 Our last panel which is to look at unification and the security environment from both the regional and global perspective and we put together a very, very strong panel for this purpose. Again, the morning panels were focused on the business investment and economic synergies related to unification. In the afternoon we've looked at the politics and the economics and we will continue to do so with this panel and very distinguished speakers. Let me introduce them briefly to you. Their full bios are in the program booklets. Our first presenter is Dr. Kurt Campbell. As many of you know he is the founding partner chairman and chief executive officer of the Asia Group. Prior to that for four years from 2009 to 2013 he served as the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs where he is widely credited as being one of the key architects of the pivot to Asia. Speaking second will be Professor Kim Jae Chan of Sogwang University. Dr. Kim is a political science with a PhD from Yale University. Before joining Sogwang he taught at Yale and he is currently the director of Sogwang's institute for international and area studies. Again as many of you know Sogwang is also the alma mater of the current president of Korea. So the Sogwang professors have a lot of juice these days. Our first discussion is Ambassador Stapleton Roy. Ambassador Roy is a single scholar and founding director emeritus of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars here in Washington D.C. He's had many posts in the Foreign Service and has served as ambassador in a number of places and in 2001 he received Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson Award for Distinguished Public Service. And our second discussion is Dr. Kim Young Ho who is professor in the Department of Political Science and Foreign Affairs at Sung Shin Women's University in South Korea. He also served previously as secretary to the president for unification and the office of the president of the Republic of Korea from 2011 to 2012. He also served following that as South Korea's ambassador for human rights from 2012 to 2013. So quite a distinguished panel to discuss this very interesting and broad topic of green unification and security environment. So I will go to Kurt first if that's okay. Thank you. Thank you for joining us. You can use the podium or you can sit here. Great. Thank you very much. It's terrific to be back at CSIS. Let me thank Victor. I think as you all know he puts together some of the most interesting thought provoking panels as part of his effort here at CSIS. He's also working on I think a long overdue study with the Bush Institute to consider what to do with the North Korean human rights situation and the refugees that have been coming out of North Korea now for over a generation. Also great to be with Korean friends and the dean of Asia specialist, State Baroy. So I'll try to be on my best behavior, offer some ideas for how to think about next steps as we go forward. I would say generally speaking when I worked in government, this is my third time, once on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a Treasury, another time at the Department of Defense and most recently the State Department. One of the things that ties that period together of almost 25 years is a set of unbelievably vexing problems associated with North Korea, that the parameters of which have changed very little over the course of 25 years and indeed the playbook itself as I was listening to the pleas of the three visitors in North Korea about wanting help from the international community of the United States. I mean it is a playbook that it's like the Green Bay Packers of the 1960s. They ran three plays over and over again and we're in the midst of one of those well understood plays where we resist initially and then finally we figure out some way to talk to the North Koreans. They're disappointed with what we put on the table but in some either exhaustion or sense of enough of this release this person. Tom over here, Hubbard is the master of this. He's been involved in several of them. But I think it is undoubtedly the case that the people who work on North Korea inside the U.S. government are suffering from not only a kind of fatigue but a sense of exhaustion in the sense of the strategies that have been applied, right? So there have been periods where we've tried substantial pressure. There have been periods, more regular periods in which certain complex nuances of diplomacy are tried. We'll try to do this, we'll signal we'll do this, then they'll say this and then we'll do this, the most arcane choreography and orchestration of diplomacy imaginable associated with North Korea. In this arena, however, with the arrival and power of Kim Jong-un, some of the former playbook no longer works. It's not clear that our former interlocutors at the foreign ministry or even in senior positions in the military have the trust and confidence of the senior leadership. Many of these people are no longer around, frankly. They've been retired from service in many circumstances. And so I think we are left with a set of circumstances that most of the senior players inside the U.S. government right now in a fundamental sense are at a loss about how to proceed. So we often talk about this with regard to strategic patience. But in truth, it is also the case that many of the tools that we've tried have just simply not worked. And we're at a set of circumstances now where it's not clear fundamentally the way forward. And I'll talk a little bit more about that as we proceed. I think one of the tendencies has been, and I would put myself in this category, is to try to redefine elements of the problem. Clearly, we have not been successful at putting substantial pressure on North Korea or seeing any kind of either domestic reform or inhibition on nuclear or proliferation activities. Proliferation of missile, nuclear uncertain. We have not been able to affect the kind of change that basically a generation of diplomacy has been aiming towards and for. But what we have been successful in, I think generally, is keeping the six-party group of nations together. We have kept a relatively solid front. No one has broken out to support or to be involved in North Korea and surreptitious activities that are fundamentally not in the best strategic interest the United States or other countries. I think China over time has come to understand that North Korea is in fact acting in ways that are quite antithetical to its strategic interests. It may not acknowledge that publicly on a regular basis. But I think what we've seen in the last several years is a deep frustration and worry that in many respects what North Korea is doing is creating a security dynamic in North Korea that is profoundly not in China's strategic interests. Now what that means over time, I'm not sure we know, but that is a profound change from 15 or 20 years ago when I think the prevailing sentiment in Beijing was quite different about North Korea. I think it's also the case that sentiments and views in the United States and other countries about what we would like to see on the Korean Peninsula has changed substantially. I think there were periods in the past where major countries or elements within countries believed that a continuing separation of North Korea was in the best strategic interests of Northeast Asia. I do not believe that is the case any longer. I think there is a broad overwhelming assessment that peaceful reunification and a move towards unification on