 Mark Schlag, the host of Think Tech Hawaii's Law Across the Sea program. Today, we're going to look across the sea at the China-Taiwan-U.S. puzzle and ask Margaret Lewis to try to put the pieces together. Margaret Lewis is a professor of law at Seton Hall University in Newark, New Jersey. Professor Lewis has exceptional personal experience and professional knowledge of China and Taiwan, including being a Fulbright senior scholar at National Taiwan University, studying at the Hopkins Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies in Nanjing, China, and her current scholarly research, which focuses on law in China and Taiwan with an emphasis on criminal justice and human rights. And I'd like to welcome Professor Lewis. How are you? Good to see you. I'm good. Thanks. Coming at you from across the Pacific in Oregon, I was just at the coast the other day, so I could wave. And you are a professor at Seton Hall in New Jersey. So you're going across all the continent of the United States. But a lot of your time has focused on China and Taiwan. And I want to ask you first, the personal question, how did you get so deeply interested in China and Taiwan? And I mean, when I described your background, that was just a small part of it. What got you interested in China and Taiwan? I am a deep believer in people-to-people relations because that's what got me into this in the first place. I'm originally from Madison, Wisconsin. And when I was 10 years old, a Chinese woman from Shanghai lived with my family because she had been brought over through a program arranged through the UW to teach Chinese in one of the local high schools. And she needed a host family for various reasons. We ended up being that family. And it really was an amazing experience. She had had a tremendously difficult life in many ways, having been raised and during the Cultural Revolution and time after. And so I got interested in China. I started studying Chinese. I was an East Asian studies major in my undergrad years. And then I first went to China in 1995 on an exchange program, spending time in Beijing, Nanjing, and then a spring at Fudan University in Shanghai. So that's where it all began. You know, it's amazing to hear that. I mean, so many synchronistic instances, people meeting people affect the rest of our lives. And we could probably talk for hours just about that. But I want to focus now on the shifting relationship between China, Taiwan, and the United States. I am really puzzled. I mean, I've enjoyed China going to Shanghai and different places within China over the years. And it seemed like only a few years ago that China and the United States were moving closer, both socially and economically. Now it seems like China and the United States are enemies. And that war over China's goal of bringing Taiwan under its control seems increasingly possible. And I want to ask you, what happened? Why? Well, you are confused with good reason. It's a complicated situation. As I said, I first went to China in 1995. I didn't go to Taiwan until a decade later. And when I first did that, it was, at that point, there weren't direct flights across the strait. You had to go via Hong Kong or another route. And I went at that point because I was studying domestic legal reforms in Taiwan with my dear friend, teacher, mentor, Jerry Cohen, who just turned 93 last week. So a happy birthday to Jerry Cohen. And at that point, Taiwan-U.S. relations were pretty quiet. And certainly it was seen by a lot of people as kind of questioning me why was I spending time on Taiwan when all the action was to look at China. But I'm grateful that I started going that during the Chen Shui-bian presidency and only a decade after the first direct presidential election and still some of the vestiges of martial law were in place because I've seen over the last 15-plus years just how much has changed domestically in Taiwan. But as you note, also just tremendous changes in U.S.-China relationships, as well as the triangular Beijing, Taipei, and D.C. dynamics. And I think there's many drivers for that. And one is that we have since Xi Jinping came into power. But even before that, and I think looking back to around the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and the rollout of security technology and greater surveillance, we started feeling even then in our work looking at, did I say, we academics and people in NGOs who were working on various programs with our counterparts in China, whether it be on death penalty reforms or social society involvement, that there was a chill starting and that we've had a more repressive turn. And that has only been ramped up in the last five-plus years as Xi Jinping not just consolidated power but really took center stage and sort of the collective leadership we were used to went diminished even further. So I think the greater repression in China, certainly Taiwan watched so closely as the last few years in Hong Kong and the national security law coming in there and a real erosion, if not destruction in some ways of civil liberties and civil and political rights. That's been something that has caused more of a cleavage across the straight. The U.S., we saw tensions