 Good morning everyone from Washington DC. I'm Gavin Helf and I'm a senior expert on Central Asia at USIP and I'll be moderating today's discussion. Just on a logistical note, we invite all of you to take part in today's discussion by asking questions using the chat box function located just below the video player on the USIP event page. We ask that you please include your name and specify where you are joining us from in your questions. You can also interact with us and each other on our Twitter feed at hashtag USIP Central Asia. As many of you know, USIP was founded by the US Congress 35 years ago as an independent nonpartisan national institute with the goal of preventing mitigating and resolving violent conflict. Our work in Central Asia with the US State Department is through the C5-plus-1 initiative, which provides a format for dialogue and a platform for joint efforts to address common challenges faced by the United States and the five countries of Central Asia. It's been just under two years since the US State Department publicly rolled out the United States strategy for Central Asia covering a period from 1919 to 2025. The six-point strategy placed particular emphasis on supporting Afghanistan and democracy in the region, increasing regional connectivity, reducing regional terrorist threats, and promoting greater US investment in Central Asia. Any strategy requires flexibility in a complex and changing world, but these past two years in Central Asia have brought some very big changes throughout the region. Just a month after this rollout, of course, COVID-19 hit the region, put massive stress on every country's government, but really did test the relationship between the governments and the people in all five Central Asian Republic. Then, soon after that, in October 2020, after a bungled parliamentary election, protests in Kyrgyzstan led to the departure of President Jen Bekov and the rise of President Jabarov and what appears to be the erosion of the Democratic experiment in Kyrgyzstan. Then, in April of 2021, a border war broke out between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, highlighting the frightening rise of competing nationalisms in the region and the first actual military clash between two countries in the region. Of course, everyone knows last August the withdrawal of American troops in the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan created a very different dynamic in terms of regional security that left a real vacuum and probably requires a little bit of thought. And then finally, we have the recent events in Kazakhstan, including the precedent setting deployment of CSTO troops in the region. All of these are really important developments to consider in the light of the American strategy. So to help us understand how these events affect the U.S. strategy in the region, we've got an excellent panel today to discuss the U.S. approach to Central Asia and what possibility there are following these recent developments. But first, I would like to introduce Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Leslie Viguri, who will provide some framing remarks for us. Leslie is the State Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia and Pakistan Affairs within the Bureau of South and Central Asia. Prior to assuming this role, he was Minister of Counselor for Political Affairs in New Delhi, previously served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Tashkent Uzbekistan. And in Washington is the Director of Europe and Asia for the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau and Director for Central Asia and the South and Central Asia Bureau. So no stranger to the reason. And with that, I would like to hand it over to you, Das Viguri. Thank you for the kind introduction, Gavin. I'm grateful to join many distinguished voices today, many of whom I know, to comment on the past, present and future of our strategic engagement with Central Asia. As you noted, it's been an eventful year in Central Asia, a region of strategic importance to the United States, and one playing an ever greater role in global affairs. The fall of Kabul on August 15th has had a huge effect on the region, as Central Asian states have expressed concern about their own security and wait and watch Taliban actions. The events of early January and Kazakhstan were surprising to all. Sorry, slight glitch here. They do emphasize the need for economic and social reforms. We're all watching Russia's aggressive actions towards Ukraine. But some sense of perspective is also in order. We've celebrated the 30th anniversaries of the Central Asian states independence, as well as the anniversaries of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the nations of Central Asia. The United States was among the first to welcome the independence of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Many things have changed over the past few decades, but our overarching goals remain the same. Our commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the countries in the region has not changed. We continue to believe that political pluralism and democratic governance are the foundational bedrock for a free and prosperous society. Through sustained bilateral engagements and regional cooperation, we continue to advance the rule of law, promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and fight corruption. With that as a foundation, we've shown over the years a flexibility to change as we look to build stronger bilateral and regional partnerships. Take, for example, our relationship with Uzbekistan. It's not an overstatement to say that our relations have never enjoyed such depth and breadth. In the past December, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Don Lu, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Kara McDonald, traveled to Tashkent and took part in our two nations inaugural strategic partnership dialogue. At this forum, in our regular dialogues and annual bilateral consultations with other Central Asian states, we offered our assistance in meeting many of these countries' stated political, economic, and human rights goals. Central Asia is at its strongest when regional cooperation allows its states to work together to address the challenges they share. Whether we are addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, or disinformation campaigns, regional cooperation yields better results for society as a whole. We're committed to using the C5-plus-1 platform as a vehicle to encourage regional integration and greater openness to the outside world as we work with our Central Asian partners to address the most pressing regional challenges. Secretary Blinken hosted a C5-plus-1 ministerial in April 2021, powerfully signaling to the first 100 days of the Biden-Harris administration the importance the United States places on Central Asia. That ministerial set the stage for a series of high-level C5-plus-1 engagements throughout 2021 that addressed our shared policy priorities, including with National Security Advisor Liz Sherwood Randall on economic connectivity in Tashkent in July, with Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change, John Kerry on climate, energy, and environment in September, and with Secretary Blinken again on the margins of UNGA regarding regional security in Afghanistan. Indeed, support for the Afghan people remains a key regional effort for the United States and our Central Asian partners. We've worked long and hard to enhance regional connectivity, economic integration, and energy linkages between Central Asian and Afghanistan. We hope that key regional connectivity investments and trade projects that can benefit the region as a whole will continue, though much will depend on the Taliban's intentions. Our Central Asia strategy is focused on the long-term prosperity, sovereignty, and strategic autonomy of our Central Asian partners. Nothing exemplifies this more than our efforts to expand and improve opportunities for the next generation of Central Asian leaders. Throughout the region, we have significantly invested in supporting education reforms, expanding English language opportunities, and facilitating higher education partnerships. Since 2017, we have helped establish 70 university partnerships between Central Asian and American institutions of higher education on topics ranging from agricultural economics to public administration. These partnerships are working to improve higher education in Central Asia and equip Central Asian students with 21st century skill sets. This month, we awarded 10 new partnership grants to specifically bolster regional collaboration and learning concerning our most pressing energy and environmental challenges. Recent events in Kazakhstan remind us of the importance of addressing the underlying social and economic factors that can lead to instability. That's why we will continue to engage and urge the governments of Central Asia to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, address economic inequality, and combat corruption. We also continue to highlight with our Central Asian partners the positive role that civil society can play in examining the root causes of economic and social frustrations. Today, I've only touched the surface of our deep and continuing engagement with the region, but I hope I've made it clear that contrary to the mistaken belief that we are losing interest, the United States is invested in Central Asia and focused on policies that help promote a stable and secure region which deepens cooperation with the United States and the world. We will tailor our engagement to reflect the realities on the ground, but we are guided by the enduring principle