the Korean Peninsula is in the best strategic interests of most of the major players in Northeast Asia and even countries where there have been some elements of ambivalence. I think some of that has been swept away by repeated human rights abuses, issues associated with the most provocative antithetical language that emanates and rhetoric that emanates from North Korea more generally. And here I think I have to compliment both the last administrations. What we have seen is in many respects almost a sociological political change in South Korea and how they talk about unification. The idea, and if you look at the history of Chinese foreign policy, the greatest success of Chinese foreign policy over the last 30 years is the concept of one China. And that nations and groups that stand in opposition to one China are working at cross purposes in terms of the best interests of the Chinese people. I believe a variation of that concept is becoming more prevalent in South Korea, a sense that Korea is one people and one nation and that efforts taken to divide the Korean Peninsula are not in the strategic best interests of the country. And I would say that the most recent, very ambitious diplomacy between Madam Park and President Xi is at least a modest step in the direction of articulating a view of a Korea in the future that does not face this division that has been so difficult and problematic over time. I think the challenge that I've seen in a lot of the commentary in South Africa, excuse me, in South Korea, South Africa is one of the examples here, assumes that the process, however, will be smooth and without difficulty. Now you talked this morning about the economic dimensions. Clearly the gap in economic performance between the North and the South is enormous. I think the going in presumption in German diplomacy was that if Germany saved an enormous amount, then the aggregate capability would allow East Germany to recover more rapidly when in fact it was not the aggregate but the differential between East and West Germany. And I think we're going to confront that problem in spades between North and South Korea. But Victor asked me primarily to talk about the security dimensions of this problem. I think it would be fair to say that the United States in conjunction with South Korea but also occasionally with Japan and irregularly with China have had conversations over almost a 20 year period about uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula. These conversations between the United States and South Korea are extraordinarily detailed and complex and they become more so over time. The conversations with China are halting, difficult and many circumstances it is the United States that talks and China listens and takes notes but doesn't feel that it wants to comment on circumstances in particular. And I think it is also the case that because of sensitive sensitivities between Korea and Japan currently there are obvious limitations about what's possible. I think if you look at the situation 15 or 20 years ago in Asia and indeed until quite recently North Korea stood as sort of the one profound problem area in Asia and if we could simply get beyond this issue then we would have at least the potential for more peace and stability and harmony in Northeast Asia. I remember our good friend, our ambassador from Australia and the United States refers to Asia often as the sunny uplands, the place that Americans and others can turn to if they want to be reminded about returns on investment strategically and politically. I will say recent years suggest that Asia's future will be challenging and we are facing tensions in maritime security issues, a variety of political dynamics that involve history, territory, future ambitions, military protocols that will be extraordinarily difficult and I don't think there's much doubt about that. So the North Korean issue is not alone any longer in Asia and complicating the political dynamics. However, I think at least what I have seen of late is that almost every issue there is a level of growing distrust and a lack of confidence at strategic levels in Northeast Asia in terms of how you would handle a major problem either around a disputed island an issue associated with navigation or a sudden change on the Korean Peninsula. And so it was the case that I think in the past that some, I was one of those people who had at least some confidence that there would be the necessary diplomacy between the United States and China about developments on the Korean Peninsula. I think in the current environment we would have to be somewhat worried that the parameters of that diplomacy would be extraordinarily complex and probably surrounded by an enormous amount of uncertainty and probably suspicion. And so it strikes me that in the period ahead I was a person who believed that in our North-South diplomacy that we should increasingly expect South Korea to take a leading role. And I think one of the conceits of American diplomacy with North Korea was to seek to lead that process sometimes without appropriate consultation and in fact leadership from South Korea. I think we've now reached a period where we should be confident and comfortable with South Korea taking a leading role in diplomacy with North Korea. But in addition to that, South Korea is, if we ever face the situation of dramatic change in North Korea, which I think is a very real possibility giving the many uncertainties that we're facing in North Korea. The critical role on the peninsula is likely to lie in Seoul. In the past, I would have said that the critical players in this would be the United States and perhaps first among equals China. But increasingly, it will be the role that South Korea plays, which will require remarkable foresight, preparation, capability, maturity. These are things that I think require very deep consultations between the United States and South Korea. The most important diplomacy that needs to take place in advance is actually not between the United States and China. That's critical. It's number two. What's most important is the diplomacy between the United States and South Korea about expectations, about preparations and the like. And then following that, a kind of three-way diplomacy that involves Japan as well, South Korea, the United States and China going forward. All told, I would say if we faced a set of difficulties and challenges, uncertainties with regard to North Korea, I've said this before, but I think we really have two choices, two possible ways forward. One is a set of very serious problems, right? And another even more serious set of problems, right? So there's no good outcome. There's no way forward that doesn't involve massive numbers of refugees, uncertainties associated with weapons of mass destruction, questions about the role of U.S. forces, Chinese forces across the border, what to do with problems, schisms inside the military, or security establishment in North Korea. These are all problems that will confound any stable, secure effort and I believe will pose the most significant diplomatic challenge of the last 25 years. So in conclusion, there are a number of things that I think the United States should be doing more of with South Korea. Obviously we've talked about in the morning sessions about the economic and commercial sides. I have to commend North Korean friends, the steps that they have taken to welcome South Korean friends. It's imperfect North Korean friends to create opportunities. I would like to see the United States