 Book 1, Chapter 2, of On War. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by Timothy Ferguson. On War by Carl von Klausowitz, translated by Colonel J. J. Graham. Book 1, Chapter 2, End and Means in War. Having in the foregoing chapter ascertained the complicated and variable nature of war, we shall now occupy ourselves in examining into the influence which this nature has upon the end and means in war. If we ask, first of all, for the object upon which the whole effort of war is to be directed, in order that it may suffice for the attainment of the political object, we shall find that it is just as variable as are the political object and the particular circumstances of the war. If in the next place, we keep once more to the pure conception of war, then we must say that the political object properly lies out of its province for, if war is an act of violence to compel the enemy to fulfill our will, then in every case all depends on our overthrowing the enemy, that is disarming him, and on that alone. This object, developed from abstract conceptions, but which is also the one aimed at, it are great many cases in reality, we shall, in the first place, examine in this reality. In connection with the plan of a campaign, we shall hereafter examine more closely into the meaning of disarming a nation, but here we must once draw a distinction between three things, which, as three general objects, comprise everything else within them. They are the military power, the country, and the will of the enemy. The military power must be destroyed, that is, reduced to such a state as to not be able to prosecute the war. This is the sense in which we wish to be understood hereafter whenever we use the expression destruction of the enemy's military power. The country must be conquered, for out of the country a new military force may be formed. But even when both these things are done, still the war, that is, the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies, cannot be considered as at an end as long as the will of the enemy is not subdued also. That is, its government and its allies must be forced into signing a peace, or the people into submission. For whilst we are in full occupation of the country, the war may break out afresh, either in the interior or through assistance given by allies. No doubt this may also take place after a peace, but that shows nothing more than that every war does not carry in itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement. But even if this is the case, still with the conclusion of peace a number of sparks are always extinguished which would have smoldered on quietly, and the excitement of the passions abates, because all those whose minds are disposed to peace, of which in all nations and under all circumstances there is always a greater number, turn themselves completely away from the road to resistance. Whatever may take place subsequently, we must always look upon the object as attained, and the business of war as ended by a peace. As protection of the country is the primary object for which the military force exists, therefore the natural order is that first of all this force should be destroyed, then the country subdued, and through the effects of these two results, as well as the position we then hold, the enemy should be forced to make peace. Generally the destruction of the enemy's force is done by degrees, and in just the same measure the conquest of the country follows immediately. The two likewise usually react upon each other, because the loss of provinces occasions a diminution of military force, but this order is by no means necessary, and on that account it also does not always take place. The enemy's army, before it is sensibly weakened, may retreat to the opposite side of the country, or even quite outside of it. In this case therefore, the greater part, or the whole of the country, is conquered. But this object of war in the abstract, this final means of attaining the political object in which all others are combined, the disarming the enemy, is rarely attained in practice, and is not a condition necessary to peace, therefore it can in no wise be set up in theory as a law. There are innumerable instances of treaties in which peace has been settled before either party could be looked upon as disarmed, indeed even before the balance of power had undergone any sensible alteration. Now further, if we look at the case in the concrete, then we must say that in a whole class of cases, the idea of a complete defeat of the enemy would be a mere imaginative flight, especially when the enemy is considerably superior. The reason why the object deduced from the conception of war, is not adapted in general to real war, lies in the difference between the two, which is discussed in the preceding chapter. If it was as pure as theory gives it, then a war between two states of very unequal military strength would appear an absurdity, therefore impossible. At most the inequality between the physical forces might be such that it could be balanced by the moral forces, and that would not go far with our present social condition in Europe. Therefore, if we have seen wars take place between states of very unequal power, that has been the case because there is a wide difference between war and reality and its original conception. There are two considerations which as motives may practically take the place of inability to continue the contest. The first is the improbability, the second is the excessive price of success. According to what we have seen in the foregoing chapter, war must always free itself from the strict law of logical necessity, and seek aid from the calculation of probabilities, and as this is so much more the case, the more the war has a bias that way, from the circumstances out of which it has arisen, the smaller its motives are, and the excitement it has raised, so it is also conceivable how out of this calculation of probabilities even motives to peace may arise. War does not, therefore, always require to be fought out until one party is overthrown, and we may suppose that, when the motives and passions are slight, a weak probability will suffice to move that side to which it is unfavourable to give way. Now, were the other side convinced of this beforehand, it is natural that it would strive for this probability only. Instead of first wasting time and effort in the attempt to achieve the total destruction of the enemy's army. Still more general in its influence on the resolution to peace is the consideration of the expenditure of force already made and further required. As war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased. This will be the case not only as regards extent but also as regards duration, as soon therefore as the required outlay becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value, the object must be given up and peace will be the result. We see, therefore, that in wars where one side cannot completely disarm the other, the motives to peace on both sides will rise and fall on each side according to the probability of future success and the required outlay. If these motives were equally strong on both sides, they would meet in the centre of their political difference. Where they are strong on one side, they might be weak on the other. If their amount is only sufficient, peace will follow, but naturally to the advantage of that side which has the weakest motive for its conclusion. We purposely pass over here the difference, which the positive and negative character of the political end must necessarily produce practically. For although that is as we shall hear after show of the highest importance, still we are obliged to keep here to a more general point of view, because the original political views in the course of the war change very much and at last may become totally different, just because they are determined by results and probable events. Now comes the question how to influence the probability of success. In the first place, naturally, by the same means which we use when the object is the subjugation of the enemy, by the destruction of his military force and the conquest of his provinces. But these two means are not exactly of the same import here as they would be in reference to that object. If we attack the enemy's army, it is a very different thing whether we intend to follow up the first blow with a succession of others until the whole force is destroyed, or whether we mean to contend ourselves with a victory to shake the enemy's feeling of security, to convince him of our superiority and to instill into him a feeling of apprehension about the future. If this is our object, we only go so far in the destruction of his forces as is sufficient. In like manner, the conquest of the enemy's provinces is quite a different measure if the object is not the destruction of the enemy's army. In the latter case, the destruction of the army is the real effectual action, and the taking of the provinces only a consequence of it. To take them before the army had been defeated would always be looked upon only as a necessary evil. On the other hand, if our views are not directed upon the complete destruction of the enemy's force and if we are sure that the enemy does not seek, but fears, to bring matters to a bloody decision, the taking possession of a weak or defenceless province is an advantage in itself, and if this advantage is of sufficient importance to make the enemy apprehensive about the general result, then it may also be regarded as a shorter road to peace. But now we come upon a peculiar means of influencing the probability of the result without destroying the enemy's army, namely upon the expeditions which have a direct connection with political views. If there are any enterprises which are particularly likely to break up the enemy's alliances, or make them inoperative, to gain new alliances for ourselves, to raise political powers in our own favor, and such, and such, then it is easy to conceive how much these may increase the probability of success and become a shorter way toward our object than the routing of the enemy's forces. The second question is how to act upon the enemy's expenditure in strength, that is, to raise the price of success. The enemy's outlay in strength lies in the wear and tear of his forces, consequently in the destruction of them on our part, and in the loss of provinces, consequently the conquest of them by us. Here again, on account of the various significations of these means, so likewise it will be found that neither of them will be identical in its signification in all cases if the objects are different. The smallness in general of this difference must not cause us perplexity for in reality the weakest motives, the finest shades of difference, often decide in favor of this or that method of applying force. Our only business here is to show that certain conditions being supposed, the possibility of attaining our purpose in different ways, is no contradiction, absurdity, nor even error. Besides these two means, there are three other peculiar ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemy's force. The first is invasion, that is, the occupation of the enemy's territory, not with a view to keeping it but in order to levy contributions upon it or to devastate it. The immediate object here is neither the conquest of the enemy's territory nor the defeat of his armed force but merely to do him damage in a general way. The second way is to select for the object of our enterprises those points at which we can do the enemy most harm. Nothing is easier to conceive than two different directions in which our force may be employed. The first of which is to be preferred if our object is to defeat the enemy's army while the other is more advantageous if the defeat of the enemy is out of the question. According to the usual mode of speaking we should say that the first is primarily military, the other more political, but if we take our view from the highest point both are equally military and neither the one nor the other can be eligible unless it suits the circumstances of the case. The third, by far the most important, from the number of cases which it embraces, is the wearing out of the enemy. We choose this expression not only to explain our meaning in few words but because it represents the thing exactly, and is not so figurative as it may first appear, the idea of wearing out in a struggle amounts in practice to a gradual exhaustion of the physical powers and of the will by the long continuance of exertion. Now if we want to overcome the enemy by the duration of the contest we must content ourselves with as small objects as possible, for it is in the nature