that the sovereignty and independence of our Central Asian partners is a foreign policy goal and interest of the United States. The path will not always be smooth, and ample challenges remain, but we believe our bilateral relations with Central Asian states and efforts to enhance regional cooperation are on an upward trajectory. Thank you, and I look forward to listening to a thoughtful discussion. Thank you, Les. Now I want to turn to our panel, a very distinguished panel. I will ask a couple of rounds of questions before turning to the audience and we very much want to engage with the audience. I want to remind you that you can take part in today's discussion by asking questions using the chat box function just below the video player on the USIP event page. But first, let me introduce briefly our panelists. First, we have Ambassador Richard Hoagland, who is currently the security and politics program director chair at the Caspian Policy Center. Ambassador Hoagland retired after 30 years of distinguished service as a foreign service officer. He served as the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia affairs and, quite importantly, ambassador to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Sharj de Ferre to Turkmenistan. We also have Jennifer Murtazashvili, who is the founding director of the Center for Governance and Markets and Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Her research focuses on issues of self-governance, security, political economy, and public sector reform in the developing world. She is a long time commentator on Afghanistan and a former Peace Corps volunteer from Uzbekistan. We have Frederick Starr, who is the founding chairman of the Central Asia Caucuses Institute and Silk Road Studies program. Fred has written extensively on Central Asia and Afghanistan over decades. He was the founding chairman of the Kennan Institute in Washington and served as the vice president of Tulane University and president of the Aspen Institute and of Oberlin College. Nath Bajor Imanova is a prominent multimedia journalist for Voice of America's Uzbek service. As an anchor, reporter, multimedia editor, and producer, she has covered the relationship between Central Asia and the United States for over 20 years on TV, radio, and online. Since 2018, she has also been reporting from the inside of Uzbekistan as the first-ever U.S.-based accredited correspondent in the country. And finally, Don Jensen is the director for Russia and Europe at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Don writes extensively on Russian domestic politics and foreign policy priorities and security policies. He also specializes in the domestic and foreign policies of other post-Soviet states, especially Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states. So I'll start with a round of questions for all of you that basically is the title of today's event. Does the U.S. strategy for Central Asia address the region's current problems? And I'll start with Ambassador Hoagland. Well, thank you very much, Gavin, and thank you so much to USIP for this very important program. If you've read the public version of the U.S. strategy for Central Asia 2020-2025, it's quite reasonable, and it doesn't really differ dramatically from earlier versions. I've read the classified version that is much, much longer, and in that version, it's Russia-China, Russia-China, Russia-China. But it seems to me it's more descriptive than prescriptive, our policy. And in some ways that's okay. But the problem is that in diplomacy, the crisis of the day takes precedence. And our high-minded ideals too often get left behind in the filing cabinet and overtaken by public events. Now, our basic policy for the region really hasn't changed in 30 years. It's to support the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the independent former Soviet socialist republics. At the beginning of the first decade of the independence of these new countries, the undercurrent in U.S. policy in Washington was that surely they would become free market democracies. If only we could offer enough assistance. But they didn't. And in retrospect, that's not in the least bit surprising. They had lived through 70 years of the Soviet Empire, and before that, several hundred years of the Tsarist Empire. Most of them with very, very little contact with the West. And even before that, in, especially in Central Asia, they've been Turkic, Mongol, Khanates, or nomadic societies. That means that none had the cultural and political backgrounds that in the West are grounded in the Renaissance, the Reformation, and especially the Enlightenment. The ways of the West were utterly foreign to them. Whereas in the West, policy tends to promote the rights of the individual, the political systems in these countries focus on an autocratic and sometimes hereditary leader to whom citizens pay taxes, bribes, and near total obeisance. And yet, without understanding this deeply embedded history, some in Washington were increasingly disappointed that they hadn't become like us once they had the choice. Now, each of these countries has matured remarkably. Each, in its own way, works hard to balance its relationships with Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has declared this region part of Russia's special sphere of influence. And at times he's up the adjudic from special to exclusive. Russia would not be at all displeased to see the West, and especially the United States, lose interest in the region, pack up its bags, and go home. In fact, in the most recent Washington, Moscow negotiations, it's becoming ever more clear that Putin wants to close a new iron curtain. Over the years, China has become a key partner for most of the countries in the region, especially with its Belt and Road Initiative. And what we're seeing now, as almost always happens, hard power follows soft power. And Beijing is starting to develop a military presence in the region. The European Union has maintained a steady, if rather low key, interest in the region, and regularly announces an updated political and economic plan for the countries. The question now, post-Afghanistan, is what would the United States do? An undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the various levels of governance in human rights problems in most of the countries has strongly motivated one faction of the foreign policy community in Washington to urge the United States to dial back its relations with these countries, because we don't need them anymore. That would be an historic mistake. Each of these countries, each in its own way, depends on the United States. And as a new generation comes to power in these countries, people who have studied in the West and now regularly do business with Western countries, inevitably they will further internationalize these countries that only 30 years ago were still isolated socialist republics. I suggest we need to have patience. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Hoagland. I want to turn to Jen Murtazashvili again with the broader question of does the U.S. strategy for Central Asia address the reasons current problems? Gavin, thank you for the opportunity to be here, and really just among such esteemed colleagues, it's just a real honor to be able to have this conversation. And so the brief answer to your question is no. The current strategy does not address Central Asia's current realities. And of course, we can talk about the Afghanistan issue separately, and I know that we'll do that a little later on. But as Ambassador Hoagland said, you know, as someone who didn't have access to the classified version of the strategy, you can see not only Russia, China written all over that strategy, but you also see Afghanistan written directly into it. And so with those changing dynamics, I think it is a really good opportunity right now for the U.S. to fundamentally rethink how the U.S. is seeing this region. And I think the U.S. can play a very constructive role in Central Asia, but has to meet Central Asia where it is, understand the needs and desires of these independent republics, understand where their goals and understand where, you know, how the U.S. can balance its own interests, meeting Central Asian republics where they are. And so, you know, we've heard for the past 30 years sovereignty and territorial integrity, these are important pillars, pluralism, these are important pillars of U.S. strategy. But is it time to sort of move beyond this except that sovereignty is, you know, over 30 years we've sort of achieved that goal of sovereignty, although there's some questions about what's happened recently in Kazakhstan for sure. But how is the U.S. adapting to this changing world? And Central Asia is such a dynamic place right now. Of course, we're focused on the conflicts, we focus on the instability that we certainly see. But these countries over the past 30 years have really moved into their own. They have their own challenges, they have their own structures of governance, they have their own dynamic economies. And we really need to understand where those interests overlap with U.S. interests. And I don't think that seeing this region through the lens of Russia or seeing through the lens of China really helps us do that. We can't be reactive to what other countries are doing. I think the United States has to be proactive and put forward a very positive strategy that really meets Central Asia where it is. Despite this deep history that Ambassador Hoagland has pointed out, there has been incredible and very rapid learning in this region. And so we're dealing with very young populations that are not post-Soviet. Using that term post-Soviet