do more of that. We today host very few North Korean refugees in the United States. We should do more of that. And what we do, I think, is primarily done by religious organizations. I think that's terrific, but I'd like to see other opportunities for North Koreans to come to study in American universities, to have the opportunity to train and the like. To date, much of that training is about technical issues, questions associated with just modern commercialism and the like. Increasingly we're going to have to train and prepare some of these people who've left North Korea to understand issues associated with governance, to think carefully about the way forward. When I earlier talked about South Africa, that's exactly what we did with South Africa for almost 25 years. Many of the people that staffed the initial South African government were trained in the United States in Britain elsewhere. We need to do more of that. We need to take that on. I'd also like to see a set of circumstances where we broadcast more, try to actually take steps to have more information penetration into North Korea and have that be a little bit more nuanced and active than it's been in the past. And I must say, and I'll just conclude with this, as we think about our overall toolkit, there is one element of our strategy that I don't think people fully appreciate. We often think of North Korea, I certainly did, as one of the most sanctioned countries in the world with almost impossible objective obstacles for people wanting to travel, invest, or the like. It turns out, when I was in the State Department working on Myanmar or Burma, comparing Burma to North Korea is night and day. Burma has much more in the way of sanctions and challenges associated with interactions. And I do think if we faced a set of further challenges with respect to North Korea, it would be possible for us to put more financial pressure on North Korea. And I think we need to let Chinese friends know and understand that some of the things that have been contemplated by the new regime, if followed through our would entail and involve a reaction that is much more strenuous than we've seen in the past. And I think that element of our diplomacy is likely to be necessary as we go forward. Ultimately, this is an issue, sometimes you ask yourself, how important are these sessions? How important are war games? How important are issues associated with planning in advance? I remember a senior official when I was at the White House saying we had set up a morning session, four hours, to go through how to think about what would happen if we faced a certain amount of uncertainty. And this person was a little impatient and saying, well, look, there's so many parameters. Why spend the time doing this? And I remember, I responded. I said, look, this is not an attempt. There will be no answers, but to socialize yourself, to prepare to think about the questions and the challenges and the problems ahead. We have to do more of that and we have to do it with Korean friends. And this is an arena where track two and think tanks have an enormously important role. And that's one of the reasons why I'm grateful for Victor for taking this on. Thank you. Thanks. Thank you very much, Kurt. Speaking of this, Dr. Kim, would you like to use the podium? To continue that dream team analogy, all my life, I thought I belonged to the second team, whether that be sports or things that I do to make a living. I already thought that I belonged to the second team. So actually I was pretty good basketball player, but I never made it to the first team. I was in the second team. So to be elevated as a member of the dream team, to be treated as a member of the dream team is a huge honor. So let me preface by saying that it's really an honor to be among distinguished experts and distinguished audience today. In previous sessions, in previous panels, we talked about the unification benefits, the benefits of unification that can be brought about, the benefits that the unification can bring to the people on the Korean Peninsula and people in Northeast Asia and major stakeholder companies in Northeast Asia. And we also talked about the ways in which we can materialize those unification benefits on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asian region. What I want to do, the thing I want to present today is a little bit different. I like to discuss how we can frame this unification benefit discussion. I like to incorporate global perspective into this unification benefit discussion. In previous semesters, we talked about unification. Debak theory that President Park proposed all in this year. I think that Debak theory or Jackpot or Bonanza, if you will, that Jackpot theory itself was a Jackpot, my opinion, because in Korea, for some reason the unification discourse has been losing momentum in recent years, but because of Debak, the unification discourse has regained momentum and there has rekindled interest in Korean society, not just in Korean society, Northeast Asian region about unification benefits. But after Debak theory has been proposed, in my opinion, much of the discussion has revolved around on material benefits, material benefits that can be brought about to the people in the Korean Peninsula mainly and people in Northeast Asian region, a major stakeholder countries in Northeast Asian region, quite understandably. My major point, I mean, of course, those interests had been defined in terms of economic and security interests, security interests, material interests. My major point, one of my major points in today's presentation is that the beneficiary of unification benefit can be much more diverse and the scope of unification Debak, or unification benefit can be much broader. In terms of the beneficiary of Debak, sure the biggest beneficiary of unification could be people on the Korean Peninsula, but the unification would also benefit for the people in Northeast Asian region and also major stakeholder countries in Northeast Asian region. That was basically what the panel see was all about. But that's not it. My contention is that unification would be a world historical event that could contribute to the international community. So we gotta take this unification benefit discussion to the international community. In terms of scope of Debak, in terms of scope of Bonanza, we tend to interpret the outcomes of unification mainly in terms of material interests, mainly in terms of security and the economic benefits, but the scope of benefit can be much broader, as I said. Unification can contribute to many issue areas of international relations, such as nonproliferation, human rights, environmental protection, human trafficking, money laundering, and so on and so forth. So if you have the booklet that I have, I don't know whether you have the booklet. Obviously, many of you don't. Anyways, table one there is a snapshot, look at the beneficiary and scope of unification Bonanza. If you take a look at row number one, initially the benefit discussion has centered on the Korean Peninsula, okay? And that it has moved to Northeast Asian region. But it seems to me that the discussion has stayed there in Northeast Asian region. And I think there is a need to take this benefit discussion, unification benefit discussion to the international community. And also the scope of Debak, that's row number two there. Initially, we used to think about, we used to talk about benefits of unification in terms of politics and in terms of security, and political benefits that