 Next, old friend, Gilles Cappell, who, as I think you all know, a very distinguished scholar of this region, of Islam, of what's going on in the banlieue of France in the very complicated world of French relations with Islam. Gilles is, I'll read this director of the Middle East Mediterranean chair of the École Normale Supérieure, a professor at Paris Saint-Séon-Saint-Letra, and has worked sometimes as an envoy for various presidents, including Jupiter. Monsieur Macron. Gilles. Well, thank you. Thank you very much for having me. I know that had the results of the soccer game being different last night, I would not be here, and I had Kyle prevailed on Kylian. It would be my English opposite number who would be here on my step. So I try to do my best. The one thing which strikes me in our conference is that it took us, panel number 19 or 20, to discuss with the Middle East issue. As if the prevailing, the present war between Russia and Ukraine was just a reenactment of some sort of east-west war of old. It is to an extent, but it is not. And as you, Mamdouh, as you, sorry, I pronounced it the Egyptian way, as you rightly mentioned, the Black Sea, this war takes place on the Black Sea, and the Black Sea is part of the Mediterranean system. But you know, this is not the first time a war that was taking place in Europe also had a very significant extension in the east, whether it be Salonique during World War I, where my great-grandfather was a gendarme militaire, or Valentine's Day 1945, where FDR and Ibn Saud had their amour toujours conversation, my oil against your protection, my protection against your oil. So to a large extent, we have to take the region into much more serious consideration, but I think we did until recently. And it's not only because of oil, because of oil prices have skyrocketed, because the reason many of us came here, we have to say that, frankly, to Thierry, is that the climate is much better, because we're freezing in Paris at zero degrees tonight, and this morning many of us went to the beach. And it's definitely, this is a very important issue, which goes back then to the Valentine's Day agreements. But there is also a very significant issue that we have not taken into consideration to a large extent, that as we mentioned, Thierry K. fortunately, which I believe is an extremely important actor with what you call hyper-pragmatism, which is a concept I will use and, of course, quote you in the future, where that means Erdogan changing sides every other day so that he thinks he will be re-elected. But this means also that he bought S-400s from Russia, sold by Akhtar drones to Ukraine, that the Iranians are helping the Russians with their own drones, and that nice guy Mr. Medvedev warned the Israelis if ever you give the Ukrainians the means to down the Iranian drones, beware about the Syrian skies, and so on and so forth. So I think that this is not something we have really thought of, that the Middle East, the global Middle East, is also taken into something which, now as you had hyper-pragmatism, which was your concept, let me try mine, which is disaffiliation, does that mean anything in English? That means that nothing has to be taken for certain. It would be hyper-pragmatism at the global scale. And like you mentioned, the mission I did as special envoy to President Macron and some of the southern and eastern countries of the Mediterranean, and what I was being told by my interlocutors was that we do not think we're bound significantly by any former alliance. If Israel brings the best missiles, China the best, whatever, Russia this and that, we're going to choose, we're going to do sort of cherry picking, which is okay if you think that the world is based on daily transactional things, but this may lead to not hyper-pragmatism, but hyper-tribalism, if I may say so. And then in a region where you have to have strong security, this is a major challenge that we are facing now, particularly in a country like the UAE, which is extremely dependent on security issues, which is part and parcel of the, not the Valentine's Day agreement, but the Abraham Accord or the Donald Accord, as you wanted it to be called, and particularly with what is happening in Iran. One other thing which we have to take into consideration is that authoritarian regimes are also being shaken in the process. What is happening in Iran, irrelevant, regardless of what happens with GCPAA, no GCPOA, post-GCPOA, and so on and so forth, is now being significantly different from whatever happened in the past. The Green Revolution or whatever it was called, where the police and arrested a number of people, sentenced them, put them in jail, and then it was put down. This is not happening. Yesterday, the sentence to death and executed the first demonstrator as an Adu Allah, enemy of God, waging war against God, which is even worse. But this is definitely not bringing any quite. This is something much deeper that has to do with the issues of identity, of self, of women cutting their hair in public, something which has to do with the button, with what is intimate in Shia culture, and they're clearly at pains finding a way to changing. And we have to foresee the fact that the Iranian leadership, in spite of the fact that they have this sort of hyperactivity militarily on their borders, are in a state which is now significantly weakened, and we have to think of that for the future. Very briefly, another issue is that what is happening in Russia also, the fact that they are unable to lead a military strategy which is winning except bombing civilians, will also change a number of things in the region. A number of countries were willing to buy Russian weaponry. What is happening now is not a great showcasing for Russian weaponry. So all that is changing. I think that there is a real need to interject much more of what happens on the south-eastern front in this war for fear not to really understand the stakes which we deal with. Yeah, which is why I sort of started a bit by at least mentioning Russia's movement into the region, which isn't brand new but is real and isn't going away. And I'm curious, others may want to respond to this too, but what this does to Russia's intentions in Syria, other places. But I also am very interested in seeing the demonstrations in Iran. I mean, I covered the Iran Revolution. I'd still try to follow it. The demonstrations in China, which are really interesting. We don't see a lot of demonstrations in Russia, I have to say, because perhaps many of the people who have demonstrated already left. But I do wonder what this shakiness in Iran and persistent rumors that Ayatollah Khamenei is quite ill, how that will impact the rest of the region and also what Iran sponsors, which is the thing we haven't really talked about. What do you think? Well, on Khamenei's health bulletin I have no answer. But what is interesting in Russia also is that the mass of people who are sent to the front are increasingly people from the Muslim Republic and non-Russians from the Federation. Not to mention the famous Ramzan Kadyrov, who repatriated recently to Chechnya, the body of Abdullah Ansarov, who beheaded Samuel Patti in France, a hero of Chechnya. But there is a price that is going to have to be paid for that by putting, relying on those populations because they are citizens of a different nature and this is going to probably lead to a problem within the State of the Union, but others here are much more competent than I am on this issue. Now, on Syria, I heard Mamdur say that he thought nothing would happen from the Turkish side, whereas we had the drum beats all over the year and was it your Minister of Defence or Interior, whatever you say, it's going to start tomorrow where we're going to wipe the Turkish terrorists out of everything. I think we're going to have our 40-kilometer debuffer state, but nothing has happened. And even in your hyper-pragmatism concept, which I like, don't you think that at the end of the day, if you, as we say in French, you cry to the wolf and the wolf does not come? Finally, you don't fear the big bad wolf anymore? Exactly. It's that famous Qawafi poem, the barbarians are coming but they never arrive, so what must we do now? They were a kind of answer. We have to say that it is Qawafis, the poet, and not Qawafi, as many people have said. Exactly.