I think has been a real hindrance for the way that Washington sees Central Asia. I do think Washington was quite forward leaning and moving Central Asia out of the Europe and Eurasia Bureau and moving it into South Asia. I think that was a very wise and forward looking move, but I think the United States really has to do more to congeal those kinds of relationships. And so it's its own dynamic region. And we've talked about some of the unfortunate events that have swept Central Asia in recent weeks and months. And if we look at the driving factors that are behind many of those, some of the violence and the unrest, we find economic factors. And those economic factors are almost completely absent from U.S. strategy. And that's where I would argue the opportunities really lie for U.S. engagement in the region, of course combating corruption, civil society. But there's a real argument to create space for rule of law based on the desire to open things like capital markets and investment. These are things that there are strong mutual interests among Central Asian states to develop their own economies. So Central Asia, the United States is looking for a stable and secure region. And that's what we heard the Deputy Assistant Secretary just underlie a stable and secure region. But I would like the United States to talk more about a prosperous region. How can Central Asia become a more prosperous region? And I think it's through this economic cooperation that U.S. can best advance its own interests that include things like democracy and human rights. So putting economic interconnectivity as a real pillar of this, focusing on positive some relations between the Republics and the United States. And then having a much more proactive foreign policy that deals with things like foreign investment, science, technology, education, engaging multilaterals in international financial institutions. The United States has spoken a lot about the need to engage with the region, but there doesn't seem to be a lot of resources supporting this engagement, which is leading many to question whether the U.S. has a sustained strategy. So my university was actually one of the 10 partners to establish this regional hub that was just mentioned to connect universities across Central Asia and we're really engaged on a new project that focuses on economic development and public administration. And so I think public administration and this intersection between economic development and public administration is really one of the key drivers that the United States should be engaged in, because without reforms in these areas, as we know, it'll be difficult for Central Asian republics to achieve their own own goals, right, of economic prosperity. And just want to leave it with one thing is that this hub that we're creating is really based on the pillar of education. And education is really the one thing I mean if we can talk about where the biggest demand for U.S. engagement in the region is right now it's in education. It's something that all governments in the region really shares a desire. And I think this is another issue that should really be the heart of a very positive strategy for the future of Central Asia. So Central Asia has a very young population. Let's create a young strategy that sort of sweeps understand that's based in the past understands the past, but really turns the page into a new era. Thank you, Jen. I want to turn to Fred with the same question. Does U.S. strategy for Central Asia address the region's current problems, although I know the question that you'd prefer that I ask is, does the U.S. have a strategy in Central Asia? So over to you, Fred. Fred, you're muted. You've got to unmute. Yeah, I salute last figure for giving a very responsible overview of its implementation. It's an impressive list. In fact, it's a laundry list. It is a grab bag. We are like the old fuller brushmen of old who show up at your door with a big packet that they open. Do you want this, this, this? This is what we're offering. It's so broad that there's nothing is more important than anything else. There are those who argue and I respect them very highly for the importance of democracy, strengthening democratic government. But if one is really taking that seriously, isn't it necessary to ask what are the preconditions, country by country, that fosters that? And certainly economic development, as we've just heard, can be an element of it, but not necessarily. Another one, though, that they would all agree on is that if our sovereignty, our capacity for self-government is weakened, then forget about the rest of your smorgasbord. Forget about the rest of your large program of very laudable activities. They disappear into the mist in the priorities of the countries themselves if we're not addressing the issue of sovereignty and security. Now, unfortunately, that is constantly threatened. It's an interesting point. It's nice to be able to consider this region without its big neighbors. But from the standpoint of its very central, and those who would push it aside, East China Sea and so forth, are missing one obvious point. And that is this is the only region square in the middle between China and Iran. These are all major concerns of the US. Afghanistan will continue to be as Jen has indicated. I think it's right. Here we are right in the middle of it all. And so that calls for a very serious American strategy, one in which everything is not equal, in which we understand what depends upon what. And that's where we failed. And you can say that's implementation. You can say it's in the strategy itself, but it's a failure. And let me say that in the eyes, the countries were speaking about. And by the way, on this issue, I would add definitely Azerbaijan as well. In their eyes, the issues of sovereignty, self, self governance, etc. Those come first. These are the sine qua non. These are the things that must be there if the other things are going to be there. And that's where we where we've come up short. We it's interesting, Gavin, I don't mean to be critical, but you didn't mention security and in your list of our goals at the beginning. It should be number one. And it's now. Why isn't it because it's parceled out into other parts of the USG. We have the Defense Department. We have a set of agreements there, which are or are not figuring in this discussion. For example, the partnership for peace with NATO. That was a serious enterprise. It involved the Central Asian battalion. It involved interaction with the leadership of every, except for Turkmenistan, all the militaries in the region. Have we heard a word about that? Seriously under threat? No. And are we volunteering to bring forward this question? I'm not suggesting this or that action. I'm suggesting a discussion with the countries that honestly includes security, sovereignty, self governance, and self determination. That's what's been missing. That's what we could put into the into the formula. And if we were to do so, then all these other laudable initiatives that we've undertaken will have some meaning instead of being just isolated good things. All right. Thank you for that. And finally, I want to turn to Navajor with the first question. Does the US strategy for Central Asia address the region's current problems? Navajor. Hello, everybody. It's great to be with this panel. Really honored. I have known you for a long time. I follow your work. I rely on your expertise in my work every day. So it's really nice to have this opportunity to share my observations and thoughts about what the United States gets and doesn't get about Central Asia. I would like to really focus on that today. Any strategy, as we know, requires awareness. I would argue that Central Asians definitely know more about the United States today than ever. Hundreds of thousands of Central Asians now live in this country, which I think also requires some focus. Uzbek-Americans, Kazakh-Americans, Kyrgyz, Tajik-Turkman-Americans are increasingly vocal. And I think Washington needs to also engage them when it's considering to renew its strategy. When I came to the United States 20 years ago and had just started doing my master's in Indiana at Bull State University in Muncie, Indiana, 9-11 had just happened and I was just starting to work with the Voice of America as a stringer. And I decided to do this little survey on campus among ordinary American students and professors about how much they knew about Central Asia, let alone about individual countries. And I remember talking to about 30 people and only three of them, two professors, and one student knew something about the region. And they tied it to Afghanistan because the United States was just opening air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and Americans were fighting in Afghanistan, were starting to fight in Afghanistan. And that factor has not changed because I've constantly inquired about this. I constantly ask Americans about how much they know wherever I travel about the region and you hear Afghanistan, Afghanistan, Afghanistan. And that in many ways also reflects U.S. strategy towards the region at least for the last 20 years. And I've covered four administrations now in Washington since 2003. And as Deputy Assistant Secretary, as Vigory mentioned, the principles and objectives have stayed the same. And that's the focus on the support of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of these countries. Why has American policy stayed basically the same over the last 20 years when the region has in fact changed? A lot, some argue. And when Central Asians ask that question, I like to challenge them back by seeing how much really, really changed in