of the thing that a great end requires a greater expenditure of force than a small one, but the smallest object that we can propose to ourselves is simple passive resistance, that is combat without any positive view. In this way therefore our means attain their greatest relative value, and therefore the result is best secured. How far now can this negative mode of proceeding be carried, plainly not to absolute passivity for mere endurance would not be fighting, and the defensive is an activity by which so much of the enemy's power must be destroyed, that he must give up his object, that alone is what we aim at in each single act, and therein consists the negative nature of our object. No doubt this negative object in its single act is not so effective as the positive object in the same direction would be supposing it's successful, but there is this difference in its favor, that it succeeds more easily than the positive, and therefore it holds out greater certainty of success. What is wanting in the efficacy of its single act must be gained through time, that is through the duration of the contest, and therefore this negative intention which constitutes the principle of the pure defensive is also the natural means of overcoming the enemy by the duration of the combat, that is of wearing him out. He lies the origin of that difference of offensive and defensive, the influence of which prevails throughout the whole province of war. We cannot at present pursue the subject further than to observe that from this negative intention are to be deduced all the advantages and all the stronger forms of combat which are on the side of the defensive and in which that philosophical dynamic law which exists between the greatness and the certainty of success is realized, we shall resume the consideration of all this hereafter. If then the negative purpose, that is the concentration of all means into a state of pure resistance, affords a superiority in the contest and if this advantage is sufficient to balance whatever superiority in numbers the adversary may have, then the mere duration of the contest will suffice gradually to bring the loss of force on the part of the adversary to the point at which the political object can no longer be an equivalent, a point at which therefore he must give up the contest. We see then that this class of means, the wearing out of the enemy, includes the great number of cases in which the weaker resists the stronger. Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War was never strong enough to overthrow the Austrian monarchy and if he had tried to do so after the fashion of Charles XII, he would inevitably have had to succumb himself but after his skillful application of the system of husbandning his resources had shown the powers allied against him through a seven years struggle that the actual expenditure of strength had far exceeded what they had at first anticipated, they made peace. We see then that there are many ways to one's object in war, that the complete subjugation of the enemy is not essential in every case, that the destruction of the enemy's military force, the conquest of the enemy's provinces, the mere occupation of them, the mere invasion of them, enterprises which are aimed directly at political objects, lastly a passive expectation of the enemy's blow are all means which each in itself may be used to force the enemy's will. According as the peculiar circumstances of the case lead us to expect more from the one or the other. We could still add to these a whole category of shorter methods of gaining the end which might be called arguments ad hominem. What branch of human affairs is there in which these sparks of individual spirit have not made their appearance amounting all formal considerations? And least of all can they fail to appear in war where the personal character of the combatants plays such an important part both in the cabinet and in the field. We limit ourselves to pointing this out as it would be pedantry to attempt to reduce such influences into classes. Including these we may say that the number of possible ways of reaching the object rises to infinity. To avoid underestimating these different short roads to one's purpose either estimating them only as rare exceptions or holding the difference which they cause in the conduct of war as insignificant we must bear in mind the diversity of political objects which may cause a war measuring at a glance the distance which there is between a death struggle for political existence and a war which a forced or tottering alliance makes a matter of disagreeable duty. Between the two innumerable gradations occur in practice if we reject one of these gradations in theory we might with equal right reject the whole which would be tantamount to shutting the real world completely out of sight. These are the circumstances in general connected with the aim which we have to pursue in war. Now let us turn to the means. There is only one single means. It is the fight. However diversified this may be informed however widely it may differ from a rough vent of hatred and animosity in a hand-to-hand encounter whatever number of things may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting still it is always implied in the conception of war that all the effects manifested have their roots in the combat. But this must always be so in the greatest diversion and complication of the reality is proved in a very simple manner all that takes place in war takes place through armed forces but where the forces of war that is armed men are applied there the idea of fighting must of necessity be at the foundation. All therefore that relates to the forces of war all that is connected with their creation maintenance and application belongs to military activity. Creation and maintenance are obviously only the means whilst application is the object. The contest of war is not a contest of individual against individual but an organized whole consisting of manifold parts. In this great whole we may distinguish units of two kinds the one determined by the subject the other by the object. In an army the massive combatance ranges itself always into an order of new units which again form members of a higher order. The combat of each of these members forms therefore also a more or less distinct unit. Further the motive of the fight therefore its object forms the unit. Now to each of these units which we distinguish in the contest we attach the name of combat. If the idea of combat lies at the foundation of every application of armed power then also the application of armed force in general is nothing more than the determining and arranging a certain number of combats. Every activity in war therefore necessarily relates to the combat either directly or indirectly. The soldier is levied, clothed, armed, exercised he sleeps, eats, drinks and marches all merely to fight at the right time and place. If therefore all the threads of military activity terminate in the combat we shall grasp them all when we settle the order of the combats only from this order and its execution precede the effects never directly from the conditions preceding them. Now in the combat all the action is directed to the destruction of the enemy or rather of his fighting powers for this lies in the conception of combat the destruction of the enemy's fighting power is therefore always the means to attain the object of the combat. This object may likewise be the mere destruction of the enemy's armed force but that is not by any means necessary and it may be something quite different. Whenever for instance as we have shown the defeat of the enemy is not the only means to attain the political object whenever there are other objects which may be pursued as the aim in a war then it follows of itself that such other objects may become the object of particular acts of warfare and therefore also the object of combats. But even those combats which as subordinate acts are in the strict sense devoted to the destruction of the enemy's fighting force need not have that destruction itself as their first object. If we think of the manifold parts of a great armed force of the number of circumstances which come into activity when it is employed then it is clear that the combat of such force must also require a manifold organization a subordinating of parts and formation. There may and must naturally arise from particular parts a number of objects which are not themselves the destruction of the enemy's armed force and which while they certainly contribute to increase that destruction do so only in an indirect manner. If a battalion is ordered to drive the enemy from rising ground or a bridge and such then properly the occupation of any such locality is the real object the destruction of the enemy's armed force which takes place only the means or secondary matter. If the enemy can be driven away merely by demonstration the object is attained all the same. But this hill or bridge is in point of fact only required as a means of increasing the gross amount of loss inflicted on the enemy's armed force. It is the case on the field of battle much more must it be so on the whole theater of war when not only one army is opposed to another but one state one nation one whole country to another here the number of possible relations and consequently possible combinations is much greater the diversity of measures increased and by the gradation of objects it's subordinate to another the first means employed is further apart from the ultimate object. It is therefore for many reasons possible that the object of a combat is not the destruction of the enemy's force that is of the force immediately opposed to us but that this only appears as a means. But in all such cases it is no longer a question of complete destruction for the combat is here nothing else but a measure of strength. Has in itself no value except that of the present result that is of its decision. But a measuring of strength may be affected in cases where the opposing sides are very unequal by a mere comparative estimate. In such cases no fighting will take place and the weaker will immediately give way if the object of the combat is not always the destruction of the enemy's force they're in engaged and if its object can often be attained as well without the combat taking place at all by merely making a resolve to fight and by the circumstances to which the resolution gives rise then that explains how a whole campaign may be carried on with great activity without the actual combat playing any notable part in it. That this may be so military history proves by a hundred examples how many of those cases can be justified that is without involving a contradiction and whether some of the celebrities out of them would stand criticism we shall leave undecided. For all we have to do with the matter is to show the possibility of such a course of events in war. We have only one means in war, the battle but this means by the infinite variety of paths in which it may be applied leads us into all the different ways which the multiplicity of objects allows of so that we seem to have gained nothing but that is not the case for from this unity of means proceeds a thread which assists the study of the subject as it runs through the whole web of military activity and holds it together. But we have considered the destruction of the enemy's force as one of the objects which may be pursued in war and left undecided what relative importance should be given to it amongst other objects. In certain cases it will depend on circumstances and as a general question we have left its value undetermined we are once more brought back upon it and we shall be able to get an insight into the value which must necessarily be accorded to it. The combat is the single activity in war in the combat the destruction of the enemy opposed to us is the means to the end. It is so even when the combat does not actually take place because in that case there lies at the root of the decision the supposition at all events that this destruction is to be regarded as beyond doubt. It follows therefore that the destruction of the enemy's military force is the foundation stone of all action in war the great support of all combinations which rest upon it like the arch on its abutments all action therefore takes place on the supposition that if the solution by force of arms which lies at its foundation should be realised it will be a favourable one. The decision by arms is for all operations in a war great and small what cash payment is in bill transactions however remote from each other these relations however seldom the realisation may take place still it can never entirely fail