 Thank you, Rob. Well, hello. I'm Andrew Shen, Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Global Institute, University of Hong Kong. Welcome to INET Live Climate Debates. This session will discuss the elephants in the room. How will US-China climate relations play out? This is a very exciting topic in the run-up to COP26 in Glasgow next month, sorry, in November. And joining us today, Andre Marqu, founder and executive director of the European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition, as well as Kevin Tu, Senior Advisor on China to Agora Anagevende. Welcome, both of you. Let's start by asking Andre to give his views on the climate debate, particularly the role of US-China relations. Andre? Andrew, thank you very much and thank you for the invitation. This is a heck of a topic and it is indeed the elephant in the room. The elephant in the room is nothing else because of the size of the economies of the world, but also in terms of the emissions that they contribute. EU is done now slip to under 10% together. These two giant economic giants account for about 40% of emissions or some what they're about. So that is not a minor, but also the geopolitics in this keep changing and that is not indifferent when it comes to climate. Climate is, we all may agree on what to do with the climate. Everybody would agree to save the planet. The question is, when I was CEO of AIDA, I had a board member, a Brazilian, who said there's an 11th commandment who pays the bill. And in the end, there is this little matter of the energy matrix and how the energy matrix affects development, how that the energy matrix affects competitiveness of the country. Now, there have been differences. I'm not the greatest China hand. My former boss, my former boss and mentor, Mori Strong, had lived in China and had taught me a few things about China. So I come from that school of thought. But all I know is that there have been at least in the climate development, there's been different stages, some of them been more indifferent, some of them more adversarial, some of them been more cooperative. Clearly in Copenhagen, where we had tried to replicate the Kyoto Protocol and go down the same pattern, there hasn't been the greatest cooperation. But then the Paris agreement was really made, as they say, on PBS, made possible by a great Antonin cooperation between the US and China. The US played an important role, of course, but there's no denying that China-US cooperation had played a key role. I'm not in that category, but one could not miss on the floor the chemistry and the dynamics between the US and the leading US and Chinese negotiator. Now, also, as you have mentioned, when the US pulled out of the Paris agreement, China did play a constructive role together with Canada and the EU to keep this going. And they have been quite successful. Everybody has taken the lead. But there are a number of things that really come into play now. And this is from the EU point of view. I will look at a few things. At least, I'm not speaking for the EU. I'm not speaking for the Commission. I'm speaking for a think tank in Brussels. But I would look at it from a number of view. First of all, carbon markets have played an important role in getting China involved. The clean development mechanism has had China. Some people call it the China development mechanism because China was at an overwhelming presence in that market. But it also created that problem from people thinking this is a great idea until they figure out that some European companies were paying their competitors in the chemical industry and other industries in China for offsets that were then used to compete with them. So, that did create some resentment. And we can still see that every time you bring up the CDM in the EU, that's a problem. And I don't think it's divorced from that. The second part of it is this Paris Agreement and the promise of the Paris Agreement, which we regard as symmetric, because we're all brothers, but everybody's moving at their own speed, according to the National Determination Contribution. So, we look at the Americans, we look at the Chinese, and we say, great, they are promising all kinds of things, but they're promising sometime in the future. But as I said, in the long term, we're all dead. So, before we get the long term, we got to get in the 20s and early 30s. And in this case, competitiveness and carbon leakage is an important point. So, a significant goal post is the carbon border adjustment mechanism, the border carbon adjustment that the EU is proposing to introduce. Now, that's an interesting concept. It has tried to introduce it before through international aviation, and it had to withdraw from that basically in the face of international pressure. But nevertheless, now they seem quite determined. The theory that we hold is that the EU in the end is going to be a very hard press to do this alone, it's going to have to find cooperation with one of two out of three, at the minimum, three out of three is best, but two out of three is a necessity. So, but we've seen China being fairly negative. I mean, the reaction from China has been very strong and very negative, saying this is environmental protectionist and this is not the right approach. We've seen the US also taking the same approach. So, so far, this has not been a very successful in, if you want, in attracting support, but it is a cornerstone of the EU policy allowing it to go to 55% in 2030 and then rapidly toward carbon neutrality. The second piece that is interesting is the last piece that's left of the Paris Agreement or the Paris Agreement