Central Asia, especially in terms of governance and freedom. But when Americans ask that question, I also like to challenge them about why Washington isn't really changing its stand on Central Asia since some things have at least changed. And I think as a journalist, and I'm not speaking on behalf of the voice of America here, overall, based on my conversations, especially in the region, I think these two questions really drive, are really crucial here. You know, how much has changed? Let's talk about that. And also, is the United States adapting sufficiently to those things if the fact, you know, if some things have changed. One consistent argument I hear from American policy makers is that, you know, long-term objectives should drive you as policy. It's all about the big picture. And as Ambassador Hoegland mentioned, you know, we don't know the classified version of the strategy. And people have depended gone and even in the State Department and other parts of the US government may be thinking, hey, you know, we're succeeding. You just don't know about it because we, in fact, don't really know about it. And when you discuss US strategy with Central Asians, especially the governments, for example, my conversations within the Uzbek government, they don't really complain. I mean, they're fine. Specifically, let's say like the Ministry of Administration, they think that the cooperation is much broader and more productive now, let's say, you know, than 15 years ago. So, I know that US policy makers can list a lot of productive things that they have done over the years in the region, but I'm here to tell you that Central Asians in general see America as this giant that is focused elsewhere. And frankly, not willing to do much with them. They see it as a country focused on its own interests, not theirs. They see it more focused on enlisting them in America's own competition, let's say, with China. Then let's say focusing on for a second and third on their needs and wants as Jennifer mentioned. And, you know, remember two years ago when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went to the region specifically to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, he talked more about China than Central Asians themselves. So, you know, optics matter, what people hear in media matter. So it's no surprise that Central Asians actually see the relationship with America as more transactional and largely confined to diplomacy. Now, maybe that seems unfair, but when the US says its strategy is premised on trying to open the systems, develop markets, enable growth, improve the quality of education, health care and life. Well, the question is, well, how much is America really doing those things for us? And I don't mean to be cynical here, but they want fewer words and more action. They want more active America in the region. So the test Central Asians are going to apply here to American strategy is whether it generates options for Central Asians to have better lives. And if it does, it's a success as far as Central Asians are concerned. Otherwise, they'll just, you know, write America off. Many want to see, as I said, the more active America, and they don't really care about what the strategy says in the first place. I also hear from many Central Asians that they get that America needs to be modest and humble in its own strategy. And, you know, and metaphorically speaking, you know, Washington shouldn't write checks that the United States isn't isn't going to be able to catch. And they also get that US needs some flexibility to maneuver. You know, you need to be able to react to inevitable setbacks, disappointments, you know, as well as to engage when there are openings and opportunities. And there's always this conversation, and I don't think it will ever end, you know, in Washington or in Central Asia, what makes a successful strategy? You know, does every part of it needs to be as successful? Is there actually a successful strategy that the United States can look at and say, hey, you know, here is this region that we've been really doing well? We can always question the strategy. And many people think that there is no US strategy for Central Asia because they don't like the tactics. So, you know, there are strategy versus tactics. But one thing that I very often hear, especially in the region is how strategic is the strategy if Central Asia as Americans constantly mentioned to us is such a strategic, you know, strategic region. And actually, you know, we constantly also hear from Washington that the relationship has been productive, especially over the last 15 years, but momentum should lead to more momentum. So, you know, what's the next set of goals for going to be? The fact is, you know, US is limited in its ability to compete with China and Russia. That we hear a lot as well. And Central Asians in many ways get that. But I think there is this feeling in the region as well, both in the government and among the public, that America needs a nuanced approach. And that applies to the American commitment of democracy as well. Okay, thank you. Yeah, I noticed I think in my newsfeed this morning that Xi Jinping is meeting with all five Central Asian leaders to yesterday and Prime Minister Modi met with them, you know, two, three days ago, all sort of, you know, in commemoration of 30 years of relations, which is something that we're doing. I invited Don Jensen to our panel to give him a break from Ukraine for a couple of hours. But also because, you know, US policy is often balanced by a concern about Russian policy. I noticed that, especially over the last three weeks with the CSTO deployment in Kazakhstan that a lot of observers in Central Asia see this setting a really strong precedent, you know, for CSTO involvement and interference or Russian reassertion of its control addressing that, you know, primary question of sovereignty that is in every American strategy. Russia has clearly been opposing any enduring US military presence over the horizon in Central Asia since last August and the withdrawal of US troops. So Don, I want to ask you what you think how Central Asia figures in Moscow's hierarchy of fear and opportunity to get a sense of from a Russian perspective what the how important the region is. Don, you're muted. Thank you for having me. I was a junior FSO with Ambassador Hoagland in Moscow 25 years ago, and he actually looks younger. Yes, I think I make a couple of points. Number one, I do think the security question is higher than some of the other speakers might have given it. But let me make a couple points about the Russian perspective and Russian behavior, because I do think both Kabul and January are important benchmarks for how Russia sees the region. Number one, I think I get upset sometimes that so many people think that Russia is trying to recreate the USSR. I don't think that it is. I think that Russia is trying to reinvent itself as a great power, a great power in Eurasia, a great power around the world. And I think that means, as Mr. Hoagland said, the US not in its backyard because Russia wants the predominant influence over its neighbors. That having been said, I do think there's a much more varied approach by Moscow to its neighbors than some people give a credit for. I think Ukraine obviously is the highest priority, positioned to NATO as well. But I think for a long time, Moscow was content to have a rather differentiated approach to the region, so long as its interests were recognized. And its interests are, I think, primarily security, but not only. It also has business interests. For example, in Kazakhstan, the Russian ethnic minority about which there has been some concern in the past few years in Moscow is something they follow relatively closely. So yes, the Russia wants the US out. It's a security issue. It's an issue of Russia seeing itself playing a certain role in Eurasia. I pause at the phrase iron curtain. I prefer to think they want the US out. But that does not mean necessarily that we can cooperate on some issues. We just have to find what those are. But what else does Putin want? Putin also wants a regime preservation for Russia. And I think that's why there are so many interesting aspects to the CSTO adventure that you mentioned, Gavin. They were not peacekeepers, obviously. Moscow apparently was surprised, but these were special operations troops that do policing, that do on-call putting down unrest around or ready to do that. But the fact that they use this for the first time, I think, in this way does set a precedent for Putin's view of what he can get away with in the region in the future. And I think that, depending on the circumstances on the ground, of course, it's likely to continue. I am not one of those people who sees China as a major threat to Russian interest in the region. I think they largely work hand in glove. Ukraine is, to Russia, where Taiwan might be the China, an offside in comparison. I think Central Asia, thus, is in the middle. And I think, for now at least, they can live with each other in their various interests without seeing a threat from the outside, and particularly from the United States. I would conclude my five minutes, Gavin, by saying the issue of the example of Kazakhstan to the denizens of the Kremlin, I think, was a surprise and also kind of frightening. And I think the relationship between Putin's need to tighten his grip at home and also to prevent similar so-called on-colored revolutions in his neighbors. Not just in Ukraine, but now evidently in Kazakhstan, too, is something they're going to pay very close attention to, which perhaps probably pretends a continued Russian interference of some sort in the security