 Well, I wish I could. Economists are very good at analyzing before and after scenarios. And we all know what the before is with the UK and the EU. But the after is still ill-defined and uncertain. Now, four chapters of the book deal with economic and social aspects of the changed UK-EU relationship insofar as they affect Ireland. Previously, as the other two speakers dealt with, the book explores mainly political, but also political economic aspects. What we did not do in this exercise was try to quantify the likely direct impacts on the UK economy of a British exit, a Brexit. We could have done it, but we didn't. However, none of the accumulating UK studies showed that there could be much by way of good economic news for the UK. However, as Kane said, in economics, you cannot convict your opponent of error. You can only convince him of it. And that's basically the argument that is going on in this book. We're trying to convince the British of the seriousness of certain issues, not least of which affect Ireland. We in Ireland have learned to live with the fact that our most significant trading partner was only half in the EU. But in the four chapters in the book, we're concerned with the possible consequence of an extreme fully out scenario, because the other scenarios are life as we've led it before. The fully out is the serious one. The chapter by Professor Morgan Roth from the SRI takes a top-down macroeconomic perspective. John McGrann takes a business perspective. Blair Horan takes a trade union perspective. And I look at UK EU issues from a Northern Ireland perspective. Now, in macroeconomic terms, Professor Morgan Roth describes three main potentially vulnerable areas, trade, energy, and foreign direct investment. By analogy with the direct impacts on UK trade, as quantified by UK studies, the knock on Irish negative trade impacts could be serious. And they could be as high as 20% of trade with the UK and 4% of overall trade. So these are not direct impacts. They're indirect impacts that flow from the negative impacts that are likely to occur in the UK. However, remember that the UK has a trade surplus with Ireland. I think we're one of the few countries they have a trade surplus with. And they'd be unlikely to throw that away casually. Now, energy security involving the UK Irish connector could also be disrupted and alternatives more expensive. These were complex areas involving huge expenditures of money. And Professor Morgan Roth deals with the potential for disruption in this area. But foreign direct investment impacts could be potentially positive as non-UK firms seek alternative insider production and service locations, insider within the EU. What, of course, our assumption is that Ireland remains within the EU and doesn't leave Britain. The uncertainty is too great to be more quantitative until the new UK-EU relationship is unsettled. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't toss around the issues and look at worst case scenarios. Now, turning to the impacts on firms producing in Ireland, John McGrath describes a UK Irish business community that for cultural, for geographical, and for historical reasons is extraordinarily interconnected. We don't trade with Britain at arm's length. We trade with them as partners. Smaller Irish-owned firms are heavily exposed to the UK market in a range of traditional, highly labor-intensive sectors. As the UK-EU drama unfolds, it will be absolutely essential for Irish businesses that free trade arrangements are maintained. Indeed, many of the quite legitimate concerns of the UK business community with the need for reforms to EU governance are also shared by the Irish business community. As the date of the in-out referendum approaches, these kinds of issues are likely to come to the fore as they did in the recent referendum on Scottish independence in a slightly awkward way. But the economic realities dominated the last weeks of that debate. So we shouldn't worry too much if the storm and drying of the early stages of this referendum is neglects economics. From the perspectives of trade unions, Blair Horan paints a complex and rather depressing picture of how the UK struggled to avoid engaging with the social agenda of an ever-deep union. But trade unions of both the UK and Ireland recognized that the EU was crucial to the evolution of social and labor market improvements and reforms. Both groups recognize that competition on the basis of conflicting social models is undesirable in a modern EU economy. The fear is social dumping. In other words, unfair exploitation of cheaper migrant workers or the reallocation of production to low wage, low social protection countries. This is sometimes characterized as a race to the bottom. It would be the Irish trade union position that the UK be given no further opt-outs in social areas in the negotiations. Finally, Northern Ireland. Here we find that political debate remains internally focused on legacy issues from the period of civil unrest. It's very understandable, but it's undesirable in many ways. This provides little space for informed debates on economic consequences for the Northern economy of a move towards Brexit. Nevertheless, three such concerns are pressing, if not for the Northern political establishment, certainly for us. First, the Northern economy is an urgent need of policy and structural reforms to deal with greater policy devolution. The high dependency on subvention from London to keep it afloat is unlikely to be permitted to last forever, particularly after a Brexit. Second, the dominant economic relationship in the North is with the British economy. Sales of Northern Ireland to Britain are not referred to as exports. They're referred to as external sales, but to all intents and purposes, they're exports. Nearly 70% of sales of goods and services produced in the North are sold within the United Kingdom. It kind of resembles the Irish Free State in the first decade of independence. It's totally in the shadow of the British economy. And the firms producing these goods are also often in vulnerable sectors just as in Ireland. The spillover consequences of any Brexit are likely to be much more serious for the North than they will be for Ireland. And little policy thinking is directed to this challenge. And thirdly, the Irish economy has a very special relationship with Northern Ireland and is often used as the first step for small firms as they move to export out of the home market. Since the Belfast Agreement, both economies have become very intertwined. So strategic repositioning between these two parts of the Ireland economy might serve to buffer any damage that a Brexit might cause Northern Ireland. If handled carefully and wisely, this may be a positive factor transforming North-South relationships. In other words, never fail to make use of a crisis.