had successfully stared him down And I won't go into the points raised about the historical accuracy of the Dean Rusk Statement by Glenn Kessler in yesterday's Washington Post But suffice it to say that I told Oliver that I was concerned and he agreed that even before the crisis that we now face in Iraq Washington again risked downplaying the potential threat posed by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Russia's military and intelligence capabilities Oliver suggested that we do an event to bring the threat of Russian capabilities and Intent into proper focus and here we are thanks to the time and generosity Of intellect from Clark and Andy who had served on a previous event We did looking at just the Ukraine crisis before Friedman's comment and also thanks to Jeff and Paul who have done some very interesting Recent writing on this topic so to get Andy to agree to do this event I had to promise I would keep my introductory remarks much shorter than last time and I'm already running dangerously close to breaking that promise So let me briefly frame what we will cover today and then try to turn it over quickly to you for questions and discussion With this remarkably expert audience There are two extreme viewpoints floating around town First that Russia has reemerged as the preeminent threat to global security and stability and something the opposite of that That Russia is dangerous from its weakness But that weakness will continue to eat away at its military capabilities and thus we must only manage Russia's decline as a sick man of Eurasia So as we contemplate China's rise in Middle East in full-blown crisis and a u.s. Population that is increasingly uneasy with any sort of activist foreign policy How should we properly consider Russian capability and intent? The reason for this event as I mentioned is to keep focus on the important question of how concerned u.s. Defense and security planners and strategists should be about Russian defense capabilities and intent So let me introduce dr. Andy kitchens who will open the conversation this morning by answering the question What were they thinking in the Kremlin in February and March of this year? What are they thinking now and who exactly is making the decisions? Dr. Kitchens is a senior fellow and director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia program He is an internationally known expert on Russian foreign and domestic policies who publishes widely and is frequently called upon By business government media and academic leaders for comment and consulting on Russian and Eurasian affairs His more recent scholarship has been devoted to issues including Russia's Asia strategy With significant travel throughout Central Asia the role of energy in the Russian Far East and a continued laser-like focus on Russia's fast Shifting foreign policy. Let's call it. Novo. Russia nationalism over to you Andy to get us started Thanks very much Sam for both Together with Oliver putting together this panel and this meeting And for those generous Introductory remarks I Like to joke with people working like a thing working at a think tank. What does that mean? Well, it means I'm working 24-7 I'm thinking when I'm in the shower I'm thinking when I'm on the golf course I'm thinking while I'm watching FIFA World Cup soccer and But it really is a little bit more seriously exactly as as Sam said it is those Unplanned conversations that take place sort of the cross fertility amongst us that I think brings us to some of our Best best results and I think these series of two meetings are part of that Also on the introduction well, I would venture to say we know who makes the decisions in Moscow Why he does however, I think remains a very difficult question to fully answer What I'm gonna do briefly in my 10 minutes is kind of go through what the Russians say doctrinally about how they see the world both a national security and foreign policy and And leave it Particularly to Paul and to Clark to talk more about the the capabilities although there's one certain set of capabilities I'll talk a bit more since they don't hit upon directly conventional weaponry and Or nuclear weapons So point one for Russia is that its nuclear deterrent is at the heart of its security strategy The first great achievement greatest achievement of the Soviet Union Was the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War two the second most Greatest achievement was achieving nuclear parity with the United States in the early 1970s And it is this achievement that is the most important legacy From the standpoint of military security clearly that was bequeathed to the Russian Federation and it's assumed greater significance in the wake of conventional deterioration over the last 20 plus years and Doctrinally the bar has been lowered on conditions justifying a nuclear strike Use of nuclear weapons. There's some controversy about this, but I think the the taboo on no first use Is no longer such a such a taboo now Maintaining strategic stability i.e. parity or more to the point preventing the United States and anybody else for that matter from having a first strike capability is Really at the crux at the core. This is absolutely essential And it sounds kind of obvious But sometimes we forget the obvious at our peril and it was very striking to me I think Jeff was at this meeting of the val die discussion club in Moscow in 2011 where When I made a comment to Putin about what a couple of u.s. Senators had supposedly told mr.. Dargozen according to mr Dargozen's account was Well, actually the term I did use there was bullshit. I Did that to kind of provoke Vladimir a little bit. I was successful and He first of all kind of looked across the table and peered at me And the room Your name is Andrew, right? Yes, I don't know if you really want mr. Putin to know who you are It's a very dubious distinction perhaps But what his response was and he went into a sort of a long history essentially of how through espionage efforts During and after World War one it was scientists who believed that strategic stability was of absolute importance and their role in conveying Technical information about the development of nuclear weapons capability, which was essential for the Soviet Union to achieve its nuclear weapons capability Was of utmost important because this prevented one country from having a monopoly on nuclear weapons And what's the relationship of course to missile defense the concern that missile defense combined with other things may compromise that Strategic stability and that one country may have a first strike capability He said it in a lengthy way. He said it in a rather emotional way, too. I would say The last point on this point I think is the Russian position on non-proliferation Which for the most part, you know, I think from the non standpoint of the non-proliferation community has been pretty constructive now there is a One certainly one good reason aside from supporting the non-proliferation regime And it is certainly that the more countries that develop a nuclear capability that would devalue some of the strategic advantage that Russia would have with its key trump card of nuclear weapons and It's important maybe for us to think about the Budapest memorandum signed 20 years ago in which Ukraine Belarus and Kazakhstan made the decision to give up their nuclear weapons. We had an interesting discussion last Thursday evening here at CSIS when the former Russian Foreign Minister first Russian Foreign Minister of an independent Russia under the Kozarev was with us about Whether or not For example, you Ukraine might have had the opportunity to keep those web keep those weapons and what obviously that would have meant The For the Russians like any other I think nuclear weapons state or Aspiring nuclear weapons state the idea of global zero to them is This is probably a little bit provocative the sort of nonsense Because this would simply make the world safe for American conventional weapons domination the second point I think for the Russians is NATO expansion the old bugaboo and if you look at the these Documents and let me give a shout out to Oliver Bacchus and Eric Griffith for the terrific analysis They prepared for me in preparation for this event and looking at the 2009 National security document the 2010 military military security and the most recent document that came out in 2013 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs NATO expansion remains the the greatest threat and Quote attempts of certain countries or groups of countries to revise the universally recognized norms of international law One change of late is that Engagement with NATO was no longer a priority as it was in the past Any attempt to quote build up relations with NATO takes into account degree of its readiness for equitable partnership Strict adherence to the norms