dimension of these regimes. Because Kazakhstan leader then becomes a very interesting figure, and for that, Gavin, I always turn to you, who knew it very well. But I think they are watching the situation very closely. If in fact, indeed, the 2,500 Russian troops who came back relatively quickly, I have no hesitation in seeing Putin repeating that there or elsewhere should the Kremlin decide that the need dictates it over you. Okay, so keeping on the foreign policy and sort of regional context theme, I want to turn now to Jennifer with a question about Afghanistan. What do you think the return of the Taliban means for U.S. goals and even for our leverage in the region? A lot of the policy points, at least two, if not three of the six policy priorities in the current Central Asia strategy focus on supporting the government in Afghanistan. Clearly that's something that needs a little bit of revision. But how do you think that affects U.S. strategy going forward? I mean, it's a fascinating time to be having this discussion and I would agree completely. We haven't been talking a lot about security, and I think there's a reason why. Because the U.S. has been so badly discredited in the region because of what has happened in Afghanistan. So that's why I didn't put security as sort of the number one priority. And it would be interesting to have this kind of discussion because is there a demand for the U.S. to have this role in the region? And I would argue if we saw what had happened, especially over the past six or seven years, let's look at Northern Afghanistan. Let's look at this from the perspective of Central Asian Republics. Russia was not opposed to the United States role in Afghanistan. Iran was not opposed. Many countries in the region were not opposed to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. What changed was the train wreck of what we did there. And so over the past, you know, since 2013, Northern Afghanistan went completely downhill. Central Asian Republics and Russia are looking at this saying this is a disaster. The U.S. wants to engage with us on counterterrorism, but look at the role of terrorists in Afghanistan under the United States. And so there was a sense that the U.S. was promoting more instability, not directly but indirectly, because it couldn't achieve its efforts in Afghanistan. And so if you're a Central Asian Republic and you're looking to build stability and you're looking to build security, is the U.S. going to be number one on your list? I'm not sure. And so I, you know, of course, I see Afghanistan as actually a place where there is potential positive some relationships between Russia, China and the United States. I think we have to nobody wants long term instability inside of Afghanistan. Nobody wants the group, the growth of groups like ISIS inside of Afghanistan. Russia has been very clear about that. China has been very clear about that. The Taliban, I think have been pretty clear about that. But the Taliban continue to, you know, they have militants from Central Asia, and I think they keep them sort of conveniently to poke the Central Asian Republics to remind them, you know, that they have this capability. But it's also important to remember that the Central Asian Republics are looking at Afghanistan and have been looking at the United States over the past six or seven years. They were, the Central Asian Republics were reaching out to the Taliban. They were, they had strong bilateral relations with the Taliban, you know, with the exception of Tajikistan, but we don't see even Tajikistan as having, you know, they're not cowering in the face of this new Taliban government. They're trying to work with it, trying to cooperate with it. And how can a U.S. strategy take account of this? And I think this is the big question is what is the U.S. policy going to be towards Afghanistan? The U.S. isn't just going to, I mean, I think there's some in Washington who just want to completely ignore it and pretend it never happened. We certainly get that feeling from some of the Biden administration and even sometimes from President Biden himself. But it's clear that these issues are not going anywhere and they're going to have long term effects in Central Asia. And Central Asian Republics are actually being quite proactive in continuing their discussions of things like CASA and TAPI and so many of the things that we have seen as being like unfathomable and like pipe dreams. Central Asian Republics, I mean, they don't have time to waste, yet they continue pursuing this. And I think we have to take that a bit more seriously. So sort of refocusing, we had the C5, C5 plus one, what happened to all these trilaterals that we were working on in Central Asia that focused on Afghanistan is Afghanistan completely gone. But having a Central Asian strategy that was so dependent on what happened in Afghanistan, I think shows us that this was a huge risk and we weren't seeing actually the strong mutual interest that many countries in Central Asia had with Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power. So this brings up, I'm going to segue where to Fred for a second with a question that I think is very much related to the response to Afghanistan. Fred, before COVID happened for a couple of years, you talked and wrote a lot about Central Asia, this region as a unit of 76 million and what it could achieve as a collective force working together. How do you think this looks the prospects for regional cooperation and sort of Central Asian solidarity after COVID, after what's happened in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with the border skirmish, and certainly with Afghanistan and the CSTO deployment. What's your take on that, how that has evolved over the last couple of years? Well, first of all, let's acknowledge that Central Asia is the only region in the world that doesn't have its own intra-regional organization without outsiders. You know, there's ASEAN, there's the Nordic Council, how many do you have in the Caribbean, South America, Middle East and so on, not Central Asia. We should have been supporting, beginning we've been approving it but not doing the foster it. But let me look at this entire security issue from their perspective, which hasn't been done here this morning. They're from Russia and China. Yes, they have to maintain and they want to maintain cordial relations there. But to keep them in bounds, every Central Asian state, including Turkmenistan, that you use the West, US, Europe to balance both of them. That only works if we're playing. If we're not participating actively, supporting that battle, playing the kind of role that is serious in terms of security, which means includes defense, but if we're not doing that, they're stuck. All our other projects fade in importance. They become nice that the Americans can bring, but they aren't really central to our sovereignty and self-governance. Now, where does that leave us? It seems to be that we should be more embracing the regional concept. You say, well, we have C5 plus one. It's been thin. The concept is good. Remember, it was not the Mr. Kerry by the then ambassador from Kazakhstan to the United States. They initiate it. Yes, they have meetings and so on and do stuff, but it's been very passive. By comparison, look, China, Russia, they're doing, and everyone else is far more active. Now, what does that mean on our side? Well, it's so many practical things. Do our ambassadors meet together before they go out as a region? Is there a regular meeting of regional ambassadors to identify American objectives? Do we convene Central Asian ambassadors to dinner? But I don't see the US government doing thinking this kind of initiative. But more than that, here's the problem. We have played favorites. We talk to the ones that we give good marks to on the democratization front, and we give demerits to the other. If we want a regional strategy, we have to get off there. We have to be far more patient and tenacious with those who are underperforming in areas that are important to us, but we don't just cut them off. That would be a sign to work with them. Why rewarding them only when they cross the finish line rather than helping them cross the finish line? By the way, that's exactly what the Russians and the Chinese do. They play favorites, and we have to get off that game. Treat them as a region, treat them with respect, foster a regional thinking in our programs, and we have a huge, we should probably come it out, do less and do better, and have it more closely related to our top priority, which is their top priority, by the way, and that is preservation and sovereignty and self-determination with self-government. So, you brought up democracy and truth in advertising. I spent 15 years working at USAID, mostly on Central Asia, as a promoter of democracy. So, I am happy to ask this question to Navajor, instead of trying to answer it myself. One of the very consistent stated objectives of US strategy going all the way back to the Clinton administration since independence has been democracy promotion, promoting democracy, good governance, and human rights. It's been in every strategy, every strategic document. This is offered now as, you know, originally the big path forward for countries in 1993 and 1994, but now increasingly it is really in competition with an alternative Russian authoritarian model and an alternative Chinese techno-authoritarian model and sort of a policy of non-interference and internal affairs by SCO and other regional organizations. With Kyrgyzstan's increasingly presidentialist system since October 2020, and not a lot of democracy to be observed in the region, Navajor, how do you