growing under Obama but then under the Trump administration, whether it be tensions with respect to trade, which were huge, greater wariness about the buildup of China's military capabilities and what that meant in the South China Sea and elsewhere. So just a number of reasons that these relationships are much more fraught and the U.S. and China are certainly competitive. I hope they're not enemies. I wouldn't say that framing, but it is a very challenging relationship today. And I expect that to continue for the foreseeable future. Well, OK, and one of the focuses and it's sometimes hard to see it. And that's part of the puzzlement is what is this motivation about annexing Taiwan? What is moving China towards that? It seems like peace and prosperity are a good alternative. And is this something you mentioned, President Xi? Is this President Xi's motivation or is this a Communist Party? Or is this the people of China? What is motivating this focus on bringing Taiwan into China, unifying it with China? And to be clear, the longstanding position of the PRC government has been the one China principle. Taiwan is a part of China. That is not new under Xi Jinping that has been there forever. And that's rooted in historical claims from Beijing that you go back before there was a PRC, before there was a Republic of China, but under the Qing dynasty, which did exercise loose control over Taiwan, really starting from the late 17th century. And then in 1895, for the treaty buffs, you had the air and get some law in there, international law, the Treaty of Shimenoseki. And this is when the Qing dynasty handed Taiwan over to the Japanese. There are arguments from people take a position more in line with the PRC government that that was an unfair treaty. It should not be respected, but just not just acknowledging that argument, not necessarily subscribing to it for the then the next 50 years. Japan colonized Taiwan. And it's very interesting because you still see that influence in the buildings, architecture and cultural affinities. And then it was only after World War Two that this real issue then came up about what was the status of Taiwan. And of course, at the same time, you had the civil war going on across the strait and then ultimately, Shanghai Shek and the KMT, the Kuomintang government, moving over to Taipei and and doing so in a way that they set up a martial law extremely repressive. And, you know, people that were already in Taiwan, many of them suffered greatly under the white terror, as it was known, thousands died. And but all along the PRC then said Taiwan is a part of of of our territory. Now, where the US comes in is the US has what's called the one China policy policy and principle here being very different. And the US, especially this became a huge issue when in the 1970s, the US switched recognition, formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China government to the People's Republic of China. And, you know, what would that mean for Taiwan? And ever since then, and with the setting up of the Taiwan Relations Act, we've had this relationship that is it's unique. And I think unique is an overused word, but there's really no other relationship like that that we see between the US and Taiwan, where it is not a formal diplomatic relationship, but a very, very close one. But what's critical here is when the US switched recognition to the PRC, the United States acknowledged the position of the PRC government that they they that Beijing took the position that Taiwan was a part of China. But the US did not recognize, endorse, you know, that position. So the US has always said, you know, we are not taking an official stance on this status of Taiwan. At the same time, under the Taiwan Relations Act, the US government made commitments to help support Taiwan, including with arms of defensive nature. And we've existed with this status quo, this kind of strange, no ambiguous zone for many decades. And it's been durable and worked quite well, but that is under strain. And it's unclear going forward, sort of how resilient that status quo structure is. I will just add that, you know, the people of Taiwan, you know, this is there's 23 million people who call Taiwan home. And polling shows that the majority favor keeping the status quo. I mean, that's a majority. This is people who are very aware of the challenging the position they're in. So maybe they would choose differently. If I know there were rainbows and butterflies and unicorns and they could have everything they want. But in general, just to that, the people of Taiwan say, you know, it's it's maybe an odd arrangement in some ways. It's certainly not your traditional structure, but the status quo has has worked in many ways. OK, so you've helped me a little bit to understand there. There's and let's put up a map of Taiwan and it right. I mean, it's so close to mainland China. And what I hear you saying and correct me if I'm wrong, is that basically we have the United States and China and have a competition going on just between themselves as countries. But then the Taiwan issue, China sees unification as the right thing to do. I mean, historically, it's a little different than