and principles of international law real progress towards a common space of peace security The Several reasons for for NATO one. I mean Russia's traditionally had a very keen focus on territory going back centuries of territorial Security particularly the great historians Richard pipes Ed Keenan who had rather different explanations for this Mr. Pipes was sort of assert that it's basically in the Russian DNA to expand into territory to Create so-called buffer zones At one point recently I was thinking what would be an adequate buffer zone for mr. Putin Probably the Atlantic Ocean that would be a good buffer zone Keenan had a different explanation which I'm more sympathetic to and that is that Russia Basically, you know over the centuries when it was expanding Behaved in a way that was normal for great powers, but in abnormal geography And Russia moving east it faced virtually certainly no physical impediments to going all the way to the Pacific Ocean and in the south in the 17th and 18th centuries it met relatively weak Resistance from Persia and the Ottoman Empire But this notion of a buffer zone is right at the core and you know We always heard the statement back in the 1990s of driving nuts that NATO is expanding right up to our borders Well, Norway was a founding member of knit of NATO Norway was always on the border of the the Soviet Union The question that is not often asked is What is driving those countries that seek to join NATO why? and And it was certainly it was Russians are low that least of in written word to talk about They're more inclined to think that this was a plot plot in Washington to Weak in Russia when in fact we were more responding to the demand from East Central European States for security relationships I Think if we look at the the key moments for the NATO relationship to stand out one especially Serbia 1999 when the Russian narrative NATO Committed an illegal act that was not sanctioned by international law i.e. the United Nations In undertaking that that war now in 2001 and after in Afghanistan Russia supported ISAF which was principally a set of NATO countries because it viewed these were they had we had common interests and Then the most recent I think a major violation from the standpoint of Russia was Libya in 2011 I think they view making a serious mistake and abstaining on the UN Security Council Allowing for the creation of the no-fly zone in Libya, but then viewing that NATO Exceeded its mandate there with that And this takes us to the third the third point and I mean I'm going to go over my time. There's a couple of minutes. I'm sorry But since you went short on your introduction And and that is a maintaining stability or how you might Some might term it Russian hegemony in the countries nearby Or as former president to meet the Medvedev talked in after the George Award August of 2008 About Russia's zone of privileged interests Now here for the most part the primary tool at least on a multilateral basis for the Russians has been the collective security treaty organization But interestingly in the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs document They talk of it's talked about is the Eurasian Economic Union Is a priority while the CSTO? Remains relevant. That's a quote From a military Security standpoint probably the biggest development over the years in the CSTO has been the development of a rapid reaction force Which initially was to be in a base in Osh in Kyrgyzstan as a CSTO base But there was a big debate about that and it eventually ended up being a bilateral agreement between the Russian Federation and In Kyrgyzstan the the fourth point to make about Russia's kind of doctrinal through the Mental framework that I think drives how these sorts of weapons that they're Developing it has to do with a very conservative interpretation of the priority of national sovereignty Over the right to intervene and this is a big one Now until quite recently The Russians had been very traditional defenders of Westphalian sovereignty And it was a key reason why they opposed the independence of Kosovo Now but with the case of Crimea Crimea basically the Russians I think are saying well Okay, you did Kosovo. We're gonna do Crimea and it's a similar justification for doing for doing so whether you Americans like it or not and I think also the On the issue right to intervene more broadly I think that has become clearly less of a doctrinal taboo for the Russians But one can look at what they've been doing in Ukraine For the last few months and one can if you can see roots of this as to what Russian forces We're doing and in Georgia particularly in Abkhazia back in 1992. It's not all that new now the What does this mean weapons wise and I'm sure Paul will say more about this But it means a focus on access denial weaponry access denial to raise the cost of US NATO intervention Virtually anywhere that's useful for the Chinese. That's useful for the Syrians That's useful for a number of other clients. So this puts an emphasis on anti air anti ship technologies and Key for Russian arms sales the big difference between Russian arms sales today in the Soviet Union is that Usually the Russians are actually getting paid Which was not necessarily the case in the Soviet Union now the second piece of this is that Kind of this kind of conservative interpretation of national sovereignty is the issue of repressing dissent at home No color revolutions and this is really jumped up in the last year in speeches by Russian officials including foreign minister Lavrov and others And it's not only thinking about Descent at home, but it's also thinking about dissent in countries that Russia has serious interests in in here We have a very very deep toolkit and and the Russians and this probably the biggest difference in these security and foreign affairs documents In the most recent one new features soft power Russians did not talk about soft power in two thousand not even in 2009 2010 And what does that include it includes what you do with civil society? Includes includes what you do with media you have to win the narrative It includes what you do with intelligence forces penetration. It includes probably what you do with cyber It also probably includes increasing concern about what you do with financial financial power Last two thoughts one on China In these documents generally Russia is silent about China We'll say something rather anodyne about China being an important to developing partner, but This is a this is an area that needs to be watched closely They their strategic rears are secured. It's important for them And I think particularly for Russia and to create multi create neutral vulnerabilities, which helps to secure those rears so that I China will not move in the direction of Russia in a military in a military way on the R&D Question its access denial, but I wonder whether they're also thinking more about access from moving from access denial to actually Weapons that promote gaining access, which is a very different kind of proposition we have a There's a there's still important R&D niches With the Russians the Chinese have a lot of money. I think we have to watch this very closely and there's also the danger The there may be some kind of strategic bargain for example that the Russians may move from their studied neutral position vis-a-vis Chinese territorial disputes in the east in order that the Chinese may support the Russians to have more running room in Areas that the Russians are more concerned about certainly Putin effectively kind of opening European security front again is a strategic benefit for for Beijing Um last thought What would be I Vlad's ideal fantasy? Well if for the Soviet Union it was getting Achieving nuclear parity, and this is really a fantasy But I think for him it would be developing a first strike capability And that would be the ultimate I think achievement for Putin in his role in Russian in Russian history and I think we better just better keep it close eye on that because And don't underestimate Where his ambitions may take him sorry for going way over my time. No, thank you very much. Great great start Let me introduce the next speaker mr. Paul Schwartz Mr. Schwartz is a senior associate with the CSIS Russia and Eurasia program He specializes in acquisition and use of information technology Telecommunications and military and aerospace technology to solve problems of defense national security and industry his research is focused on Russian and Eurasian security policy and The Russian military and defense sectors with a special emphasis on Russian defense technology programs Defense industrial base arms export programs in the future development of Russia's military capabilities Last week Paul released another excellent article. I will point you to also available on the CSIS website in title entitled Sergei Shogu Forgive