 Good afternoon and welcome to a global report. I'm your host, Leigh Holstein, all the way live from Singapore. We have with us today Mr. Vila Hari Kausikhan, who is a highly accomplished diplomat. Mr. Kausikhan was the permanent SAC at the Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also the permanent rep of Singapore to UN and Singapore's ambassador to Russia. Nowadays, Mr. Kausikhan is the chairman of the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore. Welcome to the show, Mr. Kausikhan. Well, thank you for inviting me to your show. Thanks, good morning to everybody in Hawaii. Thank you so much. Yeah, it's afternoon there. But thanks for coming on. Now, today we're not going to be talking about the Middle East. We're going to have you back on a later show for that. But what I wish to hear from you, which I think will benefit the American viewers too, is your take on small state diplomacy. And let me just quickly explain why this is needed. In my experience, and I lived in US for the larger part of my life, it's inconceivable almost to get people from big countries to see the world through the lens of small countries like Singapore. They don't understand our foreign policy of being friends to everybody, you know, even countries that they don't like. So with your broad experience and diverse undertakings, could you share with us what small state diplomacy entails, please? Well, you're absolutely right, first of all. I gave up many, many years ago trying to explain how the world looks to a small country. It looks very fundamentally different to a small country, and then to a big country, whether that big country is the United States or China, or even a medium-sized country, let's say like Japan or Australia, right? Well, I think, you know, if you are a small country, you have to start from the premise that I am irrelevant to the world. That means your first thought, your basic strategic imperative, is how I make myself relevant to the world. And there is no magic formula, there is no silver bullet to this, because what makes you relevant vis-a-vis, say, the country A, right? Maybe irrelevant vis-a-vis country B. And what makes you relevant today? Maybe irrelevant next week or next month. So it is a constant process, it's a process. It's not an event. You can't say, all right, I'm irrelevant now forever. How you do that, of course, is you have to be alert. You have to be agile. And you have to be aware that however small a country is, it always has some agency. However dire a situation may be, there is always something you can do. Now, whether you have the wit to recognize what you can do and the courage to do it, that's another matter. But in principle, there is always something that can be done. Now, Mr. Halsey, can I just to interrupt you there? You said that a country, a small country has to be agile. But I know that Singapore has this consistent principle approach when it comes to dealing with foreign players. So do you think that mindset somehow constrain our flexibility and our ability to adapt? No, I think you have to understand what we mean by being consistent. We are consistent in the pursuit of our national interests. That is the consistency. Our national interests based on a number of principles. And that is, shall we say, the star by which we navigate. But you can't influence many international events because you are small. So in order to keep that cause, you have to cultivate agility, mental as well as policy and agility. Right now in the context of US-China competition, much more intense than normal, your national interests, Singapore's national interests, might sometimes take us, lead us to tilt in the American direction. Sometimes it may lead us to tilt in the Chinese direction. And sometimes it may lead us to disregard both of them and go our own way. That's what I mean. That is the basic consistency. Small countries get into trouble when they try to please one big power or another. Because if you please one, you won't please the other. So you have to please yourself. When I was in the foreign ministry, I used to tell young Foreign Service officers that we are not put on Earth to bring joy to American hearts or to bring joy to Chinese hearts or Australian hearts or Japanese hearts or Indian hearts or European hearts. We have on Earth to bring joy to Singapore hearts. And that is the consistency that we must pursue. Now you mentioned China. I know one of the constant pressure that we feel from China is that they try to impose this Chinese identity on us. Because we are the only ethnic Chinese majority country outside of mainland China. So there's this constant pressure from them that we are a Chinese country. But we're not Chinese country. We're Chinese Malay, Indians, Eurasians. And I don't think there's any interest in any of us to be subsumed into the Chinese dynastic system. So how has Singapore gone about dealing with this pressure from China? Well, we have to keep reminding them over and over again that we are not. Because I think it is something very deep in the cultural and political DNA in China. That if your majority of your population is of ethnic Chinese origin, you must be a Chinese country. I mean, they may understand it may be otherwise intellectually, but emotionally, they keep coming back to it. And this is true of officials, of normal people, of everybody. So you have to keep, this is one of the consistencies you must adopt. Secondly, I think the fact is from time to time, you have to draw red lines and enforce them. About three years ago, we had to expel this Chinese professor, who had both PRC and American citizenship. And we have had to do that with the US too. We have had to do that with other countries. That we are ourselves. We are not a copy of A or B. Now you said that we have to sometimes tilt a little to the lab and sometimes tilt a little to the ride. And I recall in 2018 that Prime Minister Li Xinlong actually said there will come a day. They may come a day when ASEAN, which is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for the American viewers, ASEAN comprises Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Brunei. So