Rulebook, which is the Article 6 Rulebook, which is carbon markets or international cooperation, including carbon market. It's quite interesting in there and looking at the dynamism because nobody can figure out why these guys can reach an agreement. You know, some people bring Brazil, other people blame, I don't know, EU intransigence. And we're looking at that. If I were to look at the dynamics between the EU, China and the US, I think the EU takes a very intransigent view. I mean, they really would like to have something really, really, really very, very, very, very strict. I see the US being more pragmatic and having, you know, if the American pragmatist, Yankee Doodle, and so on, they're much more pragmatic in how they approach this. And we see China taking a very interesting position in some cases, in some cases, basically going into a G77 group and in some cases taking an LMDC group, like-minded group of countries. So it's quite an interesting dynamic. And I think that in the end, you know, when China and the US will fall, if you want, align themselves and the trio between US, China and the EU will manage to get their position a little bit more synchronized, that is going to be telling, and we'll be able to move this agenda. We see the announcement that was made at the United Nations by the President of China, which is very promising. So we think that the EU really has bet quite a lot on maintaining a good relation and the climate diplomacy relation with China and the US. We look at the EU having put a lot of resources in cooperation with China on climate change. The US, it's been out, it's been seen a little bit now, it's quite positive, but a bit more stable, if you want, relationship when it comes to climate change. If you look at the period of the last 15 years, that would be kind of a view from here, but it is driven by cooperation, Andrew, but it's also driven by the harsh reality that climate change and how we address climate change and the speed with which climate change has an impact on the economic future of this continent. Thank you very much, Andre. That's very helpful. If I may very quickly sum up, you see that actually EU playing a very crucial role in the relations between US and China and so the three-party relationship on how the outcome of this will shape the future of the COP26. This is very good indeed. Well, I'm going to invite Kevin, but unfortunately, he's lost his connection. Kevin, are you there? No, we have an unstable connection at the moment for Kevin, but let me, Andre, while also waiting for Kevin to join. Andre, the issue as I see it, the joke always was when in Asia that when elephants fight, the grass gets trampled, but they also get trampled when the elephants make love. I mean, so the smaller economies are really caught by all this. And so are you fundamentally positive about COP26 or do you feel that things may end up with more of the same as it was? Andre, it is a difficult question because it is a difficult moment. Look, in many cases, even in the corporate sector, they're all very good friends and all wanted to move forward on climate change, but now they got down to brass tacks and they really realized this competition and substitution and so on. So yes, there is love, but at some point you realize that life is getting very real. I think the same thing happens in Glasgow. I think that we are now getting beyond the rhetoric and we see the harsh reality of what this means. It doesn't mean that one has to be negative to be realistic and we see what it means. I mean, it means it will mean it's not 100 percent this, but it is high energy prices in the EU right now. I mean, if there's anything that people's blood up right now is, I don't know, they'd want to talk about football, but they talk about what they're going to pay for electricity. Now, carbon is not the only part. It is a portion of that. There's dynamics in the other energy commodities, but it's something that people in everyday life will attribute to that. So it's a difficult environment and that is compounded in a very serious way by the negotiating circumstances or the discussion circumstances where people, which are usually huddling with each other and I don't know, patting each other in the back, are going to be told to sit a meter and a half apart from each other. I think it's not really unrealistic if you know the negotiator. So I think it's a difficult environment. I don't know what the percentages are. The only thing that I do know is that we had a good success in Paris because we had a good presidency and Minister Fabius and the French presidency had a very good job. I mean, I can't say enough good things about how well they did. And UK diplomacy is something that they've been doing now for a few hundred years. And I have great hopes that the UK diplomacy is going to be able to, as they say in Canada, stick handle this whole thing through not an easy environment. Good. Kevin, can you switch on your mic, please? Your turn to say a few words on your view on where the US-China relations are going. Okay. Before I talked about US-China relations, I would like to talk about the Chinese energy economies in general against the backdrop of a global pandemic. Chinese economy actually grew by 2.3 percent year over year in 2020 because of this discrepancy, China's share of global carbon emissions increased from about 29 percent in 2019 to 31 percent last year. So this number alone explains why it's important for China to be part of global energy transition and also net zero emissions agenda. However, whenever we look at the climate policy in China, we need to