just strict competition. It is. The proper or we would say in Hawaii, Pono, the right thing to do, the right thing to to get back Taiwan to China. And it because it was taken improperly and it was abused. And and so is that is that a correct? Am I seeing that correctly? Though those two issues, one is just a natural competition between two major economic countries. And the other is is a historical issue about doing the right thing. I don't know. Yeah, it's really doing the right thing, just that the PRC position being it is the thing like that that Taiwan is a part of China. Period, full stop underscore end of conversation. Like that is just a non-negotiable point. You know, and I would just add with that, you know, that, you know, of course, too, since World War Two and there was Japan gave up Taiwan, there's some ambiguity about and what it went to. But of course, since World War Two, we've had decolonization around the world. We've had the rise of the emphasis on self-determination as a fundamental human right. And so there's historical aspects to this. But there's also, you know, someone who studies human rights. Just what should those 23 million people what say should they have in their future, not just in who they say is their president. We have an election coming up in January in Taiwan. But this emphasis and the U.S. does recognize this as part of their one China policy. And it came in to the language of the one China policy under Clinton that any changes in the cross-strait relationship should be done with the ascent of the Taiwanese people. They have a democracy and their future is something that they should determine. Well, they're there. Yeah. So there's conflicting what the right thing to do is amongst the different countries. And you mentioned two things that I want to ask you about. First of all, you mentioned that the Taiwanese people, how they feel about it. Do you have any idea about how the people of mainland China feel about the unification? Is there any is there any way to gauge that? It's much easier to do polling in Taiwan. And, you know, I'm not Taiwanese. I care deeply about my friends there, you know, don't want to speak for them. But I do feel confident that we have good polling in Taiwan. Some polls better than others, but but that's there. Much harder to get that sort of information from China. There's not the openness where academics can just come over from the U.S. or whoever and start asking questions for data driven work. And we've also had a much harder time, of course, going to China because of the pandemic and this traffic of academics, people from think tanks is only starting to pick up slowly. And I have high hopes that that will gain more momentum because we need that kind of contact. That said, I feel confident in saying that I think if you asked, you know, people in China, they would say that Taiwan is a part of China. And that is something that has been so much a part of the the government's position of education from the time they opened a textbook as kindergartners, that that is that is fundamental to a widespread view. People might vary and what they think should be done to effectively bring Taiwan under the control of the PRC government, sort of what risks, what costs they're willing to bear. That I just don't have a good sense of that texture because we haven't been able to do the work to really get reliable information on a widespread scale. OK, all right. Now, you also mentioned the presidential election coming up in Taiwan. Now, how is that affecting this issue? Is that being talked about? Is there forces on both sides talking about the unification matter with mainland China in Taiwan in the presidential election process? We have. Yes. So first of all, there's a long way between now and January 13th, which is going to be the election. Taiwan politics are never dull. And so I'm kind of hesitant to say too much because, especially because two of the three candidates and it is a three way race have had to say basically nothing because they've been focused only on domestic politics. So the KMT, their candidate, Ho-Yo-Wee, is the mayor of New Taipei City, Shenzhen, and when you're the mayor, you don't really have to say what's going on with Beijing or D.C. And so this is new. But the KMT in general has tried to paint the DPP, the party that is currently in power under Tsai Ing-wen, as being destabilizing and making it more likely there's going to be a conflict. The DPP, which has been in power for the past eight years under President Tsai Ing-wen, she cannot run for a third term. The person running for the DPP is Lai Qingde, William Lai, the current vice president, who traditionally was seen as perhaps, we would say, deeper green, which means that he was more associated with the pro-independence under the name of Taiwan kind of platform. But he has increasingly made clear he is quite moderate. He's very close to the president's size position, though Beijing, I don't think trust that. And then the third candidate is the former mayor of Taipei, and that is Mayor Ko, Ko En-chou, who has created his own party that is trying to emphasize that it's very pragmatic. And listen, hey, we want to get