these 10 member states. And Li Xinlong said that there may come a day when ASEAN has to pick a side between US or China. He didn't say who we're going to pick. But I think in a recent survey by ICS use of eShop, 53% of the respondents said that they would pick United States. But when we break the respondents down into their nationality, a majority from seven out of 10 countries said that they would pick China. So what are your thoughts on that? Is the American losing regional confidence here? OK, if you look at that survey and it's by the Southeast Asian Studies Institute and an earlier one, and there are a number of other surveys, they have been pretty consistent. The precise figures vary from survey to survey. But they may be pretty consistent in two things. If you ask respondents, is China important and growing importance? Overwhelming majority will say yes. If you ask the respondents, is the US important? A majority will also say yes. But if you ask the respondents, do you trust either US or China? Majority will say not particularly. So I think that it's a limitation of these surveys. I think one of the strongest motivations in Southeast Asia is nationalism. And nationalism leads you to one autonomy. So ASEAN will have to navigate very carefully between these two powers, particularly in this period of enhanced competition, which is going to be a prolonged period, irrespective of who ever wins in November. I don't think it is necessary that we have to choose when Prime Minister Lee Sam Lung said it may come to that. It will come to that if we are clumsy, if we lack agility, and if we fail, ASEAN as a whole. I don't think that is a pre-ordained situation. I don't think the world is a binary place. In fact, most situations are not binary. There may be some issue domains where the choices will be binary. And I don't expect every 10 members will make the same choice. Let me give you an example. It's a bit hypothetical now, but I think it is a right example. I think one of the domains where people are going to have to make binary choices, but even then it's not so binary, is Huawei and 5G. But I don't expect that all 10 countries will make the same choice. So as a whole, even Singapore, we haven't made a simple binary choice. The two main service providers will not use Huawei, but the third can use Huawei if it wants to. And I think if you take ASEAN as a whole, I cannot see, although the choice is binary, because it's been forced on you. But you can always find a third way as Singapore did. And I think, let's say, 10 countries, and I'm just throwing out numbers as a hypothetical here, maybe six will choose Huawei. Because there are advantages to choosing Huawei, because it's cheaper for a start. If you are one of the poorer ASEAN countries, cost is going to be a major consideration. But maybe the rest won't. And maybe the rest, some of the rest, or even some of those who choose Huawei, will not necessarily cut themselves off entirely from the other service providers. So it's a question of your wit. Can you find, can you create more than binary choices even in a binary situation? It's up to us. So Mr. Bilahari, let's say we go beyond the two binary choices and try to engage more broadly. But looking at ASEAN, I mean, I agree that, I think multi-polarity is good for ASEAN. But I just don't think ASEAN has figured out a way to capitalize on a multi-polarity. I mean, if you look at ASEAN, it's such a diverse organization, be it in political, structure, economic development, even all the primordial stuff like race, language, religion is so different. The only thing they have in common is maybe the weather and a desire for autonomy. So how can we overcome this difficulties in very complicated decision-making on the internal even? Well, I'm not saying it's going to be easy. It's going to be quite difficult. But if you look at what ASEAN has done, forums that the ASEAN 10 have created, things like the East Asia Summit, things like the ASEAN Regional Forum, even the ASEAN Defence Minister's Plus where you invite your dialogue partners, even the whole structure of dialogue relationships, this is intended even in a small matter. I'm not saying we have enormous influence, right? But we do have, but we are not without some influence. As I said, everybody has some agency. Now, all these forums, they are intended to promote a kind of multi-polar balance in Southeast Asia. It's giving all the major powers some legitimate stake in Southeast Asia to get involved in the region. Now, a unipolar Southeast Asia, whether the pole is China or the US, is a disaster because there will be zero move, zero place to maneuver. A bipolar Southeast Asia, there will be slightly more place. But a multi-polar Southeast Asia, there will be even more space. Now, whether you have, again, I must stress this, whether you have the wit to take advantage of that space and the agility and the courage to use it, that's another matter. But in principle, it's there. Look, I don't see any country in Southeast Asia shunning a relationship with China or shunning a relationship with the US. But those are not the only countries. They nobody wants an exclusive relationship. Japan will always be there. Indonesia will always be there. Australia will always be there. And at least some European, some members of the European Union will be players in the region. So this is a naturally multi-polar region, not just Southeast Asia, but I would guess what we now call the Indo-Pacific, that huge threat of things from Northeast Asia, right down through Southeast Asia, to South Asia, to the person girl. This is a naturally multi-polar region. Japan is not going to disappear. India is not going to disappear. Australia, South Korea, and Indonesia is a big country in itself. And so is Vietnam. So that is the space. Now talking about broader engagement, I have to ask you this because you were the former Singapore's ambassador to Russia and your father, the highly respected P.S. Rahman Worster, Singapore's ambassador to Soviet Union. So you know Russia better than most of us. Now in 2016, ASEAN and