to occur. If the decision by arms lies at the foundation of all combinations then it follows that the enemy can defeat each of them by gaining a victory on the field not merely in the one on which our combination directly depends but also in any other encounter if it is only important enough for every important decision by arms that is destruction of the enemy's forces reacts upon all proceeding it because like a liquid element they tend to bring themselves to a level thus the destruction of the enemy's armed force appears therefore always as the superior and more effectual means to which all others must give way it is however only when there is a supposed equality in all other conditions that we can ascribe to the destruction of the enemy's armed force the greater efficacy it would therefore be a great mistake to draw the conclusion that a blind dash must always gain the victory over skill and caution an unskillful attack would lead to the destruction of our own and not the enemy's force and therefore is not what is he meant the superior efficacy belongs not to the means but to the end and we are only comparing the effect of one realized purpose with the other if we speak of the destruction of the enemy's armed force we must expressly point out that nothing obliges us to confine this idea to the mere physical force on the contrary the moral is necessarily implied as well because both in fact are interwoven with each other even in the most minute details and therefore cannot be separated but it is just in connection with the inevitable effect which has been referred to of a great act of destruction, a great victory upon all other decisions by arms that this moral element is most fluid if we may use that expression and therefore distributes itself the most easily through all the parts against the far superior worth which the destruction of the enemy's force has over all other means stands the expense and risk of this means and it is only to avoid these that any other means are taken that these must be costly stands to reason for the waste of our own military forces must Ceterus Paribus always be greater the more our aim is directed upon the destruction of the enemy's power the danger lies in this that the greater efficacy which we seek recoils on ourselves and therefore has worse consequences in case we fail of success other methods are therefore less costly when they succeed, less dangerous when they fail but in this is necessarily lodged the condition that they are only opposed to similar ones that is that the enemy acts on the same principle but if the enemy should choose the way of a great decision by arms our means must on that account be changed against our will in order to correspond with his then all depends on the issue of the act of destruction but of course it is evident that Ceterus Paribus in this act we must be at a disadvantage in all respects because our views and our means had been directed in part upon other objects which is not the case with the enemy two different objects of which one is not part the other exclude each other and therefore a force which may be applicable for the one may not serve for the other if therefore one of two belligerents is determined to seek the great decision by arms then he has a high probability of success as soon as he is certain that his opponent will not take that way but follows a different object and everyone who sets before himself any such other aim only does so in a reasonable manner provided he act on the supposition that his adversary has as little intention as he has are resorting to the great decision by arms but what we have here said of another direction of views and forces relates only to other positive objects which we may propose to ourselves in war besides the destruction of the enemy's force not by any means to the pure defensive which may be adopted with a view thereby to exhaust the enemy's forces in the pure defensive the positive object is wanting and therefore while on the defensive our forces cannot at the same time be directed on other objects they can only be employed to defeat the intentions of the enemy we have now to consider the opposite of the destruction of the enemy's armed force that is to say the preservation of our own these two efforts always go together as they mutually act and react on each other they are integral parts of one in the same view and we have only to ascertain what effect is produced when one or the other has the predominance the endeavour to destroy the enemy's force has a positive object and leads to positive results of which the final aim is the conquest of the enemy the preservation of our own forces has a negative object leads therefore to the defeat of the enemy's intentions that is to pure resistance of which the final aim can mean nothing more than to prolong the duration of the contest so that the enemy shall exhaust himself in it the effort with a positive object cause into existence the act of destruction the effort with the negative object awaits it how far the state of expectation should and may be carried we shall enter into more particularly in the theory of attack and defence at the origin of which we again find ourselves here we shall content ourselves with saying that the awaiting must be no absolute endurance and that in the action bound up with it the destruction of the enemies armed force engaged in this conflict may be the aim just as well as anything else it would therefore be a great error in the fundamental idea to suppose that the consequence of the negative course is that we are precluded from choosing the destruction of the enemy's military force as our object and must prefer a bloodless solution the advantage which the negative effort gives may certainly lead to that but only at the risk of it's not being the most advisable method as the question is dependent on totally different conditions resting not with ourselves but with our opponents this other bloodless way cannot therefore be looked upon at all as the natural means of satisfying our great anxiety to spare our forces on the contrary when circumstances are not favourable it would be the means of completely ruining them very many generals have fallen to this error and been ruined by it the only necessary effect resulting from the superiority of the negative effort is the delay of the decision so that the party acting takes refuge in that way as it were in the expectation of the decisive moment the consequence of that is generally the postponement of the action as much as possible in time and also in space in so far as space is in connection with it if the moment has arrived in which this can no longer be done without ruinous disadvantage then the advantage of the negative must be considered as exhausted and then comes forward unchanged the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force which was kept back by counterpoys but never discarded we have seen therefore in the foregoing reflections that there are many ways to the aim that is to the attainment of the political object but that the only means is the combat and that consequently everything is subject to a supreme law which is the decision by arms that where this is really demanded by one it is a redress which cannot be refused by the other that therefore a belligerent who takes any other way must make sure that his opponent will not take this means of redress or his cause may be lost in that supreme court hence therefore the destruction of the enemy's armed force amongst all the objects which can be pursued in war appears always as the one which overrules all others what may be achieved by combinations of another kind in war we shall only learn in the sequel and naturally only by degrees we content ourselves here with acknowledging in general their possibility as something pointing to the difference between reality and the conception to the influence of particular circumstances but we could not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the crisis the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force is the first born son of war if when political objects are unimportant motives weak the excitement of forces small a cautious commander tries in all kinds of ways without great crises and bloody solutions to twist himself skillfully into a peace through the characteristic weaknesses of his enemy in the field and in the cabinet we have no right to find fault with him if the premises on which he acts are well founded and justified by success still we must require him to remember that he only travels on forbidden tracks where the god of war may surprise him that he ought always to keep his eye on the enemy in order that he may not have to defend himself with a dress rapier if the enemy takes up a sharp sword the consequences of the nature of war how ends and means act in it how in the modifications of reality it deviates sometimes more sometimes less from its strict conception fluctuating backwards and forwards yet always remaining under that strict conception as under a supreme law all this we must retain before us and bear constantly in mind the consideration of each of the succeeding subjects if we would rightly comprehend their true relations and proper importance and not become involved incessantly in the most glaring contradictions with the reality and at last with our own selves End of Book 1, Chapter 2 Recording by Timothy Ferguson Gold Coast, Australia Book 1, Chapter 3 of On War This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Timothy Ferguson On War by Carl von Klasowitz translated by Colonel J. J. Graham Book 1, Chapter 3 The Genius for War Every special calling in life if it is to be followed with success requires peculiar qualifications of understanding and soul where these are of high order and manifest themselves by extraordinary achievements the mind to which they belong is termed genius We know very well that this word is used in many significations which are very different both in extent in nature and that with many of these significations it is a very difficult task to define the essence of genius but as we neither profess to be philosopher nor grammarian we must be allowed to keep to the meaning usual in ordinary language and to understand by genius a very high mental capacity for certain employments We wish to stop for a moment over this faculty and dignity of the mind in order to vindicate its title and to explain more fully the meaning of the conception but we shall not dwell on that, genius which has obtained its title through a very great talent on genius properly so called that is a conception which has no defined limits What we have to do is bring under consideration every common tendency of the powers of the mind and soul towards the business of war the whole of which common tendencies we may look upon as the essence of military genius We say common fit just therein consists military genius that is not one single quality bearing upon war as for instance courage while other qualities of the mind and soul are wanting or have a direction which is unserviceable for war but that it is an harmonious association of powers in which one or other may predominate but none must be in opposition If every combatant required to be more or less endowed with military genius then our armies would be very weak for it implies a peculiar bent of intelligent powers therefore it can only rarely be found where the mental powers of the people are called into requisition and trained in many different ways the fewer the employments followed by a nation the more that of arms predominates so much the more prevalent will military genius also be found but this merely applies to its prevalence by no means to its degree for that depends on the general state of intellectual culture in the country if we look at a wild warlike race then we find a warlike spirit in individuals much more common than in a civilized people for in the former almost every warrior possesses it whilst in the civilized whole masses are only carried away by it from necessity never by inclination but among uncivilized people we never find a really great general and very seldom what we can properly call a military genius because that requires a development of the intelligent powers which cannot be found in an uncivilized state the civilized people may also have a warlike tendency and development is a matter of course and the more this is general the more frequently also will military spirit be found in individuals in their armies now as this coincides in such case with the higher degree of civilization therefore from such nations have issued forth the most brilliant military exploits as the Romans and French have exemplified the greatest names