examine where China is nowadays. Because from the perspective of many advanced economy, it's very difficult to consider China as a typical developing country for various reasons, such as the size of the economy, the second largest one in the world, the size of the energy sector, the largest one in the world. However, if we look at many per capita indicators, especially energy-accessed one, China still has near 400 million people who don't have access to cooking fuel. So that's not what we expect to witness in a typical advanced economy. So that's why I personally categorize China as the first-ever hybrid superpower in the modern era. In other words, China sits right in the middle of the developing country block and the developed country block. This is very important to understand China's climate policy. For instance, back in September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to peak China's national carbon emissions before 2030 and then achieve carbon neutrality before 2016. This 30-60% energy could internally be explained by China's hybrid superpower status. If we look at the Chinese decision makers, they grew up in a year. The country is a real developing country, so they do have the so-called developing country mentality. So that's why it's very difficult for China to directly commit to climate neutrality pledge as the OECD countries. So the country needs 10 years of buffer time to pick its national carbon emissions. However, if we look at what will happen in 10 years, China will become high-income countries according to World Bank standard, and the newer generation leadership will have more superpower mentality. So that's why by 2016, China will achieve carbon neutrality. So we need to remember China is a hybrid economy sitting right in the middle between developing country and advanced economy. Then I would like to touch upon the EUCBM. If we look at the EUCBM from the perspective of the European Union, it makes sense because the bloc has the highest carbon pricing in the entire world, more than 50 euros per tons of carbon dioxide emissions. If you look at other parts of the world, if you keep its carbon pricing higher and higher, then the so-called carbon leakage will become inevitable. However, if we look at the perspective from China, China actually is in a rather difficult position. On the one hand, the country still considers itself as a developing country, which is difficult to be accepted by either EU or United States. But on the other hand, if we look at what will be down the road, China has already kicked off its own national carbon emission trading scheme. Although the current carbon pricing level is not very high, but sooner or later it will mimic the trajectory of other advanced economies. Then if we look at the surrounding regions, none of them could easily commit to either climate and neutrality or net zero emissions targets. We are talking about those developing countries such as India or Vietnam. Then sooner or later, China will also face the so-called carbon leakage threat. If China want to keep a significant portion of its manufacturing capacity, sooner or later the country need to work with the European Union on a global carbon pricing package. The last issue I would like to point out, which is actually related to U.S.-China relations. On September 22nd, actually, Chinese President Xi Jinping just pledged to stop finance of overseas greenfield coal-fired power plants. This is actually a quite big news for the international community. However, it's quite interesting to observe. Again, China made such a big commitment without making any political concession from counterparts such as the European Union or United States. If we look at what happened during the Obama era, the willingness for China to work with the United States to conclude Paris Agreement actually had led to a bad overall U.S.-China relations. But this is not the case nowadays. China had made several major political concessions in the climate front without anything in return in the area of U.S.-China relations. Of course, on the one hand, this is next, the increasingly complicated U.S.-China relations. But on the other hand, I don't believe this situation is sustainable if U.S.-China relations keep deteriorating over time. I'm not entirely sure there will be enough momentum to sustain all the climate efforts when it will be made by China until now. I will just stop here. For some reason, they unmuted me. The issue now is that the basic U.S.-China difference, as I see it, is that the Chinese want a total package, whereas the Americans prefer an al-Aqat, cooperation on climate change and containment and competition on everything else, which is not going to be easy to negotiate. So that's where the big picture is. I am pleased to hear that President Biden say in the United Nations that there will be no Cold War, and hopefully that is the case. But obviously, if there were areas of agreement in COP26 between U.S. and China, and particularly the EU playing a very important sort of moderating role, as it were, then you'll be a very good way forward. But as you know, as Kevin, you said, the China is a hybrid country, it's part of it is very advanced income, and part of it is very, very backward still. And so you take somebody like India, India's position is quite hard-line. In the sense, hard-line, to be fair to India, if they were to be able to meet all these conditions, their GDP would be actually quite hurt from the conventional perspective. So how do you see the negotiations, these elephants coping with the newer emerging elephants or the emerging market dealing with the