my pronunciation. I will let Paul pronounce it correctly progress report on military modernization Paul will cover today his findings in that paper and more broadly his thoughts Regarding Russian military capabilities and their likely trajectory over coming years. Thanks Paul. Thanks for kind introduction Sam Before delving into specifics. I thought it might be useful to first provide you with a little context It's now been six years since Russia's relatively poor performance in the Georgia war Showed just how badly its military had declined since the Cold War Since then Russia has embarked on a major program of military reform During the initial phase of that reform they focus primarily on making structural changes For example converting divisions to brigades While restarting procurement with the expectation that modernization would follow Since then the reform process has zigged and zagged a bit There's even been a few notable reversals But in general Russia has stayed the course especially with respect to the most important elements of reform And as a result the Russian military is finally starting to show real signs of improvement The stated objectives of Russian military reform are to move away from the Soviet era mass mobilization military and replace it with a smaller More mobile permanent combat ready force capable of fighting local and regional wars in Russia's near abroad Let's openly stated are three additional objectives as well To counter the emerging threat from us ballistic missile defense technology To enhance Russia's anti-access capabilities and to develop a long-range precision strike force To improve its capabilities the Russians intend to increase the percent of modern weapons held by the Russian military from its current level of about 19% to 70% by 2020 But since this will take time Russia is in the meanwhile significantly increasing the pace of training in military exercises Which has led to real improvements in combat readiness As part of the reform effort the Russia military has been reorganized into four military districts Each a potential theater of operations with the east facing China Central and Central Asia the south facing the Caucasus in the west facing NATO Recently Russia has also begun fortifying the Arctic The army currently comprises 79 brigades plus four elite airborne divisions, which are not technically part of the army As part of the reform process the Russian army is adopting net-centric warfare theories of modern warfare And they're showing an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the concepts, but they continue to struggle to develop the necessary command and control systems One of the elements of reform is to develop the ideal and optimized brigade structure They continue to experiment with this having now moved from the initial experiment of a Heavy brigade to a heavy medium and light structure, which allows For better tailoring to meet the needs of each specific military district A lighter brigade structure also contributes to achieving greater mobility which is Crucial for Russia because they still have to defend a country with nine time zones using a substantially reduced military force To beef up its aging inventory of soviet era tanks The russians are buying new equipment including up to 2300 next generation tanks such as the armada But because serial production of these won't start until at least next year achieving this by their goal Deadline of 2020 seems increasingly unlikely The army is also buying over 1000 new helicopters 250 which have already been delivered plus 100 batteries of their precision ischander ballistic missiles The navy is still divided into its four traditional fleets the northern the baltig black sea and pacific And there's also a caspian sea flotilla Each fleet now reports to the specific military districts, which is important because it shows that the role of the navy Has been once again subordinated to primarily supporting land-based military operations Currently the navy has too many Models for example, there's four different classes of destroyers making it very difficult to maintain and resupply To address this the the navy is Rolling out modular designs and attempting to standardize on a few core model models going forward And while it rebuilds its tattered shipbuilding industry The russians are starting small replacing lighter combat vessels to acquire experience before it tackles larger projects sometime later this decade The navy currently has just under 300 total combat vessels But it plans to purchase 24 new submarines and 50 surface warships by 2020 Interestingly despite much talk of a new blue water russian navy prior to 2020 the russians will actually receive only a handful of Ocean going vessels 15 frigates A few submarines and two mistral assault ships purchase from france. Although it may also refit three soviet era cruisers The air force is starting from a relatively low baseline having refued received only a handful of aircraft prior to 2008 Fortunately for it the russian aircraft industry is in relatively good condition Having benefited greatly from ongoing export activity during this period The russians currently have 1,300 total combat aircraft would expect To purchase 600 additional aircraft by 2020. Although this is likely to slip somewhat Most of these are our fourth generation models such as the su 34, which is russia's new multi role deep strike fighter However, russia's first fifth generation stealth aircraft the t-50 Will not be ready until at least 2017 Meanwhile, the russian air force is also receiving a lot of new precision strike weapons such as the kh-101 cruise missile Which has an effective range of up to 5,000 kilometers But the russian air force continued to lag badly in the production of advanced drone technology Although it's likely to catch up somewhat over the next decade Finally the aerospace defense forces also known as the vko is an independent arm of the military Was formed in 2011 by the merger of the space command and the air and missile defense forces Funding for the vko has received especially high priority Because of its anti-access role in defending russia against mass precision strikes, especially from the us The backbone of its air defense system consists of 100 batteries of its old s 300 air defense systems, which are still quite capable But to improve this it's purchasing several advanced new platforms such as the s 400 While these are quite formidable The only real question is whether can russia can purchase them in sufficient numbers to make a meaningful difference In fact producing modern weapons in sufficient numbers is one of the two key challenges for military reform The russian defense industry continues to face many serious problems Including aging factories technological backwardness and widespread corruption To russia continues to be reluctant to suffer the political consequences of implementing real structural reform And so it continues to sustain many poorly performing companies forcing the military to continue to accept subpar equipment in many cases If this is not rectified russia could spend billions of dollars in additional procurement procurement while getting very little return for its investment The second major problem for russia's reform program is its continuing manpower shortages Officially the russian military is supposed to have one million active duty troops But due to unfavorable demographics russia continues to struggle To recruit enough volunteers and draft enough conscripts and the conscripts it receives only serve for one year terms As a result the actual size of the russian military is probably closer to 700 and 800 thousand and it may decline further from this level consequently many units still remain understaffed and While high turnover of conscripts adversely affects combat readiness So the key takeaways for you are is that in my view despite such deficiencies So long as russia stays a course and continues to strive for improvement The russian military will continue to make steady progress and improving its overall conventional military capability To improve beyond this russia will have to find solutions to its two key challenges This deficient defense industry and its ongoing manpower shortages since for political reasons this seems unlikely The reforms will likely fall substantially short of russia's ambitions for them Thank you very much paul Our next speaker is dr. Clark murdoch who is a senior advisor at csis And director of the defense and national security group and the project on nuclear issues Dr. Murdoch is an expert on defense planning the nuclear mission and strategy with decades of executive branch congressional academic and think tank experience His recent work has concentrated on understanding the military force structure implications for the united states of continued sequester