the unification would bring to the people, to the Koreans, and then also people in Northeast Asian region. But after Debak, after Bonanza, theory has been initiated by President Park, the benefit discussion have moved to economic realm. We now talk about the benefits of unification in terms of economic benefits. And I think there was what session, what one in the morning was all about. But I also believe that there is a need to take this unification benefit discourse or discussion, if you will, to the many different issue areas in international relations. Why? Because I think it is important for Korea to get international community involved in this unification discourse. That way we can have a greater appeal to the international community. If unification is completed successfully, if we can accomplish successful unification, I think unification can work as what I would call international public goods, international public goods. Of course, I mean, the unification plan has to be executed in proper manner in order for this to happen. How does this happen? Well, there are two big messages that unifications can impart. Five more minutes? Well, I thought that I could be very brief. There are big messages that we can impart to the world that is intractable conflicts can be resolved. If we put in good faith efforts, we can resolve these seemingly intractable conflicts. What I mean by this is that the world is plagued by a number of intractable conflicts. And I think Korean Peninsula has been one of those zones of age old conflicts in the world. So by resolving these conflicts, we can impart this positive message to the world that age old conflicts can be resolved with proper measures. I think that in and of itself can be a positive contribution to the international community. International, I mean, unification also means that integration is possible. What do I mean by this? You know, today's world's growing income inequality across the nation states and within nation states has been one of the many problems associated with the unfettered advance of globalization. How can we resolve it? Or maybe successful integration of South Korea with North Korea can present a model. South Korea being one of the top 10 economies in the world, successful rich country. North Korea, one of the most backward countries in the world. So successful integration of these two different societies can present a model for social integration. Maybe I'm being naive, but these are the positive messages that we can send to the world. And then we are working on several visions or slogans, visions with which we can convince to the world that international, I mean, I'm sorry, unification can actually work as international public goods. Slogan number one, or vision number one is nuclear free Korea, or peace Korea, if you will. You know, unified Korea will be free from not just nuclear weapons, but all kinds of weapons and mass constructions. And I think this will contribute greatly to the strengthening of international non-proliferation regime. The list goes on, I'll be very brief actually because I only have a couple more minutes. Green Korea, unification will restore ecosystem in North Korea and improve environment on the Korean Peninsula. And I think DMZ or Peace Park can work as a symbolic case or a test case for this endeavor. Human rights Korea, you all know this, unification will be a great accomplishment in terms of promoting democracies and human rights values and human rights on the world stage. And fourth slogan, I can think of unified Korea as a promoter of a free trade. Unified Korea will definitely pursue a free trade and this will definitely reinforce existing free international trade order. So two points, unification means resolution of all the problems associated with North Korea. It means improvement of world security situation as a whole. And this I think will bolster existing world order and existing global governance on many issue areas in international relations. One caveat though, one caveat is that in order for the unification of work as international public goods, I think several conditions should be met. First, unification should not be a reunification which bring the situation to the status quo and to 70 years ago. The unification should be new unification meaning that we'll have to create a new country that embody is not just a nationalistic visions or values but is pausing universal values. So related to that is that nationalism should not be a too much of driving force for unification. Should the is powers universal vision not nationalistic one. And unification should not be a simple extension of Korean system to North Korea. Unification should fulfill a more refined vision so that we can appeal to the international community and the more refined vision of course includes as I said before peace Korea, green Korea, human rights Korea. Korea as a big promoter of international free trade. Maybe I'm being too idealistic. This is just my idea. And of course, I mean, in order for this to happen we got to have solid plans and we'll have to execute these plans implement these plans in order for the unification work as what I would call international public goods to the international community. Thank you. Thank you very much. And our discussant Ambassador Roy. Thank you. We've had two very excellent presentations. Kurt Campbell has stressed the complexity of the whole issue of Korean unification and Professor Kim has talked about the potential economic bonanza it could create. In other words, looked at some of the positive aspects of unification. Our panel is supposed to be talking about unification and the security environment looking at the broader potentially global aspects of this. My reaction to the presentations is we don't know how Korean unification will take place. We had four divided countries that resulted from World War II. Two of them have unified. The unifications in each case took place in ways that had not been anticipated. I mean, Vietnamese unification occurred largely because of the collapse of President Nixon's domestic political position and the fact that the administration was left powerless in dealing with the negative reaction to the Vietnam War to intervene in any way. And this created circumstances for the reunification of Vietnam, which was violent. It occurred because of a major war and then it was still violent. It was an invasion, essentially, of North Vietnam into South Vietnam. The German case took place largely because of the unraveling of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, something that people had not anticipated. And it was peaceful. So when we look at Korea and China, I think we should assume that we cannot anticipate at this point exactly what the circumstances are that will suddenly create the opportunities for unification, which could be either violent or could be peaceful. We can comment on the fact that the end results will have different effects. And certainly, one would hope in the Korea's case that the reunification would be peaceful and contribute to a more stable East Asia. Now, Korea has a special problem. It's at the intersection point of great power rivalries. In the 19th and 20th century, it was caught up in the rivalries between Qing Dynasty China and Imperial Japan, between Imperial Japan and the Russian Empire, between Imperial Japan and Republican China, and between the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in the post-Cold War period. And these are major contributing factors to why Korea is