Russia put together a comprehensive plan of action and you were part of the ASEAN-Russia Eminent Person Group that put forth areas that ASEAN and Russia could collaborate in. Fast forward two years 2018, ASEAN and Russia elevated their partnership to one of strategic nature and President Putin made his inaugural EAS attendance in Singapore. So you know my question to you is there's interest on both ends and we have this big laundry list that's been created but what's being done on the ground to walk all the talk and to move all these things beyond symbolism? Is there anything that's being done? Not very much. I must tell you honestly, not very much. Is it a deliberate, are they deliberately not doing anything? No, no, I can tell you why, I can tell you why and I've written about this before. You know, when I was in the Eminent Person Group I came to two conclusions, right? The Russians had not talked very deeply what they wanted to do with ASEAN and the ASEAN countries had not thought very deeply what they wanted to do with Russia. If you look at the document that came out of the Eminent Person Group it's a laundry list. It is, it is. It's a laundry list of different items. Some items are clearly not practical. If I remember correctly, there's one item they want somebody, I mean it was on the Russian side wants to build a gas pipeline all the way from, you know, the Siberia and the Russian Far East to Southeast Asia. Now that's ridiculous. I quote my Russian experience. Why did they write it if it's not practical? I mean, was it just an exercise? Very simple, very simple. And I'm not blaming the Russian side in particular because some of my ASEAN colleagues had the same attitude. They were just preparing for the first ASEAN Russia summit, SOC. They wanted to have a long impressive looking list of things. That's all. Okay, so I mean, I was, I struggled against it for a little while and then I couldn't be bothered because I knew none of this is going to materialize, right? So we're just trying to create a document. No, but I think that said, it is time for both the Russians to think very deeply and in a practical way what they really want to do in Southeast Asia. And it's time for ASEAN countries to sit down and think equally deeply and in a practical way what we want Russia to do in Southeast Asia. And then to get together and see whether there is common ground. I think there will be some common ground, right? Because, but we haven't had that conversation yet. I see. Well, thank you. Now we have a question that came in from a viewer. It's a bit of a digression, but that's okay. The viewer wants to know, do Singaporeans want Trump or Biden to win the November election? You know, American politics is like the weather, you know? There's nothing you can do to influence it, right? So whether it rains or it's sunny, whether it's a hurricane comes or there's a drought, you still have to adapt yourself to it and that's pretty much the situation we are in, you know? Whether it is Trump or Biden, you know, it is a choice for Americans. We have no vote in the coming election, but we have to live with the outcome, whatever it is. Now to add to that, I think that there's this illusion or rather dissolution on the ground that once Trump is gone, a lot of the problems we see today will disappear, you know, whether he's gone in four more to his loaded year or in just a few months. I don't believe in it. Do you actually believe that once Trump is gone, a lot of the problems will go away? Well, I have to say this, right? Okay, many of the things that Trump has pursued as his foreign policy goes in this area, not all of them, many of the things are not bad goals. They are actually good goals. And some of the things are even better are better than what Obama was trying to do, right? Could you list some of them please? I will list them, but where I think it is open to criticism is the, is the, how would I put it? Is the unconventional way in which policy is made and conveyed? Let me give you an example, right? The situation in the South China Sea. The Obama administration started conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. But every time they did one, there was a very open public and almost metaphysical debate between the Department of Defense and the White House under Susan Rice, right? But whether a foreign op was really a foreign op, right? It was a quasi-metaphysical debate and that of course destroyed the effect of having a foreign op. Obama did, he said he's going to pivot to Asia and to some degree he did, right? By shifting assets and all that. But he was never very, he was never very comfortable with the reality of great power competition, right? Now that is a reality, whether you like it or not, part of international relations is great powers compete. In fact, not so great powers compete too, right? And you should deal with it. Now, one of the most foolish things I've ever heard any international statement do is when John Kerry said Russia's annexation of Crimea is 19th century behavior in the 21st century. I thought this was extremely stupid. I'm not saying that I approve of annexing another country, but why must you expect that your competitor or your adversary has the same values as you? In fact, if you think that is the natural order of things, you're going to get ambushed all over the time. Another thing I think that Mr. Trump did better is to deal with North Korea. Now, North Korea is never going to give up its nuclear weapons. They're not stupid, all right? They're bad, but they're not mad. And how do you deal with a nuclear weapon state? You deal with it as countries have already done it by deterrence. I think deterrence of North Korea did erode during the eight years of Obama because he clearly had no stomach for it. He did nothing for eight years and called it strategic patience. On the other hand, I think where Trump policy in this part of the world falls short is in the area of trade, right? Particularly the TPP. Not joining up the TPP. The TPP is actually, if you look at the details, and I don't think anybody in the administration probably looked