level cuts Through his affordable military working group, which i believe is launching a report later this week And dr. Murdoch is also currently leading a multiple think tank competitive strategies exercise to think about u.s nuclear strategy and posture in the 2025 to 2050 time frame And in this context, he's been thinking a lot about the evolving russian nuclear doctrine and strategy and what it means for the united states He's also spent the last year thinking deeply about strategic stability with china and russia And it's this topic with russia that we've asked him to dig into us into for us today. Thanks. Clark Thank you sam. Uh, thank you for the kind words. I also appreciate you're pulling together the panel I'm not sure which thing take you work at but I find i'm too busy to actually talk much to my colleagues So it's always a treat to come here, particularly when they reside on a different floor than I do So it's always a treat to be on a panel like this and and to listen to people Talk about subjects that they know deeply I'd like to start out on a definitional thing when I think about strategic stability. It's a word that was used Very frequently in the 2010 nuclear posture review of the united states, but it was never defined The russians also focus a lot on strategic stability, but unlike the united states actually define them And what they mean by it really and I look at it sort of as the absence of instability They mean it the absence of crisis instability. That is both sides have nuclear capabilities Um That are formidable enough and robust enough and survivable enough that no one has an incentive to strike first in the case of a crisis Everybody has a first strike capability the issue is can you destroy enough on the first strike to limit the amount of damage That you will suffer in retaliation During that time, uh, the russians therefore worry very much and sort of the chinese about Oblistic missile defenses on the part of the united states Because while we may not model it they certainly do model it What would be the effects of a surprise bolt out of the blue attack from united states forces Against china or russia and then what would our defenses be able to sweep up of the remaining Offensive capability of both russia and china We in the united states don't tend to think that way. It's like nuclear war is more unthinkable for us And so we worry about the impact of cyber the impact of space But I think what we tend to worry about is the potential for miscalculation and inadvertent escalation And that is that we believe I think many american experts believe that The russians and the chinese for that matter are sort of overstating Their ability to control escalation and may think that they can do something regionally and Preveal at the regional level without it mushrooming up to use a phrase To the strategic level or nuclear level And that is of a concern particularly when you look at the russian strategy now where beginning in 2000 shortly after Shortly after kosovo which had a real impact as andy pointed out on the way the russians think about it Immediately after the end of the cold war no first use as a as a declaratory policy went out the window But after two 1999 When vladimir uh, putin was the state secretary for their security council They developed a new military doctrine in which they talk about nuclear de-escalation. That is the use of a nuclear weapon Against a conventionally superior power that might be invading them That would be invading them that would persuade That power to back off and therefore De-escalate the conflict. So it's talking about the first use of a nuclear weapon to de-escalate a conventional conflict A policy not unlike what the united states did during the 1950s When we had conventional inferiority for reasons of whether the war saw it back and we deployed ultimately during the cold war 7 000 forward deployed nuclear weapons There were a raid around perhaps not right on the border but pretty close. So To the war saw back powers during that time so concern about This instability and the use of nuclear weapons To prevent first strike Incentives during that time another use of armed of Strategic stability is the absence of an arms race That is the offense defense competition that people are taking a look at now We have one at the conventional level where it's us power projection capabilities versus anti-access aerial denial capabilities Of our potential adversaries Same thing occurs at the strategic at the nuclear level as well I tend to add another element to this of the absence of for strategic stability Volatility that is big perturbations in the relations between United States and Russia or the United States and China Where you have big swings in what's happening can create an instability all of its own that may lead to the inadvertent escalation that we're talking about I would argue that Putin's seizure of Crimea was one of those That is perhaps a game changer in the way we think about our Relations with China during this time I wanted to draw people's attention To a recent analysis that was done by dean wilkening Of rand and it was done in a tribute to ted warner called challenges in u.s. national security policy in which Dean goes through and does a classic cold war era analysis Of offense and defense exchange rates at the nuclear level And he points out, okay, what is the impact of a first strike from the united states against Russian capabilities And a bolt out of the blue full bore Russians have left 170 weapons If the russians do the same thing against the united states United states has about 550 weapons that survive If you factor in a deployment more robust than we have now and assume that it works the way Americans would like it to work missile defenses that 170 nuclear weapons that Russia would have after a bolt out of the blue first strike attack goes down to 90 I don't know 90 a comfortable figure for the russians Probably not if the united states has five to six times as many weapons At the same point there so this issue of the perceptions The russians still believe the nuclear balance matters in a way that we americans do not they do these calculations So while I think the chances of the russians developing sufficient first strike capability of the united states that we wouldn't have enough weapons left To destroy them Is well out of reach Largely because they don't have the resources for it Why are they so much more vulnerable than we are they're more vulnerable because they don't put as many missiles at sea Because subs are expensive They don't put as many of their mobile missiles out and have them operate in the field They could easily increase The amount of survivable weapons they have if they just deployed more On a day-to-day alert status the way we americans do Another way they can compensate for this is launch under attack Something that the russians have always been interested in that is when you first see those signals Everything goes out And if you do that that raises for the russians from 170 to 675 Warheads deliverable against the united states. That's an enormous increase in their capability in the event of a nuclear exchange I'd be very surprised if they didn't have that as part of their operational doctrine during that time because that is You know a cheap way of compensating for the relative vulnerability of their forces compared to the united states But it's also one that has a lot of escalatory potential During that time as we know from a couple of close Close russians that we had during the cold war. So the russians still think this way Uh, they still calculate this way and it's something I think that we have to keep in mind as we think about What do we do? What does the united states do and I'll just Comment on what does this mean for the united states post-ukraine? Well, I think the first thing we have to accept is that the era of the united states and russia Moving to become strategic partners of russia becoming a responsible stakeholder to use another term Um, that era is over. I think you have to accept that u.s. Russian relations are going to have a very strong adversarial component to them And we better just get used to that. That's the reality that we have to live with I would also argue that this is a time Where the united states having a strategic capability nuclear capability Second to none, which is the phrase that's used. It's absolutely critical We may not care as much about the the nuclear balance Because we have conventional superiority But the russians care about a lot and i'm I would not want to have to deal with a russia that felt in some way emboldened By the fact that it believed it had superior nuclear capabilities To the united states the russians tend to be pretty crude about these kind of things the most recent statement. I saw Was a prime minister Dmitry