situation? Andre, maybe you would have a crack at it, since you've negotiated on behalf of emerging markets. Well, again, this is Andrew getting into higher politics here to some degree, but I will give you my two cents. My observation is that in general, China is trying to stay within alliances in the climate change. I will not comment about other areas of the world, but when I see China, I see China being very solidarity and being very careful not to bring G77 solidarity, and also to look at other groups that it's being parked off with the major developing countries, with the LNDCs. So it is getting into a number of these alliances, and not being in a position to go alone at it. That is my impression. I think that it really has been, to some degree, in certain areas, a strong voice. In other areas, it has come in, and sometimes being a stronger voice, like in markets, in Article 6, it has been a stronger voice. Sometimes it's been a more muted voice. It has a certain points that would like to tactically support, because I think it is, again, in this coalition. On issues like border carbon adjustments, for instance, which is the only issue that you see, the only place where you see this in the UNFCCC, it's a very esoteric copy called the Sponses Measures. It's a very political thing. China is a strong voice. It's one of the leaders of the G77 when you see them getting together. My sense is that China is playing a strong and will be a very strong voice in Glasgow. I would, you know, where it will fall on these issues. I think you referred to this a la carte, which I've also independently also read this in other places, but this a la carte approach, where this is acceptable to the people's Republic of China, is something that, as we know, they will do what is the interest of China. At this time, my sense is that the EU is playing, wants to play the role of being the champion, so the EU is going to run up the hill with the flag and then look behind and see where this duo of the US and China are having a powwow and discussing how we're going to do this, guys, and then make a decision whether they follow up or not. I think the EU is going to be difficult to move this alone. I mean, 10% of the global emissions, even with a very big market, my view is very difficult to move the world, so they will always have to look over the shoulder and see if these two as a giant are following. I'm not sure what the EU is from Beijing, Kevin, but that's the way I would say it. Kevin, maybe would you like to respond to that? So I would like to share a few of my own thoughts on this issue. So first, if we look at the prospects of reaching Paris Agreement goal, we really need international collaborations. We talk about international collaborations. We are talking about not only advanced economies such as the US and the EU, we are not only talking about emerging economies such as China, we are also talking about those developing countries with rising carbon emissions, such as the India and the Asian countries. So that's why we need to find a way to really to encourage all those countries or those economic blocs to work with each other instead of undermining each other on some key issues and hopefully wishing those countries and the blocs to work on a single political issues. In this case, the climate change. So if we look at the mentality of decision makers in China, there's a rising uncertainty about China's climate pledge. The reason is quite simple because China's quite a unique political system, whatever have been pledged by Chinese president, it needed to be observed by not only the current administration, but also the administration after the current one, maybe also the next one after the next one. However, if we look at the track record in certain western countries, they have made a U-turn, some not only Paris Agreement and also Kyoto Protocol. So this is where the anxiety of Chinese decision makers comes from, because once China make a commitment, then the government will expect and need to deliver in the end. So far, China's track record to meet international climate commitment have been relatively good. So that's why we need to understand this type of mentality of Chinese decision makers. And in this regard, if you could find a way to encourage or even pressurize China and the United States to work not only on climate change, but also on some other quite pressing ones, such as the pandemic control is a shame. The largest economy in the world cannot even work together on pandemic control. This is a real shame. So that's why although climate change is very important, we shouldn't forget there are many other pressing issues. You should encourage US and China to work together instead of undermining each other. Through such approach, if US and China could be either encouraged or to be pressurized by the international community to work on more and more pressing issues with global interest in mind, then the world could become a better place. Well, basically what both of you are saying is that the trust issue is very critical. Okay. I mean, it's not just trust between the three of them, but also trust with the rest of the world. I mean, you know, how do we deliver what we promise and then not upset the trust factor between them? There's a very good question that's come out and I think there's more addressed to, I mean, both of you, I guess, which impulses do you expect from the new German administration for COP26? Which is a good one because, you know, the German coalition comprises a lot of greens. Andre, what did you start? It's a difficult question because the German coalition, the German