at the details, it's actually stacked in America's favor. It is not a normal free trade agreement. It is actually setting standards for the next generation of industry, the next generation of business. Now, which is the one country that would benefit most from the next generation of business? It's the United States. Okay, well, it's your decision, you left, right? But I don't think this is a final decision. I'm not expecting the US to come back next week or in the next five years or six years, but eventually you will come back. Now, looking at the US electorate, it seems that they are very divided on the inside because on one hand, there is the default DNA to spread their ideology, their powers far and wide. And on the other hand, I think they are tired of this never ending wars. They want to step back, they want to withdraw. Do you say you ask internally being wedged between a rock and a hard place? And if it is, how can they get out of that conundrum? Well, first of all, I'm not sure there is a conundrum, right? I think Obama and Trump agree that it was a mistake to get entangled in the Middle East. Right? And they both have been in their own way trying to disentangle the US from that entanglement. And that's probably a wise thing to do. Now that's not quite the same thing as saying you're withdrawing, you know? There is this trope that is current in American liberal intellectual circles, that we say, that America is in retreat. Now this, I just don't see it. If you have an administration that says as a policy goal, I am going to compete and compete robustly with China. How can you be in retreat? And that is the one thing about China that the two candidates agree on. That's the only thing they agree on is they're both going to get tough on China. Yeah, I think they are going to get tough. That will remain, right? That will remain. And I don't think you will see any, you may see a change of tone. You may see a more deliberate way of making policy and conveying policy. And that's all to the good, right? But I don't think you're going to see any fundamental shift of direction. There will be strategic competition and one of the main areas of strategic competition is going to be technology because you have a lot of new legislation in the US. And it's not that this legislation only applies to the Trump administration. It will not apply to some other administration, right? So I think that will continue, right? With a bit more deliberation in how the policies conveyed and how it's made. And that's not a bad thing. I think I don't see the US is withdrawing from East Asia or the Indo-Pacific now. You are a viewer in Hawaii, that's now the site of Indo-Pac Command. It has always been and I don't see it never been, right? And as the new name implies, it implies that US has interest in this wide sphere of things from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. And I don't see that changing, right? Now how you, the, the one of the things about America is even when a new administration pursues the same policy, it feels obliged to say it's a new policy. Okay, I've got used to that, but you know, look at the substance, there has been a very basic continuity in American policy since 1969. The big disruption in American policy in this world is the so-called Nixon Doctrine or Guam Doctrine. We says that I am not going to get involved on the mainland of Southeast Asia again. I am going to be the offshore balancer. And that has been the American posture, whether you call it a pivot to Asia, whether you call it the Indo-Pacific, it's been the American policy since 1969. So sounds like whether it's going to be Trump or whether it's going to be Biden, there's going to be rivalry, our strategic competition against China and this rivalry is likely just going to intensify. So how can we as a small state Singapore as a small state navigate this dispute? First of all, have a clear idea of your own national interests. And that is your, as I said at the beginning, your guiding star. Then be alert, be agile and be courageous because sometimes you're going to have, I said sometimes you will tilt this way, sometimes you're going to tilt that way and sometimes you're going to tell both great powers, I'm going my own way. We have done it before and we can do it again. There's no reason why we have not, cannot do it again. Don't forget, don't forget, there's one last point that we make. We tend to think of the last 25 years when there was basically no alternative to the American-led world order as the natural order of things, right? It is not the natural order of things. For much longer, the international order has been divided and contested. It was so during the co-op, for example, right? And it is now perhaps returning to a more natural order of things. And it's complicated for everybody, it's complicated for China. No, when Mr. Xi Jinping praises globalization and says he supports globalization, he's expressing a deep concern because China was the main beneficiary of American-led globalization. And if America is no longer prepared to give it the same degree of support, China may be the greatest loser too. Yeah, I don't think they are too eager to dismantle the current order because they're the, like you said, they're the main beneficiary. Now, just one minute to close, let me squeeze in one more question. You mentioned the Cold War. I know things were very different back then. Things were binary, it's one or the other. But I think these days, if America were to go around telling everybody to stop trading with China, nobody's gonna listen to them. Nevertheless, is there any lesson from the Cold War that we can extract and apply to our present efforts at navigating this dispute between US and China? Yeah, I think there's one big lesson. We did it then, there's no reason we can't do it now. We survive, something more dangerous, we can survive this. And prosper, we prosper, then we can prosper now. Awesome. Well, on that plastic note, I wanna thank you for your time today, Mr. Vilahari, and look forward to having you back on another show. Thank you so much, sir. Thank you. Bye, thank you.