a divided country. The interests of the Korean people have been secondary considerations in this great power politics, giving rise to a phrase I think that my Korean colleague here has referred to, that Korea has been a shrimp among competing whales. I think it's fair to say, however, that Korea is no longer a shrimp. You could define it as a lobster or maybe as a great white shark. I don't know what you would say, but I think South Korea is much more in the position that West German was in at the time of reunification. It has gotten real heft. And if you look at the unification process, in each case of the two that have gotten unified, one of the parties was the driver in the unification process and the other essentially had to accept what emerged. If we think about Korean unification, you would have to conclude that South Korea was clearly in a stronger position to be in the driver's seat in any type of unification scenario. But again, that doesn't answer the question of whether it will be peaceful or whether it will not be peaceful and whether it will contribute to stability or contribute to instability in Northeast Asia. Given the fact that the Korean people themselves have been the principal victims of the great power rivalry in which Korea has been either a prawn or a pawn, depending on which term of speech you want to use, it's clearly desirable that Korean unification should give rise to new circumstances in Northeast Asia marked by stability and opportunities for economic development and prosperity. Is that an impossible goal? The answer is no. And German unification we've seen has in many ways contributed to that. But you could also argue that German unification created circumstances in Europe which looked like a dream outcome for 20 years and all of a sudden we're beginning to see the potential for new conflict emerging from the circumstances that were created by the collapse of the Soviet Empire. So in other words, we don't want that pattern to repeat itself in Northeast Asia. It's frankly too dangerous and we have to worry about it. This is not going to be an issue left entirely to the interests of the Koreans themselves. Great powers are still great powers and Japanese interests, Chinese interests, Russian interests, American interests are all going to be factors in unification, not simply the wills and desires of the Korean people themselves, important as those are. From Japan standpoint, it's unacceptable from a security standpoint for the Korean peninsula unified to have the potential to drift into China's sphere of influence. And from China's standpoint, it's unacceptable to have a unified Korean peninsula that could be used as a great power platform for threats against China. So how do you compromise those two types of considerations? Now I think President Park and her residence speech wisely referred to perhaps we need some type of a cooperation and security system created in Northeast Asia that could address these types of issues. And I think that's a likely consideration, but the question is are current security arrangements in Northeast Asia compatible with the type of new security and cooperation system that would have to emerge? And if so, how do you handle that transition? And once again, great power interests are clearly an important consideration. We often talk about the law of unintended consequences. But there's also the law of unexpected consequences. The two are not the same. And unintended consequence may be something that you knew would happen, but it wasn't the real reason why you did what you did. But an unexpected consequence is something you hadn't anticipated. Well, I think it's very important to try to anticipate the potential consequences of Korean unification. And one of those I would point out is this would leave China as the last country that is ununified. And my judgment as someone who's lived a long time in China is that is going to change the psychology of the Chinese people. And it's something we need to bear in mind. Domestic pressures in China to complete Chinese unification are going to increase if Korean unification takes place. And the problem is, while remarkable common interests have been created across the Taiwan Strait between the mainland and Taiwan, what they have done is they have lessened support for dangerous independent scenarios on the part of Taiwan. They have greatly increased support for maintenance of the status quo in Taiwan, but they have not increased support on Taiwan for unification with the mainland. So if unification of Korea were to create pressures from China to unify under conditions where Taiwan had not yet moved to a willingness to accept a unification outcome, we could have a very dangerous situation in East Asia. And this could be an unintended consequence of Korean unification, but it shouldn't necessarily be an unexpected consequence. In other words, we need to think about these considerations because if you look at history, things occur which then create follow-on consequences. And in many cases, those follow-on consequences are very negative. And that's not what we would like to happen in the case of Korean unification. So is Korean unification compatible with the interests of the major power? In my judgment it is. Kirk Campbell, I think, referred to this. The United States has officially endorsed the concept of unification. China, in my judgment, cannot afford to oppose unification because it has not yet unified itself and that would simply be untenable for China to impose the unification of a divided country, but it will want the circumstances to be compatible with China's interests. Russia, I don't think, has any reason to want to oppose Korean unification. So the issue is not really great power opposition to unification. The issue lies in the fact that has been referred to by our presenters, which is the development since World War II have created two different types of careers that are far more different in their essences than was the division between the two parts of Germany which when unification took place in Germany actually was very, very difficult to overcome. It wasn't just the economic imbalances, it was the whole different attitudes of mind had been generated in the part of people who grew up under a social system and those who had grown up under a free open system. And you have those same types of differences embedded in the Korean Peninsula and this is one of the issues that you need the cooperation of the great powers in order to overcome those types of obstacles in bringing about the unification that ought to serve the interests of all of the interested parties. Thank you. I'm sorry, Dr. Kim. Thank you, Dr. Cho. I want to extend my thanks to the organizers of this conference. And it is also known to be a member of such a distinguished panel. There is no surprise left when it comes to the last discussion of the last panel, but I will try. I agree with what Dr. Campbell said in his eliminating presentation, especially, I agree with what he said about the point that the consensus began to emerge that Korean unification is to the benefit of all the parties in North East Asian region. So now consensus is that Korean unification is not only to the benefit of the Korean nation and to the benefit of all the countries in the region. And as Dr. Kim gave us, told us that it is also to the interest of the world. So I also agree with what Dr. Kim laid out on the effect of Korean reunification, especially I like Dr. Kim's conclusion that the beneficiaries and the