Rogazin he's returning from transnistra And he's having some problems getting clearances out of moldeva Moldova, I'm sorry And he says well next time I come back I'm going to come back into playing that has nuclear weapons on it. He says Russian version of a charm offensive So Important to be second to none I do not want the russians to feel that they have superior nuclear capabilities because it'll affect the way they act because they believe in this stuff I would also argue it's not a time for the united states to make any unilateral us nuclear reductions during this time could we afford to have less than 675 survivable Even under the worst of scenarios nuclear weapons probably But again The nuclear equation matters a great deal to the russians And we shouldn't give the russians anything without them making a price for it without them paying a price for it I also think another thing we have to do although this wanders more into the themes that we struck In the last panel is that we have to think about rebuilding us credibility on use of force issues One step at a time You don't do it all at once But you do it one step at a time and that is The russians it's important for our security It's important for americans. It's important for europeans That the russians believe us when we say we're going to do something It's important and you do that not through what you say you do it through your actions And we have a tendency to say a lot of things And not follow up with actions Witness the imposition of sanctions Against putin for his behavior in the ukraine Over to you jeffrey Thank you very much clark and let me introduce dr. Jeff mankoff who's the deputy director and fellow with the csis russia and eurasia program He's widely published author and frequent commentator on international security Russian foreign policy regional security in the caucuses in central asia Ethnic conflict and energy security and in fact in any given week jeff might write on all of those subjects So hard to keep up with his with his great writing He's a particularly shrewd observer of russian foreign policy in its surrounding region And i commend to all of you another piece, which is one he wrote in april available on our csis website Russia's latest land grab how putin won crime and lost ukraine Jeff will fit in a little bit fill in a little bit more about what russia is really up to when it comes to its neighbors And how this figures into us russia dynamics over to you jeff Okay, thank you very much I should add that I see my role here are sort of providing the neighboring perspective on Russian security actions, especially since the crisis in kremia Andi and i have been engaged in a project looking at the smaller post-soviet countries and how they view their changing Strategic environment. This is a project that we conceived of more than a year ago And have been laying the groundwork for traveling around In the caucuses in central asia This was independent of what happened in kremia, but obviously what's happened in kremia has given this a certain Relevance perhaps that maybe it didn't necessarily seem to have when we started a year and a half or two years ago We were in kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan In april we were in the three south caucuses countries Azerbaijan, Armenia and georgia a couple of weeks ago and on friday We're leaving for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Yeah, exactly so it's been a really interesting time to Be in these countries because they are also trying to make sense of what is going on and how russia's own Strategy for dealing with them has changed in the extent to which kremia does or does not represent some kind of a game changer for them so andi Mentioned one of the things that seems to have changed in russian foreign policy strategy in the last Year or so has been on the question of intervention Versus sovereignty Now there's always been a certain Sense in which the countries of the former soviet union occupy a special place in russian foreign policy Especially with regard to this issue of sovereignty and intervention In the 1990s there was a term that was Officially used and today it doesn't have official Use anymore, but you still see it in the media and it's used by commentators referring to this area as the so-called near abroad Those are the post-soviet states now. What exactly does that mean? Well above all I think it means that Russia views them as being less sovereign less independent and less able to Guarantee themselves against foreign intervention specifically russian intervention And the connection that this view has to russian and soviet history is something that we can talk about in the discussion But needless to say it very much exists if you go back to the collapse of the soviet union There's been a number of cases of russian military intervention both direct and indirect in the countries of the near abroad starting with the separatist conflicts in georgia in the 1990s and in the early 1990s And you know you've seen these all around the post-soviet space and in some case in some sense Crimea is just the latest iteration And yet traveling around In these countries over the last couple of months There's a profound sense of unease because there seems to be a real sense That the elites in these countries view what happened in Crimea as a departure from what they viewed as the well established Norms of russian behavior Within the post-soviet space for two reasons one because there was not any clear red line That was crossed in ukraine that would seem to have given impetus for russian intervention and detachment of Crimea It wasn't as if the new ukrainian government had made joining NATO a priority And second because of the territorial revision in all of the previous Cases of russian intervention in the post-soviet space in the near abroad There were political changes in georgia in 2008 Of course russia recognized the independence of south asetia in abkhazia, but Crimea was actually annexed This was the first time that russia had gone so far as to actually annex territory From the countries that it had in which it had intervened and this was seen in The places that we visited as being a clear departure from what russia had done in the past So there's really a sense in which we're in kind of uncharted territories here Another way and i would Really call attention to this you can see in the speech that Putin gave to the federation council Announcing the annexation of Crimea on march 18th where he talked about the justification for russia's New intervention strategy. He talked about a duty to protect russians and russian speakers Now who are these people? well ethnic russians of course inhabit much of the Much of um are scattered around i should say much of the former soviet space They're concentrated certainly in some areas more than others In the aftermath of this speech some russian politicians began talking about northern Kazakhstan Which has a very large russian population as being an area that potentially russia could seek to protect Russian speakers though is a much broader category that encompasses about 80 percent of the population of ukraine a significant percentage of At least the older generation all around the post-soviet space And then this was really the first time that Moscow, putin the russian government had made it a declaratory emphasis that they were going to protect ethnic russians and russian speakers So it's not just now about You know strategic advantage. It's not just about The relationship with the united states and nato, but it's also about Ethnicity in some sense triumphing over sovereignty in the post-soviet space and this of course Calls into question the whole notion of wasphalian sovereignty if countries are not sovereign over their borders But rather there's a special right to protect co ethnics Living on the other side of them then we live in a very different world Um, and there's one other issue here, too This wasn't used in putin's speech on march 18th But was used in some of the discussion including from putin in the run up to the annexation And that was the use of the term compatriots satetshniki in russian now this is a very Fluid term, but there's actually a law in russia that was passed in 2011 that defines who exactly is a compatriot Now it's anybody who has lived in the russian federation or in the soviet union And has made a conscious choice and this is i'm quoting has quote made a conscious choice in favor of spiritual cultural or jurisdictional bonds With the russian federation or their descendants So this Law coupled with the declaration about protecting russians and russian speakers Theoretically gives mosca a very wide scope to exercise a protectorate over people Inhabiting various parts of the post-soviet space So it's not only ethnic russians ethnic russians are the