think the US should think about engaging on these questions? Thank you, Gavin. The fact that none of the Central Asian countries were invited to the summit for democracy last month says volumes about where things are in terms of democracy in the region and how the Biden administration sees Central Asia. Pro-democracy people obviously want more from this, you know, most powerful western democratic partner and measure the viability of the strategy based on the democratic development in the region. So if you don't see democracy flourishing in the region, then the democracy promotion by the United States is failing. And that's what we hear constantly. If you don't see economic development as well or media freedom or human rights advancements in the region, then the US strategy is failing. In my reporting, to be honest, I'm here to see some compelling arguments though about how to make the strategy more effective in areas like democratization or human rights with governments that are, as we know, inherently skeptical and resistance. What changes the reality on the ground is the will of the people. And we hear this, you know, from the American policymakers as well, always. Kazakhstan, it's true that Kazakhstan tolerated Azerbaijan for 30 years. Uzbekistan lived with Kremlin glorifying him for a quarter of a century. The Jigistán has been doing that with Rahman for nearly 30 years now. And Pakistan is going back to authoritarian ways of doing things. So things don't look good in terms of democracy development in the region. And what can US do that differently compared to the last 30 years, you know, in the face of these realities? What tools does it have? That would be my question. How much will and how much money is there to do that? I think, you know, money matters here, right? More than anything. It always has an option to throw its arms off and walk away or stay engaged in ways that it can with the leaderships and have at least some leverages in order to maintain the ability to express itself or, you know, effect change to some degree. People in the region want more accountable and responsible leaders. And my question to them, especially Uzbekistan, since this has been really debated more openly now than ever before, is that, you know, where do these leaders come from? I always ask Uzbeks, you know, what have you done to actually produce them? What kind of democratic investments have you made for the last 30 years to have better governance now? And the question is, what is the US input in that? How could have the United States help in this process? And can it help? Does it want to help now? So without knowing the answer to those questions, I mean, we can suggest all kinds of things, right? I mean, I always push for media freedom, but those are the real issues here. And Afghanistan is a perfect example. You can, if you have no internal drive to change or reform or you may invest, you know, trillions of dollars, but you won't see that. You won't see that outcome. So here the question is, you know, do those few policymakers, a tight circle of policymakers on Central Asia want to push harder for democratic development? So if we know the answer for that, then we can come up with a lot of suggestions and recommendations. Yeah, and a very quick note, if I may, and that is, we cannot separate this issue from the issue of self-determination. If that's their priority, if we want them to listen to our priority, we better address their priority. And that means everything, including security, military issue, what's going on? Look, I don't care if the secret version of the C5 plus one or new strategy rather is unavailable. We can see what's actually being done in the security area. Nothing's being written on this. Let's get it out in the open. Let's see if we're doing anything serious. If we are, we can expect them to respond in terms of our priorities until we are. Don't expect them to respond in anything. So I'm going to offer our panelists a chance to two finger or comment and rebut each other before we move to questions. Fred figured that out and anticipated it, but do any of the other panelists have comments on those dick? Yeah, thank you very much, Kevin. I know our time is short, so I'm going to cut to the chase here. In the last six months or so, I have been in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and have talked with senior government officials there. Here's something really important. I heard it then and actually for about the last five years, those countries have perceived that the United, all the countries of the region have perceived that the United States is withdrawing from the region. They repeat that again and again and again, but we aren't. We have full scale embassies to continue our civilian and military programs with relatively little change, but it's often true, especially in these countries perception is reality. And I'd like to suggest it's time for the Biden administration to come up with and publicize a new and enhanced policy for this enormously strategic part of the world. The United States basically needs to be more visible in Central Asia. And the very, very first step the State Department can make is to get full-fledged U.S. ambassadors into Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. We only have three ambassadors in the region. That's it. Jim, did you have a comment? Yes, along these lines, you know, sort of the democratization angle. I used to be a USAID democracy and governance officer in Tashkent during some of the darkest days. And that was not easy work. But what surprises me is that the U.S. is still using the same tools that they had. They were using 20 years ago to promote democracy in the region. And I just think at a certain point, these strategies, these tactics actually just become sort of very empty. And, you know, we have to understand that Russian disinformation has had a huge effect on people's understanding and perceptions of words like democracy and civil society and gender. They sound like foreign words. They sound like things coming from the outside. And the way that the U.S. sort of promotes these issues, I don't think necessarily number one helps promote the issue at hand. And number two seems like a foreign policy issue rather than a domestic one. So I think if the U.S. is going to continue to do it, it has to be much smarter, really rethink how it does this kind of work. You know, we talk so much about NGO registration. Like NGOs are sort of that pivotal point thing that we all look at. But young people don't think they don't create NGOs anymore. I mean, this is like what old people do. Let's think about like new dynamic ways that people are organizing, but yet we get so hung up on NGO registration as being the pivotal measure of civil society. In Uzbekistan, for example, is much more vibrant than it has been at any time in its modern history. So many young people involved in, you know, civic activism and ways that are just not captured by our old measures. And why isn't the U.S. jumping on this and, you know, engaging it where it is rather than using these sort of old hammers to look at this very important issue. And I would agree with, you know, Fred here is that we have to meet these countries where they are. And if this is really important to us, yes, the security aspects are very important. But exploring how these democracy issues are so interconnected with their own goals for prosperity. And, you know, I think that Kazakhstan understood that. And I think even if we look at what President Tokayev is saying in response to what has happened, you know, one very positive thing I think we can take away from what's happened is his response to the U.S. response to these events wasn't Antijan, wasn't, you know, shutting everything off, kicking everyone out at least for now, but it's saying we're open. We continue to be open. And in fact, here are the reforms that I'm going to pursue as a result of this. You know, whether we believe him or not, it's a different matter, but that is very important. I was talking about the kinds of governance reforms and he was the one over the years who talked about the important issues of decentralization and local elections in order to pursue the broader goals of economic reform. And so, you know, understanding this, I think is really key for all of the countries in the region. I would add just along those lines, two things. One, unlike when you were in Tashkent promoting democracy, Russia is really a player in soft power projection in Central Asia. As is China. In a lot of ways, Russia is mimicking I've learned this at lunches with dawn over on Wednesdays. We look at what rush is doing throughout the globe in terms of using institutions that are very parallel to our own NGOs and election observation missions and things like that. The other is, and I feel like this is a little bit, you know, like, like the character in the movie the graduate, you know, you know, two words, social media. Is a place where even in lockdown environments, media environments. We're seeing very much activity we're seeing the use of multimedia and the use of social media to mobilize along a lot of lines. And that's where the action is. So, I'm going to go to some audience questions. And the first one that we have is from Frank Marachione, who studies Chinese policy in the region, which countries could be the most relevant partners for an enhanced US role. What do you think the US can contribute to the region that China cannot. Anybody want to grab that one. Jen. I think there's a lot here. I mean, look, a lot of the countries in Central Asia, of course, they look to the China model is like this miracle, right? Like, okay, we don't