in these and in all other nations that have been renowned in war belong strictly to epochs of higher culture from this we may infer how great a share the intelligent powers have in a superior military genius we shall now look more closely into this point war is the province of danger and therefore courage above all things is the first quality of a warrior courage is of two kinds the first physical courage or courage in the presence of danger to the person and next moral courage or courage before responsibility whether it be before the judgment seat of external authority or of the inner power, the conscience we only speak here of the first courage before danger to the person again is of two kinds first it may be indifference to danger whether proceeding from the organism of the individual contempt of death or habit in any of these cases it is to be regarded as a permanent condition secondly courage may proceed from positive motives such as personal pride, patriotism enthusiasm of any kind in this case courage is not so much a normal condition as an impulse we may conceive that the two kinds act differently the first kind is more certain because it has become a second nature never forsakes the man the second often leads him father in the first there is more of firmness in the second of boldness the first leaves the judgment cooler the second raises its power at times but often bewilders it the two combined make up the most perfect kind of courage war is the province of physical exertion and suffering in order not to be completely overcome by them a certain strength of body and mind is required which either natural or acquired produces indifference to them with these qualifications under the guidance of simply a sound understanding a man has at once a proper instrument for war and these are the qualifications so generally to be met with amongst wild and half civilized tribes if we go further into the demands which war makes on it then we find the powers of the understanding predominating war is the province of uncertainty three fourths of those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty here then above all a fine and penetrating mind is called for to search out the truth by the tact of its judgment an average intellect may at one time perhaps hit upon this truth by accident and extraordinary courage at another may compensate for the want of this tact but in the majority of cases the average result will always bring to light the deficient understanding war is the province of chance in no human sphere of activity is such a margin to be left for this intruder because none is so much in constant contact with him on all sides he increases the uncertainty of every circumstance and arranges the course of events from this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions this continual interposition of chance the actor in war constantly finds things different from his expectations and this cannot fail to have an influence on his plans or at least on the presumptions connected with these plans if this influence is so great as to render the predetermined plan completely nuggetory then as a rule a new one must be substituted in its place but at the moment the necessary data are often wanting for this because in the course of action circumstances press for immediate decision and allow no time to look about for fresh data often not enough for mature consideration but it more often happens that the correction of one premise and the knowledge of chance events which have arisen are not sufficient to overthrow our plans completely but only suffice to produce hesitation our knowledge of circumstances has increased but our uncertainty instead of having been diminished has only increased the reason of this that we do not gain all our experience at once but by degrees thus our determinations continue to be assailed incessantly by fresh experience and the mind if we may use that expression must always be under arms now if it is to get safely through this perpetual conflict with the unexpected two qualities are indispensable in the first place an intellect which even in the midst of this intense obscurity is not without some traces of inner light which lead to the truth and then the courage to follow this light the first is figuratively expressed by the French phrase coup d'oeil the other is resolution as battle is the feature in what which attention was originally chiefly directed and as time and space are important elements in it more particularly when cavalry with their rapid decisions with the chief arm the idea of rapid and correct decision related in the first instant to the estimation of these two elements and to denote the idea an expression was adopted which actually only points to a correct judgment by eye many teachers of the art of war then gave this limited signification as the definition of coup d'oeil but it is undeniable that all able decisions formed in the moment of action soon came to be understood by the expression as for instance the hitting upon the right point of attack and such it is therefore not only the physical but more frequently the mental eye of the movement by coup d'oeil naturally the expression like the thing is always more in its place in the field of tactics still it must not be wanting in strategy in so much as in it rapid decisions are often necessary if we strip this conception of that which the expression has given it of the over figurative and restricted that it amounts simply to the rapid discovery of a truth which to the ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so after long examination and reflection resolution is an act of courage in single instances and if it becomes a characteristic trait it is a habit of the mind but here we do not mean courage in face of bodily danger but in face of responsibility therefore to a certain extent against moral danger this is often been called courage disparie on the ground that it springs from the understanding nevertheless it is no act of the understanding on that account it is an act of feeling mere intelligence is still not courage for we often see the cleverest people devoid of resolution the mind must therefore first awaken the feeling of courage and then be guided and supported by it because in momentary emergencies the man is swayed more by his feelings than his thoughts we have assigned to resolution the office of removing the torment of doubt and the dangers of delay when there are no sufficient motives for guidance through the unscrupulous use of language prevalent this term is often applied to the mere propensity to daring to bravery, boldness or to merity but when there are sufficient motives in the man let them be objective or subjective true or false we have no right to speak of his resolution for when we do so we put ourselves in his place and we throw into the scale doubts which did not exist with him here there is no question of anything but strength and weakness we are not pedantic enough to dispute with the use of language about this little misapplication our observation is only intended to remove wrong objections this resolution now which overcomes the state of doubting can only be called forth by the intellect and in fact by a peculiar tendency of the same we maintain that the mere union of a superior understanding and the necessary feelings are not sufficient to make up resolution there are persons who possess the keenest perception for the most difficult problems who are also not fearful of responsibility and yet in cases of difficulty cannot come to a resolution their courage and their sagacity operate independently of each other do not give each other a hand and on that account do not produce resolution as a result the forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making evident the necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will this quite peculiar direction of the mind which conquers every other fear in man by the fear of delivering or doubting is what makes up resolution in strong minds therefore in our opinion men who have little intelligence can never be resolute they may act without hesitation under perplexing circumstances but then they act without reflection now of course when a man acts without reflection he cannot be at variance with himself by doubts and such a motive action may now and then lead to the right point but we say now as before a huge result which indicates the existence of military genius should our assertion appear extraordinary to anyone because he knows many a resolute has our officer who is a no deep thinker we must remind him that the question here is about a peculiar direction of the mind and not about great thinking powers we believe therefore that resolution is indebted to a special direction of the mind for its existence a direction which belongs to a strong head rather than a brilliant one in corroboration of this genealogy of resolution we may add that there have been many instances of men who have shown the greatest resolution in an inferior rank and have lost it in a higher position while on the one hand they are obliged to resolve on the other they see the dangers of a wrong decision and as they are surrounded with things new to them their understanding loses its original force and they become only the more timid the more they become aware of the danger of the irresolution into which they have fallen and the more they have formally been in the habit of acting on the spur of the moment from the good to oy and resolution we naturally speak of its kindred quality presence of mind which in a region of the unexpected like war must act a great part for it is indeed nothing but a great conquest over the unexpected as we admire presence of mind in a pithy answer to anything said unexpectedly so we admire it in a ready expedient on sudden danger neither the answer nor the expedient deed be in themselves extraordinary if they only hit the point for that which as a result of mature reflection would be nothing unusual therefore insignificant in its impression on us may as an instantaneous act of the mind produce a pleasing impression the expression presence of mind certainly donates very fitly the readiness and rapidity of the help rendered by the mind whether this noble quality of a man is to be ascribed more to the peculiarity of his mind or the equanimity of his feelings depends on the nature of the case although neither of the two can be entirely wanting a telling rapper T bespeaks rather a ready wit a ready expedient on sudden danger implies more particularly a well balanced mind if we take a general view of the four elements comprising the atmosphere in which war moves of danger and minimal effort uncertainty and chance it is easy to conceive that a great force of mind and understanding is requisite to be able to make way with safety and success among such opposing elements a force which according to the different modifications arising out of circumstances we find termed by military writers and analysts as energy firmness staunchness strength of mind and character all these modifications of the heroic nature might be regarded as one in the same definition modified according to circumstances but nearly related as these things are to each other still they are not one and the same and it is desirable for us to distinguish here a little more closely at least the action of the powers of the soul in relation to them in the first place to make the conception clear it is essential to observe that the weight burden resistance or whatever it may be called by which the force of the soul in the general is brought to light is only in a very small measure the enemy's activity the enemy's resistance the enemy's action directly the enemy's activity only affects the general directly in the first place in relation to his person without disturbing his action as commander if the enemy instead of two hours resists for four the commander instead of two hours is four hours in danger this is a quality which plainly diminishes the higher the rank of the commander what is it for one in the post of commander in chief it is nothing secondly although the opposition offered by the enemy has a direct effect on the commander through the loss of means arising from prolonged resistance and the responsibility connected with that loss and his force of will is first tested and called forth by these anxious considerations still we maintain this is not the heaviest burden by far which he has to bear because he has only himself to settle with all the other effects of the enemy's resistance act directly upon the combatants under his command and through them react upon him as long as his men full of good courage fight with zeal and spirit it is seldom