scope of Korean unification is much broader than expected. So I'm going to make some comment to elaborate the important point the two presenters have made. The first point I want to make is that Korean unification should be pursued and achieved in the geopolitical context of emerging US Chinese global hegemonic competition. I think it is very important to understand this point because US Chinese hegemonic competition is going to have very significant impact on saving the new international order in the 21st century. The Korean nation was divided during the period of the Cold War. Then what is the Cold War? The Cold War was the period of the Cold War. The Cold War was the hegemonic war between the two superpowers. So the Korean division was made as a result of the first post-war global hegemonic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now the Soviet Union is gone and China has replaced the United States as the next competitor of the United States in the second hegemonic competition in the 20th century. So I think we need to understand this strategic background when we approach Korean unification issue a global perspective. So as Ambassador Roy explained to us in detail in his discussion, Koreans were victimized and the Korean peninsula became the battleground for hegemonic competition. Whenever regional and global hegemonic competition took place among great powers. So my point here is that still, there is still grave danger for the nuclear war as well as the conventional war with North Korea's development and the possession of the nuclear weapons. So peaceful Korean unification should be achieved to prevent the Korean peninsula again from being the battleground in the period of regional and global power transition and emerging US-Chinese hegemonic competition. So I think we need to understand the importance of peaceful Korean unification from geopolitical perspective of hegemonic competition. So when I hear today's discussion at this conference, the Park Geun-hae government focused on the economic benefit and aspect of Korean unification. But I think it is not true, Park Geun-hae government also pay attention to the geopolitical dimension as well as economic dimension of Korean unification. So President Park Geun-hae proposed the trust-building process on the Korean peninsula as South Korea's North Korea policy to achieve peaceful unification. Also, the Park Geun-hae government proposed the North East Asian peace and cooperative initiative. So I think these policies of the current government shows us that the Korean government is also interested in the geopolitical aspect of the Korean unification. So this is the first point I want to make. Then the next question is, will be what kind of policy options the Republic of Korea can take in this geopolitical context to achieve peaceful unification? My suggestion is that Koreans need to take a realistic approach based on the historical lessons they can throw from their dealings with great powers in the past. As Ambassador Roy explained to us in detail, Koreans experienced many different hegemonic systems in the past. These examples include the Chinese tributary hegemony, the Japanese imperial hegemony, and the Soviet communist hegemony, and finally the American liberal hegemony. So according to experience of the Korean nation, I think among these different hegemonies, the American hegemony was the most beneficial to Koreans in terms of security and the political and economic development. And also the Republic of Korea on the winning side of the Cold War that was the first global hegemony competition with the help of the U.S. ROK Alliance. So I think maintaining the U.S. ROK Alliance and upgrading this alliance in the 21st century is critical for peaceful Korean unification and peace and prosperity in the region. And as Dr. Cha mentioned, Dr. Campbell is the architect of the U.S.-New Asian strategy that is rebalancing strategy. So to approach the Korean unification issue, I think we need to mention briefly this U.S.-New rebalancing strategy. My question is whether this U.S.-New rebalancing strategy is in the South Korean national interest or not. My answer is that it is in the South Korean national interest because this new strategy will strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance and it also depends diplomatic and military and economic cooperation between the two countries. Then the next point I want to make regarding this U.S.-rebalancing strategy is that this strategy is a clear expression of U.S. intention to continue to assume the role of balance in the region. So continued U.S. presence and security commitment as a balance in the region was pivotal and indispensable to security and prosperity in the region. So the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the U.S.-Japanese Alliance were the two most important pillars to support U.S. presence in the region. So I think in this respect, it is very important to restore ROK-Japanese relations. I think it is not prudent to give North Korea maneuvering room to drive a wedge between before Korea and Japan. So good ROK-Japanese relationship is very important for solving North Korean nuclear issue and peaceful Korean unification. And also to approach Korean unification issue from a global perspective, I think I need to briefly mention about China's new strategy. Dr. Johnson and in the previous panel mentioned China's new strategy that is a new type of great power relations. In my view, from the South Korean perspective, the de-duperization of North Korea is an important written test for the successful development of China's new type of great power relationship strategy. If China does not play a constructive role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, credibility in China's new strategy will be in doubt. I think China is not enough to provide conference rooms and room service for the six-part talks. I think China needs to do more to solve the North Korean nuclear problem. During today's conference, Chinese specialist mentioned China's policy on Korean unification is called delayed unification. I interpret China's intention of delayed unification as an attempt to extend the bulk area to South Korea, including North Korea. I think the Chinese attempt to extend the bulk area to South Korea cannot be successful. And this attempt will be also detrimental to peace and prosperity in the region. Finally, I will mention the North Korean nuclear issue which is the most serious impediment to Korean peaceful reunification. North Korean nuclear program poses three very serious problems. The first one is the transfer of nuclear materials and facilities to other countries and terrorist groups. The second one is the domino effect. The third one is a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula. So because of time limit, I will mention just briefly on the domino effect. The United States is very concerned about the domino effect. It will undermine the NPT system, which is one of the most important cornerstone of American foreign policy. So to prevent this domino effect, the US provide nuclear umbrella to Japan and ROK in the form of extended nuclear deterrence. However, for South Koreans, North Korea's nuclear weapon is a cache in hand to be used anytime. In contrast, extended nuclear deterrence is a check which takes time to be cached in. So when the defect of North Korea's nuclear status becomes a reality, this domino effect cannot totally excluded in South Korea for domestic political reasons. So to avoid this domino