have to engage in like substantial economic reforms. I mean, political reforms and yet we can get economic growth. But I think Central Asian republics understand the inherent limitations of Central Asian republics very well understand what's going on in Xinjiang. Of course, they're not going to speak openly about these issues. I think it's quite heartbreaking for so many people to see this and they understand that is this a model that they really want. You know, in some ways they're able to take that, you know, draw on certain elements of it but mimicking it completely I don't think is in anyone's cards. So, you know, looking at issues like education, like human capital, do they do students do Central Asian republics really want to send all of their young people to study in China I'm not convinced that's the case. Right. So, I mean, I think education is being one important role, you know, are the investments from BRI really what countries thought they would be. There was a lot of talk but I mean, I think that, you know, the great disappointment that we see especially in post Mirzioia Uzbekistan right is we're going to open up and all this investments going to come flooding in you know a lot of that is the fault of the Uzbeks are not moving forward I think on the reforms as they had promised. But I do think that there is real disappointment you know from the US know of course the US can't engineer firms like the same way that China can to come and invest in state driven development doesn't work the same way. But I really do think that there's opportunities to engage more, you know, not just on these government's issues but on these economic and education issues. And another thing I noticed in my newsfeed yesterday was that Tokayev has announced that he's reorienting the Balashak training program which has, you know, basically sent thousands of now middle level bureaucrats to the west to get training he's reorienting that on Russia and Russian universities I don't know if that's a. And Uzbekistan has a similar program we've looked at the data actually not before and I looked at some of this data and you know the Uzbek government has its own now equivalent to Balashak. A reinvigorated one they had one years before they have a new one and you look at the data that they publish on their website, all of people are going to China, I mean sorry to Russia. So many of the students are going to Russia and not to the United States and not to China. So I do think that you know for whatever reason, but I do think this is an opportunity. Yeah, I think there's something really important that we have to think of right at this time about policy. And that's how is the United States going to react in a policy way to what happened in Kazakhstan. I know for a fact that the United States government the Biden administration is still debating immediate policy. I've had I've been in meetings within the last couple days about this, and there's no consensus yet. The countries are going out the region the five countries the four other countries let's say, are going to watch very very closely. And if we come down too hard, or if we pull back from Kazakhstan, that's going to very much influence our status in the region is going to be very important. Look, we need to balance real politic with our ideology. We stand for human rights and democracy and we can never forget that, but we need to find essential and proper ways to move that forward. And public finger wagging and naming and shaming is counterproductive. It's not going to help us in the region I'm afraid. Agree with a mass at a whole plan that you know naming and shaming isn't always effective looking at the fact that the security services across Central Asia are still after people who get funded by the United States who work closely with the US organizations. We can totally, you know, come to that conclusion that, you know, despite the fact that we're now celebrating this great cooperation between Central Asia governments and Washington. America still has that problem, you know the lack of trust. So if you're trained by the United States if you're, if you're an organization funded by the United States you're still in trouble mostly you know across the region in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as we see, Kyrgyzstan had a stronger civil society 10 years ago Tajikistan had civil society a decade ago they don't have that anymore. Why, you know, and that really needs to be that needs to be really deeply analyzed when reconsidering you know US strategy towards the region, just to add very quickly, you know, the new administration I would argue is more open like Uzbekistan is more open than ever to work with the United States. When I said, Central Asia wants more active America really meant that because, you know, there are enough pro Americans, there are enough liberals still in the Uzbek government, for example, as much as there are you know pro Russians and for Chinese even. So you need to engage them in ways that you know I mean yes you have these bilaterals you have this dialogue various platforms going on with Central Asian governments but you don't really have anything that goes deeper. And that applies to the promotion of human rights and freedom as well so that's you need to engage them deeper so that you can develop a nuanced approaches and if there are Central Asians now going to Russia and China. There is an economic factor there, and there is also another factor it's not easy to come to the United States US doesn't really issue visas for example in Uzbekistan really so many prefer to go to Russia and China because it's cheaper it's easier to study there if you expand exchange programs for example I know a lot of people are quite cynical about that as well. You need to create opportunities for more Central Asians to come and study here, I mean that's a long term investment if you want to make but that's one of the reasons why they're going they're not going there because they want to be like Chinese or Russians they're going there because that's the option they have. Or they could stay at home and go to new universities. Yeah, that's exactly which are mainly being opened by China and Russia as well. They're shifting everything to Russia. The main development there is that they're, they're shifting them to the new school program that exists under Nazarbayev University as a trustee I've followed this closely. They are domesticating the bullet shot program. We share their higher education their school programs and so on. We're not we're still single-mindedly focusing on getting them abroad. We could be a very quick note, and that is how from generalities to specifics, I would suggest the way to go right now immediately state is to convene a meeting of C five plus one that is open, open by the President of the United States place in Washington, and have the art, if their name, thank you for raising that important issue. If we have them, have them prepare for that meeting by beginning us. How can we provide and what is in your security interest and what is in our interest and then parallel to that parallel to it shouldn't shouldn't be done totally in the darkness is a similar but quiet discussion in NATO. The ship for peace all the Central Asians, they were sending people to two programs and seminars they were getting training in 100 areas. It was very productive. What's the status of that and what should it be in them tomorrow. We do that. We're back in the game. All right, I've got a couple of questions that actually play right into that discussion. Number one, numerous panelists made statements for a strategy that includes the needs of the states and for government and government in general. How can the US make sure the general public's needs and interests are also addressed in this strategy. Number one that sort of plays off of that a little bit from Ambassador Alan mustard. In the 1980s the US government quit large scale funding and university scholarships for foreign students China moved into that space in Central Asia your thoughts on this, including this in the US strategy, Jen you look like you're. So I mean this is exactly why with all due respect friend star, you know I don't think that the security first. You know that might be that might win the hearts and minds of the states, but I think we also have to think about the people and this is where I think putting not security instability, but also prosperity has to be the heart. And this is what people care about right and if we're going to look at these this instability that we've seen in Central Asia you can look at all of these issues, and you know there's an economic bullseye on so many of these issues that have taken shape and if we care about perceptions of the United States I do think that this is a positive some outcome that government share citizen share and it puts citizens I think at the heart of this number two education. The US has made massive investments into the American University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan it's helped a lot of people you know throughout the region but mostly in Kyrgyzstan. You know that that university in Kazakhstan citizens of Kazakhstan, the largest population in Central Asia is in Uzbekistan I think that the US would be. If we look at what went well in Afghanistan, I would argue that the investment that paid off the most was education and education had a transformational impact and the US has this comparative advantage I'm going to keep saying it, and this is how we put people first. This is how we put prosperity first and this is how we put you know positive some relations. I know that the Uzbeks for example want this very