government can fall into quite a few coalitions and they can be quite different. To some degree, yes, you can argue that there is a bunching on environmental and climate issues, but I think that there could be quite a difference, you know, depending on the composition of the government. I would think that the German government is not, at least to my understanding, is not enamored with the idea of an adjustment at the water. So it's going to be a carbon adjustment at the water being so dependent on exports and neither is the BDI. Again, speaking for myself, I don't speak for them, but I think that is going to have an impact on EU policy because I think the need to reach other type of accommodation and other type of cooperation as opposed to adjust whether the water is going to be an important thing. So my expectation is that a very green German coalition is going to push hard to reach out to those things in the US and China to ensure that the resulting glass bill is important to them because the last thing they want is they want to get into a trade war. You know, this border adjustment is nobody quite knows how this is going to end up. This is like the old man, the mutual destruction and nobody knows if you unveil the weapon or you build the weapon that you hope you never use. So my expectation is that a strong German coalition with strong environmental leanings, they will all have environmental leanings, but with stronger environmental leanings is going to push very hard for a good result in and in Brazil. That's very good. Kevin, any views? So if we examine the different options of a coalition government after the forthcoming German elections, there is probably 70 to 80 percent of the chance the Green Party will be part of the next German government. However, if we look at whether there is a comprehensive climate strategy that has already been formulated by... Oh, I'm sorry. We lost, sorry. Yeah, we got Kevin back. Carry on. We seem to have lost Kevin in terms of voice. I'm sorry. It's a connection issue. Kevin, can you hear us? No, we seem to have lost connection. Andre, whilst we're waiting for Kevin to come back on, let me ask you your views on whether we will get the fulfilment of the 100 billion climate fund in COP26? I'm sure, yeah, it depends how you count it. That's a good one. You can always get to a number. It depends what you count in and what you count out. I think the sense I have is that there is going to be, I'm not sure there will be 100, but I think there's going to be a real progress towards that number. I think that the developed world, having gone through this crisis of COVID and made substantial outlays of money to maintain, to support the economy, now getting into a situation where there's significant amounts of money being also dedicated to climate change, to the transition, both in Europe and in the US, that is less clear, but it's certainly the bill is there and there is a desire on the part of administration. The only thing that is a little bit confusing, if you wanted the signal, Europe confuses us a little bit, is the fact that there's been pressure on the part of many, including ourselves if you wish, for some of the funds that are being, if you want, a port taken through the adjustment of water or what proposed adjustment of water also be made available for international purposes. Whether that would be to the Green Climate Funds or as a mechanism, but it could be counted toward that commitment. So we would like to see some of the money, especially through this measures that impact other countries to be dedicated to mitigation in an adaptation in developing world, especially even though the SIDS and the LDCs are not included. So that's a little bit slightly contradictory, but the American administration has made it quite clear they're prepared to contribute. They haven't made clear the numbers. The EU is always kind of game and there's contributed to that. So I think we're going to get closer to that number. I'm sure that somebody is going to count 100 billion if they want to, but certainly the direction of travel is going to be on the other side. Kevin, you may need to switch on your mic because I think it's off at the moment. So if you want to finish, if not, we were talking about what are the chances of getting the 100 billion climate fund on the road? So I will talk quickly about EU-CBM. No matter which coalition government will be formulated in Germany after the forthcoming election, it's quite important to deal with the EU-CBM discussion at the EU level because EU-CBM is just like a nuclear weapon in international climate politics. It's in any major economies right to design, to formulate this weapon of mass destruction, but everyone should be extremely careful to actually utilize such an instrument because the devil is always in detail. If it's not appropriately handled, EU-CBM could turn out to be a catalyst for another round of nuclear war. So that's why the next German coalition government should be extremely careful about EU-CBM related agenda. We are regarding the 100 billion US dollar commitment because I have attended many Beijing-based discussion. No one really takes it too serious. First of all, it's not from a public channel. Secondly, the incremental ability of this funding is difficult to ensure. So this issue now makes the international negotiation between developing countries and the advanced economy extremely bitter. If you look through the eyes of those poor African countries, Asian countries, Latin American countries, they have now been committed by the advanced economy for this funding, but they haven't seen