people who've gotten the most emphasis certainly because There are a majority in Crimea But in terms of russia's security relationship with the post-soviet countries It's it's much broader than that Now the way that russia has exercised its security role in these countries and certainly this has Become especially evident in Crimea has been the manipulation of ethnicity And the declaration of a protectorate over allegedly threatened ethnic groups The ability to do this grows out of the soviet system of ethno-territorial federalism Where the soviet union was a kind of pyramid Of different ethnic groups inhabiting different territories and each as you go down each level There are different territorially concentrated minority groups. It's actually more like a set of concentric circles And in the context of the crisis in ukraine, of course russia talked about protecting the ethnic russians Living in Crimea the russian inhabitants of ukraine, but of course, this is a crisis. That's not only about ukraine Um The crisis was touched off by ukraine's aspirations to sign an association agreement with the european union But of course ukraine wasn't the only country that was doing that georgia moldova also are Far along in this process and we see something similar going on in terms of russian intervention on behalf of Allegedly threatened minority groups in both of these countries as well Um in addition to the ascetians and the abkhaz in georgia whom russia doesn't recognize as actually being in georgia anymore There's been some effort to support ethnic armenians who are advocating for a closer relationship with russia in addition to support for strands within the georgian orthodox church incidentally Which is trying to to slow down the process of georgia's Move towards an integration in the west in moldova efforts to support the aspirations of the ethnic turkic gogas minority who once again played this role of a kind of Um I don't want to use the word fifth column but a kind of lever for the introduction of russian influence in addition Of course to the conflict uh in transnistria Now why does russia pursue this strategy of promoting ethnic? fracturing in countries that seem to be On a path out of russia's orbit Well for one thing it helps keep them out of nato Because of course nato Is not in the practice of admitting countries that have unresolved territorial disputes The one of our interlocutors in central asia did point out that this issue was finessed When west germany was brought into nato and the article five guarantee That nato membership confers was specifically held to exclude East germany which of course was outside the block Secondly russia pursues this strategy because it provides a foundation for the physical deployment of russia forces in the post-soviet space So russian troops were pulled out of georgia in 2007 at the insistence of the sakashvili government Then after the war in 2008 and the recognition of south asetian and abcazing independence They were reintroduced in south asetian abcazia over the objection of the government in tbilisi Similarly in transnistria where the government in maldova has asked for the withdrawal of these troops And russia has said no Third Support for separatists can be calibrated in response to political developments And we see this in eastern ukraine where russia has increased or decreased its security assistance for the separatist rebels in denetsk and lukhansk Enough to ensure that they're not militarily defeated but also as a way of keeping The threshold of the conflict at a manageable level And i would argue that this Kind of support is something that we have to think about as potentially having applicability not only in Countries like maldova georgia in ukraine, but also More broadly because after all there are ethnic russians and there are groups that russia can provide various kinds of political and even security support to in a number of other countries as well We see this in the baltik states where there are pro-russian ngos Receiving in some cases russian funding We see this in europe where if you look at the results of the recent european parliamentary elections in a number of countries anti-eu parties That did very well did so on the basis of russian financial assistance Now for nato for the united states. This is obviously a concern nato, of course was built to deal with conventional and Nuclear military threats that is the kind of security challenges that we've gotten used to talking about over the last five or six decades But what we've seen in crimia and what we're seeing on a smaller scale in some of these other places is The use of russian security assistance at a lower threshold that may or may not necessarily Rise to the level of something that would invoke an article five guarantee so if russia provides financial support for pro-russian parties in the baltik states or For pro-russian separatist groups whether in the baltik states or elsewhere How does the united states how does nato cope with that kind of a of a challenge one that doesn't have a clear cut military dimension to it And then i would just like to add a couple of quick observations from Our time in central asian the caucuses that i think help provide a little bit of perspective on how Not only crimia but also the broader changes in russian security strategy towards this region Is viewed In in central asian the caucuses One Theme that was raised again and again was surprise Surprise that russia would go as far as it did especially given the lack of a clear cut provocation such as a decision To pursue nato membership one of our interlocutors in kazakhstan put it very bluntly and said crimia was our 9 11 So it's obviously an event that's causing a lot of rethinking Around the region not only about russia but also about where these countries fit and their relationships With the outside world And of course that becomes more relevant because the western response to events in crimia was almost across the board seen as being fairly weak We got in a number of conversations complaints that These countries had taken risks done things that were politically unpopular to support the united states whether that was Sending forces to afghanistan and iraq whether that was Signing energy contracts that were beneficial to us allies And that in response the u.s. Was not doing enough to protect them either militarily or politically diplomatically The fact of the matter is russia is still seeking to court so-called wayward states like azerbaijan and georgia Even as it also maintains political relationships with separatist forces In these countries and the ability of russia's effort to court these states I would argue it will have a lot to do with how they perceive the level of u.s. Interest and commitment to them Many would like to see a deeper security relationship with the united states Including weapons sales including Temporary rotations of forces including training Even countries that have very difficult relations among themselves like azerbaijan and armenia Both would seem to have an interest in a higher level of u.s. Military support for the other as long as it doesn't disrupt the balance So increases on both sides to maintain parity among them But at the same time showing a greater level of u.s. Commitment to the region as a whole And so I think the issue for a lot of these countries is that they see that they've entered a new world with russia And they're looking very much to the united states and nato, but the united states in particular For some kind of leadership to reassure them that this new world isn't one that is going to fundamentally Threaten their sovereignty and independence Thank you fantastic and given who's in the audience today I would be foolish to ask my own questions and not just turn it over to you I would ask if you would please uh In in asking your question, please do make it a question Identify yourself and your affiliation and if you don't mind standing up to That was a request from external relations today and just Stay stay put until the mic comes to you Yeah, and and and he suggests rightly that I will collect a few at a time So let me let me take two to start with Right here in the front Hello, my name is sahan. I'm interning this summer here in washington dc at a private Private equity venture capital startup fund and I'm originally from the university of iowa So my question is certainly we've been talking a lot about like, you know, russian military technology and ground forces But uh, there's certainly other ways that russia can infiltrate, you know, the west and the united states You know, we've heard they've been involved in cyber cybersecurity hacking and many other other forms of attack in the united states My question is could they attack us financially like for an example a big big state-run companies like gas prom have been Especially