effect, the US and the ROK need to find a way to enhance independent conventional war fighting capability of ROK army. So in this respect, we need to pay careful attention to the recommendation, the policy recommendation that the US and ROK need to consider signing the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty. The US signed the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty with Great Britain and Australia. So these treaties can be used as model for the future US ROK Defense Trade Treaty. So this treaty will enhance the interoperability between the two military forces of the two countries and also this treaty enables the two countries to deal with the conventional and the nuclear threat from North Korea. And I think this treaty will also reuse the domino effect in South Korea making more clear US commitment to South Korea. So this is my presentation. Thank you. Thank you. We are sure on time we may have time for maybe one or two questions from the floor. Let me just start the questions by asking. I mean, all of the discussants and speakers hovered around this question of unification, the United States and China in a strategic competition. I guess the very specific question I would ask, particularly our two presenters is, in your view, what specifically has to happen between the United States and China for Korean unification to be seen as a positive, a public good, as Dr. Kim mentioned, but as something that's a positive sum game for both countries? What specifically would you like to see it happen in order to reach that outcome? Now I think we have time for maybe one or two from the audience. So yes, ma'am, right here, get her a mic. Howdy, I'm Nick Malick, I'm an independent researcher. I guess my question is, there's been a lot of discussion today that unification would be a benefit and broadly in the interests of all the powers in Northeast Asia and would obviously deliver some benefits to those powers. But it strikes me that also we've overlooked the one key player, which is North Korea. Obviously, noting it's an extremely opaque government in particular, there are, I would argue, some pretty significant costs to North Korea if reunification were to occur. Obviously there would be some great benefits to North Korea society, but I don't think we can assume that the elite would melt away in totality or in fact that there is really any real separation, any full separation between North Korea's elite and the rest of society. Just wondered what the panel considers about that. Great, thank you. Yes, Professor Kim, and that will be the last question from the floor. I'd like to direct this question to Dr. Campbell. How would you assess the prospect of relations between Japan and China in the years ahead? And in what ways would the evolving relationship may affect U.S. interests, perhaps adversely? Okay, great. So we have three sets of questions. Kurt, would you like to start? Sure, I'll go quickly. Thank you, great presentations. And I must confess the point that State made about how China and its own lack of unity would be impacted. I must say I had not considered that before and I found that very profound and I really think it's something to think about more carefully going forward. To Victor's point about what needs to happen, I think there are some elements of U.S.-China relations that a much higher level and regularity of strategic dialogue. And I just think, I think there has to be more familiarity with some of these issues. To be honest, I think Chinese friends have been very reluctant to talk to the United States about North Korea rather than the well-understood bromides. And I think part of it is they worry that even the most careful discussion could be leaked at any time. I think they probably have good reason to have concerns about that, right? I think the other issue is they're deeply ambivalent about the potential prospects of unification. I agree with Stape, but I think they're coming closer to a recognition that it's either inevitable or something that is actually not undermining potentially China strategic interests in Northeast Asia. But still, it requires a kind of leap of strategic faith that I think when compared to the maintenance of the status quo, the status quo is going to look more comfortable. So ironically, if you ask Victor what is the most important step? I actually think the gap in trust and confidence between Chinese relations with North Korea and in contrast, Chinese relations with South Korea will be the biggest factor. Now, I'll be very careful. I can't go into great detail about this, but I will say occasionally you get some insights into how senior Chinese officials think. And a few years ago, after some high level interaction between China and South Korea, I think some senior Chinese officials basically said, you know, I think we maybe didn't end up with the good Koreans. You know, I'd say it started to dawn on them that maybe they're not well positioned with regard to the relationships on the Korean Peninsula. I think that's one of the reasons that we have seen such a dramatic move on the part of President Xi and Madam Park. Now, my own personal view is that we should support that process and China fully expects that we will seek to block it or deter it. But I believe that a better relationship between China and South Korea is one of the most important and in fact the only positive strategic development in Northeast Asia that we've seen in the last couple of years. And I have to say is I looked at how Madam Park definitely managed her relationship with President Xi. I felt very confident that the kind of ally and friend that we had that wants a better relationship with China, but also understands the enduring importance of the United States. We have to support that. We have to encourage that. And Victor, if that takes root and grows, I think more than any single thing, that is likely to be decisive in the thinking of Chinese strategic leaders. I'll just take the, I think others will have other points. The question about, the very important question professionally about relations between China and Japan. I believe that these trends are profoundly not in the best strategic interests of the United States. And that there has to be a workable set of relations among the key players in Northeast Asia. And we're getting dangerously close to relations with between Japan and South Korea and Japan and China that frankly run the risk of triggering their own kind of crisis in Northeast Asia. And so that brings me, if I could, to the American role. It is often said that between Japan and South Korea that the US has to be extremely careful how it positions itself in this regard. I would like to see the United States playing a continuing active role in not just encouraging but insisting that Japan and South Korea work more closely together and get along better. And that the longer this process goes on, it's not only bad for both countries, but it's very bad for the United States. And I know there's an enormous risk that somehow this will be misperceived, but I believe just simply a diplomatic effort that underscores that we want two of our best friends in the world to get along better is in our better strategic interests. And I think the general care about kind of not trying to play a role encouraging this process beyond the excellent first step of the president's meeting in the Hague, I think that's something that we should think about carefully, thank you. Thank you, Kim. Yeah, from the perspective of South