necessary for the chief to show great energy of purpose in the pursuit of his object but as soon as difficulties arise and that must always happen when great results are at stake then things no longer move on of themselves like a well-oiled machine the commander himself begins to offer resistance and to overcome this the commander must have a great force of will by this resistance we must not exactly suppose disobedience and murmurs although these are frequent enough with particular individuals it is the whole feeling of the dissolution of all physical and moral power it is the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice which the commander has to contend with in himself and then in all others who directly or indirectly transfer to him their impressions feelings, anxieties and desires as the force in one individual after another becomes prostrated and can no longer be excited and supported by an effort of his own will the whole inertia of the mass gradually rests its weight on the will of the commander by the spark in his breast by the light of his spirit the spark of purpose, the light of hope must be kindled afresh in others insofar only as he is equal to this he stands above the masses and continues to be their master whenever that influence ceases and his own spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of all others the masses drawing him down with them sink into the lower region of animal nature which shrieks from danger and knows no shame these are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of the military commander have to overcome if he is to make his name illustrious they increase with the masses and therefore if the forces in question are to continue equal to the burden they must rise in proportion to the height of the station energy in action expresses the strength of the motive through which the action is excited let the motive have its origin in a conviction of the understanding or in an impulse that the latter can hardly ever be wanting where great force is to show itself of all the noble feelings which fill the human heart in the exciting tumult of battle none we must admit are so powerful and constant as the souls thirst for honour and renown which the german language treats so unfairly and tends to deprecate by the unworthy associations in the word eagites greed of honour and rumsucht hankering after glory no doubt it is just in war that the abuse of these proud aspirations of the soul must bring upon the human race not rages but by their origin they are certainly to be counted amongst the noblest feelings which belong to human nature and in war they are the vivifying principle which gives the enormous body a spirit although other feelings may be more general in their influence and many of them such as love of country, fanaticism revenge, enthusiasm of every kind may seem to stand higher the thirst for honour and renown still remains indispensable those other feelings may rouse in general and excite them more powerfully but they do not give the leader a desire to will more than others which is an essential requisite in his position if he is to make himself distinguished in it they do not, like the thirst for honour make the military act especially the property of the leader which he strives to turn to the best account where he plows with toil sows with care that he may reap plentifully it is through these aspirations that we are speaking of in commanders from the highest to the lowest this sort of energy, this spirit of emulation these incentives that the action of armies is chiefly animated and made successful and now as that which especially concerns the head of all we ask has there ever been a great commander destitute of the love of honour or is such a character even conceivable firmness denotes the resistance of the will in relation to the force of a single blow staunchness in relation to a continuance of blows close as is the analogy between the two and often as the one is used in place of the other still there is a notable difference between them which cannot be mistaken in so much as firmness against a single powerful impression may have its root in the mere strength of a feeling but staunchness must be supported rather by the understanding for the greater duration of an action the more systemic deliberation is connected with it and from this staunchness partially derives its power if we now turn to strength of mind or soul then the first question is what we to understand thereby plainly it is not vehement expressions of feeling nor easily excited passions for that would be contrary to all usage of language but the power of listening to reason in the midst of the most intense excitement in the storm of the most violent passions should this power depend on the strength of understanding alone we doubt it the fact that there are men of the greatest intellect who cannot command themselves certainly proves nothing to the contrary for we might say that it perhaps requires an understanding of a powerful rather than a comprehensive nature but we believe we shall be nearer the truth if we assume that the power of submitting oneself to the control of the understanding even in moments of the most violent excitement of the feelings that power which we call self-command has its root in the heart itself it is in point of fact another feeling which in strong minds balances the excited passions without destroying them and it is only through this equilibrium that mastery of the understanding is secured this counter-boys is nothing but a sense of the dignity of men that noblest pride, that deep-seated desire of the soul always to act as a being endued with understanding and reason we may therefore say that a strong mind is one which does not lose its balance even under the most violent excitement if we cast a glance at the variety to be observed in the human character in respect to feeling we find first, some people who have very little excitability who are called phlegmatic or indolent second, some very excitable but whose feelings still never overstep certain limits and who are therefore known as being full of feeling but sober-minded thirdly, there are those very easily roused up quickly and violently like gunpowder but do not last fourthly and lastly those who cannot be moved by slight causes and who generally are not to be roused suddenly but only gradually but whose feelings become very powerful and are much more lasting these are men with strong passions lying deep and latent this difference of character lies probably close on the confines of the physical powers which move the human organism and belongs to the amphibious organization which we call the nervous system which appears to be partly material partly spiritual with our weak philosophy we shall not proceed further in this mysterious field but it is important for us to spend a moment over the effects which these different natures have on action in war and to see how far a great strength of mind is to be expected from them indolent men cannot easily be thrown out of their equanimity but we cannot certainly say there is strength of mind and there is a want of all manifestation of power at the same time it is not to be denied that such men have a certain peculiar aptitude for war on account of their constant equanimity they often want the positive motive to action impulse and consequential activity but they are not apt to throw things into disorder the peculiarity of the second class is that they are easily excited to act on trifling grounds but in great matters they are easily overwhelmed men of this kind show great activity in helping an unfortunate individual but by the distress of a whole nation they are only inclined to despond not roused to action such people are not deficient in either activity or equanimity in war but they will never accomplish anything great unless a great intellectual force furnishes the motive and it is very seldom that a strong independent mind is combined with such a character excitable, inflammable feelings are in themselves very little suited for practical life and therefore they are not very fit for war they have certainly the advantage of strong impulses but they cannot sustain them at the same time if the excitability in such men takes the direction of courage or a sense of honour they may be very useful in inferior positions in war because the action in war over which commanders in inferior positions have control is generally of shorter duration and courageous resolution when effervescence of the forces of the soul will often suffice a brave attack, a soul stirring hurrah is the work of a few moments whilst a brave contest on the battlefield is the work of a day and a campaign the work of a year owing to the rapid movement of their feelings it is doubly difficult for men of this description to preserve equilibrium of the mind therefore they frequently lose head and that is the worst phase in their nature as respect to the conduct of war but it would be contrary to experience to maintain that very excitable spirits can never preserve a steady equilibrium that is to say they cannot do so even under the strongest excitement why should they not have the sentiment of self-respect for as a rule they are men of a noble nature this feeling is seldom wanting in them but it has not the time to produce an effect after an outburst they suffer most from feeling of inward humiliation if through education, self-observance and experience of life they have learned sooner or later the means of being on their guard so that at the moment of powerful excitement they are conscious per times of the counteracting force within their own breasts then even such men may have great strength of mind lastly those who are difficult to move but on that account susceptible of very deep feelings men who stand in the same relation to the proceeding as red heat to a flame are the best adapted by means of their titanic strength to roll away the enormous masses by which we may figuratively represent the difficulties which beset command in war the effect of their feelings is like the movement of a great body slower but more irresistible although such men are not so likely to be suddenly surprised by their feelings and carried away so as to be afterwards ashamed of themselves like the proceeding still it would be contrary to experience to believe that men never lose their equanimity or be overcome by blind passion on the contrary this must always happen whenever the noble pride of self control is wanting or as often as it has not sufficient weight we see examples of this most frequently in men of noble minds belonging to savage nations where the low degree of mental cultivation favors always the dominance of the passions but even amongst the most civilized classes in civilized states life is full of examples of this kind of men carried away by the violence of their passions like the poacher of old chained to the stag in the forest we therefore say once more a strong mind is not one that is merely susceptible of strong excitement but one which can maintain its serenity under the most powerful excitement so that in spite of the storm in the breast the perception and judgment can act with perfect freedom like the needle of the compass in the storm tossed ship by the term strength of character or simply character is denoted tenacity of conviction let it be the result of our own or others views and whether they are principles opinions momentary inspirations or any other kind of emanations of the understanding but this kind of firmness certainly cannot manifest itself if the views themselves are subject to frequent change this frequent change need not be the consequence of external influences it may proceed from the continuous activity of our own mind in which case it indicates a characteristic unsteadiness of mind evidently we should not say of a man who changes his views every moment however much the motors of the change may originate with himself that he has character only those men therefore can be said to have this quality whose conviction is very constant either because it is deeply rooted and clear in itself little libel to alteration as in the case of indolent men there is a want of mental activity and therefore a want of motives to change or lastly because an explicit act of will derived from an imperative maximum of the understanding refuses any change of opinion up to a certain point now in war owing to the many and powerful impressions to which the mind is exposed and in the uncertainty of all knowledge and of all science more things occur to distract a man from the road he has entered upon and doubt himself in others than in any other human activity the harrowing sight