with their recent deal with china natural gas deal They have been they have ditched the dollar and using uon ruble for trade and also gas prom also announced that they Issued their first uon corporate bond. So my question is what can they were they able to attack the united states economy by Valuing their oil prices outside the united states dollar or using their their currency for international trade instead of the dollar and by By doing that is there a possibility that they could attack the united states or the west economically? Thank you. Ambassador courting Yes, hi bill courting a retired diplomat Earlier former finance minister alexa kudwin cautioned that the spending For military purposes that president putin was undertaking Could be very costly to the economy Since then we now see that there are likely to be setbacks in the russian economy because of the ukrainian actions Is there a possibility that the plan military spending effort Might be affected by these economic issues Great, why don't we take those and andy you want to take a shot at the first question on Russian financial levers Um, yeah I'll address bill's question as well briefly The answer is yes I mean we know that in 2008 2009 Vladimir pudin suggested to the chinese leadership that they engage in a large sale of us t bills To hurt the u.s economy hurt the status of the dollar now that's The chinese resisted the chinese have a much more of a symbiotic economic relationship with the united states And that was not deemed attractive attractive to them Um, but I think this question is much more relevant now that we've embarked on this path of financial financial sanctions and uh, I think that we need to keep in mind that from the standpoint of moscow financial sanctions on our part essentially constitute an act of war And that we should certainly be absolutely prepared As well as we can be For every kind of symmetrical or asymmetrical uh retaliation on the part of russia in this event And I am certain that this is one of the inhibiting factors for The obama administration not to speak of Our european allies in pursuing This this course of action One thing i've been concerned about I mean we had a very interesting discussion about this back in the middle of may here in which Two u.s government officials basically said off the record that There is no expert in the u.s government for what we are trying to do i.e To financially isolate a country the size of the russian federation There's no playbook for that The biggest concern for me about is a is a larger strategic point essentially the capacity to Inflict Financial sanctions and for them to be effective Is based upon essentially continued United States hegemony dominance of the international financial system The more that we try to use this tool The more that Not only russia But everybody Is going to look to measures to Decrease one Fundamentally the u.s role in the international financial system. They're going to look for ways around it We already saw a lot of evidence of that beginning With these with these sanctions and um So I think we need to think very strategically About you know, what an asset it is for united states power in the world Its role in the financial system And that we would want to be very very very careful about doing things that are likely to lead to the acceleration Of the erosion of our domination of the financial financial system Bill on your question about the uh The economy It's an excellent it's an excellent question uh For me You know ever since mr. Putin came back to To jure a power Two years ago He while initially enunciating a set of economic goals and reforms They were very admirable There's been close to no progress on that reform program So my larger concern is that he has To some extent abandoned or decided to avoid the risk Of undertaking structural economic reforms That would be the basis for um broader and more sustainable economic growth Because of the concern that this would risk the political foundation of the system Um, and if already since he's become president the russian economy as uh Since recovery from the global financial crisis Uh, he was at about three four percent growth when he came to power and right now russian growth is at about zero And that russian growth is at about zero basically before financial sanctions uh hit I think I mean to what extent has the have the sanctions hurt the russian economy Uh, one they've made the cost of capital already more expensive because of ratings agencies Lowering their their ratings on russia. So the cost of capital is more expensive And two is just increase the perception of risk in the country So that not only foreign investors, but also russian investors themselves Are will want to keep their money Will not want to invest their money in russia And that's a problem an upside with what's happened is I suppose from mr. Putin's standpoint is that a lot of russian capital has returned back to russia over the last few months Um, but i'm not sure that much of it is actually being used It was very striking uh to see, you know in all the hullabaloo last month about the china russia Um gas deal Of which we know virtually no details about That uh, uh, mr. Putin spoke favorably a couple of weeks ago through weeks ago, perhaps About the russian government Capitalizing gas prom to the tune of 50 to 55 billion dollars for um For execution of the projects tied to the pipeline and supply of the gas and the development of those gas those gas resources Before that deal there was lots of talk that the chinese would be Putting money on the table that we'll have to have to see how that turns out, but the it's It's hard to say, you know to what extent, uh, I mean These concerns about further sanctions are driving Putin I mean certainly they're having some effect because Putin tries to play this game to stay below the radar of the multi-sectoral sanctions But we show very very little enthusiasm Which I don't necessarily think is such a bad thing except for the fact that we announced this this was our policy And so it creates the credibility problem But I think the the sanctions policy is You know of its own is is uh, is dangerous But he seems to want to stay below that uh, uh that radar And any comment on the uh, the actual military spending is that is that too is it too high? Is it needed to sustain the company's fault that you have any thoughts and specifically on the export piece? Maybe we could add that in as well. Let me just comment on the military spending There already is some impact announced on the the rate of military spending over the next period It isn't a big deal yet It sounds like they have agreed the minister of finance and ministry of defense to move about 20 to 30 billion dollars to the right While as a result of the economic slowdown the russians typically enter into these revolving 10-year procurement programs And they're they're currently in in the midst of the 2010 to 2020 procurement plan They're about ready to roll out a new plan from 2015 to 25 Which is typically what they do they shift the new plan in midstream, which is a great way to avoid accountability by the way but um, I I believe I've always believed that their ambitions to rearm by 2020 were unrealistic I think most observers would also concur with that so I think More realistically it'd be the 2025 to 2030 time frame Bill just one last point on that because I If you before february 28th, I would have said mr. Putin faces a real problem. The pie is not growing. He's over promised spending whether it's military or whether it's social welfare spending for for citizens And I would have been more confident that he would have sacrificed More on the military spending to make sure the social welfare spending continues and Subsidies and salaries getting paid and pensions getting paid because people that depend upon the state as a source of their income That's his core constituency I'm not sure how how how hard that how hard that holds at this point But he does have to win an election in 2018 Great, let me take another couple questions sir Peter Humphrey Intel analyst and former diplomat If I were Putin, I would cool my jets for a couple years And then make a big play for trance and easter before obama leaves office This would help lock down surround the ukraine and I'm mourning what you guys think About that possibility. Do you do you concur? And more importantly what on earth are we doing to prevent that inevitability? And next next question right right right there. Thank you Ed Verona with mclardy associates for mr. Schwartz. You referred to the mistral sails Could you say just a few more words? How significant would the mistral? ships be In addressing the capability gaps in the soviet and excuse me russian military Okay, and let's take just one more question way in the back there My name is ken duckworth. I'm