enough of them after so many years. So this is really the time for EU to take a need to resolve the ongoing dispute between advanced economy and developing countries. We've talked about government negotiations. What is the role do you see with the private sector in helping to push the adaptation, mitigation, and to what extent would the private sector have a bigger voice in COP26? This is a very, very broad question, but I'd like to hear both of your views. Maybe Kevin, you go first this time. So in terms of adaptation, I would say we need to be a little bit careful because we still need to pay attention to mitigation first. If we focus too much attention to adaptation, this could turn out to be a climate nightmare in the end because every country, especially the advanced economy, puts too much weight on adaptation. So how could the world that is short of funding to deal mitigation issues could resolve the climate crisis and meet the Paris Agreement goals? I think, look, private sector, I started in, I've been the COP in all impersonation if you want, but I started with the private sector in business and I was with the business community, what they call the bingos in the COP. I think there was a heyday of the bingos where I think we're a little bit behind us in terms of really broad participation in certain ways, but in different ways they've really scaled up. And what I mean by that is that we see a lot of companies coming up there, not being observers, but really being, trying to be actors and show that they are ahead of government. Now, is this realistic? Is this what you call gridwashing? I mean, it's both and it's never clear and clean, but it's quite clear that you see many, many companies that are there and they put a lot of time and effort in putting their right foot forward and showing the best face. Why? Because they think that it is a place where they can, if you want, highlight the fact that they are moving, they can move and in a way they are being held by the restraining leash of the government. It is in, you know, you see a lot of commitments being made. You see a lot of investment and people moving forward with investment and technology that in the end will depend on the government's continues to move in the same direction. This train has left the station and if there is a reversal or a slowdown, there are actually going to be a whole bunch of people at this point who are going to be punished because they have made a leap and invested a lot of money. I mean, I'm looking at a lot of the power companies, if you want. We're now beginning to look at a lot of the transportation companies. You know, we're looking at, you know, in my mind, my expectation is that 10, 15 years from now, or maybe sooner, I'm going to have to choose between an electric vehicle made in Munich or in Beijing. I think that that competition is going to become very, very acute and I think companies are really positioning themselves. So from that point of view, there's always companies that will advise a more orderly transition and there is a fear for a disorderly transition, especially in the energy supply chains. You know, what we don't want to see is prices of oil going from 30 to 100. I don't think that's helpful to anybody. I think that we need a stable transition. We need a transition that companies can plan and companies can have the resources to pay for the transition. I mean, it is a big outlay. The governments will put some money down, but a lot of the funds will come from the investment. So companies I think are going to be a positive actor and those that will not be a positive actor are going to be very unwelcome in Glasgow. Let me pose this question from the emerging markets. You know, when you talk about ESG, it's easier for the big multinationals to meet ESG standards, but a lot of emerging markets are finding huge problems. There are no agreed standards. The actual transition at the grass root level, corporate level of ESG standards and SDG standards is a complete mess as I see it. Lots of consultants coming in say, I want to advise you on this, but really they don't know because the standards are not quite there. So in my mind, the private sector is having not enough guidance on how to prepare the projects to help either on the mitigation and on the adaptation. Is that a fair comment? Well, Andrew, it depends. You know, it depends how status you are. And some would argue, always in the transition in an economy, I'm not an economist, I'm a one of the economists, but anyone in transition, you always have this tension between regulation and market forces. And that is a tension between the efficiency of transition, but also the lackability of market forces. So the question is, you know, one of the big issues in Europe right now, which is spreading, I'm not sure how it plays in China. I'm sorry, Kevin, I just don't know. Maybe you can tell us, is this issue of financial taxonomy? And there's some people in the corporate sector who love it. Because my God, I need, as you said, Andrew, I need somebody to tell me what the standards are. I want to make investment and I want somebody to tell me what the standards are, what's sustainable, what qualifies as a sustainable investment. On the other hand, you hear people like, you know, Clement Fuske, the head of I4, big think tank in, you know, the economic think tank of Germany to some degree, basically saying, listen, guys, if you go down this route too fast, you're going to end up with a centrally planned economy. And what you're asking for, you're asking for governments, you're asking for governments to basically to take the