of danger and suffering leads to the feelings gaining ascendancy over the conviction of the understanding and in the twilight which surrounds everything a deep clear view is so difficult that a change of opinion is more conceivable and more pardonable it is at all times only conjecture or guesses at truth which we have to act upon this is why differences of opinion are nowhere so great as in war and the stream of impressions acting counter to one's own convictions never ceases to flow even the greatest impossibility of mind is hardly proof against them because the impressions are so powerful in their nature and always act at the same time upon the feelings when the discernment is clear and deep none but the general principles and views of action from a high standpoint can be the result and on these principles the opinion in each particular case immediately under consideration lies as it were at anchor but to keep to these results of bygone reflection in opposition to the stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it is just the difficulty between the particular case and the principle there is often a wide space which cannot always be traversed on a visible chain of conclusions and where a certain faith in self is necessary and a certain amount of skepticism is serviceable here often nothing else will help us but an imperative maxim which independent of reflection at once controls it that maxim is in all doubtful cases adhere to the first opinion and do not give it up until a clear conviction forces us to do so we must firmly believe in the superior authority of well-tried maxims and under the dazzling influence of momentary events not forget that their value is of an inferior stamp by this preference which in doubtful cases we give to first convictions by adherence to the same our actions acquire the stability and consistency which make up what is called character it is easy to see how essential a well-balanced mind is to strengthen character therefore men of strong minds generally have a great deal of character force of character leads to a spurious variety of it obstinacy it is often very difficult in concrete cases to say where the one ends and the other begins on the other hand it does not seem difficult to determine the difference in idea obstinacy is no fault of the understanding we use the term as denoting a resistance against our better judgment and it would be inconsistent to charge that to the understanding as the understanding is the power of judgment obstinacy is a fault of the feelings or the heart this inflexibility of will this impatience of contradiction have their origin only in a particular kind of egotism which sets above every other pleasure that of governing both self and others by its own mind alone we should call it a kind of vanity where not decidedly something better vanity is satisfied with me show but obstinacy rests upon the enjoyment of the thing we say therefore force of character degenerates into obstinacy whenever the resistance to opposing judgments proceeds not from better convictions or reliance upon a trustworthy maximum but from a feeling of opposition if this definition as we have already admitted is of little assistance practically still it will prevent obstinacy from being considered merely force of character intensified whilst it is something entirely different something which certainly lies close to it and is cognate to it but is at the same time so little an intensification of it that there are very obstinant men who from want of understanding have very little force of character having in these attributes of a great military commander made ourselves acquainted with those qualities in which heart and head cooperate we now come to a speciality of military activity which perhaps may be looked upon as the most marked not the most important and which only makes a demand on the power of the mind without regard to the forces of the feelings it is the connection which exists between war and country or ground this connection is in the first place a permanent condition of war for it is impossible to imagine our organized armies affecting any operation otherwise than in some given space it is secondly of the most decisive importance because it modifies at times completely alters the action of all forces thirdly, while on the one hand it often concerns the most minute features of locality on the other it may apply to immense tracts of country in this manner a great peculiarity is given to the effect of this connection of war with country and ground if we think of other occupations of man which have a relation to these objects on horticulture, agriculture on building houses and hydraulic works on mining, on the chase and forestry they are all confined within very limited spaces which may be soon explored with sufficient exactness but the commander in war must commit the business he has in hand to a corresponding space which his eye cannot survey which the keyness seal cannot always explore and with which owing to the constant changes taking place he can also seldom become properly acquainted certainly the enemy generally is in the same situation still in the first place the difficulty although common to both is not the less a difficulty and he who by talent and practice overcomes it will have a great advantage on his side secondly this equality of the difficulty of both sides is merely an abstract supposition which is rarely realized in the particular case as one of the two opponents the defensive usually knows much more about the locality than his adversary this very peculiar difficulty must be overcome by a natural mental gift of a special kind which is known by the true restricted term of the orison sense of locality it is the power of quickly forming a correct geometrical idea of any portion of country and consequently of being able to find one's place in it exactly at any time this is plainly an act of the imagination the perception no doubt is formed partially by means of the physical eye partially by the mind which fills up what is wanting with ideas derived from knowledge and experience and out of the fragments visible to the physical eye forms a whole but that this whole should present itself vividly to the reason should become a picture a mentally drawn map that this picture should be fixed that the details should never again separate themselves all that can only be affected by the mental faculty which we call imagination if some poet or painter should feel hurt that we require from his goddess such an office if he shrugs his shoulders at the notion that a sharp gamekeeper must necessarily excel in the imagination we readily grant that we only speak here of imagination in a limited sense of its service in a really menial capacity but however slight this service still it must be the work of that natural gift for if that gift is wanting it would be difficult to imagine things plainly in all the completeness of the visible that a good memory is a great assistance but whether memory is to be considered as an independent faculty of the mind in this case or whether it is just that power of imagination which here fixes these things better on the memory we leave undecided as in many respects it seems difficult upon the whole to conceive these two mental powers apart from each other that practice and mental acuteness have much to do with it is not to be denied Poisega, the celebrated quartermaster general of the famous Luxembourg used to say that he had very little confidence in himself in this respect at first because if he had to fetch the parole from a distance he always lost his way it is natural that scope for the exercise of this talent should increase along with rank if the Hussar and Rifleman in command of a patrol must know well all the highways and byways and if for that a few marks a few limited powers of observation are sufficient the chief of an army must make himself familiar with the general geographical features of a province a country must always have vividly before his eyes the direction of the roads, rivers and hills without at the same time being able to dispense with the narrower sense of locality a risen no doubt information of various kinds as to objects in general maps, books, memoirs and for details the assistance of his staff are a great help to him but it is nevertheless certain that if he has himself a talent for forming an ideal picture of a country quickly and distinctly it lends to his action an easier and firmer step saves him from a certain mental helplessness and makes him less dependent on others if this talent is then to be ascribed to imagination it is also almost the only service which military activity requires from that erratic goddess whose influence is more hurtful than useful in other respects we think we have now passed in review those manifestations of the powers of the mind and soul which military activity requires from human nature where intellect appears as an essential cooperative force and thus we can understand how the work of war although so plain and simple in its effects can never be conducted with distinguished success by people without distinguished powers of the understanding when we have reached this view then we need no longer look upon such a natural idea as the turning of the enemy's position which has been done a thousand times and a hundred other similar conceptions as the result of a great effort of genius the one is accustomed to regard the plain honest soldier as the very opposite of a man of reflection full of inventions and ideas or of the brilliant spirit shining in the ornaments of refined education of every kind this antithesis is also by no means devoid of truth but it does not show that the efficacy of the soldier consists only in his courage and that there is no particular energy and capacity of the brain required in addition to make a man merely what is called a true soldier we must again repeat that there is nothing more common than to hear of men losing their energy on being raised to a higher position to which they do not feel themselves equal but we must also remind our readers that we are speaking of preeminent services of such as give renown in the branch of activity to which they belong each grade of command in war therefore forms its own stratum of requisite capability of fame and honour an immense space lies between a general that is one who is at the head of a whole war or theatre of a war and his second in command for the simple reason that the latter is in a more immediate subordination to a superior authority and supervision consequently is restricted to a more limited sphere of independent thought this is why common opinion sees no room for the exercise of high talent except in high places and looks upon an ordinary capacity as sufficient for all beneath this is why people are rather inclined to look upon a subordinate general grown grey in the service and in whom constant discharge of routine duties has produced a decided poverty of mind as a man of failing intellect and with all respect for his bravery to laugh at his simplicity it is not our object to gain for these brave men a better lot that would contribute nothing to their efficiency and little to their happiness we wish only to represent things as they are and to expose the error of believing that a mere bravo without intellect can make himself distinguished in war as we consider distinguished talents requisite for those who are to attain distinction even in inferior positions yet naturally follows that we think highly of those who fill with renown the place of second in command of an army and their seeming simplicity of character as compared with a polyhistor with ready men of business or with counsellors of state must not lead us astray as to the superior nature of their intellectual activity it happens sometimes that men import the fame gained in an inferior position to a higher one without in reality deserving it in the new position and then if they are not much employed and therefore not much exposed to the risk of showing their weak points the judgment does not distinguish very exactly what degree of fame is really due to them and thus such men are often the occasion of too low an estimate being formed of the characteristics required to shine in certain situations for each station from the lowest upwards to render distinguished services in war there must be a particular genius but the title of genius history and the judgment of posterity only confer in general on those minds which have shown in the highest rank that of commanders in chief the reason is that here in point of fact the demand on reasoning and intellectual powers is much greater to conduct a whole war or its great acts