with the u.s. Department of Commerce most recently most recently our trade attaché in st. Petersburg It seems also, you know, the u.s. Has the issue with sanctions of some of our companies Having business interests in russia and I think in the oil and gas sector We have the u.s. Chamber now and and nam sort of publicly coming out against sanctions How does that it doesn't help that the administration's position? But how do we counterbalance some of that here? When we have to look at the larger strategic picture and not just the bottom line of x on mobile Or some of the larger players in in the industry there Great, let me suggest that we actually start with the mistral question about how how major a capability that is and then Why don't we go to the end of the table starting with jeff to answer the other two questions on How the u.s. has been controlling his jets and the larger strategic considerations with with further sanctions Thank you. The purchase of the mistral will fill a gap in russia's limited force projection capabilities operating its near abroad It allows them to Overcome some of the deficiencies that they encountered during the georgia war where they struggled to come up with adequate transport To move forces from Crimea and other parts of the russian mainland to georgia This ship will have several different capabilities including assault helicopter transport capability to move forces relatively substantial number of forces that are on shipboard to To land in the event of need for some kind of an expeditionary action It also can act as a command and control center for those forces It can also support deployment of Ground-based forces through fast attack craft as well the primary Thinking that i've seen in my research on the russians that they're looking for this primarily to beef up their capability and their near abroad They're occasionally you see discussion about potentially using this for a longer range out of area operations if you will for For example, there was some discussion about using this to combat somali pirates that were potentially attacking or Taking over russian merchant vessels near the the coast of somalia, so Yep Okay, jeff Okay, um on transnistria. Yeah, you know during the Crimea crisis The salience of transnistria started increasing This is a frozen conflict that's been pretty well frozen for The better part of two decades and as recently as four or five years ago Looked like there might actually be a political process leading to some kind of of managed outcome And that seems to have have gone away And I think the significance is well, it's a couple of things I mean one Because if you look at the map of where transnistria is located the only way that russia can supply it can move People and equipment and anything else into transnistria is basically through ukraine And so you started hearing this narrative in the russian press about how There was a an alleged blockade of transnistria And my own reading of that is that was laying the groundwork to justify a deeper Intervention into ukraine not only Crimea and not only the the east but potentially Much broader to open up some kind of a of a corridor to transnistria And I think that Is one that the kremlin is still keeping in reserve to see To potentially employ down the road now Both of maldova and ukraine have now signed their association agreements with the eu And That was in part. I think the eventuality that russian Pressure was designed to Prevent so now, you know, we'll see what happens But the presence of of transnistria Does remain As a kind of sword of damocles that the russians can dangle not only over maldova But also over ukraine. And so I think it's a it's a space that very much bears Watching Especially because if both ukraine and maldova are in Have the free trade agreements with the eu and are closed off by new customs frontiers from russia Then transnistria becomes very economically as well as politically isolated and that is a potentially dangerous Scenario As far as the the opposition of the u.s business community to to sanctions I guess what I would say is that you know, this is a it's a difficult place for the administration to be in On the one hand, I think one way that you gain Credibility is to take steps that are going to have a negative impact on your own interests showing that you're willing to accept a cost Including potentially a cost to your your business community To do things that are in your strategic advantage, but that's very hard to do right now because there's So much opposition on the european side and the argument that the chamber of commerce And others are making and I think it's a valid one Is why should american companies suffer the brunt of sanctions when the european governments are not willing to to do anything similar? And so the european companies will continue to have opportunities to do business With russia that are being denied to american companies And that I think is the is the challenge that the administration has to face it. It it's going to need I think more buy-in from at least the germans In order to you know to maneuver around this this problem And I think miracle has been pretty good on this score But there's a lot of of people that she has to keep happy and of course, you know She also has to maneuver in the in the very complex Environment of of intra-eu politics as well So I don't think there's there's a simple answer here. Unfortunately Clark do you want to add anything especially on the question of whether you you think mr. Putin will now Take a strategic time out or whether he'll continue to press um Purely personal reading on this. I don't think so the reason I don't think so is that Putin is a player. He senses an opponent of To use the washington post phrase one who dithers indecisive You don't give a weak adversary time to recoup you keep pushing And so my reading of Putin is that he will keep pushing and That's where the risk of Of miscalculation comes in because I think There will become a point at which the action that the united states takes will be one That raises the stakes considerably for russia in this context and so is worrisome We've got exactly two minutes left. So andy. Why don't I turn over the remainder of the time to you and we'll close out on this question I was going to talk for 30 seconds To the transistor question I think from the from the standpoint of using this as an action to support his domestic political consolidation And going into the 2018 election, which I think is a significant consideration Since I do not see anything probably happening positive with the russian economy Even with the economic sanctions out the window, then it would make sense to have This maybe a bit down the road because you do need to kind of Swallow Crimea And that's going to be more complicated than people think because you're going to have to deal directly with the Kievan government about supplies of water There's the elect the power generation grid, etc And then of course, you know, they've got the what right now is the eight billion dollar Closest estimate for the the bridge from kerch to Crimea, which would make the supply to Crimea much much better But on the other hand exactly as clark stated Uh You know if If the united states and this will segue to my last my last comment If the united states and its allies were actually to do Some effective things to strengthen the the sovereignty i.e the capacity for countries like maldova and others to Raise the costs of russian military intervention and take that action in a pretty strategic And comprehensive comprehensive way Then the incentive for mr. Putin is would be to take action sooner rather than later before That uh that comes about now and this gets to the the sanctions point my position on february 28th has been consistent on this That we need to spend a lot Less time on punishing russia Because nobody can push punish russians better than russians themselves Mr. Putin is punishing russia very effectively economically The the the fairly weak sanctions that we've put on actually just give him a good excuse To to to push the blame over to us the west for russia's economic economic woes Now i'm not categorically against sanctions But i think that far more time and strategic thought and resources needs to be put to strengthen The capacity of states Like ukraine like maldova like georgia like armenia like kazakhstan whoever desires Stronger support economically militarily security and otherwise That is to me where the the strategy should be And then we can talk less about less about sanctions And we can talk more about what we actually do to strengthen the sovereignty of those countries And that addresses the crux of the strategic problem Excellent note to end on and thank all of you for coming out on an early on a monday and a july 4th weekend and thanks to the panel