 The World's Honored Watch is Laun Jean. Laun Jean watches have won ten World's Fair Grand Prizes, twenty-eight gold medals and more, honors for accuracy than any other timepiece. Laun Jean, the world's most honored watch, is made and guaranteed by the Laun Jean Whittenall Watch Company. It's time for the Laun Jean Chronoscope, a television journal of the important issues of the hour, brought to you every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. A presentation of the Laun Jean Whittenall Watch Company, maker of Laun Jean, the world's most honored watch, and Whittenall, distinguished companion to the world-honored Laun Jean. Good evening. This is Frank Knight. May I introduce our co-editors for this edition of the Laun Jean Chronoscope? Mr. Peter Keyes of the New York Herald Tribune, and Mr. William Bradford Huey, editor of the American Mercury. Our distinguished guest for this evening is Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State. The opinions expressed are necessarily those of the speakers. Mr. Rusk, I believe you've just returned from a fast trip to Japan and Korea, sir. That's correct, Mr. and I'm sure that our Chronoscope audience will be very much interested in your views. Now, sir, what are the possibilities for a ceasefire in Korea? Well, as a matter of fact, I didn't make this particular trip to talk about a ceasefire, but I think it's fair to say that the prospects for a ceasefire are somewhat better than they have been at any time since the talks started. But I would like to caution Mr. Huey that there still are some very serious and formidable points to be agreed, and I would not want to be in the position of predicting that we are going to see an early ceasefire in Korea. Let's ask you about the crucial one, Mr. Rusk. Have you got any good reason to believe that the communists will agree to any inspection behind their lines in Korea, something that would really guard against the new aggression? We are now in the process of finding that out, Mr. Keyes. We don't know yet, but that's what the negotiation is about at the present time. We feel that a reasonable inspection to assure against the resumption of hostilities is a reasonable point to include in a ceasefire. Was it possible how to ceasefire without an inspection? That remains to be seen. We have insisted that some form of adequate inspection is an essential. Now, sir, do I understand that you are saying to our people and our people are gravely concerned about the Korean issue now? Are you predicting that there's anything optimistic in Korea? Are you cautioning our people to expect the worst, perhaps? I think we have to play this as it comes. We are trying to find out whether there can be established a ceasefire on terms which are reasonable and acceptable to us. Now, if the other side can meet those terms, there will be a ceasefire. But what I was trying to say was that we should not be foolishly optimistic here and think that what remains to be done is easy because there are two or three very important points still to be covered in the negotiations. Now, sir, suppose there is not a ceasefire then what is likely to develop in the Orient? The United Nations have been fighting with very great determination here to stop this aggression in Korea. At the same time, I think everyone outside of the Communist block must admit that they've been acting with great self-restraint in order to prevent a world war if possible. Now, patients is likely to run out someday. And if there is not a ceasefire or a continuation of a course of aggression there will be produced a very grave situation. Our people have recently, last week, were warned by General Vandenberg, very impressive press conference. And General Vandenberg indicated that our patient seems to be running rather low. Now, is what you are seeing in accord with what General Vandenberg expressed? I don't believe that General Vandenberg intended to say that we are unwilling to pursue this ceasefire negotiation to its conclusion. General Ridgway has been faced with a very difficult double job out there. He has been conducting negotiations in the ceasefire and he's been offering combat leadership to our troops. And he's been doing both in a superb fashion and deserves our support. I'd be interested in one thing, Mr. Rusk. Have you got any good reason why the communists should want to ceasefire in Korea? If you were a communist, would you want to ceasefire in Korea? If I were a communist, which I am not. I'm glad to hear that. Anyone in the State Department has got to clear themselves these days. I think there are many reasons why the communists might want to ceasefire, but we don't know yet. We're finding out. But the Korean affair has been costly to them in prestige and confidence and building up the coalition of the great world against them. They have lost great influence in Asia. They have succeeded in putting this country on the alert and have started a great mobilization process here. They have warned West in Europe that that course of action on which they were embarked needs to be resisted by organized effort. There are very great costs to the communists in this enterprise in Korea. Now, Mr. Rusk, if I might ask one other question, aren't there some pretty big costs to the West as well in Korea? We're tying down an awful lot of our best troops, aren't we? Yes, there are costs, and I don't think any of us feel that decisions about whether you fight are to be lightly taken. But we strongly believe that the costs of not resisting aggression in Korea would have been far greater than the cost of resisting it in lives and material, in our own security right here in our own homes. Mr. Rusk, during the MacArthur hearings, I believe that the spokesmen for the government, for the State Department and for the Defense Department, I believe they made a great deal of the fact that we couldn't afford to get involved in a large-scale war on the Asiatic mainland that it was something to be avoided at almost all costs. Now, you're talking about patients running out, and General Vandenberg is warning. Now, does that mean that we are ready as a nation to embark on a large-scale war, or are we contemplating a large-scale war on the Asiatic mainland? Mr. Hill, I have to return to my earlier answer, and that is that if the ceasefire talks fail, and if this course of aggression continues, we'll face a very grave situation. I simply cannot anticipate the decisions that would have to be made in that situation. Let me ask you this, sir. In the State Department, and of course you are primarily concerned with far Eastern affairs, are you encouraged by the attitudes of our allies in the Korean fighting? On the whole, yes. Mr. Huey, those who have troops in Korea have their ambassadors meet with us regularly two or three times a week in Washington. And we have seen there a very high degree of solidarity throughout this entire affair. But what we should like to have is additional support, particularly from some of those countries which