Koreans, we definitely want to see more of cooperation taking place between the United States and China. If the relationship exacerbates, there is a possibility for two countries to settle with the status quo rather than supporting unification. I mean, if you think about Cold War rivalry, when the Cold War temperature was at its height, the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States over Europe had been quite stable. I mean, they were happy with the status quo because the balance of interest was there because the stake was too high. The leader side was willing to push the other too hard. So because of the unpredictability of the outcome of the unification process, I think if the relationship between the two countries exacerbates, we worry that the two countries might prefer status quo. So we definitely want more of cooperation. And we like to arbitrate the relationship between the two countries, but the problem is that we only have a limited, wherewithal, with which we can do that. We don't really have leverage. So one of the suggestions is actually made by Madam President Park to establish some sort of multilateral security channels framework in the region so we can discuss cooperation on some of the easy issues, not these intractable traditional security issues. By cooperating on these non-traditional easy issues, we can cultivate the habit of cooperation. And maybe with this trust and with the habit of cooperation, we can apply this trust to a more intractable traditional security problems in the region. Just if I can talk a little bit about the worsening situation between South Korea and Japan. Well, overall, we've been talking to Chinese that you got the only country that can pressurize your North Koreans into dismantling nuclear weapons. My suggestion is, I don't know, it's not my suggestion, my perception is that the United States is the only country that has the leverage over Japan and then some sort of pressurizing Japanese into adopting a correct view of history. I mean, there are two different issues at stake here. One is Japanese move to have self-defense, right? I think it's doable. I mean, it's a worrisome, but for sovereign country like Japan to move toward having self-security, right? It's, there's nothing we can say about this. I mean, it may be actually good in the context of rise of China in Northeast Asia region, but for Japanese to distort the history issues and practicing what I would call creative history. I mean, if you're national leaders, I mean, you can practice creative history in your bedroom, but for these national leaders to practice creative history in public place, it has consequences and repercussions. So only what the United States can do is to sort of pressurize Japanese into adopting correct view of history. Well, that can be, that is the topic of a whole other conference that I'm sure that we could have at some point, but let me just say that on behalf of our two American presenters, I know both of them have worked very hard behind the scenes to not necessarily pressurize Japan, but to try to improve as best they can the trilateral relationship among the three countries, and I wanna thank them for that. Just so, just to close this panel in the day's events, let me first thank all of our panelists for joining us. They're all very busy individuals and some of them have become a very long way to join us. Over the course of the day, I think we've had a lot of different discussions on unification and different angles to it. Let me just offer, in closing, five quick points. And I do mean that they're quick, five quick points about thinking about unification as a bonanza or a jackpot, or thinking about it in the future. The first is a historical point, and that is that we talk a lot about unification, but I think the thing to remember is that division of the Korean Peninsula is a historical aberration. That when the history of this is written, it will be remembered that this 60 or 70 year period when South Korea grew dramatically and became a liberal democracy and a beacon of advanced industrial society in this part of the world, East Asia, it will be remembered as that, but it will also be remembered as a very aberrant period in Korean history because the actual history of Korea is one as a unified nation. So that's the first point. The second is a political point, and that is, and it was mentioned in some of the earlier panels as well as in this panel. When we think about unification politically, we should not think about it as being the extreme point. In this sense, what I mean by that is ideologically extreme point. Questions of unification, questions of North Korea and human rights have always been sort of pushed to the far right end of the spectrum, if you will. And I think what President Park's speech and what the discussion here today has shown is that it isn't something that is solely the preoccupation of one particular part of the ideological spectrum. It is increasingly becoming much more of the middle of our discussions on policy and politics. Third on security, and this is in part inspired by something Ambassador Roy said, when you think about unification and security, we don't want the solution to become the problem. In other words, if we think unification is the solution, we have to work extra hard to ensure that the unintended consequences, the negative externalities, do not come back and bite us in the backside. We don't want 18th century balance of power politics to be what comes to East Asia after unification. We want 21st century security community to sort of be the way we think about Asia. Fourth on economics, we had a lot of discussion about profit and margins and all this that comes with unification. And I think that's a very important part of thinking about unification. But it's not just about profit, it's also about overall growth and overall reduction of poverty. And what I mean there is essentially that we know that South Korean economy will take a hit when unification comes. But in the longer term perspective, growth of the peninsula will accelerate dramatically. This was Mark Nolan's point from the first session. And most importantly, poverty reduction of the entire Korean Peninsula will be dramatic. And that leads to the fifth and the last point, which is that we talk about unification as a bonanza for Americans, for South Koreans, potentially for Japanese or Chinese or others. But we have to remember the real... I think it's four o'clock, they've just turned it off. The lights go next. Sorry. The parking meter is all... Remember, that's the biggest winner for unification are gonna be the North Korean people. They will be the biggest winners and that needs to be communicated and conveyed to them. So with that, first let me thank our organizers and sponsors of the NRCS. As well as the Korea Institute for National Unification, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, as well as the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Train. I want to especially thank two of our members of the Korean delegation that did not join us on the stage but have been participating. Dr. Chun, if you will, from the Blue House who's joined us. As well as... As well as the President for the Clean Political Science Association, please take... Dr. Kim, please take a bow. We shall also say thank you to Victor as well. I think Ambassador Ahn started off by talking about how we are the dream team panelists around the day. Let me just say that you've been a dream. Thank you all for joining us.