things done. Because also Taiwan has tons of issues that needs to deal with that have nothing to do with China, very little energy. They import close to 100 percent of their energy needs. Demographic pyramids been inverted and the lowest birth rate in the world, which puts huge pressures on the society. So Taiwan has a lot of problems to deal with that have nothing to do with Beijing. As well. And is Beijing trying to influence, you know, who gets elected? Is there any idea? Not openly, right? And they wouldn't just say, like, here's who we want to have elected. There is great concern about both disinformation and misinformation. To what extent it's people just having wrong information that's coming from Beijing and putting it out there as compared with more nefarious motives of trying to purposely create confusion and even false information about candidates. There's some a lot of NGOs as well as government sponsored work that's trying to look at this to make sure that the election is free and fair and widely believed to be so, not just actually so by the populace. But there's I think it's safe to say that Lai Qingde and the DPP would not be the preferred outcome of of Beijing. But it's sort of unclear. I think I'm hesitant to say at this point, where in the whole yo-wee and and Coenjo, like where they're coming out. But I'm going to be in Taipei in less than two weeks. So I'll put my ear to the ground and see what I can find out. OK, now you you were a member of an independent task force for the Council on Foreign Relations that recently issued a report titled US Taiwan Relations in a New Era, responding to more assertive China. What was that about? Why did it come about? What were the key findings and recommendations of the task force report? And we got up on the screen, the link to that task force report. Yes. And if you Google CFR Taiwan, you'll be taken to it. It's readily accessible. I first say that I'm a member of the Council on Foreign Relations as well as on this task force that had about I think 17 of us chaired by Sue Gordon and Mike Mullen, both amazing experts in intelligence and the military and the program. The project director, David Sacks, has tremendous background in studying Taiwan, so it was a great group to work with. And but the CFR itself does not take any positions on policy. This was very much an independent group of experts coming up with our views. And and it was complex. And you'll see that in the report that there's a number of additional views, partial dissents, I issued one because there is so much texture and debate about these these issues. We all agreed as a group to that the one China policy was that was the way to go, that the US should continue to continue that policy, which has some wiggle room and that can have strong relations. But but that the US does not take a position on the ultimate status of Taiwan. Taiwan has agency. We support that. But at the same time, being very clear that the task force felt it was critical that the US needs to stand up against the use of force and coercion. So not just showing up landing on the shores of Taiwan, but the gray zone tactics that we're seeing, the increase in flight activity around Taiwan by PLA that the PRC military forces shows of how the PRC could eventually perhaps use a blockade or other ways to quarter to make it so Taiwan was inaccessible. So making this combination of having a military presence that could deter help to deter any more aggressive actions by the PRC. But I and others as well as the task force in general, but I emphasize this in an additional view, the importance of the diplomatic side that you don't just need military deterrence, but you also need reassurance that the US policy had not changed and that the US was not taking a position on the ultimate status of Taiwan. And that ultimately, I hope that every day that Xi Jinping gets up and decides that it's not a day to take a more forceful stance towards bringing Taiwan under his control is a good day. Well, and when I read the report, it gave me actually was a little scary. It did sound like there was more of a potential for. War or some type of aggressive action by. The China that would get the United States involved. And I mean. So it seemed more possible as a from what I read than I thought originally is is is that is that the general task force. Idea is that the do they believe is that the you concluded? The task force, we coalesced around a sense of unease that, you know, there were factors in all parts in Taiwan and in US and in China that makes only the possibility for conflict more likely than it was even probably five years ago and certainly 10 years ago. This does not mean that a kinetic conflict, but actually military conflict is inevitable war is an if not a win. But it is important that's why we need this combination of diplomatic reassurances as well as military deterrence. There's difficult to figure out where that sweet spot is. But we need to have both of those going side by side. I'd say, too, that the importance of communication, I'm glad to see that we've got now Kerry going over next week, we just had Yellen Blinken, we need to have high level communications. In part