risk away for you, because they'll tell you what to invest in and you don't have a risk because you invested what the government tells you. So I think there's a balance that needs to be kept between the two. If you break that balance, it's in one way and there is no standards and there is no guidance. I think the guidance has to come in the format, at least where we come from, and we are a fairly free market think tank. Guidance has to come in the clear direction of march, of walk, what is the direction of walk. But I think that the entrepreneurial spirit and what market forces will discover in the end has brought us this level of prosperity. We see that, you know, we see how China is using markets in a different political system, but using market forces to allow, to some degree, in a very, very good way. And we in Europe here have a fairly mixed economy. It's certainly, it's a much more status, the centralized approach that would be used in North America. So that's, I'm not sure I'm giving you an answer, but giving you a feeling for what the thinking is and what people are watching for. No, that's useful because from the emerging markets at the moment, there is a lot of confusion at the corporate level. I've just participated in a meeting in which everybody vented frustration. They say, we want to move, but there's no guidance anywhere. I'm not even talking about guidance from the government. I'm talking about the guidance from the accounting profession. The securities regulators say, well, just meet them, but how do you meet them? Because, you know, this is a real issue on the ground. And it's practical issues that are very, very important now. How do you? It is not, I mean, it is totally correct because if you take, if you take advanced economies with good infrastructure, good information systems, what have you, and, you know, again, I'm not the China hand, and I can't claim that I know it very well. But, you know, somebody described that you and Kevin described that a little bit of a two-speed with a very, very advanced and very well-to-do part in this part of it, which is less in that, in the same category. But if you look at other countries, which are nowhere, I mean, you know, what you're going to do and go and implement an emission trading system in an LDC, you know, that is a, that's a real toll order. You know, I mean, it took the EU 20 years to do one and get one kind of right, kind of, you know, it's kind of working now. But, you know, you want to go into LDC and you want to, you want to tell them that they, they have to export according to certain standards. You know, once you start putting standards on cocoa exports to Europe, then all of a sudden you change the nature of the cocoa industry in a developing country because you need to amalgamate. So there's got to be that this is why, you know, also as, as a think tank, and this is our five-second commercial, we are very concerned about transition and the impact, the cross-border impact of this measure. They need, there needs to be a lot more to be done on impact assessment and a lot more needs to be dedicated to ensuring that the, the changes in developing countries, which are much more rapid and deep that in other countries need to be well understood and that they can be, well, accommodated may not be the right word, but the countries or the economies can adapt to it and react to it. In many cases, they are takers of regulation. Thank you. I think we're running out of time, unfortunately, because, you know, we have to leave at, you know, 9.55. So, you know, Kevin, you, we lost you for a while. Why don't I give you the last word? You know, what, what are your feelings and your hopes for, you know, COP26 and especially U.S.-China? Okay, one minute. So, in terms of U.S.-China relations, I personally wish this country will work on not only on connected issues, but also on many other pricing and overall issues, especially pandemic control. Even climate change has been often mentioned as the, the area of standard on all issues. I do believe reasonable bilateral relationship and mutually accepted one should be beneficial for these two countries to collaborate on this white-only important issues. This is my personal wish for what will happen between these two countries during COP26. Okay, good. Andrei, last word. Last word is I totally agree. I would completely agree with Kevin. I think that COP26 success without China-U.S. cooperation is going to be a not an easy, not an easy result. So, I do hope that, that at the time that the corners return and that we will see that cooperation going back to what we saw in Paris. Well, that's, well, I think we're literally running out of time. So, on that very good note, which I totally share with you, we all realize how complex the issues are. Both of you have taught me, you know, a lot of detail. You know, the devil's truly in the detail in these negotiations. So, thank you both for some fantastic speakers and our audience for a wonderful session. We hope we can, you know, we could talk about this all night. But I hope those of you who are listening will be able to join us for the next session, International Cooperation, Who Governs and Who Funds the Climate Transition with Jayati Ghosh, Rohinton Medora, and Keston Perry, starting very, very shortly. So, let me end the session here. Thank you very much indeed, and we'll say goodbye and good night for any of you who are in the already the evening zone. Okay. Thank you very much, Andre, for joining. And thank you, Kevin. I'm sorry about the connection issues. Okay. There we are. Thank you very much for helping. Bye-bye.