which we call campaigns to a successful termination there must be an intimate knowledge of state policy in its higher relations the conduct of the war and the policy of state here coincide and the general becomes at the same time a statesman we do not give Charles the 12th the name of a great genius because he could not make the power of his sword subservient to a higher judgment and philosophy could not attain by it to a glorious object we do not give that title to Henry the 4th of France because he did not live long enough to set at rest the relations of different states by his military activity and to occupy himself in that higher field where noble feelings and a chivalrous disposition have less to do in mastering the enemy than in overcoming internal dissension in order that the reader may appreciate all that must be comprehended and judged of correctly at a glance by a general we refer to the first chapter we say the general becomes a statesman but he must not cease to be the general he takes in view all the relations of the state on one and on the other he must know exactly what he can do with the means at his disposal as the diversity and undefined limits of all the circumstances bring a great number of factors into consideration in war as the most of these factors can only be estimated according to probability therefore if the chief of an army does not bring to bear upon them a mind with an intuitive perception of the truth a confusion of ideas and views must take place in the midst of which the judgment will become bewildered in this sense Bonaparte was right when he said that many of the questions which come before a general for decision would make problems for a mathematical calculation not unworthy of the powers of Newton or Euler what is he required from the higher powers of the mind is a sense of unity and a judgment raised to such a compass as to give the mind an extraordinary faculty of vision which in its range allays and sets aside a thousand notions which an ordinary understanding could only bring to light with great effort and over which it would exhaust itself but this high activity of mind this glance of genius would still not become matter of history if the qualities of temperament and character of which we have treated did not give it their support truth alone is but a weak motive of action with men and hence there is always a great difference between knowing an action between science and art the man receives the strongest impulse to action through the feelings and the most powerful sucker if we may use that expression through those faculties of heart and mind which we have considered under the terms of resolution firmness perseverance and force of character if however this elevated condition of heart and mind in the general did not manifest itself in the general effect resulting from it and could only be accepted on trust and faith then it would rarely become matter of history all that becomes known of the course of events in war is usually very simple and has a great sameness in appearance no one on the mere relation of such events perceives the difficulties connected with them which had to be overcome it is only now and again in the memoirs of generals or of those in their confidence or by reason of some special historical inquiry directed to a particular circumstance that a portion of the many threads comprising the whole web is brought to light the reflections mental doubts and conflicts which precede the execution of great acts are purposely concealed because they affect political interests or the recollection of them is accidentally lost because they have been looked upon as be scaffolding which had to be removed on the completion of the building if now in conclusion without venturing upon a closer definition of the higher powers of the soul we should admit a distinction in the intelligent faculties themselves according to the common ideas established by language and ask ourselves what kind of mind comes closest to military genius then a look at the subject as well as at experience will tell us that searching rather than inventive minds comprehensive minds rather than such as have a special bent cool rather than fiery heads are those to which in time of war we should prefer to trust the welfare of our women and children the honor and safety of our fatherland end of book 1 chapter 3 recording by Timothy Ferguson Gold Coast, Australia book 1 chapters 4 through 8 of on war this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Timothy Ferguson on war by Carl von Klausowitz translated by Colonel J.J. Graham book 1 chapter 4 of danger in war usually before we have learnt what danger really is we form an idea of it which is rather attractive than repulsive in the intoxication of enthusiasm to fall upon the enemy at the charge who cares then about bullets and men falling to throw oneself blinded by excitement for a moment against cold death uncertain whether we or another shall escape him and all this close to the golden gate of victory close to the rich fruit which ambition thirsts for can this be difficult it will not be difficult and still less will it appear so but such moments which however are not the work of a single pulse beat as is supposed but rather like doctors drafts must be taken diluted and spoiled by mixed with time such moments we say are but few let us accompany the novice to the battlefield as we approach the thunder of the cannon becoming planer and planer is soon followed by the howling of shot which attracts the attention of the inexperienced balls begin to strike the ground close to us before and behind we hasten to the hill where stands the general and his numerous staff here the close striking of the cannon balls and the bursting of shells is so frequent that the seriousness of life makes itself visible through the youthful picture of imagination suddenly someone known to us falls a shell strikes amongst the crowd and causes some involuntary movements we begin to feel that we are no longer perfectly at ease and collected even the bravest is at least to some degree confused now a step farther into the battle which is raging before us like a scene in a theater we get to the nearest general of division here ball follows ball and the noise of our own guns increases the confusion from the general of division to the Brigadier he a man of acknowledged bravery keeps carefully behind a rising ground a house or a tree a sure sign of increasing danger great rattles on the roofs of the houses and in the fields cannon balls howl over us and plough the air in all directions and soon there is a frequent whistling of musket balls a step farther toward the troops to that study infantry which for hours has maintained its firmness under this heavy fire here the air is filled with the hissing of balls which announced their proximity by a short sharp noise as they pass within an inch of the air the head or the breast to add to all this compassion strikes the beating heart with pity at the sight of the maimed and fallen the young soldier cannot reach any of these different strata of danger without feeling that the light of reason does not move here in the same medium that it is not refracted in the same manner as in the speculative contemplation indeed he must be a very extraordinary man who under these impressions for the first time does not lose the power of making any instantaneous decisions it is true that habits soon blunts such impressions in half an hour we begin to be more or less indifferent to all that is going on around us but an ordinary character never attains to complete coolness and the unnatural elasticity of mind and so we perceive that here again ordinary qualities will not suffice a thing which gained truth the wider the sphere of activity which is to be filled enthusiastic, stoical natural bravery great ambition or also long familiarity with danger much of this there must be if all the effects produced in this resistant medium are not to fall far short of that which in the students chamber may appear only the ordinary standard danger in war belongs to its friction a correct idea of its influence is necessary for truth of perception and therefore it is brought under notice here chapter 5 of bodily exertion in war if no one were allowed to pass an opinion on the events of war except at a moment when he is benumbed by frost sinking from heat and thirst or dying with hunger and fatigue we should certainly have fewer judgments correct objectively but they would be so subjectively at least that is they would contain in themselves the exact relation between the person giving the judgment and the object we can perceive this by observing how modestly subdued even spiritless and desponding is the opinion passed upon the results of under water events by those who have been eye witnesses but especially if they have his concerned this is according to our view a criterion of the influence which bodily fatigue exercises and of the allowance to be made for it in matters of opinion amongst the many things in war for which no tariff can be fixed bodily effort may be specially reckoned provided there is no waste it is a coefficient of all the forces and no one can tell exactly to what extent it may be carried what is remarkable is that just as only a strong arm enables the archer to stretch the bow string to the utmost extent so also in war it is only by means of a great directing spirit that we can expect the full power latent in the troops to be developed for it is one thing if an army in consequence of greatness fortunes surrounded with danger falls all to pieces like a wall that has been thrown down and can only find safety in the utmost exertion of its bodily strength it is another thing entirely when a victorious army drawn on by proud feelings only is conducted at the will of its chief the same effort which in one case might at most excite our pity must in the other call forth our admiration because it is much more difficult to sustain by this comes to light for the inexperienced one of those things which put fetters in the dark as it were on the action of the mind and wear out in secret the powers of the soul although here the question is strictly only respecting the supreme effort required by a commander from his army by a leader from his followers therefore of the spirit to demand it and of the art of getting it still the personal physical exertion of generals and of the chief commander must not be overlooked having bought the analysis of war conscientiously up to this point we could not but take account also of the weight of this small remaining residue we have spoken here of bodily effort chiefly because like danger it belongs to the fundamental causes of friction and because its indefinite quantity makes it like an elastic body the friction of which is well known to be difficult to calculate to check the abuse of these considerations such a survey of things which might aggravate the difficulties of war nature has given our judgment a guide in our sensibilities just as an individual cannot with advantage refer to his personal deficiencies if he is insulted and ill treated but may well do so if he has successfully repelled the affront or fully revenged it so no commander or army will lessen the impression of a disgraceful defeat by depicting the danger the distress the exertions things which would immensely enhance the glory of a victory thus our feeling which after all is only a higher kind of judgment forbids us to do what seems an act of justice to which our judgment would be inclined chapter 6 information in war by the word information we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country therefore in fact the foundation of all our ideas and actions let us consider the nature of this foundation its want of trustworthiness its changefulness and we shall soon feel what a dangerous edifice war is how easily it may fall to pieces and barriers in its ruins for although it is a maxim in all books that we should trust only certain information that we must always be suspicious that is only a miserable book comfort belonging to that description of knowledge in which writers of systems and compendiums take refuge for want of anything better to say great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory a still greater part is false and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character what is required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can give the law of probability must be his guide this is not a trifling difficulty even in respect of the first plans which can be formed in the chamber outside the real sphere of war but it is enormously increased when in the thick of war itself one report