because I look back 20 years, I wrote my law school paper on the 2001 EP three collision when the US surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet and that was a that was a crisis. It was walked back. It was dealt with in a way that was resolved peacefully. I do worry that if there was some sort of inadvertent collision, something goes bump in the night, would the US and China be able to deal with that kind of crisis in a way that didn't escalate, especially with, you know, forces, domestic forces on both sides and rising nationalism in China? So so we were, I think, you know, yes, very wary, but at the same time determined that this is a situation that does not have to end in conflict. And there are there is more that can be done on all sides to try to make it so there is diminished likelihood going forward of some sort of really catastrophic event. Well, and I really like what you say about the diplomacy strategy. And I've seen now, to me, very hopeful, these various visits by US government officials to China. And how about Pelosi's visit and other government officials to Taiwan? Is that affected anything with that was that was that was, you know, of course, you know, a lot of there was a strong response from the PRC when that happened. That was not unexpected. You know, they were going to do that. I think, you know, one thing that was interesting was making clear the US making clear to China that Biden doesn't get to tell Pelosi what to do. You know, we have it goes back to Schoolhouse Rock and separation of powers. And, you know, and this is this is not, you know, it's a different situation over here with respect to who gets to tell what who what they can and can't do. I think overall, the lessons from that, though, and this is very clear in the Task Force report is to be cautious when it comes to symbolic gestures. You know, yes, it feels good. And I want deep in my heart for people who identify as Taiwanese to come to the US and fly the flag that they consider their own and do these things. But at the same time, you know, when it comes to sort of what what is the representative of the government and Taiwan government in the US called, you know, well, that, you know, is that something that you want to say? It should be ambassador. If that's going to provoke Beijing in a way that what are we really gaining? So one message that we had is to think carefully about policy and US Taiwan policy that you're focused on substance, stronger economic ties, making sure that you have a resilient Taiwan, not just their military, but the populace, you know, what are the things that are going to keep semiconductors supply chains in place? You know, that's what really matters. And to not let sort of the momentary like let's throw that into legislation make it so that we're taking what is a very challenging situation and fueling perhaps, you know, some dynamics that that are not going to be productive. You know, I like your personal insights into both China and Taiwan. And we have about a minute left in our program. Is there something you'd like to let Americans know about Taiwan and its citizens and China and its citizens and the potential to work together and live in peace and security going forward? I had two things. So with Taiwan, I really think that I'm delighted to see more stories focusing on the domestic joys and triumphs in Taiwan. Taiwan has the Constitutional Court demanded that there be same sex marriage. There was a recent ruling that requires that people who are in same sex couples be allowed to adopt from outside the relationship. I mean, it is a really vibrant overuse for Taiwan, but it is a vibrant society and so much more than just the security issues that dominate the news with China. I think there, too, I hope that we're going to get more tourism or people going. I have deep, deep affection for my friends there. And one thing that I've been working on is a whole other topic for another time. But I am worried that the tensions in U.S.-China relations have made it so that people who identify as Chinese heritage in the United States have faced greater bias, xenophobia. And not only is that just flat out wrong because we shouldn't treat people in any particular way based on where they're from, where their ancestors are from. But I also just think, you know, when we think about the U.S. and I hope the U.S. has a strong science and technology going forward, that that's driven in a significant part by welcoming the best and brightest minds from all over the world. And I really hope that we can continue to do that as a society. Well, I really like your insight and your views. And obviously, you feel deeply about this. I can tell you're passionate about China and Taiwan. Thank you, Professor Margaret Lewis, for your insights and your discussion today. We greatly appreciate it. Give us a lot to think about. Well, thank you so much for inviting me. I really, really enjoyed the talk. Aloha. Thank you so much for watching Think Tech Hawaii. If you like what we do, please click the like and subscribe button on YouTube. You can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn. Check out our website, thinktechawaii.com. Mahalo.