very badly. It's a low hanging fruit easy win for everyone. Any other comments. Yeah, you've created a false dichotomy. No one's arguing against what you just said. The question is how do you get them engaged to the level that is in our interest on those issues and that requires more than we're doing and it requires a degree of of candor about and communication about security matters that has not been present. I don't disagree with you there and I don't think this is a false dichotomy I just think that when we have a strategy that says security and stability and says nothing about prosperity. No, you don't have such a. Okay, let me let me let me redirect this a little bit. We've got a question. And I actually feel this sometimes when I bring up C five plus one issues and I'm dealing with embassies here in Washington. Does Central Asia want to be dealt with as a region to these countries want to be dealt with as as a group, or would they prefer to be established bilateral relations with the United States we are very much for, you know, the group principle. But sometimes, you know, we see maybe competition Fred. We're not very much for it we've, we've tipped our hat to it but done very little to implement it. Let me say, for years they were not for me understandably as new sovereignty is just like the United States after independence. And so our own way brushed everyone else aside, and so on, and then later on we started reengaging. And they have all reached a level of self confidence, whether it's fully learned into not as another question but they have. And so they want not to not to their sovereignty but to build a second story on. And the second story is regional and the history of this regionalization in Central Asia is extremely interesting. It involves expeditions to Singapore to analyze and discuss and meet with all the top people in ASEAN in involves study of the Nordic Council and involves meetings at the president. So it's all and these have been frequent and it calls meetings of women by the way women in civil society organizations these have already taken place on a regional level with presidential support, and an education research all sorts of things this is all happening before us. It's just that we've taken a rather passive approach, they've gone ahead of us and we have to catch up. This is this is not against anyone by the way. Rather than following behind it. We should be, we should not to do, but we should make clear, we're ready to support this and to work with you on it tomorrow morning. Okay, Navarro and then Dick. Well, they want both, Gavin, they want to be treated as a region as a legitimate part of the world, or you know with common interests and priorities but they also each central Asian, you know, country wants to be seen within its own unique qualities and unique position so they prefer both. And they love it when you call them unique. They love it when you call them you know something different than anybody else but the United States is not going to win the hearts and minds in Central Asia by, you know, US top level diplomats going to touch on the roles where you know making plots and posting pictures you know or or having a nice summer ground register background pictures I mean those things are really cheap PR at this point. You mentioned social media I didn't mean I didn't mention social media before because it's such a normal normalcy now that it's nothing new yes central Asians are on social media so what, what is happening in those conversations. I hear a lot in those conversations nowadays is the lack of energy across the region. You know, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan lost, you know had massive outage this week and millions and Uzbekistan are still living without gas and power now as we speak. So talk about your energy policy lack of like this is a regional issue. And then of course corruption. Now we hear President Biden talking about anti corruption efforts he talks about commitment, you know, in terms of fighting terrorism he never mentioned Central Asia, we haven't heard anything about Central Asia in his speeches yet. So, how about that. I mean I would really take that into account when Central Asians here President Biden speak about things obviously they relate they live in those environments where corruption is deep when they really need help fighting corruption. And yet we don't really as I said earlier we don't hear deeper, more engaging conversations about that engage the government but also the public and the best way to engage the public is of course engaging the media community and I know that you're going to ask this question. You know what can us do or what can it change in its strategy in the coming years it would be support media freedom and supporting media freedom should not and will not threaten the governments in the region you they need to understand that you need to have that conversation with the governments that media freedom press freedom professional responsible media in the region will just take them forward. And that's also not happening. If you can't if us doesn't support this and its partners, it's Western partners, nobody else will and that's something unique about the United States and that's something that I would really really strongly suggest in terms of you know renewing us to the strategy for the region media freedom supporting. We're running running short on time and you've already anticipated my, my lightning round outro question, which is, what one thing would you add or change to the strategy going forward so dick I'm going to let you make your comment and then you can answer the question of what one thing you would change or add to the strategy going forward. Well, actually my, my comment is going to take care of both of those Gavin. I want to go back to what Fred was saying about the regional organization. Look, they've already started that on their own in 2018 with the leadership of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. They had a summit. They had a C five. It wasn't a C five plus one. It wasn't a C five plus Japan. It wasn't a C five plus South Korea. It was a C five. And they followed that up. The change in government, the change in presidency in Uzbekistan sort of slowed that down for a while. And now in evidently the issues in Kazakhstan is going to slow it that are going to slow it down once again. But they do have a date set for their next summit. So that's one thing we need to do in US policy and I hope that less victory is still listening. What we need to do is fully openly support and promote the regional organization on the model as Fred said of ASEAN or the Nordic Council, or many many others, because that will make them stronger among themselves. They don't lose sovereignty. They gain strength. That's important. So Fred, what would you add or change in the current strategy going forward, lightning round? Well, I agree with with Dick Hogan 100%. We always have on this. In addition to the been passive and mechanical on this, it's not that we're against it. We've just been been mechanical and and and sort of bureaucratic and we've not asked them. What can we do to support? But a second matter, I think in that is, let's have some daylight on the security relationship. The whole issue there. What are we doing? What is NATO up to now? What has it done in the past? What should it do in the future? How does that support or not support our policy that state is pursuing? What is coming from two totally different entities that don't don't talk with each other? They should be mutually reinforcing. That's my point. The security and the civil programs should should each support the other. And that isn't the case today. All right, so Navajo, you've already told us what your answer is. So I'm going to let Jen take us out with the one thing we need to change in US strategy going forward. So it's doing exactly what with both this and Fred suggested first on the regional integration, but to building on what Fred just said in terms of security. One of the things we haven't talked about at all is Afghanistan. And Fred has made a longstanding argument, which is the smartest argument I've seen about the need to integrate Afghanistan into this region. And so I would put Afghanistan into this strategy, not just only the security dimension is huge, of course. So I would, I would have a C5 C6, right. And I know Fred that you've argued with this I 100% with you. And it's even more important now than ever. If we want to reach the people of Afghanistan, you know, look at how the Central Asian republics are approaching this right now. And I think if you take your glasses off all of us in this world, it's going to surprise you. They are confident in dealing with Afghanistan. They're more confident in dealing with Afghanistan than we are. You know, it was back as they set up a huge humanitarian hub in Tarmaz. If we want to deal with the people of Afghanistan, we might not like the government, but I hope that we continue to support the people of Afghanistan. So I think making this strategy actually include Afghanistan in a very serious way. You know, Afghanistan doesn't want to be part of I mean historically is not wanted to be part of. They want to be many Afghans want to be part of Central Asia and see this strategy is very important to them. So let's put Afghanistan into the strategy. Okay, we are out of time, but even more importantly, we seem to have reached consensus, which I think is a wonderful way to add a very thoughtful, very engaging panel. So I want to thank all of our panelists. I want to thank our audience for the questions and everybody have a great weekend. You too. Thanks very much.