follows hard upon the heels of another it is then fortunate if these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability and thus call forth a scrutiny it is much worse for the inexperience when accident does not render him this service but one report supports another confirms it magnifies it finishes off the picture with fresh touches of colour until necessity in urgent haste forces from us a resolution which will soon be discovered to be folly all those results having been lies exaggerations errors and such and such in a few words most reports are false and the timidity of men acts as a multiplier of lies and untruths as a general rule everyone is more inclined to lend credence to the bad than the good everyone is inclined to magnify the bad in some measure and although the alarms which are thus propagated like the waves of the sea subside into themselves still like them without any apparent cause they rise again firm in reliance on his own better convictions the chief must stand like a rock against which the sea breaks its fury in vain the role is not easy he who is not by nature of a buoyant disposition or trained by experience in war and matured in judgement may let it be his rule to do violence to his own natural conviction by inclining from the sight of fear to that of hope only by that means will he be able to preserve his balance this difficulty of seeing things correctly which is one of the greatest sources of friction in war makes things appear quite different from what was expected the impression of the senses is stronger than the force of the ideas resulting from methodical reflection and this goes so far that no important undertaking was ever yet carried out without the commander having to subdue new doubts in himself at the time of commencing the execution of his work ordinary men who follow the suggestions of others become therefore undecided on the spot they think that they have found circumstances different from what they had expected and this few gain strength by their again yielding to the suggestions of others but even the man who has made his own plans when he comes to see things with his own eyes will often think he has done wrong firm reliance on self must make him proof against the seeming pressure of the moment his first conviction will in the end prove true when the foreground scenery which fate has pushed on to the stage of war with its accompaniments of terrific objects is drawn aside and the horizon extended this is one of the great chasms which separate conception from execution chapter 7 friction in war as long as we have no personal knowledge of war we cannot conceive where those difficulties lie of which so much is said and what that genius and those extraordinary mental powers required in a general have really to do all appear so simple all the requisite branches of knowledge appear so plain all the combination so unimportant that in comparison with them the easiest problem in higher mathematics impresses us with a certain scientific dignity but if we have seen war all becomes intelligible and still after all it is extremely difficult to describe what it is which brings about this change to specify this invisible and completely efficient factor everything is very simple in war but the simplest thing is difficult these difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war suppose now a traveller who towards evening expects to accomplish the two stages at the end of a day's journey four or five leagues with post horses on the high road it is nothing he arrives now at the last station but one finds no horses or very bad ones then a hilly country bad roads it is a dark night and he is glad when after a great deal of trouble he reaches the next station and finds there some miserable accommodation through in war through the influence of an infinity of petty circumstances which cannot properly be described on paper things disappoint us and we fall short of the mark a powerful iron will overcome this friction it crushes the obstacles but certainly the machine along with them we shall often meet with this result like an obelisk toward which the principal streets of a town converge the will of a proud spirit stands prominent and commanding in the middle of the art of war friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on paper the military machine the army and all belonging to it is in fact simple and appears on this account easy to manage but let us reflect that no part of it is in one piece that it is composed entirely of individuals each of which keeps up its own friction in all directions theoretically all sounds very well the commander of battalion is responsible for the execution of the order given and as the battalion by its discipline is glued together into one piece and the chief must be a man of acknowledged zeal the beam turns on an iron pin with little friction but it is not so in reality and all that is exaggerated and false in such a conception manifests itself at once in war the battalion always remains composed of a number of men of whom if chance so wills the most insignificant is able to occasion delay and even irregularity the danger which war brings with it the bodily exertions which it requires augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the greatest causes of it enormous friction which is not concentrated as in mechanics at viewpoints is therefore everywhere brought into contact with chance and thus incidents take place upon which it was impossible to calculate their chief origin being chance as an instance of one such chance the weather here the fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time a battery from firing at the right moment a report from reaching the general there rain prevents a battalion from arriving at the right time because instead of for three it had to march perhaps eight hours the cavalry from charging effectively because it is stuck fast in heavy ground these are only a few incidents of detail by way of elucidation that the reader might be able to follow the author for whole volumes might be written on these difficulties to avoid this and still give a clear conception of the host of small difficulties intended within war we might go on heaping up illustrations if we were not afraid of being tiresome but those who have already comprehended us will permit us to add a few more activity in war is movement in a resistant medium just as a man immersed in water is unable to perform with ease and regularity the most natural and simplest movement that of walking so in war with ordinary powers one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity this is the reason that the correct theorist is like a swimming master who teaches on dry land movements which are required in the water which must appear grotesque and ludicrous to those who forget about the water this is also why theorists who have never plunged in themselves or who cannot deduce any generalities from the experience are unpractical and even absurd because they only teach what everyone knows how to walk further every war is rich in particular facts while at the same time is an unexplored sea full of rocks which the general may have a suspicion of but which he has never seen with his eye and round which moreover he must steer in the night if a contrary winds brings up that is if any great accidental event declares itself adverse to him then the most consummate skill presence of mind and energy are required whilst to those who only look on from a distance all seems to proceed with the utmost ease the knowledge of this friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in war which is required in a good general certainly he is not the best general in whose mind it assumes the greatest dimensions who is the most overawed by it this includes that class of overanxious generals of whom there are so many among the experienced but a general must be aware of it that he may overcome it when that is possible and that he may not expect a degree of precision in results which is impossible on account of this very friction besides it can never be learnt theoretically and if it could there would still be wanting that experience of judgement which is called tact and which is always more necessary in a field full of innumerable small and diversified objects than in great and decisive cases when one's own judgement may be aided by consultation with others just as the man of the world through tact of judgement which has become habit speaks acts and moves only as suits the occasion so the officer experienced in war will always in great and small matters at every pulsation of war as we may say decide and determine the suitability to the occasion through this experience and practice the idea comes to his mind of itself that so and so will not suit and thus he will not easily place himself in a position by which he is compromised which if it often occurs in war shakes all the foundations of confidence and becomes extremely dangerous it is therefore this friction or what is so termed here which makes that which appears easy in war, difficult in reality as we proceed we shall often meet with the subject again and it will hereafter become plain that besides experience and a strong will there are still many other rare qualities of mind required to make a man a consummate general Chapter 8 Concluding Remarks Book 1 those things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war and make it a resistant medium for every activity we have designated under the terms danger, bodily effort, exertion information and friction in their impediment effects they may therefore be comprehended again in the collective notion of a general friction now is there then no kind of oil which is capable of diminishing this friction only one and that one is not always available at the will of the commander or his army it is the habituation of an army to war Habit gives strength to the body in great exertion to the mind in great danger to the judgment against first impressions by it a valuable circumspection is generally gained throughout every rank from the Hussar and Rifleman up to the general of division which facilitates the work of the chief commander as the human eye in a dark room dilates its pupil draws in the little light that there is partially distinguishes objects by degrees and at last knows them quite well so it is in war with the experienced soldier whilst the novice is only met by pitch dark night habituation to war no general can give his army at once and the camps of maneuver, peace exercises furnish but a weak substitute for it we can comparison with real experience in war but not weak in relation to other armies in which the training is limited to mere mechanical exercises of routine so to regulate the exercises in peacetime as to include some of these causes of friction that the judgment, circumspection, even resolution of the separate leaders may be brought into exercise is of much greater consequence than those believe who do not know the thing by experience it is of immense importance that the soldier high or low whatever rank he has should not have to encounter in war those things which when seen first time set him in astonishment and perplexity if he has only met with them one single time before even by that he is half acquainted with them this relates even to bodily fatigues they should be practised less to accustom the body to them than the mind in war the young soldier is very apt to regard unusual fatigues as the consequence of faults, mistakes and embarrassment in the conduct of the whole to become distressed and despondent as a consequence this would not happen if he had been prepared for this beforehand by exercises in peace another less comprehensive but still very important means of gaining habituation to war in time of peace is to invite into the service officers of foreign armies who have had experience in war peace seldom reigns over all Europe and never in all quarters of the world a state which has been long at peace should therefore always seek to procure some officers who have done good service at the different scenes of warfare or to send some of their own that they may get a lesson in war however small the number of officers of this description may appear in proportion to the mass still their influence is very sensibly felt their experience, the bent of their genius the stamp of their character influence their subordinates and comrades and besides that if they cannot be placed in positions of superior command they may always be regarded as men acquainted with the country who may be questioned on many special occasions end of book one chapters four through eight recording by Timothy Ferguson Gold Coast, Australia