have not yet furnished troops, and we're negotiating as we can to find where we might get additional forces for Korea. Have you sense that their patience, too, is running out in Korea? I can't speak for them. I can tell. I can testify that there has been, maintained here, a very strong and unified attitude toward the Korean War itself. We'd like, on that question of additional troops for Korea, it seemed to me that a lot of the United Nations members have offered to have single volunteers enlist in the United Nations Legion, yet the United States has always seemed to oppose that. What's the situation on that? Well, I think by and large our defense people would prefer to have units that are organized by the respective countries themselves, for they would be responsible for their elementary discipline, and where we would not be involved in recruiting and training a great many incidental personnel who would not be effective in combat for quite a long period. Yet you're going to have to occupy Korea for quite a while. You're going to have to have manpower for that thing. Even if you had a ceasefire, you're not going to get out of Korea for a long time to come. I just want to say out of hand, Mr. Keyes, that your suggestion doesn't have any possibly good idea. I'm just saying that thus far the administrative arrangements for dealing with it have not seemed to be practical. Now, Mr. Rusk, are you a policymaker? Are you one of the policy makers in the State Department? For better or for worse, I suppose that an assistant secretary is ranked as a policy officer in the Department. And you are particularly in charge now of the Far East. Is there a Far East policy now in the State Department? I'm going to surprise you, Mr. Hewitt, by saying that not only is there a Far Eastern policy, but there is a broad Far Eastern policy which has general support throughout the country, regardless of our political party. I realize that's quite a statement in these days of considerable quarreling among ourselves here at home. But let me just give you a few samples of what I refer to as a generally agreed Far Eastern policy. This great piece of reconciliation which we've just signed with the Japanese. The security treaty which we've signed with the Japanese immediately after the peace treaty was signed. The determination to assist Japan in coming back into the world community as a free and equal member under conditions in which they can earn their living. Resistance to aggression in Korea. An attempt to deal with aggression in Korea without spreading it into a world war. The recognition of nationalist China. The prevention of Famosa from falling into hostile hands. The non-recognition of Pei Feng. The support of the nationalist membership in the United Nations. And all out security commitment to the Philippines. Economic, technical, and other types of assistance to the Philippines to help them get their house in order. Assistance to the French and associated states forces in Indochina to try to deal with the military threat to that country. Economic and technical assistance to a whole range of new countries in the Far East to help them get themselves on a working basis. You asked for the question now. Those are some samples. Well, that's a very impressive defense. I'll admit, sir, I'd like to come back to just one thing that you said. Do you believe that the country in general now supports the State Department and its Far East activities? We find, Mr. Hewitt, that there is a very broad support for these main lines of policy in the Far East that I'm talking about. Do you concede that there has been a great deal of distrust in the country as regards our State Department policy in the Far East? There has been a lot of argument about it and my prediction is that that argument will continue. But I am suggesting that the principle disagreements have been about certain matters of history, certain points of procedure and technique, but not about the fundamental arguments. Are you one of the spokesmen who follows the plan that the State Department or maintains the position that the State Department has not made any errors in the Far East, or do you concede errors? What's your practicing? I don't think anyone ought to claim that errors have not been made. But if you ask me the next question, what are those errors? What those errors have been, I don't think I'm going into those. Without asking you about errors, I wonder if I could ask you, as a matter of news, what do you think is the strength of the Chinese Communist government? How much of a hold has it got on its people? Is there any opposition in Communist China? I think during the last year and a half, Mr. Keyes, the taping regime has been able to consolidate its control over the key centers of communication and principal cities in China. And that's the very vigorous and persistent purge through which they have driven non-communist elements has been effective. And that therefore we find that only in the remote areas and in a somewhat minimum way is there any active resistance. Mr. Rusk, you've made a very spirited defense of the State Department tonight, and I'm sure that our audience appreciates your coming here from Washington. Thank you very much, sir. The editorial board for this edition of the Long Gene Chronoscope was Mr. Peter Keyes and Mr. William Bradford Huey. Our distinguished guest was Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State. Now, before you go to bed tonight, do this. And there is December and just 20 shopping days before Christmas. Now, if you have an important gift to buy, say a watch, and particularly a Long Gene watch, don't put it off another day. There are so many reasons why no other watch or fine character enjoys so great a preference for Christmas giving throughout the world as Long Gene. These medals, for instance. Do you know that Long Gene is the only watch in history to win 10 World's Fair Grand Prizes and 28 Gold Medal Awards? And in observatory accuracy contests, the Long Gene precision record is unsurpassed. For these reasons and for many more, Long Gene is correctly called the world's most honored watch. Yet you may buy and proudly give a Long Gene watch this Christmas for as little as $71.50. Now, notice the superb good taste of the styling of each and every one of these lovely Long Gene watches. Long Gene, the world's most honored watch. Premier product of the Long Gene Wittner Watch Company since 1866. Maker of watches of the highest character. This is Frank Knight again inviting you to join us every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday evening at this same time for the Long Gene Chronoscope. A television journal of important issues of the hour, broadcast on behalf of Long Gene, the world's most honored watch, and Wittner, distinguished companion to the world-honored Long Gene, sold and serviced from coast to coast by more than 4,000 leading jewelers who proudly display this emblem, Agency for Long Gene Wittner Watchers. This is the CBS television network.